ECall Type-Approval - TRL Client Project Report CPR1868

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eCall

Technical considerations regarding
type-approval testing of eCall
in-vehicle systems

EC Project Number 2014.3476
TRL Client Project Report CPR1868

Prepared by TRL

J Carroll, M Seidl, R Cuerden, A Stevens

European Commission eCall

May 2014 2

Disclaimer
This report has been produced by the Transport Research Laboratory under a contract
with the European Commission. Any views expressed in this report are not necessarily
those of the European Commission.
The information contained herein is the property of TRL Limited and does not
necessarily reflect the views or policies of the customer for whom this report was
prepared. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that the matter presented in
this report is relevant, accurate and up-to-date, TRL Limited cannot accept any liability
for any error or omission, or reliance on part or all of the content in another context.

Catalogue number: NB-04-14-361-EN-N
ISBN: 978-92-79-36985-8
DOI: 10.2769/95970


May 2014 3

Executive summary
One of the safety initiatives attempting to reduce the burden from the 1,100,000
injurious accidents occurring on the roads of Europe, each year, is the implementation
of pan-European eCall. The core function of an eCall system is to notify the emergency
services automatically and rapidly of a potentially injurious accident. The benefit of
eCall arises through the reduction in response times for emergency services attending
to the accident, thus helping to save lives and to treat injuries more rapidly.
The European Commission (EC) has adopted a proposal for a regulation concerning
type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall system. However, the
delegated/implementing acts to this regulation, detailing technical requirements and
test procedures for type-approval, do not exist as yet. This report documents,
structures and assesses the available information which may offer support in
developing the vehicle approval requirements and test procedures with respect to
eCall in-vehicle systems.
A comprehensive review was undertaken of all available relevant information which
could be used as a basis for delegated/implementing acts supporting the Commissions
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning
type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system. This
review forms the basis of the study and included sources from
proposals for EU, UN and Russian legislation;
European, Russian and international technical standards;
deliverables from research groups; and
position documents and statements provided by stakeholders.
It considered the available options existing currently for full-scale crash testing and
component testing of eCall IVS. Based on the technical assessment of the material
available and discussions with technical experts in the area of eCall and stakeholders
from various groups, 20 distinct aspects of eCall were identified that need to be
considered for a type-approval regulation. For instance, the aspects reviewed included
such things as scope of the regulation, automatic eCall triggering conditions,
mechanical resistance of the IVS, audio equipment tests, etc.
The requirements on eCall should be defined so as to maximise the benefit, i.e. affect
a large number of casualties, while avoiding disproportionate costs. Detailed
consideration was therefore given to which vehicles can and should be required to
provide automatic eCalls and in which accidents automatic triggering should occur.
Options how type-approval testing can ensure that automatic eCall triggers in
accidents as required and the in-vehicle system remains operational after accidents as
required are assessed in this study.
From a detailed analysis of these 20 aspects, some areas were identified where there
is a general consensus on requirements and test methods and it is expected that
regulatory text could be drafted by combining, amending or expanding primary


May 2014 4

sources. In other areas, differing views on the necessity of regulatory requirements
and the approach to be taken make a decision necessary before progress can be made
in specifying requirements. Finally, several aspects which should be included in a
regulation remain underdeveloped, i.e. no test methods are currently available that
could reasonably be considered for immediate use in a type-approval regulation.
These areas will require substantial work to define appropriate requirements and test
procedures and represent priorities for future development, if they are to be included.
Areas where substantial further work was identified as being necessary were:
The practicalities associated with demonstrating post-crash operations of the
eCall IVS within the environment of full-scale crash test facilities.
A mechanism to test and discourage superfluous eCall triggering in very low
severity collisions.
The appropriate testing regime for assessing wireless link performance of the
vehicle regarding positional accuracy and mobile phone network
communication robustness.
The extent of self-test features of the IVS (and perhaps also periodic technical
inspections) to identify faults and hence reduce the need to regulate lifetime
performance at the type-approval stage.
Defining guidelines for the HMI design of eCall systems.
These areas should be considered as a priority.


May 2014 5

Table of Contents

Executive summary ........................................................................................... 3
1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 8
2 Supporting documents, standards and research ....................................10
2.1 Legislators, standardisation and research groups ........................10
2.2 Overview of relevant sources ....................................................12
3 Future requirements and test methods for eCall in-vehicle system (IVS) ..13
3.1 Scope of the regulation ............................................................14
3.1.1 Options ........................................................................14
3.1.2 Commentary .................................................................17
3.1.3 Recommendation ...........................................................18
3.2 Privacy and liability aspects ......................................................19
3.2.1 Expectations .................................................................19
3.2.2 Liability ........................................................................22
3.2.3 Privacy and data protection .............................................25
3.3 Conformance to relevant technical standards ..............................29
3.3.1 Reasons for requirements ...............................................29
3.3.2 Options ........................................................................29
3.3.3 Commentary .................................................................31
3.3.4 Recommendations .........................................................33
3.4 eCall triggering and test calls ...................................................34
3.4.2 Expectations .................................................................35
3.4.3 Options ........................................................................36
3.4.4 Commentary .................................................................54
3.5 Resistance to mechanical impact during normal use ....................58
3.5.2 Options ........................................................................58
3.5.3 Commentary .................................................................62
3.6 Resistance to mechanical impact during accident (crash) .............65
3.6.2 Options ........................................................................65
3.6.3 Commentary .................................................................68


May 2014 6

3.7 Climate resistance ...................................................................70
3.7.2 Options ........................................................................70
3.7.3 Commentary .................................................................71
3.8 Autonomous power supply .......................................................73
3.8.2 Options ........................................................................73
3.8.3 Commentary .................................................................74
3.9 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)..........................................77
3.9.2 Options ........................................................................77
3.9.3 Commentary .................................................................79
3.10 Resistance to electric impacts ...................................................80
3.10.2 Options ........................................................................80
3.10.3 Commentary .................................................................81
3.11 Wireless link performance of global navigation satellite system
(GNSS) module and mobile network device (MND) .............................................83
3.11.2 Options ........................................................................83
3.11.3 Commentary .................................................................85
3.12 Installation and connection ......................................................88
3.12.2 Options ........................................................................88
3.12.3 Commentary .................................................................88
3.13 Audio equipment .....................................................................91
3.13.2 Options ........................................................................91
3.13.3 Commentary .................................................................95
3.13.4 Recommendation ...........................................................96
3.14 In-vehicle system (IVS) self-test ...............................................97


May 2014 7

3.14.2 Options ........................................................................97
3.14.3 Commentary and recommendations .................................98
3.15 Human-machine interface (HMI) ............................................. 100
3.15.1 Reasons for requirements ............................................. 100
3.15.2 Options ...................................................................... 101
3.15.3 Commentary ............................................................... 101
3.15.4 Recommendations ....................................................... 103
3.16 Test equipment ..................................................................... 104
3.16.1 Standards conformance testing ..................................... 104
3.16.2 Wireless link performance testing .................................. 105
3.16.3 Resistance testing ........................................................ 105
3.16.4 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing .................... 107
3.16.5 Audio equipment testing ............................................... 107
3.17 Definitions of terms ............................................................... 108
3.18 Co-existence of third party and mandatory eCall systems .......... 109
3.18.1 Reasons for requirements ............................................. 109
3.18.2 Expectations ............................................................... 109
3.18.3 Commentary ............................................................... 111
3.18.4 Recommendations ....................................................... 112
3.19 Nomadic eCall devices ........................................................... 113
3.20 Additional aspects ................................................................. 114
4 Summary ....................................................................................... 115
4.1 Aspects where a clear recommendation is available ................... 116
4.2 Aspects where a decision is pending ........................................ 117
4.3 Aspects where development of a test concept is required ........... 119
5 Conclusions .................................................................................... 121
6 References ..................................................................................... 123
7 Glossary of terms ........................................................................... 124
Appendix A .................................................................................................... 127


May 2014 8

1 Introduction
During 2012, in the European Union, over 28,000 people were killed on roads
1
. The
number of people injured was around 1,400,000; resulting from just under 1,100,000
accidents
2
. One of the initiatives attempting to reduce the burden from these accidents
is the implementation of eCall.
The concept of an automatic crash notification system or eCall is not new. In the case
of a crash, an eCall-equipped car will automatically call the nearest emergency centre
via the emergency number 112. Even if no passenger is able to speak, e.g. due to
their injuries, a 'Minimum Set of Data' is transmitted, including the exact location of
the crash. Shortly after the accident, emergency services therefore know that there
has been an accident, and where exactly it occurred. The benefit of eCall arises
through the reduction in response times for emergency services attending to the
accident, thus helping to save lives and to treat injuries more rapidly. EC documents
suggest that eCall could speed up emergency response times by 40% in urban areas
and 50% in the countryside, and save up to 2500 lives a year
3
.
In addition to the road safety benefits, eCall may also help to reduce the congestion
caused by traffic accidents and the potential for secondary accidents to occur as a
result of unsecured accident sites.
Conventionally, eCall is activated automatically as soon as in-vehicle sensors detect a
serious crash. Once set off, the system dials the European emergency number 112,
establishes a telephone link to the appropriate emergency call centre and sends
details of the accident to the rescue services, including the time of incident, the
accurate position of the crashed vehicle and the direction of travel (most important on
motorways and in tunnels). An eCall can also be triggered manually by pushing a
button in the car, for example by a witness to a serious accident.
The European Commission (EC) has adopted a proposal for a regulation concerning
type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall system. However, the
delegated/implementing acts to this regulation, detailing technical requirements and
test procedures for type-approval, do not exist as yet. It is the intention of the new
regulation that it builds on the existing technical standards. For instance, the
European Standardisation Organisations, ETSI and CEN, have already developed
standards for the deployment of a pan-European eCall service. These should apply for
the purposes of the regulation. Therefore, as a first stage in working towards the
development of type-approval requirements, existing information is gathered that
could help in that purpose. This report documents, structures and assesses the

1
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/pdf/observatory/trends_figures.pdf
2
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/pdf/observatory/historical_evol.pdf
3
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/kallas/headlines/news/2013/06/ecall_en.htm


May 2014 9

available information which may offer support in developing the vehicle approval
requirements and test procedures with respect to i eCall in-vehicle systems.
Following this information gathering, it is expected that the available information will
then be compared with the requirements and expectations for eCall in-vehicle systems
before final proposals (draft regulatory texts) for system validation testing will be
made at a later stage.


May 2014 10

2 Supporting documents, standards and research
Many previous studies have reviewed the technology and investigated and discussed
the potential benefits associated with eCall systems. The target for this review of the
supporting documents, standards and research was to provide the EC with an
objective review of the existing documents supporting the implementation of eCall. It
is anticipated that the information collated forms the basis of, and enables, the
detailed technical requirements and tests for the type-approval of eCall IVS to be
specified. Therefore it included, wherever possible, the identification of proposals for
methods and assessment procedures which could be used to assess eCall systems in a
vehicle type-approval setting.
2.1 Legislators, standardisation and research groups
The United Nations Informal Working Group AECS
4
(Accident Emergency Call Systems)
is in the process of drafting a new UN Regulation on the type-approval of accident
emergency call systems (in the following referred to as Draft UN Regulation No. XX on
AECD/AECS). The Informal Working Group (IWG) is under chairmanship of the Russian
Federation and forms a sub-group of the Working Party on General Safety Provisions
(GRSG) within WP.29 (1958 Agreement). The 1
st
meeting took place in October 2013
with the initial aim to complete the work by October 2014. At the 4
th
meeting in April
2014 it was decided to postpone the date for finalising an agreed draft to October
2015. The discussions are based on an initial draft text provided by the Russian
federation and input from Contracting Parties and stakeholders, including OICA,
CLEPA, GSA and CETECOM. The work concerns common technical requirements of
AECS devices and functions, the data to be transmitted, and test methods; it does not
address questions such as mobile phone communication protocols.
The EC published a proposal on type-approval of M1 and N1 vehicles with regard to
eCall in-vehicle systems (IVSs) in June 2013. This proposal does not contain the
detailed provisions on technical requirements or testing. These "non-essential"
elements will be introduced by the EC through delegated/implementing acts. The
European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on the text in February 2014;
and the Council discussed and adopted a general approach in May 2014. Both
institutions support the mandatory introduction of the eCall in-vehicle system
proposed by the EC. If an early second reading agreement can be reached between
Council and Parliament, this might lead to possible draft delegated/implementing acts
at the end of 2014. The opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the
proposal of Parliament and Council has been obtained.
A set of European EN standards with regard to eCall has been published by the
European Committee for Standardization (CEN) since 2011 covering numerous

4
https://www2.unece.org/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=14319865


May 2014 11

technical aspects like operating requirements, data to be transmitted in case of an
accident and end-to-end conformance testing.
The Russian Federation is in the process of legislating on ERA-GLONASS which is the
Russian equivalent to eCall. ERA-GLONASS will be required for M1, M2, M3, N1, N2
and N3 vehicles (with varying levels of functionality) from the beginning of January
2015 for new types of vehicles. The Russian legislative process was supported by a set
of nine GOST standards, published in two batches in 2011 and 2013 respectively.
These cover numerous aspects of technical requirements and test methods and were
designed with the aim in mind to ensure technological compatibility with the main
functional properties of EUs eCall, e.g. using a modem tone as the main mechanism
for transferring data, structure and format of the standardized mandatory data
transmitted as part of the MSD, and two-way voice connection with vehicle occupants.
The Japanese eCall equivalent, HELPNET, was established in 2000 and has since been
voluntarily adopted by major vehicle manufacturers such as Toyota, Lexus and Honda.
The system is not legally mandated or regulated but based on voluntary agreements
and managed privately.
The HeERO project
5
is a pre-deployment trial for pan-European eCall based on the
common European emergency number 112. The project started with a first phase in
January 2011 and continued with a second phase, running partly in parallel, in
January 2013, extending to December 2014. The aim of the project is to prepare the
deployment of the necessary infrastructure for a harmonised in-vehicle emergency call
system that is interoperable and provides cross-border continuity. To test and assess
the European technical standards in real-world conditions trials are carried out in 15
European countries (nine in HeERO 1; 6 in HeERO 2). Some deliverables of the project
provide assessments of the certification procedures and recommendations for future
deployment activities.
The European eCall Implementation Platform (EeIP)
6
is a coordination body for
stakeholders and national platforms supporting the implementation of eCall. The
platform coordinates with member states and assists the EC in preparing legislation.
Its aim is to guide, coordinate and monitor the progress of implementation in Europe
to ensure a timely, effective and harmonised deployment.
The eSafety Driving Group eCall
7
was a working group established by the EC under the
eSafety forum. It was co-chaired by ERTICO-ITS Europe and ACEA and finalised its
work in 2006. Members of the working group represented all sectors involved in the
implementation of eCall.

5
http://www.heero-pilot.eu/view/en/home.html
6
http://www.imobilitysupport.eu/imobility-forum/governance-structure/european-
ecall-implementation-platform-eeip
7
http://www.esafetysupport.info/en/ecall_toolbox/driving_group_ecall/


May 2014 12

The ITS Advisory Group
8
is a group of experts on Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS)
set up by the EC to advise on business and technical aspects of deployment and use of
ITS, including eCall. The group was formed in 2012 and consists of 25 members,
including service providers, manufacturing industry, transport operators.
2.2 Overview of relevant sources
The supporting documents identified and reviewed throughout this study are listed in
Table A-1 (see Appendix A, page 127). The table provides a concise overview of the
documents considered relevant for type-approval legislation on eCall IVSs. The
relevant content of each document is listed with regard to potential type-approval
requirements and potential test procedures. Furthermore, comments on the status of
the documents and their relevance are given. The table is intended to give a brief
summary of all documents referenced in the main body of the report and to inform the
reader on the wider context of documents if needed while reading the report.

8

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its/road/action_plan/its_advisory_group_en.ht
m


May 2014 13

3 Future requirements and test methods for eCall in-
vehicle system (IVS)
Based on a technical assessment of the material available and discussions with
technical experts in the area of eCall and stakeholders from various groups, many
distinct aspects of eCall were identified that needed to be considered for type-approval
regulation:
1. Scope
2. Privacy and liability aspects
3. Conformance to relevant technical standards
4. eCall triggering and test calls
5. Resistance to mechanical impact during normal use
6. Resistance to mechanical impact during accident (crash)
7. Climate resistance (temperature, temperature change, foreign body ingress,
water-tightness, condensed water)
8. Autonomous power supply
9. Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
10. Resistance to electric impacts
11. Wireless link performance of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) module
and mobile network device (MND)
12. Installation and connection
13. Audio equipment
14. In-vehicle system (IVS) self-test
15. Human-machine interface (HMI)
16. Test equipment
17. Definitions of terms
18. Co-existence of third party and mandatory eCall systems
19. Nomadic eCall devices
20. Additional aspects
The following technical sections will discuss the relevant aspects of each of these items
in detail. This includes a brief explanation why requirements might be considered; an
overview of options for requirements and testing existing in current legislation,
proposals and technical standards; commentary and discussion of the most relevant
options; and a recommendation how to proceed on each of the items.


May 2014 14

3.1 Scope of the regulation
The scope defines which vehicle categories the type-approval regulation applies to and
whether separate eCall systems intended to be fitted in such vehicles are also
covered. The scope of a regulation is a fundamental requirement of its
implementation. The requirements within the regulation are not necessarily uniform
for all vehicles in scope.
3.1.1 Options
Different options have been proposed as ways of defining the scope for a regulation
concerning type-approval requirements for the deployment of eCall IVS within the EU.
During the course of the legislative process, the European Commission (EC), the
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (i.e. the member states)
have adopted and published their positions. The Commissions initial proposal included
all M1 and N1 vehicles in scope; the Parliaments resolution added an exemption for
small series vehicles; the Councils general approach included separate technical units
and components within the scope, but added exemptions for individual approval
vehicles and vehicles which for technical reasons cannot be equipped with an
appropriate eCall triggering mechanism:
Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall
in-vehicle system and amending Directive 2007/46/EC, 2013/0165(COD), 316
final, dated 13/06/2013:
o Recital 7: The mandatory equipping of vehicles with the eCall in-vehicle
system should initially apply only to new passenger cars and light
commercial vehicles (categories M1 and N1) for which an appropriate
triggering mechanism already exists.
o In TRLs view, appropriate triggering mechanism in this context could
be understood as either an accident detection system for triggering an
automatic eCall or a button for triggering a manual eCall. If this is
meant to refer to automatic eCalls, it is assumed that this means a
system able to detect a crash of severity sufficient to suggest eCall
could be of benefit. The practical manifestation of this assumption is,
perhaps, through the airbag modules; where any vehicle fitted with an
airbag will have a crash detection system already installed and
potentially available for triggering of an eCall. This might, in practice
refer to all M1 and N1 vehicles in which an airbag is installed. However,
a formal definition would be required to fully define what is meant by a
crash detection system and/or a crash detection sensors.
o Recital 11: Small series vehicles and vehicles approved pursuant to
Article 24 of Directive 2007/46/EC are excluded under Directive
2007/46/EC from the requirements on the protection of occupants in the
case of frontal impact and side impact. Therefore, those vehicles should


May 2014 15

be excluded from the obligation to comply with the eCall requirements.
Moreover, some M1 and N1 vehicles cannot be equipped with an
appropriate eCall triggering mechanism.
o Article 2: This Regulation shall apply to vehicles of categories M1 and
N1 as defined in points 1.1.1. and 1.2.1. of Annex II to Directive
2007/46/EC.
European Parliament legislative resolution of 26 February 2014 on the proposal
for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning type-
approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system and
amending Directive 2007/46/EC, P7_TA(2014)0154, dated 26/02/2014:
o Recital 7: The mandatory equipping of vehicles with the 112-based
eCall in-vehicle system should initially apply only to new types of
passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (categories M1 and N1) for
which an appropriate triggering mechanism already exists. The
possibility of extending the application of the 112-based eCall in-vehicle
system requirement in the near future to include other vehicle
categories, such as heavy goods vehicles (HGVs), buses and coaches,
powered two-wheelers (PTW) and agricultural tractors, should be further
assessed by the Commission with a view to presenting, if appropriate, a
legislative proposal.
o It should be noted that to date, few HGVs, buses, coaches, and powered
two-wheelers will be equipped with an airbag system. However, it is not
known whether some of them have accident detection systems. Before
automatic triggering eCall systems are required for these vehicles, it
should be demonstrated that the appropriate system components can
be installed at a reasonable cost. It is a general expectation that eCall
would be of benefit for these vehicles as well as for passenger cars and
light commercial vehicles.
o Recital 7a (new): The equipping of vehicles of existing types to be
manufactured after 1 October 2015 with the 112-based eCall in-vehicle
system should be promoted in order to increase penetration. In respect
of types of vehicles type-approved before 1 October 2015, an eCall
system may be retrofitted on a voluntary basis.
o Recital 11: Small series vehicles are excluded under Directive
case of frontal impact and side impact. Therefore, those small series
vehicles should be excluded from the obligation to comply with the eCall
requirements set out in this Regulation.
o Article 2: This Regulation shall apply to vehicles of categories M1 and
N1 as defined in points 1.1.1. and 1.2.1. of Annex II to Directive
2007/46/EC.
This Regulation shall not apply to small series vehicles.


May 2014 16

General Approach of the Council with regard to the Proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council concerning type-approval
requirements for the deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system and amending
Directive 2007/46/EC, 9879/14 ENT 123 MI 428 CODEC 1299, dated
19/05/2014:
o Recital 7: The mandatory equipping of vehicles with the eCall in-vehicle
system should initially apply only to new types of passenger cars and
light commercial vehicles (categories M1 and N1) for which an
appropriate triggering mechanism already exists.
o Recital 11: Small series vehicles and vehicles approved pursuant to
Article 24 of Directive 2007/46/EC are excluded under Directive
case of frontal impact and side impact. Therefore, those vehicles should
be excluded from the obligation to comply with the eCall requirements.
Moreover, some M1 and N1 vehicles cannot be equipped with an
appropriate eCall triggering mechanism.
o Article 2: 1. This Regulation shall apply to vehicles of categories M1
and N1 as defined in points 1.1.1. and 1.2.1. of Part A of Annex II to
Directive 2007/46/EC and to eCall in-vehicle systems, components and
separate technical units designed and constructed for such vehicles.
It shall not apply to the following vehicles:
(a) vehicles produced in small series approved pursuant to Articles 22
and 23 of Directive 2007/46/EC;
(b) vehicles approved pursuant to Article 24 of Directive 2007/46/EC;
(c) vehicles which cannot for technical reasons be equipped with an
appropriate eCall triggering mechanism, as determined in accordance
with paragraph 2.
2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in
accordance with Article 9 to identify vehicles or classes of vehicles of
categories M1 and N1 which for technical reasons cannot be equipped
with an appropriate eCall triggering mechanism, on the basis of a
cost/benefit analysis carried out or mandated by the Commission and
taking into account all relevant safety and technical aspects. ()
For the future UN Regulation No. XX on AECD/AECS, the scope is not yet decided. The
following options are being discussed:
Latest Draft UN Regulation No. XX on AECD/ AECS, Part I, document number:
AECS 03-04e, dated 26/02/2014
o This Regulation applies to:
Part I: the AECDs which are intended to be fitted to vehicles of
categories M1 and N1;


May 2014 17

Part II: the installation on vehicles of categories M1 and N1 of
AECDs which have been approved to Part I of this regulation.
Part III: vehicles of categories M1 not exceeding 2,5 tons, and
N1 where the "R" point of the lowest seat is not more than 700
mm from ground level, with regard to AECS or equipped with an
AECD which has not been separately approved according to Part
I of this Regulation. Other vehicles may be approved at the
request of the vehicle manufacturer.
Discussions at the 4
th
AECS meeting in April 2014 indicated that the scope is
still disputed: it might either be defined as a wide scope, i.e. all M1 and N1
vehicles (possibly except small series); or M1 and N1 vehicles which are fitted
with accident detection systems; or M1 and N1 vehicles which undergo UN R94
and/or UN R95 full-scale crash testing. Separate technical units will also be
covered in the Regulation.
The following vehicles would be covered, if the scope was linked to full-scale
crash testing:
o Define scope as M1/N1 undergoing both UN R94 and UN R95 crash
tests: Would capture only M1 vehicles 2,500 kg
o Define scope as M1 undergoing one or both of UN R94 and UN R95
crash tests: Would capture M1 vehicles 2,500 kg, and all M1 and N1
vehicles with R point height of lowest seat 700 mm
3.1.2 Commentary
The scope of the future European Regulation has been commented on by Commission,
Parliament and Council and will be defined so as to cover M1 and N1 vehicles with
certain vehicles being exempt (small series, individual approvals and vehicles which
cannot be equipped). In TRLs view it is sensible to exempt individual and small series
vehicle approvals if they cannot meet the requirements for destructive testing and
assurance of eCall system performance (i.e. if they dont have to undergo UN R94 or
UN R95). Also, small series vehicle converters may have disproportionate costs if they
had to add eCall systems to campervan conversions, etc. Another example might be
special purpose vehicles like emergency service vehicles it could be unnecessary to
make an eCall if one is involved in an accident given that the PSAP is probably in
direct contact with the vehicle already and they might be tracked via a dedicated
monitoring service anyway.
At the UN level, proposals have been made either to include all M1 and N1 vehicles, or
to limit the scope of the regulation to those vehicles of categories M1 and N1 which
also belong to the scope of UN Regulations No. 94 and/or 95. The importance of this
link with full-scale crash tests is discussed in detail in Section 3.4 in conjunction with
automatic eCall triggering, because it is important even in the European context with
regard to available assessment techniques. In summary, whilst UN R94 and UN R95
can provide a useful testing environment for checking automatic eCall triggering and
post-crash performance, linking the scope of an eCall regulation to the scope of these


May 2014 18

UN regulations would mean that it will no longer apply to all M1 and N1 vehicles. This
would severely limit the potential safety benefits of eCall.
3.1.3 Recommendation
Based on the General Approach of the Council, currently all large series M1 and N1
vehicles (and eCall systems and components intended to be fitted in such vehicles)
should be included in the scope of the regulation as long as they can be equipped with
an appropriate triggering mechanism. The vehicles which cannot be equipped will need
to be clearly identified in the future, which is already covered in the General Approach
by empowering the EC to carry out analyses and adopt delegated acts in this regard.
General Approach of the Council, 9879/14 ENT 123 MI 428 CODEC 1299, dated
19/05/2014, Article 2:
1. This Regulation shall apply to vehicles of categories M1 and N1 as defined
in points 1.1.1. and 1.2.1. of Part A of Annex II to Directive 2007/46/EC and to
eCall in-vehicle systems, components and separate technical units designed
and constructed for such vehicles.
(a) vehicles produced in small series approved pursuant to Articles 22 and 23
of Directive 2007/46/EC;
(b) vehicles approved pursuant to Article 24 of Directive 2007/46/EC;
(c) vehicles which cannot for technical reasons be equipped with an appropriate
eCall triggering mechanism, as determined in accordance with paragraph 2.
2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance
with Article 9 to identify vehicles or classes of vehicles of categories M1 and N1
which for technical reasons cannot be equipped with an appropriate eCall
triggering mechanism, on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis carried out or
mandated by the Commission and taking into account all relevant safety and
technical aspects. ()


May 2014 19

3.2 Privacy and liability aspects
Basic expectations regarding privacy and liability aspects associated with eCall have
been described by several authors (including CEN, eSafety Driving Group eCall,
European Data Protection Supervisor and Article 29 Working Party). In addition
specific liability questions have been considered in previous research and data privacy
aspects have also recently been reconsidered by the European Data protection
Supervisor. These sources of information on privacy and liability aspects have been
reviewed and are summarised and, in some cases, reproduced below.
3.2.1 Expectations
Some core texts are provided to set the context for the privacy and liability aspects of
eCall.
EN 16072
o eCall shall be considered as a public service operating as part of the
public emergency call service, where the first part of service provision is
a Public Safety Answering Point (which may be a public or private
organisation under public delegation as determined within nation
states).
o All stakeholders involved shall comply with all EU and national
regulations related to the protection of data and the privacy of the
citizens in relation to emergency service support.
o The eCall service shall only operate from the point of service demand
(automatic or manual) triggering of the eCall. eCall shall therefore be a
'sleeping' application and shall not be used to monitor the movement of
vehicles other than at the point of eCall message triggering as defined
in EN 16062. For detail of network registration, see ETSI TS 122 101.
o NOTE Article 29 Working Party on the protection of the individuals with
regards to the processing of personal data have provided an
interpretation of these requirements, and the attention of implementers
is directed to these interpretations. See
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp125_
en.pdf.
Recommendations of the eSafety Driving Group eCall (DG eCall) for the
introduction of the pan-European eCall, Version 2.0
o In order to protect the privacy of the citizens DG eCall recommends that
eCall is considered as a public service build on top of the pan-European
single emergency call number 112, which means that the data controller
will be a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP), or a private organization
appointed by the public authorities to perform that role. DG eCall also
recommends that all stakeholders involved will be obliged to comply


May 2014 20

with all directives related to the protection of data and the privacy of the
citizens in relation to 112. The different Directives related to the single
European emergency number 112 and data protection can be found in
the Directive on data protection 95/46/EC.
o The DG eCall recommends that the MSD includes only the minimum
required information needed by the emergency services to ensure an
adequate response.
o The DG eCall recommends that the citizen will be informed about the
existence of the eCall service at the moment of buying/hiring a vehicle.
This must include information about the data that would be transferred
to the PSAP in the event of a call, and explain that the contract will
include the explicit acceptance of the citizen of the eCall service. The
citizen should have the possibility to ask for a disconnection of the
service at the moment of purchase and in this scenario, it must be
possible for the vehicle owner to ask for a re-connection of the service
at a later stage.
o DG eCall recommends that when implementing eCall it is ensured that it
will not be possible to track the vehicle at all times. It is recommended
to make eCall a sleeping application on the eCall generator that only
comes to life when the eCall generator detect an incident serious
enough for triggering an automatic eCall or the vehicle occupants
generate a manual eCall.
The opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) of 29 October
2013
o Taking into account: the functioning of the European Union, the
fundamental rights of its members, the processing of personal data and
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data; the EDPS provided opinion on the European Commission proposal
for an eCall regulation. This opinion is described in the document of 29
October 2013. It provides general analysis of the Commission proposal,
some specific comments and conclusions. Extensive reference is made
to this document in the Privacy and data protection Section (3.2.3)
below.
Article 29 Working Party - Working document on data protection and privacy
implications in eCall initiative
o In summary: If the eCall is optional, a user-friendly solution taking care
of self-determination of car users by introducing the technical possibility
to switch off/on eCall on a case-to-case basis must be introduced, for
instance by means of electronic switches, smart cards or other devices
allowing the voluntary activation of the eCall device and also, if desired,
enabling the communication of data beyond the MSD. If the eCall is


May 2014 21

mandatory, rules have to be embodied in a dedicated law, taking into
account data protection principles.
o In case the mandatory option is implemented, a system of proper data
protection safeguards has to be introduced.
o While using eCall, a Minimum Set of Data (MSD) to handle the
emergency will be circulated. The Article 29 Working Party considers
that MSD including the complete VIN number as currently indicated
could be excessive in relation to the clearly defined purpose.
o From a data protection point of view, an emergency call released
automatically by a device or triggered manually and transmitted via
mobile networks resulting in geo-localization of the emergency event is
in principle admissible, provided that there exists a respective specific
legal basis and sufficient data protection safeguards are provided.
However, the purposes of the emergency call system and the relevance
of the data to be processed must always be taken into account, in
particular if the processing involves the so-called Full Set of Data.
o Recital 7c new: Consumers should be provided with a realistic overview
of the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system and of the private eCall
system, if the vehicle is equipped with one, as well as comprehensive
and reliable information regarding any additional functionalities or
services linked to the private emergency service, in-vehicle emergency
or assistance-call applications on offer, and regarding the level of
service to be expected with the purchase of third party services and the
associated cost. The 112-based eCall is a public service of general
interest and should therefore be accessible free of charge to all
consumers.
eCall in-vehicle system should be without prejudice to the right of all
stakeholders such as car manufacturers and independent operators to
offer additional emergency and/or added value services, in parallel with
or building on the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system. However, any
additional services should be designed not to increase driver distraction
or affect the functioning of the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system and
the efficient work of emergency call centres. The 112-based eCall
in-vehicle system and the system providing private or added-value
services should be designed in such a way that no exchange of personal
data between them is possible. Where provided, those services should


May 2014 22

comply with the applicable safety, security and data protection
legislation and should always remain optional for consumers.
o Recital 13: Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council
1
, Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council
2
and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union
3
govern the processing of personal data carried out
in the context of this Regulation. Any processing of data through the
112-based eCall in-vehicle system should therefore be carried out in
accordance with these Directives and under the supervision of the
Member States' competent authorities, in particular the independent
public authorities designated by the Member States pursuant to those
Directives, in particular to guarantee that vehicles equipped with
112-based eCall in-vehicle systems, in their normal operational status
related to 112 eCall, are not traceable and are not subject to any
constant tracking and that the minimum set of data sent by the
in-vehicle eCall system includes only the minimum information required
for the handling of emergency calls by PSAPs, and that no personal data
is stored after that . Given the consent of the data subject or a contract
between both parties, other conditions may apply in case another
emergency call system is installed in the vehicle in addition to the
112-based eCall in-vehicle system, but it should nevertheless comply
with those Directives.
1. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31).
2. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic
communications) (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37).
3. 11a OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 1.
3.2.2 Liability
One of the key original concerns regarding eCall was who would be liable if an eCall
was unsuccessful. This issue was reviewed by Francsics et al. (2009). Information
from that report is summarised here:
Due to its technical and organisational complexity we can envisage several possible
causes for an unsuccessful or corrupted eCall (i.e. the eCall failed partially or
completely), including:


May 2014 23

1. incidental flaws in hardware and software components in the in-vehicle
equipment
2. the threshold for triggering the automatic eCall was not met
3. the in-vehicle equipment is damaged in a crash before an automatic eCall was
triggered
4. in-vehicle equipment was not adequately installed or maintained
5. service provider or PSAP eCall equipment not adequately installed or
maintained
6. lack of telecom service (due to lack of network coverage or other
circumstances)
7. human errors somewhere in the service delivery chain
Depending on the reason(s) for the unsuccessfulness of the automatic eCall, liability
claims may be directed towards one or more of the actors in the production and
service delivery chain, including:
1. dealer/system supplier
2. car/system manufacturer
3. private service provider
4. mobile network operator
5. PSAP (public safety answering point)
It should be noted that this is a somewhat abstract and non-exhaustive typology of
stakeholders. It may well be that in reality one stakeholder embodies more than one
of the above mentioned stakeholder categories. Furthermore, it is also possible that,
depending on the circumstances, other parties may be confronted with claims (e.g.
installers, car rental companies, certification bodies, automobile servicers, fixed
network provider, etc.). There may be a variety of liability relationships between the
different actors.
Liability under the Product Liability Directive
Initially, product liability was governed entirely by national laws. In 1985 however, a
European Council Directive on liability for defective products was introduced (Council
Directive 85/374/EEC, OJ 1985 L. 210/29). The goal of this Directive was to
harmonize product liability rules in Europe.
The most important element of the European Directive is the notion of a defective
product. According to the Directive the producer shall be liable for damage caused by
a defect in his product (Article 1). Article 6 (1) of the Directive provides a definition of
a defective product:
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety a person is entitled to
expect, taking all circumstances into account including:


May 2014 24

1. The presentation of the product;
2. The use the product could reasonably be put to;
3. The time when the product was put into circulation.
From the wording of Article 6 it can be concluded that the EC Directive defines "defect"
in terms of consumer expectations. Furthermore, the definition of a defective product
makes clear that courts are allowed to take a broad range of circumstances into
account when deciding product liability questions and therefore there are no clear and
unambiguous answers when it comes to assessing product liability implications of eCall
equipment.
A key question in relation to eCall is whether an unsuccessful or corrupted eCall can
render the system defective in terms of the Directive. To answer this question it is
useful to distinguish between manufacturing defects and defects that can be
considered to be inherent system limitations. It seems reasonable that expectations of
the consumer regarding the inherent system limitations could be managed to some
extent via the provision of information regarding the service.
Manufacturing Defects
A manufacturing defect exists when a product (an eCall system or component) does
not meet the manufacturers own product specifications. In other words, the product
deviates from the product-line-standard. For example, it could happen that some
badly produced sensors or electronics have been used in one or more eCall-devices. In
such cases it can be argued that the eCall system is defective in the sense of the
Directive because the system does not meet the manufacturers own product
standards.
However, even if it was to be concluded that an unsuccessful eCall was caused by a
manufacturing defect, this does not necessarily mean that the manufacturer could be
held liable towards vehicle occupants. For the manufacturers liability to be established
it must also be shown that the unsuccessful eCall contributed to the damage
(aggravating the injuries or causing death due to longer rescue time). In other words
the claimant in principle has to prove the damage and the causal link between the
defect and the damage. This means that the claimant in principle has to prove that,
and to what extent, his injuries were aggravated due to the unsuccessful eCall. In
many cases this question cannot be answered easily and will require the help of
medical experts.
Closely related to the concept of causation are theories of contributory negligence
(claimants own negligent conduct leads to a decrease of the damages to be paid by
the tortfeasor) and contributory risks (other causes for which the claimant has to
answer can reduce the amount of the awarded damages). For example, if a driver
caused the accident by reckless driving, he may not claim full compensation or any
compensation at all. In practice, questions of contributory negligence are of major
importance.


May 2014 25

An unsuccessful (or corrupted) eCall may also be the result of inherent limitations of
the eCall system. The eCall may be unsuccessful as a result of specific accident
situations (e.g. threshold for triggering the automatic eCall not met, vehicle under
water), inadequate coverage of mobile phone network, eCall equipment damaged in
the crash, etc.
It will be clear that manufacturers in principle cannot be held liable for services
independently delivered through the in-vehicle equipment. It is only for defects in the
in-vehicle equipment for which the manufacturer is responsible under the Directive.
Liability for false alarms
The situation of false alarms differs from unsuccessful or corrupted eCall in terms of
consequences (unnecessary dispatch of emergency services) and potential claimants
(government entities responsible for emergency services).It should be noted that
normal PSAP operation already includes a high number of false alarms.
An end user may be held liable in tort for intentionally misusing an emergency number
and as such an eCall system. However, in other cases recovery of costs will be
problematic because providing emergency services is a typical public task and seeking
recovery of costs through a civil law claim may be regarded inadmissible. This is
because it conflicts with public law and because of the potential hurdle it would create
for people to call the emergency services.
Summary
All actors in the production and service delivery chain are exposed to potential liability
for negligence (breach of a duty of care) or attributable non-performance.
Some actors are exposed to liability risks based on (more) strict liability standards (for
example manufacturers in relation to so called manufacturing defects) or are more
likely to be confronted with potential claims (e.g. service providers because of their
direct relationship with the end user).
3.2.3 Privacy and data protection
When the European Commission put forward the proposal for a regulation on eCall,
the European Data Protection Supervisor was asked to comment on that proposal and
subsequently prepared the document containing his opinion (of 29 October 2013).
Some of the opinions contained in that document are repeated here.
eCall is a sleeper function which has no live tracking potential. In principle, it is not
possible to identify the cars position at any time via the in-vehicle eCall device.
However, once a call has been made, the AECD has presented the opportunity for the
vehicle to be identified (as the VIN is transmitted). For privately owned cars, the
vehicle identification is directly related to the identity of the owner of the car who may
be the driver. For other cars, e.g. rental cars, information obtained from the owner will
lead to the identification of the driver. Combined with these personal details, the
positioning information (location data of the vehicle), and other information processed,


May 2014 26

is related to a directly or indirectly identifiable individual and therefore qualifies as
personal data. Therefore, the PSAP is presented with personal information which
requires data protection.
This means that in the technical and organisational set up of eCall services the
principles laid down in the relevant European Directives and national data protection
laws have to be applied. Processing of personal data is one of the core obligations
created by the Proposal which is therefore subject to the application of and compliance
with data protection legislation and safeguards. In this regard, the European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS) provided a reminder that it is essential to explicitly
mention the applicable EU data protection law in a substantive provision of the
Proposal: a mere indirect reference in a recital cannot be considered as sufficient. The
reference should explicitly provide, as a general rule, that Directive 95/46/EC and its
national implementing rules apply to the processing of personal data within the
framework of the Proposal.
Other comments provided by the EDPS were:
Article 6 would require vehicle manufacturers
i. to ensure that vehicles equipped with the system are not traceable and are
not subject to any constant tracking in their normal operational status
related to the eCall,
ii. to make use of privacy enhancing technologies (hereinafter 'PETs') as well
as to adopt safeguards to prevent surveillance and misuse of the data,
iii. to make sure that the in-vehicle system only processes the minimum set of
data,
iv. and to inform eCall users about the processing of data and in particular:
its legal basis,
its activation by default,
the modalities of data processing,
the purpose pursued,
the types of data collected and processed and the recipients,
the time limit for the retention of data,
the fact that there is no constant tracking,
the modalities for exercising data subject's rights and
any necessary additional information.


May 2014 27

The EDPS recommends the introduction of an additional paragraph to Article 6 of the
Proposal which contains these additional essential safeguards, and in particular:
i. Designates the data controller and the entity responsible for handling access
requests.
Specifies the list of data referred to as a minimum set of data and as a full
set of data (possibly to be elaborated in a delegated or implementing act).
Includes the possibility for data subjects to deactivate private eCall and
added value services.
Specifies retention periods for the data processed.
Specifies the modalities of the exercise of data subjects rights,
The EDPS highly welcomes that Article 6(3) requires manufacturers to provide
individuals purchasing new vehicles with information about the embedded 112
eCall in-vehicle system and the resulting processing of data, and specifies in
the Regulation itself the details of what such information should cover, i.e. the
fact that the system is activated by default, and the modalities of the data
processing that is performed as required under Articles 10 and 11 of Directive
95/46/EC (such as the purpose of the 112 eCall processing, the reference to
the legal basis for the processing, the types of data collected and processed,
the recipients of the data, the fact that there is no constant tracking of the
vehicle, the time limit for the retention of data in the in-vehicle system and the
modalities for exercising data subjects' rights).
The EDPS therefore recommends that the requirement for an appropriate and
distinct contract between the consumer and the service provider is stated in a
specific provision of the proposed Regulation. He also recommends clarifying in
the provision that this contract should cover data protection aspects, including
providing appropriate information to consumers on the service(s) and collecting
their consent for the processing of data in relation to the provision of these
added value services. This could, if needed, be elaborated in the delegated acts
that the Commission will adopt.
This contract will have to provide the following additional information:
Clear and transparent information of end-users on the mandatory processing of
location data, including a clear description of the data processed and the
conditions of processing.
The absence of any constant geo-location unless the user has been made
aware of it and is in a position to give prior free and informed consent.
The EDPS also recommends that the proposal ensures that data subjects are given the
choice to opt for the services, through a specific contract offer, made prior to the
processing. Non-negotiable clauses part of a car sale contract, or clauses belonging to


May 2014 28

general terms and conditions, whose acceptance is mandatory, will not fit this
requirement.
Under Directive 95/46/EC, data exchanged should only be kept for the time necessary
to achieve the purposes for which they were collected and should be automatically
deleted following the expiry of the retention period. The EDPS notes that the retention
period of the data processed for 112 eCall purpose is not specified even though this
information is included in the notice that should be given to data subjects by car
manufacturers. In any event, the data shall not be retained longer than necessary for
adequate transmission to the appropriate PSAP and the MSD should be deleted
afterwards. These storage periods shall be adapted and harmonised depending on the
parties and location of the data (in-car storage, PSAP databases storage). If the data
were to be necessary after the expiration of the required period of storage, in
particular for statistical purposes, they should be anonymised, i.e. there should be no
way to identify directly or indirectly a person based on these data. The EDPS advises
specifying these safeguards with regard to retention.


May 2014 29

3.3 Conformance to relevant technical standards
3.3.1 Reasons for requirements
Different actors are involved in the eCall chain (vehicle/IVS, MNO, PSAP, TPSP) and
pan-European eCall is intended to work across the EU. In order to allow transfer of an
emergency message and the establishment of a voice channel between IVS and PSAP
via a mobile network, common protocols and standards are required. To ensure
interoperability, test procedures are necessary to assess conformance without having
influence over the other actors involved. Also, the content and format of data to be
transmitted from the vehicle to the PSAP (the MSD) has to be defined to ensure
interoperability.
3.3.2 Options
As mentioned in Section 2, Working Group 15 of the CEN TC274 has written a set of
standards regarding eCall. Compliance with these standards is required in the General
Approach of the Council, dated 19/05/2014, Article 5.7:
EN 16062 - eCall high level application requirements (HLAP) defines the high
level application protocols to facilitate eCalls using mobile networks.
Requirements for the IVS include: Procedures following power-up, activation of
eCall, MSD transfer, handling of error cases, and timings (Section 7, Annex 7).
The standard also defines corresponding test and conformance requirements
(Section 11.2).
EN 16072 - Pan-European eCall operating requirements specifies the generic
operational requirements and intrinsic procedures for the provision of an eCall
service that allows to transfer an emergency message and to establish a voice
channel between IVS and PSAP. With regard to the IVS this includes high level
functional requirements, such as the presence of a NAD (Network Access
Device), capability of automatic and manual eCall and robustness to survive a
crash (Section 6). Operational requirements, also concerning the IVS, are set
out in Section 7 of the standard. Please note: This standard includes the
requirement to transmit an automatic eCall in all crash tests which are
required by regulation for the European type-approval (Section 7.5, document
version 18/08/2011). It has to be carefully checked that this does not conflict
with other triggering requirements (Section 3.4).
EN 16102 - eCall - Operating requirements for third party support covers the
same scope for but for third party services in order to allow service providers to
offer services handling eCalls. Please note that TPS eCall is not in scope of the
current project.
EN 15722 - eCall minimum set of data (MSD) specifies the content and format
of the data to be transferred by the IVS to the PSAP during an eCall. This


May 2014 30

includes data presentation, encoding and transmission. Brief requirements for
conformance testing are set out.
CEN/TS 16454 - eCall end to end conformance testing sets out test procedures
that allow different actors in the eCall chain (vehicle/IVS, MNO, PSAP, TPSP) to
claim conformance to all above listed EN eCall standards without being able to
control the behaviour of other actors. The standard specifies a set of state
transition points for which conformance requirements are defined and tests are
arranged into. With regard to the IVS, 47 test objectives and related tests are
defined to demonstrate that it is capable of triggering an eCall, sending the
MSD, and making a voice channel available (Sections 2, 9.1 to 9.6, Annex A).
Please note that this document is currently has the status of a published
Technical Specification (TS). A Technical Specification is established by a CEN
Technical Body and approved through a vote by the CEN national members. It
may be adopted as a national standard, but conflicting national standards may
continue to exist. A Technical Specification may however not conflict with a
European Standard. If a conflicting EN is subsequently published, the TS is
withdrawn.
Various standards from the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
exist for mobile phone equipment to be interoperable. The following ETSI standards
have been referenced in the various eCall related documents:
ETSI TS 102 164 (Version 1.3.1)
ETSI TS 121 133 (Release 8 or later)
ETSI TS 122 101 (Release 8)
ETSI EN 301 511
ETSI EN 301 908


May 2014 31

3.3.3 Commentary
The EN eCall standards EN 16062, EN 16072 and EN 16102 provide an agreed
framework of high level and operating requirements specifically for European
conditions. The standards are highly developed and were created by experts in the
relevant fields. In order to make these standards mandatory, compliance would need
to be required in eCall type-approval legislation. As there is an ongoing review process
for these documents, the latest version available at the time of legislating will need to
be checked and referenced.
CEN/TS 16454 defines an advanced procedure for demonstrating conformance to the
requirements defined in the EN eCall standard framework and could be used for type-
approval testing. This conformance testing requires specialised test equipment (see
Section 3.16) and is expected to be carried out by the eCall system manufacturer (or
on their behalf) in order to provide the vehicle manufacturer with a certificate of
compliance to eCall standards for the system to be integrated into the vehicle.
EN 15722 defines a widely accepted and technically sound format and content of the
MSD transmitted to the PSAP. This format is also used in the Russian standard GOST R
54620 and discussions on UN level indicate that it will be adopted, regional
discrepancies notwithstanding, in the future UN Regulation. The MSD as defined in EN
15722 includes, however, certain elements which are politically disputed due to
potential privacy and data protection issues (see also Section 3.2):
The VIN, which is intended to enable PSAPs to obtain detailed information from
a database on vehicle make, model, colour, etc. in order to facilitate
identification of the vehicle.
Two recent vehicle locations, intended to enable PSAPs to determine the
direction of travel. This might be relevant for example on large carriageways
with separate lanes.
The Commission proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the
council concerning type-approval requirements for eCall, dated 13/06/2013, does not
reference EN 15722 but only defines that the MSD shall include only the minimum
information required for appropriate handling of emergency calls.
The European Parliament legislative resolution, dated 26/02/2014, sets out in Article
6:
The MSD sent by the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system shall as a maximum
consist of the information required by the standard referred to in point 2c of
Article 3 [i.e. EN 15722]. The MSD shall not be processed for longer than
necessary for the purpose for which they have been processed, and shall not
be stored for longer than is required for the appropriate handling of emergency
calls. The MSD shall be stored in such a way as to make possible its full
deletion.
The General Approach of the Council, dated 19/05/2014, sets out in Article 6:


May 2014 32

The minimum set of data sent by the eCall in-vehicle system shall include only
the minimum information as referred to in the standard EN 15722:2011
"Intelligent transport systems - eSafety - eCall minimum set of data (MSD)".
The personal data included in the eCall in-vehicle system shall not be retained
longer than necessary for their transmission to the appropriate PSAP. Data
submitted shall only be used for the purpose for which they were submitted.
They shall be deleted as soon as they are no longer necessary for the purpose
for which they were collected.
From a technical point of view, it is recommended that the MSD data format is
required to comply with EN 15722 to ensure interoperability. Regarding contents,
further discussion appears necessary to decide on the items mentioned above. In their
final report in 2006, the eSafety Driving Group eCall recommended that the MSD
should include only the minimum required information needed by the emergency
services to ensure an adequate response. A stakeholder survey carried out by EeIP
among road operators (published in the Deliverable of Task Force 3 in 2011) indicated
the following requirements regarding data transmitted:
The system must provide:
o Number of persons involved
o Number of vehicles involved
o Number of automatic signals and manual signals related to one event
o Only verified information on relevance and severity of the incident
o Information on incident type
o Information from Samaritan signals (but the Samaritan signal count is
sufficient)
The system shall provide:
o Fuel type of involved vehicles
o Information on the make and type of vehicles involved
o Information on the colour of vehicles involved
o Information concerning the possible number of casualties and fatalities
(the AIS scale)
o Information to what extent the vehicle can still drive
o Information on the speed of the vehicle immediately prior to the
incident to provide the road traffic manager with an extra indicator of
the severity of the incident
The Japanese voluntary HELPNET system contains some additional elements compared
to the European MSD, for example (details can be found in document AECS-03-05e):


May 2014 33

Position info (report site and travel trail, 64 points at 80 m intervals, i.e. ca. 5
km), based on GPS, gyro, velocity signals, map-matching, etc.
Road type
Sensor info (DeltaV, airbag sensors, overturn sensor, multiple crash, etc.)
Originator ID (Originator ID is used to acquire member and vehicle information
(make, model, colour, etc.) from a database.
With regard to mobile communication standards, it appears necessary for the MND to
be compliant in order to successfully access PLMNs. The ETSI standards listed in
Section 3.3.2 are not eCall specific and have not been reviewed in-depth during this
project because they are well-established. Conformance with these standards is, in
part, already required by conformance to the EN standards (as these contain
references).
ISO 24978 on data registry procedures for Intelligent transport systems, for example,
requires in a general way:
() wireless communication shall be established in full compliance with local
telecommunication regulations, procedures and protocols for that media using
the appropriate International or Regional Standards ()
UN R116 for vehicle alarm systems, which might also include transmitting equipment,
requires compliance with the relevant ETSI standards and lists examples. The
wording used in UN R116, Section 6.2.3. is:
[The system] shall comply with the relevant ETSI Standards, e.g. EN 300 220-
1 V1.3.1. (2000-09), EN 300 220-2 V1.3.1. (2000-09), EN 300 220-3 V1.1.1.
(2000-09) and EN 301 489-3 V1.2.1. (2000-08) (including any advisory
requirements).
3.3.4 Recommendations
In order to mandate compliance with the relevant EN and ETSI standards, the
legislative text on eCall might set out the following:
The eCall in-vehicle system shall comply with the EN standards EN 16062, EN
16072 and EN 16102. Conformance shall be demonstrated using the test
procedures prescribed for IVS in CEN/TS 16454. The IVS shall also comply with
the relevant ETSI standards.
A list of applicable ETSI standards might be provided together with this statement in
the regulation if deemed necessary.
The MSD data format is required to comply with EN 15722 to ensure
interoperability.
As discussed above, the current version of EN 16072 at the time of legislating should
be checked for potentially conflicting triggering provisions.


May 2014 34

3.4 eCall triggering and test calls
It is a basic functional premise of eCall that in the event of a collision the system is
able to detect the collision and initiate the eCall. This is based on the assumption that
the collision is of a severity that is potentially injurious and that the occupants of the
vehicle may not able to initiate the call themselves. Thereby there is some benefit
associated with automatic triggering of a call to the emergency services.
Within the context of vehicle type-approval one expects certain limitations as to what
can be assessed to guarantee safe performance of vehicle systems. It is often not
cost-effective or practical to test every conceivable condition of use. In the case of
expensive full-scale crash testing, these limitations can be even more evident. To
reduce the costs associated with eCall system development and type-approval it is
hoped that existing crash tests can be used for the assessment of the automatic
triggering of eCall. Options for this are discussed in the Section 3.4.3.
Alongside crash performance of the vehicle, it is anticipated that each manufacturer
will design and implement an algorithm for deciding whether the eCall should be
triggered. A level of in-house development is therefore assumed. The type-approval
testing merely provides some assurance that for an accepted severity the eCall will be
activated. Furthermore the testing also provides experimental validation that the
system in its complete, and truly representative, state will survive such an impact and
still be able to offer the rudimentary functions expected of it.
Therefore, the features of the testing that are required include:
Being cost effective
Being of a severity where injury is possible, in which case triggering should
occur
If practicable, being of a severity where no injury is possible, in which case
triggering should not occur
Representing as broad a range of real world accident scenarios as possible
Having a feasible means of checking the triggering state
Having a feasible means of assessing post-crash survival of the system and
functions
Being repeatable and reproducible


May 2014 35

3.4.2 Expectations
Directive 2007/46/EC, 9879/14 ENT 123 MI 428 CODEC 1299, dated
19/05/2014:
o Article 5, Point 2: Manufacturers shall demonstrate that all their new
types of vehicle are constructed to ensure that in the event of a severe
accident, detected by activation of one or more sensors or processors
within the vehicle, which occurs in the territory of the Union, an eCall to
the single European emergency number 112 is triggered automatically.
o Point 7 of the introductory text: The mandatory equipping of vehicles
with the eCall in-vehicle system should initially apply only to new
passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (categories M1 and N1) for
which an appropriate triggering mechanism already exists.
EN 16072, Section 7.5
o The automotive manufacturer/equipment supplier shall make best
reasonable effort to enable an audio channel to be established so long
as the relevant equipment has not been disabled in the crash.
o The in-vehicle eCall system shall transmit the MSD message, so long as
there is an ETSI prime medium wireless network available to receive the
signal, in all crash tests which are required by regulation for the
European type-approval:
o NOTE At the time of developing this European Standard, the relevant
frontal crash tests are defined in Directive 96/79, amended by Directive
1999/98 (or equivalent ECE R94-01); and lateral crash tests are defined
in: Directive 96/27 (or equivalent ECE R95-02).
HELPNET System Specifications - AECS-03-05e: Japan; Automatic triggering is
linked to airbag deployment
GOST R 54620, Sections 6.1 and 6.2
o These sections require that eCall services should ensure the formation
and transmission of the MND upon the occurrence of an accident:
For vehicles of category M1 this is expected to be based on
automatic triggering in the event of an accident in which there is
a substantial likelihood of threat to life and health of people in
the vehicle at the time of the accident ;
For vehicles of categories M and N this is expected to be via a
manual mode.


May 2014 36

Draft UN Regulation No. XX on AECD/ AECS, Part I: Automatic triggering shall
occur at least under the conditions of UN R94 and UN R95 crash tests (perhaps
also other conditions). Calculation of the automatic triggering signal will not
form part of the UN Regulation.
3.4.3 Options
Draft UN Regulation No. XX on AECD/AECS, Part II, Section 15.2
o The specifications apply to vehicles of category M1, covered by
Regulations Nos. 94 and (or) 95, and those of category N1, covered by
Regulation No. 95.
o Russian proposal for text:
The e-call system shall enable:
Automatic transmission of information about the accident
at the time of the accident. The fact that transmission has
occurred and the information about the accident shall be
recorded by the technical service:
o When simulating a frontal collision of the vehicle
during tests under Regulation No. 94. If the vehicle
is not covered by Regulation No. 94, frontal
collision shall be simulated during tests under
Regulation No. 12.
o When simulating a lateral collision of the vehicle
during tests under Regulation No. 95.
o OICA proposal for text:
Any vehicle fitted with an AECD complying with the definition
above shall meet the performance requirements contained in
paragraphs 15.2.3. to 15.2.3.2
The AECD shall demand in-band modem communication
at the latest [1 second] after reception of the triggering
signal defined in paragraph 12.2. The triggering signal
shall be generated by one of the following means:
o Performance or simulation of a frontal collision. In
the case of a simulation, the logic signal can be
generated according to a test report established
during a Regulation No. 94 frontal collision;


May 2014 37

o Performance or simulation of a lateral collision. In
the case of a simulation, the logic signal can be
generated according to a test report established
during a Regulation No. 95 lateral collision.
Draft UN Regulation No. XX on AECD/AECS, Part III, Section 24.2.2 + Section
24.3.2
o Generation of the triggering logic signal
The triggering logic signal shall be generated by at least one of the
following events:
Occurrence of a frontal collision according to Regulation No. 94
(frontal collision); or
Occurrence of a lateral collision according to Regulation No. 95
(lateral collision); or
Activation of the AECS control.
o Testing the generation of a triggering logic signal
The manufacturer shall carry out or simulate the following tests with a
vehicle that is representative of the vehicle type to be approved to
demonstrate that the triggering logic signal is generated:
A frontal collision according to Regulation No. 94 (frontal
collision); or
A lateral collision according to Regulation No. 95 (lateral
collision); or
Activation of the AECS control.
as an alternative to paragraph 24.3.2.1., the manufacturer may present
to the type-approval authority a certificate established in accordance
with the model set out in Annex XXX.

CLEPA Positions as a follow up of AECS-02, AECS-03-12e
o To have a meaningful system, AECS must be able to sustain certain
level of shock. E94 E95 tests conditions is a possible reference.
GOST R 54620, Section 6.2
o 6.2.1 Automotive system call emergency services should recognize the
following types of accidents: a frontal collision, side impact, rear impact.


May 2014 38

o 6.2.2 For the AU, established in the configuration of standard
equipment, the mechanism of determining the moment of the accident
is determined by the vehicle manufacturer.
o 6.2.3 AC installed in the option configurations, as a criterion of
operation of the system it is recommended to use the condition in which
the value of the index is greater than the possible damage
ASI15_TRESHOLD, given in Annex A.
NOTE: This limit was not obvious in Annex A
Index of possible damage ASI 15 is calculated using the following
equations:

where: (t 2-t 1) - a record interval parameters for evaluation
index of possible damage equal to 15 ms
- The current value of the index possible damage
- Components of the acceleration point vehicle in
place of the sensor acceleration direction of the main axes
vehicle (longitudinal -x, transverse -y, vertical -z);


May 2014 39

- Components of the acceleration of the point
vehicle in place of the sensor acceleration direction of the main
axes vehicle averaged over the interval = 50 ms;
- The limit values for the components of the
acceleration on the main directions of the axes of TS.

CEN/TS 16454
Tests of the Post-side-crash performance of automatic trigger; Post-frontal-
crash performance of automatic trigger; and Performance of automatic
trigger - different crash types are defined in CEN 16454. These are
available under CTP 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4 and 1.1.2.5. The concept for these
tests is to establish that the automatic trigger is activated as intended by
the system manufacturer. For the lateral crash the conditions refer to UN
Regulation 95, the frontal crash refers to Regulation 94. In both cases it is
suggested that an equivalent pulse can be generated via sled testing. For
the performance in different crash types it is simply suggested that an
invalid trigger, below the threshold for activation, is generated in
accordance with the manufacturers instructions.
It should be noted that CEN 16454 does not provide any stipulation as to
whether triggering should activate the automatic eCall during the crash
tests. Simply that it performs in accordance to the manufacturers intention.
Instead it is suggested that a more severe triggering input may be required
to evaluate the automatic behaviour if the crash tests are below the
triggering threshold.
Recommendations of the DG eCall for the introduction of the pan-European
eCall, Version 2.0, Section 4.2.2.1
o The automatic eCall trigger should be safe, roust and designed so that a
minimum of false eCalls are generated by the eCall generator.
o Therefore the DG eCall recommends that:
The Automatic eCall trigger signal is generated in the airbag
control module and/or a combination of other sensor data (e.g.
gyro, radar, axel load, speed);
The eCall shall be generated to reflect as many different crash
types as possible (e.g. front, rear, side and roll crashes);
Trigger thresholds based on delta velocity could be send as
additional optional data to the PSAP, provided that this


May 2014 40

information can be used in PSAPs with a sufficient level of
reliability to evaluate the likeliness of serious injuries; and
The vehicle manufacturers are responsible for determination of
the automatic eCall trigger signal.
Use of crash tests
As mentioned in the reasons for requirements, it is hoped that existing crash tests can
be used for the assessment of the automatic triggering of eCall. The potential crash
tests available for this purpose are listed below.
UN Regulation 12
o This Regulation applies to the behaviour of the steering mechanism of
motor vehicles of category M1, and vehicles of category N1 with a
maximum permissible mass less than 1,500 kg, with regard to the
protection of the occupants in a frontal collision.
o The unladen vehicle, in running order, without a manikin, is collision-
tested against a barrier at a speed of 48.3 km/h (30 mph).
o This 30 mph test could provide some helpful information with regard to
eCall offering a slightly different scope to Regulation 94.
o However, this test can be omitted if UN Regulation 94 has been passed.
Therefore it is typically only used in approving heavier M1 vehicles
without an airbag system.

UN Regulation 33
o This Regulation applies to vehicles of category M1 with regard to their
behaviour in a head-on collision.
o The unladen vehicle is collision-tested forwards against a barrier at a
speed of 48.3 km/h (30 mph)
UN Regulation 34
o This Regulation applies:
PART I: To the approval of vehicles of categories M, N and O 1/
with regard to the tank(s) for liquid fuel.
PART II: At the request of the manufacturer to the approval of
vehicles of categories M, N and O approved to Part I or IV of this
Regulation fitted with liquid fuel tank(s) with regard to the
prevention of fire risks in the event of a frontal and/or lateral
and/or rear collision.


May 2014 41

o PART II concerns the approval of vehicles with regard to the prevention
of fire risks in the event of collision
o Part II requires:
a frontal-impact test against a barrier carried out by the
procedure specified in Annex 3 to this Regulation,
This is either the same 30 mph unladen vehicle test as in
Regulations 12 and 33 or the test procedure described in
annex 3 of Regulation No. 94, 01 series of amendments.
a lateral impact test performed according to the procedure
described in Annex 4 of Regulation No. 95, 01 series of
amendments, and
a rear-end impact test carried out by the procedure specified in
Annex 4 hereto,
For this test an impactor is driven into the rear of the
vehicle. The impactor may either be secured to a carriage
(moving barrier) or form part of a pendulum. The velocity
of collision shall be between 35 and 38 km/h. The
aggregate weight (mass) of carriage and impactor shall
be 1,100 20 kg.
UN Regulation 94
o Vehicles of category M1 of a total permissible mass not exceeding 2.5
tonnes are required to undergo the crash test defined in Annex 3 of the
Regulation.
o This is a frontal impact test with the test vehicle crashing
perpendicularly into a barrier
o The severity of the test is related to:
the impact speed {"Vehicle speed at the moment of impact is 56
km/h. However, if the test is performed at a higher impact speed
and the vehicle meets the requirements, the test shall be
considered satisfactory."},
the object struck {"The front face of the barrier consists of a
deformable structure as defined in Annex 9 of this Regulation." -
defined to represent crush characteristics of a typical car}
and the level of interaction or overlap {"The vehicle shall overlap
the barrier face by 40 per cent"}


May 2014 42

o This test is designed to challenge the vehicles structural
crashworthiness. Only one side of the vehicle interacts fully with the
barrier and is responsible for absorbing (or managing) most of the
energy.
UN Regulation 95
o This is applicable to M1 and N1 categories of vehicles where the R point
of the lowest seat is not more than 700 mm from ground level when the
vehicle is in the condition corresponding to the reference mass defined
in paragraph 2.10. of this Regulation.
o Such vehicles undergo a test in accordance with Annex 4 of the
Regulation.
o For this test, a mobile deformable barrier (MDB) collides with the side of
the vehicle. The barrier consists of a deformable front face of an
impactor (designed to represent crush characteristics of a typical car) on
a trolley. The total mass of the impacting barrier is 950 kg. The mobile
deformable barrier speed is 50 km/h.
Potential future UN Regulation 13x
o It should be noted that Regulation 94 is being updated with a
recommendation to include the additional requirement of a full-width
test into a rigid barrier at 50 km/h. This is likely to offer a more severe
acceleration pulse at the occupant compartment than the offset
deformable barrier test at 56 km/h.
o Currently at the proposal stage for consideration by the GRSP Informal
Working Group on Frontal Impact.
o The potential scope is M1 vehicles 3,500 kg
o 50 km/h full-width frontal crash into rigid barrier (concrete covered with
plywood)
o The intention of this test is to provide a greater focus on restraint
system performance rather than on structural performance. As such it is
anticipated that the accelerations (or mechanical shock) within the
occupant compartment will be greater than in the Regulation 94
configuration.


May 2014 43

Rollover tests:
UN Regulation 66
o This Regulation applies to single-deck rigid or articulated vehicles
belonging to categories M2 or M3, Classes II or III or class B having
more than 16 passengers.
o It includes a "Rollover test on a complete vehicle" meaning a test on a
complete, full-scale vehicle to prove the required strength of the
superstructure.
There are currently no regulatory full-scale tests for assessing M1 and
N1 vehicles in rollover conditions.
It is assumed that only a small percentage of the vehicles sold in Europe are currently
equipped with sensors to monitor for rollover or turnover of the vehicle. However,
most M1 and N1 vehicles are fitted with acceleration sensors in order to deploy
airbags; and it is therefore reasonable to believe that they could also be used for eCall
systems. This limits eCall automatic operation to impacts where airbags are deployed,
but there is much real world evidence, including from the accident analysis undertaken
for this study, that front and/or side airbags deploy in many accident types, including
rollovers. Therefore, it is the authors opinion that essential devices to determine
rollover collisions (e.g. gyroscopes), which may be relatively costly, are not essential
at this time of preparing initial requirements. However, care should be taken so as not
to exclude them should a manufacturer which to include them in the crash detection
system.
Low severity tests (lower boundary):
In theory one might expect accidents to occur at two ends of a spectrum, the first
where a serious or life threatening injury is likely and the eCall system must trigger;
and the second where a serious or fatal injury is very unlikely, and the eCall system
should ideally not trigger. In the middle this could leave a region of uncertain
outcome, where it is recommended that the manufacturer is permitted to use
discretion as to whether eCall should be triggered or not (Figure 3-1).


May 2014 44

Figure 3-1: Simple representation of automatic triggering conditions based
on severity
The crash tests described in the section above have a severity level set around the
point at which there is a substantial risk of injury, in which case they could be used to
assess the point above which eCall must trigger. However, it may also be useful to
have a low severity check to make sure that eCall is not activated when there is no
risk of injury. As such, there may be a desire to use tests at a lower severity to try
and identify a consistent severity under which eCall should not be triggered.
Therefore, when considering trigger checks of the automatic eCall system it may also
be worth acknowledging the other end of the severity spectrum. This would provide
some assurance that there would be at least a certain benefit across the market, that
manufacturers would have a level playing field and that PSAPs wont be inundated
with (low-urgency) superfluous or false calls. The following tests were identified as
potential options for this purpose.
RCAR Low-speed structural crash test protocol Issue 2.2
o This document describes the RCAR test procedure to assess a vehicles
damageability and repairability. The assessment includes an estimation
of the vehicle damage (physical damage and repair cost) in two
impacts: A 15 km/h frontal impact into a rigid barrier and a rigid-faced
mobile barrier striking the rear of the stationary vehicle at 15 km/h.
o The test procedure was revised in 2006 to change the impact angle
from 0 to 10 and the rear impact mobile barrier weight from 1000 to
1400kg.
o It is now also accompanied by a lower speed bumper test described
below.
RCAR Bumper Test Issue 2.0
o This document describes the RCAR bumper test procedures that assess
bumper performance. An international RCAR working group has


May 2014 45

developed test procedures to assess how well a vehicles bumper
system protects the vehicle from damage in low speed impacts. Damage
in these tests closely replicates the damage patterns observed in real
world low speed crashes
o The new bumper tests incorporate a rigid bumper-shaped barrier fitted
with an energy-absorbing material and cover. The barrier is 100 mm tall
and is mounted to an immovable surface and impacted by test vehicles.
o For full-width tests, the impact velocity is 10 km/h. For corner tests, the
velocity is 5 km/h.
UN Regulation 42
o Low severity bumper tests are described in Regulation 42. However,
they are extremely low severity and the Regulation isnt widely adopted.
UN Regulation 116, Section 6.4.2.13.
o Safety against false alarm in the event of an impact on the vehicle
It shall be verified that an impact of up to 4.5 Joules of a
hemispherical body with 165 mm in diameter and 70 10 Shore
A applied anywhere to the vehicle bodywork or glazing with its
curved surface does not cause false alarms.
Accident analysis
The aim of the accident analysis investigation was to quantify broadly the potential
effect of specifying different automated triggering modes and thresholds for eCall. An
accident analysis was carried out using the Road Accident In Depth Studies (RAIDS)
database, and specifically the data contained within the programme which was
collected as part of the Cooperative Crash Injury Study (CCIS), 2000 to 2010. Two
principle automated eCall triggering options were considered:
1. That triggering should occur in accident conditions similar to and at least as
severe as Regulations 94 or 95;
2. Triggering should occur when an airbag deploys (i.e. this sets a lower
deployment threshold than the first option and may include more accident
modes).
Estimates were provided for the proportion of casualties that could have been
positively affected if eCall was fitted in all cars for either Option 1 or 2.
The in-depth CCIS accident data from the RAIDS database were scaled to match those
of Great Britain national casualty numbers.
The selection criteria for the CCIS in-depth accident cases were:


May 2014 46

Cars registered between 2000 and 2009 and involved in an accident occurring
between 2000 and 2010
Cars towed from the scene
Cars equipped with front and side airbags
Car occupants for whom the injury data is present and their severity of injury is
known
The national data were taken from UK Department for Transport figures
9
. In total
there were approximately 126,000 injured car users for each year in Great Britain
(GB).
An important factor is the distribution of different collision types; Figure 3-2 presents
the collision types for CCIS car occupant casualties by their injury severity. Car impact
typology varies across the EU member states; and therefore the relative importance
and effectiveness of aligning an eCall automatic triggering threshold to a specific
collision type will vary. For example, if there are more frontal impacts in a region,
using an automatic triggering threshold that is based on impacts with similar
characteristics, or which exceed those, of the R94 conditions, is likely to result in a
greater proportion of eCalls compared to a region with a greater proportion of rollover
or side impact injury collisions.
Based on the UK data analysed, if airbag deployment is used as a trigger condition,
more automatic emergency calls will be made for all accident types, and all injury
severities, compared with triggering limited to at least the severity of the Regulations
94 and 95 full-scale crash tests (Table 3-1).
However, this analysis assumed that all cars were fitted with front and side airbags,
which are not required, albeit they are standard features on the vast majority of
passenger cars sold in Europe and becoming increasingly commonplace on N1
vehicles. Further, the analysis may have underestimated the number of car users for
Option 1, because some of the multi-impacts and rollover events may have involved
dynamic loading conditions similar to those experienced in the R94 and 95 tests.

9
Department for Transport (DfT, 2013), Reported road casualties in Great Britain:
main results 2012, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/reported-road-
casualties-in-great-britain-main-results-2012]


May 2014 47

Figure 3-2: Distribution of collision typology by driver and passenger injury
severity outcome (UK, CCIS data)

Table 3-1: Summary of percentage of annual GB road users potentially
affected by different eCall automatic triggering mechanisms
Casualties Fatal Serious Slight Total
Car users (GB
2013) 834 100% 8,496 100% 116,610 100% 125,945 100%
Automatic eCall
trigger estimate
Option 1: R94 or
R95 impact 392 47% 2,841 33% 21,678 19% 31,251 25%
Option 2: airbag
deployment
10
699 84% 6,862 81% 74,390 64% 88,303 70%

The results are not intended to be absolute measures of likely automated eCall trigger
rates; rather they provide a comparison between the two options. There is a lack of
in-depth data across Europe on which to base these estimates for a full Europe-wide
comparison. However, the authors believe, that for vehicles equipped with airbag
protection for front and side impacts, it is sufficient to say that triggering associated
with airbag deployment will always initiate more calls than triggering simply linked to

10
Any airbag deployed in the vehicle


May 2014 48

the crash test characteristics; and hence there will be a potential benefit for more
casualties. Unfortunately, using airbag deployment as a trigger mechanism alone, is
also likely to lead to a greater number of emergency calls that are superfluous (e.g.
uninjured occupants). Robust estimates of the burden of calls associated with minor or
non-injury collisions are beyond the scope of this study because of the challenges
associated with gathering the pertinent data, often on non-police reported collisions
across Europe.
Test call
Acknowledging the potential link with airbag deployment and the idea to use crash
tests to assess a mandatory triggering severity, then consideration must be given to
exactly what is tested for type-approval. Hence, once a crash test has been selected
for use in assessing the eCall system, then it will be important to set out the functional
requirements to be investigated during the test.
Draft UN Regulation No. XX on AECD/AECS, Part II, Section 15.2
o Russian proposal for text:
On completing the tests specified in paragraph 15.2.3.1,
retention of functionality and two-way voice communications
with the emergency services through mobile telephone
communications networks. The fact that the communication has
occurred and that voice communication is possible shall be
recorded by the technical service.
o OICA proposal for text:
When performing the tests specified in paragraph 15.2.3.1., the
AECD shall fulfil the requirements of paragraph 6.6.2. (data
batch transmission) and 6.6.5. (reception of mobile phone
networks signals). For the purpose of this paragraph, one of the
mobile telephone communication networks identified in Annex
XXX1 shall be simulated. The vehicle manufacturer shall
demonstrate, through the use of documentation, compliance with
all the other mobile telephone communication networks identified
in Annex XXX1 to this Regulation. Any such documentation shall
be appended to the test report.
OICA - Proposals for homologation of AECD and Installation in vehicle AECS-
03-11e
o AECD without a back-up battery have to demonstrate that after the
impact tests of UN R94/R95 on-board energy is still available
o Verification (in minimum) of
generation of Trigger Signal during the UN R94/R95 impacts,


May 2014 49

audio capabilities and MSD transmission during crash test
procedure.
TV Rheinland German point of view Results of the national meeting of
German experts AECS-03-08e
o Homologation of the vehicle should ensure, that after a standard
accident (UN-R 94, UN-R95) the vehicle is able under minimum
conditions (to be defined) to determine its position and to establish a
mobile phone connection in a sufficient quality (to be defined)
EN 16072, Section 7.5
o This defines the Post crash performance of in-vehicle equipment
o The automotive manufacturer/equipment supplier shall make best
reasonable effort to enable an audio channel to be established so long
as the relevant equipment has not been disabled in the crash.
o The in-vehicle eCall system shall transmit the MSD message, so long as
there is an ETSI prime medium wireless network available to receive the
signal, in all crash tests which are required by regulation for the
European type-approval:
o In cases where it is impracticable or not commercially viable to test
using real crash tests, for example after-market devices, equivalent
functionality shall be demonstrated.
o NOTE For these cases, it is recommended to use the test call flag as
defined in EN 16062:2011, Annex C.
EeIP TF PTI Technical Report V1.0.0, Sections 7.1 and 7.2
o In their considerations of the test procedures that might be appropriate
for periodic technical inspections (PTI) of eCall systems, the EeIP PTI
Task Force made some comments regarding possible options for placing
and receiving test calls. These may be relevant as means of placing a
test call after a crash test. Therefore the options are reproduced and, to
some extent, summarised here.
o Use of TS12 emergency call set-up message to identify and route test
eCalls Option A
It may be possible to differentiate eCalls from test eCalls and to
route test eCalls to designated test centres This additional
information can be used by the network to route the call to
another location not to the PSAP but to a test centre There are
some significant risks to this approach


May 2014 50

o TS12 emergency call and additionally using the test indicator in the MSD
Option B
In addition to the eCall flags, described earlier, that are used
solely by the mobile network to differentiate eCalls from other
emergency calls, the IVS also includes eCall and test call
identifiers in the MSD sent to the PSAP. When the MSD data file
is opened the eCall may be recognized as a real eCall, manually
or automatically initiated, or as a test eCall.
o Reservation of fixed numbers for test calls Option C
Test eCalls will normally be made to a non-emergency number
that may be pre-programmed on the USIM e.g. in the case of
eCall only configured devices, or in case of an unrestricted device
may be stored elsewhere in the IVS, or entered using a keypad.
In the call set up a fixed number (long number) specifies that a
connection to a dedicated test centre shall be established. The
network does not recognize any characteristic of an eCall,
however the MNO will accept this service call from a restricted
IVS. If a dedicated E.164 number (reserved for testing) is used
then the MNO may use this long number, in conjunction with a
routing table, to identify the designated test centre to which the
test call is to be forwarded. Routing of test calls to dedicated test
centres in this way is, therefore, considered to be feasible.
Another solution might be that the call will go to a dedicated
switching centre at national or European level, one per member
state or even several per member state... The dedicated
switching centre accepts the call and will forward the call directly
to the respective test server, depending on the location from
which the test call was initiated. Therefore this option is
recommended.
o Capturing all calls coming from the vehicle and routing to a dedicated
device for testing (e.g. by a femtocell) Option D
Directly at the site where the physical inspection is done a local
mobile network is set up. Depending on the intended range, a
microcell or femtocell for GSM would be installed. This
infrastructure allows all mobile devices to connect directly to the
(privately owned) femtocell instead to one of the in parallel
existing mobile networks. A femtocell has coverage of only a few
metres thus allowing capturing the manual initiated eCalls but
not the calls initiated by mobile phones close-by.
o Use of normal emergency call 112 to PSAP Option E


May 2014 51

In this case additional means are necessary in the network to
route the call to a test server. A simple solution would be the
oral information of the PSAP about the test call, but this solution
is not recommended.
o Test eCall initiation
In all cases test eCalls are initiated in accordance with the
manufacturers instructions and access to the test call initiation
mechanism e.g. menu command or button, may or may not be
made accessible to the vehicle user.
o A test centre might be hosted by:
1. PSAP
2. Governmental body on European or Member State level
3. Privately by vehicle manufacturers, national dealership or
inspection bodies
4. Locally by the service centre performing the inspection
o eCall test centre hosted by PSAP (Option 1)
This eCall test centre hosting option could be implemented by
using the call set-up and routing possibilities A, B, C, D and E
Routine test calls, including PTI test calls, must not be made to
an operational PSAP. With prior agreement between a PSAP and
a vehicle manufacturer, it might still be possible to perform very
limited type-approval eCall IVS certification testing using the 112
emergency service but this would have to be carefully controlled.
In these cases the test indicator must be set in the MSD to
inform the PSAP operator that the received emergency call,
displayed on his/her screen, is a test eCall and not a real eCall.
It seems that ideally, A PSAP could host a test server that only
accepted test eCalls from an IVS using a non-emergency
number, in a similar way to any other government / state
administered body, and this is discussed next in option 2.
o eCall test centre hosted by governmental body (Option 2)
This test centre hosting option could be implemented by using
the call set-up and routing possibilities A, C, or D. This allows a
variety of implementation variants. There might be just only one
large test centre on European level to which all calls will be


May 2014 52

routed. Every member state may decide on their own if there will
be one national or numerous local test centres. In parallel some
member states might still prefer not to operate any test centre
on national level but to use one on European level.
o eCall test centre hosted by vehicle manufacturer or national dealership
(Option 3)
This test centre hosting option could be implemented by using
the call set-up and routing possibilities C and D. This allows a
variety of implementation variants. There might be just only one
huge European test centre per manufacturer or one test centre
per dealership to which calls will be routed. Every manufacturer
may decide on its own if there will be one or numerous test
centres. If routing possibility D to a dedicated device (e.g.
femtocell) is chosen, the call might need to be forwarded by the
telecommunications equipment located at the inspection body to
a dedicated test server of the car manufacturer.
o eCall test server hosted locally by vehicle service centres (Option 4)
This server hosting option could be implemented by using the
call set-up and routing possibilities C and D. The call would be
routed always to the inspectors notebook computer. This
notebook would offer the functionality of a test centre with an
integrated 3GPP modem. In case the call set-up and routing
possibility D is chosen, i.e. femtocell option, then this approach
provides the highest flexibility to the industry, without any
limitations and restrictions in the used call centre. No third party
is required nor any additional routing. However this approach
requires the MNO to modify their network infrastructure to
handle eCalls received via femtocell in a special way, not only
forwarding the call to the dialled number.
GSMA Liaison Statement on TF PTI report
o However, in response to the EeIP document, GSMA released a Liaison
Statement:
The GSMA mAutomotive Workstream believes there are
significant commercial and operational issues relating to the PTI
recommendations that need to be addressed, not the least the
model for funding the PTI deployment and the test call.


May 2014 53

Manual triggering
One of the features of eCall often discussed is the ability to make a Good Samaritan
call. That is to initiate an eCall manually when observing another vehicle being
involved in a life-threatening crash. This function would potentially increase the
benefit of eCall during the period where not every car on the road is fitted with an
automatic system; in the transitional period to dominating penetration of eCall
systems into the vehicle fleet.
However, alongside the benefit of manual eCall is the negative potential for manual
activation to be abused and hence generating fraudulent calls to the Public Service
Answering Points.
General Approach of the Council, 9879/14 ENT 123 MI 428 CODEC 1299, dated
19/05/2014,Article 5, Point 2: Manufacturers shall demonstrate that new
types of vehicles are constructed as to ensure that an eCall to the single
European emergency number 112 can also be triggered manually.EN 16072
o The objective of implementing the pan-European in-vehicle emergency
call system (eCall) is to automate the notification of a traffic accident,
wherever in Europe, with the same technical standards and the same
quality of services objectives by using 'Public Land Mobile
Networks'(PLMN) (such as GSM and 3G), which supports the European
pre-assigned emergency destination address (see normative references)
and to provide a means of manually triggering the notification of an
incident.
GOST R 54620
o Functions of automotive systems call emergency services
For vehicles of categories M and N - in manual mode (by
pressing the "Emergency Call").
HEeRO State-of-the-art analysis report, Deliverable D2.1
o The eCall service can be activated manually or automatically when a
serious incident occurs, the on-board sensors trigger the start of an
automatic eCall.
03-11e
o Vehicles of category M1 and N1 not in the scope of UN R94 and/or R95
have to be equipped (at the minimum) with a manual activation of an
emergency call.


May 2014 54

TV Rheinland German point of view Results of the national meeting of
German experts AECS-03-08e
o Systems, installed in vehicles within the scope of UN-R 94 and UN-R
95, shall be triggered automatically.
o All other vehicles shall be fitted with a system which may be triggered
manually
From these sources, the manual triggering of an eCall system is expected to be a core
supplemental function and could be required in type-approval. In which case the
manual triggering should be demonstrated to function in two conditions:
the Good Samaritan mode, and
after a collision, especially but not limited to, incidents where automated
triggering is not expected or mandated.
Manual triggering without an impact to the eCall equipped vehicle, to help another
road user, requires good design of the system to prevent inadvertent calls and to also
ensure calls can be easily and rapidly made when required. These factors are
discussed in the Human-Machine Interface (HMI), Section 3.15 of this report.
Manual triggering is also a possible function following a collision when an automated
call has not been made. It is recommended that the functionality of the manual call
mode could be tested following the physical testing which is discussed in Section 3.6
(Resistance to mechanical impact). Following the sub-system impact tests it would be
expected that the eCall system would be demonstrated to be functional post simulated
impact(s).
For verification of the manual triggering operation, it is believed that testing methods
similar to the automated trigger tests should be used with regard to capturing all calls
coming from the vehicle and routing to a dedicated device for testing (e.g. by a
simulated network).
3.4.4 Commentary
Given the development effort and complexities surrounding modern crash sensors in
vehicles, it seems to make little sense to specify a simple triggering algorithm for
assessing crash severity.
The scope is set so as to include vehicles for which an appropriate triggering
mechanism already exists. Given that this vehicle infrastructure already exists, it
might be worth noting that, effort and cost or providing eCall functions are likely to be
similar. This should be expected, at least, for those vehicles undergoing the UN
Regulation 94 and 95 full-scale crash tests (even though airbags are not required to
pass these tests).
It should be kept in mind that defining the boundaries of when an eCall system must
or must not trigger is in reality a complex task. Real world accident severity is not only
dependent on deceleration, but there are also different accident types which together


May 2014 55

are directly related to vehicle occupant injury risk. The injury risk for any occupant(s)
will not only be determined by the severity of crash for the vehicle, but also on
occupant age and frailty and seating position, etc. This together with the limited
existing options for full-scale testing calls for a degree of pragmatism in selecting the
test conditions. Therefore, the automatic triggering decision must be left to the vehicle
manufacturers discretion.
The Regulatory tests R94 and 95 are associated with some risk of severe injury and
hence it is suggested that these could be appropriate for assessing a threshold where
eCall is expected to operate.
The exact practicalities of doing the evaluations around the crash tests still needs
some consideration; however, there will need to be some check that the system tried
to initiate an eCall after the impact and that it still passes some rudimentary systems
checks.
It should be noted that inside crash test facilities there may be weak or no mobile
network or Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) coverage. Forcing a
requirement to set-up a dedicated network (e.g. using a femtocell) is technically and
legally complex across different countries and potentially expensive (as noted earlier
in this Section).
The link with the crash tests of Regulations 94 and 95 is to provide:
A check of the automatic triggering system (that it triggers in a potentially
injurious crash configuration)
Some assurance that the in-vehicle system can survive such a crash
Both of these items can be done with the components, by testing on a sled and by
simulating a trigger input for the eCall device when on a desk. However, without a
full-scale assessment there is no assurance that the functions work as installed and
used in the vehicle.
The scope of the European eCall regulation includes all M1 and N1 vehicles. Therefore,
in principle, automatic triggering for all vehicles could be assessed via crash tests.
However, it seems unrealistic to expect crash tests to be done for eCall alone.
Manufacturers of vehicles outside of the scope of the crash test regulations may push
back against the option that the automatic triggering is verified via crash tests for all
vehicles on the grounds of onerous requirements and product liability (i.e. claiming
that they will have to do internal development testing that otherwise they would not
need). Therefore, alternative options are considered on how to make use of existing
crash tests to incorporate assessments of expected eCall functionality.
By assessing automatic triggering in the full-scale crash tests of both UN R94 and R95,
it limits the vehicles expected to undergo automatic triggering verification to:
Vehicles of category M1 of a total permissible mass not exceeding 2.5 tonnes where
the R point of the lowest seat is not more than 700 mm from ground level when the
vehicle is in the condition corresponding to the reference mass defined in paragraph
2.10. of Regulation 95. As such, limiting the physical triggering assessment to only
those vehicles which undergo both the Regulation 94 and 95 tests would exclude all


May 2014 56

N1 vehicles and large M1s. However, most passenger cars of current designs would
still be included.
As a slight change to considering only vehicles undergoing R94 and R95, would be the
potential to limit scope of a physical triggering check to those vehicles required to
undergo either Reg. 94 or 95. This is a slightly broader remit of crash testing which
would capture some N1 vehicles (those where the R point of the lowest seat is not
more than 700 mm from ground level). The manufacturers response to this, as muted
during the 3rd meeting of the Informal Group on AECS was that there would be
product liability issues if releasing products which havent undergone broad evaluation
testing implying that they would have to do additional development tests to address
such limitations.
If Regulation 12 was added as well, (i.e. Reg. 95 and either Reg. 94 or 12), that would
give a crash-test assessment for M1 and N1 categories of vehicles where the R point
of the lowest seat is not more than 700 mm, and for the N1 category where the
maximum permissible mass is less than 1,500 kg. However, as the requirements of
the Regulation 12 test are related to physical measurements taken within the vehicle,
it may be that the Technical Services offering Regulation 12 testing may not be as
prepared for eCall system checks compared with those offering Regulation 94 testing,
which already includes an element of electronic data analysis and processing.
Furthermore, it is not expected that there are many M1 vehicles being approved via
Regulation 12 that also have airbags fitted.
In an ideal situation the following would be possible:
A crash test to check that when installed in the vehicle, the eCall device
survives the mechanical shock and triggers appropriately
o Assuming that a dedicated crash test for eCall will not be required, then
we hope to use Regulation 94 and 95 tests where possible for this
purpose. Note that these tests are not very severe, based on a risk of
life-threatening injuries in the real world, therefore the eCall device
should survive and it should trigger.
o The link to Reg. 42 or a consumer information low-severity test may not
be justifiable from a cost/benefit perspective, though it does seem
sensible to have some minor severity, non-triggering check. Therefore
this might need further consideration in the future depending on the
level of false or superfluous calls received by the PSAPs.
A sled test to confirm that the core eCall components are capable of surviving a
specified mechanical shock
It is suggested that the vehicles required to undergo a triggering check during crash
tests should be defined as those currently expected to comply with Reg. 94 or


May 2014 57

Reg. 95. That is for the M1 category of vehicles where the R point of the lowest seat is
not more than 700 mm from ground level, or where the maximum permissible mass is
less than 2,500 kg.
However, some vehicles with high R points and high mass already use safety systems
very effectively (e.g. Ford Transit). Perhaps a reduced set of requirements for a
triggering assessment could encourage eCall for the vehicles outside of the dynamic
testing scope. In this way it might be useful to have a definition of the automatic
triggering expectations such as:
All M1 and N1 vehicles for which an appropriate triggering mechanism
already exists are to offer eCall. All M1 and N1 vehicles being tested in a
full scale crash are expected to demonstrate proof that the automatic
system functions correctly under those conditions.
Ideally, taking into account the accident analysis, this would be supplemented by the
requirement that triggering is to be linked with airbag deployment. Evidence of a link
should be shown to the appropriate Technical Service during the approval process.
Therefore the definition above would be extended with the following stipulation:
All M1 and N1 vehicles required to provide eCall but that are not being tested in
a full scale crash are expected to demonstrate a link between airbag
deployment and automatic triggering of the eCall functions.
For the test call, two paths will be needed:
A. If a mobile network is present at the test location:
a. Check if a test call can be successfully performed after the crash test.
Demonstrate:
i. Automatic triggering was initiated
ii. A successful test call to a simulated PSAP can be placed using a
long number
iii. The Minimum Set of Data can be transmitted from the vehicle
appropriately
B. If a mobile network is not present at the test location:
a. Check if automatic triggering occurred during the test via assessment of
the log files from the eCall system
b. Demonstrate that a successful test call to a simulated PSAP can be
made and that the MSD can be transmitted by moving the vehicle to an
area with network coverage
c. Note that the movement of the vehicle (how and where exactly) could
be agreed between the manufacturer applying for the approval and the
Technical Service before commencing the test.


May 2014 58

3.5 Resistance to mechanical impact during normal use
The IVS will be subjected to mechanical vibration and repeated shocks during normal
use of the vehicle. This has the potential to prevent the system from working correctly
while under vibration, permanently damage components or loosen connections. Please
note that severe shocks, as they would occur during a crash, are discussed separately
in Section 3.6.
3.5.2 Options
Draft UN Regulation No. XX, Section 6.4.3 and Annex 7 define requirements and a test
procedure for the AECD in which the SUT is fixed to a test stand (vibration platform /
shock plant) and subjected to a defined level of vibration and repeated shocks, each
repeated in three perpendicular directions. Separate tests are defined for:
Resistance to vibration,
Durability under vibration,
Resistance to repeated shocks,
Durability under repeated shocks, and
Resistance to repeated shocks during transportation (tested in packaging).
The test conditions as defined in Annex 7 of the document are reproduced in Table
3-2. A later proposed amendment of the draft defines additional but differing test
conditions, as detailed in Table 3-3 (the requirements are currently not consistent
within the document). The vibration conditions of the later amendment were copied
from UN Regulation 116 (Uniform technical prescriptions concerning the protection of
motor vehicles against unauthorized use).
The System Under Test (SUT) is required to not suffer mechanical defects of the body,
connectors or connecting cables during these tests. In addition, operability tests are
performed on the SUT which it is required to pass without any failure (in the case of
resistance tests periodically during the test; in the case of durability tests once after
the test). The operability tests are defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.2.11 of Annex 6 and
have to be carried out using a special diagnostic programme running on a computer
connected to the SUT, as defined in Section 4.4 of Annex 6. The programme shall
allow the following tests:
- microphone connection test. For example, the In-Vehicle Emergency Call
System/Device plays a voice prompt with the request to the tester to say the
phrase, records the sound into entire memory, plays back the sound and asks
the tester to push the needed button (buttons) in case the sound is correct;
- speaker (speakers) connection test. For example, the In-Vehicle Emergency
Call System/Device plays a sound or a voice prompt through the left and right


May 2014 59

speakers and requests the tester to push the needed button (buttons) in case
the sound is correct;
- users interface unit detailed test. For example, the In-Vehicle Emergency Call
System/Device plays a voice request to push needed buttons in a specified
order. In addition the In-Vehicle Emergency Call System/Device asks the tester
to confirm the correct work of status indicators of the In-Vehicle Emergency
Call System/Device.
- standby battery test, in case if there exists one and there is a possibility to do
a standby battery test;
- performance test of automatic road accident identification sensor
(mechanism) (only for vehicles of category M1), that is obligatory for this
category of vehicles;
N o t e If a base vehicle system is used as a road accident data source, then
the use of previous data of performance of automatic road accident
identification sensor (mechanism) is applied; data received during the period
between engaging the ignition (for example, performance data of automatic
road accident identification sensor (mechanism), received during the diagnostic
process of base vehicle systems, started after engaging the ignition).


May 2014 60

Table 3-2: Test conditions as proposed in Draft UN Regulation No. XX, Annex
7
Test parameters Value
Permitted
deviation
Resistance test when exposed to
sinusoidal vibration
Range of frequencies, Hz 10-70 1
Acceleration amplitude,
m/s
2
(g)
39,2 (4) 2(0,2)
Action time in each of
three directions, min
30 -
Durability test when exposed to
sinusoidal vibration
Range of frequencies, Hz 50 1
Acceleration amplitude,
m/s
2
(g)
49 (5) 2 (0,2)
Action time in each of
three directions, min
2 h 40 min -
Stability test when exposed to
mechanical shocks of repeated action
Shock acceleration peak
value, m/s
2
(g)
98 (10) 20%
Shock duration, ms 10 -
Sweep count in each of
three directions
333 -
In-vehicle Emergency Call
System/Device durability test when
exposed to mechanical shocks of
repeated action
value, m/s
2
(g)
98 (10) 20%
three directions
3333 -
Test of In-vehicle Emergency Call
System/Device resistance to
mechanical shocks during
transportation
value, m/s
2
(g)
250 (25) 20%
three directions
4000 -


May 2014 61

Table 3-3: Vibration and shock conditions for mechanical resistance test as
proposed in Draft UN Regulation No. XX, Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2
Vibration
conditions:
The AECD components are subdivided into two types:
Type 1: components normally mounted on the vehicle,
Type 2: components intended for attachment to the engine.

The components/AECD shall remain operational under a sinusoidal vibration
mode characterised as follows:
For type 1
The frequency shall be variable from 10 Hz to 500 Hz with a maximum amplitude
of 5 mm and maximum acceleration of 3 g (0-peak).
For type 2
For both type 1 and type 2
The frequency variation is 1 octave/min.
The number of cycles is 10, the test shall be performed along each of the 3 axes.
The vibrations are applied at low frequencies at a maximum constant amplitude
and at a maximum constant acceleration at high frequencies.
Shock
conditions:
AECD should remain operational during and after repeated shocks in each of
three mutually perpendicular positions with the following values of influencing
factors:
- peak shock acceleration 98 m/s
2
(10 g);
- shock repetition frequency no more than 80 shocks/min;
- shock duration from 5 to 15 ms (preferably 10 ms);
- the number of shocks in each direction 3333 (overall number of shocks
10000).

UN Regulation No. 116, Section 6.4.2.8. defines requirements and a test procedure for
safe operation after vibration test for vehicle alarm systems, in which the electrically
connected SUT is subjected to vibrations as detailed in Table 3-4 and operability tests
are performed afterwards. The Regulation does not set out shock tests. The Regulation
allows the resistance tests to be performed first and afterwards the general operations
tests required for type-approval are then performed.


May 2014 62

Table 3-4: Vibration conditions for safe operation after vibration test as
defined in UN Regulation No. 116, Section 6.4.2.8.
Vibration
conditions:
For this test, the components are subdivided into two types:
Type 1: components normally mounted on the vehicle,
Type 2: components intended for attachment to the engine.

The components/VAS shall be submitted to a sinusoidal vibration mode whose
characteristics are as follows:
For type 1
For type 2
For both type 1 and type 2
The frequency variation is 1 octave/min.
The number of cycles is 10, the test shall be performed along each of the 3 axes.
The vibrations are applied at low frequencies at a maximum constant amplitude
and at a maximum constant acceleration at high frequencies.

GOST R 54620, Section 13.3 defines requirements and a test procedure for
mechanical stability. The vibration and shock conditions and passing requirements are
identical to or very similar to the conditions defined in the Draft UN Regulation XX (see
Table 3-3). Please note that the relevant section contains references to GOST and IEC
standards (GOST 16019, IEC 52230) which could not be followed up because either no
English version was available or the referenced standard could not be found.
3.5.3 Commentary
Because an eCall system is not regularly used, the vehicle user might not have a
natural opportunity to detect a malfunction of the system before it is intended to
perform its function after a crash. The extent of prescribed self-tests (see Section
3.14) and potential operability checks in future PTI regulations need therefore to be
taken into consideration when discussing the necessity and severity of mechanical
resistance tests. Less stringent requirements could be justified if the systems
functionality is to be thoroughly checked throughout the life of the vehicle.
At the UN level, some regulations dealing with primarily electronic systems set out
requirements and test methods for mechanical resistance for these systems, as
discussed above (e.g. UN Regulation 116 for vehicle alarm systems). However, many
other vehicle systems contain electronic components for which no mechanical
resistance requirements are set out in the corresponding UN Regulations (e.g. UN R13


May 2014 63

on braking; ABS sensors are an example of electronic components). Other vehicle
safety systems such as airbags are not regulated at all in type-approval legislation,
but, if fitted, are implicitly assumed to work reliably (as they did in the mandatory full-
scale crash tests in the Type Approved sample vehicle) after being exposed to
mechanical impacts during normal use.
It should therefore be carefully considered whether mechanical resistance
requirements and tests are necessary for eCall IVS. A failure of the eCall system would
not create an immediate hazard, as opposed to, for example, a failure of a vehicle
immobilizer might be switching off the engine during driving at high speeds. Requiring
a thorough self-test of the IVS (see Section 3.14) could ensure that a driver gets
warned in case of a malfunction and can seek assistance at a garage.
If mechanical resistance is to be covered in type-approval legislation, it appears not
feasible to take over entire sections of the current Draft UN Regulation No. XX,
because:
The current draft version of the document contains several unresolved
inconsistencies (e.g. different test conditions in main body and annex); and
The operability tests to be performed are not defined in sufficient depth (e.g.
the standby battery tests) and require programming or procuring additional
dedicated test software (which cannot be used for compliance testing to EN
standards).
Furthermore, TRL considers requirements and tests of the packaged product for
resistance to shocks during transportation as not necessary for type-approval
legislation. The aim of type-approval is to assess the performance of vehicles with the
IVS installed. Testing a representative sample vehicle is expected to also cover
potential damage of components during transportation.
An ideal test procedure should expose the IVS to a range of different vibration and
shock conditions and assess whether it is operable while being exposed and after
being exposed for a reasonable duration (durability). The IVS should be fixed to the
test stand in a way that is representative of the intended attachment to the vehicle
and it should be tested in different directions. CLEPA raised a comment in document
AECS-03-12e suggesting that requirements should be equivalent to international or
Russian standards.
Values for the following main parameters would therefore need to be defined in
legislative requirements:
Vibration conditions;
Shock conditions;
Operability assessment procedure;
Attachment; and
Test directions.


May 2014 64

If mechanical resistance is to be covered in type-approval legislation, vibration
conditions as defined in UN R116 (see Table 3-4) prescribing 10 test cycles, could be
set out. This equates to about 60 minutes of testing, which is less than the testing
prescribed in the Russian UN proposal (160 minutes). UN R116 is an established
regulation accepted for EU type-approval of an electronic system to be installed on a
vehicle (alarm systems) and also used in Draft UN Regulation No. XX as proposed by
OICA.
Shock conditions may be defined based on the later proposal of the Draft UN
Regulation No. XX (see Table 3-3). These are in agreement with Russian proposals
and standards.
An operability test procedure is required in order to provide objective pass or fail
criteria. A full set of compliance tests in accordance with CEN/TS 16454 after exposing
the system to mechanical impacts would provide a high level of assurance that the
system is fully operable. However, in practical terms these compliance tests require
specialised test equipment and will likely be performed by different companies from
the mechanical resistance tests (at a different stage of system development; the
conformance testing is expected to be carried out by the eCall system manufacturer
(or on their behalf) in order to provide the vehicle manufacturer with a certificate of
compliance to eCall standards for the system to be integrated into the vehicle). A
reduced set of functionality tests would therefore need to be defined that allows the
operability of core functions of the eCall system to be demonstrated (e.g. successful
test call to a simulated PSAP using a test number (long number), and successful
transmission of MSD).
Ideally, these operability tests would be carried out both after the SUT has been
exposed to the adverse conditions for a longer period (to asses durability of
components and loose connections) and also during exposure (to ensure the system
works while under the influence of vibrations; for example, when performing a manual
eCall while driving).
The attachment of the SUT to the test stand should be required to be representative of
the attachment method to the vehicle (e.g. including shock absorbing elements). UN
R116 requires the system to be electrically connected during the tests. With regard to
test directions, the common approach in vibration and shock testing is to apply the
conditions repeatedly in 3 mutually perpendicular axes.
It would need to be ensured that all core components necessary for functionality are
tested (including, for example, backup batteries, microphone and speaker). This would
mean incorporating these components (and their representative attachments) into the
test stand.


May 2014 65

3.6 Resistance to mechanical impact during accident (crash)
During a road accident, the IVS will experience very severe mechanical shocks. In
order to perform its intended safety function it has to be able to withstand these
impacts.
The mechanical resistance tests discussed below are intended to supplement potential
full-scale crash testing, rather than replace it. This section therefore assumes that the
full-scale tests of UN Regulation 94 and 95 will be used to assess eCall systems fitted
into vehicles. The tests described below offer an additional means of assessing the
eCall device independently of the vehicle into which it is to be fitted. For this to be of
benefit, it should be anticipated that the component level tests will require mechanical
resistance at higher accelerations, which represent more severe accidents than UN
R94/R95 crash tests.
In accidents matching the conditions of the UN Regulation full-scale crash tests,
occupants of modern vehicles may stand a relatively low risk of serious injury
(assuming similar anthropometry to the crash dummy, that they were not out-of-
position, etc.). To perform its main purpose of facilitating quicker care for severely
injured casualties, it is necessary to ensure that the IVS is capable of withstanding
more severe accidents, where there is a greater anticipated risk of serious or fatal
injuries occurring.
Though the exact severity needs to be decided, component tests performed on a test
sled or drop rig could be used to offer a more stringent test than the full-scale
evaluation and could also be used to assess rear impacts and potentially what would
be vertical loading in the car.
Note that this is likely to be a simplified setup of components compared with the full
vehicle. Therefore it might not be reliable for checking the full routing of cables,
positioning of antennae, interactive audio systems, etc.
3.6.2 Options
Full-scale crash tests
The requirements of the full-scale vehicle crash tests which are options for use in the
eCall regulation were briefly mentioned in the section on automatic triggering. Use of
such tests, would provide some assurance of resistance to mechanical impact during
an accident. However, the requirements adopted from the full-scale testing may not
represent the extremes of severity which should still be covered by reliable operation
of eCall systems.


May 2014 66

Component tests (performed on test sled or drop rig)
In current UN legislation, two different test pulse corridors representing frontal
impacts are available and used for testing safety belt anchorages, seats, etc.:
The first deceleration corridor is initially defined in UN R17, Annex 9 and used for a
"Test procedure for devices intended to protect the occupants against displacement of
luggage". The pulse corridor describes a maximum deceleration of 20g-28g, a
minimum duration of 15 ms and v = 50 +0/-2 km/h (see Figure 3-3). An identical
pulse corridor is used in UN R44, UN R100 and UN R129.
Information about the source of these conditions is difficult to find, but TRL
understands that they were derived from full-scale front impact experiments using
cars that were representative at the time (i.e. the late 1970s/early 1980s). These
historic experiments were carried out against a rigid barrier that extended across the
entire width of the car. This type of test arrangement typically results in high
passenger compartment deceleration (because there is limited deformation of the
frontal structure). In order to protect the occupants from intrusion, frontend designs
of cars became stiffer over the decades, leading to higher peak accelerations in
identical frontal impacts in modern vehicles compared to older vehicles.

Figure 3-3: UN Regulation No. 17, Annex 9 deceleration corridor

The second, more severe, deceleration corridor is defined in UN R16, Annex 8, for
testing restraint systems (safety belts). The pulse corridor describes a maximum
deceleration of 26g-32g, a minimum duration of 20 ms and v = 50 +/-1 km/h (see
Figure 3-4). The historic source of this corridor is assumed to be identical to the UN
R17 corridor, but measured to represent the deceleration experienced by a different


May 2014 67

part of the vehicle (vehicle deforms during a crash, therefore does not experience the
same level of acceleration along the body). As mentioned above, frontend designs of
cars became stiffer over the decades, leading to higher peak accelerations in identical
frontal impacts compared to older vehicles. Data from full-width crash tests are not
widely available in Europe (due to the requirements for 40 per cent offset testing in
the legislation and consumer programmes described above). However, full-width crash
testing is carried out by the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) in the United States and the data are published on their web site
(www.nhtsa.gov). Comparison of the deceleration levels shows that the UN R16
corridor, although not being designed for that, can be regarded as being
approximately representative of the B-pillar acceleration of a modern car in a full-
width, rigid barrier, 50 km/h crash test.

Figure 3-4: UN Regulation No. 16, Annex 8 deceleration corridor

The Draft UN Regulation No. XX, Annex 7, Section 4.6 defines a test for the resistance
of the IVS to single mechanical shocks of a far higher deceleration, exceeding 75 g for
a duration of 1 to 5 ms:
To conduct the visual inspection and to attach the test In-vehicle Emergency
Call System/Device sample on the platform of the mechanical shock plant in a
special device that simulates the conditions attachment on a vehicle
Using the connection diagrams (see picture 2 Annex 6), to test the In-vehicle
Emergency Call System/Device operability according to the test method given
in section 4.4 Annex 6.


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To expose the In-vehicle Emergency Call System/Device to the impact of three
single mechanical shocks with the peak shock acceleration 735 m/s
2
(75 g) and
the shock acceleration duration from 1 to 5 ms (preferably 3 ms).
To take the In-vehicle Emergency Call System/Device down from the
mechanical shock plant, to conduct the visual inspection of the attachment and
operability check according to the test method for acceleration sensors.
The In-vehicle Emergency Call System/Device is considered to have passed the
test of In-vehicle Emergency Call System/Device resistance to single
mechanical shocks with acceleration 75 g if there are no mechanical defects,
damage of paint-and-lacquer coating, looseness of the In-vehicle Emergency
Call System/Device components attachments, and the In-vehicle Emergency
Call System/Device operability tests are completed successfully.
3.6.3 Commentary
The mechanical resistance tests discussed supplement potential full-scale crash testing
in that they allow the assessment of mechanical resistance at higher accelerations on
test sleds or drop rigs, which represent more severe accidents than UN R94/R95 crash
tests.
In some proposals it is suggested to use the UN Regulation 17 pulse (acceleration
corridor 20 g to 28 g). This probably doesnt offer much additional information over
the full-scale test, so may draw into question the value of doing both. Instead, the
Regulation 16 corridor (acceleration corridor 26 g to 32 g) would be a more stringent
requirement for assessing the resistance to mechanical impact during a crash.
However, the proposal to test at 75 g seems to offer the greatest benefit compared
with the cost of doing the test and would add the most additional information to the
full-scale evaluation. This level of acceleration is more representative of a severe crash
which may represent the conditions in which eCall offers greatest societal benefit.
The UN Regulation proposal suggests a peak of 75 g should be maintained for between
1 and 5 ms. At 1 ms, the time in excess of 75 g is very short. A longer time above the
75 g minimum (perhaps for 5 ms) would be more representative of a crash event
whilst still being possible to implement using common test equipment.
In the previous section concerning mechanical impact during normal use, proposals
were presented for repeated low severity testing of the eCall system (vibrations and
low severity shocks). If one of those proposals is thought to be worth including in the
regulation, then it should be remembered that the mechanical impact during a crash
assessment must be at a substantially greater severity in order to be of merit and
complement that testing.
It will be extremely difficult to check automatic triggering on a test sled. Replicating
the necessary components and their connections on the sled could require an
extremely complex body-in-white arrangement, which could be more expensive to do
than the full-scale test.


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Even for vehicles not undergoing the full-scale test then we should still expect their
eCall device to complete the series of sled tests; in which some requirements can be
set for survivability. However, these vehicles would not have a robust check of the
triggering and the survival of the complete system as installed in a vehicle; these
aspects will not be assessed without full-scale testing.
In terms of pulse severity, the UN Regulation 16 pulse would provide a more stringent
assessment of the system than the UN Regulation 17 pulse, however would not add
much value to full-scale crash testing.
Therefore, it is recommended to assess resistance to severe crashes using tests of
system components with a 75 g deceleration pulse for a minimum of 5 ms. The tests
should be carried out in three perpendicular directions in order to simulate vertical
loading and rear impacts. After exposing the components to the deceleration, it needs
to be demonstrated that the system remained fully operative. This can be done by
performing a manually triggered test call using a test number (long number). Please
see Sections 3.4 and 3.16.3 for a discussion of the practicalities to be considered for
test calls. The manufacturer should be given the option to use a new IVS for the
deceleration pulse in each direction, because only one such event is to be expected
during real-world use. The manufacturer would then need to demonstrate that the
system remained fully operative after each of these deceleration events separately.
The way the SUT is fastened to the sled or drop rig should be specified. It is expected
that it will need to be rigidly fastened, as in the car.
Also, the exact components to be tested need to be set. In principle the testing should
include the core components of the eCall device. However, the practicalities of
installing microphones, speaker(s), antennas, etc. in a way that is representative of
the in-vehicle installation needs to be considered.


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3.7 Climate resistance
The IVS will be subjected to high and low ambient temperatures, temperature
changes, humidity, water and the potential ingress of dirt or foreign bodies during its
normal use in the vehicle. This has the potential to cause temporary malfunctions or
damage components permanently. The term climate resistance is meant to include the
resistance to temperature, temperature change, foreign body ingress, water-tightness,
and condensed water.
3.7.2 Options
Draft UN Regulation XX, Section 6.2 and Annex 6 define requirements and separate
test procedures for climate resistance. Annex 6 sets out separate test procedures for:
Impact of low temperature,
Impact of high temperature,
Durability when changing temperature,
Impact of humidity,
Impact of dust, and
Impact of water.
The general principle is to subject the SUT to certain temperature and humidity
conditions, e.g. in a climate chamber, and require it to pass periodic operability tests
under these conditions.
A later proposed amendment of the draft defines additional but differing test
conditions in Section 6.2 of the document (the requirements are currently not
consistent within the document). These were copied from UN Regulation 116.
UN Regulation No. 116, Sections 6.4.1., 6.4.2.2., 6.4.2.3. and 6.4.2.4. set out
operation parameters (see Table 3-5) and test procedures for vehicle alarm system
with regard to:
Safe operation after foreign body and water-tightness test,
Safe operation after condensed water test (humidity)
For impact of low and high temperature, the test principle is to perform a reduced set
of the operability tests while the SUT is subjected to a certain ambient temperature.
The foreign body and water-tightness test is performed in accordance with IEC 529-
1989 (for protection levels see Table 3-5) and the reduced operability test is
performed afterwards. The manufacturer is required to specify in the installation


May 2014 71

instructions any restrictions on the positioning of the installation with respect to dust,
water and temperature. The test can be omitted under certain installation conditions.
The condensed water test is performed in accordance with the cyclic damp heat test
as defined in IEC 68-2-30 (1980) also followed by the reduced operability test. The
regulation allows all resistance tests to be performed before performing one
operability test (this does not apply to low and high temperature test).
Table 3-5: Operation parameters for the installation of vehicle alarm systems
as defined in UN Regulation No. 116, Section 6.4.1.
Environmental temperature -40C to +85C for parts to be fitted in the passenger
or luggage compartment
-40C to +125C for parts to be fitted in the engine
compartment unless otherwise specified.
Degree of protection for installation
(IEC 529-1989)
IP 40 for parts to be fitted in the passenger
compartment
IP 42 for parts to be fitted in the passenger
compartment of roadsters/convertibles and cars with
moveable roof-panels if the installation location
requires a higher degree of protection than IP 40
IP 54 for all other parts
Weatherability (IEC 68-2-30-1980) 7 days

GOST R 54620, Section 13.2 references requirements for:
Impact of low atmospheric pressure,
Durability when changing temperature,
Impact of humidity,
Impact of foreign body,
Impact of water, and
Resistance of coating to fuels and lubricants.
In addition, it is required that the operation environment of the IVS does not contain
conductive dust, corrosive gases or vapours. Please note that the relevant references
to GOST and IEC standards (GOST 14254, GOST 15150, GOST 16019, IEC 50905, IEC
52230, IEC 52456 and IEC 54618) could not be followed up because either no English
version was available or the referenced standard could not be found.
3.7.3 Commentary
eCall IVSs type approved for the EU will be subjected to a wide variety of climatic
conditions in the different member states (e.g. between Spain and Sweden) and need
to remain operable under these conditions and be able to withstand these conditions
for long periods without damage.


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Because an eCall system is not used regularly, the vehicle user might not have a
natural opportunity to detect a malfunction of the system before it is intended to
perform its emergency function after a crash. The extent of prescribed self-tests (see
Section 3.14) and potential operability checks in future PTI regulations need therefore
to be taken into consideration when discussing necessity and severity of climate
resistance tests. Less stringent requirements could be justified if the systems
functionality is to be thoroughly checked throughout the life of the vehicle.
requirements and test methods for climate resistance for these systems, as discussed
above (e.g. UN Regulation 116 for vehicle alarm systems). However, many other
vehicle systems contain electronic components for which no climate resistance
requirements are set out in the corresponding UN Regulations (e.g. UN R13 on
braking; ABS sensors are an example of electronic components). Other vehicle safety
systems like airbags are not regulated at all in type-approval legislation, but, if fitted,
are implicitly assumed to work reliably under changing climatic conditions as they did
in the mandatory full-scale crash tests in the Type Approved sample vehicle.
It should be carefully considered if climatic resistance requirements and tests are
necessary for eCall IVS. A failure of the eCall system would not create an immediate
hazard, as opposed to, for example, a failure of a vehicle immobilizer might by
switching off the engine during driving at high speeds. Requiring a thorough self-test
of the IVS (see Section 3.14) could ensure that a driver gets warned in case of a
malfunction and can seek assistance at a garage.
If climate resistance is to be covered in type-approval legislation, the conditions and
tests referenced in UN Regulation No. 116, Sections 6.4.1., 6.4.2.2., 6.4.2.3. and
6.4.2.4. provide a suitable basis. As certain eCall related elements might possibly be
installed in the engine compartment (e.g. accelerometers), keeping a separate
temperature class of up +125C for these parts would be reasonable.
An operability test procedure is required in order to provide objective pass or fail
criteria. As for other resistance tests (see Section 3.5), a reduced set of functionality
tests would need to be defined that allows the operability of core functions of the eCall
system to be demonstrated (e.g. successful test call to a simulated PSAP using a test
number (long number), and successful transmission of MSD)


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3.8 Autonomous power supply
The main purpose of an eCall IVS is to work during and after a crash (automatic
eCall). However, the main energy storage devices or power supply systems of vehicles
can get damaged in high severity accidents which would prevent a successful eCall if
the IVS relies only on this power supply.
3.8.2 Options
The European eCall standard framework does not require an autonomous power
supply for the IVS. EN 16072, Section 7.17.2 sets out that the IVS shall remain
registered on the network for at least 60 minutes after an eCall is terminated in order
to allow call back from the PSAP. However, if the ignition is turned off or the available
power is exhausted, an earlier disconnection is allowed, i.e. a backup power supply is
not required by this standard. Consequently, CEN/TS 16454, Section 9.4.45 defines a
test for this requirement in ignition-on mode and does not define any test of the
capacity of a backup power supply. For TPS IVS, EN 16102, Sections 8.8 and 8.9
require best reasonable effort of the manufacturer to ensure that an 8 minute voice
connection is possible post-crash.
Draft UN Regulation No. XX, Section 6.9 defines different requirements in different
revisions of the draft. The current OICA proposal requires the IVS to be able to
operate autonomously:
The AECD shall be able to operate autonomously for a period of not less than
20 minutes in call-back mode and subsequently not less than 5 minutes in
voice communication mode.
The current Russian proposal is an if fitted requirement for backup batteries defining
a call back period of 60 minutes and 10 minutes of voice communication. The lifetime
of a backup battery shall be at least 3 years. Additionally, Section 15.1.3. requires
that the backup battery, if fitted, is connected to the on-board electrical network so
that it is charged.
The OICA proposal AECS-03-11e suggests that vehicles not fitted with a backup
battery shall demonstrate that on-board energy is still available after a UN R94/R95
crash test. CLEPA commented that call back periods should apply for temperatures of -
20C (not -40C).
GOST R 54620, Section 8.11 sets out requirements with regard to a backup power
supply. The IVS is required to provide an 8 hour call back period after an eCall and 10
minutes of voice communication. Testing of these requirements shall be performed at
a temperature of +20C. A rechargeable or non-rechargeable backup battery needs to
be fitted if the vehicle battery does not guarantee that the requirements are met. The
expected lifetime and service interval of the backup battery shall be indicated in the


May 2014 74

user manual. If a non-rechargeable battery is used, a visual or audible warning needs
to be given to the vehicle user when the battery needs replacement.
UN Regulation No. 116, Section 7.3.10 on vehicle alarm systems defines that the
power supply for the system may either be the vehicle battery or an additional
rechargeable or non-rechargeable battery. If additional batteries are used, these shall
by no means supply energy to other parts of the vehicle electrical system. The
regulation does not define a minimum operation period after the vehicles ignition is
switched off, but instead defines a maximum limit for energy consumption of 20 mA in
the set state at an environmental temperature of 235C (Please note: A vehicle
alarm systems active state always occurs while the ignition is switched off.).
3.8.3 Commentary
To enable the IVS to transmit the MSD, perform a successful voice call and be
available for potential call backs from the PSAP (e.g., if the vehicle cannot be found),
some form of power supply is required after an accident. Performance requirements in
the form of minimum operation times split into voice connection mode and call back
mode could ensure sufficient capacity of energy storage devices. A requirement to
operate autonomously from the vehicles electrical system could increase the
possibility that the IVS remains operable in high severity crashes.
Type-approval legislation will need to clarify whether or not the eCall IVS is required
to operate autonomously from the vehicles electrical system. The vehicle battery is
typically installed in the engine bay towards the occupant compartment (or the boot in
some cases) and might potentially get destroyed during a crash due to deformation of
the vehicle structure (or power lines might break which, according to accident
investigators, is observed less frequently). Unfortunately, no published up to date
accident data is available showing how frequently modern electric system failures
occur post collision and new original work would be required to provide an evidence
base on which to base any judgements. However, according to statements from
accident investigators, the electrical system can generally be expected to remain
intact in many airbag deployment accidents. However, the likelihood of electrical
system failure increases with the accident severity. Electrical system failure during a
crash would lead to a complete failure of the eCall (i.e. also prevent the MSD from
being sent) unless the IVS can rely on an autonomous power source. Please note: In
electric vehicles, the high-voltage power supply is deliberately disconnected after a
crash so as to avoid injuries to rescue services or occupants. This does not necessarily
involve the 12 V circuit supplying the eCall IVS.
The amount of energy stored in autonomous power supplies will reduce over time for
most designs (ageing) and thus require occasional replacement due to reduced
capacity (rechargeable batteries) or insufficient energy content (non-rechargeable
batteries). If an autonomous power supply is required, this is vital for successful
eCalls. One approach could be a requirement to indicate a fixed service interval (in
years) in the user manual or service plan and thereby transfer the responsibility to the
user. To rely solely on this prescribed service interval, however, seems impractical
particularly for older vehicles, which are often not serviced according to the service


May 2014 75

plan. To indicate the need for servicing more clearly to the user, the IVS self-test
could be required to include low energy content or low capacity conditions (see
Section 3.14). Suitable and feasible requirements for this part of the self-test would
still need to be defined.
The European eCall standards framework does not define a minimum period for voice
connection mode of the IVS but for TPS-IVS states that best effort shall be made to
allow an 8 minute voice connection. This requirement appears well balanced, lying in
between the GOST R 54620 requirement (10 minutes) and the OICA UN proposal (5
minutes). With regard to the duration of the call back period, EN 16072 requires 60
minutes after an eCall is terminated. A longer call back period, such as 480 minutes
required in GOST R 54620, appears unnecessary for European geographical
conditions, where it seems reasonable to expect that the accident scene can be found
and reached by emergency services within 60 minutes.
Type-approval testing of these requirements could be performed by carrying out a test
call (long number) for the required voice call duration and, subsequently, the
conformance test according to EN 16454, Section 9.4.45 for the required call back
period (i.e. remain registered on the network for a call back and demonstrate that a
call back at the end of the period is answered automatically).
Testing could, for practical reasons, be performed at standard atmospheric conditions
(at an environmental temperature of 235C). It should however be noted that that
different conditions (e.g. lower temperatures, lower mobile network strength, ageing
of the battery) can lead to reduced performance in real-world use compared to the
test results. This needs to be considered when deciding on the durations discussed
above.
As indicated above, a decision needs to be taken on whether or not the eCall IVS is
required to operate autonomously from the vehicles electrical system. Further
research appears necessary in order to inform this decision. The test setup for the
duration requirements (vehicle battery connected or not) needs to reflect the decisions
taken. The principal options are:
Require autonomous IVS operation: Test setup with disconnected vehicle
battery (even if the vehicle battery is connected to the IVS in the actual vehicle
design). This would in fact require an autonomous power supply to pass the
test.
Do not require autonomous IVS operation: Test setup with connected vehicle
battery (only if the vehicle battery is connected to the IVS in the actual vehicle
design). The capacity of the vehicle battery will cover the required time periods
without additional effort.
Do or do not require autonomous IVS operation depending on the outcome of
the frontal crash test: For vehicles in scope of UN R94, the state of the
vehicles electrical system after the full-scale frontal crash test could be
assessed, recorded and then reproduced in the test setup. This would in fact


May 2014 76

require an autonomous power supply for vehicles where the energy system
fails at a severity level of a UN R94 crash test. This might, in practice, lead to a
situation where many vehicles are not required to have an autonomous power
supply, although the vehicles electrical system would fail in higher severity
crashes (with increased likelihood of severe injuries). As discussed above, no
accident data is available to quantify potential casualties affected. Please note:
Component tests at higher severity (sled or drop rig tests) as suggested for the
IVS itself are not deemed suitable to determine the robustness of the electrical
system because the likely failure mechanism is structural damage of the
battery due to vehicle deformation (which is not simulated in a sled test) rather
than high forces due to deceleration.


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3.9 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
The eCall IVS is an electronic device, which additionally includes a transmitting device,
the NAD. The functionality of the IVS might be impaired by electromagnetic fields
caused by other electronic devices or it might, conversely, introduce electromagnetic
disturbances to other devices.
3.9.2 Options
Several acts of UN and European legislation apply to the eCall IVS with regard to EMC
as discussed in the following. The European Commission proposal, dated 13/06/2013,
required compliance of the IVS with UN Regulation No. 10 and Directive 1999/5/EC.
UN Regulation No. 10 applies to all M-category vehicles and separate technical units
intended to be fitted in these vehicles. It sets out:
Requirements regarding the immunity to radiated and conducted disturbances;
and
Requirements regarding the control of unwanted radiated and conducted
emissions.
Type-approval of a vehicle type according to UN Regulation 10 can be performed by
either testing the individual Electronic Sub-Assemblies (ESAs) or a whole vehicle
installation. If the whole vehicle option is chosen, ESAs do not have to be tested
separately and only Annexes 4, 5 and 6 of the regulation apply (no tests for conducted
emissions).
Annexes 4 and 5 (Measurement of radiated broadband/narrowband electromagnetic
emissions from vehicles) are performed with equipment activated, which can be
switched on permanently by the driver or passenger. This excludes, for example, the
horn and electric window motors because they are not used continuously. An eCall
IVS can most likely be activated manually and will then remain activated for a longer
period. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the eCall IVS is in scope of the equipment that
is intended to be activated in these tests. Annex 6 (Testing for immunity of vehicles to
electromagnetic radiation) does not cover monitoring the operability of the eCall IVS
under influence of electromagnetic radiation.
Additional whole vehicle tests apply to vehicles in rechargeable energy storage system
(RESS) charging mode coupled to the grid, i.e. plug-in electric vehicles, in order to
avoid disturbances to the grid. These tests are not relevant for the eCall IVS:
Method(s) of testing for emission of harmonics generated on AC power lines
from vehicle (Annex 11)
Method(s) of testing for emission of voltage changes, voltage fluctuations and
flicker on AC power lines from vehicle (Annex 12)


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Method(s) of testing for emission of radiofrequency conducted disturbances on
AC or DC power lines from vehicle (Annex 13)
Method(s) of testing for emission of radiofrequency conducted disturbances on
network and telecommunication access from vehicle (Annex 14)
Method of testing for immunity of vehicles to electrical fast transient / burst
disturbances conducted along AC and DC power lines (Annex 15)
Method(s) of testing for immunity of vehicles to surges conducted along AC and
DC power lines (Annex 16)
As mentioned above, UN R10 also defines tests for separate ESAs. These do not
normally have to be performed if the route of whole vehicle installation test is chosen
for type-approval. Nevertheless they can be made applicable by referencing UN R10
for the type-approval of the eCall IVS itself, as is proposed in the Commission
proposal for a type-approval regulation, dated 13/06/2013. Please note: This
reference has been removed in the Councils adopted general approach, dated
19/05/2014. Four tests are defined, which are performed with the SUT in normal
operation mode:
Method of measurement of radiated broadband electromagnetic emissions from
electrical/electronic sub-assemblies (Annex 7)
Method of measurement of radiated narrowband electromagnetic emissions
from electrical/electronic sub-assemblies (Annex 8)
Method(s) of testing for immunity of electrical/electronic sub-assemblies to
electromagnetic radiation (Annex 9)
Method(s) of testing for immunity to and emission of transients of
electrical/electronic sub-assemblies (Annex 10)
The automotive EMC Directive 2004/104/EC (which amends Directive 72/245/EEC)
applies to vehicles, components and separate technical units. It contains requirements
regarding radiated emissions and immunity to radiated emissions (for vehicles and
separate units); and requirements regarding conducted emissions or immunity to
conducted emissions (for separate units only). European eCall standards require
compliance to this directive also for TPS-IVS (EN 16102).
Directive 2004/108/EC (the European EMC directive) has the primary intention of
protecting the electromagnetic spectrum rather than safety of the equipment. It
applies to most electrical products; however, automotive equipment is excluded. The
European eCall standard EN 16072 nevertheless requires compliance of the IVS with
this directive.
Directive 1999/5/EC (the R&TTE Directive) contains general requirements to avoid
harmful interference of transmitting devices (i.e. the NAD). Compliance of the IVS to
this directive is required by EN 16072 (and by EN 16102 for TPS-IVS).


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UN Regulation No. 116 for vehicle alarm systems requires that parts of UN R10 are
followed (radiated broadband and narrowband emissions), but also refers to additional
tests:
Electrical disturbance from electrostatic discharges according to EN 61000-4-2
or ISO/TR 10605-1993
Electromagnetic field according to ISO 7637, Parts 1, 2 or 3
3.9.3 Commentary
UN Regulation No. 10 is a well-established automotive EMC regulation that is broadly
accepted to cover the relevant EMC aspects for most electronic equipment intended to
be fitted on vehicles. Referencing this regulation for the eCall IVS it would ensure that
the equipment is tested for compliance with the necessary requirements regarding
immunity to disturbances and control of unwanted emissions.
Tests with regard to electrostatic discharge are intentionally not included in UN R10,
because equipment fitted to the vehicle body is within an isolated structure while the
vehicle is operated (rubber tyres). Under normal conditions, significant electrostatic
discharge can therefore only be expected when occupants are entering or leaving the
vehicle (this means the vehicle is stationary at the time). Consideration should
generally be given to the fact that this assumption is not necessarily fulfilled after an
accident involving severe deformation of the vehicle structure. UN R116 for vehicle
alarm systems requires additional tests with regard to electrostatic discharge (EN
61000-4-2 or ISO/TR 10605-1993).
The transmitting part of the eCall IVS, the NAD, is in scope of the European legislation
covering interference of transmitting devices, the R&TTE Directive 1999/5/EC. Explicit
reference to this directive is also made in EN 16072. A certificate of compliance with
this standard would therefore also ensure the avoidance of harmful interference of the
NAD with other devices.
TRL recommends referencing UN R10 for the eCall IVS and give consideration to
adding electrostatic discharge requirements, perhaps based on the example of UN
R116. The transmitting part, the NAD, is covered by the R&TTE Directive 1999/5/EC.


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3.10 Resistance to electric impacts
The IVS is electrical equipment that might get damaged, for example by voltage
fluctuations during normal use of the vehicle or by faults during installation or vehicle
repair.
3.10.2 Options
UN Regulation No. 116, Sections 6.4.1.4., 6.4.2.2., 6.4.2.5. and 6.4.2.6. set out
requirements to protect vehicle alarm systems against damage. Tests are defined for
the resistance against:
Voltage changes,
Reversed polarity, and
Short circuits.
Please note that this regulation only applies to vehicles with a 12 V electrical system.
6.4.1.4. Electrical conditions
Rated supply voltage: 12 V
Operation supply voltage range: from 9 V to 15 V in the temperature range
according to paragraph 6.4.1.1. [-40C to +85C or +125C]
Time allowance for excess voltages at 23C:
U = 18 V, max. 1 h
U = 24 V, max. 1 min.
During these test procedures, the system is exposed to:
-40C/9 V and to +85C or +125C/15V for 4 hours;
Reversed polarity of 13 V for 2 min; and
Short circuit of the electrical connections against earth at 13 V.
A reduced set of operability tests is performed during or after applying the test
conditions. These operability tests are the same as used in the mechanical and climate
resistance tests (see Sections 3.6 and 3.7).
Draft UN Regulation XX, Annex 12, Section 3. includes EMC requirements and also
requirements and tests for resistance against electric impacts:
Operability check at minimum and maximum supply voltage;
Operability check when exposed to the reverse polarity supply voltage;
Protection from a short circuit on the supply voltage source poles; and
Resistance under the impact of conductive noise on supply circuits.


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A test for resistance under the impact of conductive noise on supply circuits is not
prescribed in UN Regulation 116. This test is to be carried out using test impulses in
accordance with ISO 7637 while running a set of operability tests.
Another general aspect is electric safety, i.e. protection of people from harm. The
eCall IVS, being a powered device, is falsely assumed in some of the reviewed
documents as falling under jurisdiction of the European Low Voltage Directive
2006/95/EC, which sets out principal elements of the safety objectives for electrical
equipment including for the protection against hazards arising from the equipment for
persons and domestic animals. However, this directive applies only to equipment with
a voltage rating of between 50 and 1000 V for alternating current and between 75 and
1500 V for direct current. The current in-vehicle grid is supplied by 12 V.
3.10.3 Commentary
As an eCall system is not used regularly, the vehicle user might not have a natural
opportunity to detect a malfunction of the system before it is intended to perform its
emergency function after a crash. The extent of prescribed self-tests (see Section
3.14) and potential operability checks in future PTI regulations need therefore to be
taken into consideration when discussing the necessity and severity of tests of the
resistance against electric impacts. Less stringent requirements could be justified if
the systems functionality will be thoroughly checked throughout the life of the vehicle.
requirements and test methods for electrical safety for these systems, as discussed
above (e.g. UN Regulation 116 for vehicle alarm systems). However, many other
vehicle systems contain electronic components for which no electrical safety
requirements are set out in the corresponding UN Regulations (e.g. UN R13 on
braking; ABS sensors are an example of electronic components). Other vehicle safety
systems like airbags are not regulated at all in type-approval legislation; but, if fitted,
are implicitly assumed to work reliably (as they did in the mandatory full-scale crash
tests in the type-approved sample vehicle).
A failure of the eCall system due to an electrical fault would not create an immediate
hazard, as opposed to, for example, a failure of a vehicle immobilizer might do by
switching off the engine during driving at high speeds. Requiring a thorough self-test
of the IVS (see Section 3.14) could ensure that a driver gets warned in case of a
malfunction and can seek assistance at a garage.
If requirements and tests for the resistance of eCall IVS against electric impacts are to
be defined in type-approval legislation, UN Regulation No. 116, Sections 6.4.1.4.,
6.4.2.2., 6.4.2.5. and 6.4.2.6. would provide a good base, covering:
Voltage changes,
Reversed polarity, and
Short circuits.
If systems other than 12 V are to be covered as well, the test values need to be
adapted to the additional voltage levels.


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Provided a comprehensive self-test of the eCall IVS is prescribed (see Section 3.14),
no further type-approval requirements in this area are considered necessary.


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3.11 Wireless link performance of global navigation satellite system
(GNSS) module and mobile network device (MND)
Positioning technologies will be used to determine the location of the vehicle in
distress (using a positioning system, very likely GNSS) and wireless communication
technologies to provide a connection and transmit the eCall to the PSAP (using a
MND). The receivers and antennas have to provide a certain performance, for example
regarding accuracy and sensitivity, in order to ensure successful eCalls.
3.11.2 Options
GNSS and MND modules can be tested with simulated test signals (satellite positioning
signals or mobile network) provided via RF cable connection (conducted testing) or
over-the-air, either using simulated or real signals. Conducted testing bypasses the
antennas, hence their performance, in particular in different directions, is not tested,
but has the advantage that the required test equipment is limited. Simulated over-
the-air testing can be used to assess the performance in all directions around the
system and takes into account the installation and quality of antennas and their
connections. It needs, however, a controlled radiated environment: A measurement
antenna emits signals in an RF shielded, anechoic chamber while being moved to
different positions on a sphere around the SUT.
OICA suggests in their Proposals for homologation of AECD and Installation in vehicle
AECS-03-11e to perform GNSS and phone communication tests during component
approval and GNSS and phone performance and/or functioning tests during vehicle
approval using over-the-air testing. No specific test procedures are referenced
however.
There are currently no EN standards available for testing GNSS and MND module
performance. CEN set up a working group (CEN/CLC/TC5/WG1) in order to develop a
test standard for Navigation and positioning receivers for road applications.
According to stakeholder input, the standard is intended to test positioning systems
for applications which require high accuracy and reliability (e.g. applications for
advanced driver assistance systems) and might therefore not be suitable for eCall. The
working group will start its drafting process at the end of 2014, so the standard will
not be available in the near future.
Standardisation work is also being carried out by ETSI Specialist Task Force 474,
under TC SES (Satellite Earth Stations and Systems), WG SCN (Satellite
Communication and Navigation), with the aim to produce a standard on
Interoperability and Integration of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) with
Telecommunications Systems for the provision of location-based services. According to
stakeholder input, the content will also not be applicable in full to eCall IVS
assessments. However, ETSI defines three application-independent scenarios for road
environment modelling, open sky, interurban and dense urban, which could be


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considered for performance testing of GNSS-based positioning systems. The
standardisation work will not be completed before 2016.
CETECOM discussed several test standards (see below) in their proposal AECS eCall
CETECOM proposal for antenna performance test methods for an eCall system in
vehicles AECS-03-10e, and concluded that, while they were providing a good
technical base, they were not suitable to be applied to eCall immediately. Different
CTIA and 3GPP standards appear to be used across the mobile device industry to test
antenna and GNSS/MND module performance, with manufacturers defining their own
tests or variations on top of these standards (e.g. Vodafone Specification for Terminals
on over the Air RF Performance).None of these could be identified which were tailored
for in-vehicle application and could be readily used. The most relevant identified
standards were:
CTIA Test Plan for Wireless Device Over-the-Air Performance - Method of
Measurement for Radiated RF Power and Receiver Performance describes tests
of the antenna performance of mobile devices.
3GPP TS 34.114 - User Equipment (UE) / Mobile Station (MS) Over The Air
(OTA) antenna performance; Conformance testing; 3GPP TS 34.171 - Terminal
conformance specification; Assisted Global Positioning System (A-GPS);
Frequency Division Duplex (FDD); and 3GPP TS 37.571-1 - Universal Terrestrial
Radio Access (UTRA) and Evolved UTRA (E-UTRA) and Evolved Packet Core
(EPC); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification for UE positioning; Part
1: Conformance test specification describes minimum performance
requirements for multi-constellation GNSS receivers.
Draft UN Regulation No. XX, Section 6.5 and Annex 9 set out a detailed test procedure
for GNSS modules and performance criteria under various interference conditions,
regarding:
Accuracy (15 m at 95% confidence level at speeds 250 km/h),
Observation interval ( 1s),
Time to first fix (60 s),
Re-acquisition time after block out (5 s), and
Sensitivity at receiver input (163 dBW during acquisition, 188 dBW during
tracking).
The test procedure in the Russian draft was designed for GLONASS and GPS receivers.
At the 4
th
AECS IWG meeting, experts from the European GNSS Agency (GSA)
presented an adaptation of this test procedure that includes Galileo in the scope.
The OICA proposal for this section contains a very general requirement for the GNSS
receiver to be compliant with CEP95, which by itself is not sufficient as a technical
performance requirement: The Circular Error Probability (CEP) is a common accuracy
measure; however, it would need to be accompanied by a required performance level,
i.e. a distance for CEP (95%) and a test procedure. Please note: With regard to
accuracy, EN 15722, Section 6.2.2 defines, for data transmitted to the PSAP, that the


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confidence bit regarding the location has to be set to low confidence if the position is
not within the limits of 150 m with 95% confidence. This is not to be understood as a
performance requirement for GNSS receivers (it would be very low) but rather as a
value for situations where no GNSS signal has been received for a certain period of
time.
3.11.3 Commentary
The MND is required to use 2G or 3G circuit-switched mobile networks (not packet-
switched 4G) for telecommunication to ensure interoperability between IVS and PSAPs
according to the current standards.
With regard to positioning technologies, the European Parliaments legislative
resolution, dated 26/02/2014, and the Councils general approach, dated 19/05/2014,
require in Article 5.3 compatibility of the eCall IVS with the GNSS constellation Galileo
and the Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) EGNOS. The manufacturer may
choose to use different GNSS in addition. The use of additional supportive
technologies, e.g. inertial measurement units (IMUs), to improve precision and
robustness is not mentioned explicitly and therefore assumed to be permissible.
Increased accuracy and robustness (in case one system is unavailable) and reduced
time to first fix can be achieved by supporting multiple constellations (Galileo and/or
GPS and/or GLONASS) and using SBAS. The current Russian draft of UN Regulation
No. XX contains a requirement to support at least two constellations, which is feasible
from a technical perspective because multi-constellation receivers are available and
widely used.
A technical view on the different constellations is as follows:
GPS, the United States Global Positioning Systems, is available globally since
1994.
GLONASS, the Russian GNSS, was restored to full working order in 2011.
Galileo, the European GNSS, is currently partially available (4 satellites) and a
test campaign is being carried out by JRC and GSA together with eCall
manufacturers. It is planned to start early operational services at the beginning
of 2015, following the 4 additional satellites expected to be launched by the
end of 2014. It might offer better precision and reliability and better prevention
of jamming and spoofing (authentication) than GPS and GLONASS (as
discussed in HeERO Deliverable D.6.1).
Compass, a future Chinese GNSS constellation, is planned to be available from
2020.
For type-approval, the compatibility of the MND with 2G/3G mobile communication
networks has to be ensured, potentially by means of certification of standards
compliance (see Section 3.3). Compatibility of the GNSS system with Galileo and
EGNOS is not covered in the current European eCall standards framework and


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therefore needs to be included in type-approval testing. This could cover a basic
demonstration that the Galileo signal is received and used for positioning and that
EGNOS is added to correct the position.
The definition of minimum performance levels for MND and GNSS receiver in type-
approval legislation, in addition to basic compatibility requirements, could further
contribute to successful eCalls, including accurate positioning, under real-world
conditions.
With regard to MND performance, several competing test specifications appear to be
used across the industry, sometimes specific to one manufacturer. None could be
identified, however, which were tailored for in-vehicle application and could be readily
used. As a longer term solution, the development of European technical standards for
GNSS and MND module performance for road applications by expert groups appears
sensible which could then be referenced in type-approval legislation.
The performance tests and requirements for the positioning system should be
simplified to a level necessary to localise a vehicle in distress reliably under adverse
conditions, and could include, at a minimum, requirements for:
Accuracy,
Time to first fix, and
Availability.
The performance tests should ideally take all technologies used for positioning into
account, not just the minimum required Galileo and EGNOS. The minimum
performance levels can likely be less challenging than required for certain advanced
driver assistance system applications (as dealt with by CEN working group
CEN/CLC/TC5/WG1 and ETSI Specialist Task Force 474).
Static testing can be used to determine accuracy and time to first fix of the positioning
system as installed in the vehicle: The vehicle under test remains in a fixed, defined
position while the output of the positioning system is monitored and compared to the
required performance levels. This testing can in principal be performed using real
signals, in order to spare the need for setting up a simulated test environment with
anechoic chamber. The varying and non-ideal signal conditions need to be taken into
account when defining the minimum performance levels.
Testing of availability, however, would require dynamic testing, i.e. moving a vehicle
along defined routes in different environments (open sky, interurban and dense urban)
and monitoring the availability of positioning signals over time. The effort for dynamic
testing appears high and it should be considered carefully if it is necessary in a
type-approval context. It may be assumed that there is some evaluation of availability
in the agreements between vehicle manufacturer and navigation system supplier.
Based on this assumption, it could be investigated, if provision of documentation to
the Technical Service, at the time of type-approval, might be sufficient to allay
concerns over a minimum level of performance in this respect.


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Experts from GSA might lead or provide assistance in the development of the
type-approval test procedures. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European
Commission has a test facility available within its GNSS Security Laboratory which is
capable of carrying out full-vehicle over-the-air tests in a 20 m diameter anechoic
chamber. GSA is also studying, together with JRC and external experts, the
opportunity to simplify the tests proposed in the Russian draft of UN Regulation No.
XX (Section 6.5 and Annex 9) and to better address Galileo and EGNOS compatibility,
possibly also increasing acceptability of these tests by automotive manufacturers.
In the longer term, after deployment of eCall, it could be monitored how frequently
eCalls with inaccurate or missing positioning information occur and if more stringent
requirements or more thorough test procedures might be necessary.


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3.12 Installation and connection
The type and severity of accidents an eCall IVS can withstand is, among other things,
determined by its installation location and the method and quality of fastening to the
vehicle. Furthermore, the installation of antennas is influential in terms of their
reception quality. The electrical and data connection between IVS and vehicle is a
factor for reliability. Please note: All aspects concerning HMI components are
discussed in Section 3.15.
3.12.2 Options
Only very few requirements concerning the installation of eCall IVS are mentioned in
the reviewed documents.
Draft UN Regulation No. XX, Section 15.1.2. requires that the IVS is connected to the
vehicles on board electrical network. With regard to antennas, Section 15.1.3.
requires that the installation ensures stable signal reception (GNSS) and a stable link
(MND), when in operating position. The later OICA proposal requires installation such
to obtain reception of signals (GNSS) and communication (MND) (these
requirements are repeated in Section 24.1.2. of the document).
UN Regulation No. 116 sets out some general requirements for vehicle alarm systems
and immobilizers so that these devices cannot be easily disabled or dismantled. None
of the installation requirements are of relevance for eCall IVSs.
The Russian standard GOST R 54620 contains several informative annexes containing
advice on installation locations and connectors. For example, Annex D suggests
favourable installation locations in the vehicle for accident detection sensors, and
Annex G specifies the layout of the connector for retrofit IVS.
3.12.3 Commentary
Antennas can be positioned within the IVS (fractal antenna design) or outside of the
IVS, the latter arguably involving a higher risk of an accident rendering the system
inoperable: HeERO 6.1 Deliverable 6.1, Section 6.6 reports from stakeholder
consultations that favourable installation locations for antennas were on the vehicle
roof or the external rear view mirrors.
For some IVS designs it can be expected that a secondary, or back-up, mobile
network communication antenna is located within the IVS. This seems a reasonable
design given the need to offer communications after a crash event. However, in terms
of vehicle type-approval testing there may be a need to assess the MND wireless link
based on only the components expected to be operational after a crash. Practically,
this suggests disabling an external antenna for the assessment. The survivability of
antennae could be determined during full-scale crash tests, where conducted and


May 2014 89

equivalent connections used on another representative vehicle for any wireless
connection checks.
With regard to the installation location of the IVS itself, HeERO 6.1 Deliverable 6.1,
Section 6.6 suggests that integration inside the dashboard would be a safe installation
location and adds the following recommendations:
1. Metallic components can cause interference that could affect the behaviour
of the internal antennas of the IVS. It is recommended to avoid metallic objects
surrounding the IVS. However, effect on antenna performance will highly
depend on the size and location of metallic components, so a deeper analysis in
final configuration should be carried out in order to proper antenna design.
2. The TCU (Telematic Control Unit) should be placed in horizontal position
from the floor to assure good reception of the GPS antenna that must get the
information from the satellites.
3. Due to the GPS antenna directive radiation pattern, any metallic part above
the antenna (metallic elements, cables, windshield thermal layer, etc.) will
affect the radiation pattern shape directly and therefore the antenna
performance.
With regard to the connection of the IVS to the vehicles information network, HeERO
Deliverable 6.1, Section 7.2 raised some concerns about retrofit devices: No connector
or interface for eCall IVSs was defined and the CAN bus might not be sufficiently open
for retrofit devices to be integrated easily.
Prescribing a specific location for installation of the IVS, including antennas, would
restrict the design freedom of manufacturers and possibly not lead to an ideal
installation in each vehicle, because vehicle designs vary substantially with regard to
packaging. The aspects mentioned in the reviewed HeERO deliverables (crash
resistance and antenna performance) can be covered with performance requirements
as discussed in other sections of this document:
Mechanical resistance (crash): Section 3.6
Wireless link performance: Section 3.11
It could be considered requiring manufacturers to make best reasonable effort to
minimise the risk that the eCall IVS, including antennas, is rendered inoperable in
accidents. This could help type-approval authorities reject inherently unsafe designs,
which are for some reason not covered by the performance requirements.
With a view to potential future PTI tests it should be considered if the IVS needs to be
easily physically accessible for these, e.g. for setting a test number or triggering a test
call.
With regard to the connector and interface to the vehicles information network,
stakeholders indicated that a factory fitted IVS is likely to be connected by the
standard CAN bus connector in most cases and that regulation on the type of


May 2014 90

connector was not necessary or appropriate. TRL generally supports this view, but
consideration should also be given as to whether this offers an appropriate interface
with the IVS in case diagnostic checks or potential future PTI inspections might need
to interrogate the IVS.
Externally installed parts, like antennas, generally involve a risk of injuring vulnerable
road users when hit by the vehicle. This is, however, not an eCall specific risk and is
covered by UN Regulation No 26 - External projections of M1 vehicles.


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3.13 Audio equipment
An eCall consists of a modem transmission of the MSD and a subsequent voice
connection to the PSAP. The voice channel must provide a certain audio quality and
loudness to enable occupants to speak to operators and provide them with further
details about the accident or casualties (including cases where there is no actual need
for emergency services to be sent to the scene) even under adverse conditions.
Additionally, the audio equipment intended to be used for the voice connection might
be damaged during a crash.
3.13.2 Options
The European set of eCall standards does not set out specific performance or
resistance criteria for the audio equipment used for the voice connection between
vehicle and PSAP. The voice connection is, however, mentioned in several places. EN
16072, Sections 7.5 and 7.13, for example, set out that:
The manufacturer shall make best reasonable effort to enable a voice channel
after a crash (so long as the relevant equipment has not been disabled in the
crash); and
The voice connection has to be hands-free.
The corresponding performance tests according to CEN/TS 16454 ensure that the IVS
enables two-way voice communication with the PSAP in normal set-up (vehicle has not
crashed) and that the vehicles entertainment system is muted. No objective
performance levels are defined for audio performance. In accordance with the
requirements above, the post-crash test requirements are passed even if the audio
equipment is destroyed during a crash test.
Draft UN Regulation No. XX proposes requirements for the general audio equipment
performance; however, these do not include crash strength requirements. Section
6.6.4. requires that the IVS enables full duplex hands-free voice communication with
the PSAP. In addition, Sections 15.1.4. and 24.1.3.3. set out a requirement for the
Receiving Loudness Rating (RLR) of the audio system:
Minimum Receiving Loudness Rating (RLR) of 2 dB; if adjustable, it shall not be
adjustable to a value below 2 dB (no test method defined)
Additional detailed performance requirements for the eCall audio equipment are
proposed in Sections 15.1.4.6. to 15.1.4.14., which are challenged by OICA. The
regulation distinguishes between narrow-band and wideband systems, which are
commonly defined as the frequency ranges 3003,400 Hz and 507,000 Hz,
respectively. The requirements are:


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Conformance to requirements in ITU recommendations ITU-T P.1100 Narrow-
band hands-free communication in motor vehicles and ITU-T P.1110 Wideband
hands-free communications in motor vehicles
Maximum signal depression levels of incoming signals of 8-13 dB
Maximum time of switching for removal of signal depression in accordance with
ITU-T P.1100 and ITU-T P.1110
The IVS shall allow implementing automatic sound level strengthening to 15 dB
when the noise level in the occupant compartment increases; and also
implementing automatic controls of audio signal strengthening, for example in
cases where after a road accident the occupants speak into the microphone
from an unusual angle.
Signal delay of in and out directions within borders of ITU-T P.1100 and ITU-T
P.1110
Echo depression (TCLw) 50 dB
Compliance to a set of additional standards/recommendations: ETSI EG 202
396-1, ITU-T P.501, ITU-T P.79, ITU-T P.340, ITU-T P.800, ITU-T P.800.1, ITU-
T P.830, ITU-T P.831, ITU-T P.832, ITU-T P.835
GOST R 54620, Section 10 apparently provided a base for the requirements in Draft
UN Regulation No. XX and sets out very similar requirements. Section 13.3.3 requires
in addition that the manufacturer takes all measures to ensure the operability of the
audio system after a crash.
The ITU recommendations referenced in the Russian UN regulation drafts, ITU-T
P.1100 and ITU-T P.1110, define a range of objective test methods and requirements
for narrow-band and wideband hands-free communication in motor vehicles,
respectively. The tests use an artificial head (HATS head and torso simulator)
according to ITU recommendation ITU-T P.58 and measure signals from both artificial
ears (left and right). Background noise is used in some tests to simulate a situation
where the vehicle is driving at an elevated speed.
For microphones, the following parameters are measured:
In anechoic chamber:
o Microphone sensitivity
o Microphone frequency response
o Microphone directional characteristics
o Microphone distortion
o Maximum sound pressure level
o Self-noise


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In car:
o Microphone output level
o Overload point
o Microphone frequency
o Idle channel noise
o SNR improvement
For hands-free terminals, the following parameters are measured:
Delay
Loudness ratings
Sensitivity frequency responses
Speech quality during single talk
Listening speech quality stability
Idle channel noise
Out-of-band signals
Distortion in send
Distortion in receive
Echo performance without background noise
Double talk performance
Background noise transmission
Section 14 gives some general guidance on additional subjective testing, which shall
be used to optimise certain parameters of hands-free systems installed in cars:
echo cancellation
double talk performance
speech and background noise quality in the send direction
speech quality in receive direction
stability of the echo canceller for a "closed loop" connection when doing car-to-
car hands-free communication
A car-to-car or car-to-landline connection is used with conversation following a defined
structure for single talk and double talk tests. The subjective evaluation on rating
scales from 1 (best) to 5 (worst) is usually done by experts experienced with
subjective audio testing.
The VDA Specification for Car Hands-free Terminals, which appears to be more widely
used across the automotive industry, defines a similar set of test procedures and
requirements for microphones and hands-free terminals. The tests are mainly carried


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out in the occupant compartment of a car with previously recorded background noise
inserted by external speakers. This background noise is used to simulate a situation
where the vehicle is driving at an elevated speed. An artificial head in accordance with
ITU-T P.58, equipped with only one artificial ear. The test signals used are speech-like
and follow the recommendations ITU-T P.50 and P.501.
For microphones, the following parameters are measured:
Microphone sensitivity (anechoic or in car)
Overload point (anechoic)
Microphone distortion (anechoic)
Microphone frequency response (in car)
Idle channel noise (in car)
Ambient noise rejection (in car)
For hands-free terminals, a large number of parameters are measured. According to
Section 6.14 of the document, the most important ones for the quality of the terminal
are:
Loudness
o Sending Loudness Rating (SLR)
o Receiving Loudness Rating (RLR)
o Maximum loudness rating in receiving (RLRmax)
Subjective speech quality
o One way speech quality in sending (TMOS SND)
o One way speech quality in receiving (TMOS RCV)
Echo depression
o Terminal coupling loss
o Terminal coupling loss, max. volume
Double talk performance
o DT-type
Ambient noise rejection
o Background noise transmission during call setup (BGNT call setup)
o Background noise transmission with far end speech (BGNT far)
o Background noise transmission with near end speech (BGNT near)
o D-Value


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Another technical specification covering this topic is ETSI TS 126 132, which covers
the assessment of performance requirements for the acoustic characteristics of GSM
and 3G terminals when used to provide narrow-band or wideband telephony. Section
7.2.3. of the specification sets out test procedures for SLR and RLR of vehicle mounted
hands-free user equipment, also based on speech-like test signals following ITU-T
P.50 and P.501.
3.13.3 Commentary
The aim of type-approval legislation is not to provide a highly optimised hands-free
system offering the best possible performance under driving conditions. Instead, the
eCall regulation should ensure a reasonable minimum quality and loudness level that
allows efficient communication between vehicle occupants and PSAP operators in post-
crash conditions. When discussing an appropriate loudness level, it needs to be
considered that the vehicle occupants are likely to have temporarily impaired hearing
following an accident, in particular after airbag deployment. If the audio equipment
fails during an accident, the MSD could possibly still be transmitted, i.e. the eCall
would not fail completely.
The ITU recommendations ITU-T P.1100/P.1110 and the VDA Specification both define
an extensive set of test procedures and requirements to ensure high quality of the
hands-free system. The procedures are similar and are both designed for in-vehicle
equipment and take the characteristics of a specific occupant compartment and
installation in the car into account. A major difference in the test setup is that the ITU
tests use a two-ear measurement, whereas the VDA tests rely on one ear (simplified
test equipment). This can, in practice, sometimes lead to a different assessment of the
quality of the same system. According to stakeholder input, the VDA specification,
although officially still in draft stage since its publication in 2008, is the most widely
used standard in the automotive industry, which makes it appear favourable as a base
for eCall test requirements.
For the type-approval of eCall audio systems, the tests defined in the VDA
specification would need to be slightly modified and a reasonable sub-set of necessary
tests to ensure a minimum quality and loudness level should be selected. A potential
minimum set of tests, based on the list provided above, might consist of:
Microphone tests:
o Microphone sensitivity (in car), VDA, Section 5.1.2
o Overload point (anechoic), VDA, Section 5.2
Hands-free terminal tests:
o Sending Loudness Rating (SLR), VDA, Section 6.3.1
o Receiving Loudness Rating (RLR), VDA, Section 6.3.2
o Maximum loudness rating in receiving (RLRmax), VDA, Section 6.3.2
o Echo depression (Terminal coupling loss, and terminal coupling loss,
max. volume), Section 6.9.1


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The minimum requirements set out in the VDA specification to pass each of these tests
should be reviewed to ensure that they actually reflect only a minimum level that is
required and can be expected in post-crash conditions.
The test conditions should be adapted in order to reflect the situation in which an eCall
audio system is used. After an accident the vehicle will be stationary, potentially with
a deformed occupant compartment and most likely with broken windows and
previously deployed airbags. The ambient noise simulation in the VDA specification is
mainly aimed to simulate driving noise of the tested car itself at elevated speeds,
which does not appear relevant for eCalls. To simplify the test setup, ambient noise
simulation might therefore be omitted. It would be desirable to carry out the audio
tests in an actually crashed vehicle. However, it seems impractical to expect that
these tests are done immediately after a full-scale crash test because the test head
and torso simulator would be difficult to install in the vehicle (occupied by dummies,
glass slivers, etc.). The tests might be carried out in the crashed car at a later point.
However, again, it is uncertain how this would align with the practical arrangements in
test houses, e.g. if the test equipment for audio tests is available at the same test
houses that carry out the full scale crash tests or if the vehicle would need to be
transferred to a different company.
3.13.4 Recommendation
A potential solution would be to set out two separate test procedures:
A brief, subjective audio test procedure carried out after a full-scale crash test.
This should be a simple test done by human testers in order to determine only
if the audio system is still operable and which parts are still operable. It is
considered likely that only parts of the full audio system of cars will be crash
hardened, e.g. one speaker designated for eCalls. The exact details of this
procedure would still need to be defined (some of the general
recommendations in ITU-T P.1100, Section 14 might be used).
The above potential minimum set of objective measurements carried out in a
car in normal working order; however, with lowered side windows (to simulate
broken glass) and only using those parts of the audio system which were crash
hardened by the manufacturer and remained operable during the full-scale
crash test. Appropriate requirement levels for post-crash conditions, in
particular with regard to the loudness level, need to be defined.
This approach is in line with the high level recommendation by OICA in the UN
document AECS-03-11e, which was to perform an audio test independent of crash
tests, but also to verify audio capabilities after a crash test.


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3.14 In-vehicle system (IVS) self-test
As the eCall function is only used in very rare occasions, the user does not have the
opportunity to pick up malfunctions of the system without a self-test and malfunction
indication of the IVS. A self-test function might also be used in potential future PTI
tests.
3.14.2 Options
EN 16062, Section 7.1.5 requires the IVS to perform a self-test on power up. In the
event of a critical system failure (i.e. a failure which would result in an inability to
execute an eCall as described in this European standard) being detected during or
following the self-test, a warning shall be given to the occupants of the vehicle. It is
not specified in detail which parts of the equipment or which aspects a self-test should
cover. The corresponding test in CEN/TS 16454, Section 9.4.6 is only verifying that a
properly functioning IVS does not indicate any faults.
The ECs initial proposal for a type-approval regulation did not make mention of an
IVS self-test function. The European Parliament and the Council later included a
paragraph on self-test in their documents.
European Parliaments resolution, dated 26/02/2014:
Manufacturers shall demonstrate that, in the event of a critical system failure
which would result in an inability to execute an eCall detected during or
following the self-test, a warning shall be given to the occupants of the
vehicle.
Councils general approach, dated 19/05/2014:
Manufacturers shall demonstrate that, in the event of a critical system failure
which would result in an inability to execute a 112-based eCall or a TPS eCall, a
warning shall be given to the occupants of the vehicle.
Draft UN Regulation No. XX, Section 6.7. requires the IVS to be able to perform a self-
test and to issue a warning if a failure is present that prevents the requirements of the
regulation being met. Detailed elements and aspects to be included in the test are not
specified.
The Russian standard GOST R 54620, Section 6.17 requires to perform a self-test
when the ignition is switched and to indicate identified failures to the driver. The self-
test has to cover the following aspects, under the caveat that this was technically
possible:
Integrity of the software image;
Interface connections to GSM and UMTS communication module;
Performance of GNSS receiver;


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Integrity (reliability) defined GNSS receiver navigation and timing parameters
(function RAIM);
Adequacy of the level of charge of backup battery (if the battery is installed);
Performance (correct connection) of external GNSS antenna (if the antenna is
installed);
Performance (correct connection) of external antenna GSM and UMTS (if the
antenna is installed);
Operation of the accident detection sensor (only vehicles of category M1);
Performance of BIP; [Please note: It is not entirely clear, what the BIP is. The
glossary of the English translation contains the explanation: Block the user
interface.]
Correct connection of microphone;
Performance of microphone; and
Performance of speakers.
3.14.3 Commentary and recommendations
The later stages of the political process (Parliament and Council documents) include a
general requirement for an IVS self-test. By requiring conformance to EN 16062, as
discussed in Section 3.3 of this document, a self-test of the system on power up would
be required in any case. It appears reasonable to define a more detailed specification
of the base components and failures this test needs to cover at a minimum, if a
comparable level shall be ensured across the range of vehicles and systems. The
extent of the required self-test might influence the severity of other requirements,
e.g. climate resistance (Section 3.7), mechanical resistance (Section 3.5) and
resistance to electric impacts (Section 3.10). Less stringent requirements could be
justified with regard to these aspects if a thorough self-test ensures that the system is
fully operational throughout the life of the vehicle.
The requirement in Draft UN Regulation No. XX to indicate any failure that prevents
the requirements of the regulation being met appears too far reaching and technically
not feasible. If this was taken literally, it would include, for example, testing against
all resistance requirements on each system power up.
The list of aspects to be covered by a self-test provided as provided in GOST R 54620
(see above) might form a starting point for type-approval requirements. However, due
to the unofficial English translation of the Russian document, some items are not
entirely clear, e.g. what the BIP is. Also, it does not seem to be defined in detail
which aspects, for example, the performance of the GNSS module includes.
It seems generally reasonable to include all components that are required for
successful eCalls in the self-test, e.g. GNSS module, NAD, accident detection sensors,
antennas, battery (level of charge, capacity), microphone, speaker, etc. The tests
could be simple tests to ensure the component is present (i.e. is it connected?); tests


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of the integrity of electric circuits; or more advanced individual tests to ensure all
component are fully operational. In addition, the integrity of the software image could
be checked.
A detailed list of components and aspects that would be technically feasible to cover in
a self-test still needs to be compiled by experts in this field for European type-
approval legislation.


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3.15 Human-machine interface (HMI)
Some requirements of the Human Machine Interface (HMI) are specified in legislation
and standards and there are some general statements and recommendations in
related to the HMI in the following documents (please refer to Appendix A, Table A-1
for brief summaries):
Draft UN Regulation No. XX on AECD/AECS, Part II
Draft UN Regulation No. XX on AECD/AECS, Part III
UN Regulation No. 121
EN 16072
GOST R 54620
ISO 2575
Recommendations of the DG eCall for the introduction of the pan-European
eCall, Version 2.0
03-11e
European Parliament legislative resolution, dated 26/02/2014
General approach of the Council, dated 19/05/2014
Where requirements of the HMI are stated the means to achieve the requirements is
not specified. Similarly, in the general statements and recommendations related to the
HMI, implementation is not included and the statements are untestable in the form
expressed. Based on these envelopes of performance it is likely that a range of
design solutions will arise for eCall equipment and, hence, variable quality and
performance of different equipment and HMI can be expected; e.g.:
Whether features are provided or not
Behaviour of equipment e.g with ignition on/off
Physical design and labelling of HMI components
Other technical choices by individual manufacturers concerning overall system issues
will indirectly impact on the HMI; e.g.:
How long the equipment operates following triggering depends on battery life
The quality of microphones and speakers affect signal quality
The location of components within the vehicle affects accessibility of manual
buttons


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This lack of uniform design for eCall HMI, coupled with general unfamiliarity with the
service and very infrequent use, could be a problem for user understanding of eCall
and lead to mis-use.
3.15.2 Options
The first option is to develop a simple checklist to verify inclusion of the mandatory
HMI elements (such as a manual button). This checklist would be a by inspection
part of the type-approval not requiring evaluation of performance of the HMI.
Without including any additional performance requirements, reference could be made
to existing HMI guidelines, codes of practice and recommendations concerning the
design of in-vehicle information and communication equipment. The most well-known
of the HMI recommendations in Europe is the Commission Recommendation of 26 May
2008 on Safe and Efficient In-Vehicle Information and Communication Systems
European Statement of Principles on HMI. This does not include any explicit provision
for testing compliance with its provisions.
Development of a specific performance testing regime for the HMI would require
further research and development.
The usual human factors approach would be to undertake a full task and error analysis
which identifies the steps to be taken, the information required at each step and the
potential for errors and their consequences. Nevertheless it is difficult to predict all the
consequences of human interaction with technology in advance of actual use, so
evaluation of trials and accumulation of experience would also be needed in advance
of setting explicit performance thresholds.
3.15.3 Commentary
The requirement to be a driver places certain thresholds on some characteristics such
as age and physical & cognitive abilities. However, passengers can be much more
variable. In particular, it cannot be assumed that drivers/passengers have good
hearing or that they understand a particular written or spoken language.
Some general points can be made about driver and passenger behaviour:
Many drivers and passengers will have little concept of eCall and may not know
whether the vehicle they are driving is equipped with eCall or not (particularly
if a hired vehicle).
Airbag events are very rare and most drivers are not trained for these and
have no previous experience to draw on. So, their reaction and the behaviour
of passengers is likely to be variable and individually unpredictable.
The sort of event that will trigger eCall is likely to be traumatic and stressful so
drivers and passenger can be expected to behave in ways that are different
from their normal behaviour when calm and alert.
As well as physical symptoms (impaired vision, hearing, loss of fine motor control etc.)
drivers may experience confusion, attentional tunnelling (inability to appreciate the


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wider context) and panic. So, even objects and behaviours that are very obvious and
natural in normal circumstances may be completely ignored by drivers and
passengers. Their appreciation of time and sequence of events and their spatial
awareness may be highly impaired.
Some key issues in the interaction of users with eCall technology can be identified in
different phases of eCall use and these consideration could be used to develop future
performance criteria for the HMI:
Automatic triggering
Following an automatic triggering, drivers and passengers need to understand what
the system is doing and what is happening on their behalf, e.g.
Detecting that a crash has occurred
Calling emergency services
Confirming that emergency services are aware and acting on information
Providing an estimate of how long it will be before they arrive
Continuously providing or repeating and updating all of the above information
Drivers and passengers may be within the vehicle or may, particularly if there is a fire
or other hazard, be trying to escape the vehicle while the eCall is in progress.
Drivers and passengers may not understand written or spoken information in a
particular language and may (e.g. as a result of the crash) have impaired sight or
hearing.
Manual Triggering
In order to successfully undertake a manual eCall, the driver or passenger need to:
Know that the vehicle has a manual eCall facility and some understanding of
what it does
Be able to access the manual button
Be able to safely initiate the manual eCall, occasionally potentially while driving
(optionally to also interact on the speech channel see above)
In order to minimise superfluous calls, the system needs:
Protection from accidental triggering
Ability to cancel an accidental manual trigger
Speech channel interaction
If and when a speech channel is established to the vehicle, the drivers and
passengers needs are:
An appreciation that the speech line is open


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An appreciation that they can speak without the need to access buttons or
handsets
For the received speech to be of sufficient quality and loudness to be easily
understood
For the microphone and other equipment to perform sufficiently well to allow
their speech to be understood (even if whispered)
If outside of the vehicle, the drivers/passengers may face a dilemma as to whether to
re-enter the vehicle to respond to the speech channel. Please also see Section 3.13
with regard to requirements for the audio equipment.
1. Develop a simple checklist to confirm that basic HMI requirements have been
met.
2. Reference should be made to existing HMI guidelines, codes of practice and
recommendations concerning the design of in-vehicle information and
communication equipment.
3. With a longer-term perspective, more specific eCall HMI guidelines should be
developed based on research and experience with eCall in actual use
4. For the requirements identified related to speech channel interaction above,
minimum performance criteria should be developed.
5. Consideration should be given to a rating scheme for equipment to
demonstrate performance above the minimum level (this is a broader issue
than HMI, of course).


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3.16 Test equipment
When defining type-approval legislation, an important economic aspect to consider is
the extent of any additional test equipment that test houses need to purchase in order
to carry out the newly specified testing. Type-approval of the eCall IVS is different
from most existing regulations in that the system
connects to the outside world (i.e. has to demonstrate interoperability to
communicate on the mobile network and receive satellite positioning signals);
and
is supposed to act after a severe crash.
The necessary test equipment was considered in each step of this review. The
following is a concise overview of the main items of additional test equipment needed
to carry out the potential type-approval tests, as discussed. Please be advised that
this can only capture the main items already under consideration because this review
identified many aspects where no test procedures are available yet. In other aspects,
test procedures may have to be adapted from those already presented. Also the
necessary equipment may change due to decisions taken by the EC as to which of the
discussed aspects will be included in type-approval legislation at all. Finally, detailed
prices of equipment cannot be given before detailed draft legislation and a tight
specification of the required testing is available.
3.16.1 Standards conformance testing
The procedure for end to end conformance testing of eCall equipment to demonstrate
compliance to EN standards is defined in CEN/TS 16454. The tests are focussed on the
conformance of systems at the application level (behaviour, inputs, and outputs), i.e.
are not intended to test the physical equipment components. To perform testing of the
eCall IVS, a PSAP and an MNO test point are required to simulate their behaviour in a
test environment (some of the tests will be difficult to carry out in real mobile
networks, which makes either conducted testing, where the device is connected via
cables, or a simulated mobile network necessary).
Conducted testing
A number of companies now offer eCall test equipment as necessary for conducted
testing of an IVS. Essentially this consists of a base station simulator and software
designed to simulate a PSAP and allow user assessments of the system functionality.
The base station is able to generate and receive signals in a way that represents the
mobile network and provides a communication path to the IVS. It also provides the
interface with a computer on which the PSAP can be simulated and by which
conformance can be assessed.
The software solutions offered to test eCall devices tend to be proprietary, although
the GLONASS Union test PSAP system is also available for this purpose via Russian


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national navigation services provider. Hosted on a computer, the software will decode
the communications received from the IVS via the base station simulator to facilitate
logical user inputs, simulating the behaviour of a PSAP in order to evaluate
conformance. These functions are vital for conformance testing of eCall IVS. As such.
CEN/TS 16454 sets out some requirements of a PSAP which could form the basis of a
mechanism for Technical Services to certify the simulated system prior to assessing
the eCall IVS.
Simulated mobile network
As mentioned, integrated solutions appear to be available on the market for simulation
of a PSAP. As for conducted testing, it can be assumed that these devices should be
certified to be compliant with the PSAP related parts of CEN/TS 16454. However,
several additional aspects have to be considered when setting up a simulated mobile
network. With regard to prices of necessary electronic equipment, the information
received from different stakeholders varied substantially. Also, it is generally not
allowed to emit radio signals on the mobile network frequencies for companies other
than the licence holder. Over-the-air tests may therefore be required to be carried out
in a shielded room, the cost of which depends largely on the necessary size of the
space to be shielded. For the IVS end-to-end conformance tests, a small chamber
should be sufficient because the equipment is not tested installed in a whole vehicle.
The extent of equipment necessary to carry out compliance testing to ETSI mobile
phone equipment standards cannot currently be overseen by TRL. However, it is
expected that equipment designed for testing of standard mobile phones can be used.
3.16.2 Wireless link performance testing
Potential procedures for testing the wireless link performance of GNSS receiver and
MND are not clearly defined at the moment, which makes it impossible to provide
specific comments on the test equipment which is necessary. However, the main items
are likely to be the following: If simulated over-the-air tests were to be carried out for
GNSS receivers and/or MND, a GNSS signal simulator for different constellations (i.e.
Galileo, GPS, GLONASS), a mobile network simulator for different frequency ranges
and standards (2G and 3G), and RF interference signal generators will be necessary.
These tests would need to be performed in a shielded and (semi-) anechoic chamber
which would be necessary at every test house. If it is decided to test the systems
installed in a vehicle and from different directions, this chamber will be very large in
size and would need to include a turntable of sufficient capacity for whole vehicles,
making it a large investment for test houses entering this business area. If over-the-
air testing is performed using real signals, these facilities are not required.
3.16.3 Resistance testing
The general principle of resistance testing is to expose the IVS to certain mechanical
or climatic impacts and perform some subsequent operability testing.


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In order to create the exposure conditions, the following equipment is likely to be
required:
Mechanical impact during normal use, i.e. vibration and shock (if covered in
type-approval legislation): The main equipment needed will be a mechanical
test stand suitable for the creation of the required frequencies and
accelerations. Test equipment suitable for UN R116 tests is likely to be
sufficient for this purpose.
Mechanical impact during full-scale crash tests: The normal equipment to carry
out the required UN R94 or UN R95 full scale crash tests is likely to be
sufficient, because the eCall IVS will be tested in conjunction with the normal
crash test. However, as mentioned above, if a subset of conformance tests is
also required after the crash test, then consideration needs to be given to the
necessity to provide a simulated network, and/or a space shielded from
existing networks.
Mechanical impact during more severe decelerations (sled or drop rig test):
These deceleration tests are intended to be component tests for the IVS (not
whole-vehicle deceleration). A test sled or drop rig will be necessary that is
capable of creating deceleration of the required level (e.g. 75 g) for the
required duration (e.g. 5 ms). As an eCall IVS is a rather lightweight object, a
challenge might be to maintain such a high level of deceleration for an
extended period of time. However, technical experts in the field deemed it
possible even without highly advanced equipment.
Climatic impacts (if covered in type-approval legislation): A climate chamber
will be necessary that is capable of creating the required temperature (-40C to
+125C) and humidity conditions. Test equipment suitable for UN R116 tests is
likely to be sufficient for this purpose.
The intention of the subsequent operability tests is to demonstrate that the eCall IVS
is still capable of performing the core functions, i.e. successful transmission of the
MSD and successful voice call. While the exact practicalities of how these tests are still
to be defined, a potential solution might be to perform a test call via a normal mobile
network. This might either be:
A TS12 call to an actual PSAP flagged as a test call. The PSAP would need to be
prepared for receiving test calls and have appropriate mechanisms in place to
enable checking the MSD transmission and voice call capabilities. The tests
might, for example, be done by an automated voice transmission from the
PSAP via the voice connection to the IVS that the MSD was received
successfully. If the tester can hear this message, MSD and speaker tests were
successful. A voice message from the tester can be recorded via the IVS
microphone and played back to the tester to check the microphone.
A test eCall using a test number (long number) to a simulated PSAP. This can
either be an integrated PSAP simulator (as used for end-to-end conformance
testing according to CEN/TS 16454) or a perhaps a less formal software-based
solution. Whatever solution is used to simulate the PSAP, it should be certified


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to be compliant with the PSAP related parts of CEN/TS 16454 to ensure
interoperability.
The details of these tests need still be defined, but a reliable mobile network will most
likely be necessary to perform the test calls, which cannot always be expected to be
readily available in the test facilities. In particular, full-scale crash test labs might be
built in a way that reduces mobile network coverage considerably (strong walls,
underground, etc.). Additional antennae/repeaters provided by network providers at
the test facilities to increase the signal strength might be a possible solution, however
this solution might incur high costs. Another solution might be to move the IVS or
whole vehicle (after a full-scale crash test) to an area with network coverage after
exposure to the test conditions in order to perform the test call. Either of these
solutions may have call routing implications for MNOs or PSAPs which must be taken
into account before implementing such a requirement in legislation.
3.16.4 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) testing
EMC testing of the eCall IVS, if it is decided to use UN R10, is not different from other
devices for which this test is already carried out on a regular basis. It is not expected
that new equipment will be necessary. The same applies for the European R&TTE
Directive 1999/5/EC.
3.16.5 Audio equipment testing
Testing of the audio equipment quality (microphone and speakers) will require
equipment that is not expected to be available currently in all test houses offering
vehicle type-approvals. However, if the tests are defined based on the VDA
Specification for Car Hands-free Terminals, the test equipment required will be of a
kind that is already available in places offering testing according to this standard.
According to stakeholder input this standard is widely used in the automotive industry.
The main equipment necessary will be an artificial head with one or two artificial ears
(depending on the test standard selected for use) and an artificial mouth (Head and
Torso Simulator according to ITU-T P58), a four loudspeaker system with subwoofer,
and a measurement system. Some of the tests defined in the VDA specification have
to be carried out in anechoic conditions. Depending on the subset of tests selected for
type-approval, an anechoic chamber might therefore be necessary. The cost of this
chamber depends largely on the required size (component tests; not whole-vehicle
tests).


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3.17 Definitions of terms
For type-approval legislation, clear and unambiguous definitions of technical terms will
be required. The existing foundation of European legislative documents and EN
standards already provides a wide base of definitions which can be used in type-
approval legislation or should at a minimum be acknowledged to avoid conflicting
definitions. The following documents were identified in this review as containing
important definitions applicable to pan-European eCall:
EN 16072:2011 - Pan-European eCall operating requirements, 18/08/2011
Commission Recommendation 2011/750/EU on support for an EU-wide eCall
service in electronic communication networks for the transmission of in-vehicle
emergency calls based on 112 (eCalls), 08/09/2011
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 305/2013 supplementing Directive
2010/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the
harmonised provision for an interoperable EU-wide eCall, 26/11/2012
CEN/TS 16454:2013 - eCall end to end conformance testing, 12/06/2013
Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
final, 13/06/2013
amending Directive 2007/46/EC, P7_TA(2014)0154, 26/02/2014
Directive 2007/46/EC, 9879/14 ENT 123 MI 428 CODEC 1299, 19/05/2014


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3.18 Co-existence of third party and mandatory eCall systems
Private systems have been available for some time, offering features recognisable as
an accident emergency call system or eCall. It is the purpose of the European
regulation to increase the proliferation of eCall systems by mandating a minimum
functional level for all vehicles of categories M1 and N1. However, private or third
party systems may offer additional features and functionality that means there is
space for that service in addition to the mandatory 112 service. Care needs to be
taken in the regulatory text to ensure that by mandating the provision of the 112
eCall, additional services are not prohibited.
3.18.2 Expectations
Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the
final, dated 13/06/2013:
o Introductory point 8: The mandatory equipping of vehicles with the
or building on the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system. However, these
additional services should be designed not to increase driver
distraction.
o Recital 7b: The public interoperable Union-wide eCall service based on
the single European emergency call number 112 (emergency number
112) and private eCall services (third party service supported eCall
systems) can coexist provided that the measures necessary to ensure
continuity in the provision of the service to the consumer are adopted.
In order to ensure continuity of the public 112-based eCall service in all
Member States throughout the lifetime of the vehicle and guarantee
that the public 112-based eCall service is always automatically
available, all vehicles should be equipped with the public 112-based
eCall service, regardless of whether or not a vehicle buyer opts for a
private eCall service.


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o Recital 7c: Consumers should be provided with a realistic overview of
the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system and of the private eCall system, if
the vehicle is equipped with one, as well as comprehensive and reliable
information regarding any additional functionalities or services linked to
the private emergency service, in-vehicle emergency or assistance-call
applications on offer, and regarding the level of service to be expected
with the purchase of third party services and the associated cost. The
112-based eCall is a public service of general interest and should
therefore be accessible free of charge to all consumers.
or building on the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system. However, any
additional services should be designed not to increase driver distraction
or affect the functioning of the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system and
the efficient work of emergency call centres. The 112-based eCall
in-vehicle system and the system providing private or added-value
services should be designed in such a way that no exchange of personal
data between them is possible. Where provided, those services should
comply with the applicable safety, security and data protection
legislation and should always remain optional for consumers.
Similar requirements are set out in the General Approach of the Council with regard to
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
concerning type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall in-vehicle
system and amending Directive 2007/46/EC, 9879/14 ENT 123 MI 428 CODEC 1299,
dated 19/05/2014:
o Introductory point 8: The mandatory equipping of vehicles with the
or building on the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system. However, these
additional services should be designed not to increase driver
distraction.
o Article 5, Point 2a: Paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the right of the
vehicle owner to use a TPS eCall in-vehicle system providing a similar
service, in addition to the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system, provided
that all the following conditions are met:
(a) the TPS eCall in-vehicle system shall comply with the
standard EN 16102:2011 Intelligent transport systems eCall
Operating requirements for third party support';


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(b) manufacturers shall ensure that there is only one system
active at a time and that the 112-based eCall in-vehicle system
is triggered automatically in the event that the TPS eCall
in-vehicle call system does not function;
(c) manufacturers shall include in the owners manual that the
owner may at any time choose to use the 112-based eCall in-
vehicle system instead of a TPS in-vehicle system.
Opinion of the EDPS on the proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council concerning type-approval requirements for the
deployment of the eCall system and amending Directive 2007/46/EC:
o Point 21: The development, by car manufacturers, of private eCall
systems and added value services is not only a prospective. Already in
its 'eCall: Time for Deployment' communication, the Commission itself
insisted on eCall being an 'opportunity to deploy added-value services'
and noted that 'proprietary in-vehicle emergency call services are
offered in Europe and worldwide by different automobile branches and
service providers (e.g., Volvo OnCall, GM OnStar, PSA, Fiat, BMW). They
are typically bundled with other services, such as breakdown assistance,
onboard mobile telephony, dynamic navigation, etc.''. The right of all
or building on the (public) 112-based eCall in-vehicle system' is indeed
envisaged in Recital 8 of the Proposal.
3.18.3 Commentary
Whilst co-existence of TPS and 112 services is already stated in the regulatory
proposals, the addition of Point 2a of Article 5 of the General Approach of the Council
was a significant change to the proposed European legislation. It extends the general
requirement to allow co-existence of TPS and 112-based systems to also include some
functional requirements:
a) Firstly, the reference to the appropriate CEN standard for TPS. It was generally
expected in the development of the eCall regulation that where reasonable, EN
standards would be cited and this seems a relevant implementation of that
expectation.
b) That only one eCall system is operational at any one point. This is a formal
requirement which could be assessed as part of the type-approval. The logistics
of such an assessment may be, however, difficult to arrange. If it is assumed
that the TPS in-vehicle system operates via a SIM registered to a particular
network, it could be possible to assess the function of the IVS if that network is
not available. In this case, 112 (TS12) call routing, the emergency 112 call


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should be possible as long as any other network is available instead. It may be
possible to test this with the IVS. However, the complications of simulating and
blocking particular networks could be awkward to arrange in practice. Also, the
simple assumptions used in generating this option for an assessment method
may not be correct for all instances of TPS. Hence, there is a need to develop
an assessment method for the switching from the TPS to 112-based service in
simulated circumstances where the TPS might not function.
c) The requirement that the user is given the choice to use either the mandatory
112-based service or a TPS has a further implication that this can be switched
upon the outcome of that choice. That is, if the user decides one day that they
no longer wish to use the TPS, that the system can be switched to revert to the
112-based system. The method of switching is not specified. It is presumed
that this could range from a physical switch in the vehicle to a software switch
operated by a trained vehicle service engineer. Perhaps the mechanism does
not need to be specified in the regulation on the basis that a reasonable
approach is taken by the vehicle manufacturers in providing the option to the
user.
Compliance of TPS with EN 16102:2011 Intelligent transport systems eCall
Operating requirements for third party support' is a requirement to be adopted.
Evidence of compliance should be expected at type-approval.
It would be useful to be able to assess what happens if a TPS does not function during
a crash event. Some aspects of this could be demonstrated during the full-scale crash
test assessments and these might be sufficient to ensure a minimum function is
guaranteed in this respect.
For this purpose it could be advisable that where a TPS exists, the IVS should be set
to operate via the TPS during the crash test event. If the vehicle triggers and attempts
to send the MSD via 112 (or a specified alternative test number) then one could
assume that it has correctly switched to the 112-based service.
The provision of some mechanism for switching from the TPS to the 112-based service
should be assessed during type-approval.


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3.19 Nomadic eCall devices
With the development of the eCall IVS concept, there has been some discussion as to
whether a portable phone (nomadic free to be removed from the vehicle) can be
used to provide the service. The concern with a portable phone is that if it gets lost,
retained by an owner, becomes obsolete or damaged, then the eCall service would not
be available. Equally, if any phone could be used as a substitute there is still the
requirement that the driver remembers and succeeds in connecting their personal
phone to the vehicle communication network for each trip in order to enable the eCall
service.
The European Parliaments legislative resolution, dated 26/02/2014, proposed an
amendment to Article 4 of the Commissions proposal, dated 13/06/2013, which would
explicitly require an embedded eCall IVS. The justification given in the Draft Report, of
the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, dated 16/10/2013,
was that,
although the provision of the eCall functionality could be achieved to a
certain extent through the use of nomadic solutions (such as mobile
phones), mandatory introduction for new type approved vehicles should
be based on embedded in-vehicle equipment as these nomadic devices
can be removed or be just forgotten to activate.
Article 4 of the Councils general approach, dated 19/05/2014, does not contain such a
requirement for an embedded system. Instead, it is only required that,
Only those eCall in-vehicle systems which can be tested shall be
accepted for the purposes of EC type-approval.
At the UN level, the issue of long life-cycle of cars and uncertainty about future
life-cycles of mobile network technology was discussed but not resolved.


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3.20 Additional aspects
Within the Russian technical standard GOST R 54620, the following additional aspects
are covered:
Frequency selectivity of receivers
Reliability
Safety and environmental friendliness
Modes of the operational equipment, e.g. test, passive, off, emergency call
Currently these aspects seem to be out of the scope of European type-approval
legislation as commonly applied.


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4 Summary
The sections above provide a of list technical aspects that were identified in this study
as needing consideration for successful implementation of a type-approval regulation
on eCall IVS. They have been populated via a detailed review of the available
information on potential type-approval requirements and testing options.
In preparing text for a regulation there is a process that needs to be undertaken to
develop a concept into a specific technical requirement. A simple (non-exhaustive)
example of the steps needed to be taken throughout this process is described in the
following bullet points:
Statement of the aspect to be regulated
Research and development to establish a test protocol. This should:
o Be able to discriminate performance levels
o Be practicable in the regulatory framework of vehicle type-approval
o Involve stakeholder input to validate the appropriateness of the
technique
o Offer potential techniques and requirements that could be specified in
legislative language
Decision to determine the need for and stringency of the testing and
requirements
Scripting of the tests and requirements in a type-approval pass-fail manner
Some evaluation that the assessment is reasonable, robust, repeatable and
reproducible, etc.
As a result of this review and considering this process it seems that the suitability, or
development, of ideas for each aspect of eCall type-approval testing falls into one of
three broad categories:
1. There is general consensus on requirements and methods of testing and it is
expected that regulatory text could be drafted by combining, amending or
expanding primary sources. The aspects in this category require the least
amount of effort in order to derive draft text and be taken forward as a
type-approval requirement. However, it should be noted that even in these
cases the process of writing the precise text and then evaluating its
implications for new models of vehicles would still be necessary.
2. Whilst positive options exist for requirements and methods of testing, there are
differing views on the necessity of regulatory requirements and the approach to
be taken and hence a decision needs to be taken by the EC before progress can
be made in specifying requirements. It might be that following this decision,
one of the options considered quickly progresses to the first category, where
only a drafting exercise and some evaluation remains to provide a precise


May 2014 116

requirement. However, it may also be that following the decision, it is realised
that none of the existing options suit the expectations, in which case the
aspects in this category could still require some further research before being
ready for implementation in a regulation.
3. No method of assessing this aspect of an eCall IVS is at a stage which could be
considered reasonably for regulation. Assuming that they are a critical part of
the anticipated regulation, the items in this category are a priority for further
research work.
To conclude this research, the key aspects and testing issues are assigned to one of
these three categories. It is hoped that this serves to illustrate where general
implementation options are available, where decisions need to be taken to progress
further and where further research is necessary.
4.1 Aspects where a clear recommendation is available
The scope of the future regulation appears to be generally agreed. The latest
document, the Councils general approach, sets out that it shall apply to vehicles of
categories M1 (vehicle designed for carriage of passengers, comprising not more than
8 passenger seats) and N1 (vehicle designed for carriage of goods with a maximum
mass not exceeding 3.5 tonnes), as defined in points 1.1.1. and 1.2.1. of Part A of
Annex II to Directive 2007/46/EC, and to systems and components type-approved as
separate technical units designed and constructed for such vehicles.
vehicles produced in small series;
vehicles undergoing individual vehicle approval; and
vehicles which cannot for technical reasons be equipped with an appropriate
eCall triggering mechanism.
Common protocols and standards have been developed by CEN for a pan-European
eCall service. In order to ensure interoperability of all actors in the eCall chain
(vehicle/IVS, MNO, PSAP, TPSP) the IVS shall comply with the EN eCall standards EN
16062 and EN 16072, which shall be demonstrated by conformance testing according
to CEN/TS 16454. The IVS shall also comply with the relevant ETSI standards to
ensure interoperability with mobile phone networks and allow successful registration
on the network and a connection to be established. The MSD data format is required
to comply with EN 15722 to ensure interoperability with the PSAP.
With regard to data protection and privacy, it is expected that advice from the
European Data Protection Supervisor will be taken into account when drafting the final
regulatory text. Some items of the MSD appear to be disputed still, e.g. transmission
of the VIN. The maximum content of the MSD must therefore finally be agreed in
order to limit data protection concerns.


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There is broad agreement that no additional full-scale crash tests are to be mandated
to assess aspects of the eCall IVS. The existing full-scale crash tests defined in UN
Regulations 94 and 95 for subsets of the M1 and N1 vehicle categories can be used for
assessing the automatic eCall function: All vehicles undergoing at least one of these
full-scale crash tests are expected to demonstrate proof that the automatic system
functions correctly under those conditions. It is expected that the operational status of
the eCall system would be determined by the ability to show automatic triggering had
occurred, that a test call can be established and that the MSD can be transmitted.
Exact procedures for these assessments still need to created and are not readily
available.
The full audio capabilities of the eCall IVS can be assessed via a minimum set of
objective measurements carried out in a car in normal working order. With regard to
audio quality, a simple simulation of post-crash conditions by lowering the side
windows of the vehicle and only using those parts of the audio system which were
crash hardened by the manufacturer and remained operable during the full-scale crash
tests is considered sufficient. Appropriate levels for some of the requirements, taking
into account post-crash conditions of vehicle and occupants (e.g. impaired hearing),
need to be defined.
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) will be covered by reference to UN Regulation 10
for the IVS to be tested as an individual system (separately from the vehicle). The
R&TTE Directive 1999/5/EC to avoid RF interference applies to the transmitting part of
the eCall IVS (NAD).
Installation and connection requirements can be managed by other specifications
based on performance (for example crash resistance and antenna performance)
without setting design restrictive provisions, for example regarding the installation
location of IVS or antennas.
4.2 Aspects where a decision is pending
It seems that the scope of the regulation has been decided. However, based on the
discussions taking place regarding the UN Regulation, the testing strategy to assess
the eCall system requirements, in the type-approval setting, remains undecided.
While the details of the accident conditions under which automatic triggering should
occur are not yet agreed, it seems reasonable to expect that no specific triggering
algorithm will be prescribed to manufacturers. This is unlikely to improve triggering
results, beyond those which are available currently, and would undermine design
freedom. However, based on the analysis of UK in-depth accident data TRL came to
the conclusion that a large proportion of casualties might not benefit from automatic
eCalls if triggering was limited to conditions similar to UN R94 and UN R95 crash tests
(including more severe accidents). TRL therefore suggests that an eCall is required to
be triggered at least in accidents where an airbag is deployed, which demonstrated
much more promising figures with regard to the number of killed and seriously injured


May 2014 118

casualties that might benefit from the system. The algorithm to decide when to trigger
an airbag would be, of course, still left to the vehicle manufacturer. Also, this shall not
prevent automatic eCalls in cases where no airbag is deployed although the crash is of
high severity (e.g. rear impacts).
While it seems apparent that UN R94 and UN R95 full-scale crash tests will be used for
testing the triggering, the exact requirements to be checked after a crash test need to
be agreed. Also, the procedures for the assessment of the subsequent MSD
transmission, the voice call and the limited audio assessment procedure are not yet
defined anywhere. A solution needs to be defined for demonstrating satisfactory
triggering for the group of vehicles fitted with automatic eCall, but not yet undergoing
UN R94 or UN R95 full-scale testing. This might potentially be done by documentation
demonstrating a link between airbag and eCall triggering.
With regard to testing the crash resistance of the IVS, the general outline of the
testing was presented by TRL to the UN Informal Working Group AECS and appeared
to be agreeable to different stakeholders at the UN level:
Test of the crash resistance of the IVS installed in the vehicle in the applicable
full-scale crash tests (as discussed above).
In addition, test of the crash resistance against higher decelerations on a
component level, e.g. using a test sled. The severity level for this test needs to
be agreed (TRL provided recommendations for an appropriate level). The
subset of components required to undergo this test and the exact procedures
for assessing whether the IVS remained fully operational still need to be
defined.
Another aspect, closely related to the crash resistance of the IVS, is whether or not
the eCall system shall be required to operate autonomously from the vehicles
electrical system. This needs to be decided by the EC, perhaps supported by further
research into the question of which proportion of casualties would be affected if eCalls
could not be completed in accidents where the vehicles electrical system is damaged.
This could be achieved by an in-depth review of the more severely damaged vehicles
following real world collisions. The aim would be to determine how many are likely to
have lost electrical power, for example as a result of gross deformation of pertinent
vehicle structures, or because of ejection or damage to the battery or other electrical
components as a result of the collision etc..
Further decisions are pending to determine:
Whether mechanical resistance requirements and tests for normal use
conditions are necessary in type-approval legislation.
Whether climatic resistance requirements and tests are necessary in European
type-approval legislation.


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Whether resistance requirements and tests against electric impacts are
necessary in type-approval legislation for eCall IVS.
Potential sources on which to base requirements in these areas would be available and
have been assessed in this study.
4.3 Aspects where development of a test concept is required
As mentioned in the preceding sections, procedures for demonstrating that the IVS
remained fully operational during a crash test and a high severity sled test need to be
defined. It seems likely that these should involve a test call to demonstrate that
automatic triggering had occurred (full-scale crash test only), that the MSD can be
transmitted and that a voice call can be established. A procedure needs to be designed
that allows these tests to be performed considering environmental conditions in
crash-test laboratories. If possible, it seems desirable for example, to avoid
burdensome investment for test houses in additional infrastructure such as a
dedicated mobile phone network. Also, the limited post-crash audio assessment
procedure is not defined anywhere yet.
In order to avoid automatic eCalls being triggered at very low accident severity levels,
TRL suggested defining and testing a low-severity boundary under which the
manufacturer shall not be allowed to trigger an eCall. This, however, appears complex
in practice as there are currently no mandatory low-severity full-scale crash tests that
could be used for the assessment. This problem still needs to be resolved, and also
discussed in the wider scope of the expected extent and consequences of superfluous
eCalls. Further evidence based research will be necessary to inform this discussion.
In order to define appropriate levels and test procedures for the compatibility and
performance of devices providing positioning and the mobile network link (positioning
system and MND receiver), further research is required to determine the appropriate
process for this. Different documents are available that might possibly be suitable to
be used as a basis for setting requirements, but these need to be assessed in detail by
technical experts in the field and would certainly need to be adapted before
specification for eCall systems. GSA might lead or provide assistance in defining a test
procedure for positioning systems.
A self-test carried out by the IVS on power up has the potential to reduce the burden
of other type-approval aspects, because it would bring potential malfunctions to the
users attention and thereby enable them to take appropriate action. However, this
depends on the extent and stringency of the self-test function. A minimum set of
aspects to be covered has not been decided. Further investigation of this potential
could be beneficial in off-setting some of the functional requirements expected to be
defined in the regulation.
There are currently no specific guidelines for the HMI design of eCall systems, which
should also be addressed in further research. The development of specific guidelines
at a later stage based on research and experience with eCall in actual use is


May 2014 120

considered beneficial. Further research into less comprehensive solutions, such as the
development of a checklist to confirm that basic HMI requirements have been met
might be sufficient for the interim.


May 2014 121

5 Conclusions
A comprehensive review was undertaken of all available relevant information which
could be used as a basis for delegated/implementing acts supporting the Commission's
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning
type-approval requirements for the deployment of the eCall in-vehicle system. This
review forms the basis of the study and included sources from
proposals for EU, UN and Russian legislation;
European, Russian and international technical standards;
deliverables from research groups; and
position documents and statements provided by stakeholders.
UN Regulations, European Regulations and Directives regarding some related topics
were also covered to form a complete picture of what is typical in the type-approval
setting. The results of the review are provided in the form of a concise table (Appendix
A), listing the relevant contents and providing comments on the status of the
documents and their relevance. The table can be used as a quick reference for the
future work on eCall type-approval legislation.
Based on a technical assessment of the material available and discussions with
technical experts in the area of eCall and stakeholders from various groups, many
distinct aspects of eCall were identified that need to be considered for a type-approval
regulation. These are reflected in the 20 technical sections reported.
From a detailed analysis of these aspects, some areas were identified where there is a
general consensus on requirements and test methods and it is expected that
regulatory text could be drafted by combining, amending or expanding primary
sources (see summary provided in Section 4). This process will need to be informed by
additional research in some cases. In other areas, differing views on the necessity of
regulatory requirements and the approach to be taken make a decision necessary
before progress can be made in specifying requirements. Finally, several aspects
which should be included in a regulation remain underdeveloped, i.e. no test methods
are currently available that could reasonably be considered for immediate use in a
type-approval regulation. These areas will require substantial work to define
appropriate requirements and test procedures and represent priorities for future
development, if they are to be included.
Areas where further work is recommended are:
The practicalities associated with demonstrating post-crash operations of the
eCall IVS within the environment of full-scale crash test facilities.
A mechanism to test and discourage superfluous eCall triggering in very low
severity collisions.


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The appropriate testing regime for assessing wireless link performance of the
vehicle regarding positional accuracy and mobile phone network
communication robustness.
The extent of self-test features of the IVS (and perhaps also periodic technical
inspections) to identify faults and hence reduce the need to regulate lifetime
performance at the type-approval stage.
Defining guidelines for the HMI design of eCall systems.
These areas should be considered as a priority.


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6 References
Due to the large number of information sources reviewed within this study (noting that
some are informal) and to avoid unnecessary duplication, an exhaustive reference list
is not provided here. However, all items are listed in Appendix A, Table A-1.


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7 Glossary of terms
AECD Accident Emergency Call Device. Definition from Draft UN Regulation
NO. XX:
AECD means a device that at least:
generates a communication toward emergency services if
a vehicle suffers a serious road accident and provides two-
way voice communication on existing mobile telephone
communication networks; and
has the ability to provide the vehicle location using signals
from global satellite navigation systems.
AECS UN Informal Working Group on Accident Emergency Call Systems
within GRSG; or Accident Emergency Call System
CEN European Committee for Standardization
EC European Commission
eCall Definition from the Councils general approach, dated 19/05/2014:
eCall means an in-vehicle emergency call to 112, made
either automatically by means of the activation of in-vehicle
sensors or manually, which carries a minimum set of data and
establishes an audio channel between the vehicle and the
eCall PSAP via public mobile wireless communications
networks
EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
FIA Fdration Internationale de l'Automobile
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System. Umbrella term for different
satellite-based positioning systems, e.g. Galileo, GPS, GLONASS or
COMPASS.
GRSG UN Working Party on General Safety Provisions
GSA European GNSS Agency
HMI Human Machine Interface
ITS Intelligent Transport System


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IVS eCall In-Vehicle System. Definition from the Councils general
approach, dated 19/05/2014:
e-Call in-vehicle system means a system activated either
automatically via in-vehicle sensors or manually, which
carries, by means of public mobile wireless communications
networks, a minimum set of data and establishes a 112-based
audio channel between the occupants of the vehicle and an
eCall PSAP
IWG Informal Working Group, organised within a Working Party, organised
within the United Nations
KPI Key Performance Indicator
MND Term used in Russian documents for the Minimum Set of Data (MSD)
MSD Minimum Set of Data. The data set to be transferred from a vehicle to
a PSAP in the event of a crash or emergency via an 'eCall'
communication session.
NAD Network Access Device. Device providing access (transmission and
reception, etc.) to mobile phone networks.
PLMN Public Land Mobile Network. Umbrella term for mobile phone
networks of different specification, e.g. GSM, 3G/UMTS, 4G/LTE
PSAP Public Safety Answering Point. Definition from the Councils general
approach, dated 19/05/2014:
public safety answering point (PSAP) means a physical
location where emergency calls are first received under the
responsibility of a public authority or a private organisation
recognised by the Member State
PTI Periodic Technical Inspection
PTW Powered Two Wheeler
RESS Rechargeable Energy Storage System
RF Radio Frequency
SBAS Satellite-Based Augmentation System
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SUT System Under Test
TA Type-Approval
TIM Traffic Incident Management
TPS Third Party Service


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UN United Nations
WWAN Wireless Wide Area Network (includes public land mobile networks)


May 2014 127

Appendix A
Table A-1: Overview of content and status of documents relevant for eCall IVS (grey background: not reviewed)
Document Date Content: Requirements Content: Testing Status
European legislation
2013/0165(COD), 316 final
- Proposal for a regulation
of the European parliament
and of the council
concerning type-approval
requirements for the
deployment of the eCall in-
vehicle system and
amending Directive
2007/46/EC
13/06/2013 Scope: Vehicles of categories M1 and
N1 (Article 2)
Triggering: Automatic triggering in
the event of a severe accident;
possibility of manual triggering
(Article 5.2)
GNSS receivers capable of (at least)
Galileo/EGNOS (Article 5.3)
EMC: IVS compliance with UN R10
and Directive 1999/5/EC (Article 5.5)
Privacy and data protection rules
(Article 6)
MSD shall include only the minimum
information required for appropriate
handling of emergency calls (Article
6.2)
none European Commission proposal
Applies to M1 and N1
Future delegated acts by the EC
shall be based on, where
applicable:
o Requirements in this
Regulation
o EN 16072
o EN 16062
o EN 16454
o Any additional European
standards relating to eCall
o UN Regulations relating to
eCall
o Note: EN 15722 (on MSD) not
explicitly mentioned
Other content:


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o Definitions of eCall in-vehicle
system and in-vehicle system
Opinion of the EDPS on the
proposal for a Regulation of
the European Parliament
and of the Council
deployment of the eCall
system and amending
Directive 2007/46/EC
29/10/2013 Recommendation on data protection
and privacy:
o Insert explicit reference to
applicable EU data protection law
o Develop concrete data protection
safeguards applying to 112 eCall
rather than in delegated acts
o Article 6(3) should be
complemented to ensure that the
information it refers
o Specify categories of the processed
data
o Specify retention period of the
processed data
o Guarantee security of the
processed data
none Final
Opinion of the European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS) on
the Commission proposal, dated
13/06/2013
2013/0165(COD), Opinion
of the European Parliament
committee on Civil Liberties,
Justice and Home affairs for
the Committee on the
Internal Market and
31/01/2014 MSD: The minimum set of data sent
by the eCall in-vehicle system shall as
a maximum consist of the information
required by the standard EN 15722
namely:
none The MSD according to EN 15722
includes the Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN); the VIN is,
however, not listed in this
document; instead the class of
vehicle shall be transmitted.


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Consumer Protection - on
the proposal for a regulation
of the European Parliament
and of the Council
vehicle system and
amending Directive
2007/46/EC
o manual or automatic activation
o class of vehicle
o type of fuel used
o timestamp
o exact position
o direction of drive
o minimum number of seatbelts
fastened.
No additional data may be sent by the
eCall IVS.
The MSD according to EN 15722
includes two recent vehicle
locations; these are, however,
not listed in this document.
Additional data is not permitted.
European Parliament
legislative resolution of 26
February 2014 on the
proposal for a regulation of
and of the Council
vehicle system and
amending Directive
2007/46/EC,
P7_TA(2014)0154
26/02/2014 Scope: Vehicles of categories M1 and
N1, except small series vehicles
(Article 2)
Embedded eCall IVS, i.e. no nomadic
devices (Article 4)
Automatic triggering in the event of
a severe accident, detected by
activation of one or more sensors
and/or processors within the vehicle
(Article 5.2.1)
TPS allowed; pan-European eCall
must be present as backup (Article
none Adopted legislative resolution of
The table highlights only the
differences in comparison with
the Commission proposal from
13/06/2013
Amended definition of eCall in-
vehicle system, deleted definition
of in-vehicle system
New definitions of eCall, public
safety answering point,
minimum set of data, in-vehicle
equipment and public mobile


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5.2a)
HMI: Warning to occupants, if a
critical system failure is detected
during the self-test (Article 5.5a)
MSD: According to EN 15722 (Article
5.7.ca)
Changes to privacy and data
protection rules (Article 6)
wireless communications
network
General Approach of the
Council with regard to the
Proposal for a Regulation of
and of the Council
vehicle system and
amending Directive
2007/46/EC, 9879/14 ENT
123 MI 428 CODEC 1299
19/05/2014 Scope (Article 2): Vehicles of
categories M1 and N1 (and systems
and components); except
o vehicles produced in small series;
o vehicles undergoing individual
vehicle approval; and
o vehicles which cannot for technical
reasons be equipped with an
appropriate eCall triggering
mechanism
TPS allowed; pan-European eCall
must be present as backup (Article
5.2a)
EMC: No EMC requirements (Article
5.5 deleted)
none Adopted General Approach of the
Council of the European Union
The table highlights only the
differences in comparison with
the Commission proposal from
13/06/2013


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HMI: Warning to occupants, if a
critical system failure is detected
during the self-test (Article 5.5a)
MSD: According to EN 15722 (Article
5.7.ca)
Changes to privacy and data
protection rules (Article 6)
Commission
Recommendation
2011/750/EU on support for
an EU-wide eCall service in
electronic communication
networks for the
transmission of in-vehicle
emergency calls based on
112 (eCalls)
08/09/2011 none none Final
Includes definitions of:
emergency service, public
safety answering point, eCall,
emergency service category
value, eCall discriminator, eCall
flag, minimum set of data,
mobile telecommunication
network operator and mobile
network operator
Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) No
305/2013 supplementing
Directive 2010/40/EU of the
European Parliament and of
the Council with regard to
the harmonised provision
for an interoperable EU-
Establishes the specifications for
the upgrading of the PSAP
infrastructure
Includes definitions of:
emergency service, public
safety answering point, most


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wide eCall appropriate PSAP, eCall PSAP,
eCall PSAP operator, service
partner, in-vehicle equipment,
eCall, eCall transaction,
minimum set of data, Vehicle
Identification Number (VIN),
mobile wireless communications
network, public mobile wireless
communications network,
emergency control centre and
raw MSD
Directive, 2007/46/EC of
the European parliament
and of the Council
establishing a framework
for the approval of motor
vehicles and their trailers,
and of systems,
components and separate
technical units intended for
such vehicles
Framework Directive, i.e.
references to other
directives/regulations relevant for
type-approval (TA)
This revision of the Framework
Directive does not contain
references to eCall legislation
(not set out yet)
All documents relevant for eCall
IVS TA which are referenced in
the Framework Directive are
included in this overview table
Directive 2004/104/EC 14/10/2004 EMC requirements for vehicles: Test methods for vehicles: Final


May 2014 133

adapting to technical
progress Council Directive
72/245/EEC relating to the
radio interference
(electromagnetic
compatibility, EMC) of
vehicles and amending
Directive 70/156/EEC on
the approximation of the
laws of the Member States
relating to the type-
approval of motor vehicles
and their trailers
Broadband electromagnetic
radiation (Section 6.2)
Narrowband electromagnetic
Immunity to electromagnetic
EMC requirements for separate units:
Broadband electromagnetic
interference (Section 6.5)
Narrowband electromagnetic
interference (Section 6.6)
Immunity to electromagnetic
Immunity to transient
disturbances conducted along
supply lines (Section 6.8)
Emission of conducted
disturbances (Section 6.9)

Broadband
electromagnetic
radiation (Annex IV)
Narrowband
electromagnetic
radiation (Annex V)
Immunity to
electromagnetic
radiation (Annex VI)
Test methods for separate
units:
Broadband
electromagnetic
interference (Annex VII)
Narrowband
electromagnetic
interference (Annex VIII)
Immunity to
electromagnetic
radiation (Annex IX)
Immunity to transient
disturbances conducted
along supply lines and
emission of conducted
Motor vehicle EMC directive for
TA
Applies to vehicles, components
and separate technical units
EN 16102 requires conformity of
TPS-IVS with this directive
Contains requirements regarding
radiated emissions and immunity
to radiated emissions (for
vehicles and separate units); and
requirements regarding
conducted emissions or immunity
to conducted emissions (for
separate units only)
Separate units which do not have
immunity-related functions are
exempt from Section 6.7.
(Section 8.3) However, eCall IVSs
are related to occupant protection
and could therefore be assumed
to be classed as immunity-
related (Section 2.1.12)
TA test for electrostatic discharge
is not considered necessary by
this directive, because the vehicle


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disturbances (Annex X) is an isolated system (rubber
tyres) except for the moment of
occupant entry/exit (when the
vehicle is stationary).
Directive 2004/108/EC of
and of the Council, on the
approximation of the Laws
of Member States relating
to electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC
Directive)
15/12/2004 Ensure that any electric or electronic
device will create no more than a
limited amount of RF interference so
that other apparatus are not affected
in their correct functioning, with an
emphasis on radio communication
(spectrum protection) (Annex 1)
Ensure that an electric or electronic
device will withstand a certain
amount of Electro Magnetic fields
while operating as intended within
specifications (Annex 1)
Application of good engineering
practice for fixed installations (Annex
1)
none eCall NAD is a transmitting device
and has to conform to this
directive in order to limit RF
interference to not affect other
apparatus
Conformity of IVS and TPS-IVS
with this directive is required by
EN 16072 and EN 16102,
respectively, however automotive
components are generally
excluded from this directive but
instead regulated under Directive
2004/104/EC
Directive, 2010/40/EU on
the framework for the
deployment of Intelligent
Transport Systems in the
field of road transport and
for interfaces with other
modes of transport (ITS
No relevant technical information
that is not also contained in more
recent document


May 2014 135

Implementation Directive)
Decision no 768/2008/EC of
and of the Council on a
common framework for the
marketing of products, and
repealing Council Decision
93/465/EEC
09/07/2008 none none Regulations for self-certification
of equipment, referenced by EN
16072
Directive 1999/5/EC of the
European Parliament And of
the Council on radio
equipment and
telecommunications
terminal equipment and the
mutual recognition of their
conformity (R&TTE
Directive)
09/03/1999 EMC: General requirements
automatically applying to eCall IVS
NADs as they are transmitting
devices, e.g. to avoid harmful
interference
none Conformity of IVS and TPS-IVS
with this directive is required by
EN 16072 and EN 16102,
respectively
eCall NAD is a transmitting device
and has to conform to this
directive, in order to limit RF
interference to not affect other
apparatus
Council Directive 93/68/EEC
amending Directives (...)
and 73/23/EEC, electrical
equipment designed for use
within certain voltage limits
(Low Voltage Directive)
22/07/1993 Repealed and superseded by
Directive 2006/95/EC of the
European Parliament and of
12/12/2006 Electric safety: General requirements
on protection against hazards arising
none Final
Applies to electrical equipment


May 2014 136

the Council of 12 December
2006 on the harmonisation
of the laws of Member
States relating to Electrical
Equipment designed for use
(low voltage)
from the electrical equipment and
hazards which may be caused by
external influences on the electrical
equipment
with a voltage rating of between
50 and 1000 V for alternating
current and between 75 and 1500
V for direct current
Although ETSI TR 102937 states
that the NAD would most likely
come under jurisdiction of this
directive (without providing
further details), in TRLs view this
will not apply to 12V eCall IVS
(below voltage limit).
Council Directive
89/336/EEC on the
approximation of the laws
of the Member States
relating to electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC)
Council Directive 73/23/EEC
on the harmonisation of the
laws of Member States
relating to Electrical
Equipment designed for use
(Low Voltage Directive)
COM(2008) 886 final,
Communication from the


May 2014 137

Commission, Action Plan for
the Deployment of
Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS) in Europe
Communication document from
2008; no relevant technical
information that is not also
contained in more recent
document
COM(2009) 434 final,
Communication from the
Commission () eCall: Time
for Deployment
Communication document from
2009; no relevant technical
information that is not also
contained in more recent
document
UN legislation
Draft UN Regulation No. XX
on AECD/AECS, Part I on
AECD (and related
annexes), document
number: AECS 03-04e
26/02/2014 EMC, references to UN Regulation No.
10 (Section 6.1)
Communication on mobile networks,
references to EN 301 489-1 V1.8.1
(2008-04), EN 301 489-7 V1.3.1
(2005-11) and EN 301 489-24 V1.4.1
(2007-09) (Section 6.1.3.7) and
definition of supported mobile
network standards (Section 6.6, TBD
for Europe)
Climate resistance requirements
based on UN Regulation No. 116,
EMC, references to UN R10,
ISO 7637-2:2004 (test
pulses), and ISO/TR 10605-
1993 or EN 61000-4-2
(electrostatic discharge)
(Section 6.1 and Annex 12)
Climate resistance (Annex 6)
Resistance to mechanical
impacts (Annex 7), remaining
operational after frontal
impact, sled acceleration test
using test pulse from UN
Regulation No. 17, Annex 9
Early draft stage. Certain
cornerstones are already decided:
o Document structure in three
parts (device, installation of
the device, vehicle with regard
to the device)
o If fitted regulation
o Scope limited to M1/N1
vehicles (might be extended in
a second step)
o Calculation of the automatic
triggering signal will not form


May 2014 138

Section 6.4. (Section 6.2)
Resistance to mechanical impact,
vibration conditions (Section 6.3.1)
and shock conditions (Section 6.3.2),
remaining operational after frontal
impact (Section 6.4)
GNSS, including requirement to
support at least two GNSS and
performance requirements for
accuracy, times and sensitivity
(Section 6.5)
Emergency call procedure, including
requirement for non-removable SIM,
full duplex hands-free voice
connection, maximum durations,
mechanisms of data transmission,
error handling, and automatic
reception of incoming calls (Section
6.6)
Self-test (Section 6.7)
If fitted requirement for backup
battery life (Section 6.9)
MSD (Annex 6 - Appendix A),
reproduction of EN 15722
Data exchange protocol between
(Section 6.4, Annex 8)
GNSS (Annex 9)
Functional diagnostic testing
for AECD and AECS, including
compliance assessment for
function requirements and
compliance assessment for
data sending protocol
requirements. The tests are
carried out on at least three
AECD and AECS (Annex 11)
part of the UN Regulation.
o Use of MSD as defined in EN
15722:2011, perhaps exclude
VIN
o Non-user-removable SIM card
or SIM-IC
Discussions at 4
th
UN AECS
meeting showed that some major
items are not yet agreed,
including:
o Which vehicles shall be
required to trigger
automatically?
o Under which conditions shall
automatic triggering occur?
o Which requirements and tests
shall be set out for crash
resistance?
o Shall climatic and mechanical
resistance requirements be
included?
o Shall GNSS be required as
technology for positioning?
Shall support of more than one


May 2014 139

AECD and devices of the emergency
response services infrastructure
(Annex 10)
GNSS constellation be
required?
The issue of long life-cycle of cars
and uncertainty about future life-
cycles of mobile network
technology were discussed but
not resolved. EC and Russia
opposed the inclusion of nomadic
devices in the regulation.
The call back duration
requirement (battery life) is
currently in form of if battery
fitted
The draft contains references to
some well-established regulations
and standards.
on AECD/AECS, Part II on
installation of AECD in
vehicles (and related
annexes), document
number: AECS 03-04e
26/02/2014 Minimum equipment of vehicle, sound
levels, and installation and electrical
connection of AECD and antennas
(Section 15.1.)
Installation requirements (Section
15.1.2.)
Audio requirements (Section 15.1.4.)
Antenna installation requirements
Automatic triggering, including
requirement to trigger in
frontal and side impact tests
according to UN Regulation No.
94 and UN Regulation No. 95,
respectively, or signals
simulated accordingly (Section
15.2)
See section on part I above


May 2014 140

(Section 15.1.3.)
Emergency call button and warning
signal, including reference to UN
Regulation No. 121 (Sections 15.1.5
and 15.1.6)
on AECD/AECS, Part III on
AECS in vehicles (and
related annexes), document
number: AECS 03-04e
26/02/2014 Connection of AECS antennas
(Section 24.1.2)
Audio head unit (Section 24.1.3.3)
Emergency call button and warning
signal, including reference to UN
Regulation No. 121 (Sections
24.1.3.1, 24.1.4, 24.1.5.)
Automatic triggering, including the
requirement that a triggering signal
shall be generated at least by one of
the two events: UN Regulation No. 94
or UN Regulation No. 95 collision
(Section 24.2.2)
Test equipment, including the
provision that either a
representative vehicle or a
hardware-in-the-loop
environment can be used
(Section 24.3.1.1)
Transmission of MSD (Section
24.3.1.2)
Generation of triggering signal
in physical or simulated UN
Regulation No. 94 or UN
Regulation No. 95 collision, or
alternatively presenting a
certificate of compliance
(Section 24.3.2)
See section on part I above
UN Regulation No. 10 -
Electromagnetic
compatibility
28/10/2011 Requirements regarding the immunity
to radiated and conducted
disturbances for functions related to
direct control of the vehicle, related to
driver, passenger and other road
Test methods for vehicles:
o Method of measurement of
radiated broadband
electromagnetic emissions
from vehicles (Annex 4)
Final
Referenced in Framework
Directive
Applies to vehicles of categories
L, M, N, O and to components


May 2014 141

users' protection, related to
disturbances, which would cause
confusion to the driver or other road
users, related to vehicle data bus
functionality, related to disturbances,
which would affect vehicle statutory
data;
Requirements regarding the control of
unwanted radiated and conducted
emissions to protect the intended use
of electrical or electronic equipment
at own or adjacent vehicles or
nearby, and the control of
disturbances from accessories that
may be retrofitted to the vehicle.
Additional requirements for vehicles
providing coupling systems for
charging the rechargeable energy
storage system regarding the control
of emissions and immunity from this
connection between vehicle and
power grid.
radiated narrowband
from vehicles (Annex 5)
o Method of testing for
immunity of vehicles to
electromagnetic radiation
(Annex 6)
Additional test methods for
vehicles in RESS charging
mode coupled to the power
grid:
o Method(s) of testing for
emission of harmonics
generated on AC power
lines from vehicle (Annex
11)
emission of voltage
changes, voltage
fluctuations and flicker on
AC power lines from vehicle
(Annex 12)
emission of radiofrequency
and separate technical units
intended to be fitted in these
vehicles, i.e. also retrofit IVS are
in scope


May 2014 142

conducted disturbances on
AC or DC power lines from
vehicle (Annex 13)
emission of radiofrequency
conducted disturbances on
network and
telecommunication access
from vehicle (Annex 14)
o Method of testing for
electrical fast transient /
burst disturbances
conducted along AC and DC
power lines (Annex 15)
surges conducted along AC
and DC power lines (Annex
16)
Test methods for
electrical/electronic sub-
assemblies:
radiated broadband


May 2014 143

from electrical/electronic
sub-assemblies (Annex 7)
radiated narrowband
from electrical/electronic
sub-assemblies (Annex 8)
immunity of
assemblies to
electromagnetic radiation
(Annex 9)
immunity to and emission of
transients of
assemblies (Annex 10)
Protection of the driver
against the steering
mechanism in the event of
impact
10/10/2012 none Frontal crash test: 48.3 km/h
into concrete barrier covered
with plywood (Annex 3)
Body block test: Impactor
shaped like upper body striking
the steering wheel at 24.1
Final
Applies to all M1 vehicles, and
lightweight N1 vehicles (<1,500
kg)
Frontal crash test testing can be
omitted if the vehicle has


May 2014 144

km/h (Annex 4)
Head form test: Hemispherical
6.8 kg impactor striking a the
steering wheel at 24.1 km/h
(Annex 5)
undergone successful UN R94
testing (Section 5.1.2.)
Airbags are normally not installed
in the frontal crash test (intended
to determine steering wheel
displacement), which is why its
not suitable for testing eCall
triggering
Body block test can be omitted if
the vehicle is fitted with an airbag
and has undergone UN R94
testing (Section 5.2.1)
Safety-belt anchorages,
ISOFIX anchorages
systems, ISOFIX top tether
anchorages and I-Size
seating positions
22/07/2009 none Mechanical resistance:
Dynamic seat belt anchorage
strength tests. These reference
the deceleration test pulse in
UN R16, Annex 8 (Annex 7)
Final
Directive
Safety-belts, restraint
systems, child restraint
systems and ISOFIX child
restraint systems
22/07/2009 none Mechanical resistance:
Deceleration test; pulse
corridor with maximum
deceleration of 26g-32g
(minimum duration of 20 ms)
(Annex 8)
Final
Directive
Test pulse defined in Annex 8 has
a higher peak than test pulse in
UN R17, Annex 9.
TRL understands that they were


May 2014 145

derived from full-scale front
impact experiments using cars
that were representative at the
time (i.e. the late 1970s/early
1980s), Measured to represent
the deceleration experienced by a
different part of the vehicle than
for UN R17. Frontend designs of
cars became stiffer over the
decades, leading to higher peak
accelerations in identical frontal
impacts compared to older
vehicles.
Corridor, although not being
designed for that, can be
regarded as being approximately
representative of the B-pillar
acceleration of a modern car in a
full-width, rigid barrier, 50 km/h
crash test.
Strength of seats, their
anchorages and head
restraints
22/07/2009 none Mechanical resistance: Test
procedure for devices intended
to protect the occupants
against displacement of
luggage (Annex 9). Defines a
test procedure involving
deceleration or acceleration of
Final
Directive
The test pulse defined in Annex 9
is used in proposal for UN Draft
Regulation for AECD to


May 2014 146

the whole vehicle and loading
the seat backs with concrete
blocks. The pulse corridor has
a maximum acceleration of
20g-28g (minimum duration of
15 ms), v = 50 +0/-2 km/h.
demonstrate that AECD remains
operational after frontal impact
(mechanical resistance).
TRL understands that they were
derived from full-scale front
impact experiments using cars
that were representative at the
time (i.e. the late 1970s/early
1980s). In order to protect the
occupants from intrusion,
frontend designs of cars became
stiffer over the decades, leading
to higher peak accelerations in
identical frontal impacts in
modern vehicles compared to
older vehicles.
Test pulse also used in UN R44,
Annex 7, UN R100, Annex 8C and
UN R129, Annex 7.
Interior fittings
08/10/1980 Requirements automatically apply to
the eCall IVS components in the
passenger compartment (HMI),
therefore do not need to be covered
specifically in an eCall Regulation
Not relevant, see column
Requirements
Final
Directive
Purpose of requirements is to
reduce the risk or seriousness of
bodily injury to a person from


May 2014 147

interior fittings in the event of a
collision.
No legislative gaps in this area,
so not relevant for new
legislation.
External projections of M1
vehicles
23/06/2005 Requirements automatically apply to
the eCall IVS components installed on
the outside of a vehicle (e.g. aerial),
therefore do not need to be covered
specifically in eCall legislation
Not relevant, see column
Requirements
Final
Directive
Purpose of requirements is to
reduce the risk or seriousness of
bodily injury to a person hit by
the bodywork or brushing against
it in the event of a collision.
No legislative gaps in this area,
so not relevant for new
legislation.
Audible warning devices and
audible signals
Directive
Regards audible warning devices
(horns), including sound-pressure
levels and endurance : Not
relevant for TA requirements or
tests for eCall IVS


May 2014 148

Protection of the occupants
of the cab of a commercial
vehicle
30/01/2011 none Mechanical resistance: Cab
strength tests (pendulum and
roof strength)
Final
Not acceded to by EU and not
referenced in Framework
Directive
Scope are only N-category
vehicles with a separate drivers
cab
Behaviour of the structure
of the impacted vehicle in a
head-on collision
01/07/1975 none Mechanical resistance: Full
width 50 km/h frontal impact
test into rigid barrier (identical
to UN R34)
Final
Directive
Prevention of fire risks
(liquid fuel tanks)
16/07/2003 none Hydraulic pressure and
overturn tests for fuel tanks
and impact tests for vehicles
Crash tests referenced:
o Frontal: UN R94 or specific
frontal impact test (Annex
3)
o Side: UN R95
o Rear: Specific rear impact
test (Annex 4)
Specific frontal impact test
(Annex 3) is a full width 50
Final
Directive
Procedures to test tanks for liquid
fuels and vehicles with regard to
fire risks from the tank.
Tests have to be carried out for
TA of M1 vehicles that have tanks
for liquid fuels.
Rear impact test potentially
relevant if mechanical resistance
of eCall IVS to rear impacts or


May 2014 149

km/h frontal impact test into
rigid barrier (identical to UN
R33)
Specific rear impact test
(Annex 4) uses a 1100 kg
impactor impacting the rear of
the stationary test vehicle at
35-38 km/h.
triggering in rear impacts was to
be tested.
Front and rear protective
devices (bumpers etc.)
01/06/1980 none Longitudinal impact test:
pendulum or moving barrier of
mass equal to vehicles
unladen mass to impact the
front and the rear two times
each at a speed of 4 km/h
(Section 2.7.)
Corner impact test: pendulum
or moving barrier of mass
equal to vehicles unladen
mass to impact four corners of
the vehicle at a speed of 2.5
km/h (Section 2.8)
Final
Directive
Tests of front and rear protective
devices in a collision at low speed
after which the vehicle should still
be in a state that allows it to be
driven from the scene (lighting
and signalling operating
correctly; bonnet, boot, doors
operable; fuel, cooling system
tight; exhaust system working;
and propulsion, suspension
(including tyres), steering and
braking systems shall remain in
adjustment.)


May 2014 150

Longitudinal impact test might
potentially provide a lower
boundary that should not trigger
an eCall. However, the impact
speed is only 4 km/h which might
be too low to be used as a
sensible lower boundary. Note
that this test does not currently
have to be carried out for TA in
the EU.
Restraining devices for child
occupants of power-driven
vehicles ("child restraint
system")
06/08/2013 none Mechanical resistance test
pulses (Annex 7):
o Test pulse for frontal
impact: Pulse corridor has a
maximum acceleration of
20g-28g (minimum duration
of 15 ms).
o Test pulse for rear impact:
Pulse corridor has a
maximum acceleration of
14g-21g (minimum duration
of 17 ms).
Final
Directive
Frontal test pulse is identical to
UN R17, Annex 9, UN R100,
Annex 8C and UN R129, Annex 7.
See comments on UN R17
Strength of superstructure
(buses)
19/08/2010 none Rollover test using a tilting
bench to drop the stationary
vehicle into a 0.8 m deep
ditch. This induces a rollover
Final
Acceded to by EU
Applies to articulated vehicles


May 2014 151

between 90 and 180 degrees.
(Annex 5)
Alternative rollover test using
body sections (Annex 6)
Alternative quasi-static loading
test of body sections (Annex 7)
Alternative quasi-static
calculation based on testing of
components (Annex 8)
Alternative computer
simulation of rollover test on
complete vehicle (Annex 9)
designed for the carriage of more
than 22 passengers only (not
applicable to M1)
Several intrusion requirements
are set out for superstructure
after rollover tests.
Instead of performing tests on a
complete vehicle, the regulation
allows to test only representative
body sections in a rollover; to
perform quasi-static loading
tests; to perform quasi-static
calculations; or to use computer
simulation.
Test are of limited relevance:
Requiring a rollover test for M1
just to test triggering seems
unlikely. Mechanical resistance
tests would require a more
severe rollover incident.
Frontal collision protection
23/06/2011 none Crash test: 40% overlap
frontal crash test at 56 km/h
into deformable barrier under
a perpendicular angle (Annex
3)
Final
Directive
Applies to M1 vehicles 2500 kg
Sets out injury criteria from


May 2014 152

dummy measurements and
vehicle criteria, e.g. limited
steering wheel displacement,
possibility to open at least one
door per seat row, specifics for
electrical vehicles, etc. (Section
5.2.)
Might be used to test automatic
triggering in frontal collision in
future UN Regulation for AECD.
Might be relevant for testing
mechanical resistance of IVS and
triggering of eCalls.
Only M1 vehicles 2500 kg have
to perform the test. Rest of M1
category covered by UN R12.
Lateral collision protection
23/06/2011 none Crash test: Lateral (side)
impact test of a mobile
deformable barrier impacting
the vehicle under test at 50
km/h under a perpendicular
angle (Annex 4)
Final
Directive
Applies to M1 and N1 vehicles
with R point height of lowest seat
700 mm
Sets out injury criteria from
dummy measurements and
vehicle criteria, e.g. possibility to


May 2014 153

open doors, no detachment of
interior devices, specifics for
electrical vehicles, etc. (Section
5.2.)
Might be used to test automatic
triggering in frontal collision in
future UN Regulation for AECD.
mechanical resistance of IVS and
triggering of eCalls.
Only M1 and N1 vehicles with R
point height of lowest seat 700
mm have to perform the test.
Rest of M1 category is only doing
frontal impact tests (UN R12, UN
R94).
Specific requirements for
the electric power train
12/08/2013 none Mechanical resistance test
procedures for batteries used
in electric power trains:
o Vibration test (Annex 8A)
o Mechanical shock test
(Annex 8C): Deceleration
test; Longitudinal test pulse
corridor has a maximum
acceleration of 20g-28g
Final
Directive
Longitudinal test pulse of
mechanical shock test is identical
to UN R17, Annex 9, UN R44,
Annex 7 and UN R129, Annex 7
(see comments under UN R17)


May 2014 154

(minimum duration of 15
ms). Transverse test pulse
corridor has a maximum
acceleration of 8g-15g
(minimum duration of 15
ms).
o Mechanical integrity test
(Annex 8D)
Climatic resistance test
procedure for batteries used in
electric power trains:
o Thermal shock and cycling
test (Annex 8B)
See comments on UN R17
Anti-theft and alarm
systems
06/04/2005 Requirement to conform with ETSI
network standards if system is
capable of radio transmission (Section
6.2.3.)
Operation parameters, including
climatic conditions, protection from
dust and water and weatherability
(Section 6.4.1.)
Requirement regarding allowable
energy consumption in the set
condition (Section 6.4.2.7.)
Requirement regarding power supply,
Operation test to test
conformance with certain
functional specifications (e.g.
alarm duration, number of
alarm cycle, etc.) (Section
6.4.2.1.)
Resistance to temperature and
voltage changes: Perform
operation tests defined in
Section 6.4.2.1. under more
extreme conditions (Section
6.4.2.2.)
Final
Directive
Regulation also concerns electric
systems, some of which might be
capable of radio transmission
Requirements of Section 6.4.1.
on climatic conditions, degree of
protection, and weatherability are
used in the Russian UN
Regulation proposal for AECD for


May 2014 155

i.e. batteries (Section 7.3.10.)
Model of installation certificate (Annex
7)
Safe operation after foreign
body and water-tightness test:
Perform test for tightness to
foreign body and water in IEC
529-1989; then perform
Section 6.4.2.1. (Section
6.4.2.3.)
Safe operation after condensed
water test: Perform resistance-
to-humidity test according to
IEC 68-2-30 (1980); then
perform operation tests
defined in Section 6.4.2.1.
(Section 6.4.2.4.)
Test for safety against
reversed polarity; then
perform operation tests
defined in Section 6.4.2.1.
(Section 6.4.2.5.)
Test for safety against short-
circuits; then perform
6.4.2.6.)
Safe operation after vibration
climate resistance requirements
Tests for safety against reversed
polarity and safety against short-
circuits potentially relevant for
eCall IVS.
The safety against false alarms
test is not suitable to define a
lower boundary for the triggering
mechanism of IVS (energy too
low).
Requirements for power
supply/batteries in Section
7.3.10. might be relevant for
eCall IVS (although design
restrictive).
Model of installation certificate
potentially useful for retrofit IVSs
(Annex 7)
EMC tests relevant for eCall IVS
(Annex 9)


May 2014 156

test: Submit components to
several sinusoidal vibration
modes; then perform
6.4.2.8.)
Durability test: Triggering of
300 alarm cycles (Section
6.4.2.9.)
Safety against false alarms in
the event of an impact on the
vehicle: 4.5 Joules impact of a
hemispherical body with 165
mm diameter shall not set off
alarm (Section 6.4.2.13.)
EMC test: Two alternative
options depending on test
facilities (Annex 9):
o ISO method: Test pulses
defined for immunity
against disturbances
conducted along supply
lines (ISO 7637-2:2004);
immunity against
disturbance coupled on
signal lines (ISO 7637-


May 2014 157

3:1995 (and Corr.1));
Immunity against radiated
high frequency disturbances
(UN R10); Immunity against
electrical disturbances
(ISO/TR 10605-1993);
radiated emission (UN R10)
o IEC method: Parameters
defined for electromagnetic
field (IEC Publication 839-1-
3-1998, test A-13);
electrical disturbance from
electrostatic discharges (EN
61000-4-2 or ISO/TR
10605-1993); radiated
emission (UN R10)
Identification of controls,
tell-tales and indicators
18/01/2006 Requirements for controls, tell-tales
and indicators that are listed in the
Regulation (eCall is not currently
listed) (Section 5.):
o Location, e.g. operable during
driving and recognizable during
night and day (Section 5.1.).
o Identification, e.g. which symbol to
use (Section 5.2.)
none Final
Directive
Intended to be used for
emergency call button and
warning signal requirements in
UN draft proposal for AECD
Requirements relevant. However,
eCall HMI elements not currently


May 2014 158

o Illumination (Section 5.3.)
o Colour (Section 5.4.)
If a control, tell-tale and indicator is
not listed in the Regulation (eCall is
not currently listed), use of symbols
in accordance with ISO 2575:2004 is
recommended.
listed in Regulation, therefore the
requirements of Section 5. do not
apply.
Draft UN Regulation No. 13x
- Protection of the
occupants in the event of a
frontal collision with focus
on the restraint system
21/02/2014 none Crash test: 100% overlap (full-
width) frontal crash test at 50
km/h into rigid barrier under a
perpendicular angle (Annex 3)
Draft proposal for potential future
UN Regulation
It is uncertain if an when this
regulation will be introduced
Applies to M1 vehicles 3500 kg
mechanical resistance and
triggering of eCall IVS in the
future.
European standards
EN 15722:2011 - eCall
minimum set of data (MSD)
11/05/2011 Content and format of Minimum Set
of Data (MSD) to be transferred by an
eCall IVS in the event of a crash or
emergency (Section 6.2)
Data presentation, encoding and
transmission (Section 6.1, Annexes A,
None, only brief requirements
for demonstration of
conformance (Section 3)
HeERO standardisation task force
proposed several changes
Standard has been updated since
2011; will be issued soon and
published as final version in 2014
Rationale for MSD contents given


May 2014 159

B, C) in informative Annex D
Draft UN Regulation XX on AECD,
Annex 6, Appendix A defines
identical MSD
Registry of additional data
provided in addition to MSD from
vehicle manufacturer or
equipment supplier in accordance
with EN ISO 24978 might be
necessary. This will be operated
by CSI.
EN 16062:2011 - eCall high
level application
requirements (HLAP)
06/08/2011 Requirements for IVS, including
procedures following power-up,
activation of eCall, MSD transfer and
handling error cases (Section 7)
Timings (Annex 7)
Test and conformance
requirements for IVS (Section
11.2), including
o Conformance points (points
of interaction during normal
operation or error situations
that were selected for
testing) for IVS (Section
11.2.2)
o Test purposes in relation to
conformance points (Section
11.2.3)
Informative annex on test
system strategies (Annex C)
HeERO standardisation task force
proposed several changes
Section 2 defines two separate
levels for verifying conformity of
eCall system elements to the
whole set of European standards:
conformity to network access
standards, and conformity to the
high level application protocol
Tests use a reference subsystem
simulator for PSAP or IVS in a


May 2014 160

Requirements for
demonstration of conformance
(Section 2)
laboratory environment
The proposed tests should be
carried out during the
engineering phase
EN 16072:2011 - Pan-
European eCall operating
requirements
18/08/2011 High level functional requirements for
IVS, such as presence of a NAD,
capability of automatic and manual
eCall and robustness to survive a
crash (Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.3)
eCall operation sequence (Section
6.1.5)
Privacy aspects and liability (Section
6.2.3)
Operational requirements (Section 7),
including:
o Post-crash performance of IVS,
including the requirement to
transmit the MSD in crash tests for
European type-approval (Section
7.5)
o Location and direction, including
the provision that the IVS provider
decides how to determine location
data; and the obligation to ensure
that the recent location data
Conformance requirements,
including references to EN
16062, EN 15722, Directive
2004/108/EC and Directive
1999/5/EC (Sections 11.1,
11.3)
eCall operation sequence
potentially useful to define the
boundaries of the TA regulation
(Section 6.1.5)
Includes the requirement to
transmit an automatic eCall in all
crash tests which are required by
regulation for the European type-
approval (Section 7.5).
Term vehicle in distress
(defined as a vehicle that has
been involved in a crash or other
impact situation where an eCall is
generated automatically) is used
in this standard. Potentially useful
term to cover all situations that
require eCall
HMI: No standardisation


May 2014 161

cannot be used to calculate vehicle
speed (Section 7.6)
o MSD (Section 7.7)
o Modes of operation, including the
requirement to allow permanent
disabling of eCall by maintenance
personnel (Section 7.8)
o HMI aspects (Section 7.9),
including the requirement to
display connection status, to be
designed to prevent false calls
o Manual triggering and automatic
triggering strategy, including the
provision that the nature and
operational process of the device
generating the trigger signal shall
be at the discretion of the
manufacturer; and that the eCall
shall reflect as many accidents
types as possible; only manual
eCalls can be terminated only
before the eCall has been activated
(Section 7.10)
o Termination of an eCall in progress
only by PSAP (Section 7.11)
regarding look and feel or
location.
Automatic trigger signal is
generated by in-vehicle
equipment, i.e. airbag control
module and/or a combination of
other sensor data (e.g. gyro,
radar, axel load, speed)


May 2014 162

o Voice call requirements (Section
7.13)
o eCall termination (Section 7.17)
EN 16102:2011 - eCall
Operating requirements for
third party support
22/10/2011 High level functional requirements for
TPS-IVS, such as: presence of a NAD,
and capability of automatic and
manual eCall (Section 5.1)
Requirements for TPS-eCall data,
referencing the MSD as defined in EN
15722 and allowing additional data
(Section 7.1)
Requirements for the TPS-IVS,
including (Section 8):
o Manual triggering and automatic
triggering strategy, including the
provision that the nature and
operational process of the device
generating the trigger signal shall
be at the discretion of the
manufacturer; and that the eCall
shall reflect as many accidents
types as possible (Section 8.3)
o Termination of an eCall in progress
(Section 8.4)
none Standard has been updated since
Concerning exclusively TPS
(covering TPS-IVS)
The IVS dataset can, but does
not have to, be larger than the
MSD


May 2014 163

o Voice call requirements (Sections
8.5, 8.6, 8.7)
o Post-crash performance, including
the requirement to transmit the
IVS dataset in crash tests for
European type-approval (Section
8.8)
o Energy supply requirements,
allowing but not requiring a battery
(Section 8.9)
o HMI aspects (Section 8.10)
o Antenna requirements, including
post-crash functionality (Section
8.11)
CEN/TS 16454:2013 - eCall
end to end conformance
testing
12/06/2013 State transition points are defined for
which conformance requirements are
defined and tests are arranged into.
The conformance requirements
related to the tests listed in the
column Testing of this table
(Sections 8.1.1, 9.3.1)
Conformance test procedure for
IVS (Sections 2, 9.1 to 9.6,
Annex A)
47 test objectives and related
conformance tests are defined
to demonstrate that the IVS
(eCall only, i.e. without TPS) is
capable of triggering an eCall,
sending the MSD, and making a
voice channel available
(Sections 9.2, 9.4, 9.5):
Document has been updated
since 2013; will be issued soon
and published as final version in
2014
Published Technical Specification
(TS). Note: A Technical
Specification is established by a
CEN Technical Body and
approved through a weighted
vote by the CEN national
members. The TS shall be


May 2014 164

o Conformance to ETSI TS
102 936-1 and ETSI TS 102
936-2
o Test for conformance to
valid SIM/USIM
o Automatic eCall triggering
does not occur when
ignition OFF
o Power on and self-test
o eCall automatically
activated
o Automatically triggered
eCall in progress was not
disconnected upon a new
eCall trigger
o Post-side-crash
performance of automatic
trigger
o Post-frontal-crash
performance of automatic
trigger
o Performance of automatic
trigger different crash
types
announced at national level. It
may be adopted as a national
standard, but conflicting national
standards may continue to exist.
A Technical Specification may
however not conflict with a
European Standard. If a
conflicting EN is subsequently
published, the TS is withdrawn.
The tests are focussed on the
conformance of systems on the
application level (behaviour /
inputs / outputs), i.e. are not
intended to test the physical
equipment components.
Further tests for TPS-IVS and TPS
equipment are set out in Sections
9.6, 9.7 and 9.8.
The state transition conformance
tests include physical tests using
MNO and PSAP test points, and,
for example, involve generating a
lateral shock load in accordance
with UN R 94/UN R95 and (if not
already triggered via this shock)
applying the necessary trigger


May 2014 165

o eCall manually activated
o Manually triggered eCall in
progress was not
disconnected upon a new
eCall trigger
o Test eCall activated
o Network registration
o Manual termination of eCall
by vehicle occupants not
allowed (automatically
triggered eCall)
o Manual termination of eCall
by vehicle occupants not
allowed (manually triggered
eCall)
o Automatically triggered
eCall in progress was not
disconnected when ignition
is switched to OFF
o Manually triggered eCall in
progress was not
disconnected when ignition
is switched to OFF
o Priority over conflicting
condition according to
manufacturers instructions.
The tests were designed for self-
certification (hence, can be
carried out without test houses).
The document does not define at
which thresholds or which
accident types the system should
trigger, but only verifies that it
triggers at the conditions the
manufacturer specifies, and
sends a MSD.


May 2014 166

communication
o Network registration is re-
tried when network
registration attempt was not
successful
o Mute IVS and vehicle audio
o Set-up TS12 call with eCall
identifier (flag) set to
automatic
o Set-up TS12 call with eCall
identifier (flag) set to
manual
o Set-up TS11 call to test
number
o eCall is attempted when no
networks are available
(limited service condition)
o Re-dial attempt completed
within 2 min after eCall is
dropped
o Duration of eCall Initiation
signal
o Send MSD with indicator set
to Automatically Initiated


May 2014 167

eCall (AleC)
to Manually Initiated eCall
(MleC)
to Test Call
o Verify MSD transfer
o Un-mute IVS audio when
AL-ACK received
o Establish voice link to PSAP
o MSD transfer request while
eCall conversation in
progress
o Call continuation when
SEND MSD request not
received (T5 expired)
o Call continuation when AL-
ACK not received (T6
expired)
o MSD is transferred
continuously until T7
expires and IVS reconnects
loudspeaker and
microphone on its expiry


May 2014 168

o Clear down call
automatically
o IVS clears down the eCall
upon T2 expiry
o IVS registers recent eCalls
o Call-back allowed by IVS
o Call-back answered by IVS
o MSD transfer occurs upon
PSAP request during call-
back
o Remain registered for 1 hr
o IVS does not perform
registration after power-up
o IVS periodically scans and
maintains a list of available
PLMNs
o Verify that PLMN
registration procedure is
executed upon initiating an
eCall
o Remain registered for 1 hr
12 hr
Accelerated test procedures are


May 2014 169

possible, that rely on the
assumption that a number of
passed key tests indicates that
many of the other state
transitions have been passed
successfully and therefore need
not be tested (Section 7.3, 7.4)
Test report for IVS, including
check lists for test results
(Annex A)
EN 61000-4-2:2009
Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC) - Part
4- 2: Testing and
measurement techniques
Electrostatic discharge
immunity test
31/05/2009 Evaluation of test results by
classification according to the level of
degradation of performance under
test (Section 9)
Description, performance and
verification of an electrostatic
discharge generator (Section 6)
Test setup for immunity of
equipment to electrostatic
discharge (Section 7)
Test procedure for immunity of
equipment to electrostatic
discharge (Section 8)
Final
Referenced by UN draft
Regulation, Part I
This standard does not intend to
specify the tests to be applied to
particular apparatus or systems.
Its main aim is to give a general
basic reference (). The product
committees (or users and
manufacturers of equipment)
remain responsible for the
appropriate choice of the tests
and the severity level to be
applied to their equipment.
ETSI EN 301 489-1 V1.8.1 Intended to become harmonized


May 2014 170

ETSI EN 301 489-7 V1.3.1
ETSI EN 301 489-24 V1.5.1
European standards
Not applicable to eCall IVS: This
series of standards deals only
with equipment that is not related
to immunity-related functions
of the vehicle according to the
definition in Directive
2004/104/EC, Section 2.1.12.
However, eCall IVSs are related
to occupant protection and are
therefore assumed to be classed
as immunity-related.
ETSI TS 102 164 (Version
1.3.1)
ETSI TS 121 133 (Release 8
or later)
or later)
or later)
or later)
ETSI TS 122 101 (Release
8)
or later)
Final, no change requests have
been submitted to ETSI for at
least one year
These standards will not be
reviewed in depth for TA of IVS
because they regard mobile
network requirements and appear
well established


May 2014 171

or later)
or later)
or later)
or later)
or later)
or later)
ETSI EN 301 511
ETSI EN 301 908
Russian standards
GOST R 54618-2011 -
Compliance test methods of
in-vehicle emergency call
system for electromagnetic
compatibility, environmental
and mechanical resistance
requirements
No English version available for
review
GOST R 54619-2011 -
Protocol of Data
Transmission from In-
Vehicle Emergency Call
review


May 2014 172

System to Emergency
Response System
Infrastructure
GOST R 54620-2011 -
General Technical
Requirements
01/09/2012 List of required components for the
automotive system, e.g. GNSS
receiver, antenna, tone modem,
power supply, etc. (Section 5)
Technical and performance
requirements for the components of
the automotive system, including for
example requirements on mechanical
resistance for the accident detection
sensor (Section 8) Note: There is no
obvious separation in the text
between compliance requirements
and compliance testing procedures
Backup battery and power source
requirements (Section 8.11)
Data transmission and composition of
messages, including the requirement
of MSD sent via SMS as fall back
solution (Sections 9.1, 9.2)
Audio/sound quality (Sections 10 and
13.3.3)
Power requirements and power
Test conditions for components
of the automotive system,
including for example
requirements on mechanical
resistance for the accident
detection sensor (Section 8).
Note: There is no obvious
separation in the text between
compliance requirements and
compliance testing procedures
Tests of climate resistance,
mechanical resistance to
vibration and shock conditions,
and EMC to be carried out in
accordance with IEC 54618
under test conditions defined
in this standard (Sections
13.1.3, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4)
Final
The reviewed English version
might not be an official
translation
Covers vehicle categories M, N
Some sections might be design
restrictive, e.g. Section 5
No obvious separation in the text
between compliance
requirements and compliance
testing procedures
MSD using a structure compatible
to eCall MSD according to EN
15722


May 2014 173

consumption (Section 11)
Climate resistance requirements,
references to IEC 52230, GOST
15150, GOST 14254, IEC 50905, IEC
52456, GOST 16019 (Section 13.2)
Mechanical resistance (to vibration
and shock conditions) requirements,
references to Section 4.20 of IEC
52230 and GOST 16019 (Section
13.3)
EMC, references to GOST 28751,
GOST 29157, IEC 50607, Section 2 of
GOST 28279, Section 2 of GOST
30429 (Sections 13.4)
Frequency selectivity of receivers
(Section 14)
Reliability of IVS, reference to IEC
50905 and specific reliability criteria
(Section 15)
Safety and environmental
friendliness, references to GOST
12.2.007.0, GOST 12.1.044 (Section
18)
Triggering of emergency call:


May 2014 174

o Automatic for vehicle category M1;
manual for all M- and N-category
vehicles (Section 6.1)
o Accident types for automatic
triggering: frontal, side and rear
impact (Section 6.2.1)
o Automatic triggering shall occur for
accidents in which there is a
substantial likelihood of threat to
life and health of people in the
cabin (Section 6.2). Triggering
criteria for AC systems are
determined by the vehicle
manufacturer (Section 6.2.2). For
AU systems, triggering criteria
based on a threshold value of
accelerations over time are
recommended, i.e. AIS15<AIS15
threshold value given in Annex A
(Section 6.2.3, Annex B
(informative)). Please note: A clear
definition of AC and AU system
could not be found in the reviewed
version of the standard.
MSD, using the same structure as
eCall MSD in EN 15722, but defining


May 2014 175

additional data elements such as:
accident severity estimation,
equipment test results, mobile
network information and crash type
definition; slight difference in field
fuel type might make standard
incompatible with current version of
EN 15722 (Sections 6.3 to 6.6, Annex
B (normative), note that Annex B
appears two times in the document;
this is probably intended to be Annex
C)
Recording and transmission of data,
including acceleration profile and path
(Sections 6.8 to 6.11)
Audio requirements (Sections 6.13 to
6.15)
HMI requirements (Section 6.16)
Self-test requirements (Section 6.17)
Recommendations for installation of
accident detection sensor (Annex D
(informative))
Recommendations for user interface
(Annex E (informative))
Connectors of equipment (Annex G


May 2014 176

(informative))
Modes of the operational equipment,
e.g. test, passive, off, emergency call
(Section 7)
GOST R 54721-2011 - Base
service description
none none Final,
The reviewed English version
might not be an official
translation
GOST R 55530-2013 -
Functional test methods of
In- Vehicle Emergency Call
System and data transfer
protocols
review
GOST R 55531-2013
Compliance testing for the
requirements for quality
speakerphone in a vehicle
review
GOST R 55532-2013 Test
methods for in-vehicle
system crash detection
feature
review
methods for wireless
communication module of
review


May 2014 177

in-vehicle emergency call
system
methods for navigation
module of in-vehicle
emergency call system
review
International standards
ISO 2575:2004 31/05/2010 Symbols for controls, tell-tales and
indicators
none Final, including amendment
A4:2009
Referred to by UN R121 for
controls, tell-tales or indicators
that are not explicitly mentioned
in the Regulation
No symbol for eCall HMI defined
ISO 7637-2:2011 - Road
vehicles Electrical
disturbances from
conduction and coupling -
Part 2: Electrical transient
conduction along supply
lines only
2011 Test pulses which equipment needs to
be able to withstand.
EMC: Test methods and
procedures to ensure the
compatibility to conducted
electrical transients of
equipment installed on
passenger cars. It describes
bench tests for both the
injection and measurement of
transients.
Final
Version from 2004 is referenced
in UN R116, Annex 9 with regard
to test pulses
ISO 7637-3:2007 - Road 2007 Test pulses which equipment needs to EMC: Bench top test for the Final


May 2014 178

vehicles Electrical
disturbances from
conduction and coupling -
Part 3: Electrical transient
transmission by capacitive
and inductive coupling via
lines other than supply lines
be able to withstand. evaluation of the immunity of
devices under test to transient
transmission by coupling via
lines other than supply lines.
in UN R116, Annex 9 for test
pulses
ISO 10605:2008 - Road
vehicles Test methods for
electrical disturbances from
electrostatic discharge
2008 Test pulses which equipment needs to
be able to withstand.
EMC: Electrostatic discharge
(ESD) test methods for
evaluating electronic modules
intended for vehicle use on the
bench and complete vehicles
Final
in UN R116 and draft UN
Regulation on AECS
ISO 24978:2009 - ITS
Safety and emergency
messages using any
available wireless media
Data registry procedures
2009 None of immediate relevance for TA
legislation
Conformance requirement statement:
In order to claim conformance with
this International Standard, wireless
communication shall be established in
full compliance with local
telecommunication regulations,
procedures and protocols for that
media using the appropriate
International or Regional Standards,
and shall be able to demonstrate that
they provide the mandatory data, and
can provide any standardized optional
none Final
Application to this standard is
recommended in EN 15722 (on
MSD) for the optional additional
data field.
Standardised set of protocols,
parameters, and a method of
management of an updateable
"Data Registry" to provide
application layers for "ITS Safety
messages" using any available
wireless media.


May 2014 179

data elements to the extent that such
data is available, and there is an
available medium to transmit the
message. (Section 2)
IEC 52230 Referenced in GOST R 54620-
2011 for climate resistance and
mechanical resistance
requirements
Document could not be found
(non-existent?)
IEC 54618 Referenced in GOST R 54620-
2011 for climate resistance,
mechanical resistance and EMC
requirements
Document could not be found
(non-existent?)
HeERO 1 and HeERO 2 deliverables
Quality and risk
management plan,
Deliverable D1.1
02/2013 none none No immediate relevance for TA of
eCall IVS
Other content:
o Overview of project and
quality processes based on
recent relevant experience in
HeERO1


May 2014 180

Final report, Deliverable
D1.3
Not yet available for review
State-of-the-art analysis
report, Deliverable D2.1
31/10/2013 High level functional requirements,
including automatic/manual
triggering, send MNO, voice
connection (Section 5.3.1)
Procedures following power-up of the
in-vehicle system, including
conformance to ETSI standards,
requirement for SIM/USIM (Section
5.3.2)
Activation sequence (Section 5.3.3)
Call set-up (Section 5.3.4)
Timers (Section 5.3.8)
Interoperability (Section 5.3.9)
none Limited relevance for TA of eCall
IVS
Other content:
o Description of some existing
IVSs and names of
manufacturers (Section 6.3)
o Description of some TPS
examples (Section 4.4)
o IVS Data encoding system
explanation, encoded into
voice system (Section 4.4)
o IVS data modem flow chart of
actions
o Description of rescue chain in
6 pilot areas
o IVS equipment descriptions
including some diagrams and
pictures in 7 pilots
o Data modem descriptions
o List of standards, and what
they contain (section 5)


May 2014 181

o Detailed explanation of the
eCall transaction (section
5.2.1.) and how the system
should deal with failures
Additional eCall systems
functionalities
specifications, Deliverable
D2.2
29/04/2013 none none No immediate relevance for TA of
eCall IVS
Other content:
o Overlap with D2.1, e.g.
standards and functional
architecture in 6 pilots
o Some additional info, e.g. PTW
in Spain and dangerous goods
in Luxembourg
Implementation plan for
HeERO 2, Deliverable D2.3
eCall IVS
Other content:
o Overlap with D2.1 and D2.2
o Timetable charts for
implementation
o Some further pictures of IVS,
vehicles, etc.
System test cases and
verification report,
08/11/2013 none Details lab tests and field tests
using pro-forma of test
Potentially relevant for test
definitions for TA of eCall IVS


May 2014 182

Deliverable D2.4 scenarios (initial conditions,
Test, expected result, actual
result and compliance or not)
Describing set of test scenarios
for validation of an eCall
system after development
phase
o Details of IVS testing
according to EN 16062
(Section 3.2.2)
o Test purpose for the IVS
(Section 3.2.3)
o Description of test scenarios
(Section 3.3)
o Mentions load and stress
tests but these do not seem
to have been detailed
further (Section 3.7)
Overview of the design of the
testing environment, relevant
for TA authorities (Annex 5)
Annex A: Member States related
sets of tests
Manuals for operators
training, Deliverable D2.5
eCall IVS
Final system test cases Not yet available for review


May 2014 183

Pilot operation preparation
eCall IVS
Other content:
o Pilot site summary table as of
May 2013
o Interoperability matrix
o National pilot structure
(overlap with D2.2 and D2.3),
including list of actors and
roles per pilot (Chapter 4)
o Data collected per site on the
eCall case files and
implementation timetables
(Chapter 5)
Operation Preliminary
results, Deliverable D3.2
Final Operation result,
Deliverable D3.3
Final agreed KPIs, test
specification and
methodology, Deliverable
D4.1
31/12/2013 Describes Key Performance Indicators
(KPIs) that are measured at the pilot
sites involved
Some KPIs are very specific to
none No immediate relevance for TA of
eCall IVS
The tests described aim to
monitor the quality of the


May 2014 184

components (e.g. position accuracy,
heading), but most are overall
performance
services over a period of time to
ensure a functional, compatible
and interoperable system in the
pilot countries, not to test
individual IVSs
The results of the study this
document sets out will give
important information on
problems, however this document
itself does not
Other content:
o KPIs for PTW and dangerous
goods
o Pilot site characteristics, with
variable detail on how KPIs will
be measured (Chapter 6)
KPIs, test specification and
methodology, Deliverable
D4.2
01/03/2012 See D4.1 See D4.1 Same topic as D4.1, but older
(HeERO1); therefore, not
reviewed
Intermediate Results of the
tests, Deliverable D4.3
Draft results of the tests
with lessons learnt,
conclusions and


May 2014 185

recommendations,
Deliverable D4.4
Final results of the tests
with lessons learnt,
conclusions and
recommendations,
Deliverable D4.5
Communication plan and
strategy, Deliverable D5.1
eCall IVS
Other content:
o Summary of groups, channels
and tools for dissemination
Project website, Deliverable
D5.2
eCall IVS
Project website exists.
Intentionally, there is no
distinction between HeERO1 and
HeERO2 projects.
Project flyer, Deliverable
D5.3
10/2012 none none No immediate relevance for TA of
eCall IVS
Dissemination brochures,
Deliverable D5.4
Newsletter, Deliverable 02/2013 none none No immediate relevance for TA of


May 2014 186

D5.5 eCall IVS
eCall deployment barriers
and enablers preliminary
28/10/2013 Deployment barriers with regard to
IVS (Section 6.6):
o Position in vehicle
o How to test if functioning
o Antenna position. Inside: protected
but bad reception; outside: easily
damaged but good reception
o Issue what connection protocols
should be used and wiring (Section
6.6.4)
Schematic overview of IVS barriers
(Section 7.1)
TA to cover IVS position in
vehicle?
o Inside the dash-board is
considered the best (Section
6.6.4)
o Retrofit devices, specifically
mentions IVS location and
communication to cars
systems being an issue
(Section 7.2)
Requirements of IVS position and
installation in vehicle are
discussed
Issues in IVS:
o Jamming & spoofing possible
GSM location as a self-check?
o Long TTFF
o No agreed tests for triggering
thresholds
o Reliability would be increased
if there was testing for
vibration, electronics &
temperature
o Antenna performance is critical
and modems can have
different sensitivity
GNSS overview, all types, and
the use of multiple systems
together (Annex II)
Other content:
o Summary of the key issues in
a number of ways, e.g. by


May 2014 187

function (IVS, MNO, PSAP,
etc.) and by country
o Design and requirements of
retrofit devices (Section 8.8.1)
eCall enablers and barriers
in Member States final
Procedures for eCall
certification and execution,
Deliverable D6.3
Stakeholder input on certification of
IVS (Section 5):
Periodic IVS checks are necessary,
possibly at PTI (see EeIP TF PTI
Technical Report V1.0.0)
Retrofit eCall IVS are important to
consider (see Directive
2007/46/EC, Chapter II, Article 4)
Minimizing false eCalls is important
VIN is important for rescue
services to know exact make,
model, colour, year of manufacture
and fuel type in order to achieve a
successful rescue
Accurate location data is crucial
but also raises privacy issues about
recording?
none Input from a range of
stakeholders on certification of
IVS, which is in part relevant for
TA of eCall IVS
Other content:
o Overview of relevant standards
(Section 4)
o Information on composition of
VIN and EUCARIS database:
VIN decoding not available in
all countries, but commercial
decoders will provide basic
information concerning the
vehicle, EUCARIS may be able
to provide keeper details
(section 5.4.3)


May 2014 188

Deployment and impact
towards standardisation,
Deliverable D6.4
03/02/2013 Change request submitted to CEN,
including some potential
improvements and interpretations of
timers (Section 5.4)
the way to implement the
protocol requirement in the
systems is likely to diverge
from one vendor to another.
Therefore, implementations of
the eCall standards (either IVS
or PSAP) must be tested.
(Section 4.2)
Limited relevance for TA of eCall
IVS
The collaborative testing carried
out ("Test Fest") concentrated on
protocols and communications.
Other content:
o Overview of standards
o Conformance testing:
comparison with standards
o Interoperability: includes
testing of interpretation of
standards and clarifications
o Certification: certificate
provision to give external
confidence in performance
Recommendation on
implementation and
operation of eCall in MS
(needs for standardisation &
guidelines), Deliverable
D6.5
European eCall Implementation Platform (EeIP)
EeIP TF PTI Technical 2012 During a PTI, the whole process Options for differentiating and Final


May 2014 189

Report V1.0.0 should be validated (Section 7):
o initialization of an eCall as a test
call
o call set up via mobile network
o establishment of a call to a test
PSAP, an eCall test centre
o transmission of the MSD with the
3GPP modem to the test centre
o bi-directional voice communication
between test centre and vehicle
o disconnection of call
o documentation of successful test
routing test eCalls (Section
7.1):
o Use of TS12 emergency call
set-up message to identify
and route test eCalls (not a
recommended option by PTI
Task Force)
o TS12 emergency call and
additionally using the test
indicator in the MSD (not a
Task Force)
o Reservation of fixed
numbers for test calls
(recommended option by
PTI Task Force)
o Capturing all calls coming
from the vehicle and routing
to a dedicated device for
testing (recommended
option by PTI Task Force).
This option involves setting
up a local mobile network at
the test site (e.g. by a
femtocell) and would
require modifications of the
Regards options for Periodical
Technical Inspection (PTI) of
eCall IVSs but contains relevant
information for TA legislation
The discussion around the option
to set up a local mobile network
(e.g. by a femtocell) at test
centres might be relevant
GSMA commented in their liaison
statement that this might impose
requirements on MNOs in order to
integrate the micro/femotcells in
the network and address any
interference implications


May 2014 190

routing tables of the MNO.
o Use of normal emergency
call 112 to PSAP (not a
Task Force)
Options for hosting the test
centre (Section 7.2):
o eCall test centre hosted by
PSAP
governmental body
dealership
o eCall test server hosted
locally by vehicle service
centres
Possibility of using
incentives, Report, Final
version
Report about potential incentives
to speed up voluntary
introduction of eCall (under the
assumption that eCall would not
become mandatory)
Deliverable of Task Force 3,
Proposal of common
01/03/2011 Requirements of road operators
derived from a stakeholder survey.
none Final


May 2014 191

protocols to forward the
information from the
PSAPs/eCall centres to the
relevant road operators,
including agreements at
national/regional level,
Version 1.0
The system must:
o minimize false alarms
o provide number of persons
involved
o provide the number of vehicles
involved
o provide the number of automatic
signals and manual signals related
to one event
o provide only verified information
on relevance and severity of the
incident
o provide information on incident
type
o provide information from
Samaritan signals but the
Samaritan signal count is sufficient
The system shall:
o provide the fuel type of involved
vehicles
o provide information on the make
and type of vehicles involved
o provide information on the colour
Concerns communication
between PSAPs and road
operators
The information requirements
articulated by the road operators
are relevant for eCall IVSs


May 2014 192

of vehicles involved
o provide information concerning the
possible number of casualties and
fatalities (the AIS scale).
o provide information to what extent
the vehicle can still drive
o provide information the speed of
the vehicle immediately prior to
the incident to provide the road
traffic manager with an extra
indicator of the severity of the
incident
Task Force OPEN, Final
Report, Version 1.0
24/03/2011 Stakeholder input regarding open
platform: European legislation must
incorporate measures to guarantee
users freedom to choose their service
providers, provided the service
provider meets quality and
performance standards and the
content is supporting the driving
tasks and does not lead to distraction
and risk-taking. This could be reached
if vehicle manufacturers and
equipment manufacturers systems
had to be interoperable with systems
installed after the vehicle production
none Final
Concerns potential add-on
services, e.g. breakdown call,
stolen vehicle tracking, traffic
information/alternative routes,
information service/service call
(parking, points of interest, etc.),
pay-as-you-drive insurance,
remote diagnostics or services
(door lock/unlock, lights on/off,
etc.), road safety alerts, etc.


May 2014 193

line (i.e. retrofit solutions) or even by
changing the on-board systems SIM
card, provided that aftermarket
systems comply with an agreed
common standard. (Section 6.4)
Stakeholder input regarding rescue
data sheet: Concerning the rescue
data a central database should be
made available to the PSAPs. The
right data set will be retrieved using
the VIN number (which is transmitted
within the MSD). The relevant data
need then made available to the
rescue forces who are leaving for the
crash scene. It needs to be clarified
who pays for the set up and operation
of such a database, which database
architecture (regional, central or
interconnected) would be the most
appropriate and how the process will
be to agree on the final model.
(Section 6.5)
Pan-European eCall
Implementation Guidelines,
Task Force GUID, Draft v3.0
03/02/2012 none none Draft version
Informative high-level overview
of the parts an IVS consists of
(Section 4.1)


May 2014 194

Standardization Activities on
eCall within ETSI and 3GPP
02/10/2013 none none Presentation given at EeIP
meeting
States that the eCall ETSI
specifications were considered
stable as no new change requests
had been submitted over at least
one year
FIA Position eCall & Third
Party Services
02/10/2013 Recommendations for TPS-IVS in
order to ensure an open platform:
o Possibility to re-configure the
physical destinations of: the voice
call (e.g. TPS phone number), and
the in-vehicle-dataset (e.g. TPS
backend server IP address)
o Access to the data required to
generate the IVS dataset for any
TPS
o Standardised format of the
technical interfaces required for
voice and data communication
between the vehicle and the TPS
shall be made available on a non-
discriminatory basis for any 3rd
party service provider
none Presentation given at EeIP
meeting
Concerns exclusively TPS
eSafety Driving Group eCall


May 2014 195

Recommendations of the
DG eCall for the
introduction of the pan-
European eCall, Version 2.0
04/2006 Recommendations for automatic
triggering strategy (Section 4.2.2.1):
o The Automatic eCall trigger signal
is generated in the airbag control
module and/or a combination of
other sensor data (e.g. gyro,
radar, axle load, speed);
o The eCall shall be generated to
reflect as many different crash
types as possible (e.g. front, rear,
side and roll crashes);
o Trigger thresholds based on delta
velocity could be sent as additional
optional data to the PSAP, provided
that this information can be used
in PSAPs with a sufficient level of
reliability to evaluate the likeliness
of serious injuries; and
o The vehicle manufacturers are
responsible for determination of
the automatic eCall trigger signal.
Recommendations for manual
triggering strategy (Section 4.2.2.2):
o Actions should be taken when
designing the eCall generator to
none Final
Note: This is the final deliverable
of the group from an early point
in eCall development (2006); the
group finished its work in 2006,
so no other deliverables will be
reviewed
Lists some European directives
and communications regarding
privacy and data protection
(Section 2.4)
Other content: Recommended
performance criteria for service
chain (end-to-end performance,
end-to-end timing, etc.) and eCall
generator, location precision


May 2014 196

avoid accidental manual triggering.
Different scenarios have been
discussed within the DG eCall, such
as; holding the eCall button down
for three seconds to trigger the
eCall or push the button twice
within 5 seconds;
o The manual trigger strategy
depends on the specific human
machine interface for the eCall
generator and it is recommended
that the vehicle manufactures
individually design the eCall
generator in such a way that
unintended activation is
minimized;
o If possible, a roadside assistance
button should be added to the
vehicle with the objective to lower
the amount of potential irrelevant
manual eCalls, but it is also
recognized that this might not be
possible for low cost eCall
solutions; and
o Appropriate education should be
given to the users on the right use


May 2014 197

of the eCall system in order to
minimise the number of manual
calls without emergency content.
Recommendations regarding privacy
(Section 5.3):
o MSD should include only the
minimum required information
needed by the emergency services
to ensure an adequate response.
o It should be ensured that it is not
possible to track the vehicle at all
times. Therefore, eCall should be a
sleeping application, only coming
to life when the generator detects
an incident to trigger an eCall.
ITS Advisory Group
No relevant documents
identified.

Other
Francsics J, Anjum O,
Hopkin J and Stevens A
(TRL); Lindenbach A (Inter-
utXXI); Joost M, Nuijten M
(TNO); Sihvola N, Kulmala
11/2009 Review of liability in case of
unsuccessful or corrupted eCalls
Review of liability in case of false
alarms
none Final
Project report prepared for the EC
containing an impact assessment
of eCall and discussing legal
issues


May 2014 198

R, Oorni R, Nokkala M
(VTT); Schettino M
(ERTICO); Patrascu I,
Bangsgaard J
(eSafetyAware); van Wees
K (Vrije Universitiet) -
Impact assessment on the
introduction of the eCall
service in all new type-
approved vehicles in
Europe, including liability/
legal issues
ETSI TR 102 937 - V1.1.1 -
eCall communications
equipment; Conformance to
EU vehicle regulations,
R&TTE, EMC & LV
Directives, and EU
regulations for eCall
implementation
03/2011 none none Technical report providing an
overview of the European and UN
regulatory framework concerning
eCall with particular focus on the
NAD
The discussed documents
relevant for eCall IVS TA are
included in this review table
CETECOM AECS eCall
Cellular Frequency Overview
26/02/2014 none none Presentation at 3
rd
AECS meeting,
UN level
Suggests to set out requirements
regarding location and
performance of antennas (cellular
and navigation)


May 2014 199

CETECOM AECS eCall
CETECOM proposal for
antenna performance test
methods for an eCall
system in vehicles
26/02/2014 none Test principle for GNSS and
WWAN antennas:
o Measure link performance
o Semi Anechoic Room with
reflective surface floor
(metal)
o Rotate car in horizontal
plane (360) and rotate
emitting test antennas
(90)
Presentation at 3
rd
AECS meeting,
UN level
Suggests that antenna
performance shall still be
guaranteed after an accident,
independent of the position of the
vehicle
References existing standards
which are not designed for motor
vehicles and would therefore
need to be slightly updated:
o USA: CTIA Test Plan for
Wireless Device Over-the-Air
Performance (GPS, GSM,
CDMA, UMTS, LTE)
o Europe: 3GPP TS 34.114
(GSM, WCDMA only; note: no
GNSS)
o Worldwide: Vodafone
Specification for Terminals on
Over the AIR RF Performance
(GSM, UMTS; note: no GNSS)
Professional GNSS
Receivers Test Plan Issue
1.0 Appendix A. GNSS
23/10/2013 None none Describes the GNSS test facilities
at the European Commission
Joint Research Centre (JRC)


May 2014 200

Test Facilities at the
European Commission Joint
Research Centre
o Anechoic chamber (20 m x 15
m)
o Instruments allow large variety
of RF tests (channel
characterization
measurements, antenna
measurements, GNSS
receivers testing, etc.)
GSMA Liaison Statement -
GSMA mAutomotive Project
Liaison to EeIP on Periodic
Technical Inspection
Requirements for eCall
equipped
17/04/2013 none Comments on the options
recommended in the EeIP
document for differentiating
and testing eCalls:
o Reservation of fixed
numbers for test calls:
Would incur significant costs
for MNOs because of high
volume of non-chargeable
calls.
o Capturing all calls coming
from the vehicle (e.g. by a
femtocell) and routing to a
dedicated device for testing:
Would incur significant costs
for MNOs because of high
volume of non-chargeable
calls; might impose
Statement of GSMA with regard
to the options proposed for
periodical technical inspections of
eCall IVSs in EeIP TF PTI
Technical Report V1.0.0


May 2014 201

requirements on MNOs in
order to integrate the
micro/femotcells in the
network and address any
interference implications.
JASIC - Current Situation of
Accident Emergency Call
System in Japan HELPNET
AECS-02-06e
04/12/2013 Transmitted data includes among
other things:
o 64 points of past navigation data
to trace the route of the car
o Preregistered car information
o DeltaV, seat belt sensor
information, etc. for prediction of
degree of injury
none Presentation at 2
nd
AECS
meeting, UN level
HELPNET is a voluntary system
which has been adopted by
Toyota, Lexus and Honda
Uses 3
rd
generation mobile
network
Allows automatic or manual
triggering
CLEPA Positions as a
follow up of AECS-02
AECS-03-12e
26/02/2014 EMC: Requirements should follow
existing standards
Climate resistance: Limit call back
period for temperatures of -20C (not
-40C)
GNSS: CEP95 defines the precision of
positioning. GPS and GLONASS and
Galileo standards and chipsets (soon
for Galileo) are available and
sufficient. Moreover the positioning
can be made more accurate with map
Crash testing: UN R94 or UN
R95 test conditions are
possible references
Mechanical resistance:
Requirements should be
equivalent to international or
Russian standards
Document contains CLEPAs
comments on Draft UN
Regulation, published for 3
rd

AECS meeting


May 2014 202

matching and additional devices in
the vehicle.
HELPNET System
Specifications AECS-03-
05e
26/02/2014 Transmitted data includes among
other things:
o Position info (report site and travel
trail, 64 points at 80m intervals,
i.e. ca. 5 km), based on GPS, gyro,
velocity signals, map-matching,
etc.
o Road type
o Sensor info (DeltaV, airbag
sensors, overturn sensor, multiple
crash, etc.)
o Originator ID (Originator ID is used
to acquire member and vehicle info
(make, model, colour, etc.) from a
database)
Automatic triggering is linked to
airbag deployment
none Presentation at 3
rd
AECS meeting,
UN level
OICA - Proposals for
homologation of AECD and
Installation in vehicle
AECS-03-11e
26/02/2014 Triggering:
o Automatic eCall should only be
required for M1 and N1 vehicles,
which are in scope of UN R94
and/or UN R95
Suggested tests for component
approval:
o Mechanical shock
o GNSS communication
Draft presentation at 3rd AECS
meeting, UN level


May 2014 203

o Manual eCall (at least) for M1 and
N1 vehicles, which are not in scope
of UN R94 and/or UN R95
o MSD transmission (fault
management, MSD content)
o Phone communication tests
o EMC tests in accordance
with UN R10
Suggested tests for vehicle
approval:
o Audio
o Reception quality for each
antenna (phone, GNSS)
o HMI (UN R121)
o Manual activation (execute
a manual emergency call to
real PSAP, PSAP dedicated
to eCall test issue, or PSAP
simulator)
o EMC (UN R10)
o During UN R94/95 (or other
measures):
Automatic triggering
signal generation
Audio capabilities


May 2014 204

MSD transmission
If no back-up battery is
used: Demonstration that
on-board energy still
available
TV Rheinland German
point of view Results of
the national meeting of
German experts AECS-03-
08e
26/02/2014 Triggering:
o Automatic eCall should only be
required for M1 and N1 vehicles,
which are in scope of UN R94
and/or UN R95
o Manual eCall (at least) for all other
vehicles, which are not in scope of
UN R94 and/or UN R95
The vehicle should be able to
communicate (to be defined) with an
emergency centre via a common
telephone number (112) and use a
world module able to support
cellular frequencies (to be defined)
available all over the world with a
sufficient quality (to be defined)
After a UN R94/95 type accident
vehicle shall be able under minimum
conditions (to be defined) to
determine its position and to establish
Mechanical resistance:
o Demonstrate after UN
R94/95 (if vehicle is in
scope)
o Demonstrate after UN R17,
Annex 7 sled test (if vehicle
is not in scope)
Presentation at 3rd AECS
meeting, UN level


May 2014 205

a mobile phone connection of
sufficient quality (to be defined)
GNSS: GPS, GLONASS or Galileo
Mechanical resistance: All systems
should be crash resistant
RCAR Low-speed structural
crash test protocol Issue
2.2
07/2011 none Frontal low speed crash test:
15 km/h, 40% overlap into
rigid barrier, 10 angled
impact
Rear low speed crash test: 15
km/h, 1400 kg mobile barrier
striking stationary vehicle,
40% overlap, 10 angled
impact
Final
Voluntary test to assess
damageability and repairability
for insurance purposes
Vehicles airbags are usually not
triggered in these low speed
crash tests
The test severity might be
suitable to be used as lower
boundary for eCall triggering
(frontal crash test). However, the
test is not mandatory for vehicle
manufacturers and the test
protocol could therefore
potentially not be referenced
directly in TA legislation.
Furthermore, some elements
might need to be specified in
more detail for TA legislation.


May 2014 206

RCAR Bumper Test Issue
2.0
09/2010 none Frontal and rear low speed
crash test: 10 km/h, full
overlap into rigid barrier
representing bumper,
perpendicular
Corner low speed crash test: 5
km/h, 15% overlap, into rigid
barrier representing bumper,
perpendicular
Final
Voluntary test to assess
damageability and repairability
for insurance purposes
Vehicles' airbags are usually not
triggered in these low-speed
crash tests
See comments on suitability of
RCAR Low-speed structural crash
test.
VDA Specification for Car
Hands-free Terminals, Draft
Edition 1.6
11/2008 Measurement parameters and
requirements for microphones
(Section 5)
Measurement parameters and
requirements for hands-free terminals
(Section 6)
Description of test
arrangement for all tests
defined (Section 4)
Verification of the transmission
performance of Bluetooth
enabled phones (Section 7)
Draft version
Voluntary assessment method
and performance criteria for car
hands-free terminals
Although it is still a draft version,
this standard is widely used in
the automotive industry for
assessing the quality of car
equipment, according to
stakeholder input

ECall Type-Approval - TRL Client Project Report CPR1868

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