Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25811 April 3, 1968
THE CENTRAL (POBLACION) BARRIO, CITY OF DAVAO, represented by
its BARRIO CAPTAIN, HONORIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CITY TREASURER, MAXIMO ASISTIDO, THE HON. CITY COUNCIL,
THE HON. CITY AUDITOR, ATTY. FELIX PEPITO and the HON. CITY
MAYOR, CARMELO PORRAS, respondents-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J .:On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No.
732 declaring as officially and legally existing, pursuant to Republic Act 2370, the
several barrios of the city. Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion.
Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it was
created under Section 27 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, asked from Davao City
for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio,
as provided in Section 23 of Republic Act 3590. Davao City's Treasurer, however,
refused to release the share for said barrio, on the ground that the amount pertaining
to said barrio, in relation to those of barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be
determined, because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as
required by law.
Stated otherwise, Davao City's stand was that the amount covering the 10% share of
these three barrios combined has been allocated, but it cannot be determined how
much thereof pertains to each of said barrios, because their boundaries not having
been fixed as regards each other, it could not be determined how much of the taxes
were collected from real properties located in each of the three aforesaid barrios,
taken separately.
On September 3, 1964, however, the Secretary of Finance, acting on the request of
the same barrio Central or Poblacion for release of its 10% share in real property
taxes, stated that barrios Agdao and Bucana were created only in 1963 in violation of
Republic Act 2370 that prohibited creation of barrios out of chartered cities, so that
said barrios are not recognized under Republic Act 3590 providing for the
abovementioned share of 10% in realty taxes. Accordingly, he ruled that the
allocated 10% share of taxes for barrios Agdao, Bucana and Central should accrue
and be given to barrio Central only, after all conditions therefor are met.
On December 2, 1964, barrio Central filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao,
thru its barrio captain, a petition for declaratory relief with mandamus, against Davao
City's Treasurer, Council, Auditor and Mayor, alleging the facts mentioned earlier in
this decision. Among others, the petition questioned the legality of Resolution No.
732 of Davao City's Council creating barrios Agdao and Bucana; the actuations of
the Auditor in passing in audit an alleged expenditure of P50,000 out of the 10%
fund; and the failure of the council to delimit the territorial boundaries of the three
barrios concerned. And it prayed that the court order payment to petitioner by
respondents of its 10% share in realty taxes as provided by Republic Act 3590,
declare illegal the creation of barrios Agdao and Bucana, and prohibit the Auditor
from approving expenditures out of its 10% share.
Respondents moved to dismiss but their motion was denied. On January 29, 1965,
respondents answered, stating among other averments, that barrio Central is
inexistent or not a part of Davao City; that there are other barrios claiming the 10%
share in real property taxes corresponding to the territory claimed by petitioner; that
Republic Act 3590 providing for the 10% share applies only to barrios in
municipalities and municipal districts, not to those in cities; and that the alleged
expenditure in question was legal and not taken from the 10% share allocated for
barrios.
After issues were thus joined the case was set for trial. On August 2, 1965, however,
the Court, upon motion of the Fiscal, dismissed the case without prejudice, on the
ground that the issues were rendered academic by the passage of Republic Act 4354,
on June 19, 1965, amending the Charter of Davao City. Petitioner, having failed in
its motion for reconsideration, took the present appeal.
At issue is the legal question of the propriety or correctness of the dismissal
order.1wph1.t
Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City of
Davao. Petitioner barrio Central or Poblacion was not mentioned therein.
Accordingly, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished barrio
Central as part of Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court a quo
had sufficient and tenable reason to dismiss the suit in the face of said law, for being
academic. A non-existent barrio, or a barrio not situated in Davao City, cannot
present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under Republic Act 3590.
Said law must be presumed, until squarely challenged and declared by the courts to
be otherwise, as constitutional, especially because the power to create or abolish
municipal corporations resides in Congress (Mendenilla v. Onandia, L-17803, June
30, 1962). Petitioner may of course assail the constitutionality of said new law. The
present suit, however, is not for that purpose. Nothing in the pleadings questions said
law's validity, for the reason that said law came after the pleadings were joined.
Neither was there amendment to said pleadings. The court a quo, therefore, rightly
dismissed the present suit, without prejudice, that is, not thereby precluding the filing
of a suit to assail the validity of Republic Act 4354.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed. No costs. So
ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165547. January 24, 2007.]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary,
RENE C. VILLA, petitioner, vs. SARANGANI AGRICULTURAL CO., INC.,
ACIL CORPORATION, NICASIO ALCANTARA and TOMAS
ALCANTARA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J p:
This is a petition for review
1
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
seeking the reversal of the Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2004 and
September 24, 2004, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79899, entitled "Sarangani Agricultural Co, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Manuel Domingo, et
al."
Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been
reclassified from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal
zoning ordinance, and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the
Municipality of Alabel.
The antecedents are as follows:
The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7228 on
March 16, 1992, composed of seven (7) municipalities, namely, Alabel, Glan,
Maasin, Maitum, Malapatan, Malungon and Kiamba which were segregated from the
Province of South Cotabato. Under said Act, the Municipality of Alabel was made
the capital of the new province where the capitol building and all other national and
provincial offices shall be established.
2

On February 14, 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution
No. 97-08 or "Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year Municipal
Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2005) of the Municipality of
Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance for Adoption and
Approval of the Provincial Governor, Honorable Priscilla L. Chiongbian, Thru The
Honorable Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani Province."
On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series
of 1997, and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that
were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the
municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.
3

On March 2, 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved
Resolution No. 98-018 or the "Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal
Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land Use
Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani
Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel." A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares,
however, was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657)
commercial farms deferment scheme.
4

The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents' properties located at
Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and
pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space
in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel.
5

On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI)
filed an application for land use conversion of the following parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 1,005 hectares:
Registered Owner TCT No. Lot No. Area Area
Applied
(Ha.) (Ha.)
SACI T-7207 1-C 52.4365 52.4365
SACI T-48807 2 181.3353 181.3353
(T-4807)
SAC I T-48808 3 281.0874 281.0874
(T-4808)
SACI T-48809 4 241.7880 241.7880
(T-4809)
SACI T-48810 5 40.6738 40.6738
(T-4810)
SACI T-48811 6 137.0340 137.0340
(T-4811)
SACI T-48812 7 12.3265 12.3265
(T-4812)
Nicasio Alcantara T-(10885) 10 20.9149 20.9149
T-44538
SACI T-9210 2 12.1425 12.1425
Tomas Alcantara T-14359 39 10.9390 10.9390
(T-1185)
Nicasio Alcantara Untitled 53 5.0672 5.0672
ACIL Corporation T-(41758) 806 3.3115 3.3115
(T-4150)
SACI Untitled 807 6.7871 6.7871
Accompanying SACI's application for conversion were the documents
required under the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No.
7, Series of 1997.
6

Subsequently, a Site Inspection Report was prepared by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Regional Office (Region XI) and was indorsed to
DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr.
On March 16, 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the
Provincial Land Use Technical Committee (PLUTC)
7
conducted an inspection of the
subject properties. In a Memorandum dated July 9, 1999, the PLUTC recommended
that SACI's application be made subject to the following conditions: 1) presentation
by SACI of its development plan; 2) submission of the lacking documents; 3) re-
survey and segregation of the property according to use or project in coordination
with the DAR Regional Office; and, 4) submission of the resulting map indicating
the technical description of the area per actual use/project attested by the Regional
Director.
Meanwhile, on March 22, 1999, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary
opposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged
that its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the
commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, an "Urgent
Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of Banana Commercial
Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI and was received by the PARC Secretariat on
July 14, 1999.
In the March 30, 2000 deliberation of the PLUTC, the committee agreed to
recommend the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares that had been planted with bananas
and coconuts. The committee noted that said portion of the property was still viable
for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest or with
opposition from SARBAI. It likewise recommended that the decision as to the rest of
the area applied for conversion shall be deferred subject to the submission of the
following within a period of thirty (30) days: 1) a five-year comprehensive
development plan; 2) a survey plan signed by the Regional Technical Director of
Land Management Service and noted by the DAR Regional Director (Region XI); 3)
SACI's proof of undertaking, which will contain the package of benefits it intends to
give to the affected farm workers except those working in the banana plantation; 4)
the concurrence of all the workers who would be affected by the proposed
conversion, which concurrence should be noted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) and acknowledged by a notary public.
On its part, SACI contended that 1) its projects were aligned to address the
current and anticipated commercial and residential needs of Sarangani province, and
the removal of any portion of its property included in its comprehensive
development plan will affect the viability of the plan; 2) the banana plantations will
be transformed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made available to
the displaced workers and the other low income earners of Alabel; 3) the company
will construct and install power generation facilities in the entire area; 4) at the time
the application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of Coverage was ever
issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly irregular
because the same may be issued only after the final resolution of the application for
land use conversion; and 5) the previous Order of Deferment cannot be a legal
barrier to the filing of an application for land use conversion.
On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI's
application for land use conversion. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:
. . . The proponent also submitted another DA certification stating that 12
parcels of land (Lot Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 807, 53, 10, 39 and 806) with an
area of 816.7401 hectares, located at Maribulan, Alabel, Sarangani are part of
expansion for urbanizing areas. Though discussed on several meetings, no
decision was made on the application since the applicant was not able to
comply with the documentary requirements and clarify the issues raised by
the Committee. DCESaI
[I]n [the] 30 March 2000 Meeting of the PLUTC, the Committee deliberated
again [on] the subject application and agreed to recommend the disapproval
of 158.0672 hectares area planted to banana[s] and coconuts. The Committee
noted that said portion of the property is still viable for agriculture, irrigated,
with Notice of Coverage and with protest or opposition from SARBAI. The
Committee also agreed to request the DAR to determine the metes and
bounds of the area planted to banana[s] and coconuts vis--vis areas devoted
to other enterprises. Relative to the rest of the area applied for conversion, the
committee deferred its decision subject to the submission of a 5-year
comprehensive development plan, showing among others, the schedule of
development by phase, the specific lots involved and the corresponding
proposed use.
. . . The Committee acceded to the request of SACI and deferred its
recommendation to deny conversion of that portion of the property planted to
banana[s] and coconut[s] pending submission of a manifesto or SACI's proof
of undertaking that it will compensate farm workers affected by showing,
among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots
involved and the corresponding proposed use [of] the conversion, concurred
by the workers/oppositors, noted by the MARO and duly notarized. The
Committee also requested SACI to submit details of the pomelo farm in
Malandag being offered as a replacement farm for the relocation of the farm
workers. SACI was given a 30-day period to submit these documents.
SACI, however, failed to submit the oath of undertaking to pay disturbance
compensation to affected workers being required by the Committee and as
provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1999. Instead,
SACI submitted an undertaking executed by the affected workers stating that
they are amenable to the package of benefits offered by the company.
Nevertheless, those who executed the deed of undertaking did not represent
the majority of the farm workers. Out of the 95 regular banana workers only
45 and eight (8) supervisors including four (4) workers who were not
included in the workers' master list of SACI executed a deed of undertaking.
As regards the 105-hectare pomelo farm, SACI failed to affirm whether they
are going to pursue their offer. Likewise, DAR Region XI reported that
coverage of the same area is on-going, and a different group of potential
beneficiaries have already been identified. Therefore, it could no longer be
offered as a relocation site. Foregoing considered, the Committee, during its
18 August 2000 Meeting, sustained its earlier recommendation to deny the
conversion of that portion of the property planted to bananas and coconuts.
With regard to the rest. of the area, the Committee deferred its decision
subject to the delineation by the SACI of the total area that they can develop
within the allowed fiveyear period. Likewise, the PLUTC is requesting the
SACI to submit a revised five-year development plan that will show the
schedule of development by phase, by year, and the proposed use for each
parcel of land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that:
1. The application filed by the Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc.
(SACI), represented by Cynthia Adao-Prat, involving parcels of land planted
to banana[s] and coconut[s] and with Notice of Coverage identified as TCT
Nos. T-10885 (20.9149 ha.), T-14359 (10.9390 ha.), T-41718 (3.3115 ha.),
OCT No. V-19574 or T-9210 (12.1425 ha.), Lot 807 (6.7871 ha.) and portion
of P-V-125 (95.00 ha.) and [an] area covered by Lot 53 (5.0672 ha.) with an
aggregate area of 154.622 [actually it is 154.1622] hectares is hereby
DENIED. The Dar Regional Office of Region XI is hereby instructed to
determine the metes and bounds of the area subject for distribution to the
qualified FWBs.
2. The resolution of the application involving the rest of the area applied
for conversion is DEFERRED pending submission by the applicant of a
revised five-year development plan indicating the specific use of each parcel
of land.
SO ORDERED.
8

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision but the
same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution, dated September 24, 2004.
Their Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order having been denied,
respondents appealed to the Office of the President (O.P. Case No. 02-1-47.4,
alleging that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform committed serious errors in 1) finding
that a notice of coverage had been issued for the banana area of the land holdings; 2)
giving undue significance to the protest or opposition by SARBAI; 3) requiring a
deed of undertaking even after applicant-appellant's written commitment to pay
whatever lawful obligation SACI may incur as a consequence of the conversion; 4)
holding that farms with commercial farm deferment cannot be applied for
conversion; 5) ruling that irrigated lands suitable for agriculture were disqualified for
conversion; and 6) ruling that applicant-appellant had not submitted a five-year
development plan.
9

In a Decision dated June 30, 2003, the Office of the President through
Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto
the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied,
10
so they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the
same issues.
On July 19, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN
DUE COURSE. Consequently, the assailed Decision and Order dated June
30, 2003 and September 12, 2003, respectively, of the Office of the President,
as well as the Orders dated November 9, 2000 and August 28, 2002 of the
DAR Secretary are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the DAR
directs the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the distribution of
the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of
Coverage. The Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby
directed to issue a conversion order covering the aforesaid area under the
terms and conditions as provided in pertinent guidelines of the department.
As to the rest of the area applied for conversion, action on which has been
deferred, the DAR Regional Office (DAR Region No. XI) is hereby
DIRECTED to expedite the processing and evaluation of petitioners' land use
conversion application in accordance with the provisions of DAR AO No. 7,
Series of 1997, and DAR AO No. 01-99 whenever the provisions of the latter
issuance are made applicable to those applications filed before its effectivity.
The DAR Secretary and all officers and employees acting on his behalf are
hereby enjoined from proceeding with the distribution of petitioners' lands
under compulsory acquisition provided in Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 6657.
Whatever actions already taken in pursuance of the June 16, 1998 Notice of
Coverage under CARP are hereby nullified for DAR's failure to observe due
process therein.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
11

Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
I
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE JUNE 16, 1998 NOTICE OF COVERAGE WAS
ILLEGAL AS DAR ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
II
WHEN IT RULED THAT DAR SHOULD USE THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND
USE PLANS AND ACCOMPANYING ORDINANCE OF THE LOCAL
SANGGUNIAN AS PRIMARY REFERENCE SO AS NOT TO DEFEAT THE
VERY PURPOSE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT (LGU) CONCERNED
IN RECLASSIFYING CERTAIN AREAS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC BENEFITS IN PURSUANCE TO ITS MANDATE TOWARDS THE
GENERAL WELFARE.
III
WHEN IT FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE BASIC
PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO
THE REQUIREMENTS OR PRECONDITIONS FOR LAND
CLASSIFICATION/CONVERSION AND THE BASIC MANDATE OF THE
CARP.
With regard to the first issue on due process, this Court holds that, under the
circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR
can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment
period
12
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657
upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998. The pertinent provision of the law states:
Sec. 11. Commercial Farming. Commercial farms, which are private
agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetables and
cut-flower farms, cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to
immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from
the effectivity of this Act. [xiii]13 In the case of new farms, the ten-year
period shall begin from the first year of commercial production and
operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the
Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon
payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon,
preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall
thereafter manage the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries. (AS amended
by R.A. 7881; Rules and regulations on the acquisition, valuation
compensation and distribution of deferred commercial farms DAR AO
No. 09, s. 1998)
DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998,
14
on the Rules and
Regulations on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of
Deferred Commercial Farms applies to all commercial farms as defined under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657:
15

SEC. 2. Statement of Policies. The acquisition, valuation,
compensation, distribution, operation and management of deferred
commercial farms shall be governed by the following policies:
(a) All commercial farms whose deferment expired as of June 15, 1998
shall be subject to immediate acquisition and distribution under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Those whose deferments
have yet to expire will be acquired and distributed only upon expiration of
their respective deferment period as originally determined by the Department
of Agrarian reform (DAR), or earlier if the DAR determines that the purpose
for which it was deferred no longer exists and revokes its deferment;
The process of acquisition of these commercial farms by DAR is specifically
provided under Article III, Section 9 of the above administrative order, to wit:
SEC. 9. Procedure for Acquisition. The acquisition of deferred
commercial farms shall be governed by the following procedures:
(a) Voluntary Offer to Sell/Compulsory Acquisition
1) The Order of Deferment previously issued over the landholding shall
serve, upon expiration of the deferment period of the subject commercial
farm, as the Notice of Coverage,
16
supported by the Compliance Work
Program and Summary of Exceptions (Form A) originally submitted with the
approved deferment application. However, for record purposes, the
landowner shall be served a Notice of Expiration of Deferment (Annex 2)
which shall contain a reminder of his right of retention, should he wish to
exercise the same;
2) In general, the procedure for acquisition shall follow DAR
Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, entitled "Revised Rules and
Procedures governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands subject of
Voluntary offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6657," subject to certain modifications intended to expedite the
process as provided herein.
Clearly, it was unnecessary for petitioner to issue a notice of coverage to
respondents in order to place the properties in question under CARP coverage.
Hence, the contention by respondents that due process was not duly observed by
petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the denial of the application for conversion must
be upheld.
As regards the second issue, DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997,
or the Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands
to Non-agricultural Uses prescribes the guidelines for land use conversion:
VI. POLICIES AND GUIDELINES
A. . . .
B. General Guidelines
xxx xxx xxx
b) Conversion may be allowed if at the time of the
application, the lands are reclassified as commercial,
industrial, residential or other non-agricultural in the
new or revised town plans promulgated by the local
government unit (LGU) and approved by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988, in
accordance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, as
implemented by MC No. 54, and Executive Order No.
72, Series of 1993
17
of the Office of the President.
In connection with the afore-stated administrative order, Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
empowers the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands:
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may,
through an ordinance passed by the Sanggunian after conducting public
hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following
cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2)
where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
Sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited
to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, FIFTEEN
PERCENT (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%), and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%); Provided
further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law," shall not be affected by the said reclassification and
the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section
65 of said Act.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The local government units shall in conformity
with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted though zoning ordinances
which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use
of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food
production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be
taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions
of R.A. No. 6657.
18

Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section
20 of R.A. No. 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991
Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-
Agricultural Uses" issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the
scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify
agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances authorizing
reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of
the province in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for
highly urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with Executive
Order No. 72, Series of 1993, thus:
SECTION 4. Use of the comprehensive land use plans
19
and
ordinances as primary reference documents in land use conversions.
Pursuant to RA 6657 and EO 129-A, actions on applications for land use
conversions on individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of
DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference documents the
comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinance passed upon and
approved by the LGUs concerned, together with the National Land Use
Policy.
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-
agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in
declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the
ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent
administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion that
while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or disapproving
applications for land use conversion filed by individual landowners on their
landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be confined to compliance
with the requirements and limitations under existing laws and regulations,
such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to be reclassified,
ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and
those falling under environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for
conversion under the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR's power in such cases
may not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the
LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic
benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare. Precisely,
therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as primary references in
evaluating applications for land use conversion filed by individual
landowners. In this case, petitioners have already complied with the standard
requirements laid down under the applicable rules and regulations of the
DAR. . . .
20

The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly
regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No.
6657 are present.
21
In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA
that DAR's scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limited
to examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case where,
because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to
urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, the
local government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural to
non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993,
and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the
comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of
respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local government for
non-agricultural uses. SCaIcA
This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents which is
included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be
automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject
to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is
present here is that a portion of respondents' property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion
totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts,
are covered by CARL's ten-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15,
1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon
the lapse of the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL
or R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the
Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands into
non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents' properties are
located.
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification
that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the
applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands
explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as repealing,
amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657." Thus,
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application.
22

In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the third
issue presented in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the issue on
due process is concerned. In connection with this, the denial by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) of respondents' application for conversion with regard to
the 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares, the deferment period of which has already
expired, is AFFIRMED; and the Orders of the DAR dated November 9, 2000 and
August 28, 2002, directing the MARO of Alabel, Sarangani to proceed with the
distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of the June 16, 1998 Notice of
Coverage, are REINSTATED. The Decision and Resolution, dated July 19, 2004 and
September 24, 2004, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79899, are hereby MODIFIED accordingly.
No costs.

LEAGUE OF CITIES
During the 11
th
Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of
municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of
Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on
bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12
th
Congress,
R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for
conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million
locally-generated income. In the 13
th
Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of
the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular
municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No.
9009. Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities
constitutional?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is
unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such
exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. The
Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a
fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed
because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the just
share of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes. (League of Cities of
the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling

No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for
reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and
declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting
16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations and
clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside
the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill
No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar
as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city
will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added.
The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities
by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants
before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income
requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair.
Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal
remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the
necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC
of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities
of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines
v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling
already became final and executory and was recorded in the SCs Book of
Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18,
2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts
(RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not
overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as
the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying
reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the
same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision, the
Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008
ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which
expressly provides that no cityshall be createdexcept in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code. It stressed that while all

the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local
Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the
increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the
LGC. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that
Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the
Constitution.Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering
the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution, the
Court held.
The Court further held that limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all
similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities
can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,
even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still
be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No.
176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499,
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling
Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the
fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011Ruling
Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should
not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not
only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also
complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC
prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave
these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this
Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and
unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective
wisdom of Congress, the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage
of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for
the creation of cities.

The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon,
the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several
municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that
RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient.
By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by
the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of
Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to
Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June
30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate
failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and
forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it.
Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the
Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably
voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously
approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption
clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express
articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without
exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by
necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express
exemptions being embodied in the exemption
clauses.(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/0414110
1.php)
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100
million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution
mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the
criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution
must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment
imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to
promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the
concomitant national growth. (GR No. 176951, League of City of the
Philippinesv. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of City of the Philippines
v. COMELEC: GR No. 178056, League of City of the Philippines v.
COMELEC, April 12, 2011)











NAVARRO vs ERMIITA
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population is
120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual
income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. 9355
creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the
COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the
creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative
votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both
the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat
Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial
officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the
May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set
of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro
and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat
as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of
Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA),
and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?
Suggested Answer:
February 10, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local
Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000
inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of

802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of
2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of
Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from
the land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found
in Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between
the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic
law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law, held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v.
Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and
Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.

April 12, 2011 Ruling
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12,
2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed
of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land
area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation
of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and
land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be
created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if
the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption
should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a
greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land
area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component
cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided
in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the
congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity
of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local government
units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land
area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted
by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not
outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that
consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves,
also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of
islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to
Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be
made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. fellester.blogspot.com This
would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a
province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate
the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural
progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential
option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer
territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of
water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of
a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by
the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10,
2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in

favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the
perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. (Navarro
vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011)

NAVARRO v ERMITA
Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands,
formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality
for not being in compliance with the population or the land area
requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous
decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as
unconstitutional.
Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province
constitutional?
Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the
creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation
of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land
area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under
Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been
the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces
especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine
archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461
of the LGC (provision relating to creation of provinces), such was
incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional
oversight in said provision and reflecting the true legislative intent.
Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which
could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the
purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the
Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together
with territorial contiguity.








DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC
Division in an election protest may not directly assail the order before the
Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is
to to seek the review of said interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial
race for the province of Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival,
filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying
and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to
the COMELEC First Division.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite
cash deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of
the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the
special affirmative defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to
the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being
merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The
COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas motion for
reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
HELD:

Petition DENIED.
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the
power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such
power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC
First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper
remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first
decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal
the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along
with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an
interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC was issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in
Kho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has no application
herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine
the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as
required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether
such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.














EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105120. September 4, 1992.]

SIMPLICIO C. GRIO, ARTURO GADIAN, THE LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, EVELYN C. JIZ AND PERLA
ZULUETA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ILOILO
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, Respondents.

Jiz, Jiz, Andrada & Gellada and Santos B. Aguadera, for Petitioners.

Juanito M. Acanto for himself and for other intervenors.

Leonardo E. Lozano for petitioner-in-intervention.

R E S O L U T I O N

MEDIALDEA, J .:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the act of
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) of disallowing the voters of the
sub-province of Guimaras, to vote for the governor, vice-governor of the
province of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the
second district of the province, in the recently conducted May 11, 1992 local and
national elections.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

This petition was filed by the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a duly
registered and accredited political party, through its Iloilo Provincial Chairman,

co-petitioner, Simplicio Grio. Grio was also the official candidate of the party
for the position of governor of Iloilo. The other co-petitioner, Arturo Gadian,
claimed to be a registered voter of the municipality of Buenavista, sub-province
of Guimaras, Iloilo.

The sub-province of Guimaras is composed of three municipalities, namely,
Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia, with a combined voting population of
fifty thousand (50,000), more or less. These three municipalities also constitute a
part of the second district of Iloilo, with the municipalities of Pavia, Leganes,
Sta. Barbara, New Lucena, Zarraga, Alimodian, Leon and San Miguel
composing the remaining municipalities constituting the entire second district. In
the previous elections, the voters from the municipalities comprising the sub-
province of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the provincial officials of the
entire province of Iloilo.

On January 1, 1992, the 1991 Local Government Code came into effect (Sec.
536, R.A. 7160). Section 462 thereof called for the conversion of existing
subprovinces into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite to be held in the areas directly affected by such conversion.
Said section likewise directed the holding of the said plebiscite simultaneously
with the national elections following the effectivity of R.A. 7160.

The first national elections conducted after the effectivity of R.A. 7160 was the
recently concluded May 11, 1992 elections which was also held simultaneously
with the local elections. Pursuant to Section 462 of R.A. 7160, the Comelec
conducted a plebiscite for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province
simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections.

On April 15, 1992, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 2410 providing for the
rules and regulations governing the plebiscite to decide the question on the
conversion of the sub-province of Guimaras into a regular province. Section 3
thereof provided that all registered voters of Iloilo, except Iloilo City, and in the
sub-province of Guimaras, who are qualified to vote for the provincial officials
thereof in the May 11, 1992 elections, were qualified to vote in the plebiscite.
The ballots used for the three (3) municipalities of the sub-province of Guimaras
and the entire province of Iloilo were provided with appropriate spaces at the
bottom for this question:chanrobles law library : red

PLEBISCITE QUESTION

Do you vote for the approval of the conversion of the sub-province pursuant to
Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160?


[ ] Yes [ ] No

It was however, observed by the herein petitioners, that the ballots distributed by
the Comelec for use in the three (3) municipalities of Guimaras did not contain
any space or provision for the election of the governor, vice-governor and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of
Iloilo, of which the sub-province of Guimaras was a part.

On May 13, 1992, or two (2) days after the election was conducted, herein
petitioners filed the instant petition far certiorari. Petitioners alleged in
substance that respondent Comelec acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion when it disallowed the voters of the sub-province of
Guimaras from voting for the governor and vice governor of Iloilo and the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of
Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was passed providing
specifically for the creation of existing sub-provinces into a full-fledged
province, it do not specifically provide that the voters of the subprovince shall no
longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who, in case of a vote
against its conversion into a regular province, would continue to represent said
sub-province. Furthermore, respondent Commission on Elections failed to
inform the candidates and the voters of such disenfranchisement.

On May 14, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Commission on Elections and the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo City
to cease and desist from canvassing and proclaiming the results of the election
for the office of the governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Iloilo. We also ordered the public respondents to file their
comments.

On May 29, 1992, public respondents filed their comment through the Office of
the Solicitor General. On June 9, 1992, the petitioners filed their reply to public
respondents comment.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On June 17, 1992, We lifted the temporary restraining order.

On June 22, 1992, Perla S. Zulueta, who claimed to be the official candidate of
the Nacionalista Party for the office of the governor of the Province of Iloilo and
who allegedly ranked number two behind the frontrunner Arthur Defensor, filed
a motion for leave to intervene and for admission of her petition in intervention
which was attached to the motion. Zulueta alleged the same allegations as those
presented in the main petition and claimed that she has an interest in the matter
of the main petition because the same is crucial and determinative of whether or

not she would win for the office of governor. We admit herein the said petition
for intervention and resolve the issue she raised therein in this decision
considering that it is the same issue raised in the main petition.

Still another motion for intervention dated June 25, 1992 was filed by Rodolfo
Legaspi and Richard Garin, Juanito Acanto and Alberto Javellana, Grace
Fernandez and Pablito Araneta, and Nerio Salcedo and Antonio Teodeco,
candidates for members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the first,
third, fourth and fifth districts of Iloilo, respectively. Apparently, unaware of the
lifting of the restraining order, they alleged in their motion that they were unduly
prejudiced by the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 14,
1992 because the issue presented in the main petition had no direct effect on
them or their election and they prayed for the lifting of the said restraining order.

On July 9, 1992, We issued a resolution denying the motion for intervention
filed by Legaspi, Garin, Acanto, Javellana, Fernandez, Araneta, Salcedo and
Tedoco because We had previously lifted the temporary restraining order and
considering that they were not directly affected by the principal issue in the main
petition (p. 126, Rollo) which involved only the positions of governor, vice-
governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district
of Iloilo.

On July 8, 1992, the petitioners filed another motion to admit Amended Petition
with the Amended Petition attached thereto. The original petition was amended
to include as petitioners, Evelyn C. Jiz another candidate for member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.

The pertinent provision affecting the principal issue in this case is Section 462 of
the 1991 Local Government Code (R.A. 7160). It provides in
full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 462. Existing Subprovinces. Existing sub-provinces are hereby
converted into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite to be held in the said sub-provinces and the original provinces
directly affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Comelec
simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this Code.

"The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall
continue to be represented in Congress by the duly elected representatives of the
original districts out of which said new provinces or districts were created until
their own representatives shall have been elected in the next regular
congressional elections and qualified.


"The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular
provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy
occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting
from expiration of their terms of office in case of a negative vote in the plebiscite
results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold
office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections
following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such
conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly
created province through appointment if none has yet been appointed to the same
as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the other
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold
office until their successors shall have been elected in the next regular local
elections and qualified.

"All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said
sub-provinces at the time of their conversion into regular provinces shall
continue in office in accordance with the civil service law, rules and
regulations."cralaw virtua1aw library

We have carefully examined this section of the 1991 Local Government Code
and We observed its incompleteness and inadequacy to govern all or any
eventuality. It should be remembered that the law should take into consideration
the decision of the populace to be affected by a change in its political set-up. As
it is worded, Section 462 completely addresses an eventuality where the people
of both the original district and the people of the new district to be created agree
to the proposed creation of the latter. The law provides that, "After the effectivity
of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor of the
newly created province through appointment, if none has yet been appointed to
the same (as hereinafter provided), and shall also appoint a vice-governor and the
other members of the sangguniang panlalawigan . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

But suppose the proposed-conversion of a subprovince is rejected by those
affected by such conversion, what does the law say? The law states only the
following in case of a negative vote: "The incumbent elected officials of said
sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until
June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent
elected officials, or resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case a
negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the
President. The appointee shall hold office until their successors shall have been
elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein
and qualified. . . ." Whatever incumbent elective positions exist under the present
set-up, it appears that in case of a negative vote, these sub-provincial positions
shall be filled by appointment of the President. The makers of the law however,

failed to foresee that in the event the negative vote prevails naturally, the sub-
province shall continue to be a part of the original province and continue to be
represented by the provincial officials of the original province. The law is silent
or whether the voters of the sub-province proposed to be converted into a regular
province shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials in the
election held simultaneously with the plebiscite. If the voters of Guimaras were
allowed to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo and the "Yes" vote in the
plebiscite prevailed, these votes shall not be considered. If however, the "No"
vote prevailed and the voters of Guimaras were allowed to vote for the
provincial officials of Iloilo, their votes shall be taken into consideration. The
Commission on Elections, being the agency directed to conduct the plebiscite
decided not to let the voters of Guimaras vote for the provincial officials. The
Commission was under mistaken presumption that under Section 462 of the
1991 Local Government Code, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a
regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up
the positions of provincial officials through appointment until their successors
shall have been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a
negative vote, the elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by
the President. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint
provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of
the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the provincial
officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by registered voters of Iloilo
province including the sub-province of Guimaras.chanrobles law library

However, it would serve no useful purpose if We undo all that the Commission
on Elections had done in that plebiscite. It is more relevant to deal with the facts
actually obtaining in the instant case. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the
voters of the subprovince of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the
conversion of Guimaras into a regular province. The total "Yes" votes was
283,224 as against 42,524 "No" votes (p. 34, Rollo). In this event, the President
shall appoint, as in fact he already did appoint according to newspaper reports,
the governor for the newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also
appoint a vice-governor and the member of the sangguniang panlalawigan in
accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-
province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically independent from the
province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a special
election for the municipalities of Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia for the
purpose of electing the governor and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and
academic.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library


SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and
Nocon, Jr., JJ., concur.


Equal Protection Gerrymandering
**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in
power. **
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution
No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise
provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities,
and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial
elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a
chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to
the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of
the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed)
questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They
said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the
right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering
motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter
of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and
historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered
voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu
would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu.
Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter.
Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including
Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to
vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that
such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the
purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the
right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a
denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of
local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is

stated that The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or
legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio
should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into
being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and
therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on
the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction.
The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It
would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity
as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial
government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the
election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal
protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to
vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of
allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and
denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of
legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right
of suffrage.











Tobias v. Abalos
Facts: RA 7675 converted Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city.
Sec. 49 of the law provides that the City of Mandaluyong shall have its
own legislative district. Petitioners contend that said section violate
three provisions of the Constitution: the one-subject one-bill rule (Art.
VI, Sec. 26(1)); that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members (Art. VI, Sec. 5(1)); and that it
preempted Congress of its right to reapportion legislative districts (Art.
VI, Sec. 5(4)).
Issue: WON Sec. 49 of RA 7675 violates the Constitution, as asserted
by petitioners.
Ruling: No violation. Liberal construction of the one-title, one-subject
rule: sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and
all the provisions are germane to that general subject. Absence of
census data showing 250K inhabitants: not required that all laws
emanating from Congress contain all relevant data considered by it in
the enactment of said laws. 250-member limit not absolute: "unless
otherwise provided by law". Preempting of Congress' right: Congress
passed the bill. Gerrymandering accusation: division of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two diminished Zamora's constituency, which
could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts:

Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of
the RA 7675 with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong

into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same
bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by
invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to
for the the conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying
RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues:

WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one
subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members
of the Congress to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.


Ruling:

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention
of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject
and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was
enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the
members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which
drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.


In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.


Miranda vs Aguirre
Posted by kaye lee on 12:46 PM
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA
No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite.
1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that
practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit
the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper
plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying
that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an
independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a
plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also
questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued
that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at
bar.

RULING:

Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court
has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political
question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could
decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is
unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger,
division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is
mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No.
8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the
President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners
were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to
be heard in the conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be
conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No.
8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as
unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.











Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its
manager and authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal
Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN
ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J .:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be
reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated
and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator
duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City
pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of
the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels
in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
1


According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San
Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are
the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager
Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S
No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took
and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car
was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone.
The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly
removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal
parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents
herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan,
Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on
May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the
clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to
Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the
prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp
by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and
carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is
P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the declamping
fee of P500.00 were not paid by the respondents.
2

The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against
each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery
under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3)
John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang.
The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City on May 23, 2003.
3
A preliminary investigation took place on May
28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging
Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with
Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of
his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was
parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of

his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle
was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but
to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue
using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he intended
to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against
Jadewell.
4

In the Resolution
5
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando
City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable
cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding
the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the
felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and
force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence
of the crime.
x x x x
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the
wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure
to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance
No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the
provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into
their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the
respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into
this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner
of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000
in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them in
Court.
6

Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with unity of action and concerted
design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an

immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was
earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for
violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and
prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation
(Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth P26,250.00 and other consequential
damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.
7

The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto
Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a
January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation
8
on February 2, 2004.
The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two
Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or
liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged
an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one
offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x
x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic]
after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was
committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand corner
of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on
October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of
the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case,
if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information
was filed.
9


In an Order
10
dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr.,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted
the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding
to the February 10, 2004 Order
11
to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the
period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these
cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has,
however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the
prescribed period.
12

Respondents filed their Opposition
13
on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a
Reply
14
on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution
15
dated April 16, 2004 upholding the
Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on
one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action
has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged
violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not
on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992,
En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails
over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO
ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND
TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition
16
for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of
prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously
saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private
respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and
not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the
complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the
institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."
17

Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable
Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in
these cases had prescribed.
x x x x
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary
Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a City
Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it
was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11
of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be
commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in
any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the
assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia
is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have
been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary
Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for
violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by
information."
18


Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive
period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,
19
respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not
gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
20
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes
21
held that the proceedings mentioned
in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus,
this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period
commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7,
2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were
filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-
month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations
(for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents
and upheld the respondent judges Order dated February 10, 2004 and the
Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of
the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang,
"John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents were charged
with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case,
assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a
Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of
two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in
Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office
of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,
22
respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not
err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the
other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that
the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with
more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also,
respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders,
since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed
Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge
Santiago
23
which held that the private complainant may only appeal the civil
aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,
24
petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004
only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did
not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also
maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must
include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National
Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
25
and Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition
for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition"
26
before the
court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law
and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to

the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and
municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive
period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not
argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,
27
this Court defined the parameters of
prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following
should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2)
the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive
period was interrupted.
28
(Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two
months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or
are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the
attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively
commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases
falling within their jurisdiction:
x x x x
B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided,
however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted
de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451
reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall not
affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent
component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall
be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized
cities or component cities. An independent component city has a charter that
proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all
cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United
States v. Pascual Pacis,
29
this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio
Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of
Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in
an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in
Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal
also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the
offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May
30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow
that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,"
the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more
than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he
wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before
that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which
says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2
thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we
must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making

power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.
30

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of
the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect
of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan
31
categorically
stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are
concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well.
However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not
to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the
Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the
representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run
until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information
and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original
charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance
did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were
correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery
and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on
October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge
Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice National Prosecutors
Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5
as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court.
The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the
same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;

b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is
sufficient if it states that the crime charged was committed or some of the
ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential
element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the
Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling
place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in
the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial
Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it
is merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, or
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try
the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
period of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or
information in court.
x x x x

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the
same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1
Presidential Decree No. 1275
32
reorganized the Department of Justices
Prosecution Staff and established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These
Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions
where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of
responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union
includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province,
Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was
designated to file the Information within the two-month period provided for in
Act No. 3326, as amended.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as
it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands
that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription
period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to
toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording
thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
33

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED






BAGABUYO vs. COMELEC
Political Law Reapportionment of a single legislative district
In 2006, RA 9371 was promulgated by Congress. It was entitled An Act
Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City
of Cagayan De Oro. This was proposed by Rep. Jaraula from Cagayan de
Oro. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. In the
next election, Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as belonging to
either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence.
The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to
Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On 13
March 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837
implementing R.A. No. 9371. Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the
COMELEC on March 27, 2007 asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371
and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that
1.) Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within
the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
2.) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator the
material change in the political and economic rights of the local government
units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 3.) a voters
sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire citys
Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the
questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in
the district designated by the COMELEC; 4.) a voter was also arbitrarily
denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city
council for the other legislative district, and 5.) government funds were
illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of
Cagayan De Oro City.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative
reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division
and conversion of a local government unit. Whether or not it violates the
equality of representation doctrine.
HELD: Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as
the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or
other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats
in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting
district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change
in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated
by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371
does not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two
political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in
Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council
members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having
two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de
Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of
the citys population. This easily means better access to their congressman
since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000. The fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for
each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian. The City,
for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and
voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the
country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence
of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a
quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in Congress. Bagabuyo further contends that RA 9371 violates
the equality in representation doctrine as it appears that one district has a
higher number of voters as compared to the other and that one is urbanized
the other is rural. This is the clarification; the law clearly provides that the
basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province, not the number of registered voters therein






Aldaba vs. COMELEC
Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to
declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district
for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the
passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House
Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223,
069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be
issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III
Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as
projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to
meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city
to meritrepresentative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district
for the City of Malolos, Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned.
And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or
projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591
isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the

1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987
Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation
with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is
based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal
effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to
issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by
Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which
provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such
are declared official by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this
case, it was not stated whether the document have been
declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of
Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which
in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate,
even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August
1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that
the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and
voting power among districts.


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EN BANC

[G.R No. 188078 : March 15, 2010]

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO,
JULIO G. MORADA, AND MINERVA ALDABA MORADA,
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.

R E S O L U T I O N

CARPIO, J .:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25
January 2010.
[1]


The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already
considered and rejected in the Decision, that Congress' reliance on the
Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director,
National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City's population
in 2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the
other sources of Malolos City's population indicators as of 2007 (2007
Census of Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report
[2]
) and
as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District, dated
31 July 2008,
[3]
and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22
August 2008
[4]
) which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic
Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-
justiciability argument to these materials.


We find no reason to grant the motion.

First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and
authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in
enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative
districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court's judicial
review power,
[5]
then there is more reason to hold justiciable
subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their
compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least
250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To
fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the
authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress
used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five
decades ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an
apportionment law alleged to violate the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation:
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040
improves existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise
of judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely
political and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of
authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review
by the courts[:]
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial
question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the ground
that it is a political question.

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so
exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude
a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is
properly brought before it.

It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit
upon the political situation does not render it political instead of
judicial.


The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present
set-up constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of
constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the
means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the
existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of duty,
Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with
the precepts of the Constitution.
[6]
(Emphasis supplied; internal
citations omitted)

To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA
9591 is to contend that this Court has no power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELEC's theory, this
Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative
districts no matter how unreliable and non-authoritative the
population indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can
be no surer way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
[7]


Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population
indicators Congress used to measure Malolos City's compliance with
the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. On
Miranda's Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth
rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135's
requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be
based on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared
official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB);
(b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the
middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or
estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Further, using Miranda's own growth rate
assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2010
will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000
(using as base Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2007 which is

223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of the
NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable as it neither
makes Miranda the NSO Administrator's designated certifying officer
nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use
demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB
or make the projection as of the middle of 2010.

Nor are the 2007 Census of Population - PMS 3 - Progress
Enumeration Report, the Certification of the City of Malolos' Water
District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng
Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of them
qualifies as authoritative population indicator under EO 135. The 2007
Census of Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report merely
contains preliminary data on the population census of Bulacan which
were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual population as indicated in
the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos City's population at
223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), adopts Malolos City's claim that the 2007 census for Malolos
City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year 2010, the
population count for Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional
requirement."
[8]
This unbecoming attack by the government's chief
counsel on the integrity of the processes of the government's census
authority has no place in our judicial system. The OSG ought to know
that absent convincing proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO
enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the performance of its
functions.

The Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District fares no better.
EO 135 excludes from its ambit certifications from a public utility
gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate
the water district's so-called population census to the level of
credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence
of NSO. This will allow population data incidentally gathered by
electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter into legislative
processes even though these private entities are not in the business of
generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific training,
experience and competence to handle, collate and process them.


Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative
because much like the Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng
Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census, much less
during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to
conduct population census are local government units (that is,
province, city, municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval
of the NSCB and under the technical supervision of the NSO from
planning to data processing.
[9]


By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely
divergent population figures,
[10]
the COMELEC unwittingly
highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized
certifications. EO 135's stringent standards ensuring reliability of
population census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core of
crucial government decisions and, in this case, the legislative function
of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating congressional
districts in cities with at least 250,000 constituents.

There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the
constitutionality of RA 9591. The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to
convince the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of
Miranda's certificate.
[11]
It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt
standards contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the
absence of an express prohibition.
[12]
Indeed, one is hard-pressed to
find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO
certification of a city's population for purposes of creating its
legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a highly-
urbanized or an independent component city.
[13]
Congress itself
confirms the wisdom and relevance of EO 135's paradigm of
privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the
population requirement in the creation and conversion of local
government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO
certification.
[14]
Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less
important than the creation of local government units in enhancing our
democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the
same stringent standards.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if,

before the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population
mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one Member."
COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in
compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA
9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from
the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan
isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district.
[15]

This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each
legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG
does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies
at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of
the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making
compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the
constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of
ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative for
Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City's
legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and
compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic
unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the
minimum mass of constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
respondent Commission on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is
DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.

SO ORDERED.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE
ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R.
MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J .:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action,
petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as
public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional
of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of
the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent
Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from
taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took
effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.
1
In substance, the said law
created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to
have a population of 1,693,821,
2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts
in this wise:
District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando
417,304
2nd District Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
474,899
3rd District Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
372,548
4th District Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
429,070
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district. The following table
3
illustrates the reapportionment made by
Republic Act No. 9716:
District Municipalities/Cities Population
1st District Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
176,383
2nd District Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San
Fernando
Gainza
Milaor
276,777

3rd District (formerly 2nd
District)
Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
439,043
4th District (formerly 3rd
District)
Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
372,548
5th District (formerly 4th
District)
Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
429,070
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both
parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of
House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in
favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public
hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur
on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and
debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the
bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such
new district.
4

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of
the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City,
which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of
Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other
local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third
and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district.
5
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic
Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population
of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for
the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.
6
The provision reads:

Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited
provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative
district.
7
The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created
province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a
minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.
8
Under this view,
existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new
districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least
250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation
of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the
minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000
in the creation of additional legislative seats.
9
The petitioners argue that when
the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the
House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the
projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year
1986.
10
According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200
district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)
representative.
11
Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population
constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200
legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts
independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a
250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional
Commission did in the original apportionment.

Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned
first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement
for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article
VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional
representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3)
and (4) of the Constitution.
12

The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
seek the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive
grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of
two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing
to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of

Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the
petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction
between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population
condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision
will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of
legislative districts in provinces.
13
Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is
only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for
the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716,
which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of
Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of
Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural
lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents
had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a
tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial
or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a
ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering
that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been
ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the
Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.

The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they
had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of
the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore,
conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted
with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of
the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules,
14
as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever
confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society.
15

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR)
16
and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,
17
this Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original
cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski
case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition
for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case
warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are
not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona,
18
Tatad v. Executive Secretary,
19
Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority
20
and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,
21
just to name
a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial
review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,
22
this Court held that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and
so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been
echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.
23


Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing
principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the
determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality.
24
Before a law may be declared
unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there
is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof
showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
25

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of
250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the
other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or
each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
26

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities
was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC.
27

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional
legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The
petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would
violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts
would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that
Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district,
explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least
one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.
28
(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither
should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering
moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least
a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either
of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but
is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran
through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two
hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional
Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI,
proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document.
The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO
THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES
AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that
the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide
apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan
Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many
districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply
discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the
determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as
an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein
at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which,
through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been
apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among,
several determinants.

From its journal,
29
we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally
divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded
to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed
by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was
given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;
30
second, the remaining seats were then
redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in
accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio."
31
Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and
then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark
32
for the
Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative
seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a
population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official
enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our
population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each
city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one
representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each
one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro,
Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever
appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with
the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
(Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province
had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the
records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission
narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern
towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa,
Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a

greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was
the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the
standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely:
1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact,
adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa
was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance
between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
x x x x
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480
and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would
result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south.
He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of
Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to
Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in
the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron
are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose
inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa
be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of
amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.
33

"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in
the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the
City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of
186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second
District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution
considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second
District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed
transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would

only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have
262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City
before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by
the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF
PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no
objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was
approved by the Body.
34

The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was
decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed
the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a
reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of
Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and
Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that,
perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of
the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by
itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second
District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the
population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower
during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase the
population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional
transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than
qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that
are also there.

Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and
Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the
place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the
Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr.
Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the
considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact
that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government
offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the
reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of
Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment
of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none
against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet
with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the
municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok,
Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District
shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting
of Region I.
35

Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into
districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a
city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit
area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters
common interests in line with the standard of compactness."
36
In the districting
of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and
common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and
disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral
leaders."
37
For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland
should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner
Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."
38


Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district
apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
39
that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or
rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To
ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of
access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires
is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand
of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have
at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the
formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population
growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled
to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the
1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this
point.
40
In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows
and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the
protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population
standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment
or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new

legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No.
4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the
regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of
the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting
from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.
41

Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the
increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter
absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,
42
that would
warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the
first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants
in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the
text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in
the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716
entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID
LAW.
SO ORDERED.



EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135927. June 26, 2000]
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI
NOR HASSAN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D.
YASSIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J .:
Way back in the 1950s and during the martial law era, it has been said
that even the dead, the birds and the bees voted in Lanao. This petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify
the Order issued by the Commission on Elections [COMELEC, for
brevity] dated June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao
Del Sur as "ghost precinct," is an illustrative case.
The facts are as follows:
On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and
annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with
the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel
Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts
sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present
petition for certiorari.i[1]
On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the
Commission sent telegrams to the respective Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) of the questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur,
including Padian Torogan, to file their answer to the petition for abolition
of precincts and annulment of book of voters.i[2]
On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur,
Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors
who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the twenty- three (23)
barangays the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to
be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in
Opposition"i[3] which included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of

the affected precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the book
of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the
purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of
Madalum, Lanao del Sur.i[4]
After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda
by the parties, the COMELEC issued an Orderi[5] dated February 11,
1998, referring the case to its Law Department for appropriate
investigation. The COMELEC - Law Department conformably issued a
memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct
a rigorous incisive investigation on the alleged ghost precincts and
thereafter submit a report on the investigation conducted."i[6]
Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION
TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing Election
Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to
conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in
the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur."i[7]
On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged
ghost precincts yielding the following results
"At 12:10 pm, the Task Force Investigation Team from the
COMELEC accompanied by traditional leaders, political
leaders, many concerned residents of this town, a
representative from the Lanao del Sur Provincial Statistics
Office, Mr. Lacson Abdullah, and a Team from the DILG-
ARMM, Lanao del Sur, arrived in the area supposedly
Barangay Padian Torogan with these comments and
observations:
"It appears that in this area there are only two structures:
One is a concrete house with no roof, and the other is a
wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously
mean that no single human being could possibly reside in
these two structures.
"Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a
cemetery not a residential place. So this contradicts the
records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the
Census saying that the area has 45 households with a

total population of 285. (Ref. Municipal census Report as
of September 1, 1995).
"Besides, no less than the Chairman of the COMELEC
Investigating Team asked the people around who among
them is a resident or a registered voter in the so-called
Barangay Padian-Torogan, and no one answered
affirmatively.
"Then at 12:50 PM, the COMELEC Investigating Team
still with the people mentioned above are in Barangay
Lumbac to look for the other supposed Barangay named
Rakutan, and found this observations.
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"By the way, unfortunately, at the peak of this ocular
inspection, the Madalum Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi
Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun,
arrived at the scene at exactly 12:55 pm boarding an
orange Mitsubishi car with four armed bodyguards, the
(sic) confronted the Team Leader of the COMELEC
Investigating Group and angrily insisted to stop the ocular
inspection.
"This STACOM Mindalano, in warning a photographer not
to take a shot on him, pointed his pistolized Rifle to this
man when the photographer positioned his camera to
take a picture of him while he is arguing with the
investigating leader, Mr. CASAN MACADATO.
"Moving camera film and several pictures are added
hereto for further information and as exhibits. Also
attached hereof are the names and signatures of among
the more-or-less one hundred people who observed the
conduct of this ocular inspection.
(NOTE: This writer, Mr. Khalil Y. Alawi, is a member of
the five (5) man Committee from the DILG-ARMM, Lanao
del Sur created in respect to the Memo/Invitation from the
COMELEC Provincial Office of Lanao del Sur dated June
15, 1998 signed by Mr. CASAN MACADATO, EO II, Chief

Investigation Team. Mr. Macadato designated verbally
and in public Mr. ALAWI to be his Secretary during this
investigation, and of course, the (sic) with the consent of
the DILG Team).
"I hereby certify that the foregoing are true and correct to
the best of my knowledge.
Prepared by: (sgd) Khalil Y. Alawi
Member, DILG Team
Submitted by: (sgd) Casan Macadato
Election Officer II
Chairman, Task Force Investigation Team" i[8]
On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato
submitted to the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi
City its 1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the
ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and Rakutan were uninhabited.i[9]
On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding
"Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the
COMELEC Order reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc:
(1) resolves to GRANT the request and hereby:
(a).....DIRECTS the Task Force Investigating Team
created pursuant to the Order of the Commission en banc
dated February 11, 1998, to continue the conduct of
ocular inspection and investigation as contained in the
original directive of the Law Department dated April 29,
1998;
(b).....RECOMMENDS to the PNP Director and the
Regional Director of the Philippine National police, (1) to
immediately relieve and transfer Chief of Police Mahdi

Mindalano of Madalum, Lanao del Sur and transfer him to
an area where it will be extremely difficult for him to return
to Mandalum and do further damage to effort of the
Commission to investigate ghost precincts in said area
considering the urgency of said investigation. (2) to look
into the possibility of involvement of other policement (sic)
in Madalum in the aforestated criminal mischief of the
Police Station Commander or their possible partisanship.
(c).....RECOMMENDS to AFP Regional Command,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to immediately assign
sufficient number of men to maintain peace and order in
the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao del Sur, and to escort
and secure the safety of the COMELEC Investigating
Team during the conduct of ocular inspections and
investigations.
(2) finds Padian Torogan as ghost precinct and shall
be excluded from the special election to be
conducted in Madalum.
(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Macadatu, to
immediately resume the investigation, the remaining
ghost precincts in Madalum and to submit its findings to
the Commission with dispatch, allowing it to submit partial
findings if necessary.
The Law Department of this Commission is hereby
directed to implement this order.
SO ORDERED." (emphasis supplied)i[10]
On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani
and Hadji Nor Hassan, in their respective capacity as former Municipal
Mayor, incumbent Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant
petition for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order issued
by the COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Likewise, petitioners moved to consolidate this case with G.R. No.
134456 entitled "Sultan Sarangani, et. al vs. COMELEC, et. al" alleging
that G.R. No. 134456 also involves a COMELEC decision declaring the
precinct corresponding to eight (8) barangays in Madalum, Lanao del Sur
as ghosts precincts.

In a resolutioni[11] issued by this Court on January 19, 1999, we denied
the motion to consolidate, considering that G.R. No. 134456 had already
been dismissed in our resolutions of August 4, 1998 and August 18,
1998.
The basic issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct.i[12]
On a preliminary matter, though not clear, it appears from the records
that Padian Torogan is a barangay in Madalum, Lanao del Sur and it was
erroneous for the COMELEC to consider Padian-Torogan as a ghost
precinct. In any case, the court is not tasked to determine whether the so-
called Padian Torogan is a barangay or a mere election precinct. The
petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan
was the one declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the
assailed Order did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared
"Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily
contemplated by the assailed Order would be the election precinct in the
said place.
It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be
at least one precinct per barangay.i[13] In designating election precincts,
the COMELEC usually refers to them by number. Nevertheless, the
determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not
and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a
factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual
findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly
supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the
absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.i[14] Upon
review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted
efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or
private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were
no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no
registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is
not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants
considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record
and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its
automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU)
may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or
any other political subdivision.i[15] In the case of a barangay, except in
Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned
subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscitei[16] conducted for
the purpose in the political units affected.
The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal
or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered
would have substantially affected the outcome of the case. The
COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election
by means available to it.i[17] The assailed order having been issued
pursuant to COMELECs administrative powers and in the absence of
any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-
existent, said order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and
uncalled for.i[18] No voter is disenfranchised because no such voter
exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitutioni[19] is
not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral
exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who
are qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the
contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the
validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of
suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by
the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to,
rather than frustrate the will of the people.i[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed
Order dated June 29, 1998 of the Commission on Elections is UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.





























EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132603. September 18, 2000]
ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE LEON, CLEMENTE M.
MATIRA, REGION P. DE LEON, MARILOU C. DE LEON, JAIME
RELEVO, JOEY S. VERGARA, CARMENCITA A. SALVA,
DIONISIO B. DE LEON, JORGE S. VERGARA, GORGONIO B. DE
LEON, AND OTHERS TOO NUMEROUS TO ENUMERATE AS A
CLASS SUIT, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Balayan, Batangas;
HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGLALAWIGAN OF BATANGAS,
BATANGAS CITY; HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGBAYAN,
CALACA, BATANGAS; and HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Order dated February 25, 1998,i[1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI,i[2] in Civil Case
No. 3442, denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from holding the plebiscite scheduled on February 28,
1998, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and residents of
barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit against the
Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of
Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 3442, before the Regional Trial Court of
Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both enacted by the Sangguniang

Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987,
series of 1998, with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary
restraining order. Ordinance No. 05i[3] declared the abolition of
barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao,
municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the
COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under
Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991.i[4] On the other hand, Resolution No.
345i[5] affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding
the vetoi[6] exercised by the governor of Batangas.i[7] Ordinance No. 05
was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires,
particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements under
Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring
to the attestations or certifications of the Department of Finance
(DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), were obtained. Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and
resolution, on February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing
the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998,
to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its
merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.i[8] Simultaneous
with the filing of the action before the trial court, petitioners also filed
an ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin respondents from enforcing Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No.
345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex parte
motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According to the trial
court, the temporary restraining order/injunction sought by petitioners
is directed only to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The trial court
ruled that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or
decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme
Court.i[9]
On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer
for a temporary restraining order, without filing a motion for

reconsideration of the trial courts Order dated February 25, 1998,
claiming the urgency or immediate necessity to enjoin the conduct of
the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998.i[10]
In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to
maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the
petition.i[11]
On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion in lieu of Comment, declaring that he concurs with petitioners
cause and recommending that the instant petition be given due
course.i[12] Consequently, the Court further resolved on September 29,
1998 to require the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas to submit their own Comment on the petition.
In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition and require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.i[13]
In their Memorandum filed on October 26, 1999, petitioners submitted
the following issue for the resolution of this Court:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS
JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN THE COMELEC FROM
IMPLEMENTING ITS RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998,
WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITE SCHEDULED ON
FEBRUARY 28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION OF
BARANGAY SAN RAFAEL AND ITS MERGER WITH BARANGAY
DACANLAO, CALACA, BATANGAS, PENDING THE
DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442 FOR THE
ANNULMENT OF ORDINANCE NO. 05, RESOLUTION NO. 345
AND COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2987.i[14]
First, petitioners contend that the assailed Order dated February 25,
1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI,
encourages multiplicity of suit[s] and splitting a single cause of action,
contrary to Section 3, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court.i[15] Petitioners

maintain that since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was only issued
pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 of the
Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, the propriety of the issuance
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is dependent upon the validity of
the Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345.i[16] And considering
that the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the validity
of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 is not disputed, the
assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, directing petitioners to seek
the preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before
this Court, advances multiplicity of suits and splitting a single cause of
action.
Second, petitioners assert that when the COMELEC exercises its
quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are subject to the exclusive
review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely
ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial
Court,i[17] citing Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs.
Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and
the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classifi1ed as
those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those
which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in
character.i[18]
Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that [t]he conduct of [a]
plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is
not adjudicatory [or quasi-judicial] in nature but simply ministerial or
administrative in nature [and only] in obedience to the aforesaid
Ordinance and Resolution, citing Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259
SCRA 99 (1996), thus:
xxx To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial
administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC
[Regional Trial Court], a court which the law vests with the power to
exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive

jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.i[19]
Lastly, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite sought to be
enjoined has already been conducted on February 28, 1998, the instant
petition is far from being moot and academic, claiming that the actual
holding of the said plebiscite could not validate an otherwise invalid
ordinance and resolution;i[20] that there are still substantial matters to
be resolved;i[21] assuming arguendo that this petition has become moot
and academic, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review;i[22] and
finally, petitioners maintain that this Court has resolved to require the
parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of
the petition, that is, a day before the plebiscite was scheduled to be
conducted.i[23]
Concurring with petitioners arguments, the Solicitor General, in his
Memorandum filed on September 7, 1999, asserts that xxx. [i]t is
already settled in this jurisdiction that what is contemplated by the
terms any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC reviewable by
certiorari to this Honorable Court, as provided under Section 7, Article
IX-A of the [1987] Constitution, are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
involving elective regional, provincial and city officials. (Citations
omitted.)i[24]24 The Solicitor General further argues that the issuance
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions, hence, it is
submitted that the aforecited constitutional provision is inapplicable.
Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on the
other hand, submits that the power to review or reverse COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court, citing the earlier
cases of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo (23 SCRA 533, 540-541 [1968]);
Luison vs. Garcia (L-10916, May 20, 1957); Macud vs. COMELEC
(23 SCRA 224 [1968]); and Aratuc vs. COMELEC (88 SCRA 251,
272 [1979]);i[25] thus:

xxx. For even without the express constitutional prescription that only
this Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission on Elections, it is easy to understand why no interference
whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on Elections of
its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The
observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz
while not precisely in point, indicates the proper approach. Thus: It is
easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance
of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to
disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on
Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to
impotence.i[26]
The COMELEC further argues that if a Regional Trial Court does not
have jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies of
government like the ones cited above [referring to the former Court of
Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office, Public Service
Commission, Social Security Commission, National Electrification
Administration and Presidential Commission on Good Government], a
fortiori it can not have any such jurisdiction over the Commission on
Elections, a constitutional independent body expressly clothed by the
1987 Constitution with, among others, quasi-judicial functions and
tasked with one of the most paramount aspects of a democratic
government. xxx.i[27] Finally, the COMELEC contends that the
temporary restraining order sought by petitioners has been rendered
moot and academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be
enjoined.i[28]
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996]) and Filipinas
Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]),
we found occasion to interpret the foregoing provision in this wise:
xxx. What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.i[29]
In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that the powers vested by the
Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may either
be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes
ministerial in character.i[30]
As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after
the COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and
resolution declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael, it issued
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in
the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 7160. We agree with the Solicitor General that xxx.
[t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part
and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of
discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone
an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and
resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants,
relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the
enforcement of the election laws. (Citation omitted.)i[31] Briefly,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not
issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely
as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct
of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final
order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining
to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its
contention that the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution
No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are simply not in point.
Zaldivar vs. Estenzoi[32] speaks of the power of the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to
the exclusion of the judiciary. In the present case, petitioners are not
contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer election laws. Luison vs. Garciai[33] refers to this Courts
power to review administrative decisions, particularly referring to a
COMELEC resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy null
and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution. In
Macud vs. COMELEC,i[34] we reiterated that when a board of
canvassers rejects an election return on the ground that it is spurious or
has been tampered with, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the COMELEC sustains
the action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court.
In both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall
within the purview of final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
In view of the foregoing, public respondents other contentions deserve
scant consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the
assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of
Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is hereby SET ASIDE and
ANNULLED. The Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch
XI is ordered to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No.
3442. The execution of the result of the plebiscite held on February
28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the outcome of Civil Case No.
3442.
SO ORDERED.



Herrera vs COMELEC

Facts:

In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras
requested the COMELEC to have the province subdivided into two provincial
districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor
conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal
officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all
political parties, and other interested parties. A consensus was reached in
favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under
the Memo Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang
Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)=
3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.

The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:
1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters
of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board
Member represents.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing Resolution No. 2950?

Held:


COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

Ratio:

1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and
adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting,
having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries
often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows
that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor. As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all
interested parties were duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1
legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras,
being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for
division shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not
the number of listed or registered voters. The districting of the Province of
Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified
by the National Statistics Office.