Burgos Sr.

vs Chief of Staff AFP Case Digest

Burgos, Sr. vs Chief of Staff, AFP
133 SCRA 800
G.R. No. 64261
December 26, 1984

Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched,
and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners should have filed a motion to
quash said warrants in the court that issued them before impugning the validity of the same before this
Court. Respondents also assail the petition on ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it). Respondents further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the documents
seized in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.

Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:
1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well as
Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former
abovementioned address.
3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
4. Real properties were seized.
5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the
Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding
of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been
sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes
sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against the government in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National
Defense.

Issue: Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed.

Held: In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the lower court, this
Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional Issue
raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. With the contention
pertaining to laches, the petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-
judicial efforts to remedy the situation, negating the presumption that they have abandoned their right to
the possession of the seized property.

On the enumerated reasons:
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed
been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises.
It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place.
3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not
be owned by him.
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to
the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law
and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. In
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which
makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in
the nature of general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the
search warrants in question are too general.
With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing rules and
regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, President Marcos himself
denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners. The closure of
the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our
fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.













Eastern Broadcasting Corp (DYRE) v. Dans Jr. Case Digest

Eastern Broadcasting Corp (DYRE) v. Dans Jr.
137 SCRA 628
L-59329
July 19, 1985

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on grounds
of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE
contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the
closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court
could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene
Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel
Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and
academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme
Court still finds that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Issue:

Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a
hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are
laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine
should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the
following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence presented.

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

(3) The decision must have something to support itself.

(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)

(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing

(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply
accept subordinates views

(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued
involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an
unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and
property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this
constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear
and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this
danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television
may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment
on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have
the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence
to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the
special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution.

























Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these
cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from
the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it
is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."



Issue: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?



Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise
of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to
the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of
religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to
impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for
delivering a sermon."

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much
less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or
the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the
press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income
tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution












G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES
Facts:
The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June
5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to release an
audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which was
audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act.. In
another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after
media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a
tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004
national elections.
Issue: Is the warning to media in not airing the hello Garci tapes a case of prior restraint?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court holds that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not
reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were
made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech
uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint.
The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be
struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and
press.













Facts of the Case
During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue,
"Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included
shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue
included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC received a
complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.
Question
Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent
language under any circumstances?
Argument
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation - Oral Argument
Full Transcript Text Download MP3
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation - Opinion Announcement
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for FCC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly
No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast
of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant
sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining
whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise
of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."