1

SolutionstotheProblemsfrom
PrinciplesofComparativePolitics,2
nd
edition
WilliamRobertsClark*MattGolder*SonaNadenichekGolder
Note:TherearenoproblemsinChapter1
Chapter2
Logic:ValidandInvalidArguments
1a.Valid.
1b.Denyingtheconsequent.

2a.Notvalid.
2b.Denyingtheantecedent.

3a.Notvalid.
3b.Denyingtheantecedent.

4a.Notvalid.
4b.Affirmingtheconsequent.
4c.Youwouldhavetoobservearichdictatorship

ScientificStatements
5.
Smokingincreasestheprobabilityofgettingcancer.Scientific,becausethestatementcouldbe
falsifiedbyobservingthatthereisnoconnectionbetweensmokingandgettingcancerorby
observingthatpeoplewhosmokearelesslikelytogetcancer.
Asquareisatwodimensionalfigurewithfourequalstraightsidesandfourrightangles.Not
scientific,becausethestatementisadefinitionandcannotbefalsified.
Thesunrevolvesaroundtheearth.Scientific,becausethestatementcouldbefalsifiedby
observingthatthesunrevolvesaroundsomeplanetotherthanearth,orthattheearthrevolves
aroundthesun,andsoon.
ItalwaysrainsinEnglandduringthewinter.Scientific,becausethestatementcouldbe
falsifiedifnorainfellduringwinterinEnglandoneyear.
Educationspendingincreasesunderleftwinggovernments.Scientific,becausethestatement
couldbefalsifiedbydatashowingthatleftwinggovernmentsspendthesame,orless,on
educationcomparedwithrightwingorcentristgovernments.
Icelandisacountry.Notscientific,becausethestatementisadefinitionandcannotbe
falsified.
Religiousfaithassuresapersonaplaceintheafterlife.Notscientific,becausethestatement
referstotheinherentlyunobservablephenomenonoftheafterlifeand,therefore,cannotbe
falsified.
Democraciesarelesslikelytogotowarthandictatorships.Scientific,becauseananalystcould
showevidencethatdemocraciesaremorelikely,orequallylikely,togotowarcomparedwith
dictatorships.
2

6.Answerswillvary.
7.
AllmainstreamU.S.senatorsagreethattheHousebillisunacceptable.
a. The statement is not scientific if mainstream is defined in terms of the acceptability of the House
bill;inthiscaseitwouldbeatautology.
b.Thestatementisscientificifmainstreamisdefinedintermsoftheideologyofthesenators.
Allgoodstudentsgethighgrades.
a.Thestatementisnotscientificifgoodisdefinedintermsofastudentsgrade;inthiscaseitwould
beatautology.
b.Thestatementisscientificifgoodisdefinedintermsofastudentsenthusiasm.

NecessaryandSufficientConditions
8.
Ifapersoncontractsmeasles,thenshewasexposedtothemeaslesvirus.Necessary.
Ifademocracyiswealthy,thenitwillstayademocracy.Sufficient.
A country cannot maintain a democratic form of government unless it has a culture that
promotescivicparticipation.Necessary.
Countrieshavemanypartiesonlywhentheyemployproportionalelectoralrules.Necessary.
Countriesalwayshavefewpartieswhentheyemploymajoritarianelectoralrules.Sufficient.

ModelBuildingintheScientificMethod
9.Answerswillvary.
10.Answerswillvary.
11.Answerswillvary.
3
Enter
Reenock
Staton
Staton
StayOut
Advertise
Advertise
Dont
Advertise
Dont
Advertise
NewSenateRaceGame
1,1
4,2
3,3
2,4
Chapter3
BackwardInduction:SomeGenericGamestoSolve
1a.GenericGameI.
Expectedoutcome:Player1goesdown.
Payoffs:3forPlayer1and5forPlayer2.
Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Down;Down).
1b.GenericGameII.
Expectedoutcome:Player1goesUp,Player2goesdown,andthenPlayer1goesright.
Payoffs:4forPlayer1and5forPlayer2.
Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Up,Right;Down).
1c.GenericGameIII.
Expected outcome: Player 1 goes down and then Player 2 goes down (note that Player 3
doesnotgetachancetomove)
Payoffs:6toPlayer1,4toPlayer2,and1toPlayer3
Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Down;Down,Down;Left).
SenateRaceGameRevisited
2a.Seepayoffslistedingamebelow.

4
2b. Expected outcome: Reenock enters and Staton doesnt advertise; Payoffs: 4 to Reenock and 2 to
Staton;Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Enter;Dontadvertise,Dontadvertise).
2c.Yes,theorderoftheplayersmovesmattersfortheoutcomeofthegame.Intheoriginalgame,with
Staton (the incumbent) moving first, the outcome was that Reenock did not enter and Staton did
advertise.Inthenewgame,withReenock(thechallenger)movingfirst,ReenockdoesenterandStaton
doesnotadvertise.Thus,bothactorschooseadifferentoptioninequilibriumdependingonwhomoves
first.

TerrorismGame
3a.Seepayoffslistedingametreebelow.Expectedoutcome:Terroristact;Payoffs:3tothesocialgroup
and1tothegovernment;Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Violence;Repress).

3b.Seepayoffslistedingametreebelow.Expectedoutcome:Terroristact;Payoffs:3tothesocialgroup
and1tothegovernment;Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Violence;Negotiate).

2,2
1,3
3,1
Negotiate
SocialGroup
Government
Repress
Negotiate
Violence
TerrorismGamewithTrueBelieversandaRepressiveGovernment
5

3c. No; the outcome (a Terrorist act) is the same regardless of the type of government faced by True
Believers.
3d.Seepayoffslistedingametreebelow.Expectedoutcome:Terroristact;Payoffs:2tothesocialgroup
and1tothegovernment;Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Violence;Repress).

3e.Seepayoffslistedingametreebelow.Expectedoutcome:Goodfaithnegotiations;Payoffs:3tothe
socialgroupand3tothegovernment;Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Negotiate;Negotiate).
3,2
1,3
2,1
Negotiate
SocialGroup
Government
Repress
Negotiate
Violence
TerrorismGamewithReluctantTerroristsandaRepressiveGovernment
2,3
1,2
3,1
Negotiate
SocialGroup
Government
Repress
Negotiate
Violence
TerrorismGamewithTrueBelieversandaResponsiveGovernment
6

3f. Yes; the outcome depends on the type of government faced by Reluctant Terrorists. When facing a
repressive government, Reluctant Terrorists will commit a terrorist act to avoid repression, but when
facingaresponsivegovernmenttheyprefertonegotiate.
3g. No, not necessarily. In the scenario with Reluctant Terrorists and a repressive government, a
terroristactgetscommitted,butthiswouldnothaveoccurredifthesameReluctantTerroristshadbeen
playingthegamewitharesponsivegovernment.
3h. Such government declarations will make no difference if the social group does consist of True
Believers, but they can be dangerous if the social group in question consists of Reluctant Terrorists
instead. By making statements that signal that a government is of the repressive type, a group of
ReluctantTerroristsmightcommitaterroristactthatcouldhavebeenavoided.

LegislativePayRaiseGame
4a.Answerswillvary.
4b.Seepayoffsinfigurebelow.
3,3
1,2
2,1
Negotiate
SocialGroup
Government
Repress
Negotiate
Violence
TerrorismGamewithReluctantTerroristsandaResponsiveGovernment
7

4c.Expectedoutcome:Raise;Payoffs:4toLegislator1,3toLegislator2,and3toLegislator3;Subgame
perfectequilibrium:(No;No,Yes;No,Yes,Yes,No).
4d.Youshouldchoosetovotefirstifyouhaveachoice,sothatyoucanvoteNoandstillgettheraise.In
equilibrium,thelegislatorwhovotesfirstgetsthehighestpayoff.Whetherthisanswerisdifferentfrom
theanswergivenin4awillvary.
4e. Yes, it suggests that agendasetting power can be useful if you want to be able to affect which
outcomes get chosen. Whether you would want to move first, last, or somewhere in the middle will
depend on the situation at hand, but being in a position to determine the order of moves can work to
youradvantage.

WritingandSolvingYourOwnGames
5a.Answerswillvary.
5b.Answerswillvary.
Raise
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1
2
3
2
3
3
3
Outcome Payoffs
Raise
NoRaise
Raise
Raise
NoRaise
NoRaise
NoRaise
Figure3.15:LegislativePayRaiseGame
3,3,3
3,3,4
3,4,3
1,2,2
4,3,3
2,1,2
2,2,1
2,2,2
8
Chapter4
TheGameofChicken
1a.Renspreferenceordering(whereeachoutcomeisdescribedbytheactionsofRen[listedfirst]and
Chuck[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Drivestraight;Swerve>Swerve;Swerve>Swerve;Drivestraight>Drivestraight;Drivestraight
Chucks preference ordering (where each outcome is described by the actions of Ren [listed first] and
Chuck[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Swerve;Drivestraight>Swerve;Swerve>Drivestraight;Swerve>Drivestraight;Drivestraight
1b.Nashequilibria:(Drivestraight;Swerve)and(Swerve;DriveStraight).
1c.No,neitherplayerhasadominantstrategy.
1d.Answerswillvary.

TheStagHuntGame
2a.Hunter1spreferenceordering(whereeachoutcomeisdescribedbytheactionsofHunter1[listed
first]andHunter2[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Stag;Stag>Hare;Stag>Hare;Hare>Stag;Hare
Hunter2spreferenceordering(whereeachoutcomeisdescribedbytheactionsofHunter1[listedfirst]
andHunter2[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Stag;Stag>Stag;Hare>Hare;Hare>Hare;Stag
2b.Nashequilibria:(Stag;Stag)and(Hare;Hare).
2c.No,neitherplayerhasadominantstrategy.
2d.Answerswillvary.

PureCoordinationGame
3a. Driver 1s preference ordering (where each outcome is described by the actions of Driver 1 [listed
first]andDriver2[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Left;Left=Right;Right>Left;Right=Right;Left

9
Driver2spreferenceordering(whereeachoutcomeisdescribedbytheactionsofDriver1[listedfirst]
andDriver2[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Left;Left=Right;Right>Left;Right=Right;Left
3b.Nashequilibria:(Left;Left)and(Right;Right).
3c.No,neitherplayerhasadominantstrategy.
3d.Answerswillvary.

AsymmetricCoordinationGame
4a. Ediths preference ordering (where each outcome is described by the actions of Edith [listed first]
andArchie[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Movie;Movie

Bowling;Bowling

Movie;Bowling

Bowling;Movie
Archiespreferenceordering(whereeachoutcomeisdescribedbytheactionsofEdith[listedfirst]and
Archie[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Bowling;Bowling

Movie;Movie

Movie;Bowling

Bowling;Movie
4b.Nashequilibria:(Movie;Movie)and(Bowling;Bowling).
4c.No,neitherplayerhasadominantstrategy.
4d.Answerswillvary.
4e.Answerswillvary

Rock,Paper,ScissorsGame
5a.Thereareno(purestrategy)Nashequilibriainthisgame.
5b. Itwould be besttorandomizeoverthethreechoices; ifyouchoseonlyoneaction,then theother
player could play her best response to that action, and you would always get your worst payoff as a
result.

AmericanFootballGame
6a.Nashequilibrium:(Shortpass;Counterpass).
6b.Neitherplayerhasadominantstrategy.
10

MafiaGame
7a.Ifc=0,thentheNashequilibriumis(Talk;Talk).ThisisthestandardPrisonersDilemmaGame.
7b.Ifc>10,thentheNashequilibriumwillbe(Quiet;Quiet).Thisisbecausesubtractingmorethan10
away from the payoffs as a punishment for talking makes those payoffs lower than the comparable
payoffsaplayerwouldgetforremainingquiet.Ifc<10,thenthegameisstillaPrisonersDilemma.Ifc
=10,thentheplayerwouldbeindifferentbetweentalkingandbeingquiet.
7c. The Mafia plays the role of a thirdparty enforcer in that it is not one of the two players in the
game (hence, a third party) but it does play a role in enforcing punishments for talking. Thus, the
Mafiacanchangethepayoffstructureofthegame.Byenforcingpunishmentsthatarelargeenoughto
deterwhatitseesasbadbehavior(thatis,havingitsmemberscooperatewiththepolice),theMafiais
abletokeepitsmemberscooperatingwithitsownrules.Thisisexactlythesameastheroleofthestate
intheCivilSocietyGamediscussedinthechapter.

CounterterrorismGames
8a. The United States preference ordering (where each outcome is described by the actions of the
UnitedStates[listedfirst]andtheEuropeanUnion[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Donothing;Preempt>Preempt;Preempt>Donothing;Donothing>Preempt;Donothing
The European Unions preference ordering (where each outcome is described by the actions of the
UnitedStates[listedfirst]andtheEuropeanUnion[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Preempt;Donothing>Preempt;Preempt>Donothing;Donothing>Donothing;Preempt
8b.Nashequilibrium:(Donothing;Donothing).
8c.Yes,bothplayershaveadominantstrategytodonothing.
8d. The United States preference ordering (where each outcome is described by the actions of the
UnitedStates[listedfirst]andtheEuropeanUnion[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Deter;Donothing>Donothing;Donothing>Deter;Deter>Donothing;Deter
The European Unions preference ordering (where each outcome is described by the actions of the
UnitedStates[listedfirst]andtheEuropeanUnion[listedsecond]thatproducetheoutcome):
Donothing;Deter>Donothing;Donothing>Deter;Deter>Deter;Donothing
8e.Nashequilibrium:(Deter;Deter).
8f.Yes,bothplayershaveadominantstrategytodeter.
11
8g.Nashequilibrium:(Deter;Deter).
8h.Yes,bothplayershaveadominantstrategytodeter.
8i.Yes,theNashequilibriumoutcomeinthisgameissuboptimal,becausebothplayersgetapayoffof
2. They could do better if both chose to do nothing (both would get a payoff of 0) or if both chose to
preempt(bothwouldgetapayoffof2).
8j.Ifanystateinvestsinpreemption,thenallstatesbenefitfromthisinvestmentwhethertheypaidfor
itornot;onlythestatethatinvestsinpreemptionactuallypaysthecostforit.Asaresult,manystates
choose to underinvest in preemption and free ride on the preemption policies adopted by other
states. If all states think like this, though, then investment in preemption will be suboptimalthere will
belessthanissociallydesired.Incontrast,statestendtooverinvestindeterrencebecausestatescannot
free ride and benefit from the deterrence expenditures of other statesstates actually have to pay for
deterrencethemselvesiftheywanttodeterterrorists.

FreeTradeGame
9a.Seepayoffsinfigurebelow.

Figure4.26:FreeTradeGame

US
Reducetariffs Imposenewtariffs
EU

ReduceTariffs

3,3

1,4

ImposeNewTariffs

4,1

2,2

9b.PrisonersDilemmaGame.
9c.TheNashequilibriumis(Imposenewtariffs;Imposenewtariffs).Theexpectedoutcomeisthatboth
theUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnionwillimposenewtariffs.
9d.Bothplayershaveadominantstrategytoimposenewtariffs.
12
9e.Presentvalueofreducingtariffs:3/(1d).
9f.Presentvalueofimposingnewtariffs:4+2d/(1d).
9g.Yes.Ifthediscountrateishighenoughthatthepresentvalueofreducingtariffsishigherthanwhat
aplayercangetfromdeviating(whichwouldyieldapayoffof4inthefirstroundinwhichsheimposed
new tariffs, and a payoff of 2 in every subsequent round), then the cooperative equilibrium can be
maintained.Thisisthecaseifd>.Toseewhy,refertoBox41,wherethisexampleislaidoutindetail.
9h.IntheoneshotFreeTradeGame, noeconomiccooperation overtariffreductionispossible.Inthe
infinitelyrepeatedgame,cooperationintheformofreducedtariffsispossible,butonlyifbothplayers
aresufficientlypatientandvaluetheirfuturepayoffshighlyenough.Thissuggeststhatcountriesshould
take care to maintain good relations with their trading partners so that everyone believes that the
economicrelationshipwilllastindefinitely.Ifoneactorisuncertainaboutthecontinuedgoodbehavior
of the other actor, this might lead her to value future payoffs less highly (that is, her discount factor
would decrease) because these future payoffs might not materialize. In such circumstances, the
cooperativeequilibriuminwhichbothplayersreducetariffswillbemoredifficulttomaintain.

WritingandSolvingYourOwnGames
10a.Answerswillvary.
10b.Answerswillvary.

13
Chapter5
ConceptualizingandMeasuringDemocracy
1.Answerswillvary.
2.Answerswillvary.
3.Answerswillvary.
4. Yes, the analyst should use DD because the level of equality of opportunity is included in the
FreedomHousemeasureitself.Ifcountrieshaveahigherlevelofequalityofopportunity,thentheyare
consideredtobemoredemocratic.Thus,usingFreedomHousewouldmakethehypothesistautological
rather than falsifiable. According to DD, regime type is unrelated to equality of opportunity and thus
usingDDwouldmakethehypothesisfalsifiable.
5.No,theanalystcoulduseeitherDDorFreedomHouseandthehypothesiswouldbefalsifiable.Thisis
becausetherearenoaspectsofthesigningofinternationaltreatiesthatarerelatedtotheconstruction
ofeithermeasureofdemocracy.
6.Answerswillvary.

Measures
7a.Interval.
7b.Nominal.
7c.Ordinal.
7d.Interval.
7e.Answerswillvary.Onecoulduseanominalmeasure(blue,green,brown,gray,violet)oraninterval
measure(usingchromaticitywithaspectroradiometer),forexample.
7f.Anominalmeasuremightbecomfortableversusuncomfortable.Anordinalmeasuremightbecold,
cool,warm,hot.Anintervalmeasuremightbe37.6Celsius.

8.Answerswillvary.

9.MeasureBismorereliablebecausethecodingyieldsvaluesthataremoretightlyclusteredtogether
thanisthecaseformeasureA.Thatis,usingmeasureB,threeofthecoderscameupwithavalueof6,
andthefourthcameupwithavalueof7,quiteclosetothevaluechosenbytheothers.However,using
measureA,thecodersdisplayedmuchgreatervariationinthevaluestheychose.Theyrangedfroma
lowof3toahighof6.

10.MeasureAismorevalidbecausethecoderschosevaluesthat,onaverage,yieldthetruevalueof5,
whereasmeasureBledtovaluesthatwerebiasedtowardahigherlevelofviolationsthanwasthecase
inreality.Theaverageofthedifferentcodersvalueswas(3+4+6+7)/4=5formeasureBand
(5+6+6+7)/4=6formeasureA.

14
Chapter6
ClassicModernizationTheory
1a. Traditional societies are characterized by economies with a small service sector, small industrial
sector, and a large agricultural sector. Politically, they are characterized by dictatorships. Modern
societieshavelargeindustrialandservicesectorsandasmallagriculturalsector,andaredemocratic.
1b.Answerswillvary.
1c.Shortanswer:becauserichpeopleareriskaverse.Longeranswerswillvary.
1d.Increasedwealthmakestheemergenceofdemocracymorelikely.
1e.Increasedwealthmakesthesurvivalofdemocracymorelikely.

AVariantofModernizationTheory
2a.Democracyemergesbecausethestatereliesongroupswhohavebecomeeconomicelitesandwho
haveexitoptionsthusthestateagreestosomelimitsonitsownpowerinordertokeepthesegroups
happy.
2b.Both the Englishand the Frenchmonarchswererelianton theireconomicelites,butintheEnglish
case the economic elites had credible exit options whereas in the French case they did not. Thus, the
English kings had to make concessions to limit their power in order to keep their elites happy but the
Frenchkingsdidnot.
2c.CountryBislikelytobemoredemocraticthanCountryAbecausetheleadersofCountryBaremore
likelytobedependentontheircitizensforrevenueandtokeeptheeconomyperformingwell.
2d. If increased globalization leads to more people having credible exit options, then it should also
increase the likelihood of democratization (at least in countries with leaders who depend on their
economicelites).
2e.Thebasicargumentisthateconomiceliteswillnotwanttodemocratizeifsocietyishighlyunequal,
because the masses of poor people will use the ballot box to expropriate their riches through higher
taxation. According to the variant on modernization theory presented in the chapter, the rich will not
worry about democratization if they have credible exit options. In turn, the poor, if given the right to
vote, will not choose to expropriate the rich because they would rather that the economic elites keep
their wealth in the country. Thus, economic inequality will only be bad for the prospects of
democratization when economic elites do not have exit options (and thus they could be expected to
resistanydemocratizingattempts).

15
Exit,Voice,andLoyaltyGame
3a. When L < 1 and E > 0, the subgame perfect equilibrium is (Disinvest, Disinvest; Reject limits). We
wouldgetdictatorshipandpooreconomicperformance.
3b. When L < 1 and E < 0, the subgame perfect equilibrium is (Pay taxes, Pay taxes; Reject limits). We
wouldgetdictatorshipandgoodeconomicperformance.
3c. For democracy to emerge, it must be the case that the citizens (economic elites, parliamentarians,
and the like) have a credible exit option. However, this is not sufficient (though it is necessary). The
other important element in the democratization process is a state (leader, Crown, and so on) that is
dependent.Ifthestateisautonomousforinstance,becauseitreceivesforeignaidanddoesnothaveto
rely on revenue from its own citizensthen it has no incentive to accept limits on its power, even if its
citizens have a credible exit threat. The result is the scenario outlined in answer 3a above. Note that
foreign aid should have no effect on democratization prospects in countries in which the citizens have
no credible exit threat (scenario 3b above)the state will not need to agree to any limits on its power
whetheritisdependentorautonomous.

CredibleCommitmentProblems
4a.Crediblecommitmentproblemsoccurwhen(i)whatisinsomeonesinteresttopromisetodaymay
notbeinhisinteresttodointhefutureand(ii)powerisinthehandsofthosewhomakethepromise
andnotinthehandsofthosewhoexpecttobenefitfromthepromise.
4b.Answerswillvary.
4c.Answerswillvary.

DependentandIndependentVariables
5a.Independentvariable(IV):smoking.Dependentvariable(DV):cancer.
5b.IV:badeconomicperformance.DV:incumbentslosingelections.
5c.IV:economicdevelopment.DV:democratization.
5d.IV:eatingtoomuchfood.DV:obesity.
5e.IV:wealth.DV:stabledemocracy.
5f.IV:citizenswithmobileassets.DV:nogovernmentexploitation.
5g.IV:poverty.DV:crime.
5h.IV:economicinequality.DV:poordemocraticperformance.
16
5i.IV:highlevelsofnaturalresources.DV:lowerchancesofdemocracy.
5j.IV:hardwork.DV:goodgrades.

OilandDemocracy:TheResourceCurse
6a. Rosss DV is the level of democracy, and he uses Polity IV to measure it. The main IV is whether a
state is oil reliant and is measured by the export value of mineralbased fuels as a percentage of a
countrysGDP.
6b. The main hypothesis is that countries with higher levels of reliance on oil will have lower levels of
democracy. This hypothesis would be falsified if it was found that oil reliance made no difference to
democracyscores,orthatcountriesthatwerereliantonoilweremorelikelytobedemocraticthannon
oilreliantones.
6c.Oilcouldbedetrimentalfordemocracyforthreereasons,whichRossreferstoastherentiereffect,
therepressioneffect,andthemodernizationeffect.Therentierstoryisthatresourcerichgovernments
are less accountable. The repression story is that resourcerich governments can spend a great deal of
money on building up internal security forces. The modernization story is that economic growth based
onoilandmineralsdoesnotleadtothekindofeconomicdevelopmentnecessarytoproducepressure
fordemocratization.
6d.ThecoefficientonthemainIV(oil)ispredictedtobenegative.Theresultsindicatethatitis,infact,
negative. You can tell that the coefficient is significant because the standard error is very small
comparedwiththecoefficient(oryoucanlookatthestarsand,becausetherearethree,youknowthat
theeffectofachangeintheIVishighlysignificant).
6e.No,RossfindsthatbeinganoilproducerhindersthedevelopmentofdemocracyintheMiddleEast
andelsewhere.
6f.Yes,theresultsfromTable3inRosssarticle(p.341)indicatethatnonfuelmineralsalsohinderthe
developmentofdemocracy.

17
Chapter7
LogicProblems
1a.Valid.
1b.Denyingtheconsequent.

2a.Invalid.
2b.Affirmingtheconsequent.

IslamandAuthoritarianism
3a.TheDVisthelevelofdemocracyinacountry.ItismeasuredusingFreedomHouseaswellasPolity
IV, though the main source is Freedom House. The main IV is whether Islamic religious tradition is
predominantinacountry.Thisisadummyvariable,codedasa1ifthereisamajorityoraclearplurality
ofcitizenswhoareMuslim,andcoded0otherwise.
3b. The main hypothesis is that Islamic countries have lower levels of democracy than nonIslamic
countries.ThishypothesiswouldbefalsifiedifevidenceweretoshowthatIslamicreligioustraditionhas
no effect on regime type or that Islamic countries are more likely to be democratic than nonIslamic
countries.
3c. Possible reasons why Islam might be detrimental for democracy: (i) Muslim countries are more
prone to political violence than other countries, which hinders democratic development; (ii) Muslim
countries are characterized by lower levels of interpersonal trust than other countries; (iii) Muslim
countries are less secular than other countries, and secularization is thought to help democratic
performance; and (iv) women are subordinated to an unusual degree in Muslim countries, and their
subordinaterolehindersdemocraticdevelopment.
3d. Fish predicts that the coefficient on Islamic religious tradition will be negative. He finds that it is
negative.Thecoefficientissignificantlydifferentfromzero,ascanbeseenbylookingatthenumberof
stars (3) or comparing the size of the standard error with that of the coefficient. In other words, Fish
finds that countries with an Islamic religious tradition have lower scores on the Freedom House (FH)
democracy measure than countries without Islamic religious traditions do, and that the difference in
democracyscoresisstatisticallysignificant.
3e. Of the four possible causal mechanisms linking Islam and (a lack of) democracy, the only one that
Fish finds support for (that is, cannot reject) is the one that hypothesizes that the subordination of
womenleadstolowerdemocracyscores.
18
3f. Using FH might be problematic in this case because the FH scores themselves are based in part on
how equally women are treated in society.
1
For example, in section F (Rule of Law), under no. 4, Do
laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population? one
elementofthisquestionis,Dowomenenjoyfullequalityinlawandinpracticeascomparedtomen?
UndersectionG(PersonalAutonomyandIndividualRights),no.3,Aretherepersonalsocialfreedoms,
includinggenderequality,choiceofmarriagepartners,andsizeoffamily?thereareseveralquestions
relatingdirectlytowomen.
3g. Looking only at one period of time might lead you to draw misleading inferences about the actual
relationship between Islam (and other religions) and democracy. That most Islamic countries are not
democracies today does not necessarily mean that Islamic countries will not be democracies in the
future. As we noted in this chapter, Catholicism was historically viewed as antithetical to democracy
because few Catholic countries were democracies prior to the 1970s; today, however, most Catholic
countries are democratic and few would argue any longer that Catholicism is inimical to democracy.
Moreover, the very question of whether Islam is incompatible with the emergence and the survival of
democracy would seem to necessitate a temporal component to any empirical analysisthe terms
emergenceandsurvivalimplyobservationsacrosstime.

SurveyQuestionsandDemocracy
4a.Ordinal.
4b. One argument is that it is difficult to compare answers to survey questions such as these across
countries(or evenwithin countries)becauseitisnotclearthatallrespondentsinterpretthequestions
and answers in the same way. Another argument is that it may be difficult to get true responses from
respondents in dictatorships. Another argument is that it is not clear that responses to these survey
questionsnecessarilytellusanythingaboutdemocraticstabilityanyway.
4c.Answerswillvary.
4d.Answerswillvary.

CoordinationandDemocracyGame
5a. Nash equilibria: (Acquiesce; Acquiesce) and (Challenge; Challenge), where the first action refers to
the action taken by group A (row player) and the second action refers to the one taken by group B
(columnplayer).

1. Although Fish uses both Polity IV and Freedom House for his initial empirical analyses, he presents evidence
usingFreedomHouseonlywhenevaluating,inmoredetail,howtheunequaltreatmentofwomenaffectsthelevel
ofdemocracyinacountry.
19
5b.TheexpectedoutcomeassociatedwiththeNashequilibrium(Acquiesce;Acquiesce)isNochallenge.
The payoff to the state is 8, the payoff to group A is 2, and the payoff to group B is 2. The expected
outcome associated with the Nash equilibrium (Challenge; Challenge) is a Successful challenge. The
payofftothestateis0,thepayofftogroupAis7,andthepayofftogroupBis7.
5c.Ifthestatethinksthatthetwogroupsofcitizenswillacquiesce,thenitwilltransgressagainstthem
andreceiveapayoffof8ratherthan2 (thepayofftothestateifitdoesnottransgress).However,ifit
thinksthatthetwogroupsofcitizenswillchallenge,thenitwillprefertonottransgress(because2>0).
5d.Inthisgame,citizensareabletopreventpredatoryactionstakenbythestateonlyifseparategroups
can coordinate. If these different groups do not have cultural norms or practices that allow them to
coordinate with each other, then the state can more easily transgress against them and prevent
democratization.
5e. If higher numbers of distinct ethnic or cultural groups exist in a society, then the likelihood that
cultural clashes occur might go up as well. Cultural differences might lessen the citizens ability to
coordinateeffectivelyagainstpredatoryactionsonthepartofthestate.
5f. If the state could transgress against only one group, this should make it harder for the groups to
coordinate.Thisshouldmakeitlesslikelyfordemocracytosurvive.

20
Chapter8
CollectiveActionProblem
1a.Answerswillvary.
1b.Thelogicoffreeridingsuggeststhatitmightbebettertoneed60percentthan30percentbecause
more people would feel obliged to turn out in the latter scenario (the incentive to free ride becomes
greater,thelargerthedifferencebetweenKandN).
1c.Thegroupwith5,000memberswillbemorelikelytohaveasuccessfulprotestthanthegroupwith
10,000 members. This is because larger groups tend to be characterized by higher levels of free riding
andalowerlikelihoodthatcollectiveactionwillbesuccessful.

DemocraticConsolidationGame
2a. See payoffs in figure below. The Nash equilibrium is (Radical approach; Radical approach). The
expectedoutcomeisacivilwar(noamnesty).Bothplayersreceiveapayoffof2.

2b. Both players would prefer the outcome of limited democracy, which would happen if both chose
Moderate approaches. This is not part of an equilibrium, however, because if the Sunnis did choose a
Moderateapproach,thentheShiitessbestresponsewouldbetotakeaRadicalapproach.
2c. See payoffs in figure below. The Nash equilibria are (Radical approach; Radical approach) and
(Moderate approach; Moderate approach). The expected outcomes are either a civil war (no amnesty)
oralimiteddemocracy.Bothplayersreceiveapayoffof2iftheoutcomeiscivilwar(noamnesty).Ifthe
outcomeislimiteddemocracy,thentheSunnisreceiveapayoffof4whiletheShiitesgetapayoffof3.

RadicalApproach
(NoAmnesty)
ModerateApproach
(Amnesty)
RadicalApproach(Fight
Back)
2,2 3,1
ModerateApproach
(SupportNewRegime)
1,4 4,3
Sunnis
(Authoritarian
Supporters)
Shiites(Supporters ofNewRegime)
21

2d.Yes,limiteddemocracy.
2e. Answers will vary, but given that students are basing their answers on the games they were just
solving,thentheyshouldconcludethattheonlywaytogettoaconsolidateddemocracyisifallactors
arewillingtotakeamoderateapproach.IfdeBaathificationpoliciesarenotseenasahelpfulpartofa
moderateapproach,thentheconclusionwouldbethatsuchordersshouldnothavebeenissued.
2f.Answerswillvary.
2g.Answerswillvary.
2h. Answers will vary but one potential reason is that democratic reformers are willing to take a
moderate approach toward the former dictatorial elites by making institutional concessions that
appeasetheoldelites.Inreturn,thedictatorialelitesarewillingtomakeamoderateapproachtooand
allow a peaceful transition to a limited form of democracy. This line of reasoning helps to explain why
democratic transitions that occur through pacts or negotiations often end up with democracies that
haveaninstitutionallegacyfromthedictatorship.

ReligiousPartyGame
3a.Preferenceorderingsoverexpectedoutcomesforthethreeplayers.
Regime:
Democraticconsolidation>Continueddictatorship>Newreligiousdictatorship
ModerateReligiousParty:
Democraticconsolidation>Newreligiousdictatorship>Continueddictatorship
RadicalReligiousParty:
Newreligiousdictatorship>Democraticconsolidation>Continueddictatorship
3b.Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Holdelections;Pursuemoderatepolicy).Expectedoutcome:
Democraticconsolidation.Payoffsare25toboththeRegimeandthe(moderate)ReligiousParty.

RadicalApproach
(NoAmnesty)
ModerateApproach
(Amnesty)
RadicalApproach(Fight
Back)
2,2 3,1
ModerateApproach
(SupportNewRegime)
1,3 4,3
Sunnis
(Authoritarian
Supporters)
Shiites(Supporters ofNewRegime)
22
3c.Subgameperfectequilibrium:(Cancelelections;Pursueradicalpolicy).Expectedoutcome:Continued
dictatorship.Payoffsare20totheRegimeand5tothe(radical)ReligiousParty.
3d.EU
Regime
(Cancelelections)=p20+(1p)20=20.
3e.EU
Regime
(Holdelections)=p25+(1p)5=20p+5.
3f.ProbabilityatwhichRegimewillchoosetoholdelections:anythinggreaterthan0.75.
EU
Regime
(Holdelections) >EU
Regime
(Cancelelections)
20p+5>20
p >
Regime will hold elections if it believes that the Religious Party is moderate with a probability greater
than.
3g.TheRegimewillbeindifferentbecause0.75isexactlythecriticalprobability.
3h.TheRegimewillholdelectionsbecause0.8ishigherthanthecriticalprobability.
3i.TheRegimewillcancelelectionsbecause0.5islowerthanthecriticalprobability.
3j.AmoderatereligiouspartywantstheRegimetothinkthatitismoderate.
3k.AradicalreligiouspartywantstheRegimetothinkthatitismoderate.
3l. Claiming to be moderate is not credible because both types of religious party want the regime to
believethattheyaremoderate.
3m. Turkey is a secular democracy. The Refah Party is a religious party that won the most votes and
seats in the 1995 elections. The party was banned and its leader forced to step down as PM by the
military in 1997. The Virtue Party was based on the banned Refah Party. It was another religious party
thatwasbanneditselfin2001.TwonewreligiouspartiesformedbasedonthebannedVirtueParty,the
Felicity Party, and the Justice and Development Party. The Felicity Party is a radical religious party,
whereas the Justice and Development Party is a moderate religious party. In the 2002 legislative
elections,theJusticeandDevelopmentPartywonamajorityofthelegislativeseats(with34percentof
the vote). In the 2007 elections, it again won a majority of the seats (with almost 47 percent of the
vote). Secularism was one of the main campaign issues in 2007 (along with foreign policy [particularly
towardtheEuropeanUnion]andtheroleofthemilitaryinTurkishsociety,andsoon).
3n.No.
3o.No.Explanationswillvary.
3p.Yes.Explanationswillvary.

23
Chapter9
TheEffectofRegimeTypeonEconomicGrowth
1. Answers may vary, but the basic story is as follows: Countries with the rule of law protect property
rights.Stablepropertyrightsencourageinvestorstoinvestsincetheruleoflawprotectstheprofitsthat
they make on their investment. Because of investment, there is economic growth. The weakest link,
both theoretically and empirically, in the causal story is the claim that democracy is more likely to
producetheruleoflawthandictatorships.Theoretically,theMeltzerRichardsmodelcallsthislinkinto
question. And empirically, the evidence presented by Barro (2000) is that there is no obvious link
betweendemocracyandtheruleoflaw.Hefindsaconnectionbetweenruleoflawandstableproperty
rights,stablepropertyrightsandinvestment,andinvestmentandgrowth;however,hefindsnostrong
link between democracy and the rule of law. Overall, there is no compelling theoretical or empirical
evidencetosuggestthatdemocraciesproducehighereconomicgrowththandictatorships.
2.Answerswillvary.

EmpiricalEvidenceoftheEffectofRegimeTypeonGovernmentPerformance
3.Answersmayvary,butthemainideaisthatthetriangulardatain9.4indicatesthattherelationship
betweenregimetypeandperformanceisnotassimpleasanincreaseindemocracyleadstoanincrease
in performance. The triangular nature of the data comes from the fact that although democracies
perform well, dictatorships have varying levels of performance. Explaining the relationship between
regime type and performance requires understanding the variation within dictatorships as well as the
high level of performance of democracies. Answers for the second part of the question, the possible
causesofthevariabilityinperformanceamongcertaincountries,andaboutfactorsnotcapturedinthe
PolityIVmeasureofdemocracythatmightaffectmaterialwellbeing,willvary.
4.Answerswillvarydependingontheargumentpresentedinthesecondpartofquestion3(above).
24
Chapter10
GameTheoryandDictatorialRegimes
MilitaryInterventionPartyGame
1a. Preference orderings over possible outcomes (technically these are preferences over the action
profiles,eachofwhichisassociatedwithanoutcome)forbothplayers.
Intervenerfaction:
(Launchcoup;Launchcoup)>(Stayout;Stayout)>(Stayout;Launchcoup)>(Launchcoup;Stay
out)
Professionalfaction:
(Stayout;Stayout)>(Launchcoup;Launchcoup)>(Launchcoup;Stayout)>(Stayout;Launch
coup)
1b.Figure10.9withthepayoffsfilledin:

Professionalfaction
Launchcoup Stayout
Intervener
faction

Launchcoup

4,3

1,2

Stayour

2,1

3,4

1c.TheNEare(Launchcoup;Launchcoup)and(Stayout;Stayout).Theoutcomecouldbeasuccessful
coup or the military maintaining an apolitical position. We cannot say which of these two possible
outcomeswilloccur.
1d.ExtensiveformofMilitaryInterventionGame,withIntervenerfactionmovingfirst.

25
Launchcoup
Intervener
faction
Professional
faction
Stayout
Launchcoup
Launchcoup
Stayout
Stayout
MilitaryInterventionGame
4,3
1,2
2,1
3,4
Professional
faction

1e.Thesubgameperfectequilibriumis(Launchcoup;Launchcoup,Stayout).Theexpectedoutcomeis
asuccessfulcoup.
1f. Yes, it makes a difference whether the two factions decide on their actions simultaneously or
sequentially; by moving first, the Intervener faction can get the outcome it wants (a successful coup)
whereasifthetwofactionsmoveatthesametimeitisnotclearwhichoutcomewilloccur.

DictatorshipPartyGame
2a.Preferenceorderingsoverpossibleoutcomesforbothplayers.
Regime:
Status quo > No party, failed coup > Party, no coup > Party, failed coup > No party, successful
coup
Challenger:
No party, successful coup > Status quo > Party, no coup > No party, failed coup > Party, failed
coup
2b. Subgame perfect equilibrium: (Do nothing; Do nothing, Do nothing). The expected outcome is the
Statusquo,sotheRegimegetsapayoffof5andtheChallengergetsapayoffof4.
26
2c. Subgame perfect equilibrium: (Launch party; Launch coup, Do nothing). The expected outcome is a
PartyandNocoup,soboththeRegimeandtheChallengergetpayoffsof3.
2d.EU
Regime
(Donothing)=p5+(1p)1=4p+1.
2e.EU
Regime
(Launchparty)=p3+(1p)3=3.
2f.ProbabilityatwhichRegimewillchoosetolaunchaparty:anythinglessthan0.5.
EU
Regime
(Launchparty) >EU
Regime
(DoNothing)
3 >4p+1
p <
TheRegimewilllaunchapartyifitbelievesthattheChallengerisweakwithaprobabilitylessthan.
2g.TheRegimewilldonothing,because0.75ishigherthanthecriticalprobability.
2h.TheRegimewilllaunchaparty,because0.25islowerthanthecriticalprobability.
2i.TheRegimewillbeindifferentbetweendoingnothingandlaunchingaparty,because0.5isexactly
thecriticalprobability.
2j.TheRegimewouldbebetteroffinaworldofcompleteinformationsothatitcouldlaunchapartyif
andonlyifit wereneeded.Ifitknewa Challengerwasweakforsure,thenit would not havetowaste
resourceslaunchingaparty.IfitknewaChallengerwasstrong,thenitwouldnotexposeitselftoacoup
byfailingtolaunchaparty.
2k.AweakChallengerwouldpreferthattheRegimeknewthatitwasweak(nouncertainty),becauseit
wouldbebetteroffiftheRegimedidnotbothertolaunchaparty.
2l. A strong Challenger would prefer a world in which the Regime was uncertain, because the Regime
mightmiscalculateanddecidetodonothing.

ClassifyingPoliticalRegimes
3a.CubalargeS,smallW.Explanationswillvary.
3b.IraqunderSaddamHussein(pre2003)largeS,smallW.Explanationswillvary.
3c.TheUnitedStatesin1776smallS,smallW.Explanationswillvary.
3d.TheUnitedArabEmiratessmallS,smallW.Explanationswillvary.
3e.ChileunderAugustoPinochetsmallS,smallW.Explanationswillvary.
3f.ArgentinalargeS,largeW.Explanationswillvary.
27
3g.SouthAfricaunderapartheid(pre1991)smallS,smallW.Explanationswillvary.
3h.TaiwanlargeS,largeW.Explanationswillvary.
3i.JordansmallS,smallW.Explanationswillvary.

PublicandPrivateGoods
4a.Answerswillvary.
4b.Answerswillvary.

TheDistributionofPublicandPrivateGoods:TheSizeoftheWinningCoalition
5a.$1,000,000,000/250,000=$4,000.
5b. A leader would choose to provide only private goods in this situation because the value of the
private goods to the members of his winning coalition exceeds the value of the public goods. A leader
whoofferedonlypublicgoodswouldbedefeatedbyachallengerwhoofferedmembersofthewinning
coalitionprivategoodsworthmorethanthe$2,000theywouldreceivefrompublicgoods.
5c.$1,000,000,000/750,000=$1,333.
5d.Aleaderwouldchoosetoprovideonlypublicgoodsinthissituationbecausethevalueofthepublic
goods to the members of his winning coalition exceeds the value of the private goods. A leader who
offeredprivategoodswouldbedefeatedbyachallengerwhoofferedmembersofthewinningcoalition
publicgoodsworthmorethanthe$1,333theywouldreceivefromprivategoods.
5e. The value of private goods to members of the winning coalition decreases with the size of the
winningcoalitionbutthevalueofpublicgoodsdoesnot.Asaresult,publicgoodswillbeworthmoreto
members of the winning coalition than private goods when the winning coalition is sufficiently large.
Because democracies have large winning coalitions, democratic leaders will prefer to provide public
goodsratherthanprivategoods.
5f.Unlikeleadersindemocracies,leadersindictatorshipsaregenerallyinapositiontouseprivategoods
tokeepthesupportoftheirwinningcoalitionbecausethewinningcoalitionindictatorshipstendstobe
small.Asaresult,thevalueofprivategoodstomembersofthewinningcoalitionindictatorshipstends
tobelargerthanthevalueofpublicgoods.

28
TheDistributionofPublicandPrivateGoods:TheLoyaltyNorm
6a.$1,000,000,000/250,000=$4,000.
6b.0
6c.250,000/50,000,000=0.005.
6d.10.005=0.995.
6e.($4,0000.005)+(00.995)=$20.
6f.$20(oralittlebitmorethan$20).
6g.$4,000$20=$3,980(oralittlebitlessthan$3,980).
6h.250,000/1,000,000=0.25.
6i.10.25=0.75.
6j.($4,0000.25)+(00.75)=$1,000.
6k.$1,000(oralittlebitmorethan$1,000).
6l.$4,000$1,000=$3,000(oralittlebitlessthan$3,000).
6m. The larger the selectorate compared with the winning coalition, the less leaders have to pay the
membersoftheirwinningcoalitiontokeepthemloyal.Riggedelectionsystemshavelargeselectorates
and small winning coalitions; as a result, leaders in riggedelection dictatorships can buy off the
membersoftheirwinningcoalitioncheaplyandpockettheremainingrevenue.

InternationalOrganizationsandEconomicDevelopment
7a. No, because the Selectorate Theory would predict that changing leaders will have little effect on
leadershipbehavioriftheinstitutionalincentivesremainthesame.GettingridofMoiinfavorofKibaki
doeslittleiftheinstitutions(thesizeofWandS)remainthesame.
7b. The implications of the Selectorate Theory suggest that providing economic development aid to
smallWsystems,withoutdemandinganyinstitutionalchanges,islikethrowingmoneydownahole.

29
Chapter11
IndividualPreferences
1.Answerswillvary.
2.Thepreferenceorderingiscompletebecauseforanypairofoptionsyoucansaywhetheryouprefer
oneoptionorwhetheryouareindifferentbetweenthem.Theorderingisnottransitive,becauseifyou
preferrocktoscissorsandyoupreferscissorstopaper,thenyoushouldpreferrocktopaper.
3.Answerswillvary.
4.Answerswillvary.

AgendaSetting
5a.Eachfinalistwinsonepairwisecontest.ThereisnoCondorcetwinner,becauseaCondorcetwinner
isdefinedasanoptionthatbeatsallothersinaseriesofpairwisecontests.Usingpairwisevoting,thus,
doesnotidentifyaclearwinner,becauseeachfinalistwinsoneandonlyonecontest.
5b.Givenyourpreferenceordering,youwantthefinalistwhosangtheIrishfolksongtowin.Toendup
withthisresult,youshouldorderthevotingagendasothatthejudgesfirstvotebetweentheballadand
the heavy metal song and then vote on the winner from that contest against the Irish folk song.
Assuming everyone votes sincerely, the heavy metal song will win the first vote and the Irish folk song
willwinthesecond,andfinal,vote.

MedianVoterTheoremandPartyCompetition
6a.ThemedianvoterisDandherideologicalpositionis4.
6b.IfP
1
locatesat2andP
2
locatesat7,thenP
1
willget4votesandP
2
willget3votes.ThusP
1
winsthe
election and implements a policy at 2. The parties will not stay at these same positions for the next
election;P
2
willmovefartherleftinanattempttogetmorevotes,andP
1
shouldmoverightwardinan
attempttopreventthelossofvotes(inresponsetoP
2
saction).
6c.Ifbothpartieslocateat4,thentheelectionwillbetied(andthefinaloutcomewillbedecidedbythe
flipofacoin).Neitherpartywillwanttochangepositions,becauseifeithermovesevenatinydistance
awayfrom4,theotherpartywillgetDsvoteandwintheelection.
6d.Seeanswerto6b,above.
6e.Seeanswerto6c,above.
6f. No, both officeseeking and policyseeking parties will act the same way because the best they can
doistolocateattheideologicalpositionofthemedianvoter.
30
6g.Bothpartiesshouldlocateat5,thepositionofthemedianvoterD.
6h.Bothpartiesshouldlocateat3,thepositionofthemedianvoterD.
6i.No,thepartiesconvergetothepositionofthemedianvoterandtheactualdistributionoftheother
votersidealpointsdoesnotmatter.
6j. If three parties are at the position of the median voter, then one would have an incentive to move
slightly to the left or the right, thereby getting almost half of the votes while leaving the other two
partiestosplittheremainingvotes.Thepartythatmovedwouldwinapluralityofthevotes.Ofcourse,
all of the parties would face this same incentive, and so all should move, which would necessitate
further movements, and so on. There is no equilibrium in this situation and parties continue to
leapfrogeachotherinsearchofthemostvotes.
6k.Yes,theMedianVoterTheorem(MVT)resultdependsontherebeingonlytwoparties;moreparties
(such as three) mean that all parties locating at the position of the median voter will not be a stable
outcome.

SpatialModels
7a.Thepresidentpreferspoliciesbetween2and12.
7b.Thelegislaturepreferspoliciesbetween2and6.
7c. Yes, the preferredtostatusquo (SQ) points overlap between 2 and 6. This is the set of points
preferredbybothactorstothestatusquopolicy.
7d.Thelegislaturewouldproposeanewpolicyat4,itsownidealpoint,andthepresidentwouldaccept
itbecausesheprefers4tothecurrentSQ.
7e.Thepresidentpreferspoliciesbetween2and6.
7f.Thelegislaturepreferspoliciesbetween2and12.
7g.Yes,thepreferredtoSQpointsoverlapbetween2and6.Thisisthesetofpointspreferredbyboth
actorstothestatusquopolicy.
7h. The legislature will propose a new policy at 6 (assuming that the president is willing to accept the
newpolicywhensheisindifferentbetweenthenewpolicyandthestatusquo).
7i.Thepresidentpreferspoliciesbetween0and2.
7j.Thelegislaturepreferspoliciesbetween2and6.
7k.No,thepreferredtoSQpointsdonotoverlap.Thereisnosetofpointspreferredbybothactorsto
thestatusquopolicy.
31
7l.ThelegislaturecannotmakeasuccessfulproposaltochangetheSQpolicy.Theonlynewpoliciesthat
thepresidentwouldacceptareonesthatthelegislaturewouldbeunwillingtopropose.
7m.Policywillbestableifthepresidentandlegislaturehaveidealpointsonoppositesidesofthestatus
quo.Iftheybothpreferpolicytobemovedinthesamedirection,however,thenitwillbemoved.How
muchpolicycanbechangeddependsonhowfarbothactorsidealpointsarefromthestatusquo.

32
Chapter12
ClassifyingDemocracies
1a. Semipresidential, because the president is elected by the entire German nation (Article 41) and
becausethecabinetisresponsibletothelegislature(Articles54and56).Althoughthequestiondoesnt
require the student to go further, this example would be considered to be a case of the president
parliamentary version of semipresidentialism, because the president can dismiss members of the
cabinet(Articles25and53).
1b. Semipresidential, because the president is elected by direct vote of the people (Article 12) and
becausethecabinetisresponsibletothelegislature(Article28).Thisexamplewouldbeconsideredto
be a case of the premierpresidential version of semipresidentialism because the government is not
responsible to the president (the president has the power to dissolve the legislature and dismiss
membersofthecabinetbutonlyontheadviceoftheprimeminister[Article13]).
1c.Presidential,becausethegovernmentisnotresponsibletothelegislature(Article32).
1d.Parliamentary,becausethegovernmentisresponsibletothelegislature(Articles66and69)andthe
headofstate(theEmperor)isnotpopularlyelectedforafixedterminoffice.
2. Canada has a parliamentary system, because it does not have an independently elected president.
(Also,itsgovernmentisclearlyresponsibletothelegislature.)
3.False.

Institutions
4. A constructive vote of no confidence requires legislators to approve the dismissal of the current
cabinet (voteofnoconfidence)atthe sametimethattheyapprovetheappointmentofa new cabinet
(investiturevote).
5.(b);agovernmentdeclaresthatavoteonapieceoflegislationisalsoavoteofsupportforthecabinet
itself.
6. No, this is not a good example of Gamsons Law because the allocation of ministerial posts is not
based proportionally on the percentage of seats Hamas contributes to the governments legislative
support.

GovernmentFormation
7.Answerswillvary.
33
8.TheleaderoftheCentrePartyisthemostlikelytobeappointedformateurbecausetheCentreParty
wonmoreseatsthananyotherparty.
9.(b);apreelectoralcoalitionprobablyformed.
10a.IfEcuadorwereparliamentary,thentheleaderofthePSCismostlikelytobeappointedformateur
becausethatpartywonthemostseats.
10b. The formateur would come from the PRE party (the presidents party), because governments in a
presidentialdemocracyareresponsibleonlytothepresidentandhegetstochoosethecabinet.

GovernmentTypes
11.Answerswillvary.Hereisoneexample(seetablebelow).GiventhesefiveMWCs,theleastminimal
winningcoalitionisbetweentheCentrePartyandtheNationalCoalitionParty.
Coalition Totalseats Surplusseats
Centre+NCP 101 0
NCP+SDP+CD 102 1
NCP+LA+Gr+CD+TF 103 2
NCP+SDP+Gr 110 9
NCP+SDP+LA 112 11

12a. A minority coalition (together the two parties control 295 seats, and 302 are needed for a
majority).
12b.Aminimalwinningcoalition(togetherthetwopartiescontrol306seats,and302areneededfora
majority).
12c. A surplus majority government, since the PDS could be kicked out of the coalition and the
remainingmemberswouldstillbeabletomaintaintheirmajority.
13.True,becausepartieshavelessofaneedtobeinthegovernmenttoinfluencepolicyinlegislatures
thatallowoppositionpartiesmorepower.
14.Presidentsinpresidentialdemocracieshavenoconstitutionalimperativetoformmajoritycabinets
theycanformminoritycabinetswhentheywant.Someoftheseminoritygovernmentswillrulewiththe
supportofanimplicitlegislativemajority,justlikeminoritygovernmentsinparliamentarydemocracies.
Other minority presidential governments, however, will rule without this kind of support. This second
type of minority government is not possible in a parliamentary system because of the existence of
legislativeresponsibility.Thisdifferencesuggests,allthingsbeingequal,thatminoritygovernmentswill
bemorefrequentinpresidentialsystemsthaninparliamentaryones.
15.Notethatthereisnoquestion15theproblemsweremisnumberedinthischapter.

34
DelegationProblems
16a.Delegationscenarios.
Scenario1
(i)rangeofpoliciesacceptabletotheprincipal:1to5
(ii)thepolicyproposedbytheagent:2
(iii)theagencyloss:0
(iv)whetherdelegationwassuccessful:yes

Scenario2a
(i)rangeofpoliciesacceptabletotheprincipal:1to9
(ii)thepolicyproposedbytheagent:3
(iii)theagencyloss:2
(iv)whetherdelegationwassuccessful:yes

Scenario2b
(i)rangeofpoliciesacceptabletotheprincipal:2to8
(ii)thepolicyproposedbytheagent:7
(iii)theagencyloss:2
(iv)whetherdelegationwassuccessful:yes

Scenario2c
(i)rangeofpoliciesacceptabletotheprincipal:4to6
(ii)thepolicyproposedbytheagent:6
(iii)theagencyloss:1
(iv)whetherdelegationwassuccessful:no,inthattheprincipalisstilloneunitawayfromtheproposed
policy.

Scenario3
(i)rangeofpoliciesacceptabletotheprincipal:5to13
(ii)thepolicyproposedbytheagent:5
(iii)theagencyloss:4
(iv)whetherdelegationwassuccessful:no

16b.InScenario3,theagent(agendasetter)hadnopowertomovethestatusquo.InScenarios1,2a
and2b,theagenthadthepowertochooseherownpreferredpolicy.InScenario2c,theagenthadonly
limitedpowerandwasabletomovepolicyinherpreferreddirectionbutwasnotabletochooseher
ownpreferredpolicy.
16c.Agencylossislikelytobelowwhentheprincipalspreferredpolicyisnotfarfromthestatusquo
and/orwhentheagentspreferredpolicyisclosetothatoftheprincipal(assumingbothagreeonthe
directioninwhichpolicyshouldbemoved).Itislikelytobehighotherwise.Theagencylosscannever
behigherthanwhattheprincipalexperienceswiththestatusquo,sincetheprincipalwouldrejectany
alternativepolicyproposalthatisfartherfromherpreferredpolicythanthestatusquois.

35
17a.ThefinaloutcomeinScenario1is8andthefinaloutcomeinScenario2is10.
17b.Answersmightvaryhere,dependingonhowoneinterpretstheideaofdelegationworkingbetter.
18a.ThefinaloutcomeinScenario1is2andthefinaloutcomeinScenario2is3.
18b.Scenario2betterrepresentsasituationinwhichtheprincipalusedascreeningmechanismto
alleviatetheproblemofadverseselection,whichiswhentheprincipalhasincompleteinformation
aboutanagentstype.
19.Juniorministerandlegislativecommitteesareexpostmechanismsorthepolicepatrolvariety.
Theseactorsareusedtokeeptabsontheactionsofmembersofanotherpoliticalpartyandtheyarein
apositiontodosocontinuously.Delegationproblemsfacingmembersofcoalitiongovernmentswould
decreaseifthepartiesingovernmenthavesimilarpolicypreferences;exantemechanismsarenotas
crucialbecausepotentialagentshavegoodpolicypreferences,andexpostmechanismsarenotas
importantbecausetheagentshavesimilargoalstotheprincipalandshouldbeworkingtoproduce
policythattheprincipallikeseveniftheprincipalisnotmonitoringtheagentsbehavior.
20a.Answerswillvary.
20b.Answerswillvary.
36
Chapter13
ElectoralSystemDesign
1.Answerswillvary.

2a.Answerswillvary.
2b.Answerswillvary.
2c.Themoreseats,themoreproportionally(orfairly)seatscanbeallocated.

3a.2005legislativeelectionsinIraq:answersmaywellvaryaccordingtodifferentsourcesusedand
dependingonwhichelectiontherewasanelectioninJanuary2005aswellasoneinDecember2005.
TheoneinJanuarywastoelectatransitionalassemblywhosememberswouldwriteanewconstitution.
TheoneinDecemberwastoelectanewlegislativeassemblyafterthenewconstitutionhadbeen
ratified.Studentsmightchooseoneortheother,orboth.Hereweprovidesomeinformationonthe
Decemberelections.(ThefollowinginformationcomesfromareportfromtheMiddleEastMedia
ResearchInstitute;thereferencetothisreportisfromanentryonthe2005Decemberelectionson
MatthewShugartsblog,fruitsandvotes.com.Toreadtheentirereport,goto
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA25205.)

ThesystemadoptedfortheDecember15electionsismorecomplicatedandboundtobe,perhaps,more
controversial than the system adopted for the elections in January. In January, the election system was
based on a strict proportional representation, with Iraq serving as one electoral district. Seats were
subsequentlydistributedamongthecompetinggroupsinproportiontothenumberofvoteseachgroup
receivedintheelections.FortheelectionsinDecember,therewillbetwogroupsofparliamentaryseats
foratotalof275seatsthemajorgroupof230seatsarereferredtoastheSeatsoftheNationalAssembly
(maqaid majlis alnuwwab) and the remaining 45 seats are referred to as the compensatory seats (al
maqaidaltawidhiyah).The230seatsaredistributedtotheprovincesbasedonthenumberofregistered
votersintheJanuaryelections:Baghdad(59),Naynawa(19),Basra(16),Suleymaniya(15),Erbil(13),Dhi
Qar (12), Babel (11); Dyala (10); Anbar and Kirkuk (9) each; Wassit, Salah alDin, Qadisiyya and Najaf (8)
each;DhoukandMisan(7)each;Karbala(6);andMuthanna(5).Thisformulawasarrivedatthroughtwo
arithmeticsteps.Atthenationallevel,thetotalnumberofvotesregisteredintheJanuaryelectionswas
divided by the total number of parliamentary seats (i.e. 275). The quotient of approximately 50,000
represents the national average per seat (the Election Board refers to it as the National Quota). At the
nextstep,thenumberofseatsallocatedtoeachprovinceisdividedbythenumberofvotesregisteredin
the January elections in that province. The quotient could vary from a high of 50,000 in Baghdad to the
mid30,000sintheprovinceofDyala.
While all slates will compete nationally, under the new system each candidate, whether running as an
individual or as a member of an alliance, must declare his/her candidacy in one of the 18 provinces. A
large alliance, such as the Iraqi National Alliance, will place different candidates in different provinces,
with their leaders placed on top of the slates in provinces where they expect a major turnout in their
favor ("safe districts" in American or British parlance). For example, the Iraqi National Alliance placed
slates of SCIRI candidates in three of its potentially strong provinces and slates of Muqtada alSadr
supportersinanotherthreeprovinces,includingthereligiouslysignificantprovinceofNajaf.Bycontrast,
anindividualorasmallalliancemightplacetheireffortsinoneprovincetomaximizethenumberofvotes
castintheirfavor.
37
The 45 Compensatory Seats: The system is designed to provide a sort of "second chance" for slates or
individuals who are unable to accrue enough votes within the province where they declared their
candidacy to earn a parliamentary seat. Even if a slate does not receive enough votes in terms of the
provincial quotient to qualify for a seat in a province, the total number of votes cast for that slate
nationwide may be sufficient to make the slate eligible for a seat. There are some other configurations
thatcouldgivepreferencetowomeniftheirnumberonaslatefallsbelowtherequiredonethird.Inthe
eventthatnotallthecompensatoryseatsareallocatedinthefirstround,aspecialformulawillbeusedto
distributetherestoftheseatsbasedonacombinationofnationalandprovincialvotes.
In sum: 18 districts, 2 electoral tiers (the upper tier being compensatory), the number of legislators
elected in each district as mentioned above, and special requirements that every third candidate on a
listbefemale.
AccordingtoinformationprovidedbytheUNontheelections,theIraqisusedaclosedlist,withaHare
quotaandlargestremainders.(http://aceproject.org/eroen/regions/Mideast/IQ/iraqelectfact
sht.pdf.)
3b.Answerswillvary.
3c.Answerswillvary.
4a.2010legislativeelectionsinAfghanistan:answersmaywellvaryaccordingtodifferentsources.
Therewere34districts.Accordingtoparagraph3ofArticle12ofthe20102electorallaw,ForWolesi
Jirgaelections,eachprovinceshallbeoneconstituencyandforNomads,thewholeofthecountryshall
beonesingleconstituency.AccordingtoArticle19,TheWolesiJirgashallhave249seats.Ofthe
allocatedseats,10seatsarereservedfornomads,and239seatsareallocatedfortheprovincesin
proportiontopopulation.Onaverage,outofthetotalnumberofseatsineachprovinceatleasttwo
femalemembersshallbeelectedtotheWolesiJirga.Ofthe249legislativeseats,68arereservedfor
women.Article22,paragraph1:Ineachprovince,seatsshallbeawardedtothecandidateswho
receivethemostvotes.Theallocatedseatsforwomenareexemptedfromthisprovision.Article23,
paragraph1:Inordertodeterminetheminimumnumberoffemalecandidatestorepresenteach
province,theCommissionshalldevelopproceduresandformulae,basedonthepopulationofeach
province,todeterminethenumberoffemalecandidatestorepresenteachprovinceinaccordancewith
therequirementsofArticle83oftheConstitutionofAfghanistan,accordingtowhichthenumberof
femalerepresentativesshallbeatleasttwicethenumberofexistingprovincesofthecountry.District
magnitudesrangefrom2to33.

3districtswithDM=2(Nimroz,Nooristan,Panjshir)
2districtswithDM=3(Urozgan,Zabul)
9districtswithDM=4(Badghis,Bamyan,Daikondi,Kapisa,Kunar,Laghman,Logar,Paktika,Parwan,
Samangan,)
6districtswithDM=5(Farah,Juzjan,Khost,Paktia,SariPul,Wardak)
1districtswithDM=6(Ghor)
2districtswithDM=8(Baghlan,Helmand)
4districtswithDM=9(Badakhshan,Faryab,Kunduz,Takhar)
38
3districtswithDM=11(Balkh,Ghazni,Kandahar)
1districtswithDM=14(Nangerhar)
1districtswithDM=17(Herat)
1districtswithDM=33(Kabul)
1districtswithDM=10(Kuchi),butnotethatunliketheotherdistrictsthatarebasedonprovinces,the
KuchiarePashtunnomads,whoelect10membersasanationwideconstituency.
Sources:http://www.aanafghanistan.org/index.asp?id=1031,http://afghan2010.com/resource/afghanistan
electorallaw,http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=2,http://psephos.adam
carr.net/countries/a/afghanistan/afghanistan2010.txt
4b.Answerswillvary.ForoneexplanationofwhySNTVisapoorchoiceinAfghanistan,hereisa
quotationfromtheInternationalCrisisGroup(AsiaReportN117,23Feb2011):
The Single NonTransferable Vote (SNTV) system remains the most pressing issue to be tackled in a
revisedelectorallaw,asevidencedbythe2005provincialcouncilandNationalAssemblyelections.SNTV
appears simple: each voter indicates one favoured candidate. In many singleseat constituency,
Westminsterbasedsystems,eachvoteralsocastsaballotforonecandidate.However,distortionsarisein
multiseat constituencies. If a large proportion of citizens votes for one candidate, this large group will
elect a single representative, while a much smaller number of voters will disproportionately elect
favouredcandidates.InAfghanistan,multimemberconstituenciesseerepresentativeselectedwithwildly
varyingmandatessinceseatscanbewoninlargeprovinceswithevensmallnumbersandsmallmarginsof
votes. SNTV is particularly unsuited to Afghanistan because political parties lack capacity and discipline.
The absence of disciplined political parties to carefully analyse prospects and to ensure that their votes
are evenly distributed among candidates results more often than not in inequitable political
representation.Therecaneitherbelargenumbersofsurplusvotesforindividualcandidatesorpolitical
groups can split their votes between multiple candidates and get far fewer seats than their power base
represents. Individual, as opposed to partybased candidates in Afghanistan is problematic. Large,
unwieldyballotpapersaredifficultbothforvotersandelectoraladministrators.Thesystemalsocreatesa
numberofbarrierstobroadpoliticalparticipationwhilebluntingthepotentialpowerofpoliticalparties.
Candidates stand as individuals with either nominal or substantial backing from political parties but
cannotlaterbeheldaccountableforpartypositions.
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south
asia/afghanistan/B117%20Afghanistans%20Elections%20Stalemate.pdf)

4c.Answerswillvary.

HowDoElectoralSystemsWork?
5a. The Hare quota is valid votes/valid seats, or 308,834/17 = 18,166.71, so each party needs 18,167
votestoobtainaseat.Seetablebelowforseatallocations.

39
2005LegislativeElectionsinOslo,NorwayHareQuotawithLargestRemainders

SP KrF Kyst H Ap V SV FrP Others Total

Votes 3,270 11,168 551 61,130 97,246 28,639 41,434 53,280 12,116 308,834
Seats 17
Quota 18,167 18,167 18,167 18,167 18,167 18,167 18,167 18,167
Votes/Quota 0.18 0.61 0.03 3.36 5.35 1.58 2.28 2.93
AutomaticSeats 0 0 0 3 5 1 2 2 13
Remainder 0.18 0.61 0.03 0.36 0.35 0.58 0.28 0.93
Remainder
Seats
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4
TotalSeats 0 1 0 4 5 2 2 3 17

5b. The Droop quota is equal to the HagenbachBischoff quota plus one, with any decimal part
removed. The HagenbachBischoff in this district is valid votes/(valid seats +1), or 308,834/18 =
17,157.44.Ifweaddone,wehave17,158.44.Wenowremovethedecimalpartandweseethatthe
Droopquotais17,158.Seetablebelowforseatallocations.
2005LegislativeElectionsinOslo,NorwayDroopQuotawithLargestRemainders

SP KrF Kyst H Ap V SV FrP Others Total

Votes 3,270 11,168 551 61,130 97,246 28,639 41,434 53,280 12,116 308,834
Seats 17
Quota 17,158 17,158 17,158 17,158 17,158 17,158 17,158 17,158
Votes/Quota 0.191 0.651 0.032 3.563 5.668 1.669 2.415 3.105
AutomaticSeats 0 0 0 3 5 1 2 3 14
Remainder 0.191 0.651 0.032 0.563 0.668 0.669 0.415 0.105
Remainder
Seats
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 4
TotalSeats 0 1 0 3 6 2 2 3 17

40
6a.dHondtDivisormethod.Seetablebelowforquotientsandseatallocations.

SP KrF Kyst H Ap V SV FrP Others Total

Votes 3,270 11,168 551 61,130 97,246 28,639 41,434 53,280 12,116 308,834
1
3270.0 11168.0 551.0 61130.0 97246.0 28639.0 41434.0 53280.0

2
1635.0 5584.0 275.5 30565.0 48623.0 14319.5 20717.0 26640.0

3
1090.0 3722.7 183.7 20376.7 32415.3 9546.3 13811.3 17760.0

4
817.5 2792.0 137.8 15282.5 24311.5 7159.8 10358.5 13320.0

5
654.0 2233.6 110.2 12226.0 19449.2 5727.8 8286.8 10656.0

6
545.0 1861.3 91.8 10188.3 16207.7 4773.2 6905.7 8880.0

TotalSeats
0 0 0 4 6 2 2 3
17

6b.St.LageDivisormethod.Seetablebelowforquotientsandseatallocations.

SP KrF Kyst H Ap V SV FrP Others Total

Votes 3,270 11,168 551 61,130 97,246 28,639 41,434 53,280 12,116 308,834
1
3270.0 11168.0 551.0 61130.0 97246.0 28639.0 41434.0 53280.0

3
1090.0 3722.7 183.7 20376.7 32415.3 9546.3 13811.3 17760.0

5
654.0 2233.6 110.2 12226.0 19449.2 5727.8 8286.8 10656.0

7
467.1 1595.4 78.7 8732.9 13892.3 4091.3 5919.1 7611.4

9
363.3 1240.9 61.2 6792.2 10805.1 3182.1 4603.8 5920.0

11
297.3 1015.3 50.1 5557.3 8840.5 2603.5 3766.7 4843.6

Total
Seats 0 1 0 3 6 2 2 3
17

41
ModifiedSt.LageDivisormethod.Seetablebelowforquotientsandseatallocations.

SP KrF Kyst H Ap V SV FrP Others Total

Votes 3,270 11,168 551 61,130 97,246 28,639 41,434 53,280 12,116 308,834
1.4
2335.7 7977.1 393.6 43664.3 69461.4 20456.4 29595.7 38057.1

3
1090.0 3722.7 183.7 20376.7 32415.3 9546.3 13811.3 17760.0

5
654.0 2233.6 110.2 12226.0 19449.2 5727.8 8286.8 10656.0

7
467.1 1595.4 78.7 8732.9 13892.3 4091.3 5919.1 7611.4

9
363.3 1240.9 61.2 6792.2 10805.1 3182.1 4603.8 5920.0

11
297.3 1015.3 50.1 5557.3 8840.5 2603.5 3766.7 4843.6

TotalSeats
0 0 0 4 6 2 2 3
17

6c.ThemostproportionalofthedivisorsystemsistheSt.Lagemethod.Thequotasystemsseemmore
proportionalthanthedivisorones,andtheHareseemsthemostproportionalmethod.Theresultshere
seemtofitwhatonewouldexpect,basedonTable13.11inthechapter.
42
Chapter14
PartySystemSize
1a.Theeffectivenumberofelectoralpartiesis1.97.Theeffectivenumberoflegislativepartiesis1.96.
1b.Theactual(raw)numberofelectoralpartiesthatcompetedintheelectionsis21.Therawnumberof
parties that won seats is 12. Answers will vary on the comparison of the usefulness of actual versus
effectivenumbersofparties.
1c.Onepartydominant.
1d. No, the translation of vote percentages into seat percentages seems pretty proportional. The
electoralsystemmustbequitepermissive,becauseapartywonaseatafterwinningonly0.3percentof
thevote.
PartySystemNationalization
2a.DifferentpartiescompetewithinvariousIndianstatesthepartysystemisnotnationalized.
2b.Becauseonlyonecandidateiselectedfromeachdistrict,themechanicaleffectoftheelectoralrule
is to magnify the success of the plurality winner and to discriminate against candidates from smaller
parties. This mechanical effect prompts voters to vote strategically for their most preferred candidate
out of the set of candidates with an actual chance of winning, and prompts candidates to enter
strategically as wellthose from small parties or with little support will prefer not to enter in the first
place.Thus,withinagivendistrict,weshouldexpecttoseetwomainparties(andtwomaincandidates
fromthoseparties).
2c.Answerswillvary.Alikelyresponsewouldbethatgovernmentspendingwasmorecentralizedinthe
1970sthaninotherperiods.
PoliticalIdentityFormation
3a.ItwouldbedifficulttopredictapersonsracialgroupifyouknowonlythatheorshespeaksEnglish.
If you know that someone is Latino, it would be difficult to predict which language, Spanish or English,
thatpersonspeaks.Likewise,ifyouknowthatsomeoneisAsian,itwouldbedifficulttopredictwhether
that person speaks English or Korean. Based on these answers, the hypothetical community seems to
havecrosscuttingattributes.
3b. The two identity categories that form minimal winning coalitions are English speakers (55 percent)
andLatinos(51percent).Thelogicofminimalwinningcoalitionssuggeststhattheleastminimalwinning
coalition,theLatinos,shouldbethemostlikelytobepoliticized.
3c.EnglishspeakingLatinosaremembersofbothminimalwinningcoalitions,whichshouldgivetheman
advantage.Theyshouldbeabletogetmorepolicyconcessionsoutoftheircoalitionpartner(s)because
theyhaveanexitoptiontheycouldleaveandformapartofadifferentMWC.
43
Chapter15
SpatialModelofBicameralism
1a. The median voter (MV) prefers policies between 3 and 9 to the status quo policy. The MV would
proposeanewpolicyof6,andtheoutcomewouldbe6.
1b.TheMVinthelowerchamberpreferspoliciesbetween3and9tothestatusquopolicy.TheMVin
theupperchamberpreferspoliciesbetween3and5tothestatusquopolicy.Theoverlappingrangethat
bothprefertothestatusquoispoliciesbetween3and5.
1c.Thelowerchamberwouldpropose5.Iftheupperchamberweretheagendasetter,itwouldpropose
4.
1d.TheMVinthelowerchamberpreferspoliciesbetween5and7tothestatusquopolicy.TheMVrin
theupperchamberpreferspoliciesbetween3and5tothestatusquopolicy.Theoverlappingrangethat
both prefer to the status quo does not exist. In this case, both houses would be indifferent between
doingnothingandproposing5,theSQpolicy.

SpatialModelofJudicialReview
2a.Thelegislaturewillsetpolicyat7,itsidealpoint.
2b.Thelegislativecommittee(LC)preferspoliciesbetween3and7tothestatusquopolicy.
2c. The LC will initiate legislation if the agencys policy is outside of the range 3 to 7. If the policy is
withinthisrange,thenitwillnotinitiatelegislation.(Weassumethatifpolicyisproposedatexactly3or
7, then the committee would be indifferent between the new policy and the status quo and would
acceptthenewpolicy.)
2d.At3(orthestudentmightchoose3.1sothattheLCisnotindifferent).
2e.TheLCwouldinitiatelegislationtochangetheSQ,andthelegislaturewouldproposeanewpolicyof
7.Ifthecourtstrikesdowntheagencypolicy,thefinalpolicyoutcomewouldbe7.
2f.Thecourtwouldnotstrikeitdownbecause3.1isclosertoitsidealpoint(4)than7is.
2g.Because3.1isclosertotheLCsidealpoint(5)than7is.
2h.3.1,forthereasonsgivenabove.
2i.Policiesbetween5and7.
2j. The agency should implement policy at 5 (if we assume that new policies are always accepted over
thestatusquowhenactorsareindifferent)orat5.1(ifweassumethatpoliciescanbeimplementedin
0.1incrementsalongthepolicyspace).ThiswillbethefinalpolicyoutcomebecauseneithertheLCnor
thecourtwouldpreferthestatusquopolicytotheproposednewpolicy.
44
2k. The court prefers all policies between 7 and 9 to the ideal point of the median voter in the
legislature.
2l.Theagencyshouldimplementpolicyat7,andthiswillbethefinaloutcome.Allactorsasidefromthe
agencyprefer7tothestatus quo,and 7iswhere thelegislature will produce thenew policy if givena
chance.Sotheagencycandonobetterthantoimplementpolicyat7inthefirstplace.
2m.Yes,acourtwiththepowerofjudicialreviewcanaffectpolicyoutcomes,andno,thecourtdoesnot
havetoactuallydoanything(suchasmakerulings)toaffectpolicyoutcomes.
2n.Inthesescenarios,policygetsmovedtowardthemedianvoterinthelegislature.
2o. No, because when policy gets moved by the court (or due to the anticipation of court actions), it
seems to move toward the median voter in the legislature. In other words, the court is not able to
simply choose policy wherever it likes regardless of the preferences of the elected members of the
legislature.

Constitutions,theProvisionofRights,andConstitutionalCourts
3.Answerswillvary.
4.Answerswillvary.

VetoPlayerTheory
5a.Seethefigurebelow.

Notes:Therearetwovetoplayers,AandB,andaStatusQuopolicy,SQ.
A
B
I
s
s
u
e

Issue2
Figure15.13TwoVetoPlayers
SQ
45
5b.Answerswillvary.
6a.Seethefigurebelow.

6b. The winset in the second figure is smaller this means that there are fewer alternatives that all
actorsprefertothestatusquopolicy.
7a.Seethefigurebelow.Noticethatthereisnowinset.Thismeansthattherearenopoliciespreferred
totheSQpolicybyallactors.

46

7b.Seethefigurebelow.Noticethatthereisnowawinset.Thismeansthattherearepoliciespreferred
totheSQpolicybyallactors.

7c. The farther apart the ideal points of the veto players, the larger the unanimity core. The larger the
unanimitycore,thehigherthelevelofpolicystability.
7d.No,anadditionalplayerwithintheexistingunanimitycorewillnotchangethesizeoftheunanimity
core.
7e.No.
8a.Seeunanimitycoredrawninfigurebelow.
Notes:Therearethreevetoplayers,A,B,andC.Thetriangleoutlinestheunanimitycore.
47

8b. J
1
should interpret statutes at her ideal point, because her ideal point is within the unanimity core
andthelegislativevetoplayerswillbeunabletochangeherpolicies.
8c. If J
2
interprets statutes at her ideal point, the legislative veto players will be able to move it. She
should interpret statutes at the point within the unanimity core (or on the edge of the core) that is
closesttoheridealpoint.
8d. If the ideal points of the legislative veto players were farther apart, the unanimity core would be
larger and the agendasetting power of judges would also increase. The larger the unanimity core, the
greatertheamountofdiscretionjudgesarelikelytobeabletoexercise.
8e. We should see higher levels of judicial activism in countries that employ federal and bicameral
institutionsbecausesuchinstitutionsproducemorevetoplayers,whichmakesitmorelikelythatthere
willbeasizableunanimitycore.
48
Chapter16

1.Answerswillvary.
2.Answerswillvary.