Priest is good: he says perversion is deviation from that which is natural. Redundant concept.

We cannot empathize or understand perversions (Stoller, 1975)

Nagel argues against a sceptical argument for the existence of sexual perversions as a means of
highlighting sexual desire 1. Sexual desire is an appetite just like any other appetite hunger, thirst,
etc. 2. Hunger cannot deviate from a normhunger is hunger. 3. Likewise, sexual desire cannot
deviate from a normit is what it is. 4. Perversion is the deviation from a norm. 5. Therefore, sexual
desire is not a perversion.

Hunger is more than a simple physiological response Hunger "is an attitude toward edible portions
of the external world, a desire to relate to them in rather special ways." (106) Serious changes in the
desire to eat change the natural relationship of the person to eating food "Like hunger, sexual desire
has as its characteristic object a certain relation with something in the external world." (107) It is the
relation of subject to object that is important


General remarks
.concept of sex remains at the center of moral and social consciousness in out, and
perhaps any, society (Goldman, 39)
If there are any sexual perversions, they will be desires or practices which are in some sense
unnatural. Of course, the natural/unnatural distinction is the problem. While there will be
certain areas of controversy, and each theory might have the draw the perversion/non
perversion line in its own place, there will nevertheless paradigm cases: unadorned sexual
intercourse cannot be a perversion, things such as bestiality seem as they though they must
always be perversion. Third, it is unnatural sexual inclinations, rather than unnatural practices
adopted for other reasons. Must be related to sexual preference.
Seems Nagel is correct in saying perversion is ultimately psychological.
In calling a (sexual) act unnatural, we are not just saying that it is wrong, since
even those who condemn adultery do not call it unnatural.
General form = If sexual desire is the desire for successful communication, perverse sex if a
breakdown of suck communication. If sexual relations are reproductive relations, then
perverse sex is the failure of reproduction.
Can it be defined as morally wrong sexual act? No because adultery can, lots of non-perverse
morally wrong acts.
Sexual perversion is not a descriptive concept. To call someone a pervert is not like calling
them a pianist. In everyday use it carries strong moral connotations.
Mortimer Kadish perversion is invincibly pejorative.
Persons, acts, or states of mind may be sexually perverted, but a person is to be considered
perverse only in virtue of a disposition or inclination towards entertaining perverse desires.
Is it essentially an incoherent idea, one we moderns ought to seek to do without in thinking
about sex? Is a revival of one or other of the traditional theologically based accounts of
sexual perversion to be undertaken, perhaps updated, by the addition of the latest psychiatric
findings? Or does the concept conceal hitherto unsuspected patterns of meaning which
philosophical analysis might uncover for the first time?
Derivation from nature
Perverted acts are those which are unnatural. This, of course, requires an idea of what natural
means. An obvious suggestion is what is natural is what is in line with natures course.
However, people are, after all, part of nature. Maybe what happens in non-human nature, but
this too draws line in a strange place. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that unnatural
is to be negatively evaluated. Many things which are unnatural are good. Indeed, it is highly
ironical that what is often thought to be good about people is that they can rise above their
animal instincts, and so be unnatural in this sense. Conversely, there are many things which
are natural and bad, such as inflicting pain and possessiveness. A third suggestion is that
which is unnatural simply means unusual in the statistical sense. Perversion, on this count,
becomes a socially relative concept. If bestiality becomes common, does that make it not
perverted? Furthermore, there should be no reason why something non-statistical should be
morally bad; for consider heroism, IQ over 100.
Nor, finally, should we be led into the swamps of teleology to think of unnatural acts as being
those that go against the purpose of sex. Even if it makes sense to suppose that there is a
purpose to sex, namely, procreation, it will be hard for any teleological theory to explain how
anyone could think that oral genital sex, as part of the build-up to coitus, was any more
unnatural than kissing, as part of that build-up.

Many thinks which go against natural laws are not morally condemnable, and some (such as
wearing clothes), may be seen as morally necessary.
SARA RUDDICK has suggested, what seems probable, that intrinsic -to the notion of
perversion is that of unnaturalness.
That and only that sexual activity which is unnatural is perverted. There are, of course,
difficulties with the notion of natural-ness itself. 'Natural' may be used synonymously with
'usual' or 'ordinary', in which case perversion would appear to be entirely culturally relative.
(We should have, perhaps, to except such things as adultery, which seem to be common to
virtually all human societies.) On the other hand, 'natural' may be used to describe particular
activities as the outcomes of naturally occurring processes.
Ignoring the circularity in this, such a definition would have as a consequence that all
perversions are natural, since the fetishes of the coprophiliac are as much the outcome of his
natural desires and propensities as those of the "normal" heterosexual. Even if it were argued
that there has been some sort of breakdown in the control mechanisms governing the
behaviour of the coprophiliac, still that breakdown itself could be accounted for ultimately
only by an appeal to naturally occurring events, in this case, perhaps, biological laws. There
is, however, a sense of 'natural' which may allow an argument such as Ruddick's to get off the
ground.
Biological process have some well-defined goal or function. What is natural is using that
function.
When we use perversion it is, as oxford says: using something for other than its proper end.
Using sex for something other than its proper end.
It is obvious that the desire for sex is not necessarily a desire to reproduce, that the psychological manifestation
has become, if it were not always, distinct from its biological roots. There are many parallels, as previously
mentioned, with other natural functions. The pleasures of eating and exercising are to a large extent independent
of their roles in nourishment or health (as the junk-food industry discovered with a vengeance). Despite the
obvious parallel with sex, there is still a tendency for many to think that sex acts which can be reproductive are,
if not more moral or less immoral, at least many natural. These categories of morality and "naturalness," or
normality1 are not to be identified with each other, as will be argued below, and neither is applicable to sex by
Virtue of its connection to reproduction.

Orthodox Catholic Church.
The oldest and most comprehensive philosophical account of sex and sexual perversion is
probably the traditional account of sex as procreation. Typically associated with its staunchest
proponent, the Catholic Church, this account argues that sex should be understood and evaluated
in terms of its natural, biological purpose, i.e. reproduction.
It makes the further connection between the natural and the moral, arguing that sexual acts are
proper and legitimate if and only if it is open to the value of procreation. Otherwise, it is deemed
to be unnatural, perverted and thus, immoral. For example, Aquinas, one of the preeminent
teachers of sexual morality in the Church, defined sin[s] against nature as those sexual acts that
are intrinsically unfit for generation, i.e. that they are not open to procreation (Anscombe 34).
Under this banner of sin, traditional perversions like bestiality, homosexuality, necrophilia, and
crucially, though certainly not intuitively, contraceptive sex and masturbation, are captured.
Catholic version of natural law theory, which holds that humans are able to comprehend
through reason part of Gods eternal law that applies to humans. Knowledge that some
behaviours are natural in that they are what God intended for humans and other behaviours
un-natural in that they are contrary to Gods purpose seems at first to be morally significant.
It is based on a theological position many cannot accept.

Negative
Sex with a male know to be infertile is perverted, sex for a woman after menopause, sex
during the safe period on a womans cycle. Catholic Church does not condemn such acts.
Any account which has straight sex between a married couples of loving 60 year olds is a
perversion must be wrong.
But why is sex just for conception? Is its purpose too not to satisfy the sexual urges, to reduce
sexual tension, to let the person leave a happy sex life?
Still, it is not clear that anything which is incompatible with the natural good is necessarily
immoral. To continue eating even though one is already full might not be compatible with the
natural good of preserving and improving ones health, but it hardly seems worthy of
condemnation and of the label of immorality.

Main problem is it includes too much. Basic issues with making claims about natural
purposes or functions. As a matter of fact, human beings (as well as some animals) engage in
sex not just for recreation but also pleasure, and as a means of communicating or expressing
certain emotions or attitudes. Furthermore, what is the connection between morality and what
is natural?
Graham Priest suggests that it is using sex for something other than its proper end of
procreation, but this cannot be right, as he himself points out, since heterosexual Intercourse
during the infertile period of the menstrual cycle is not traditionally considered perverted. (363)



Sara Ruddick
Of course, difficulties of the last type can be avoided by disconnecting the procreation view
of sex and sexual perversion from its traditional theological underpinnings, and stripping it of
its moral import. This has been done is Sara Ruddick's paper "Better Sex." Ruddick defines
"natural sex" in terms of "the evolutionary and biological function of sexuality? Namely,
reproduction."2 "'Natural' sexual desire," she maintains, "is for heterosexual genital activity,
not for reproduction. ... It is so organized that it could lead to reproduction in normal
physiological circumstances."3 Accordingly, "natural" sexual desire has as its "object" living
persons of the opposite sex, and in particular their post pubertal genitals. The "aim" of natural
sexual desire that is, the act that "naturally" completes it is genital intercourse. Perverse sex
acts are deviations from the natural object (e.g., homosexual, fetishism) or from the standard
aim (sadism.)
Ruddick emphasizes that this conception of natural and perverted sex is morally neutral. In
cases where no extrinsic moral considerations apply, perverted sex acts are preferable to
natural ones, if they are more pleasurable. To be sure, it is sometimes claimed that perverted
sex is less pleasurable than natural sex. But such claims still have to be substantiated by
evidence. Moreover, "to condemn perverse acts for lack of pleasure is to recognize the worth
of pleasure, not of naturalness."5 But this account still faces other problems of the traditional
procreation view: it is just as over inclusive as the latter. On Ruddick's account, just as on that
of Thomas Aquinas, not only the main traditional sexual perversions, but also such common
practices as masturbation, petting to orgasm, and oral sex will have to be characterized as
unnatural and perverted. While the former (with the likely exception of homosexuality) might
be thought appropriate, the latter implication is surely unattractive.


Levy
Levy takes something to be natural if it denies someone a basic human good, such as life,
health, control of mind or body without providing some basic human good in return. At
least this shows why perversions are wrong. But on this account, nothing which usually
counted as a perversion is a perversion. Homosexuality, sadism would not fall into this
category. Plus necrophilia would not be a perversion. While there may be a certain amount
of flexibility allowed, we cannot rule out paradigm cases wholesale. Priest.


Freud sees perverted any sexual impulse which is diverted from the biologically normal aim of
sexual union: the aim that, conditions favourable, leads to procreation. ( Freud, 1905) All acts which
do not look for penis into vagina and abnormal, and a disposition to perform them is deviant or
perverted. There are no moral conclusions drawn by Freud. However, is this a perversion? Is it not
part of human nature to go beyond the limited repertoire of conduct instilled in us by our simian
instincts? (284) In other words, is abnormality not what is normal, in beings like us?
As Scruton (288) says, it is doubtful that any theory which implies contraception is a perversion for
the same reasons that bestiality is a perversion is going to let us capture what is repellent in the
former.




Communication
The view that sex is a means of communication is a comparatively recent one. Unlike the
procreation and love accounts, this view presents sexual perversion as a morally neutral notion.
Introduced by Sartre, it essentially argues that sex is the communication of a message, such as
love, gratitude, hate, passivity and trust.
One approach to defining the sexual domain has been to identify a paradigm that all
instances of sex either embody or fall short of. This way of thinking about sex has yielded
very subtle and insightful discussions over the last few decades, but we will see that it is not
really justified. These discussions are influenced by two key aspects of Jean-Paul Sartres
famous analysis of sexual relations in Being and Nothingness: they adopt his aim of
describing paradigmatic sex, and their resulting accounts build upon his notion of double
reciprocal incarnation. (Sartre, 2003, 413)



Moultons attack on communication
Nagel takes what I shall call sexual anticipation to be characteristic of all sexual behaviour and gives us no account of sexual satisfaction.
Solomon believes that flirtation and deduction are different from regular sexual relationships, however he considers only characteristics of
sexual anticipation in his analysis and concludes that regular sexual relationships are inferior to novel ones as they lack same of these
characteristics
Flirtation, seduction and traditional courtship involved sexual feelings that are quite independent of physical contact. What is anticipated is
the opportunity for sexual satisfaction, and it is difficult to distinguish.
Sexual satisfaction involves feelings which are increased by the other person knowledge of ones preferences and sensitiveness, the
familiarity of ones way of moving, not by the novelty of sexual interest.
It is easy to think that the more excitement or enthusiasm involved in an event will translate to more satisfaction. However anticipation and
satisfaction are often divorced. Many experiences with no associated anticipation are satisfying, and many long anticipations lead to no
enjoyment at all.
In sexuality this dissociation will be frequent. A strong feeling of sexual anticipation is produced by the novelty of the encounter, but the
tension and excitement that increase with anticipation often interfere with satisfaction.
For some people the processes that create sexual anticipation, the exchange of indirect signals, the awareness of the other person's sexual
interest, and the accompanying sexual anticipation may be all that is valued in sexual behaviour. Satisfaction is equated with release, the end
of a good time, and is not considered a process in its own right. But although flirtation and seduction are the main objects of sexual fantasy
and fiction, most people, even those whose sexual relations are frequently casual, seek to continue some sexual relationships after the
flirtation and seduction are over, when the uncertainty and challenge are gone. And the motives, goals, and feelings of sexual satisfaction
that characterize these continued sexual relations are not the same as the motives, goals, and feelings of sexual anticipation that characterize
the novel sexual relations Nagel and Solomon have tried to analyse. Let us consider their accounts.
Nagel's account applies only to the development of sexual anticipation. He says that "the proliferation of levels of mutual aware-ness . . . is a
type of complexity that typifies human interactions", so he might argue that his account will cover Romeo and Juliet's later relationship as
well. Granted that levels of mutual awareness exist in any close human relationship. But it does not follow that the development of levels of
awareness characterize all human relationships, particularly sexual relationships between familiar partners. In particular, the sort of
awareness Nagel emphasis -"a desire that one's partner be aroused by the recognition of one's desire that he or she be aroused" -does not
seem essential to regular sexual relationships. If we accept Nagel's account for sexual behaviour in general, then we must classify as a
perversion the behaviour of an intimate and satisfying sexual relation begun without any preliminary exchange of multi-level
arousals
Sexual desire can be generated by many different things-a smell, a phrase in a book, a familiar voice. The sexual interest of another person is
only on occasion novel enough to be the main cause or focus of sexual arousal. A characterization of sexual behaviour on other occasions
should describe the development and sharing of sexual pleasure-the creation of sexual satisfaction. Nagel's contribution lies in directing our
attention to the analysis of sexual behaviour in terms of its perceptions and feelings. However, he characterizes only a limited sort of sexual
behaviour, flirtation and seduction.
Solomon characterizes sexual behaviour by analogy with linguistic behaviour, emphasizing that the goals are the same. He says: Sexual
activity consists in speaking what we might call "body language." It has its own grammar, delineated by the body, and its own phonetics of
touch and movement. Its unit of meaningfulness, the bodily equivalent of a sentence, is the gesture . . . body language is essentially
expressive, and its content is limited to interpersonal attitudes and feelings (343). The analogy with language can be valuable for
understanding sexual behaviour. However, Solomon construes the goals of both activities too narrowly and hence draws the wrong
conclusions. He argues that the aim of sexual behaviour is to communicate one's attitudes and feelings, to express oneself, and further, that
such self-expression is made less effective by aiming at enjoyment:
No one would deny that sex is enjoyable, but it does not follow that sexuality is the activity of "pure enjoyment" and that "gratification," or
"pure physical pleasure," that is, orgasm, is its end (341). And consequently he shows merely that orgasm is not the only aim of sexual
activity. His main argument is: If sex is pure physical enjoyment, why is sexual activity between persons far more satisfying than
masturbation, where, if we accept recent physiological studies, orgasm is at its highest intensity and the post-coital period is cleansed of its
interpersonal hassles and arguments? (343)
A glance at the list of feelings and attitudes above will show that its items are not independent. Shame, for example, may include
components of embarrassment, lack of confidence, fear, and probably mutual recognition and submissiveness. To the extent that they can be
conveyed by sexual body language. a mere grunt or whimper would be able to express the whole range of the attitudes and feelings as well,
if not better, than sexual gestures. Moreover, it is not clear that some attitudes are best expressed sexually. Tenderness and trust are often
expressed between people who are not sexual partners. The tenderness and trust that may exist be-tween an adult and a child is not best
expressed sexually. Even if we take Solomon's claim to apply only to sexual partners, a joint checking account may be a better expression of
trust than sexual activity. And domination, which in sado-masochistic sexual activity is expressed most elaborately with the cooperation of
the partner, is an attitude much better expressed by nonsexual activities such as beating an opponent, firing an employee, or mugging a
passer-by, where the domination is real, and does not require the cooperation of the other person. Even if some attitudes and feelings (for ex-
ample, prurience, wantonness, lust) are best expressed sexually, it would be questionable whether the primary aim of sexual activity should
be to express them.
The usual conversation of strangers is "small talk": cautious, shallow, and predictable because there has not been time for the participants to
assess the extent and nature of common interests they share. So too with sexual behaviour; first sexual encounters may be charged with
novelty and anticipation, but are usually characterized by stereotypic physical interactions. If the physical inter-action is seen as "body
language," the analogy with linguistic behaviour suggests that first encounters are likely to consist of sexual small talk. Doing what is
deemed socially desirable in order to seem desirable.
Solomon's conclusion that sexually one should have more to "say" to a stranger and will find oneself "repeating the same messages for
years" to old acquaintances, violates the analogy. With natural language, one usually has more to say to old friends than to strangers.




Nagel
Positive
Thomas Nagel adopts this approach. Paradigmatic sexual desire, he argues, is a desire that
ones partner be aroused by the recognition of ones desire that he or she be aroused, a desire
whose satisfaction can lead to further arousal, the recognition of which might arouse ones
partner further, and so on in an ever deepening complex of mutual arousal. This is not simply
something that sexual immersion in the body has an ability to be like, but is rather the
basic framework of any full-fledged sexual relation.7 Anything that deviates from this model
by manifesting a truncated or incomplete version of the complete configuration is to be
classed as a perversion: narcissism, bestiality, sadism, and masochism are perversions
because they cannot aim for the erotic interaction of mutual arousal, though this notion of
perversion does not itself carry any moral weight.8 The multi-levels of awareness occur when
x perceives those reactions in y, when y perceives xs original perception, when x perceives
ys perception of xs original perception, when x perceives ys perception of xs original
perception, and so on. Sexual desire is enhanced by x sensing that y is aroused by x. Nagel
emphasizes that his account is general. In particular acts there will be psychologically far
more detailed, depending on the employed physical techniques and anatomical details, but
also on countless features of the participants conceptions of themselves and each other,
which become embodied in the act.
Nagel acknowledges that to label a sexual act or person perverted is to evaluate the act or
the person in some sense, the evaluation need nor always be moral; for instance we make
non-moral judgements about peoples beauty or health.
Since this is an account of natural sex, we would think that Nagel would tell us that any
sexual desire that deviates from it, must be, to some extent, perverted. He does not. He claims
there is no simple dichotomy between perverted and un-perverted sex. He gives the example
of two heterosexual people having sexual intercourse and fantasizing about other people and
therefore not recognizing each other as the real sexual partner.
Narcissistic practices and intercourse with animals, infants and inanimate objects seem to be
stuck at some primitive version of the first stage of sexual feeling Inanimate objects do not
allow x to be aware of the objects embodiment of desire, because they have none. Children
and animals do not allow x to be aware of their embodiment, because they do not reciprocate,
they do not perceive that xs arousal is due to their own sexual awareness. Exhibitionist do
not want sexual attention from others, and voyeurs do not require recognition by their sexual
objects. In all these cases, no higher levels of mutual awareness are reached. Sadism and
masochism = perverted, homosexuality is not.


Nagel's account is illustrated by a tale of a Romeo and a Juliet who are sexually aroused by each other,
notice each other's arousal and become further aroused by that: He senses that she senses that he
senses her. This is still another level of arousal, for he becomes conscious of his sexuality through his
awareness of its effect on her and of her awareness that this effect is due to him. Once she takes the
same step and senses that he senses her sensing him, it becomes difficult to state, let alone imagine,
further iterations, though they may be logically distinct. If both are alone, they will presumably turn to
look at each other directly, and the proceedings will continue on another plane. Physical contact and
intercourse are perfectly natural extensions of this complicated visual exchange, and mutual touch can
involve all the complexities of aware-ness present in the visual case, but with a far greater range of
subtlety and acuteness. Ordinarily, of course, things happen in a less orderly fashion-sometimes in a
great rush-but I believe that some version of this overlapping system of distinct sexual perceptions
and interactions is the basic framework of any full-fledged sexual relation and that relations involving
only part of the complex are significantly incomplete (11/2).
Nagel then characterizes sexual perversion as a "truncated or in-complete version" (13) of sexual
arousal, rather than as some deviation from a standard of subsequent physical interaction.
Nagel analyses sexual desire as a complex system of superimposed mutual perceptions
He claims that sexual relations that do not fit his account are incomplete, and therefore, perversions.
Nagel says its incomplete sexuality, which lacks the feature of double reciprocal incarnation
described by Sartre.
Sara Ruddick also uses Sartres concept of double reciprocal incarnation in higher
explanations of what she considers good sex, but she does not think that incomplete sex is the
same thing as perversion. She says that the natural sex object is the genitals of a living person
of the opposite sex, but she gives little significance to perversion. She says that perverse
desires are as natural as non-perverse ones.
A sexual act is not perverted when it involves two (maybe more) people; each is sexually by
the other, each is sexually aroused by the other being sexually aroused, each is sexually
aroused by the others being sexually aroused by the other sexually aroused.



Negative
Nagel - Robert C. Solomon correctly objects to Nagel's account as "sexuality without content
"and points out that Nagel's Romeo and Juliet "arouse each other, but there is no indication
to what end"(336).
Nagel fares no better in the implications of his over intellectualized norm. Spontaneous and heated sex between
two familiar partners may well lack the complex conscious multileveled interpersonal awareness of
Which he speaks without being in the least perverted. The egotistical desire that one's partner be aroused by
one's own desire does not seem a primary element of the sexual urge, and during sex acts one may like one's
partner to be sometimes active and aroused, sometimes more passive. Just as sex can be more significant when
love is communicated, so it can sometimes be heightened by an awareness of the other's desire. But at other
times this awareness of an avid desire of one's partner can be merely distracting. The conscious awareness to
which Nagel refers may actually impede the immersion in the physical of which 1 spoke above, just as may
concentration upon one's "vocabulary" or technique.

One might argue that in the case of solitary masturbation, there is some sort of multi-levelled
awareness that occurs if the masturbator masturbates while fantasizing about a person with
whom he interacts in the way Nagel requires (Soble 2008a, 84). However, Nagel insists on
the perception of the actual embodiment of desire in another person; his claim is that desire is
not merely the perception of a pre-existing embodiment of the other, but ideally a
contribution to his further embodiment which in turn enhances the original subjects sense of
himself. This implies that that the interaction has to be real, not imagined. This also
addresses the interesting example given by Soble (2008a, 84-85) of a prostitute who fakes
arousal to get her client of quickly. The client may believe the prostitutes arousal is genuine,
and in turn reciprocate genuinely, which then she, in turn, reciprocates with more fake
arousals. The man is not aroused by her desires, but by his belief that she desires him. If
Nagel insists on the reality of the exchange of levels of desires, then this too is a case of
perversion.
(Halwani) Nagel may have a good reply. We should not be blinded by examples focusing on
acts and asking whether they are perverted. We must remember that Nagels view centres on
sexual desires or preferences, not on particular acts (despite some of his own misleading
wording). The example of the heterosexual couple fantasizing about others during sex would
not be perverted on Nagels view because in and of itself it says nothing about the structure
of the couples desires. Presumably, not only are the couple capable of multi-levelled
awareness, they would also enjoy it were it not for the intervention of time and the withering
of their lust for one another. Equally, the solitary masturbator prefers sex involving multi-
levelled awareness, its just no one else is available, and the client too, if he could find a
woman who would genuinely embody desire then this would be preferable, however at the
moment a stand-in will have to make do. The point is that as long as the sexual preferences of
the people would follow the path of multi-levelled awareness under ideal conditions, neither
the people nor their desires are perverted. If someone can enjoy sex only by masturbation or
only with prostitutes, then this may be plausibly called perversion. All this implies, of course,
that a young male who has had a dry spell with the ladies, who decides one day to release his
sexual frustration on a sheep, is not perverted, for he would have preferred sex with a lady,
but the warm orifice of a sheep provides a suitable substitute, as, after all, bad sex is
generally better than none at all.
Although this reply goes some way in replying to the counter-examples given against his
view in philosophical literature, his view still fails. Consider a commonly agreed-on
perverted sexual preference, coprophillia, the use of or focus on faeces in a sexual act. These
sexual acts involved the knowing participation of another person, indicating that multi-
levelled mutual awareness can occur, despite, even because of, the use of faeces. It is not the
faeces in-itself, but rather the faeces combined with the awareness of another person.
Consider: even though Nagel claims that the object of sexual attraction is a particular
individual, who transcended the properties that make him attractive, during sexual acts
partners often focus on particular body parts without necessarily losing sight of the whole
person ass being the object of sexual desire. If Kim and Mary sexually desire each other, then,
according to Nagel, each one as a whole is the object of the others sexual desire (not sure
about this, is it not consciousness that we want awareness?) Nevertheless, they are
probably going to focus every now and then on each others particular body parts - the clitoris,
the breasts, the neck. On Nagels view, none of this is an obstacle to Kim and Mary attaining
higher and higher levels of mutual awareness and arousal. How about Tim and Gary, who
also sexually desire one another but also enjoy faeces. Smearing faeces under Garys nose
before kissing him heightens their arousal of each other, spiralling them into higher and
higher levels of arousal. When Sam goes into a frenzy as he sucks on Alicias big toe,
sending Alicia herself into a frenzy as she senses Sams heightened arousal, he is sucking
Alicias toe because it is the toe of that individual whom he finds attractive. Foot fetishists do
not usually and simply have intercourse with inanimate objects as Nagel seems to think.
They do not wish to fondle a dismembered foot, but they incorporate the foot into a complex
sexual act with someone whom they find attractive. If Kims focus on Marys clitoris during
their sex is not enough to make her a pervert, then why should be different in the case of
faeces? If it has something to do with faeces, then it has nothing to do, as such, with levels of
mutual arousal. Coprophillia may well be a perversion, but not for the reasons that Nagel
offers.
In short, two people can instantiate Nagels multi-levels of arousal during sexual activity that
most people consider perverted. Nagels account, while interesting, is not going to tell us how
to explain why one preference is perverted but another not.
However, would Nagels view correctly explain why bestiality, necrophilia and paedophilia
are perversions given that animals, children, and human corpses cannot reciprocate sexual
desire? Is Nagels view useful here? Lets take a detour.
Consider Newt. Newt can only enjoy sex if it does not involve Nagels multiple levels of
awareness. Is he sexually perverted? We might agree hes weird, but perverted? To call
someone perverted is to imply strong evaluative overtones, ones which it does not seem Newt
deserves. This indicates that Nagels account has not his the correct explanation for why
some sexual preferences are perverted and some are not.
Why does Nagel reach his conclusions? Intuition; the intuition that arousal of ones sexual
partner increases the others arousal. If someone finds his partners arousal non-arousing, or
worse, dampening of his own arousal, we might think that there is something wrong with this
person. This much is true of Nagels intuition.
The core idea in this intuition is not the same as Nagels account of sexuality. It is one thing
to claim that in sexual activity each partners arousal increases the others, but it is a different
claim that ideally in sexual activity the partners attain higher and higher levels of arousal. The
idea of multiple levels of arousal is not intuitive at all. Even if Nagels account itself is
intuitive, it is missing an argument as to why deviations from it constitute sexual perversion.
It is not obvious why people who do not have the kind of preference or desire found in
Nagels account are sexually perverted, as opposed to impoverished, untalented, un-
sophisticated, or even is their sexual preference is defective at all.
Finally, why two people? What if someone found mutual awareness with ten people?



The following examples leave us with the wrong perversions; heterosexual couple having sex
and thinking about others, sex between a prostitute and her client, solitary masturbation,
routine, unexciting sexual intercourse or oral sex. None require the multi-levelled awareness
that Nagels view of natural sex requires, so they should be examples of perversions, but we
may find this hard to agree, though they may be bad in some other sense (immoral or boring).

Some complain that Nagel does not describe what happens between Romeo and Juliet after
their interaction at the bar, thus accusing him of giving a sexless account of natural sex
(Solomon 2002). But Nagel wanted to locate perversion and naturalness in sexual desire, and
this need not only occur during sexual interaction. Presumably, if Romeo and Juliet, having
begun their encounter with the complexity of multi-level awareness, go on to have sex
without this multi-level awareness, then they would not be perverts, because their complexity
has already been reflected in their desire prior to their sexual act
Sara Ketchum considers Nagels notion of perversion seriously lacking. It would, she claims,
accept rape as un-perverted sex; rape can be a matter of reciprocal arousal, with the victims
fear increasing the viciousness of the rapist and the rapists wrath arousing greater terror in
the victim.
If we add that it must be mutual, as Ketchum suggests, do we get much further? It may be
that such sex, lacking genuine mutuality, should be subject to moral criticism, but I fear few
people have the moral sensitivity to see the wrongness of any heterosexual act between
married people. (The idea that one may not be the wholehearted participant.)
Draws line in a strange place; homosexuality sadomasochism and paedophilia may be non-
perverted id done in the right way, while masturbation rape and even straight sex of a very
bored kind, prostitution for example, may be perverted.
The other problem is there is nothing moral in this description; it may be bad- but its not
immoral.
while Nagels innovation of replacing the dark content of Sartre with arousal is far too vague
for we must know arousal of what, for what, to what end, which Nagel fails to give in his
account (Solomon, Sexual Paradigms 87).

Nagel does not indicate why it is important or noteworthy that some people seem to want
only incomplete versions of sex instead of the complete ones-why do we need the
classification "perversion" at all? (After all, we have no special designation for those who
select their meals from the a la carte menu instead of ordering the complete dinner.) Another
trouble with Nagel's view is that the prostitute, for example, who hardly participates at all in
the interpersonal awareness Nagel refers to, would be perverted, yet neither ordinary usage
nor any traditional classification of the perversions has such a result. (Nagel seems to be
aware of this problem but does not regard it as crucial.) Besides, the sadomasochistic pair do
complete the psychological process Nagel refers to, that is, there is interpersonal awareness
between them on many levels, yet they would commonly be classified as perverted. It is
surprising and puzzling that Nagel claims that sexual perversions ". . . will have to be sexual
desires or practices that can be plausibly described as in some sense unnatural, though the
explanation of this natural/unnatural distinction is of course the main problem."' Yet he does
not attempt to explain the distinction or relate the concept of perversion to it.








Solomon

Robert Solomon criticises this account for providing only an outline of the grammar of
sexual interaction but no semantics: rightly wanting to retain Sartres model of sexuality as
communicative while rejecting the idea that possession and degradation are the message
communicated, an idea that Solomon claims would be enough to keep us out of bed for a
month, Nagel has overlooked the messages paradigmatic sex conveys. Sexual activity
involves an essentially expressive body language with its own phonetics of touch and
movement, though its content is limited to interpersonal attitudes shyness, domination,
fear, submissiveness and dependence, love or hatred or indifference, lack of confidence and
embarrassment, shame, jealousy, possessiveness.9 This allows us to distinguish two classes
of perversion: bestiality is a perversion of the form of sex, since one cannot communicate
with a nonhuman animal this way; pretending affection and tenderness through sexual
behaviour is a perversion of content, since ones body language is not expressing genuine
feelings.
Solomon agrees with Nagel, moreover, that perverse sex is not necessarily bad or immoral
sex, but also points out that false sexual communication, like false communication generally,
is potentially vicious. (344-5, 1974)



Masturbation is like talking to yourself (2002, 27)
As Soble states some of the most fruitful discussions you can have are precisely with oneself
(2008 86)
On Solomon's account, the end or goal of sexual desire is "interpersonal communication"
(338) in which, by "body language," we express various emotions, such as "tenderness and
trust, domination and passivity . . ., possessiveness, mutual recognition, 'being with', and
conflict" (344).


Robert C. Solomon faults Nagel's definition of perversion for emphasizing the form of the
interpersonal awareness in sex rather than its content.14 According to Solomon, sadism, for
example, is not so much a breakdown in communication as "an excessive expression of a
particular content, namely the attitude of domination, perhaps mixed with hatred, fear, and
other negative attitudes."'15 Solomon offers no account explaining at what point the
expression of attitudes of domination becomes excessive enough to warrant being labelled
perversion; more important, it is hard to see why being excessive in the expression of
domination should count as perversion at all and not merely as rudeness, perhaps.

Solomon claims that sexual behaviour should be analysed in terms of goals rather than
feelings.
He maintains that the end of desire is interpersonal communication and not enjoyment. The
sexual relations between regular partners will be inferior because there is less remaining to
communicate sexually.

Solomon lists a number of feelings and attitudes that can be ex-pressed sexually (my
arrangement of items on pp. 343/4): -love, tenderness and trust, "being-with," mutual
recognition -hatred, indifference, jealousy, conflict -shyness, fear, lack of confidence,
embarrassment, shame -domination, submissiveness, dependence, possessiveness, passivity
He claims "some attitudes, e.g., tenderness and trust, domination and passivity are best
expressed sexually" (344), and says his ac-count: . . . makes it evident why Nagel chose as his
example a couple of strangers; one has far more to say, for one can freely express one's
fantasies as well as the truth to a stranger. A husband and wife of seven years have probably
been repeating the same messages for years, and their sexual activity now is probably no
more than an abbreviated ritual incantation of the lengthy conversations they had years before
(344).

For Solomon, sex is the communication between persons of a particular message as there can be
no strictly private language (Sex 281). Sex is observed to have its own grammar, delineated
by the body, and its own phonetics of touch and movement where the equivalent of a sentence is
the gesture. Though it is true that we can communicate simply through words rather than actions,
Solomon argues that some attitudes, e.g. tenderness and trust, domination and passivity, are best
expressed sexually (Sexual Paradigms 89). Hence, [w]hatever else sexuality might be and for
whatever purposes it might be used or abused, it is first of all language (Sex 281).

With this view of sex in mind, Solomon generates his account of sexual perversion. Yet as
Primoratz observes, his stance on sexual perversion is somewhat ambiguous (Sexual Perversion
249).For while Solomon begins his account of sexual perversion in Sex and Perversion as
remarking that it is little more than a logical category and that it would be advisable to drop
the notion of perversion altogether and content ourselves with sexual incompatibility or sexual
misunderstanding, he nonetheless proceeds to give a definition of sexual perversion as a
communication breakdown (282-283). To compound the confusion, in a separate paper,
Sexual Paradigms, Solomon argues that sex as a language admits of two kinds of perversions
a deviance of form and content linking a breakdown in communication to form rather than to
content while pointing out that the more problematic perversions are the semantic deviations, of
which the most serious are those involving insincerity, the bodily equivalent of the lie (90).
Hence, his treatment of sadism in Sexual Paradigms is that it is not so much a breakdown in
communication ... as an excessive expression of a particular content, namely the attitude of
domination, perhaps mixed with hatred, fear, and other negative attitudes while masochism is
the excessive expression of an attitude of victimization, shame, or inferiority (89).

To make sense of this, we have to understand that in Sex and Perversion, when speaking about
various perversions like non-complementary sadomasochistic sex as examples of a breakdown
in communication, he had inserted the caveat that [s]exual activities themselves are not
perverted; people are perverted, i.e. that these activities might or might not be considered
perversions in themselves; it depends not on the nature of the activity but on the skill and
performance of the participants (285-286). He then comes to the conclusion that [a]s a language,
sex has at least one possible perversion: the nonverbal equivalent of lying, or insincerity (Sex
286, emphasis his). Thus, there is no contradiction between the two papers, though he does make
the interesting and potentially confusing comment that as an art, sex has a possible perversion in
vulgarity (emphasis his).
With his two-pronged approach to sexual perversion, Solomon seems able to account for most of
the traditional perversions like fetishism, bestiality, sadomasochism and paedophilia. In addition,
because sex is viewed as a language, even a touch of insincerity can be considered a perversion
on this account. For example, Solomon explains how if one were to have a private sexual fantasy
while having sex with another, one would be performing an innocent semantic perversion but if
one were to put on a show of tenderness and affection that quickly disappears when orgasm is
reached, one has performed a potentially vicious perversion (Sexual Paradigms 90).
Homosexuality, however, is off the hook because the only difference between homosexuality and
heterosexuality is the mode of resolution, i.e. instead of communicating between persons of
opposite sex, homosexuality is the communication between persons of the same sex, and there is
nothing in homosexuality that necessarily affects communication in a negative manner (Sexual
Paradigms 89). For that same reason, group sex and casual sex are not considered as perversions
either, an outcome that seems advantageous to Solomons account of sexual perversion.

Negative
Janice Moulton, in criticizing Solomon's account, points out correctly that there is nothing
particularly sexual about these emotions, that they are often expressed non sexually and even
better expressed nonsexual, and that "even if some attitudes and feelings (for example,
prurience, wantonness, lust) are best expressed sexually, it would be questionable whether the
primary aim of sexual activity should be to express them" (544).
We might also add that the desire for "interpersonal communication" via "body language"
hardly seems either necessary or sufficient for sexual desire, nor even widely conjoined with
it, although one might find this fact regrettable.
Solomon's analysis is beset by the same difficulties as those pointed out in relation to the narrower sex-love
concept. Just as love can be communicated by many activities other than sex, which do not therefore become
properly analysed as essentially vehic1es of communication (making breakfast, c1eaning the house, and so on),
the same is true of the other feelings mentioned by Solomon. Domination can be communicated through
economic manipulation, trust by a joint savings account. Driving a car can be simultaneously expressing anger,
pride joy, and so on. We may, in fact, communicate or express feelings in anything we do, but this does not
make everything we do into language. Driving a car is not to be defined as an automotive means of
communication, although with a little ingenuity we might work out an automotive vocabulary (tailgating as an
expression of aggression or impatience; beating another car away from a stoplight as expressing domination) to
match the vocabulary of "body language." That one can communicate various feelings during sex acts does not
make these acts merely or primarily a means of communicating.

More importantly, to analyse sex as a means of communication is to overlook the intrinsic nature and value of
the act itself. Sex is not a gesture or series of gestures, in fact not necessarily a means to any other end, but a
physical activity intensely pleasurable in itself. When a language is used, the symbols normally have no
importance in themselves; they function merely as vehic1es for what can be communicated by them.
Furthermore skill in the use of language is a technical achievement that must be carefully learned; if better sex is
more successful communication by means of a more skilful use of body language, then we had all better be well
schooled in the vocabulary and grammar. Solomon's analysis, which uses the language metaphor, suggests the
appropriateness of a sex-manual approach, the substitution of a bit of technological prowess for the Natural
pleasure of the unforced surrender to feeling and desire.

However, in allowing vulgarity into the picture of perversion and prizing subtlety over frankness
(284-285), Solomon seems to be committed to the idea that an awkward, first sexual encounter
between two teenagers who clearly love each other but who also are just coming to know and
appreciate themselves as sexual beings would be vulgar and thus perverted. Note how he claims
that [t]here is sometimes nothing less appealing or satisfying, even when one is in a fully sexual
mood, than a too-straightforward sexual encounter, unadorned by preliminary conversation
both verbal and bodily (Sex 285). This description of a too-straightforward sexual encounter
can certainly belong to that of the awkward teenage couple. On the other hand, a Don Juan-esque
sexual encounter or group sex is to be prized because the former offers the compensation and
reward of being always fresh and novel while the latter offers the rare possibility of linguistic
forms unavailable with fewer voices that would be impossible with fewer people (Sex 286).
Yet one would have thought that if content was indeed more important than form, as Solomon
had earlier maintained, then the content in the awkward teenage sexual encounter is, because of
its honesty and sincerity, more to be prized than the content to be found in the latter two cases.
Furthermore, it could be argued that it is precisely the supposed vulgarity in form that best
expresses the particular content of the former case; the lack of skill and performance (Solomon,
Sex 286) enhances, rather than takes away, the message of I love you where the awkward
teenagers are concerned.
This ... implies that much too much in what goes for common, everyday sex among human beings
is actually perverted. In sex, as everywhere else, breakdown of communication among humans is
a very common occurrence. If every case of such breakdown is to count as perverted sex, the idea
of perversion will no longer refer as it presumably should to something uncommon and
strange. (Sexual Perversion 249)
This criticism certainly seems true. A breakdown in communication can be as simple as someone
misinterpreting a message, which can happen many times a day. Similarly, in sex,
misinterpretation of messages can occur. For example, a woman saying no to her lovers
request for sex could actually be playing hard to get and wants to have sex. But the man could be
a simpleton who is unaware of the sexual games that people play and genuinely thinks that the
woman does not want to have sex. Then, the woman has to teach the man the rules of the game.
This certainly takes away the subtlety and excitement of the sexual encounter, but it hardly seems
perverted.
In conclusion, Solomons account does seem to enjoy distinct advantages over the procreation
and love accounts in its ability to accommodate homosexuality, group sex and casual sex as non-
perversions. Its willingness to forego the moral character of sexual perversion, leaving it as a
morally neutral notion, also allows it to say that even though an act is considered perverted on its
account, it is not condemned as such. Rather, the label acts more as a descriptive claim, one that
reveals how the act in question has deviated in form and/or content. This is an advantage because
even if one disagrees with Solomon in, say, classifying the awkward first sexual encounter as
perverted, at least perverted here does not mean that the act or its participants are condemned,
which is a far more acceptable conclusion than to out rightly condemn the awkward first sexual
encounter as immoral. However, Solomons account also faces some tough questions which it
seems unable to answer, not least that it is far too inclusive and would render the term almost
unrecognisable from the way we normally use it. Lastly, like the procreation and love accounts,
Solomon also commits the mistake of conflating ideals and norms such that any sex act which
does not measure up to his ideal of subtlety and sincerity is deemed perverted when it may just be
mediocre sex; it might not be good sex, but that is not to say that it necessarily is bad sex.

Scruton
Scruton (289) sexual desire involves the marshalling and directing of animal urges towards an
interpersonal aim, and an interpersonal fulfilment.
Sees emphasis on our interpersonal attitudes, seeing them as constitutive of our personal existence.


Roger Scruton develops a richer account of paradigmatic sex, according to which sexual
desire is itself inherently nuptial: it involves concentration upon the embodied existence of
the other, leading through tenderness to the vow of erotic love.11 although marriage vows
are social institutions, they are the culmination of the natural progression of sexual desire.
The sexual arousal in which paradigmatic sexual desire begins is focused not on a human
body as such but on some particular person in their physical embodiment.
Arousal and desire both involve inherently individualising intentionality and naturally
progress through sexual intimacy, which Scruton describes as the goal of the unveiling
gestures of lovemaking and the point to which desire naturally leads, by its own devices,
ultimately reaching the commitment founded in the mutuality of desire that is exclusive
erotic love.12 Perversion, on this view, consists precisely in a diverting of the sexual
impulse from its interpersonal goal, or towards some act that is intrinsically destructive of
personal relations and of the values that we find in them.



To Roger Scruton, because human beings are social and political animals, we must count
among [the human persons] most important motives the interpersonal attitudes which
express his recognition of his social nature these attitudes are elements of human nature,
and to lack them is to be a deviant (1986, 289)
Because we are constituted by both rational and animal natures, we must unite these
otherwise our sexual desire is deviant or perverted. Close connection between morality and
perversion.
Also immoral because romantic love is a virtue, and to not be virtuous is immoral.
All perversion is any way of sexually relating to another person such that the person is not
recognized as a person but it reduced to animal components. Once this happens, it is not
possible for sexual desire to come to its natural conclusion - love- with that person.

For Scruton, every developed form of sexual desire will tend to reach beyond the present
encounter to a project of inner union with its object, i.e. sexual desire is not merely aimed at sex
itself, but towards erotic love (93). Like the procreation account, this account views sexual
perversion to be a morally emphatic notion.


Employing a phenomenological approach to human sexuality, Scruton argues that the three basic
phenomena of human sexual feeling: arousal, desire and love are purely human phenomena
(14). For Scruton, sexual pleasure, and thus arousal and desire, is physical as well as intentional
because unlike a mere [pleasure] of sensation, it is object-directed and may be in conflict with
the facts (emphasis his). This explains why, when one realises that the touch on ones back
belongs to an interloper and not to ones lover, the pleasure is instantly extinguished. This is not
so in the case of a pleasure of sensation for even after being told that what I took for water is
really acid, the pleasure might nonetheless linger in a diminished form. Therefore, Scruton
concludes that for one to truly enjoy sexual pleasure, one must have an intentional object and the
caresses by him are not the accidental causes of a pleasurable sensation which might have
been caused in some other way. Thus, sexual pleasure is not merely intentional but also
interpersonal.
Roger Scruton finds fault with homosexuality on the basis of gender rather than sex. He
claims that mature sexuality requires the opening of the self to a mystery of another gender,
an adventure and taking of risk that involve taking responsibly for the experience of sex and
that leads to commitment.
Scruton argues that the aim of sexual desire is not merely sex but union with the other, leading
to sexual pleasure, intimacy, and ultimately to erotic love (93). It is in this vein that Scruton
concludes that every developed form of sexual desire will tend to reach beyond the present
encounter to a project of inner union with its object.
Scruton perversion is that which separates love from lust, flesh from spirit, and animal from
personal.
With erotic love as the sexual virtue, Scruton generates his account of sexual perversion.
For Scruton, perverted acts are deviations from the unity of animal and interpersonal relation
(289). what this means is that it is perverted to detach the sexual urge from its interpersonal
intentionality, and reconstitute it in impersonal, and purely bodily terms. In short, all sexual
acts that are detached from the virtue of erotic love are perverted (293). Impersonal sex is thus
perverted because [t]he complete or partial failure to recognise, in and through desire, the
personal existence of the other is therefore an affront, both to him and to oneself (289).
From here, Scruton proceeds to underwrite most of the prohibitive sexual morality put forth by
the procreation account, preserving traditional perversions like bestiality, necrophilia and
paedophilia. However, unlike the procreation account, and to his advantage, Scruton argues that
contraceptive sex and homosexuality are not perverted.3 Indeed, Scruton also holds the not-so-
unintuitive view that sadomasochistic sex could potentially not be perverted it could be non-
perverse if the aspect of pain inflicted and endured becomes incorporated into the love-play of
the partners, and is thereby transcended (301).


Negative
Various factors again ought to weaken this identification. First, there are other types of love besides that which
it is appropriate to express sexually, and "romantic" love itself can be expressed in many other ways. 1am not
denying that sex can take on heightened value and meaning when it becomes a vehicle for the expression of
feelings of love 01' tenderness, but so can many other usually mundane activities such as getting up early to
make breakfast on Sunday, cleaning the house, and so on. Second, sex itself can be used to communicate many
other emotions besides love, and, as 1will argue below, can communicate nothing in particular and still be good
sex.


However, Scrutons account is not free of problems either. Firstly, Primoratz points out that in
order for Scruton to arrive at the conclusion that all impersonal sex is perverted, he has to justify
the claim that in sex, one should treat the other as the unique human being that the other is (Ethics
29). this claim, however, is radically different from the weaker claim that because sex is an
interpersonal experience, we should treat the other party as a human being. While it is true that in
sex, as in our other actions, we should treat others as human beings worthy of respect, i.e. that we
should not treat them as merely means to an end, this in no way justifies the stronger claim that
we should treat others as the particular, unique individual that he is. Indeed, treating the other as a
person is in no way incommensurable with casual sex which, on Scrutons view, would be
perverted.

As A. Ellis points out, there seems to be nothing intrinsically or characteristically
Problematic where the motives and consequences of casual sex are concerned (125-137). Just as
we do not think that it is problematic for a man to go down to a basketball court and play
basketball with anyone who he finds there, even though he is not interested in them as particular,
unique individuals with unique sets of skills, it seems at least morally permissible to engage in
honest, above board casual sex where the parties involved treat each other as persons but not
necessarily as the particular, unique individuals that they are.

Secondly, and more importantly, Scrutons account makes the exact same mistake as the
procreation view in conflating ideals with norms. Indeed, it is only in treating the ideal of erotic
love as a norm that Scruton is able to arrive at his account of sexual perversion. This move,
however, is unjustified for it is not clear that if a sex act is detached from erotic love that it is
therefore necessarily perverted. A case in point would be that of sex between a couples who only
got married because it was an arranged marriage. They have no love for each other but are
nonetheless able to live amicably and simply want to have children. It is not great sex to be sure,
but to call it perverted because it falls short of Scrutons ideal of erotic love would be too harsh.
Scrutons account then, like the procreation account, does not allow a space for morally
permissible, though not admirable, sex acts without offering any good justification for it.






Perversion as statistical deviation.
Alan. H. Goldman


1shall suggest here that sex continues to be misrepresented in recent writings, at least in
philosophical writings, and 1 shall criticize the predominant form of analysis which 1term
"means-end analysis." Such conceptions attribute a necessary external goal or purpose to
sexual activity, whether it be reproduction, the expression of love, simple communication, or
interpersonal awareness. They analyse sexual activity as a means to one of these ends,
implying that sexual desire is a desire to reproduce, to love or be loved, or to communicate
with others. AlI definitions of this type suggest false views of the relation of sex to perversion
and morality by implying that sex which does not fit one of these models or fulfil one of these
functions is in some way deviant or incomplete.

The alterative, simpler analysis with which 1will begin is that sexual desire is desire for contact with another
person's body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfil
such desire of the agent. Whereas Aristotle and Butler were correct in holding that pleasure is normally a by-
product rather than a goal of purposeful action, in the case of sex this is not so dear. The desire for another's
body is, principally among other things, the desire for the pleasure that physical contact brings. On the other
hand, it is not a desire for a particular sensation detachable from its causal context, a sensation which can be
derived in other ways.

Central to the definition is the fact that the goal of sexual desire and activity is the physical contact itself, rather
than something else which this contact might express. By contrast, what 1 term "means-end analyses" posit ends
which take to be extraneous to plain sex, and they view sex as a means to these ends. Their fault lies not in
defining sex in terms of its general goal, but in seeing plain sex as merely a means to other separable ends. 1
term these "means-end analyses" for convenience, although "means-separable-end analysis," while too
cumbersome, might be more fully explanatory. The desire for physical contact with another person is a minimal
criterion for (normal) sexual desire, but is both necessary and sufficient to qualify normal desire as sexual. Of
course, we may want to express other feelings through sexual acts in various contexts; but without the desire for
the physical contact in and for itself, or when it is sought for other reasons, activities in which contact is
involved are not predominantly sexual. Furthermore, the desire for physical contact in itself, without the wish to
express affection or other feelings through it, is sufficient to render sexual the activity of the agent which fulfils
it. Various activities with this goal alone, such as kissing and caressing in certain contexts, qualify as sexual
even without the presence of genital symptoms of sexual excitement. The latter are not therefore necessary
criteria for sexual activity.


Page 48/9 of plain sex:
What all these analyses share in addition to a common form is accordance with and perhaps derivation from the
Platonic-Christian moral tradition, according to which the animal or purely physical element of humans is the
source of immorality, and plain sex in the sense 1 defined it is an expression of this element, hence in itself to be
condemned. .All the analyses examined seem to seek a distance from sexual desire itself in attempting to extend
it conceptually beyond the physical. The love and communication analyses seek refinement or intellectualization
of the desire; plain physical sex becomes vulgar, and too straightforward sexual encounters without an aura of
respectable cerebral communicative content are to be avoided. Solomon explicitly argues that sex cannot be a
"mere" appetite, his argument being that if it were, subway exhibitionism and other vulgar forms would be
pleasing. (Sex and perversions 285). This fails to recognize that sexual desire can be focused or selective at the
same time as being physical. Lower animals are not attracted by every other member of their species, either.
Rancid food forced down ones throat is not pleasing, but that certainly fails to show that hunger is not a
physical appetite. Sexual desire lets us know that we are physical beings and, indeed, animals; this is why
traditional Platonic morality is so thorough in its condemnation. Means end analyses continue to reflect this
tradition, sometimes unwittingly. They show that in conceptualizing sex it is still difficult, despite years of so-
called revolution in this area, to free ourselves from the lingering suspicion that plain sex as physical desire is an
expression of our "lower selves," that yielding to our animal natures is subhuman or vulgar.



We should take our cue from an insightful aspect of Alan Goldmans account of the nature of
sex that is usually overlooked in discussions of it. Goldman shares with Nagel, Solomon, and
Scruton the aim of understanding sex in terms of a paradigm and perversions of it, and agrees
with Nagel and Solomon that perversion is morally neutral.
The paradigm or normal sexual desire, he argues, is desire for physical contact with
another person, where this is someone in particular and therefore the desire is not a desire
for a particular sensation detachable from its causal context, a sensation which can be derived
in other ways. (267-287) what is interesting for our purposes is the reason
Goldman gives for classifying non-paradigmatic sexual desires as sexual: that their
occurrence is accompanied by physical sexual effects such as erection in males; perverted
desires are abnormal desires with sexual effects upon their subject. (284-5) Goldman
therefore understands there to be a common factor unifying sexual desires and activities: their
occurrence involves such physical sexual events as genital arousal. If he is right in this, then
our concept of the sexual nature of some desires, activities, and pleasures does indeed track
an aspect of our experience even though their intentional objects need have nothing in
common. So why not accept as necessary and sufficient for a desire, activity, or pleasure to
count as sexual that its occurrence involves such arousal?




There are two reasons why Goldman does not accept this. One is his commitment to
analysing the concept of perversion in order to understand paradigmatic sex, an approach that
we have seen to be mistaken. The other is that sexual arousal and excitement do not always
occur in activities that are properly characterised as sexual, say, kissing for the pleasure of
it.39


Alan H. Goldman, in an attempt to introduce a more robust sense of reality into these
abstruse accounts, claims that "sexual desire is desire for contact with another person's body
and for the pleasure which such contact produces." But anyone who has seen a parent and
child warmly hugging or two old friends enthusiastically shaking hands knows this is not a
sufficient condition and will reject as highly implausible Goldman's suggestion that either sex
is at the bottom of such contact (269). Nor is it a necessary condition, as voyeurism and
exhibitionism show.
Two ways to evaluate sex: morally and by the degree of pleasure it yields. Not an evaluative
concept but a statistical one. Its a deviation from the norm, but the norm in question is
merely statistical. (2008, 69) Not all acts which deviate from norm are perverted (three hour
long session).
Sexual desire = contact with another persons body and for the pleasure which such contact
produces: (2008, 56). The abnormality in question must relate to the form of the desire itself
in order to constitute sexual perversion; for example, desire, not for contact with another, but
for merely looking, for harming or being harmed, for contact with items of clothing (2008.
69). No necessary connection between perverted and immoral/not-pleasurable sex (2008, 70-
1)
Perversion has two conditions: statistically in the minority and must be a desire for contact
with anothers body. First is socially relative, but, is this not in tension with condition two? If
one day everyone was voyeurism, would voyeurism still be sexually perverted? (Halawani,
239)
Alan. H. Goldman argues for a statistical notion of perversion. Goldman only considers acts
perverted which relate to the form of desire itself, such as desire to look, to harm or be
harmed, to have contact with an object, rather than desire for physical contact with another
human. These desires are to be a means of sexual gratification if they are to be perverted. To
say that are perverted is a statistical notion rather than a moral one. If perverted acts are
morally wrong, it is their mistreatment of a person rather than their connection to sex.
Socially relative concept.
Advanced by Alan Goldman in his paper, Plain Sex, this next account is similar to the
communication view in that it also views sexual perversion to be a morally neutral concept.
Where it is different is its removal of the evaluative dimension of the concept, viewing sexual
perversion to be a purely statistical notion.
Goldmans view of sex as plain sex is motivated by what he sees as the primary failing behind the
prior three philosophical accounts. He points out that where these accounts are concerned, sex
becomes "merely a means to other separable ends" like procreation, love and communication"
(269). The motivation behind such a move, Goldman charges, lies in an accordance with and
perhaps derivation from the Platonic-Christian moral tradition, according to which the animal or
purely physical element of humans is the source of immorality, and plain sexis an expression
of this element, hence in itself to be condemned (279).
This explains why the previous accounts had tried to extend sexual desire beyond the merely
physical to a rational, and ostensibly nobler, end of procreation, love or communication. However,
in doing so, not only do they romanticise sex and give a distorted picture of what sex is, it also
invariably affected the account of sexual perversion they offered, thus explaining the various
problems that these accounts ran into. Thus, Goldman remarks:
Sexual desire lets us know that we are physical beings and, indeed, animals; this is why
traditional Platonic morality is so thorough in its condemnation. Means-ends analyses continue to
reflect this tradition, sometimes unwittingly. They show that in conceptualising sex it is still
difficult, despite years of so-called revolution in this area, to free ourselves from the lingering
suspicion that plain sex as physical desire is an expression of our lower selves, that yielding to
our animal natures is subhuman or vulgar. (279)
Hence, on his account, Goldman unsurprisingly reduces sex to its barest, physical level such that
sexual desire is defined to be the desire for contact with another persons body and for the
pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfil such desire
of the agent (268). Though sex on this account is still viewed as the means to the end of physical
contact, such a move does not romanticise nor distort what sex is, for the desire for physical
contact with another is, in itself, both a necessary and sufficient condition for a desire to be
considered sexual. Furthermore, while Goldman is aware that his account merely captures sex at
its barest level, he argues that it is worth distinguishing and focusing upon this least common
denominator in order to avoid the false views of sexual morality and perversion which emerge
from thinking that sex is essentially something else (271).
Sexual perversion then for Goldman is a merely statistical notion where to be perverted is not
to deviate from the reproductive function (or kissing would be perverted), from a loving
19 relationship (or most sexual desire and many heterosexual acts would be perverted), or from
efficiency in communication (or unsuccessful seduction attempts would be perverted) (284).
However, Goldman is quick to point out that not all statistically abnormal sexual desires and acts
are perverted for a three-hour continuous sexual act would be unusual but not necessarily
abnormal in the requisite sense.
Goldman does not deny that the concept of perversion is often used in an evaluative manner,
carrying with it morally-loaded connotations, rather than in a purely descriptive manner. What he
does deny is that we can find a norm, other than that of statistically usual desire, against which
all and only activities that properly count as sexual perversions can be contrasted (285). To try
and preserve the evaluative dimension would be to commit the same mistake that the means ends
accounts committed, which is to superimpose an ideal onto sex and making that the norm. Such a
move merely misrepresents sex, thereby distorting its relationship with morality and perversion.
Therefore, on Goldmans account, an act which is deemed to be perverted now might not remain
so for it is not true that we properly could continue to consider acts perverted which were found
to be very common practice across societies (286). Indeed, Goldmans observation seems to
cohere with our experience of homosexuality. While it was widely deemed to be a perversion in
the past, in recent times, it has become more widely accepted such that an increasing number of
societies today are granting homosexual unions a similar set or the same kind of legal rights that
heterosexual unions enjoy.4 Furthermore, as Goldman rightly observes, if we persist to view acts
which are no longer statistically abnormal and are not immoral as perverted, then we are simply
exhibiting prejudiced moral judgements that are purely emotive ... without consistent Logical
criteria for application.



Negative
If bestiality becomes common, does that make it not perverted? Furthermore, there should be
no reason why something non-statistical should be morally bad; for consider heroism, IQ
over 100.
However, Goldmans account of sexual perversion faces its fair share of problems. For starters,
having sexual perversion as a merely statistical notion is problematic. As Primoratz points out,
while our current acceptance of homosexuality as a non-perversion does seem to be a case of how
sexual perversion seems to be a statistical notion in that as the practice became more prevalent,
the label has been withdrawn from it, yet it is not at all clear that, if we were to make a similar
discovery with regard to, say, necrophilia or zoophilia, we would be as ready to declassify it as
perversion and come to think of it as but another unproblematic sexual orientation (Sexual
Perversion 246).

HOWEVER:
Rather, it is the form of the desire itself that has to be abnormal (emphasis his). Hence, a
perverted sexual desire is that which does not desire for physical contact with anothers body and
yet the fulfilment of which gives rise to the same kind of pleasure that most human beings
experience through physical contact with other persons bodies. Furthermore, presenting
perversion in such a non-evaluative manner in no way prevents one from saying that an act is
immoral because there is no necessary connection between morality and perversion. An immoral,
perverted act would remain immoral even if it should one day become widely practised in society
such that it ceases to be statistically abnormal and perverted because the general moral rules
which condemn it would continue doing so regardless of the prevalence of such an act the
immorality of an act does not vary with its degree of perversion (Goldman 285-286).


Goldman (and Robert Gray), leave a concept of perversion without any substantive content.
More importantly, if we were to take Goldmans suggestion of stripping perversion of its
evaluative dimension, leaving it as a mere descriptive concept, it appears that the whole concept
becomes redundant, a thoroughly unintuitive notion. This is because one could simply replace the
term with something like atypical sexual acts, and if they are immoral, atypical immoral
sexual acts, without losing anything essential. That the term has been traditionally associated
with condemnation and thus difficult to detach completely in ordinary usage only lends more
weight to the argument for dropping the concept altogether. After all, if condemnation is the
strongest and most striking feature of perversion as a concept, then dropping that particular
feature while trying to preserve perversion as a statistical, non-evaluative and descriptive concept
seems to make little sense. It would be far more efficient to simply replace the term altogether,
one without a necessary moral evaluative dimension.
These then are the main reasons why Goldmans attempt to generate a concept of sexual
perversion is, ultimately, a failure. However, far from it being viewed as a problem that needs to
be circumvented, some philosophers have viewed it as simply sounding the death knell for the
concept of sexual perversion.

(Shaffer)
But anyone who has seen a parent and child warmly hugging or two old friends
enthusiastically shaking hands knows this is not a sufficient condition and will reject as
highly implausible Goldman's suggestion that either sex is at the bottom of such contact (269)
or the physical contact is not really desired for itself (270). Nor is it a necessary condition, as
voyeurism and exhibitionism show. If, with Goldman, we say these cases involve abnormal
or perverted sexual desire, we still need to be told why they are called sexual desire at all, and
Goldman fails to do that. Nor is the desire for contact with an animal's body necessarily
abnormal sexual desire; it would be ludicrous to accuse the myriad of those who have had the
pleasure of petting a cat of engaging in sexual abnormality.
No perversion

Primoratz

Some philosophers have argued that the pleasure gained from stimulating the sexual organs
unifies the category of the sexual. Primoratz, for example, defines sex as activity that tends to
fulfil sexual desire and sexual desire as the desire for certain bodily pleasures, claiming that
these bodily pleasures include pleasures experienced in the sexual parts of the body and
pleasures that can be associated with arousal, such as the pleasure of kissing.(46) Sexual
activity, on this view, is activity of a type that tends to fulfil desire for the kinds of pleasures that
are or can be associated with arousal. He also suggests a stronger definition when he argues
that copulation that does not involve this pleasure, such as the work of the prostitute,
should not be classified as sexual despite being a kind of activity usually accompanied by
sexual pleasure. (48-9) we will see that neither version of this view is acceptable. The
approach has been criticised for assuming that sexual desire and sexual pleasure do not
vary -(examples of those kids) in character across the range of human sexuality. Although solo
masturbation and certain other activities are often aimed at fulfilling desires for a certain physical
pleasure, the argument runs, this should not be generalised to all sexual desire and activity.25
Alan Soble has recently responded with an argument for this generalisation: the view that sexual
desire is the desire for certain pleasurable sensations allows us to distinguish sharply between
the instinctual, paired sexuality of animals and the endlessly varied behaviours of human
sexuality and can help to explain the etiology of our sexual preferences.26 Human sexual
variety should be understood as the range of ways that individuals with different constitutions and
environments have found can fulfil the same basic desire for certain physical pleasures.


We first begin with Primoratz who chooses to bite the bullet to the objection that Goldmans
account of sexual perversion leaves us with a redundant concept. A Plain Sex proponent,
Primoratz chooses to bite the bullet to the objection that Goldmans account of sexual perversion
leads us to the unintuitive conclusion that it is a redundant notion. Indeed, he argues that we
should jettison the concept altogether. For starters, ordinary usage is inconsistent and confusing.
Furthermore, the prior philosophical accounts, which are supposed to be the four main
philosophical accounts of sex, seem to have singularly failed in presenting us with a coherent and
justified concept of sexual perversion. Indeed, as Primoratz observes, though sexual perversion as
a concept does enjoy rich evaluative connotations, they tend to vary very much, not only in
intensity, but also in quality (Ethics 65). Thus, though the term has enjoyed a rich and colourful
history, the term serves no useful purpose as it can be easily replaced by other descriptive, non-
evaluative terms and should therefore be jettisoned. While Primoratzs analysis is undoubtedly
methodical in covering a wide range of philosophical accounts.

Were we to adopt Scrutons account of sex while rejecting his views on personhood and the
corruption of desire, or were we to adopt Nagels or Solomons conception of sex, then we
might well argue that sex is morally special in such a way that makes some form of consent
sufficient for moral acceptability in this domain. But we should not accept such accounts of
sex, since there is no good reason to privilege one kind of sexual desire, activity, or pleasure
as paradigmatic. To see why, consider first the idea that these accounts are far too narrow.
Primoratz criticises Solomons account for overlooking the enjoyment people take in
meaningless sex with strangers or prostitutes, as oddly out of touch with those who go to
sex shows, resort to prostitutes, or peruse pornography, and as equally out of touch with
the sexual experience of pre-literature cultures.(1999, 26) This criticism is misplaced:
Nagel, Solomon, and Scruton do not present their paradigms as inclusive of all sexual activity
or as primitive in individual or social development.16 They hold only that non-paradigmatic
sex is, in Nagels words, truncated or incomplete.


Weber
Herein lies the real problem: what does it mean to say that some desire or activity falls short
of the paradigm? Solo masturbation, it seems, cannot be communicative. In which case, all it
can share with any of these paradigms is sexual arousal, excitement, and pleasure. But if there
are such common ingredients in all sexual desires and activities, why not allow them to
define the sexual? One response would be to claim that solo masturbation is an incomplete
form of paradigmatic sex after all, because it involves merely imagining sexual interaction, a
view Solomon summarises in the slogan no masturbation without representation.(paradigms,
343). For this strategy to work, it would have to cover all sexual arousal, excitement, and
pleasure.

Some of the more exotic aspects of human sexuality certainly do not seem to involve
imagining a partner. Fetishists gain sexual pleasure from contact with specific objects, such
as shoes, or materials, such as rubber. Kleptophilia is the sexual enjoyment of theft, usually
shoplifting. Melolagnia is sexual enjoyment of music.18 it is far from obvious that bestiality
requires the pretence that the animal involved is a person, or that the activity arouses some
human witness, and indeed it is not even clear whether masturbation does require
representation. The idea that all sexual activity falls short of interpersonal communication in
any stronger sense than that it involves sexual arousal, excitement, and pleasure, therefore, is
a substantial speculation that would require much empirical support. In the absence of such
support, what does motivate the view that sex is paradigmatically communicative?

Nagel is most explicit. There is something to be learned about sex from the fact that we
possess a concept of sexual perversion, he writes. (Nagel, 5) Analysing the concept of
perversion will, he thinks, allow us to understand the paradigm from which it departs. For this
approach to be acceptable, however, the concept of perversion must track the contours of
some aspect of our sexual experience. If the concept is an artefact of a moral theory that
happens to have been dominant in our culture, then analysing that concept will reveal only
the shape of that theory. Initial evidence that the concept is indeed a theoretical artefact is
provided by its almost total disappearance from intellectual discussion over the past few
decades. Indeed, it now seems somewhat quaint and even downright curious that these
philosophers should have made it central.

Further evidence is given by considering the traditional extension of the concept. It is not
simply a term for sexual activities of which society disapproves, as Nagel points out, since
adultery is not usually classified as a perversion. (PERVERSION 6)




Humber
Humbers argument is straightforward enough. As Humber rightly observes, for a concept of
sexual perversion to be successfully defended, the following needs to be done:
(1) Recognize the intimate connection which exists between ones theory of human
nature and his/ her concept of sexual perversion, (2) develop a theory of human nature
(T), (3) show that (T) requires acceptance of a particular definition of sexual
Perversion, and then (4) demonstrate that (T) is more adequate than all theories of
human nature which give rise to different definitions of sexual perversion. (168)
(2) This enterprise is, according to Humber, one that would frustrate the philosopher because
it is a task that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to complete. This is because
human nature is an essentially contested concept (ECC), which simply means that no
one can prove that the concept of human nature which supports his/ her definition [of
sexual perversion] is true (169).


Though Humber concedes that his claim that human nature is an ECC cannot be defended in
detail, he does offer two reasons why it should be viewed as such. Firstly, he invokes the
Following excerpt from W.B. Gallies paper on ECCs:

When we examine the different uses of these terms and the characteristic arguments in which
they figure we soon see that there is no one clearly definable general use of any of them which
can be set up as the correct or standard use... Now once this variety of functions is disclosed it
might well be expected that the disputes in which the above mentioned concepts figure would at
once come to an end. But in fact this does not happen. Each party continues to maintain that the
special functions which the term ... work of art or democracy ... fulfils on its behalf or on its
interpretation is the correct or proper or primary, or the only important, function which the term
in question can plainly be said to fulfil. Moreover, each party continues to defend its case with
what it claims to be convincing arguments, evidence and other forms of justification. (168,
emphasis Gallies)

According to Humber then, these observations of the essentially contested nature of democracy
and art are also applicable to the debate surrounding the theories of human nature.

Secondly, Humber points out that Gallie had compared the debate surrounding ECCs to the
competition between rival scientific hypotheses. For Gallie, the crucial distinction between the
two is that the latter is resolvable because there are acknowledged general methods or principles
for deciding between rival hypotheses (179). Unfortunately for ECCs, however, no such
standard exists which can help resolve these debates. This too, according to Humber, is
observable in the debate surrounding theories of human nature. For despite the fact that this
debate has been going on for thousands of years, it still has not been resolved. And while this
does not mean that people might not deny all other theories save that of their own, such a denial
would merely be another characteristic of an ECC. More importantly, none of the theories of
human nature have been decidedly shown to be false because each of the various theories of
human nature can be accepted and defended by someone (Humber 169). Hence, Humber
concludes, since one of the premises that a theory of sexual perversion relies on, i.e. a theory of
human nature, cannot be conclusively defended, then the theory of sexual perversion itself cannot
be conclusively defended and thus, a coherent and justified concept of sexual perversion is an
impossibility.
These observations seem true. Consider how, for example, after centuries of debate, we are still
undecided about the nature of the human being. The dualists contend that the human being is
made up of two kinds of things the mental and the physical while the monists claim that the
human being is made up of just one kind of thing the physical, for the behaviourist, or the
mental, for the idealist. Each party argues that the other parties have got it wrong and that they
themselves have the right answer, and yet unlike their scientific counterparts, there seems no
general principle that we can appeal to resolve the debate. If there were, one would have thought
that it would have been resolved by now. Since the debate continues, it follows then to suppose
that there is no such general principle and thus, human nature is an ECC.






Priest
To make matters worse, Priest claims that the concept of sexual perversion makes no sense and
is therefore another notion that needs to be assigned to the scrap-heap of the history of ideas
(371). Priests argument is essentially this. Sexual perversion as a concept is one of a sexual act
that does not fulfil its natural function, and is, ipso facto, bad. However, such an idea of sexual
perversion only makes sense if we assume an Aristotelian metaphysic where everything in the
world is teleological and the natural order and the moral order line up such that [t]he virtue
(arete) of anything consists exactly in its fitness to perform its proper function (365). Indeed,
such a move was made by Aquinas in his attempt to establish what counted as sins against nature
and what did not. As Priest observes, The alignment is also reinforced for Aquinas by the fact
that nature is created by God, and so must be what He intends. Going against it is therefore
impiety (365). Crucially however, the Aristotelian metaphysic is a largely discredited one,
having been replaced by a purely causal metaphysic, which has no connection to morality, during
the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century. Hence, Priest concludes that without a
theoretical underpinning of the Aristotelian kind, there is just no reason to suppose that it is bad
to use something for other than what was its Aristotelian end (366).

Furthermore, attempts to try and save the concept of sexual perversion by replacing
Aristotelian teleology with more current metaphysical systems seem doomed to failure. Priest
identifies two accounts of functionalism that seem compatible with Darwinianism, the prevalent
theory in biology the aetiological and the dispositional accounts of function.8 However, neither
is able to provide the kind of theoretical underpinning that is necessary for a theory of sexual
perversion. This is because neither will ground the crucial claim that it is morally bad to us
something for other than its function (367). For there is nothing wrong in using something other
than for its biological function as defined in Darwinianism? Hence, for example, while body hair
could be argued to have the function of protecting ones body from the sun, it is surely
permissible to shave ones head and use the hair for another purpose, say, to sell to someone to
make a wig. Indeed, other attempts to try and provide such an underpinning to sexual perversion
via an analysis of an account of function that is compatible with Darwinianism will also miss the
mark because genuine tele having disappeared from the cosmos or at least our theories thereof
functions must be analysed purely as some kind of cause and effect (Priest 367). But causality
is a morally innocent notion. For example, hitting a white billiard ball to cause the red billiard
balls in the centre of the billiard table to scatter is an event which has no necessary connection to
morality. As Priest concludes, What causes what, is one thing; what is good and bad, another.
Finally, even if we were to allow that evolution had some kind of telos, perhaps by arguing that
some behavioural patterns had been selected for in the evolutionary sense, yet in the light of
modern science, it makes perfectly good sense for things counted traditionally as perversions to
be functional (Priest 368). Priest gives two examples to back up this claim. Homosexuality could
be argued, via socio-biology, to be a good strategy for facilitating certain gene transmissions.
And in the current context of a threat of overpopulation in this world, promoting non-procreative
sex could well be a sensible strategy where evolution is concerned. In conclusion, there seem to
be strong arguments as to why the concept of sexual perversion should be jettisoned. Not only
have the main philosophical accounts offered so far failed in presenting us with a coherent and
justified account, such an account seems logically impossible to offer because (i) it requires a
theory of human nature but that is itself an ECC and can never be conclusively established, and
(ii) the concept of sexual perversion rests on a discredited Aristotelian metaphysic and even
attempts to try and update it seem doomed to failure. However, rejoinders to these arguments are
possible.

Shaffer
These various accounts of sexual desire, though differing in de-tail, present a common
general formula, namely that sexual desire is desire for something, let us say desire for sex, or,
alternatively, desire that one engage in something, let us say desire that one en-gage in sexual
activity. Let us call this the propositional theory of sexual desire. We can express it this
way. Taking our situation to be a case in which a person S at some time t sexually desires 0.
The propositional theory holds the following:
At t, S sexually desires 0 = Dt At t, S desires that he or she have sex with 0
We leave open what having sex means.
Although this theory has the merit of simplicity, unfortunately it is false. Neither side of the
purported equation entails the other.
(1) Desiring sex does not entail having sexual desire. A person may desire that sex occur
for any number of reasons without having sexual desire. The person may desire sex
because he or she believes that it would be a valuable experience, be good for the
health or the nerves, bring in some money, result in a desired pregnancy, be required
by duty or obligation, provide pleasure for the other, or even induce sexual desire,
without it being the case that he or she actually has sexual desire. Even where sex is
desired just for the fun or enjoyment or satisfaction it will produce, there may be no
sexual desire:
(2) Nor does having sexual desire entail desiring sex. Suppose a person sexually desires someone but
finds it unthinkable that he or she actually have sex with that individual. Perhaps it is an adult who
sexually desires some child or close relative (or both). In some such cases, there is a conflict of
desire, ambivalence, repressions, etc., but surely there are cases in which there may be absolutely
no real desire that sex occur, no conceivable circumstances under which the adult would have sex
with the other, but, to the contrary, an un-ambivalent desire that sex not occur and a total horror
at the idea of its occurring.

In pointing out that sexual desire is not a case of desiring that, I am saying that sexual desire as such has no
necessary connection with any goal, aim, or end in view.

Micheal Slote
It would seem, finally, that the ordinary notion of perversion involves the idea of
unnaturalness. Perverted sexual behaviour is by definition unnatural sexual behaviour, and
since the latter notion is inapplicable, so is the former.
But whatever its full delineation, such a technical notion presumably at least involves the idea
of deviation from some favoured explanatorily rich ideal-typic model of the development of
human sexual motivation.