NLTDRA v CSC

Issue: W/N membership in the bar which is required for

the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4
of EO 649 (Reorganizing the LRC) should be applied only
to new applicants, and not to those who were already in
the LRC at the time off issuance of the EO. No.

Facts:
Garcia, a law graduate was previously the Deputy
Register of Deeds III in the LRC. By virtue of EO 649, she
was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II
under a temporary status for not being a member of the
Bar. She appealed to the DOJ but her request was denied.
Later, she was issued a Memorandum from SoJ
notifying her of her termination because she was said to
be receiving bribe money. The memo was subject to an
appeal which was later transferred to Merit Systems
Protection Board which dropped the appeal, the latter
saying that her termination was due to expiration of her
temporary appointment.
CSC, in a resolution, however reinstated Garcia.
It said that under the vested rights theory, the new
requirement of Bar membership would not apply to Garcia
but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions after
the EO took effect.

Ratio:

EO authorized the reorganization of the LRC.
- It abolished all positions in the now defunct LRC
and required new appointments to be issued to all
employees of the NALTDRA;
- EO 640 expressly provided for the abolition of the
existing positions under Section 8;

From the moment an implementing order is issued, all
position in the LRC are deemed non-existent;
- This does not mean removal, however;
- Removal implies that the post subsists and that
one is merely separated therefrom; after
abolition, there is in law no occupant, thus there
can be no tenure to speak of;
- So, any impairment of security of tenure does not
airse;

Abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity;
- 2 questions: abolition carried out by a legit body?
Done in good faith?
- Section 9, Article XVII of 1973 Consti cited; all
officials shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by law or decreed by the incumbent
President of the PH;

Power to reorganize not absolute:
- Must be in good faith;
- If new office has substantially different and
additional functions, duties or powers, it will be
considered as an abolition of one office and the
creation of a new or different one;
- Same is true if one office is abolished and its
duties, for reasons of economy are given to an
existing officer or office;
- AT CASE: EO 649 enacted to improve the services
and better systemize the operation of the LRC;
read good faith -> for economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient;
- BAR membership was imposed to meet the
changing circumstances and new development of
times;

No such thing as a vested right theory in an office
- Except for constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary.

Petition Granted.




Sec of DOTC v Mabalot
2002 | Buena, J.
Facts:
1996, DOTC Sec Garcia issued MO 96-735 which
transferred regional functions of LTFRB to DOTCCAR
Regional Office pending the creation of a Regional
Franchising and Regulatory Office pursuant to EO 202 and
that personnel of DOTC CAR shall perform LTFRB
functions subject to the direct supervision and control of
the LTFRB Central Office.
Later, Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the LTFRB Chairman praying that the
MO be declared illegal and without effect. The lower court
issued a TRO enjoining the petitioner from implementing
the MO.
In 1997, DOTC Sec Lagdameo issued DO 97-1025
which provides that the DOTC-CAR Regional Office shall
be established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB and
shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the
CAR subject to direct supervision and control of LTFRB
Central Office.
After trial, the OSG moved to reopen the hearing
to enable petitioner to present the DO. The lower court
rendered a decision declaring the MO null and void as
being violative of Constitutional provisions:
1. Against encroachment on the powers of the
legislative department; and
2. Enjoining appointive officials from holding any
other office or employment in the
government.

ISSUE:
W/N the administrative issuances of the DOTC Sec (DO
and MO) are valid. Yes

Respondent argues:
1. Transfer of powers and functions, special those of
quasi-judicial in nature, could only be effected
thru legislative fiat; not even the president ccan
do so;
2. Among powers of LTFRB are to issue injunctions;
these powers devolve by extension on the LTFRB
regional offices; they cannot be transferred to
another agency without congressional approval
thru a law;

SC disagrees.
The president and thru his alter egos may egaly
and validly decree the reorganization of the Department,
particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB
Regional Office at the CAR, with the concomitant transfer
and performance of public functions and responsibilities
appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
Why?
1. A public office may be created thru:
a. Constitution;
b. Law;
c. By authority of Law;
2. Congress can delegate the power to create
positions; at various times, Congress has
vested power in the president to reorganize
executive agencies and redistribute functions,
and particular transfers under such statutes
have been held to be within the authority of
the President;
At case:
1. The Creation of the LTFRB-CAR regional office
was made pursuant to 3
rd
mode(authority of law)
which could be decreed through an EO issued by
the President or an order of an admin agency
such as the CSC pursuant to EO 292 (Section 17,
Book V) otherwise known as the Admin Code of
1987.
2. The MO and DO was issued pursuant to AO 36 of
the President; it provides that the various
departments are directed to establish their
respective offices in the CAR;
3. In the latter, the president did not merely
authorize but directed the creation and
establishment of regional offices in the CAR;
4. It is as if the President carried out the creation
and establishment of the LTFRB-CAR Regional
Office and the Sec as alter ego of the president
merely sought to implement the Chief Executives
Admin Order;
5. Section 17, Artivle VII of the Constitution cited;
Control is the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter; it includes the authority to
order the doing of an act by a subordinate;
Cabinet members: their personality mere
projection of that of the President;
6. Latin v Exec Sec: expressed the continuing
authority of the president the reorganize the
National Government which includes the creation,
alteration or abolition of public offices;
7. Section 20, Book III of EO 292: strong legal basis
for Presidents power to reorganize the National
Government; residual powers
8. Power to reorganize; basis: PD 1772 which
amened PD 1416; 1987 Consti: laws shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked;
9. As to double employment: the organic personnel
of DOTC CAR were merely designated to perform
additional duties and functions pending the
creation of a regular LTFRB Regional Office; to
designate a public officer to another position may
mean to vest hi with additional duties while he
performs the functions of his permanent office;
10. Assuming arguendo, employees of DOTC CAR
hold more than one office, it is still not a breach
of Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution,
because there, an office or employment held in
the exercise of the primary functions of ones
principal office is an exception to, or not within
the contemplation, of the prohibition.
GRANTED.

Engr. Claro Preclaro v Sandiganbayan and People
1995
Facts:
1990, Petitioner was charged with a violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019. He was subsequently found
guilty of requesting 200k as part of the expected profit of
460k from the contractor in connection with the
construction of a government building wherein he had to
intervene under the law in his capacity as Project
Manager, said offense being committed in relation to the
performance of his official duties.
Petitioner was employed under a written contract
of services as Project Manager:
1. by the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial
Technology Development Institute (ITDI), a
component of the DOST;
2. to supervise the construction of ITDI-CMD
Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan.

Petitioner was to be paid a monthly salary drawn from
counter-part funds duly financed by foreign-assisted
projects and government funds duly released by the DBM.

Petition filed a petition for review.

Issue:
W/N petitioner is a public officer. Yes, so Sandiganbayan
had jurisdiction.

Petitioners arguments:
1. He was neither elected nor appointed to a public
office;
2. He is merely a private individual hired by the ITDI
on contractual basis for a particular project and
for a specified period as evidenced by the
contract of services; that he was not issued any
appointment paper separate from the
abovementioned contract;
3. He was not required to use the bundy clock to
record his hours of work and neither did he take
an oath of office;

Court disagrees.
1. Public officer in RA 3019 (SEC 2(b)) includes
elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary whether in the classified
or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the
government;
2. includes indicates that the definition is not
restrictive; classified, unclassified or
exemption service were old categories of
positions in the civil service which have been
reclassified into Career Service and Non-
Career service by PD 807 providing for the
reorganization of the CSC and by the Admin Code
of 1987;
3. Non-career service characterized by:
a. Entrance on bases other than those of
the usual test of merit and fitness utilized
for the career service; and
b. Tenure is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made; **get
examples from case
c. Evidently, petitioner falls under the
category (formerly termed unclassified or
exemption service) of the CSC and thus
is a public officer as defined by RA 3019;
4. Recording working hours in a bundy clock or
taking an oath of office are unessential
considerations in view of the provision of law
including petitioner within the definition of a
public officer;
5. Petitioner: his intervention was not required by
law but in performance of a contract of services
entered into by him as a private individual
contractor; erroneous; just a mere splitting of
hairs; petitioner is classified as a public officer,
his duties delineated in the contract of services
are subsumed under the phrase wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law;
6. One of petitioners duties as a project manager is
the evaluate the contractors accomplishment
reports so he has the privilege and authority to
make a favourable recommendation and act
favourably in behalf of the
government;**remember additives, deductive;s;

AFFIRMED
























Maniego v People
1951 | Bengzon, J.
Accused was found guilty of article 210 of the
RPC. He pleads for acquittal in this case.
Although appointed as a labourer, accused had
been charged the issuance of summons and subpoenas for
traffic violations in the sala of a judge in Municipal Court
of Manila. According to testimony, he had been permitted
to write motions for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases
against offenders without counsel and submit them to
Court for action.
On the day relevant to the case, Rabia, the
complainant, approached accused to inquired about a
subpoena he received which was in connection with a
traffic violation. Accused then went the Fiscal and
informed the latter the offense had already prescribed.
Fiscal instructed accused that if the violator had no
lawyer, accused could write the motion for dismissal. This
was done and the matter submitted to Court, which
granted the dismissal.
According the Rabia and an agent of the NBI,
accused informed Rabia that he was subject to a fine of
15 pesos; that Rabia asked if this could be reduced and
that accused informed Rabia he could fix the case if
former be paid 10 pesos. Rabia paid allegedly and
pocketed the amount. Accused denied the charge.

W/N Maniego is a public officer? Yes

4 essential elments of offense in Article 210:
1. Accused is a public officer within the scope of
article 203 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. Accused received by himself or thru another,
some gift or present, offer or promise;
3. Such gift, present or promises has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime or
any act not constituting a crime;
4. The crime or act relates to the exercise of the
functions of the public officer.

Accused a public officer:
1. 203 includes all persons "who, by direct provision
of law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Philippine
Government, or shall perform in said government
or any of its branches, public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official or any
rank or class."
2. Definition is quite comprehensive, embracing
every public servant from highest to lowest;
obliterates distinction in law of public officers
between officer and employee;

Accused argues:
1. The doctrine of "the temporary performance of
public functions by a laborer" should not apply in
defendant's case.
2. The overt act imputed on the accused does not
constitute a circumstance by which he may be
considered a public official.
3. His appointment as laborer came from one
source, while the designation and delimitation of
the functions of his appointment came from
another source.

SC remain unconvinced:
1. Law clear;
2. For the purposes of punishing bribery, the
temporary performance of public functions is
sufficient to constitute a person a public official;
3. Court concurred with Spanish court when it
opined that a labourer in the Bureau of Post
temporarily detailed as filer of money orders was
a public officer within 203;
4. Common sense indicates that the receipt of bribe
money is just as pernicious when committed by
temporary employees as when committed by
permanent officials;

2
nd
element proven:
1. Accused received money in consideration of his
fixing Rabias case and thereafter fixed it by filing
a motion for dismissal;

Affirmed.




LAUREL v DESIERTO
+++++++++++++++





Segovia v Noel
1925 | Malcolm, J.
Issue: W/N the portion in Act 3107 which provides that
justices of peace and auxiliary justices of peace shall be
appointed to serve until they reached the age of sixty five
should be given retroactive effect. No.

Facts:
Segovia was appointed justice of peace of
Dumanjung, Cebu and he continued to occupy the position
until he passed 65 years old when he was ordered to
vacate the office. Noel acted as the justice of peace after.
Segovia instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings
to oust Noel and to procure reinstatement. Noel
interposed a demurrer (no coa) which was overruled.

Ratio:
Public office, as a fundamental principle cannot be
regarded as the property of the incumbent, and that a
public office is not a contrac.
- Petitioner abandons this position, said the court;

Original law was Act 136
- After Segovias appointment, it was amended by
Act 1627 which provided that all justices and
auxiliary justices of peace shall hold office during
good behaviour and those now in office shall so
continue;
- Later, amended again and ultimately codified in
203 and 206 of the Admin Code;

Section 1 of 3107 added a proviso in 203 which provides
that the justices concerned shall serve until they reach 65
years of age;
- BUT 206, entitled Tenure of office and reading a
justice shall hold office during good behaviour
unless office be lawfully abolished or merged in
the jurisdiction of some other justice was left
unchanged;

STAT CON used: a statute operates prospectively only
unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made
manifest expressly or by necessary implication
- In a New York decision: though there is no
vested right in an office, which may not be
disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent
has, in a sense, a right to his office; if the
right is to be taken, the terms should be
clear(Ryan v Green)
- AT CASE: intention of legislature to vacate the
office not expressed at all (unlike in Chanco v
Imperial);
- Language of 3107 gives no indication of
retroactive effect;

Affirmed.