Marbury v.

Madison
5 US 137
Facts:
A commission for William Marbury as justice of peace for the District of Columbia was signed by then
United States President John Adams. The seal of the United States was affixed to it but they were not
delivered before the expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the
commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss
term.
William Marbury and others who did not receive their commissions compelled James Madison, then
Secretary of State to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to deliver their
several commissions as justices of peace for the district of Columbia.
Marbury and others invoked the Judiciary Act of 1789 that granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States.
Issues:
1. Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void?
4. Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution?
5. Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Ruling:
1. Yes, Marbury has a right to the commission.
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president and sealed by the secretary of state,
was appointed; and as the law creating the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent
of the executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights which are
protected by the laws of his country. To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court
not warranted by law, but violated of a vested legal right.
2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties
of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty,
the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President,
by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal
of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the
signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a
consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which
the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard
the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution,
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in
which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it
had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between
the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is
entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty togive this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is
form without substance.
5. No. The Judiciary Act of 1789 which Marbury invoked was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court because it contradicts the United States Constitution. According to Constitution the Supreme Court
does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. To enable the court then to issue a
mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them
to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and
corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a
mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in
effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original
jurisdiction.

Held: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the commission.








Angara v. Electoral Commission
63 Phil 139
Ponente: J. Laurel
Facts:
The national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of petitioner
Angara to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by
the National Assembly as aforesaid. The Electoral Commission took cognizance of the protest filed against
the election of the herein petitioner protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua notwithstanding the
previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly.
Issue:
Whether or not the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance ofthe protest filed against the election
of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on
December 3, 1935.
Ruling:
The Electoral Commission is a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are
equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed
with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period
within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The
Electoral Commission in such case wouldbe invested with the power to determine contested cases
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at
all time to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not onlywould the purpose of the framers of
our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935
can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe.


Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
267 SCRA 408, February 3, 1997
Ponente: J. Bellosillo
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC).
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P
41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,which bid
for the same number of shares at P 44.00 per share, or P 2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the
bid price of P 44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995
petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos as Bid Security
to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to
accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive thatrespondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened byrespondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995
the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating
the sale to the Malaysian firm.
Issue:
Whether or not the GSIS violated the Filipino First Policy of the 1987 Constitution
Ruling:
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution
not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be
enforced.
Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if
no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity.
In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the
constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not
have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it
had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners
matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to
execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue
93 Phil 696, August 31, 1953
Ponente: J. Montemayor
Facts:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugos
salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it
shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered
that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation
received by judicial officers.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial
officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution.
The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13
of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted
from paying its taxes. Thisspecific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has
provided.










Francisco v. House of Representatives
415 SCRA 44, November 10, 2003
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices [5] of
this Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.
Petitions were filed before this Court, prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. It likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings
3. Whether or not the resolution thereof is a political question and has resulted in a political crisis.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the second impeachment complaint violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2. Yes, the Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
When an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only theright but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
The power vested in Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution , is not just a power but also a duty , and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
3. Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." There are two
species of political questions: (1) truly political questions (2) those which are not truly political questions.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separarion of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
Te term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.


The foregoing pillars of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from
different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been
adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must havestanding to challenge; he must have apersonal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue
152 SCRA 284, July 23, 1987
Ponente: J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts:
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is
unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the
directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the
judges of the judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for
all.
Issue:
Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.
Ruling:
No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt
justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other
branches of the government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is
that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary
which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be
subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
All citizens should bear their part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden
of general income taxation equitably.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such increase
will immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the
law increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
The Constitution also authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices
and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if
lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval.

State Montevideo Convention
ARTICLE 1
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a
permanent population; b ) a defined territory; c )government; and d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other states.
Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
G.R. No. 1833591, October 14, 2008
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon
motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiationand the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began.
On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27,
1998. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice- Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and
to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and
the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be
declared unconstitutional.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final
draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered
that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA
vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation .under Republic Act
No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING
itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly
Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,.RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected
Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Ruling:
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory,
Resources, and Governance.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory
opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic.questions. The limitation of the
power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a
tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance,.the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present
petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of
the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c)
the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact
that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present
MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly
dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no
serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous
cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the
need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee,
the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the
Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party- list nominees, among others, are matters of
public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as
it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carryout the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the.associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
















ARTICLE I NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial,
fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
ARTICLE 3 Treaty of Paris
Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending
the islands lying within the following line:
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of
the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-
seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty
seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five
minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45']) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4
[degree symbol] 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen
degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of
longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich
to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north, thence along the parallel
of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north to its intersection with the one
hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the
intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth.(118th)
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of
twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present
treaty.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3046 (as amended by RA 5446 )
AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES.
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines describes the national territory as comprising all the territory
ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and Spain on December 10,
1898, the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the
treaty concluded at Washington, between the United States and Spain on November 7, 1900, and in the treaty
concluded between the United States and Great Britain on January 2, 1930, and all the territory over which the
Government of the Philippine Islands exercised jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
WHEREAS, all the waters within the limits set forth in the above-mentioned treaties have always been regarded
as part of the territory of the Philippine Islands;
WHEREAS, all the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippines archipelago,
irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land
territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries
set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines; WHEREAS, the baselines
from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points
of the outermost islands of the archipelago; and
WHEREAS, the said baselines should be clarified and specifically defined and described for the information of all
concerned; Now, therefor,
Section 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are hereby defined and described specifically as
follows: Section 2. All waters within the baselines provided for in
Section one hereof are considered inland or internal waters of the Philippines.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved: June 17, 1961.
Cruz v DENR
G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000
Per Curiam
Facts:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
on theground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, inviolation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend
that, by providing for an all- encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which
might even include private landsfound within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the
rights of private landowners.
Issue:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain
somehow against the regalian doctrine.