Ninal vs.

Bayadog 328 SCRA 122

March 14, 2000
Fact of the Case:
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa on September 26, 1974. On April 24, 1985 he shot and killed her. After 20
months he remarried Norma Badayog, the respondent herewith. After Pepito died, his heirs by his first marriage filed a petition
for declaration of nullity on the marriage of their father with Norma Badayog on the ground of lack of marriage license. Norma
Badayog contends that the ground have no legal basis for her marriage to Pepito according to Article 34 of the Family Code no
marriage license isnecessary for person who have cohabited for atleast five years. The respondent also contends that petitioners
are not among those allowed by the law to file a suit for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Pepito.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent on the ground that indeed theFamily Code is silent as to situation. The
Petition should have been filed before the death of Pepito and not after his death. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that no need of marriage
license was necessary for Pepito and her have cohabited for at least five years.
(2)Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito valid.

Held:
Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally cohabited for atleast five years since Pepito was still married to
Teodulfa counting backwards from the time he and Norma celebrated their marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized
by exclusivity and continuity. There should be no legal impediment on either party to marry. Pepitosprevious marriage to
Teodulfa is a legal impediment disqualifying him to the exception of a marriage license. Thus, his second marriage should have
a marriage license to be valid. In this case, the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking the formal requisite of a marriage license is
therefore void.


















San Luis vs. San Luis
Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an
American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the
children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous
since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held that even with
FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd
marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse. However, as the 3rd
marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse to present further
evidence on this.
Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
2. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which was
granted in 1973
3. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n 1974,
lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND
SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati (covers
Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)
2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid (Family
Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights in accordance
with Article 256, FC)
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff:
Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue
Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to prove
capacity to sue
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside
Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so petition was
properly filed
Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law
1. WON Venue properly laid? YES
-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing
the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.
2. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES
As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently
provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse (as
well as other cases which were in Ma'am's book)
-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a
divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again
---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as
the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC
Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration as an
"INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating that she is considered a co-owner of
properties owned by persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is void.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139
October 8, 1985

Fact of the Case:
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen
of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and
the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render
an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the
divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The
lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

Issue:
(1)Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2)Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held:
As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As heis bound by the Decision of
his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he
is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private
respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.











CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS AND SOLICITOR-GENERAL
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Facts: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen through naturalization.
Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the
wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to work commitments; however, when he came back he was shocked to
discover that the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus, petitioner went back to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted the petitioners petition for
divorce. The divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his
love to his fiance; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree
on his and the respondents marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still
subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, hence this recourse by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Ruling: No.
Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse due
to the given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and as such the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code limits its applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because in our jurisdiction, the foreign divorce
decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petitions for its recognition. Even
though, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the
complementary statement that his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition filed by Corpuz before the
RTC. the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to
our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title
of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.