TRANSPORTATION OF PASSENGERS CASE DIGESTS

1. 1. Locum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. | Barredo, J.

GR No. L-23733, October 31, 1969

Facts: Plaintiff Locum, who was a passenger in defendants Bus No. 120 then making a trip
within the Dita, Laguna was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers,
contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and
miscellaneous items by a co-passenger. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff and the main
basis of its decision is that defendant company did not observe the extraordinary or utmost
diligence of a very cautious person required by the Civil Code: Articles 1733, 1755, 1756.
Defendant filed an appeal to assail the decision of the trial court.

Issue: WoN the decision of the trial court erred in its decision in ruling in favor of plaintiff?

Held: The appealed judgment of the trial court is REVERSED as defendant company
succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing that it exercised
extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers. There is no question that Bus No. 120
was road worthy when it left its Manila Terminal. The injuries suffered by the plaintiff were not
due to mechanical defects but to the explosion of firecrackers inside the bus which was
loaded by a co-passenger. A carrier is ordinarily not liable for injuries to passengers from fires
or explosions caused by articles brought into its conveyances by other passengers, in the
absence of any evidence that the carrier, through its employees, was aware of the nature of
the article or had any reason to anticipate danger therefrom. Where there is evidence of
circumstances indicating cause or causes for apprehension that the passenger's baggage in
dangerous, and the common carrier's employee has failed to act in the fact of such evidence,
the common carrier becomes liable for any injury caused to its passengers by reason of such
baggage.

It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be loaded in
the bus by the conductor (Mendoza), inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same.
From its appearance there was no indication at all that the contents were explosives or
firecrackers. Neither did he open the box because he relied on the word of the owner.
Inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not
outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of
being transgressed. When there are sufficient indications that the representations of the
passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, the assistance of the police
authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage, but
to conduct the needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and, above all, the
constitutional rights of the passenger.

Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers,
allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility
of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger
will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers and his
own.



Article 1733 is not as unbending as the trial court has held, for it reasonably qualifies the
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers
transported by them to be "according to all the circumstances of each case." In fact, Article
1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."

IMPORTANT: The breach of contact was NOT due to a fortuitous event, an unexpected event
or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. The cause of the unexpected
event must be independent of the will of man, or something which cannot be avoided.

2. Mecenas v. Court of Appeals

Facts: In April 22, 1980 M/T Tacloban City, owned and operated by PNOC, collided near
Mindoro with M/V Don Juan of NENACO carrying with it 750 listed passengers. As a result,
many of the passengers perished that fateful day and it included the petitioners parents
Perfecto and Sofia Mecenas.

On December 29, 1980, petitioners filed a complaint in the CFI of Quezon docketed as Civil
Case No.Q-31525 against NENACO and Capt. Santisteban with prayer for actual damages
not less than 100K as well as moral and exemplary damages be awarded to them. Another
complaint was lodged in the same court against PNOC and NENECO by Linda Ciocon due to
death of her husband in the collision. Two cases were consolidated.

On 17 July 1986, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive of which read
as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment ordering:
a) The defendant Negros Navigation Co., Inc. and Capt. Roger Santisteban jointly and
severally liable to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No Q-31525, the sum of P400,000.00 for the
death of plaintiffs' parents, Perfecto A. Mecenas and Sofia P. Mecenas; to pay said plaintiff's
the sum of P15.000,00 as and for attorney's fees; plus costs of the suit.

b) Each of the defendants Negros Navigation Co Inc. and Philippine National Oil
Company/PNOC Shipping and Transportation Company, to pay the plaintiff in Civil Case
No.Q-33932, the sum of P100,000.00 for the death of Manuel Ciocon, to pay said plaintiff
jointly and severally, the sum of P1 5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus costs of the suit.

PNOC and NENACO appealed to CA. Linda Ciocon entered into settlement with PNOC and
NENACO.

CA rendered a decision to Civil Case Q-31525 affirming and modifying that Mecenas be
awarded P100,000.00 for actual and compensatory damages as well as attorneys fee of
15K.







ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in reducing the award of damages from 400k to 100k ?

HELD: The Court noted that in an action based upon a breach of the contract of carriage, the
carrier under our civil law is liable for the death of passengers arising from the negligence or
willful act of the carrier's employees although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or even in violation of the instructions of the carrier, which liability may
include liability for moral damages. It also relied on Article 2332. In contracts and quasi-
contracts, the court may exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

The Court find the respondents actions grossly negligent also by allowing 864 passengers
exceeding the allowable passengers, Capt. Santistebans inappropriate action of playing
majong games during the course of the voyage and failure to delay the sinking of the ship.

Wherefore, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the decision of the CA that reduced the
amount of damages awarded to petitioners to P100, 000.00 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The award granted by the trial court is hereby RESTORED and
AUGMENTED as follows:
(a) P 126,000.00 for actual damages;
(b) P 60,000.00 as compensatory damages for wrongful death;
(c) P 307,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P 307,000.00 as exemplary damages making a total of P 800,000.00; and
(e) P 15,000.00 as attorneys fees.

3. Negros Navigation v CA
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. 4 special
cabin tickets for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a
family reunion. Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City,
an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. The4 members
of private respondents' families were never found.

ISSUE: whether the crew members of petitioner were grossly negligent (YES)

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Petitionerdenied that the 4 relatives of private respondents
actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered.
Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
Tacloban City.
Petitioner also criticizes the lower court's reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that,
although this case arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are
different and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case


should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in
short, on the record of this case.

RULING:
RTC: awarded damages to private respondents for the death of relatives as a result of the
sinking of petitioner's vessel

CA: affirmed with modification

SUPREME COURT:
In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied
on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court,which case was
brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the
proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the
crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latter's master, Capt. Rogelio
Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior
Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the
imminent danger facing them. Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in
tolerating the playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board
the ship and failing to keep the M/V Don Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank within
10 to 15 minutes of its impact with the M/T Tacloban City.

In addition, the Court found that the Don Juan was overloaded. The Certificate of Inspection,
dated August 27, 1979, issued by the Philippine Coast Guard Commander at Iloilo City stated
that the total number of persons allowed on the ship was 864, of whom 810 are passengers,
but there were actually 1,004 on board the vessel when it sank, 140 persons more than the
maximum number that could be safely carried by it.

Taking these circumstances together, and the fact that the M/V Don Juan, as the faster and
better-equipped vessel, could have avoided a collision with the PNOC tanker, this Court held
that even if the Tacloban City had been at fault for failing to observe an internationally-
recognized rule of navigation, the Don Juan was guilty of contributory negligence. Through
Justice Feliciano, this Court held:In the total set of circumstances which existed in the instant
case, the "Don Juan," had it taken seriously its duty of extraordinary diligence, could have
easily avoided the collision with the "Tacloban City." Indeed, the "Don Juan" might well have
avoided the collision even if it had exercised ordinary diligence merely.

Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's policy of maintaining stability in
jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim "stare decisis et non quietamovere" (Follow
past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in
a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

4. Korean Arilines Vs CA

Facts:


Juanito Lapuz was contracted for employment in Saudi Arabia through Pan Pacific Recruiting
Services, Inc. He was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines, but was initially listed as a
chance passenger. According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in and was cleared for
departure. When he was on the stairs going to the airplane, a KAL officer pointed at him and
shouted, Down! Down! and he was barred from taking the flight. When he asked for another
booking, his ticket was cancelled. He was unable to report for work and so he lost his
employment. KAL alleged that the agent of Pan Pacific was informed that there are 2 seats
possibly available. He gave priority to Perico, while the other seat was won by Lapuz through
lottery. But because only 1 seat became available, it was given to Perico. The trial court
adjudged KAL liable for damages. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with
modification on the damages awarded.

Issues:
(1) Whether there is already a contract of carriage between KAL and Lapuz to hold KAL liable
for breach of contract (2) Whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded, and to
what extent

Held:
(1) The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger
when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His
clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed
as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage
between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination. A contract to transport
passengers is different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. The business
of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives
the latter an action for damages against the carrier. The breach of contract was aggravated in
this case when, instead of courteously informing Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed" passenger,
a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down! Down!" while pointing at him, thus causing him
embarrassment and public humiliation. The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had
indeed checked in at the departure counter, passed through customs and immigration,
boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft. In fact, his baggage had
already been loaded in KAL's aircraft, to be flown with him to Jeddah. The contract of carriage
between him and KAL had already been perfected when he was summarily and insolently
prevented from boarding the aircraft.

(2) The Court of Appeals granted moral and exemplary damages because: a. The findings of
the court a quo that the defendant-appellant has committed breach of contract of carriage in
bad faith and in wanton, disregard of plaintiff-appellant's rights as passenger laid the basis
and justification of an award for moral damages. b. In the instant case, we find that defendant-
appellant Korean Air Lines acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner when it "bumped off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8, 1980, and in addition treated
him rudely and arrogantly as a "patay gutom na contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines,"
which clearly shows malice and bad faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to moral damages.


c. Considering that the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to moral damages has been fully
established by oral and documentary evidence, exemplary damages may be awarded. In fact,
exemplary damages may be awarded, even though not so expressly pleaded in the
complaint. By the same token, to provide an example for the public good, an award of
exemplary damages is also proper. A review of the record of this case shows that the injury
suffered by Lapuz is not so serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The
assessment of P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view,
reasonable and realistic.

5. PAL vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 621 GR. NO. 120262

FACTS: On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City,
boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to
take his connecting flight to Surigao City However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting
flight to Surigao City was cancelled.

To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash
assistance of P100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of two days in
Cebu. Respondent Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL's expense
because he did not have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus, respondent
Pantejo was forced to seek and accept the generosity of a copassenger, an engineer named
Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to
pay his share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao.

On October 25, 1988 when the flight for Surigao was resumed, respondent Pantejo came to
know that the hotel expenses of his copassengers, one Superintendent Ernesto Gonzales
and a certain Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine National Bank, were reimbursed
by PAL. At this point, respondent Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PAL's Manager for
Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in charge of cancelled flights, that he was
going to sue the airline for discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to
pay respondent Pantejo P300.00 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the
latter decline.

On March 18, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, rendered judgment
in the action for damages filed by respondent Pantejo against herein petitioner, Philippine
Airlines, Inc., ordering the latter to pay Pantejo P300.00 for actual damages, P150,000.00 as
moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and 6%
interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until said amounts shall have been fully
paid, plus costs of suit.

On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the court a quo, but with the exclusion of
the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner airlines acted in bad faith when it failed and refused to
provide hotel accommodations for respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel expenses
incurred by reason of the cancellation of its connecting flight to Surigao City due to force
majeure

Held: Petitioner is liable.



To begin with, it must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers is quite different
in kind and degree from any other contractual relation, and this is because of the relation
which an air carrier sustain with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages.
In ruling for respondent Pantejo, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
herein petitioner acted in bad faith in refusing to provide hotel accommodations for
respondent Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel expenses incurred despite and in contrast to
the fact that other passengers were so favored.

In declaring that bad faith existed, respondent court took into consideration the following
factual circumstances:

1. Contrary to petitioner's claim that cash assistance was given instead because of
nonavailability of rooms in hotels where petitioner had existing tieups, the evidence
shows that Sky View Hotel, where respondent Pantejo was billeted, had plenty of
rooms available.
2. It is not true that the P300.00 Paid to Ernesto Gonzales, a copassenger of
respondent, was a refund for his plane ticket, the truth being that it was a
reimbursement for hotel and meal expenses.
3. It is likewise not denied that said Gonzales and herein respondent came to know
about the reimbursements only because another passenger, Mrs. Rocha, informed
them that she was able to obtain the refund for her own hotel expenses.
4. Petitioner offered to pay P300.00 to private respondent only after he had confronted
the airline's manager about the discrimination committed against him, which the latter
realized was an actionable wrong.
5. Service Voucher No. 199351, presented by petitioner to prove that it gave cash
assistance to its passengers, was based merely on the list of passengers already
given cash assistance and was purportedly prepared at around 10:00 A.M. of October
23, 1988. This was two hours before respondent came to know of the cancellation of
his flight to Surigao, hence private respondent could not have possibly refused the
same.

Petitioner theorizes that the hotel accommodations or cash assistance given in case a flight is
cancelled is in the nature of an amenity and is merely a privilege that may be extended at its
own discretion, but never a right that may be demanded by its passengers. Thus, when
respondent Pantejo was offered cash assistance and he refused it, petitioner cannot be held
liable for whatever befell respondent Pantejo on that fateful day, because it was merely
exercising its discretion when it opted to just give cash assistance to its passengers.

Assuming arguendo that the airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in
case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure, what makes petitioner liable for damages in
this particular case and under the facts obtaining herein is its blatant refusal to accord the so-
called amenities equally to all its stranded passengers who were bound for Surigao City. No
compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and prejudicial conduct.
More importantly, it has been sufficiently established that it is petitioner's standard company
policy, whenever a flight has been cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers cash
assistance or to provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tieups. In


fact, petitioner's Mactan Airport Manager for departure services, Oscar Jereza, admitted that
PAL has an existing arrangement with hotels to accommodate stranded passengers, and that
the hotel bills of Ernesto Gonzales were reimbursed obviously pursuant to that policy.

While petitioner now insists that the passengers were duly informed that they would be
reimbursed for their hotel expenses, it miserably and significantly failed to explain why the
other passengers were given reimbursement while private respondent was not. Although
Gonzales was subsequently given a refund, this was only so because he came to know about
it by accident through Mrs. Rocha, as earlier explained.

Petitioner could only offer the strained and flimsy pretext that possibly the passengers were
not listening when the announcement was made. This is absurd because when respondent
Pantejo came to know that his flight had been cancelled, he immediately proceeded to
petitioner's office and requested for hotel accommodations. He was not only refused
accommodations, but he was not even informed that he may later on be reimbursed for his
hotel expenses. This explains why his copassenger, Andoni Dumlao, offered to answer for
respondent's hotel bill and the latter promised to pay him when they arrive in Surigao. Had
both know that they would be reimbursed by the airline, such arrangement would not have
been necessary.

On the bases of all the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that petitioner acted in bad
faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers and in discriminating
against herein respondent Pantejo. It was even oblivious to the fact that this respondent was
exposed to humiliation and embarrassment especially because of his government position
and social prominence, which altogether necessarily subjected him to ridicule, shame and
anguish. It remains uncontroverted that at the time of the incident, herein respondent was
then the City Prosecutor of Surigao City, and that he is a member of the Philippine Jaycee
Senate, past Lt. Governor of the Kiwanis Club of Surigao, a past Master of the Mount Diwata
Lodge of Free Masons of the Philippines, member of the Philippine National Red Cross,
Surigao Chapter,and past Chairman of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, Surigao del Norte
Chapter.

The discriminatory act of petitioner against respondent ineludibly makes the former liable for
moral damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code.

6. Calalas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
Mendoza, J.,

Facts: Eliza Sunga, a college student, was a passenger on the jeepney owned and operated
by Vicente Calalas. The jeepney she rode on was already full of passengers but to be
accommodated, she was given a wooden stool (extension seat) situated at the rear end of the
jeepney. The jeepney was on its way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental when Sunga
had to give way to a passenger who was being let off. It was also at the same time that an
Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the rear end
portion of the jeep and injured Sunga. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin" and she was on a cast for a period of
three months. She also had to make use of crutches for the same period.



Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas by alleging that he violated the
contract of carriage in failing to exercise the diligence required of him by law as a common
carrier while Calalas filed a third-party complaint against the owner of the truck. The lower
court absolved Calalas from liability and rendered judgment against Salva as it was the truck
driver who was responsible for the accident. The Court of Appeals on the other hand reversed
the lower court's decision because Sunga's complaint was based on a breach of contract of
carriage, not a quasi-delict. The CA held that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required by the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not Calalas exercised extraordinary diligence as required by the Civil Code

Held: No. Art. 1756 of the New Civil Code provides "in case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755." The Court affirms the CA's finding that the jeepney was not properly
parked, that it stopped and let the rear end portion of the jeep be exposed to the broad
shoulders of the highway and it took in more passengers than what was allowed by its seating
capacity. With that, it violated sections 54 and 32 RA 4136 or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. The fact that Sunga was given an extension seat placed her in a peril greater
than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Also, the case at hand is not a case
fortuito because Calalas should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
exposed two meters from the highway.

7. Jose Pilapil v. CA & Alatco Transportation Co., Inc. | Padilla, J.
GR No. 52159, December 22, 1989

Facts: This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision rendered by the CA which
reversed and set aside the judgment of the CFI (Camarines Sur) finding respondent company
liable to petitioner.
An unidentified man, a bystander along the national highway from Iriga to Naga, hurdled a
stone at the left side of Bus No. 49 (owned by respondent company) which hit petitioner, a
paying passenger, above his left eye. Private respondents personnel lost no time in bringing
the petitioner to the provincial hospital in Naga City where he was confined and treated.
Petitioner was treated but despite the treatment accorded to him, Dr. Capulong said that
petitioner lost partially his left eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.

Issue: WoN the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court.

Held: The appealed judgment of the CA is AFFIRMED. The injury sustained by the petitioner
was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or
to the negligent or willful acts of private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no
issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent
employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which
the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule
otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers
which is not the intention of the lawmakers.



The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely
prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved
type, in general use by others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree
of care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with
negligence in this respect.

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. Article
1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the
carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can
provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the
circumstances. Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence
on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for
the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence. The presumption of fault or negligence against
the carrier is only a disputable presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established
proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the
injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.

As a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe
transport of their passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is
to be determined when intervening acts of strangers directly cause the injury, while the
contract of carriage exists. According to Article 1763, a tort committed by a stranger which
causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier.
The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by
the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have
been foreseen and prevented by them. When the violation of the contract is due to the wilful
acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the
common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

8. Fortune Express v. Court of Appeals
Justice Mendoza

Doctrine:Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of
the common carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioners
employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo (leader of the Maranaos) and his men was
made possible

Facts:
One of the buses of Fortune Express, Inc. collided with a jeepney owned by a Maranao which
resulted in the death of several passengers of the jeepney including two Maranaos. In relation
thereto, the Philippine Constabulary of Cagayan de Oro warned the petitioner through its
operations manager Diosdado Bravo that Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the
petitioner by burning some of its buses. Bravo assured them the necessary precautions to
ensure the safety of the lives and properties of the passengers.


On November 22, 1989 three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized and
burned the bus of the petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del norte while on its way to Iligan City
which resulted in the death of one of its passengers, Atty. Caorong. Thus the heirs of Atty.
Caorong filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of carriage against the
petitioner.


Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioner breached the contract of carriage by its failure to exercise
the required degree of diligence.
2. whether or not the acts of the Maranaos should be regarded as a case of force majeure.

RULING:

TC: ruled against petitioner

CA: Affirmed the Trial courts ruling. Hence, petition for review by certiorari

SC: 1. Yes. It is because of the negligence of the petitioners employees that the seizure of
the bus by the Maranaos was made possible. Despite the warning of the Philippine
Constabulary that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning
some of its buses and the assurance of the petitioners operations manager, Bravo, that the
necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its
passengers. Had the petitioner and its employees been vigilant, they would not have failed to
see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances,
simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of the passengers, such as frisking
passengers and inspecting their baggage, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as
metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating
the passengers constitutional rights.
2. No. in the present case, unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be
considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of the PC agent
that the Maranaos were planning some of its busses and the assurance of petitioners
operation manager be taken, nothing was really done by the petitioner.

9. Philippine Rabbit Bus v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Facts: On December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua,
Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida
Parejas boarded and contracted the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and
Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo. On their way to Pangasinan, the rear
tire of the jeepney detached and it went to make an abrupt u-turn opposite of their direction as
a result. On the same incident, a speeding Philippine Rabbit bus driven by Tomas delos
Reyes was fast approaching unable to avoid the the jeepney thus resulting to bumping the
rear part of the jeepney.

Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinada Meriales died from the accident and Caridad
Pascua sustained multiple injuries as a result from the mishap. After the police investigation,
police filed criminal charges to Manalo which resulted to his conviction.



Civil case for recovery of damages was subsequently filed and rendered decision as follows
that favored the plaintiffs for damages, and decision for cross claim case ordering ordering
Mangune et al. to pay cross-claimant Philippine Rabbit for loss income and repairs of the
bus.

On appeal to CA regarding the decision of awarding damages to Philippine Rabbit, CA
reversed the CFI ruling and rendered another decision ordering Philippine Rabbit and Delos
Reyes to pay Pascua et al for the injuries and death suffered by the victims.

Motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N CA is correct in holding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines and Tomas Delos Reyes is
also civilly liable to damages due to death and injuries suffered by the victims?

HELD: NO. The CA erred in its decision. The Court laid the down the principles and
application of laws used by CFI and CA in arriving at their decision. CFI applied the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor or the thing speaks for itself. Clearly based from the evidence taken, it is
unrebuttedly that the action of Manalo et. Al. is the proximate cause of the accident that
brought death and injuries to the victims.

On the contrary, CA based its ruling applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance,
(2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of
the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test.
Concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.

The Court ruled that CA misapplied the doctrine where it said that the doctrine of last chance
is between the owners of the two colliding vehicle. The case is based on contractual
obligations of the carrier and its passengers.

After scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, the Court find that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was
due to a fortuitous event.

10. Bustamante v. CA | G.R. 89880 6 February 1991
Medialdea, J.

Facts: At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a gravel
and sand truck, and a Mazda passenger bus with along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza,
Cavite. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result
of the injuries they sustained. Before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus
were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the
truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the


vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding
this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin
shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was
ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor
being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. While the bus was in the
process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the
two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. The trial court reached that
conclusion that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each other
in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the aforementioned persons. It could
not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which
was the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the liability of the two drivers for their
negligence must be solidary. However, upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, truck drive rand
owner were absolved from the liability based on the doctrine of the last clear chance wherein
it opined that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless
negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the
collision."

Issue: Is the doctrine of last clear chance correctly applied in this case?

Held: No. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may
have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery. The doctrine provides that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third
person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
of the accident. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable
to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself
in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities, should have been
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of
the plaintiff to avoid an accident. In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court citing
the landmark decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled
that the principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence." Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the
field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the
injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor
cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have
avoided the injury." All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent
Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the
defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles.

11. LOURDES J. LARA, ET AL. vs. BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA GR. NO L9907 June 30, 1958



FACTS: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao with an
annual salary of P1,800. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his
lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said concession upon instructions of his chief to
classify the logs of defendant which were about to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of
Parang. The work Lara of lasted for six days during which he contracted malaria fever. In the
morning of January 9, 1954, Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao asked defendant if
he could take him in his pickup as there was then no other means of transportation, to which
defendant agreed, and in that same morning the pickup left Parang bound for Davao taking
along six passengers, including Lara.

The pickup has a front seat where the driver and two passengers can be accommodated and
the back has a steel flooring enclosed with a steel walling of 16 to 17 inches tall on the sides
and with a 19 inches tall walling at the back. Before leaving Parang, the sitting arrangement
was as follows: defendant was at the wheel and seated with him in the front seat were Mrs.
Valencia and Nicanor Quinain; on the back of the pickup were two improvised benches
placed on each side, and seated on the right bench were Ricardo Alojipan and Antonio
Lagahit, and on the left one Bernardo and Pastor Geronimo. A person by the name of
Leoning was seated on a box located on the left side while in the middle Lara sat on a bag.
Before leaving Parang, defendant invited Lara to sit with him on the front seat but Lara
declined. It was their understanding that upon reaching barrio Samoay, Cotabato, the
passengers were to alight and take a bus bound for Davao, but when they arrived at that
place, only Bernardo alighted and the other passengers requested defendant to allow them to
ride with him up to Davao because there was then no available bus that they could take in
going to that place. Defendant again accommodated the passengers.

When they continued their trip, the sitting arrangement of the passengers remained the same,
Lara being seated on a bag in the middle with his arms on a suitcase and his head cove red
by a jacket. Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio Catidtuan, Lara accidentally fell from the pickup
and as a result he suffered serious injuries. Valencia stopped the pickup to see what
happened to Lara. He sought the help of the residents of that place and applied water to Lara
but to no avail. They brought Lara to the nearest place where they could find a doctor and not
having found any they took him to St. Joseph's Clinic of Kidapawan. But when Lara arrived he
was already dead. From there they proceeded to Davao City and immediately notified the
local authorities. An investigation was made regarding the circumstances surrounding the
death of Lara but no criminal action was taken against defendant.

ISSUE: Is there enough evidence to show that defendant failed to observe ordinary care or
diligence in transporting the deceased from Parang to Davao on the date in question?

HELD: NO.

It appears that the deceased, as well his companions who rode in the pickup of defendant,
were merely accommodation passengers who paid nothing for the service and so they can be
considered as invited guests within the meaning of the law.
As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the pickup
owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported
safely to their destination.



Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of authority that the owner or operator of an
automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and
not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. This
rule, as frequently stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a guest the
duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one riding in an
automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so, the same
obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of one expressly invited to ride" (5
Am. Jur., 626627). Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not
in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law
(Articles 1755 and 1756, new Civil Code).

We find that the same are not sufficient to show that defendant has failed to take the
precaution necessary to conduct his passengers safely to their place of destination for there is
nothing there to indicate that defendant has acted with negligence or without taking the
precaution that an ordinary prudent man would have taken under similar circumstances. It
should be noted that Lara went to the lumber concession of defendant in answer to a call of
duty which he was bound to perform because of the requirement of his office and he
contracted the malaria fever in the course of the performance of that duty. It should also be
noted that defendant was not in duty bound to take the deceased in his own pickup to Davao
because from Parang to Cotabato there was a line of transportation that regularly makes trips
for the public, and if defendant agreed to take the deceased in his own car, it was only to
accommodate him considering his feverish condition and his request that he be so
accommodated. It should also be noted that the passengers who rode in the pickup of
defendant took their respective seats therein at their own choice and not upon indication of
defendant with the particularity that defendant invited the deceased to sit with him in the front
seat but which invitation the deceased declined. The reason for this can only be attributed to
his desire to be at the back so that he could sit on a bag and travel in a reclining position
because such was more convenient for him due to his feverish condition. All the
circumstances therefore clearly indicate that defendant had done what a reasonable prudent
man would have done under the circumstances.

There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due to an
unforeseen accident accused by the fact that at the time the deceased was half asleep and
must have fallen from the pickup when it ran into some stones causing it to jerk considering
that the road was then bumpy, rough and full of stones.

"A passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to
himself" (Article 1761, new Civil Code), which means that if the injury to the passenger has
been proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.
All things considered, we are persuaded to conclude that the accident occurred not due to the
negligence of defendant but to circumstances beyond his control and so he should be exempt
from liability.

12. PRECILLANO NECESITO, ETC., v. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-10605; June 30, 1958
GERMAN NECESITO, ET AL., v. NATIVIDAD PARAS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-10606; June 30, 1958
REYES, J. B. L., J.:



FACTS:
In the morning of January 28, 1964, Severina Garces and her 1 old son, Precillano Necesito,
carrying vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck or bus No. 199 of the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines(PBR) at Agno, Pangasinan.

The passenger truck, driven by Francisco Bandonell, then proceeded on its regular run from
Agno to Manila. After passing Mangatarem, Pangasinan truck No. 199 entered a wooden
bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after wrecking the
bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep.

The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son, Precillano Necesito, was injured, He
was brought to the Provincial Hospital at Dagupan, where the fracture was set but with
fragments one centimeter out of line. The money, wrist watch and cargo of vegetables were
lost.

Two actions for damages and attorney's fees totalling over P85,000 having been filed in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the carrier, the latter pleaded that the accident was
due to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the of the driver
Bandonell.

TRIAL COURT RULING: After joint trial, the CFI found that the bus was proceeding slowly
due to the bad condition of the road; that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right
steering knuckle, which was defective in that its center or core was not compact but "bubbled
and cellulous", a condition that could not be known or ascertained by the carrier despite the
fact that regular thirty-day inspections were made. The trial court, holding that the accident
was exclusively due to fortuitous event, dismissed both actions. Plaintiffs appealed directly to
this Court in view of the amount in controversy.

CA RULING: We are inclined to agree with the trial court, and forced to assume that the
proximate cause of the accident was the reduced strength of the steering knuckle of the
vehicle caused by defects in casting it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle - YES
Whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence
required by law -NO

HELD:

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for the all the circumstances.

It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. His liability rests upon
negligence, his failure to exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires, and
by Art. 1756, in case of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the burden of satisfying
the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence required.



Under American jurisprudence, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent
or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance.
According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the
carrier from liability.
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor
control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the
carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective
equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It
is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not in insurer of the safety of his
passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if
such flaws were at all discoverable

The liability of the manufacturer must depend on the terms of the contract between him and
the carrier, of which the passenger has no knowledge, and over which he can have no
control, while the carrier can introduce what stipulations and take what securities he may think
proper. For injury resulting to the carrier himself by the manufacturer's want of care, the
carrier has a remedy against the manufacturer; but the passenger has no remedy against the
manufacturer for damage arising from a mere breach of contract with the carrier . . . .

The carrier, in consideration of certain well-known and highly valuable rights granted
to it by the public, undertakes certain duties toward the public, among them being to
provide itself with suitable and safe cars and vehicles in which carry the traveling
public. There is no such duty on the manufacturer of the cars. There is no reciprocal legal
relation between him and the public in this respect. When the carrier elects to have another
build its cars, it ought not to be absolved by that fact from its duty to the public to
furnish safe cars. The carrier cannot lessen its responsibility by shifting its
undertaking to another's shoulders. Its duty to furnish safe cars is side by side with its duty
to furnish safe track, and to operate them in a safe manner.
None of its duties in these respects can be sublet so as to relieve it from the full measure
primarily exacted of it by law. The carrier selects the manufacturer of its cars, if it does not
itself construct them, precisely as it does those who grade its road, and lay its tracks, and
operate its trains. That it does not exercise control over the former is because it elects to
place that matter in the hands of the manufacturer, instead of retaining the supervising control
itself. The manufacturer should be deemed the agent of the carrier as respects its duty
to select the material out of which its cars and locomotive are built, as well as in
inspecting each step of their construction. If there be tests known to the crafts of car
builders, or iron moulders, by which such defects might be discovered before the part was
incorporated into the car, then the failure of the manufacturer to make the test will be deemed
a failure by the carrier to make it. This is not a vicarious responsibility. It extends, as the
necessity of this business demands, the rule of respondeat superior to a situation which falls
clearly within its scope and spirit. Where an injury is inflicted upon a passenger by the
breaking or wrecking of a part of the train on which he is riding, it is presumably the result of
negligence at some point by the carrier.

In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the steering
knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any cracks
developed. It nowhere appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested
the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to standard, or that it had no
hidden flaws would impair that strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware of the


critical importance of the knuckle's resistance; that its failure or breakage would result in loss
of balance and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects upon the passengers. No
argument is required to establish that a visual inspection could not directly determine whether
the resistance of this critically important part was not impaired. Nor has it been shown that the
weakening of the knuckle was impossible to detect by any known test; on the contrary, there
is testimony that it could be detected. We are satisfied that the periodical visual inspection of
the steering knuckle as practiced by the carrier's agents did not measure up to the required
legal standard of "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" "as far as human care and
foresight can provide", and therefore that the knuckle's failure cannot be considered a
fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility.

A due regard for the carrier's obligations toward the traveling public demands adequate
periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those vehicle portions the failure of
which may endanger the safe of the passengers.

13. Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 118864

Facts:
Private respondents were passengers of Japan Airlines from San Francisco California bound
for Manila. The flights were to make an overnight stopover at Nairita, Japan as an incentive
for traveling, at the airlines' expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day. Upon
arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko
Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went
to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which
rendered the NAIA inaccessible, respondents flight from Japan to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely. JAL assumed the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15,
1991. However, JAL no longer settled their hotel and accommodation expenses during stay at
Narita, Japan. Since NAIA was only reopened for airlines traffic on June 22, 1991, private
respondent were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their
personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Hence, they commenced an action for
damages against JAL for failing to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when
it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to June 21, 1991.

Private respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort
to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation
expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL
was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long as they were still stranded in Narita. On the
other hand, JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested
right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to "force majeure."

Issue:
Whether or not JAL was liable for the hotel and meal expenses defrayed by private
respondents while pending destination.

Held:



The Supreme Court held that JAL cannot be held liable. A contract to transport passengers is
quite different in kind, and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude
that it is a relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to
live up to the exacting standards of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that
may be sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers are
absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a
fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense of "force majeure," as an
exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.

14. Yobido v. CA |G.R. 113003 17 October 1997
Romero, J.

Facts: On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children boarded at
Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido Liner bus bound for Davao City. The left front tire of the
bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine. The incident resulted in the death of 28-year-old Tito
Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers. The plaintiffs asserted that violation of the
contract of carriage between them and the defendants was brought about by the drivers
failure to exercise the diligence required of the carrier in transporting passengers safely to
their place of destination. The bus which was full of passengers had cargoes on top. For their
part, the defendants tried to establish that the accident was due to a fortuitous event. Abundio
Salce, who was the bus conductor when the incident happened, testified that the bus was not
full as there were only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat. He
affirmed that the left front tire that exploded was a brand new tire that he mounted on the
bus five (5) days before the incident. The trial court found that the falling of the bus to the cliff
was a result of no other outside factor than the tire blow-out. It held that the ruling in the La
Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v. De Jesus that a tire blowout is a mechanical defect of
the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been
subjected to a more thorough or rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning is
inapplicable to this case. In this case, however, the cause of the explosion remains a mystery
until at present. As such, the court added, the tire blowout was a caso fortuito which is
completely an extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the defendants who
should be relieved of whatever liability the plaintiffs may have suffered by reason of the
explosion pursuant to Article 1174 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals rendered the
Decision reversing that of the lower court.

Issue: Is the explosion of a newly installed tire of a passenger vehicle a fortuitous event that
exempts the carrier from liability for the death of a passenger?

Held: NO. The Civil Code provides:Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Accordingly, in culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed


to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that the carrier had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by
Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger
was due to a fortuitous event. A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; (d) the obligor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. As Article 1174 provides, no person
shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency
from the cause of injury or loss. Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the
new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the
situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from
manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact
that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in
the conclusion that it could not explode within five days use. Be that as it may, it is settled
that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its
driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. Moreover,
a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous
event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the
death or injury resulting from an accident. It is interesting to note that petitioners proved
through the bus conductor, Salce, that the bus was running at 60-50 kilometers per hour
only or within the prescribed lawful speed limit. However, they failed to rebut the testimony of
Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down.
These contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the
presumption of negligence of the carrier in the law. Coupled with this is the established
condition of the road rough, winding and wet due to the rain. It was incumbent upon the
defense to establish that it took precautionary measures considering partially dangerous
condition of the road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not
sufficient proof that it was not negligent. Petitioners should have shown that it undertook
extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier, such as conducting daily routinary check-ups
of the vehicles parts.

15. VDA. DE NUECA v. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

Facts: - At 3 p.m. on Dec. 22, 1958, Fermin Nueca brought 7 sacks of palay to Manila
Railroad Co. (MRC) at its station in Barrio del Rosario, Camarines Sur, to be shipped to the
municipality of Libmanan of the same province. - He paid P 0.70 as freight charge and was
issued Way Bill No. 56515. - The cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of Train 537.
Passengers boarded the train and shunting operations started to hook a wagon thereto. -
Before the train reached the turnoff switch, its passenger coach fell on its side some 40 m
from the station. The wagon pinned Nueca, killing him instantly. - Nuecas widow and children
bring this claim for damages, alleging that the Nueca was a passenger and his death was
caused by MRCs negligence. - MRC disclaimed liability stating: (1) it exercised due care in


safeguarding the passengers during the shunting operation, (2) Nueca was not a passenger
but a trespasser, (3) even if Nueca were a passenger, he illegally boarded the train without
permission by not paying the fare, (4) the mishap was not attributable to any defect in MRC
equipment, (5) that the accident happened due to force majeur. -MRC presented evidence
showing there was no mechanical defect, but it did not explain why the accident occurred or
show that force majeur caused the mishap. - The lower court absolved MRC of liability and
held that Nueca was a trespasser since he did not buy any ticket, and in any case, was not in
a proper place for passengers.

Issue: 1. W/N Nueca was a passenger?
2. W/N MRC is liable?
3. Was the accident due to MRCs negligence or force majeur?
4. Is Nueca liable for contributory negligence?

Held: 1. No, Nueca was not a passenger thus, MRC did not owe him extraordinary diligence.
A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract, express or
implied, with the carrier as to the payment of the fare, or that which is accepted as an
equivalent. The relation of passenger and carrier commences when one puts himself in the
care of the carrier, or directly under its control, with the bona fide intention of becoming a
passenger, and is accepted as such by the carrier as where he makes a contract for
trasportation and presents himself at the proper place and in a proper manner to be
transported. Even disregarding the matter of tickets, and assuming Nueca intended to be a
passenger, he was never accepted as such by MRC as he did not present himself at the
proper place and in a proper manner to be transported.
2. Yes, the liability of railroad companies to persons upon the premises is determined by the
general rules of negligence relating to duties of owners/occupiers of property. While railroad
companies are not bound to the same degree of care in regard to strangers who are
unlawfully upon the premises of its passengers, it may still be liable to such strangers for
negligent or tortious acts. Here, Nueca was not on the track, but either unlawfully inside the
baggage car or beside the track. It is normal for people to walk on the track or roadbed when
there is no oncoming train and to walk beside the track when a train passes. This practice is
tolerated by MRC. Generally, MRCs stations are not enclosed, and is easily accessible to the
public.
3. MRC is negligent; doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied. The train was under the complete
control of the railroad company at the time of the accident. The baggage car would not have
been derailed if the train had been properly operated. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
4. No. An invitation to stay in the premises is implied from the lack of prohibition to outsiders
to keep off the premises, hence, a stranger who is injured by a derailed train while staying
beside a railroad track is not guilty of contributory negligence. Note: Our law on common
carriers is lifted from Anglo- American statutes.


16. Dangwa VS CA October 7, 1991
G.R. No. 95582, Regalado,J.



FACTS: On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudimat as a result of a vehicular accident which occured
on March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. While petitioner Theodore M.
Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless and
imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to
persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. Due to the negligence of
the of the appellee-driver in prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the
passenger to first secure his seat resulting in the latter to fall from the platform of the bus and
was run over by the rear tires of the vehicle. Instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the
nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the
victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their destinations before bringing said
victim to Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
Petitioners alleged that they had observed and continue to observe the extraordinary
diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and the supervision of the
employees. It was further alleged that it was the victims own carelessness and negligence
which gave rise to the accident. They claim that the victim was negligent in trying to board of
moving vehicle without giving the driver or conductor any indication that he wishes to board
the bus.
Trial Court rendered a decision holding Pedrito Cudiamat negligent , which negligence was
the proximate cause of his death. Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the lower court
and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the CA is right in its contention in holding petitioner driver and petitioner
corporation liable for the death of the victim?

HELD: YES. It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances a
reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an oppurtunity to board and enter and
they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting
up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so. It is not negligent per se, as a
matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An
ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt to board the moving conveyance
under the same or similar circumstances.
The victim herein, in stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a
passenger and entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual realtion.
Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons
extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according
to all the circumstances of each case.
It has been held that an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to
pay the damages sought by the passenger. The carrier assumes the express obligation to
transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances and any injury that might be a suffered by the passenger
is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. It is incumbent upon the
carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence.
Judgment and resolution of respodent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.



NOTE: When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the
same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a
continuous offer to bus riders. It becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time
the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger
while he was attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this
case was a breach of such duty.

17. La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966
Barrera, J.

Facts: Plaintiffs Mariano Beltran and family boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, plate TPU
No. 757, owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for
Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. After the bus reached Anao where, it stopped to allow the
passengers bound and the plaintiffs got off. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy
to get his other bayong, not noticing his daughter Raquel followed him. While said Mariano
Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong,
the bus suddenly started moving forward, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not
given the driver the customary signal to start. Sensing that the bus was again in motion,
Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from
the conductor. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a
dead child, which was his daughter Raquel. RTC found defendant liable for breach of contract
of carriage and sentenced to pay P3, 000.00 and P400.00 as compensatory damages
representing burial expenses and costs. Court of Appeals raised liability to P6, 000.00,
although the Court of Appeals sustained this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-
appellant guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its
driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
WON C.A. erred in holding defendant liable for quasi-delict, considering that the same
complaint was one for breach of contract?

Ruling:
No, it has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease
at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the
carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable
time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.
In the present case, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost
diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put
off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him
the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers
Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier,
entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage. THUS, the defendant is liable for the
death of the child.

18. Aboitiz Shipping v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84458, Nov. 6, 1989


Regalado, J.

Ratio: The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed
at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination,
safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving
the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes
a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure.
Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded M/V Antonia at the port at San Jose, Negros Occidental. The
vessel was bound for Manila and it was owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. The vessel
arrived in Manila on May 12, 1975 and the passengers were provided a gangplank on their
way out from the vessel to the port. Instead of using the gangplank, Viana disembarked from
the vessel via the third deck of the ship, which was on the level of the pier. After
disembarking, Viana remembered that he still had belongings on board so he returned to the
ship but while conversing with the crew and pointing to said crew the place where his cargo
was , a crane that was operated by Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation hit him and pinned
him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was brought to the hospital and he
passed away three days after the incident. On his death certificate, it was said that his cause
of death was "hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone
lacerating the urinary bladder."

Viana's wife and parents constituted a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of
contract of carriage but Aboitiz denied responsibility, contending that at the time of the
incident, the vessel was under the control of Pioneer and the crane operator is not an
employee of Aboitiz therefore it cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.

Aboitiz instituted a third-party complaint against Pioneer, imputing liability for Anacleto Viana's
death as having been allegedly caused by the negligence of the crane operator who was an
employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and supervision. Pioneer answers by saying
Aboitiz has no cause of action against them and they are not liable because the Vianas are
suing Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage, to which Pioneer is not a party to.

Trial Court's judgment: in favor of Vianas; ordered Aboitiz to pay the Vianas for damages and
Pioneer reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount they pay the Vianas.

After filing motions for reconsideration, the trial court then absolved Pioneer of its liability as
the Vianas and Aboitiz were unable to establish that there was negligence on the part of the
crane operator.

Court of Appeals judgment: affirmed the decision of the trial court with the exception of award
of damages

Issue: Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and liable for the death of Anacleto Diaz

Held: YES. As to the contention of Aboitiz that Viana ceases to be its passenger because an
hour had already passed since he disembarked from the vessel, the Court maintains that the


relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises.

Aboitiz failed to establish that the an hour prior to the incident, Viana had already
disembarked from the vessel. It can then be presumed that the victim had only left the vessel
when he went to retrieve his belongings. Under the circumstances, the Court rules that Viana
is still a passenger of the carrier at the time of his death.

A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. When a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is thus presumed to have
been at fault or have acted negligently. There was no evidence found by the Court of Appeals
that the passengers were sufficiently warned that venturing to the area was dangerous. Also,
there was no showing that Aboitiz was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that
said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of
preventing entry into the forbidden area.

While it may have been established that the deceased was contributorily negligent, the fact
that Aboitiz still failed to exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause
of Viana's death as it could have prevented the scenario from happening.

19. Mallari Sr. vs CA
G.R. No. 128607, January 31, 2000

Facts: The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned by Mallari Sr. collided with the
delivery van of Bulletin along the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera
which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of
Bulletin coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. The collision
occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The
impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its
passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his
injuries.

Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr.
and Mallari Jr., and also against Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands
Insurance Co. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of Israel
was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney and the
Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.

The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Angeles
(the driver of the Bulletin delivery van) considering the fact that the left front portion of the
delivery truck hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney. Thus, the trial
court ordered Bulletin and Angeles to pay jointly and severally Claudia Reyes. The trial
court also ordered N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company to indemnify Claudia, which when
paid would be deducted from the liabilities of Bulletin and Angeles to the plaintiff.

On appeal, the court reversed the decision of the lower court and held that it was Mallari Jr.
who was negligent. The CA ordered both Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. to pay Claudia Reyes and


absolved from any liability respondent Bulletin, Angeles and N.V. Netherlands Insurance
Company. Hence, this petition.


Issue: W/N petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel - YES

Held: The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking
another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not
to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a
curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does
not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a
car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.

Petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the
opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00
o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles
in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision
resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole
negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who
recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by
traffic rules.

Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating
a traffic regulation. Petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. failed to present satisfactory
evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding
against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney
engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based on contract of
carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of
the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the
passenger. Under Art. 1755of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover,
under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it
observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable
for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
formers employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its
employees. Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr.
assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury or
death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier.




20. LRTA vs. Navidad | February 16, 2003
G.R. No. 145804, Vitug, J.

Facts: In October 14, 1993, Nicanor Navidad, herein deceased, entered the EDSA LRT
station drunk after purchasing a token which serves as the ticket of the passengers of the
LRTA. Junelito Escartin, a security guard of petitioner, apprehended the deceased leading to
a fist fight between the two resulting to the deceased falling on the LRT tracks. At the precise
moment of the deceaseds fall, a train being operated by one Rodolfo Roman came in
causing the death of the deceased. Marjore Navidad, herein respondent and the widow of
Nicanor, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners and Prudent Securities. The
trial court ruled in favour of the respondents causing the petitioners to appeal to the appellate
court. The appellate affirmed the decision of the trial court stating that a contract of carriage
had already existed between the petitioner and deceased despite the non-boarding of the
latter which obligates the former to exercise extraordinary diligence. However, Prudent
Securities and Escartin were exonerated since respondents failed to prove that the proximate
cause of the death of Nicanor was due to the fist blows of Escartin. Hence, the instant petition
wherein petitioners aver that Escartin caused the deceased to fall in the tracks and that an act
of stranger could not have been prevented.

Issue: Whether or not the LRTA is liable for damages.

Held: The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. Article 1755 of the Civil Code imposes the
obligation to common carriers to exercise extraordinary diligence in the carriage of
passengers and that in cases of death or injuries, Article 1756 gives rise to the presumption
that the common carrier acted negligently. Articles 1759 and 1763, also impose the liability to
the common carrier due to the negligent or wilful acts of their employees, strangers and other
passengers. In the instant case, the obligation of the LRTA to exercise extraordinary diligence
in the carriage of passengers arose from the moment the deceased entered into a contract of
carriage with the former by purchasing a ticket and presenting himself for boarding. Even
though Escartin and Roman are employees of Prudent and Metro Transit respectively,
petitioners cannot escape liability because of the mandate of Article 1759 and 1763 which
obligates common carriers to answer for the negligence of their employees, strangers and
other passengers. It is their duty to carry their passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, with due regard for all the circumstance as mandated by Article 1755 of
the New Civil Code. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages as a common carrier.

21. Pestao v. Sumayang, Dec. 4, 2000
GR NO. 139875, Panganiban, J.

FACTS: Around 2pm of August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along
the national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu,. Riding with him was his friend Manuel
Romagos. As they came upon a junction where the highway connected with the road leading
to Tobagon, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by petitioner Pestao and owed by
petitioner corporation Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation, which had tried to overtake them,
sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. Sumayang was
prounced dead on arrival while Romagos succumbed to his injuries a day after.


According to Ignacio Neis, he saw both vehicles coming from the north and as the motorcycle
approached the junction to Tabagon, the driver signalled his left arm to indicate that he was
taking the Tabagon Road but as the motorcycle was turning left it was bumped by the
overspeeding bus.
Pestao blamed Sumayang for the accident. He testified that when he first blew his horn, the
motorcycle went to the right side of the highway and when he blew again his horn to
acccelerate and overtake them, the motorcycle suddenly turned left toward Tabagon Road.
He was able only to apply his break after the impact.
To substantiate its defense of bonos pater familias, Pestao explained how his driving
experience and ability were tested by the company before he was hired. He further declared
that the management gave regular lectures to drivers and conductors and that he checked
together with the mechanic the tires, signal lights, as well as the tools to be brought along on
that same day. The corporation presented its maintenance supervisor who corrobated
Pestaos testimony that his driving ability was roughly tested, and that all drivers underwent
periodic lecture on various aspects of safety friving. They also confirmed the through checkup
of every vehicle before it would depart.
The lower court found Pestao to have been negligent in attemptong to overtake the
motorcycle at a dangerous speed. The court likewise found Metro Cebu directly and primarily
liable for failure to present evidence that it had observed due diligence in the supervision of
damage. Nor has Metro Cebu proved that it had exercised due diligence in the supervision of
its employees and in the maintenance of its vehicles.
The CA affrimed the respondents liability for the accident and for Sumayangs death. It
further stated that METRO CEBU had shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and
supervision of its employees. By allowing the bus to ply its route despite the defective
speedometer. Having failed to observe the extraordinary diligence required of public
transportation, it was held liable to the victims of the vehicular accident.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Pestao was negligent?
WON Metro Cebu should be held liable?

Held: YES. The CA agreed with the Trial Court that the vehicular collision was caused by
Pestao negligence when he attempted to overtake the motorcycle. He should have
anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous manuever and should have exercised
extreme caution.

YES. Under Art. 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for
damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the
selection or in the supervision of said employees. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. The CA said that allowing
Pestao to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro
Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence
alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver. Pestao was able to use a bus with a faulty


speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in
the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence
required by law. The Petition is Denied and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.

22. Ludo & Luym Corp vs CA | February 1, 2001
GR No. 125483

Facts: Petitioner Ludo & Luym Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in copra
processing with plant and business offices in Cebu City. Private Respondent Gabisan
Shipping Lines was the registered owner and operator of the motor vessel MV Miguela, while
the other private respondent, Anselmo Olasiman, was its captain. Petitioner owns and
operates a private wharf used by vessels for loading and unloading of copra and other
processed products. Among its wharfs facilities are fender pile clusters for docking and
mooring. On May 21, 1990, at around 1:30 P.M., while MV Miguela was docking at
petitioners wharf, it rammed and destroyed a fender pile cluster. Petitioner demanded
damages from private respondents. The latter refused. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and the trial court disposed the case in
favor of petitioner. Upon private respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision and denied the motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable to this case?

Held: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was explained in Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258
SCRA 334 (1996), thus:

Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

The doctrine recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof
and allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. This is invoked when
under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. According to
SC, all the requisites for recourse to this doctrine exist. First, MV Miguela was under the
exclusive control of its officers and crew. Petitioner did not have direct evidence on what
transpired within as the officers and crew maneuvered the vessel to its berthing place. We
note the Court of Appeals finding that Naval and Espina were not knowledgeable on the
vessels maneuverings, and could not testify on the negligence of the officers and crew.
Second, aside from the testimony that MV Miguela rammed the cluster pile, private
respondent did not show persuasively other possible causes of the damage.


23. Roberto Juntilla vs. Clemente Fontanar , et al.
G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985; GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:



Doctrine: A tire-blow out cannot be considered a fortuitous event when it is coupled with
negligence. The specific circumstances must be taken into account before it is classified as a
fortuitous event that will relieve carriers of liability.

FACTS:

Roberto Juntilla was the passenger of a public utility jeepney bound to Cebu City from Danao
City. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the
vehicle to turn turtle and Juntilla, who was then seated at the front part of the jeepney, was
thrown out. As a result of which, Juntilla momentarily lost consciousness and suffered several
wounds on his palm, arm, thigh and back. After the incident, he went back to Danao City but
he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. When he arrived in Danao City, he
requested his father-in-law to go to the place of the accident and look for the watch but the
same can no longer be found. At the time of the accident, the jeepney was driven by Berfol
Camoro and it was registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar, but it was actually
owned by Fernando Banzon. Juntilla then sued for breach of contract and damages against
all three respondents.

The respondents contend that the accident was beyond their control taking into account that
the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up.

The City Court of Cebu (MTC) decision: The Court rendered judgment in favor of Juntilla
ordering the respondents to pay him the following sums: a) P750.00 as reimbursement for the
lost Omega wrist watch; b) P246.64 as unrealized salary of the petitioner; c) P100.00 for
doctor's fees and medicine; and d) P300.00 for attorney's fees.

The respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

The Court of First Instance (RTC) decision: The Court reversed the lower courts judgment
stating that the accident was due to a fortuitous event.

Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of First Instance. He
now comes before the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the accident was a fortuitous event that would absolve respondents from
liability

RULING:

The accident is not a fortuitous event.

A tire blow-out is an inevitable accident that exempts the carrier from liability, absent a
showing of misconduct or negligence on the part of the operator in the operation and
maintenance of the vehicle. However, the case at bar will not fall under caso fortuito since the
accident was not independent of human will. The Court ruled that the accident was caused
either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire.

A. Negligence of the driver



1. The jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident.
-
This evidence is established by the fact that the jeepney jumped into a ditch when its right
rear tire blew up. A vehicle running on a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch
even when one of its tires blows up.


2. The jeepney was overloaded
- Juntilla stated there were 3 passengers in front of the seat and 14 passengers in the rear.

Also, no evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road
conditions or that necessary precautions were taken by the driver to avoid the accident. The
sudden blowing-up of the tire could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into
the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the
accident

B. Mechanical Defects

1. Exercise of Extraordinary Diligence

- This Court has ruled in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al. (104 Phil. 75), that a passenger is
entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance
purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been
discovered by the carrier had it exercised extraordinary diligence with regard to inspection
and application of the necessary tests.

2. Manufacturer is the agent of the carrier

- The manufacturer is considered as the agent of the carrier since the passenger has neither
choice nor control over the selection and use of the equipment and appliances that the carrier
chooses to use. Having no privity whatsoever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective
equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has.

The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and as a result of
which it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.

Hence, the decision of the Court of First Instance is REVERSED and the decision of the City
Court is REINSTATED.

24. Bayasen vs CA
G.R. No. L-25785, February 26, 1981

Facts: Dr. Saturnino Bayasen, the Rural Health Physician in Sagada, Mountain Province,
went to barrio Ambasing to visit a patient. He drove a Rural Health Unit Jeep. From there, two
nurses, namely Elena Awichen and Dolores Balcita, rode with him in the jeep. On his way to
barrio Langtiw, the jeep went over a precipice. About 8 ft. below the road, it was blocked by a
pine tree. The three were thrown out of the jeep. Elena Awichen was found lying in a creek
further below. Among other injuries, she suffered a skull fracture which caused her death.



The CFI of Mountain Province found Dr. Bayasen guilty of the crime of Homicide thru
Reckless Imprudence. The CA affirmed the same with modifications. The appellate court held
that the unfortunate accident was due to appellants failure to exercise due diligence under
the circumstances. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N Dr. Bayasen (petitioner) is entitled to acquittal on the ground that the CAs finding
that the proximate cause of the death of Awichen was the petitioners negligence in driving at
an unreasonable speed is contrary to the evidence of the prosecution. - YES

Held: Dolores Balcita testified that petitioner was driving his jeep moderately just before the
accident and categorically stated that she did not know what caused the jeep to fall into the
precipice. In light of her testimony, there is absolutely no evidence on record to show that the
accused was negligent in driving his jeep.

These answers of Dolores Balcita are all in the negative and equivocal. They do not deny or
preclude the truth of the positive testimony of the accused. As to the relative weight to be
given to the positive and consistent testimony of the accused (petitioner) and to the negative
and equivocal answers of Dolores Balcita, the former is more worthy of credence.

Bolstering Balcitas testimony, Pablo Lizardo, then mayor of Sagada, testified that he found
the jeep in second gear.

It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of
the jeep and not the unreasonable speed of the petitioner. Skidding means partial or complete
loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. It may
occur without fault. No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the
petitioner.

25. Cervantes vs CA | March 2, 1999
125138: J. Purisima

Facts:
On March 27, 1989, Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL) issued to Nicholas Cervantes a round trip
plane ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which ticket expressly
provided an expiry date of one year from issuance, i.e., until March 27, 1990. On March 23,
1990, the petitioner used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles on the same day, he immediately
booked his Los Angeles-Manila return ticket with the PAL office, and it was confirmed for the
April 2, 1990 flight. However, upon learning that the same PAL plane would make a stop-over
in San Francisco, and considering that he would be there on April 2, 1990, petitioner made
arrangements with PAL for him to board the flight in San Francisco instead of boarding in Los
Angeles. On April 2, 1990, when the petitioner checked in at the PAL counter in San
Francisco, he was not allowed to board by the PAL personnel due to the expiration of the
validity of his ticket. Thus, Cervantes filed a Complaint for Damages for breach of contract of
carriage and before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Surigao del Norte. He claimed that
the act of the PAL agents in confirming his ticket extended its period of validity. But the trial


court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:
WoN the act of PALs agents in confirming subject ticket extended the period of validity of the
petitioners ticket.

Held:
No. The Court ruled that since the PAL agents are not privy to the agreement in the issuance
of the ticket and the petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was
necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The said agents,
according to the Court of Appeals, acted without authority when they confirmed the flights of
the petitioner. Under Article 1898 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the
scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or
impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person knows that the agent was acting beyond his
power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said
third person (herein petitioner) is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not
entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the
principals ratification.

26. De Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
G.R. L-8034, November 18, 1955, Reyes, J.B.L. J.,

Facts: On April 1, 1946, at 7:30 am, Lt. Tomas Gillaco, husband of petitioner Cornelia A. de
Gillaco, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from
Calamba, Laguna to Manila. When the train reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio
Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company, happened to be in said station waiting
for the same train which would take him to Tutuban station, where he was going to report for
duty. Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, dating back to the
Japanese occupation. Devesa shot Gillaco upon seeing him inside the train coach with the
carbine furnished to him by the Manila Railroad Company for his use as a train guard. Gillaco
died as a result of the wound he sustained from the shot fired by Devesa. Consequently,
Devesa was convicted of homicide by final judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner filed an action against the Manila Railroad Company with the CFI Laguna. The trial
court sentenced the railroad company to pay P4,000 damages as a result of the negligence of
their employee. The railroad company appealed.

Issue: Is respondent Manila Railroad Company liable for the act of Devesa?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The act of Devesa in shooting Gillaco was entirely unforeseeable by respondent Manila
Railroad Company. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would
meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist between each
one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its
trains. The shooting in question was therefore caso fortuito within the definition of Art. 1105*


of the old Civil Code, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances.
Pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of Manila Railroads contract of safe
carriage with the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby.

* Art. 1105 of the Old Civil Code states that No one shall be liable for events which could not
be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in
which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes
such liability.


27. Antonia Maranan v. Pascual Perez, et al.
G.R. No. L-22272; June 26, 1967; BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS:
On October 18, 1960,Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by
Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.

Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the CFI of Batangas. Found guilty, sentenced to
suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.Appeal
from said conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals.

On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an
action in the CFI of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of
her son.

Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the
driver by stabbing him from behind, Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito
for which the carrier was not liable.

The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against
defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed.

From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking
for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier mentioned,
during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered
therein.

ISSUE:
Whether or not carrier is liable for the death of the passenger through employees wilful act

HELD:
Yes. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad
Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees
upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar


are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope
and the course of duty of the guilty employee.

Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger,
in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In
other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course
of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his
duties.

Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which,
unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the
safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees.
The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted
the carrier from liability.

Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common
carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the
wording of Art. 1759:

Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests
either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's
implied duty to transport the passenger safely.

Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within
the course of employment only.

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that
the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier
that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The
carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from
assaults committed by its own employees.

As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule
based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. From a
jurisprudence; (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger
that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed
by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other
passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the
passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to
passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of
his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the
passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the
passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's


employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and
remove them.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with
due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less
important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and
social attitude.

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly
adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of
the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on
breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is
covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.

28. Philippine National Railways vs. CA
139 SCRA 87

Facts:
Winifredo Tupang was a paying passenger who boarded Train No. 516 f the Philippine
National Railways at Camarines Sur bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the
train stopped which took two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila.
Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Tupang fell off the train resulting to his
death. Alarm was raised by the passengers that somebody fell but the train did not stop.
Instead, the train conductor called the station agent and requested for verification of the
confirmation. Police authorities of Lucena City were
dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang.

Rosario Tupang, the deceaseds widow filed a complaint against PNR for breach of contract f
carriage. Court of First Instance of Rizal, after trial, held the petitioner PNR liable for damages
for breach of contract of carriage. On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the
trial ourt that the PNR did not exercise the utmost diligence required by law of a common
carrier. Moving for reconsideration of the above decision, the PNR raised for the first time, as
a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit and that PNR was a mere agency of the
Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of it own. Likewise, they
contended that their funds are governmental in character, thus they are not subject to
garnishment or execution.

Issue:
Whether or not PNR could be held liable for damages for the death of Winifredo Tupang.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that PNR should be held liable. The Philippine National Railways is
not exempt from garnishment. It descends to a level of a citizen, thus it cannot assail non-
suability as a bar for damages. Under PA 4156, PNR was created generally with all powers of
a corporation under the Corporation Law. Hence, the characteristics and attributes of a
corporation is fully applicable to PNR. PNR may sue and be sued and could be subjected to
court processes just like any other corporation.



29. Cesar Isaac v. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. L-9671 August 23, 1957, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Facts: A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as defendant, is a
corporation engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land for compensation in
the Bicol provinces and one of the lines it operates is the one connecting Legaspi City, Albay
with Naga City, Camarines Sur. One of the buses which defendant was operating is Bus No.
31. On May 31, 1951, plaintiff boarded said bus as a passenger paying the required fare from
Ligao, Albay bound for Pili, Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus
collided with a motor vehicle of the pick-up type coming from the opposite direction, as a
result of which plaintiff's left arm was completely severed and the severed portion fell inside
the bus. It appears that the pick- up car was at full speed and was running outside of its
proper lane. The driver of the bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was then
running, swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear wheels
have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road. Said driver
could not move the bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of
which was about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his passengers. And
notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car.
Plaintiff was subsequently rushed to a hospital for emergency treatment, and was thereafter
transferred to two other hospitals for operation and rehabilitation for a total duration of more
than 5 months, and incurring a total expense of P623.40 for the ordeal.

Thus, plaintiff brought this action against defendants for damages alleging that the collision
which resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and
recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by defendant and that defendant incurred in
culpa-contractual arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff safely
to his, destination.

Defendant set up as special defense that the injury suffered by plaintiff was due entirely to the
fault or negligence of the driver of the pick-up car which collided with the bus driven by its
driver and to the contributory negligence of plaintiff himself. Defendant further claims that the
accident which resulted in the injury of plaintiff is one which defendant could not foresee or,
though foreseen, was inevitable.
The Trial Court ruled in favour of the defendant. The case was thus appealed.

Issue/s: (1) Whether or not mere breach of contract (culpa-contractual) is sufficient to attach
liability to a common carrier.
(2) Whether or not extraordinary diligence has been observed by the bus driver

Ruling:

1. No. From the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and
7), we can make the following restatement of the principles governing the liability of a
common carrier:

(1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There
is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances of
each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a


very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is
presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to,
passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4)
the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.

Thus, a mere perusal thereof would show that the liability of the carrier was predicated not
upon mere breach of its contract of carriage but upon the finding that its negligence was
found to be the direct or proximate cause of the injury complained of. Ergo, the necessity to
determine the exercise of extraordinary diligence now arises.

2. Yes. While the position taken by appellant appeals more to the sense of caution that one
should observe in a given situation to avoid an accident or mishap, such however cannot
always be expected from one who is placed suddenly in a predicament where he is not given
enough time to take the course of action as he should under ordinary circumstances. One
who is placed in such a predicament cannot exercise such coolness or accuracy of judgment
as is required of him under ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected to
observe the same judgment, care and precaution as in the latter.
Thus, it was held that "where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency,
the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken
into account, and he is held to the same degree of care that he would otherwise be required
to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as any
ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the
failure on his part to exercise the best judgement the case renders possible does not
establish lack of care and skill on his part which renders the company liable. Considering all
the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver of the bus has done what a
prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and in our opinion this relieves appellee
from liability under our law.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; MILITATION OF CARRIERS LIABILITY
Plaintiff seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with
his left elbow outside the window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took
place. It is for this reason that the collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the
body of appellant thus doing him a great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is
guilty of contributory negligence. Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with a
portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been avoided as is the case
with the other passenger. It is to be noted that appellant was the only victim of the collision.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; NEGLIGENCE PER SE; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
INJURY
It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily or
inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through the
window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface of the car, so
as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can be
had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained.

30. Bachelor Express vs. CA
G.R. No. 85691, July 31, 1990, Gutierrez, Jr. J.,



Facts: On August 1, 1980, Bus 800, owned by petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by
Cresencio Rivera came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan
City. While at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger. Fifteen minutes
later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion
and panic among the passengers. When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and
Narcisa Rautraut were already dead and found lying down the road. The passenger-assailant
alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police.

Thereafter, the heirs of Beter and Rautraut filed a complaint for sum of money against
Bachelor Express, its alleged owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera. After due trial, the
trial court issued an order dated August 8, 1985 dismissing the complaint. Respondent CA
reversed and set aside the trial courts decision, finding Bachelor Express, Yasay and Rivera
jointly and solidarily liable to pay the amount of P75,000.00 in loss of earnings and support,
moral damages, straight death indemnity and attorneys fees to the heirs of Beter, and the
amount of P45,000.00 for straight death indemnity, moral damages and attorneys fees to the
heirs of Rautraut. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue: Is the Court of Appeals correct in holding petitioners liable for damages?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Bachelor Express failed to overcome the presumption of negligence of common carriers
found in Art 1755 of the Civil Code.

The negligence of the common carrier, through its employees, consisted of the lack of
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising vigilance and utmost care
of the safety of its passengers, exemplified by the drivers belated stop and the reckless
opening of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably fast speed.

Bachelor Express argument that they are not insurers of their passengers deserves no
merit in view of their failure to prove that the death of the two passengers were exclusively
due to force majeure and not to their failure to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting
safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law.

31. Manila Railroad Company v. Macaria Ballesteros

Rules applicable: Article 1763 of the Civil Code and Section 48 (b) of the Motor
Vehicle Law
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the wilfull acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers,
if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person to
drive the motor vehicle under his control, or permit a person, sitting beside him
or in any other part of the car, to interfere with him in the operation of the motor


vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the steering wheel, or in any
other manner take part in the manipulation or control of the car.
__________________________________________________________________________
Facts: Private respondents (plaintiffs below) were passengers on petitioners bus driven by
Jose Anastacio. Anastacio stopped the bus at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to replace a
defective spark. While he was thus engaged, Dionisio Abello, an auditor assigned to
defendant company by the General Auditing Office, took hold of the steering wheel. Although
Anastacio tried to take the wheel back twice, Abello remained in control of it. While
proceeding to Isabela, petitioners bus collided with a freight truck driven by Marcial Nocum,
who, while trying to evade the holes on the right lane, swerved towards the middle of the
road. The left side of the truck smashed the left side of the bus resulting in extensive
damages to the body of the bus and leaving several passengers injured, including plaintiffs.
Petitioner contends that the negligence of the freight truck driver could not be imputed to it;
thus, it shall be absolved from liability. The trial court rejected petitioners contention, finding
Dionisio Abello negligent when he was driving the bus at the rate of 40 to 50 kilometers per
hour on a bumpy road.

Petitioner also argues that it cannot be held responsible for the acts of Abello, who was not its
employee. The trial court likewise rejected petitioners claim, considering the provisions of
Article 1763 of the Civil Code and Section 48 (b) of the Motor Vehicle Law (stated above) The
trial court also found that there were negotiations between the parties and that the
Government Corporate Counsel, who represents petitioner, advised the latter to accept the
reasonable offer of the claimants after analyzing that Anastacios act of allowing Abello to
drive constitute reckless imprudence. His advice, however, was not favorably acted upon,
petitioner obviously preferring to litigate.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petition can be taken up on appeal;
(2) Whether or not petitioner can be held responsible for the acts of Abello, who is not its
employee

Held:
(1) No. The issues proposed to be taken up on appeal are: whether or not Dionisio Abello
acted with reckless negligence while driving petitioner's bus at the time of the accident, and
whether or not petitioner may be held liable on account of such negligence, considering that
he was not its employee. These are no longer justiciable questions. The trial court previously
dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was manifestly interposed to delay the settlement
of the just and reasonable claims of herein plaintiffs, which have been pending since 1958.
The fact that an appeal is frivolous and interposed only for purposes of delay has been
recognized as a valid ground to deny issuance of the writ of mandamus to compel the trial
court to approve and certify the appeal.
(2) The defense put up by petitioner that it cannot be held responsible for the acts of Abello
had already been correctly overruled by the trial court, there being no possible doubt in view
of the provisions of the Civil Code and of the Motor Vehicle Law hereinbefore cited. With
Abello driving, the bus stopped from time to time to pick up passengers. Anastacio, the


regular driver, could have taken over. Clearly, Anastacio could have prevented the act if he
exercised the diligence of a good father.

32. Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Catalino Borja and International To
Wage and Transport Corp.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts:

It appears that on September 23, 1987, Smith Bell [herein petitioner] filed a written request
with the Bureau of Customs for the attendance of the latters inspection team on vessel M/T
King Family which was due to arrive at the port of Manila on September 24, 1987. Said vessel
contained 750 metric tons of alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer.
On the same day, Supervising Customs Inspector Manuel Ma. D. Nalgan instructed
[Respondent Catalino Borja] to board said vessel and perform his duties as inspector upon
the vessels arrival until its departure. At about 11 oclock in the morning on September 24,
1987, while M/T King Family was unloading chemicals unto two (2) barges ITTC 101 and
CLC-1002 owned by [Respondent] ITTC, a sudden explosion occurred setting the vessels
afire. Upon hearing the explosion, [Borja], who was at that time inside the cabin preparing
reports, ran outside to check what happened. Again, another explosion was heard. Seeing the
fire and fearing for his life, [Borja] hurriedly jumped over board to save himself. However, the
[water] [was] likewise on fire due mainly to the spilled chemicals. Despite the tremendous
heat, [Borja] swam his way for one (1) hour until he was rescued by the people living in the
squatters area and sent to San Juan De Dios Hospital.
After weeks of intensive care at the hospital, his attending physician diagnosed [Borja] to be
permanently disabled due to the incident. [Borja] made demands against Smith Bell and ITTC
for the damages caused by the explosion. However, both denied liabilities and attributed to
each other negligence.
The Trial Court and Court of Appeals both ruled in favour of herein Respondents. Hence the
instant appeal.

Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable.

Ruling:

Yes. Both the RTC and the CA had already ruled that the fire and the explosion had
originated from petitioners vessel. As a consequence, this Court is bound by the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals when these are supported by substantial evidence. Verily,
this Court reviews only issues of law.
Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby
that other person suffers injury. Petitioners vessel was carrying chemical cargo -- alkyl
benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their vessel was carrying
dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary
precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore, negligent.


The three elements of quasi delict are: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages inflicted on the plaintiff. All these elements
were established in this case. Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals,
petitioner was negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting the cargo.
Hence, the owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are
liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property by reason of
negligent management or navigation.

AMOUNT OF LIABILITY; COMPUTATION; NET INCOME
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of
gross annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).
In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of
the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income, less living
and other incidental expenses. When there is no showing that the living expenses constituted
a smaller percentage of the gross income, we fix the living expenses at half of the gross
income.

33: Reynalda Gatchalian vs. Arsenio Delim & CA
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991; FELICIANO, J.:

Doctrine: A waiver that limits a common carriers liability to its passengers is void for being
offensive to public policy.

FACTS:

Reynalda Gatchalian boarded at Aringay, La union a "Thames" mini bus bound for Bauang,
La Union owned by Arsenio Delim. While the bus was traversing along a highway in Bauang,
a "snapping sound" was heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle
bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell
into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian were injured (lacerations on
the forehead, abrasions on the elbows, legs, and knees). They were then sent to a hospital in
San Fernando, La Union, for medical treatment.

Three days after the accident, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited the passengers in
the hospital and paid for their medical expenses. She also gave Gatchalian P12.00 for her
transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she
had the passengers sign a prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among other things that: a)
the accident was due to a mechanical defect; and b) the passengers are no longer interested
in filing a complaint, criminal or civil against the driver and owner of the Thames mini bus,
since the owners have already extended help to the passengers.

Notwithstanding this document, Gathalian filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union an
action to recover damages. She alleged that the accident had left her with a conspicuous
white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating mental suffering and an
inferiority complex on her part. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and
deprived her of opportunities for employment and as a result, she had to retire in seclusion
and stay away from her friends.



She prayed for an award of: P10, 000.00 for loss of employment; P10, 000.00 for the cost of
plastic surgery for removal of the scar; P30, 000.00 for moral damages; and P1, 000.00 as
attorney's fees.

In defense, Delim contends that the accident was due to force majeure, and that Gatchalian
had already been paid and had waived any right to institute any action against him and his
driver as evidenced by the affidavit that she has signed.

The Court of First Instance (RTC) decision: The Court dismissed the complaint filed by
Gatchalian stating that she had relinquished her right of action when she signed the affidavit.

The Court of Appeals decision: The appellate court reversed the trial court's conclusion as to
the existence of a valid waiver, but it still affirmed the dismissal of the case and denied
Gatchalians claim for damages.

Gatchalian then filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON Gatchalian is still entitled to damages even if she signed a waiver renouncing
her rights of action

RULING:

Gatchalian is entitled to damages since the affidavit she signed is void and Delim failed to
show that he has exercised extraordinary diligence.

Affidavit signed was not a valid waiver

The Court agreed with the finding of the CA that there was no valid waiver signed by
Gatchalian because a valid and effective waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right. Moreover,
Gatchalian testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the accident when she signed
the affidavit; and that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but upon seeing the
other passengers sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the same.
Considering these circumstances, it appears that there is doubt as to whether petitioner
understood fully the terms of the affidavit and whether she actually intended to waive any her
rights of action.

More importantly, what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier and as such, we
must construe any waiver strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and
effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a
waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger would be to weaken the
standard of extraordinary diligence required by law from common carriers. Such waiver is
offensive to public policy.

Delim failed to exercise extraordinary diligence



Also, the law provides that in case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption
arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it
had observed extraordinary diligence". It is incumbent upon the common carrier to overcome
this presumption by showing that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the
injuries.

In this case, Delim failed to show that he exercised the degree of diligence required by law.
Respondent tried to exculpate himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the result
of force majeure but he failed to substantiate this defense. In the direct examination,
Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle went off the road, a "snapping sound" was
heard and when one of the passengers asked the driver, "What happened?" ("Apay addan
samet nadadaelen?"), the driver replied, "That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The
driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's
reply shows that the "snapping sound" had already been heard in the bus on previous
occasions in order for him to consider it normal. This could only mean that the bus had not
been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping
sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten used to it. Such a sound
should not be present in a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and Delim should have
checked and repaired the same.

As regards Gatchalians claim for damages, first: the Court denies her claim for loss of
employment since at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in the public
school she purports to be employed; second: the claim for the cost of plastic surgery in the
amount of P 15,000 is allowed since she is entitled to the physical integrity of her body and
she is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap; third: the award of P 30,000 as moral damages; and fourth: P1,000 as attorneys
fees.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED.

34. Singson vs CA| November 18, 1997
G.R. No. 119995

Facts: Petitioner Carlos Singson and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from
respondent Cathay Pacific Airways two (2) open-dated, identically routed, round trip plane
tickets (Manila to LA and vice versa). Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons, each
would be detached at the start of each leg of the trip. On July 1, 1988, Singsons coupon
corresponding to the San Francisco-Hongkong trip was found to be missing. Instead, what
was there is the ticket for Los Angeles-San Francisco, which was supposed to be already
detached. It was only on July 6 that the airline company arranged for his flight back to Manila.
Singson filed a complaint for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, but the decision was
reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
1) Whether a breach of contract was committed by Cathay when it failed to confirm the
booking of petitioner


2) Whether the carrier was liable not only for actual, but also for moral and exemplary
damages

Held:
1) Yes. The round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete
written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a
complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the
fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via
San Francisco and Hong Kong back to the Philippines, and the carriers acceptance to bring
him to his destination and then back home; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare
paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket; and, (c) object, which was the transportation of
the passenger from the place of departure to the place of destination and back, which are
also stated in his ticket. In fact, the contract of carriage in the instant case was already
partially executed as the carrier complied with its obligation to transport the passenger to his
destination, i.e., Los Angeles. , the loss of the coupon was attributable to the negligence of
Cathays agents and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's return
flight.

2) Yes. Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the
negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith, in which
case, the passenger likewise becomes entitled to recover moral damages.
These circumstances reflect the carriers utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its
passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of
the rights of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no different from fraud, malice and
bad faith. As the rule now stands, where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant
airline is shown to have acted fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in addition to actual damages, is proper.