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2014
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai BANKING CORPORATION.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for respondent Cu
Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of
prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court
of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. Mariano Cu
Unjieng, et al.", MORE particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under
the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action
or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this
court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the
defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.",
criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent
herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15,
1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor.
After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the
court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to
indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor,
to pay the costs and with reservation of CIVIL ACTION to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from
five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and
four successive motions for NEW TRIAL which were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was
accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on
certiorari to the SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in
November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the
defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the
case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, INTER ALIA, that he is
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no CRIMINAL RECORD and that he would observe
good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the
application for probation of the Insular PROBATION OFFICE which recommended denial of the same June 18,
1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the
petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among
other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing EQUAL
PROTECTION of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because
section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in
their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary
opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation
of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, ART. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that "las pruebas
no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad DEL peticionario y que TODOS LOS hechos
probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R.
No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social que se han
expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la misma, una parte de la
opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de
probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud
y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en
menoscabo DEL interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying
probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or
new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration
submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was
postponed at the petition of counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene
in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court.
Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to
withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was
circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed
the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of
execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae
aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all events, said motion should be
denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of the several
counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order
requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14,
1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution
of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for
Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge
thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for
leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave
to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at
this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged
was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him,
exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make
effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners
allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probation for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only
to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered
cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the
absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of
Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act No.
4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be
applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section
11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City
of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and
distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in
excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit
Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying
Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting
or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June
28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or
change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for
which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but
without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the
respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit
his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a
system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is
unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the
Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its
province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces,
because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several
provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and
by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives
the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law
the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law
(section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces
without uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City
of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first
time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on
the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of
reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive
to grant pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which
he contended that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but
also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of
the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-
General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the
validity of its own laws and the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same
persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it
denies the equal protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and,
further, that the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity
of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the
probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in
prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the
writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the
very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution
before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment
before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same
under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court nevertheless
cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over
the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be
tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in
the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to
and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution
of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law does not
specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of
First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order,
resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason that the
said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the
requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the
restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial
court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the
motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the accused
was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because the
accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise
of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have an opportunity to
correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains
its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and justice;
that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be
exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case
taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent
allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal
would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment the
accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d],
827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is
constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the
pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the
respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in
addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of
Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of the
Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court; that probation in unavailable; and
that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this
court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised by
the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that the court
below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said
application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability
of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies
guilt be final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the
offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly,
especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of
the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in
subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the
Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior
courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the
intergrated judicial system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the respondents, this
court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1)
whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the
affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of
certain incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It is a well-
settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that
question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e.,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil.,
563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless,
resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law
even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this
court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus
proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil.,
259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this
259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this
court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the
Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in
habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are
authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute
(mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction
where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The
same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271
U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R.,
854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra,
decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The
constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the
petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised
"relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This
court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was
constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed
the judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of
jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme court is granted
concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original
jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually
be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court.
(Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new act seriously
affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the
Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and decide in
the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte
Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764;
Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B,
283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann.
Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the petition, this is now
disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad
powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an
inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally
vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is
that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself
determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the
complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But
where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala.,
42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs.
Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5
Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which
prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has
become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of the courts to
suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts,
including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts
(Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W.,
497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616).
But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37
Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under
the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as
to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon
conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that, in
exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise
reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions
reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions
afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the
power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the
proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is
observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative
and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute,
elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right
to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs
to the executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of
Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the
execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said,
"that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions."
(at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance
sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred
exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition where
the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver
[1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at
bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the
petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however,
acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not
being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex
County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any
attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not
affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional
question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge,
conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a
quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it
was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the
private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano
Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of
constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to
a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the
decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity
of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of
the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were
to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the
issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings,
ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J.,
p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that
the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a
question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.)
Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be
raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even
in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for
the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case.
(McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis
Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S.
W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time,
where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the
power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these
proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the
hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the
proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the
opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila,
is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity
of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution,
the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50
Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845),
this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of
Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to
renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was
unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to
question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may
question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the
statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court
by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede
that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not
be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not
be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also,
Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule
admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting
the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal
cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time
at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has
been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if
it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs.
Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo.
685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held
that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of
the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with
emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional
question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines,
represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the
Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge
the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in
Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an
act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In
Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan,
through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a
mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional
because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the
constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their
representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation their government, a statute
enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied
on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more
saving effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law,
and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The legislature and the
respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr.
Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature:
"The people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise
of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by the
Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether
Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether
or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state is always
interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as
an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City
60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or county
attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the matter determined,
either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A.,
662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by
injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan.
App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006;
State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board
of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E.,
1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11).
In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing
the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the argument three decisions are
cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex
rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel.,
Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do
not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one which it
is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should
not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill
of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially
declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it
must be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is
authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its
provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in
enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking
Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state
treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground that
they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to support the
Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or
one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to
enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of
the statutes is unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional
limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may
impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact,
they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in
the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the
petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from
attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city.
(Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For
courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination,
and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised
later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the
courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the
resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is
indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in
which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447.
Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional
question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev.
Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D,
56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63
Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is
founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F.
Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the
respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a
new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that may
persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are
already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait
the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant
case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S.,
500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444;
Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489;
Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous
situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand
merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the
courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule
the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary
situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised.
Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court,
by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution,
may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk
from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme
law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed
to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone
but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative
department of the government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser
[1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained
by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to
support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and
sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise
its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L.,
p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people
as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts
will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to
require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the fact that the
President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act,
adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however,
reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President
in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the
Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly
repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the
President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the
Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in
Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in
vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which
he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual
controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner
insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to
be at the same time pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or
determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment
on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given
case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political
history, it is that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government
independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to
popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon
the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it
denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the time of
the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the
Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now
vested in the President of the Philippines. (ART. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the
Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the
Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of
the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok
[1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the
United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our
Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning
power can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not
extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of
the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of
an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not
understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307;
15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio
St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not
confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under
the Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole punishment attached by
law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment,
perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense
committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our
Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the
pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be
granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need
not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the
pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief
Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the
power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative
restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate
departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one
of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided
for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the
executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such
power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp.
838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason
unconstitutional and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in
1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61
Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an
exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the
court was limited to temporary suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was
vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish
vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish
probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is
concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such
other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to
meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for
judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things
adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National
Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action
was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an
appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service.
(Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme Court of
the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court
has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him
probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the
constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act
and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives
(Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a form of
probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation officers or
volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178;
37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to
suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the
courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation. In 1917, a bill
was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee
again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was never reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to its treatment
of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the
present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and
juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs. United
States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have been
reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act
fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. This
case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the
act we have to consider, and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7
F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs.
U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to
Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually
enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a
probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is
supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the
court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to
prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A.
[N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set punishment for crime
is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the
largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it
should be certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.)
Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the
legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in
imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by
vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict,
peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence
merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty
merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty
provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where
both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for
a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such
compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again,
article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the limits of each
periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In
the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not
only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66,
Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of
the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal
liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the
period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the
social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a
fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form the entire
term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not imposed when
the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme
Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the
death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or
while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become
insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution
of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or
imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is more clearly
demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law
enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole
(secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as
amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by
section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile
Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act
and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117
of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this
Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the
modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of
the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular
circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has
in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions
of probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in conflict with
the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme
Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared
by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns
solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parte
Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of
the Georgia probation statute against the contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power
lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been
imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed
by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the legislature
to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so
would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46
Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150;
182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132
Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep.,
230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor
[1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30
S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15;
19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D.
C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark.,
620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928],
89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick
[1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914],
88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913],
257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie,
Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs.
Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525;
State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909],
75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M.,
542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23
L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N.
Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N.
Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla.,
Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C.,
466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs.
State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs.
State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W.,
573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep.,
394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt.,
197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash.,
287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.)
We elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature
to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand
vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a
statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by
the court, and required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the
term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the
court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the
state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each
other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N.
E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the
constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former was always a part of the
judicial power; the latter was always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply
postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and
the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the
punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out
of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it
were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law.
ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed.,
442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles governing the
power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of
the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were used to express the authority formerly
exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How.,
307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions
307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions
to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and pardons should
abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal
courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were
still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial
department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to
suspend sentence in certain cases after conviction, a power inherent in such courts at common law, which
was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since
its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just
sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the earliest
times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265,
Carson, J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely
exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the
probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides
that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the
period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court
shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during
the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court;
and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be
committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a
new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and
find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other
sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary,
is against the criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is
thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this
cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State
([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the
petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been
vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the
courts by means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that
case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in
terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished
between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the
court, through Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is
settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a
suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas
a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y.,
264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict
with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutations is not but
to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of Montana
had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections
12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of
the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the time our
Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the suspension of the execution
of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace,
proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet.,
150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of
the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71).
"Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally
imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N.
W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone'sW., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's
Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a
temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section 12078 has been
determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes which vest the power to parole
in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld
quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100;
169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning
power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation
Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of
the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for that
reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially
independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government
derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive
cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12)
and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The
Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was
introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was
established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found
its way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of
the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is
that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or
place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the
doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom,
and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any
other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This
court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria
[1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State
vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be
managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence while the rule is also
fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self
government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general
legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial
practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick,
supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the
territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality
or city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed.,
1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1
Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some
authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy
[1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has
ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a
ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a
judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32
Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain
progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions
of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454;
111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless,
also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas,
and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of
war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing
constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the
other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether
the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was
left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs.
Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void
in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price
of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compaia General de
Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by
another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted
or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with
power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates
of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive
officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a
variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but,
it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action
or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases,
it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a
rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
(See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947;
People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See
also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in
the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective
provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the
respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the
language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the
provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its
own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability
and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other
interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs.
Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of the law conferring
upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court
held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to
be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for
the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the
importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this advisable or
if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of
execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the
provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11
Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus
Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro
[1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the
legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive
or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the
United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.
(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the
existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all
branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93
Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark
[1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax
the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic
forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of
Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's
Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work
on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States
in the following language speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle
which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are
such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the
rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the
legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action
is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the
administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the
ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is
governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of
New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a
declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon
which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State
vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then may provide that a
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has
arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon
specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire
operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is
absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of
any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no principle of expendiency announced by the
legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose
or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the
salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time
we cannot say when the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus
put the law into operation in the various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we
reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain
specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than
legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the
Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended
Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended
only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No
power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the
Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the
General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the
legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law,
a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension
must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11
Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is declared that
the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the
legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall
expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of
England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an
enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and
the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of
dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The
first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by
legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further
declared and enacted, that "No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be
allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such
statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power here mentioned;
because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all
governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and absolute power
resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the
constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to the
subject, and subversive of his right to protection, "according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man
or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general principle from the
English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the general court
one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary
to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any
one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances;
or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like
circumstances are exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the owner of
domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a
provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year
their county should be governed by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that
the legislature could not confer that power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a power than to
authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or
to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was
held void for the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general
statute formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should be of opinion
that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the
same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become inoperative in such county for the
period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws
theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a
former act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not
submit the question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall
commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by
name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in
the county, and having by its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the
county court is . . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the
question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that
the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under our constitution, cannot be
delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the present case, the question is not presented
in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that
county, did by order suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the
subject of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and,
while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may jurisdiction have sustained the
constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus
sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities
placed under different circumstances. "They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the
running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained
on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary powers of
municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to
which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So
that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local
concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in
matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general
subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No.
4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the
necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine
whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality
empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be
held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The
validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen
& Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what
may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would
become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government
lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of
government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained
under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions
which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23;
Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a
grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions,
legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority
to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to
any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our
government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like
the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme
Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356;
30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law.
ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902],
184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and
favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co.
vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40
Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3
N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C,
160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern
Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs.
Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of
legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by
one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the
necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such
a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province
while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the
salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the
obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of
appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the
Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no
province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer which
is the situation now and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of
Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation
for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may
result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases
the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a
situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities
requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law
vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act
No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference
between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung
vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543;
Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed.,
567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356;
30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey
vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918],
247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional
because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law.
ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the
effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.
S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl.,
165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under
section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in
other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year and have
probation during that year and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is
subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here
indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to
prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf
C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S.,
91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of this court (18
Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as
held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of
the equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the
right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of
legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the
subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in
section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall
not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due
investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other
hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney
although not in the form had in the provinces was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila,
considering the peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation where the
constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit court,
except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St.
Louis Court of Appeals. The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution
that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to
equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is
whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will
resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and
is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act
substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55
Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-
established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must
be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted
it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs.
Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek
Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and
valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner
contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper
vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.
S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs.
Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal
force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will, independently
of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L.
R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which
the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional
grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the
suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act
that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical
benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system. The clear
policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of
the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of
the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on
the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one
of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a
probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation
officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every probation
officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of
the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care
are complied with. Among those conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer concerning his conduct
or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside within a specified place
or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses caused by his
offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation, promulgated in(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation, promulgated in
accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation. Under section 4, it
is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the
court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated
and the probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-
compliance with said conditions, as reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the
probationer and said probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity
to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the
execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the
duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his supervision a statement of the
period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed concerning
their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such other
measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court as may seem most suitable, to bring about
improvement in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers
at least once every two months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such
report as are necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform
such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct.
The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for
adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as
parole officer of persons released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional
compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces under
section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a
PROBATION OFFICE under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the Governor-
General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per
annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is
hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer under
civil service regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed
by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation officers and administrative
personnel until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not those
probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula
singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various
provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the
supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and
make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec.
2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the
probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the
probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation officer"
in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in charge of a
particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the legislature, for instance, to
require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation
officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his
conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are
assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces or
groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not
on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to
pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive
interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters
and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the
salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the
Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be
applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation
officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been
officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been
included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix
the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act.
Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries
of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to be
sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that
there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand
pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary
not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said
act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there
can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted,
here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the
adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a
period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts
may be reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an
opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform. (United States
vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24
F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely
incidental. But while we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines
should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our
fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel for
both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our
attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of
this case. In the examination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to
adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the
general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have
declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is
settled directly or by clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United
States. This line of approach is justified because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the
dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal
Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect to the Insular Government
(Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d],
871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the integrated
judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York [1904], 198
U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new developments of times and
circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9;
24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be
interpreted having in view existing local conditions and environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without
any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Villa-real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.
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