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Breaker failure rates dependencies with respect to age, voltage level, manufacturer and operating interventions. Risk of asset condition deterioration and wear out failures increases as equipment approaches end of useful service life. Risk-based approach models the underlying distribution of failures or "bath-tub" curve of each asset class.
Breaker failure rates dependencies with respect to age, voltage level, manufacturer and operating interventions. Risk of asset condition deterioration and wear out failures increases as equipment approaches end of useful service life. Risk-based approach models the underlying distribution of failures or "bath-tub" curve of each asset class.
Breaker failure rates dependencies with respect to age, voltage level, manufacturer and operating interventions. Risk of asset condition deterioration and wear out failures increases as equipment approaches end of useful service life. Risk-based approach models the underlying distribution of failures or "bath-tub" curve of each asset class.
This paper presents an extensive analysis of air blast circuit
breaker outages on the Hydro One Transmission System. The aim of the study was to determine the dependencies of breaker failure rates with respect to age, voltage level, manufacturer and operating interventions. Both forced and planned outages were examined. The statistical data base contains 6337 air blast circuit breaker outages on the Hydro One Transmission System. Results are reported in this paper. Key words: air blast breakers, outages, failure rates. I. INTRODUCTION In an effort to maximize equipment reliability and minimize asset life cycle costs, Hydro One Networks Inc. has adopted a risk-based approach to optimize the timing of investment and operating interventions to supplement more traditional engineering studies. The risk of asset condition deterioration and wear out failures increases as equipment approaches the end of its useful service life. The rationale and timing of investment decisions in anticipation of this end of life has traditionally been left to engineering judgment. This may result in higher costs to the utility and its customers if investments are not optimally timed, i.e. made too early, results in higher interest payments; made too late results in failure costs. With an aging asset infrastructure, it becomes increasingly critical to identify equipment bath-tub curves or hazard functions of major asset classes and to understand the risks and influence of critical variables on equipment failure rates during the useful service life of an asset. The risk based approach models the underlying distribution of failures or bath-tub curve of each asset class to allow Hydro One Networks Inc. to optimize the risk cost function in its decision making process. Traditionally, equipment failure rates are computed by dividing the number of outages by the equipment-years considered in the studies. The forced and planned outages are normally considered in this analysis and failure and maintenance rates are assumed to be constant throughout the equipment life. However, many factors influence equipment failure and maintenance rates including, equipment age, utilization, voltage level, manufacturer and maintenance intensity. In order to understand how these factors, referred here to as descriptive variables, affect equipment performance, Hydro One collected outage statistics on their Air Blast Circuit (ABCB) breakers over the period of 1990 to 2001. The authors were then given the task of performing statistical analysis of this data. The aim of the analysis was to correlate the relationship of various parameters on the probability distribution of equipment time to failure and its failure rate. Some surprising results of these studies are summarized in this paper. II. THE BREAKER POPULATION An Excel file with 6,337 records of the ABCB breaker outages during the 12-year period was prepared. This record spans the performance of 318 breakers over 3971 breaker- years.. The demographics of the current population of the ABCB breakers in-service on the transmission system are shown in Figures 1 and 2. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 Age N u m b e r <50 kV 115 230 500
Figure 1. In-Service Airblast Circuit Breaker Demographics by voltage level 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 Age N u m b e r OEM1 OEM2 OEM3
Figure 2 In-Service Airblast Circuit Breaker Demographics by manufacturer GEORGE ANDERS, FELLOW IEEE HENRYK MACIEJEWSKI BRUNO JESUS FARUQ REMTULLA Analysis of Failure Rates of Air Blast Breakers As A Function of Age And Usage G. Anders is with Kinectrics Inc. in Toronto, email: george.anders@kinectrics.com H. Maciejewski is with the Technical University of Wroclaw, email: hmac@ict.pwr.wroc.pl. B. Jesus is with Hydro One Networks, email:b jesus@hydroone.com F. Remtulla is with Hydro One Networks, email faruq.remtulla@hydroone.com. 0-7803-7967-5/03/$17.00 2003 IEEE Paper accepted for presentation at 2003 IEEE Bologna Power Tech Conference, June 23th-26th, Bologna, Italy
The average age of ABCBs on the system is 32.3 years. These demographics highlight the following facts that will affect the future management of ABCBs: 1. The overall population is well past a breakers midlife of 20 1 years and is fast approaching the manufacturers specified design end-of-life of 40 years. 2. 28 breakers are already greater than 40 years of age. 3. In order to keep the age of these breakers below 40 years, 28 breakers would need to be replaced immediately with an additional 12 breakers being replaced annually. 4. If 50 years of age is used as the trigger, then 4 breakers would need to be replaced immediately with an additional 11 breakers being replaced annually.
ABCBs also normally require a mid-life overhaul, as specified by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Therefore, at about 20 years of age, major maintenance of auxiliary systems and main systems, as deemed appropriate at the time is carried out. Hydro One relies on performance and condition information to trigger mid-life overhaul work on its fleet of ABCBs. This mid-life overhaul is required to restore breaker reliability and design functionality for the duration of the expected useful life; it does not extend the ABCBs expected life beyond its normal design life or re-set its age to zero. III. HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE A. Performance trends ABCB equipment reliability performance can be measured in terms of frequency of outages (events/unit/year), average duration of outages (hours/event), and equipment unavailability (% of time breaker cannot be used in a year). These three key performance indicators can be examined on the basis of age, voltage and original equipment manufacturer. 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Year N u m b e r
o f
O u t a g e s Planned Forced Fgiure 3 Annual number of ABCB outages
ABCB equipment reliability analysis was carried out based on ABCB historical performance information of forced and planned outages over the period 1990 2001. The results of this analysis are summarized below for all forced and planned outage causes and are illustrated in Figures 3 5. The
1 Based on information provided by original equipment manufacturers of circuit breakers. following comments can be made. 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Year D u r a t i o n
1. The number of forced outages from all causes (i.e. main power equipment, terminal equipment, adverse environment, human element, foreign interference, non- power equipment) remains constant throughout the period at about 100 outages/year. This is equivalent to a failure rate of about 0.35 Outages/year. 2. Planned outages occur at approximately three times the rate of forced outages. This high number of planned outages is dominated by routine/testing activities at about eight times as often as corrective outages occur. 3. After 1998, the frequency and duration of planned outages dropped to its lowest level in 10 years resulting in a corresponding decrease in ABCB unavailability. An explanation for this trend is the implementation of the Asset Management Model, which was introduced in 1998. B. Outage root causes The equipment database classifies each forced and planned outage by the root cause as listed in Table 1. Non-Power Equipment forced outages is the primary cause of ABCB forced outages. These outages are associated with ABCB external auxiliary systems such as High Pressure Air (HPA) Systems and Protection & Control (P&C) Systems. This is primary driver of the level of maintenance carried out on ABCBs (e.g. repairing HPA system air leaks), but not a primary driver for ABCB replacement the O&M costs of repairing these systems are about two orders of magnitude less than the cost of replacing the main ABCB. Main Power Equipment outages are integral to the ABCB itself and reflective of deterioration of breaker condition. Therefore, ABCB historical forced outage performance will focus on Main Power Equipment outages only, as the other forced outage root causes do not drive the need for breaker replacement.
Table 1: Root causes of outages C. Forced outages 1) Main Power Equipment Main Power Equipment forced outages are classified by failures associated with the following ABCB sub-component systems: bushing, operating mechanism, interrupter, insulation, auxiliary, and sub-component. The frequency and duration of ABCB main power equipment failures are shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively with the horizontal line denoting the average value. The following observations can be made from Figures 6 and 7. The frequency of Main Power Equipment forced outages ranges from a high of 0.11 outages/yr in 1992 and 2000 to a low of 0.04 outages/yr in 2001 with an average of 0.074 outages/yr. Based on Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) report on Forced Outage Performance of Transmission Equipment for the Period January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2000, Networks integral ABCB outage rates are consistent with other Canadian utilities. The main cause of Main Power Equipment outages are associated with the integral ABCB sub-components and auxiliary systems. These account for an average of about 14 incidents per year or 57% of the average annual forced outage incidents over the study period.
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 F r e q u e n c y
( O c c / Y e a r ) Bushing Op. Mechanism Interrupter Insulation Auxiliary Subcomponents
Figure 6 Frequency of main power equipment forced outages 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 D u r a t i o n
( h r s ) Bushing Op. Mechanism Interrupter Insulation Auxiliary Subcomponents Figure 7 Duration of main power equipment forced outages
Operating mechanism and interrupter related outages together appear to contribute about 33% of the remaining forced outages; and bushing and insulation failures contribute the remaining 10% and do not appear to be of recent concern. The duration of Main Power Equipment outages is on average about 2600 hrs / yr and varies significantly from about 6800 hrs in 1991 to the recent low of about 735 hrs in 2001. The duration depends on a number of factors, including: 1. Spare parts availability e.g. a failed bushing that is not in stock may take weeks for delivery and replacement. 2. Outage cause - it takes longer to replace a major integral component (e.g. bushing, interrupter, operating mechanism) than an integral sub- component or auxiliary system. 3. Field crew priorities in addressing an ABCB outage since ABCBs are all connected in a redundant supply to bulk electricity stations (i.e. diameter breakers) and to DESN stations (transformer and bus-tie breakers), the failed ABCB can be quickly isolated and power re-routed with minimal disruption to the system and Forced Outages (FO) Root Causes No. of Outages % of Forced Outages 1. Main Power Equipment 317 30.19% 2. Terminal Power Equipment 114 10.86% 3. Adverse Environment 5 0.48% 4. Human Element 27 2.57% 5. Foreign Interference 1 0.10% 6. Non-Power Equipment 586 55.81% TOTAL 1050 100% Planned Outages (PO) Root Causes No. of Outages % of Planned Outages 1. Construction 354 7.03% 2. Maintenance 3117 61.86% 3. Repair 488 9.68% 4. Testing 1043 20.70% 5. Investigation 37 0.73%
TOTAL 5039 100%
to Customers. Thus, the priority to address an ABCB outage may be relaxed to deal with outages that are directly affecting Customers. The next step in the analysis was to determine the probability distribution of the time between outages. Several studies were performed. The parameter of interest is the number of repairs performed on the breakers. The data was divided into three classes: (1) breakers with up to one repair, (2) breakers with two repairs, and (3) breakers with 3 or more repairs. Figure 8 shows the plot of the time to failure for forced internal outages on a log-log scale. The parallel straight lines on this graph indicate that the Weibull distribution is well applicable in this case. Another parameter of interest is the hazard function for the three groups identified above. A hazard function ( ) h t gives the probability that the equipment will fail in the next time interval t given that it survived up to the time t. The relevant plots are shown in Figure 9 with the vertical axis representing the double log of the survival function. We can observe that in the case of one or no repairs, the hazard function is almost constant. In the other two cases, the hazard function declines with time. A decreasing hazard rate may be interpreted as the longer the ABCB survives without an outage, the lower its probability of failure will be. In all the graphs showing the hazard function, the data after about 3600 days should be taken with caution because the total study period is about 11 years. -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 Log of time between outages (days) L o g
N e g a t i v e
L o g
S D F <=1 repair 2 repairs >=3 repairs
Figure 8 Log-log plot of times to failure for internal forced outages for three groups of components
The analysis shows that a growing number of repairs in the lifetime of a breaker changes the distribution of time between subsequent failures. In the ideal (but perhaps unrealistic) scenario when a repair reverts a breaker to the as-new state, the distribution of time between failures for each grouping (i.e. 1 repair, 2 repairs, and 3 repairs) should remain about the same. This, however, was not the case, the results in Figure 8 clearly show that the distribution of the time to failure and the hazard rate significantly depend on the number of repairs recorded for a breaker: especially for times <1500 days. A rule that may be applied is, the more repairs that have been recorded, the higher the hazard rate will be observed. 0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 time between outages (days) H a z a r d
F u n c t i o n <=1 repair 2 repairs >=3 repairs
Figure 9. Hazard function for three groups of breaker outages. The application of the techniques to compute the hazard rates described in the paper pertains to non repairable systems. In particular, the survival function and the hazard function are by definition applicable to non repairable components. The way we apply them is as follows. 1. We look at the random variable representing times to failure. 2. We assume that after each repair, the component is as good as new. Under these assumptions, we can apply the techniques pertinent to the non repairable systems. This is a gross simplification of the actual situation because after repair only seldom the component is as good as new, but a common practice in the analysis of the outage statistics. The study reported above looked specifically at the effect of the number of repairs on the equipment hazard rate. 2) Forced Outages by Voltage Class An analysis was carried out to examine the ABCB times to failure by voltage class i.e. <115 kV, 230 kV, and 500 kV, as shown in Figures 10 and 11. -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 Log of ttime between outages (days) L o g
N e g a t i v e
L o g
S D F low voltage medium voltage high voltage
Figure10: Log-log graph of time to failure for three different voltage levels From Figure 10, we can conclude that for all voltage levels the distributions of times between failures are similar. These distributions tend to follow a straight line indicating that the time to failure can be modeled using a Weibull distribution.
Figure 11 indicates that the hazard function falls sharply for times between outage of up to about 1000 days. For times between 1000 and 2000 days, low voltage breakers exhibit significantly lower hazard then other groups (by a factor of 2). However, this is mainly attributed to the rare number of failures associated with a small population of breakers (i.e. 52). For times exceeding 2000 days, all groups exhibit about the same constant hazard of about 0.0003. No data is available for the low and high voltage breakers for times between outages longer than about 10 years.
0 0.00025 0.0005 0.00075 0.001 0.00125 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 time between outages H a z a r d
F u n c t i o n low voltage medium voltage high voltage
Figure 11 Hazard function for forced outages for three voltage levels.
3) Forced Outages by Original Equipment Manufacturer An analysis was also carried out to examine the forced outage performance of ABCBs by original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for each voltage class. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2 and summarized below: 1. Very rare LV and 115 kV ABCB forced outages may be attributed to the negligible maintenance regime on these breakers. In addition, the population of these breakers is very small, i.e. forty-five LV and eleven 115 kV ABCBs.
Forced Outage Rate (outages/year) OEM LV 115 230 500 Total Company 1 0.02 0.00 0.45 0.07 0.27 Company 2 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.67 0.26 Company 3 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.41 0.37
Table 2 Forced outage rates for different manufacturers.
2. Company 1 equipment are the worst performing 230 kV breakers on the system with a forced outage rate that is about 60% to 80%, greater than for the other two manufacturers. This is of concern because Company 1 breakers are also the oldest breakers on the system. 3. Company 2 breakers are the worst performing 500 kV breakers on the system, but this performance is skewed by the very small sample i.e. only 2x500 kV ABCBs remain in-service. If this performance is discounted, Company 3 has the worst performing 500 kV breakers at about 6 times the rate of Company 1 and about 1.6 times worse than their 230kV class cousins. D. Planned Outages Planned outages are classified by corrective maintenance to address an unforeseen ABCB problem/deficiency; planned maintenance to carry out ABCB preventative/routine maintenance; or construction to isolate the ABCB to facilitate maintenance or installation of an adjacent piece of equipment. The frequency and duration of ABCB planned outages for each of these causes are shown in Figures 12 and 13. 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 F r e q u e n c y
( O u t a g e s / y r ) Maintenance Corrective Construction Average Figure 12 Frequency of ABCBs planned outages 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 D u r a t i o n
( H r s ) Maintenance Corrective Construction Average
Figure 13 Duration of ABCBs planned outages
The following observations can be made from Figures 12 and 13. The frequency of planned outages has remained fairly constant over the period at about 1.2 outage/yr/breaker. This represents a planned outage rate that is approximately 10 times the rate of forced outages. The drop in outages from 1997 2001 is mainly attributed to implementation of the Centralized Asset Management Model, implementation of preventative maintenance optimization process and the removal of 32 ABCBs from the system. This impact is amplified in Figure 13 that shows approximately a 70% reduction in the duration of total planned outages. Translated, this means that ABCBs continue to be taken out for maintenance about once per
year, and the maintenance is now being done in about of time that it used to take. Routine maintenance outages, on average, account for about 80% of the total planned outages. This is equivalent to about 1.0 outage/yr/breaker. Corrective maintenance outages account for about 10% of the total planned outages. This is equivalent to about 0.1/outage/yr/breaker. Construction outages are insignificant to the total number of planned outages. An increase in these outages tend to point out the years in which significant ABCB removals have occurred, i.e. 1992 and 2000. The outage duration contributions from planned maintenance, corrective, and construction are very similar to the proportions described above for the frequency of planned interruptions i.e. 80%, 10% and negligible. 1) Corrective Maintenance Outages by Voltage Class The time to failure and hazard function for each voltage class of ABCBs was examined to further analyze the effect of corrective maintenance outages. The results of this analysis are summarized below and shown in Figures 14 and 15. -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 Log of time between outages (days) L o g
N e g a t i v e
L o g
S D F low v oltage medium v oltage high v oltage
Figure 14 Log-log plot of Time to Failure of Corrective Maintenance Outages by Voltage 0 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 time between outages (days) H a z a r d
F u n c t i o n
( o c c / d a y ) low v oltage medium v oltage high v oltage
Figure 15 Hazard Plot for Corrective Maintenance Outages by Voltage
The medium voltage breakers have the largest probability of corrective outage. For time between corrective outages <1000 days, the hazard rate for all voltage classes drops significantly. This means that if a breaker did not have a corrective maintenance outage for about 3 years, its probability of failure will be much lower than for a similar breaker that recently had a such an outage. After about three years of operation without a corrective maintenance outage, the probability of such outage is constant for all three voltage classes. There is no recorded data beyond about 6 year between outages for low and high voltage breakers. The time between corrective maintenance outages can be represented by a Weibull distribution for all voltage classes. 2) Planned Outages by Original Equipment Manufacturer An analysis was also carried out to examine the planned outage performance of ABCBs by original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for each voltage class. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 3.
Planned Outage Rate (outages/year) OEM LV 115 230 500 Total Company 1 0.02 0.00 1.48 0.33 0.87 Company 2 0.00 0.45 1.35 2.33 1.27 Company 3 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.63 1.35
Table 3 OEM Planned Outage Rates by Voltage
Company 1 breakers are the highest maintained 230 kV breakers on the system with a planned outage rate that is about 10% to 300%, greater than the equipment of the other two manufacturers. This may be appropriate given that the Company 1 breakers are also the oldest breakers on the system. Company 2 and 3 equipment have the highest maintained 500 kV breakers on the system. These breakers require about 2 outages/yr for maintenance. E. Performance By Age An analysis was also carried out to examine the performance of integral forced outages (i.e. Main Power Equipment) and planned outages with respect to ABCB age. The results are summarized below and shown in Figures 16- 21. 1) Results without explanatory variables a) Failure rates (forced outages caused by main equipment failures) Figure 16 shows the number of breaker-years (i.e. the number of breakers of a given age summed up over the period 1990 2001) and the number of integral (main power equipment) forced outages for each age group. Figure 17 shows the failure rate for this population. It appears that the forced outage rate of ABCBs is fairly independent of age and the value of 0.1 outages per year can be used for the failure rate for all age groups.
0 50 100 150 200 250 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Age (years) C o u n t Breaker-years No. of outages
Figure 16. Population information for forced outages due to internal failure
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Age (years) F a i l u r
r a t e
( 1 / y )
Figure 17. Forced outage rate as a function of age
b) Maintenance outages Figures 18 and 19 show the population and maintenance /planned outage rate information over the period 1990 - 2001. In the case of maintenance outages there was one breaker that when it was 8 years old, it had 4 maintenance outages in one year. When the information for this breaker is ignored, the maintenance rate for all breakers older than 10 years is approximately the same and equal about 1 outage per year. The counter-intuitive conclusion reached here is that ABCB performance does not vary with age to about 40 years of age. The forced outage rate remains constant at about 0.1 outages/yr. However, beyond 40 years, there is insufficient performance data to accurately predict ABCB performance deterioration trends that are consistent with their end of life and last stage of the typical bath-tub curve. The vital question then becomes, at what age will ABCB performance begin to deteriorate and exhibit signs of the last stage of the bath-tub curve? 2) Results with explanatory variables Several studies were performed to see the effect of the number of repairs, voltage level and the OEM on the failure rate as a function of age. It is noted that outages involving a population of one or two breakers of a given age were ignored since any outage in such a group would skew the results.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Age (years) C o u n t Breaker-years No. of outages
Figure 18 Population information for maintenance outages 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 Age (years) O u t a g e
r a t e
( 1 / y )
Figure 19 Maintenance outage rate
Figure 20 shows the integral (main power equipment) failure rates by OEM. Company 1 breakers have the highest failure rate with the average about 0.15 outages per year. This group exhibits very high failure rate for equipment that is 16- 17 years old. Company 3 breakers have lowest failure rates up to about age 34 when performance deteriorates significantly. The maintenance outage rate for all OEMs is shown in Figure 21. Company 3 has the highest maintenance rates with the rate sharply increasing at about 30 years in service.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Age (years) F a i l u r e
R a t e
( 1 / y ) Company 1 Company 2 Company 3
Figure 20 Forced outage rate as a function of age
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 9 19 29 39 49 Age (years) O u t a g e
R a t e
( 1 / y ) Company1 Company2 Company3
Figure 21 Maintenance outage rate as a function of age IV. CONCLUSIONS In order to determine the parameters that play an important role in characterizing the equipment failure rates, an extensive statistical probabilistic analysis was undertaken on the performance of Hydro Ones air blast circuit breakers. Using the results of the probabilistic risk analysis, Hydro One will be able to better predict equipment failure rates and make better, more timely, investment decisions. This will help to optimize asset life cycle costs while continuing to increase its knowledge of the deterioration process of its assets. This is the first study reported in the literature that looks at detailed causes of the equipment outages. In addition to forced and planned outage rates, that would usually be studied, we have looked at the effect of age, manufacturer and the voltage level on the computed indices. Several conclusions drawn from this study confirm generally held views about failure and maintenance rates. However, some conclusions are not so obvious. General conclusion about the ABCBs that emerged from this study can be summarized as follows: Failure rates as a function of age can be considered constant for all voltage classes and all manufacturers for the breakers under consideration. The number of repairs has an effect on the performance of the breakers. Equipment with more repairs tends to have higher hazard rates. This means these breakers are more likely to fail than the units with a smaller number of outages. The 230 kV breakers, which constituted the largest sample in this study, exhibit somewhat higher hazard rates for planned than the other two voltage levels. There are substantial differences in maintenance and failure rates between different manufacturers. The breakers with the highest preventive maintenance rate exhibit the smallest failure rate as a function of age. The main cause of Main Power Equipment outages are associated with the integral ABCB sub-components and auxiliary systems. These account for an average of about 57% of the average annual forced outage incidents over the study period. Operating mechanism and interrupter related outages appear to each contribute about 33% of the remaining forced outages; and bushing and insulation failures contribute the remaining 10% and do not appear to be of recent concern. Routine maintenance outages, on average, account for about 80% of the total planned outages whereas corrective maintenance outages account for about 10% of the total planned outages. Construction outages are insignificant to the total number of planned outages. The outage duration contributions from planned maintenance, corrective, and construction are very similar to the proportions described above for the frequency of planned interruptions i.e. 80%, 10% and negligible. V. BIOGRAPHIES
George J. Anders (M74, SM84, F99) received a M.Sc. degree in EE from Technical University of Lodz in Poland in 1973, and an M.Sc. degree in Mathematics and Ph.D. degree in Power System Reliability from the Univ. of Toronto in 1977 and 1980, respectively. Since 1975, he has been employed by Ontario Hydro first as a System Design Engineer in Transmission System Design Dept. of System Planning Division and currently as a Principal Engineer in Kinectrics Inc. (a successor company to Ontario Hydro Technologies). Dr. Anders is the author of two books Probability Concepts in Electric Power Systems", published by John Wiley & Sons, NY, 1990, and Rating of Electric Power Cables, published by IEEE Press, New York, 1997 and McGraw-Hill, New York, 1998. He is a registered Professional Engineer in the Province of Ontario.
Henryk Maciejewski received a M.Sc. degree in Computer Engineering from Wroclaw University of Technology, Poland in 1990, and Ph.D. degree in Computer System Reliability from Wroclaw University of Technology in 1998. In 1992-93 he was visiting researcher at Ontario Hydro, Toronto, Canada; since 1993 he has been with the Institute of Engineering Cybernetics, Wroclaw University of Technology, initially as research assistant, and since 1998 as assistant professor. Since 2002 he has also been a lecturer in the Faculty of Software Engineering of the Technische Fachhochschule Hagenberg, Austria. His research interests include data mining technologies, statistical data analysis, probabilistic methods in reliability, and parallel processing. He is author of more than 30 papers in these areas.
Bruno Jesus received his B.A.Sc. degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Toronto in 1987. He is a registered Professional Engineer in the Province of Ontario. He has been with Hydro One and its predecessor, Ontario Hydro, for 15 years. He is currently a Team Leader in the Network Strategy Division responsible for developing customer and asset strategies.
Faruq Remtulla received his Honors Business Administration Degree from The Richard Ivey School of Business in 2002. He has been with Hydro One Inc. since graduation and is currently working as a Business Analyst in the Network Strategy Division.