"

DISTRICT COURT, DOUGLAS COUNTY,

4000 Justice Way Ste. 2009
Castle Rock, CO 80109

Petitioner: MARILYN R. MARKS, an individual (pro se)

v.

Respondents: SALLY MISARE, in her official capacity as
Clerk of the Town of Castle Rock, Colorado, and the TOWN
OF CASTLE ROCK, a Colorado home rule municipality,
and JUDY CRENSHAW, in her capacity as an election
commissioner, and BETTY COX, in her capacity as an
election commissioner, and JIM HENDERSON, in his
capacity as an election commissioner, and RYAN REILLY,
in his capacity as an election commissioner, and BRIAN
TOBLER, in his capacity as and election commissioner















! COURT USE ONLY !



Case Number:
Division:

VERIFIED PETITION FOR RESOLUTION OF ELECTION
CONTROVERSY PURSUANT TO 31-10-1401

Petitioner Marilyn R. Marks, pro se, a Colorado elector and Registered Agent for
Committee for Constitutional Rights (the Committee), an issue committee in the Town of
Castle Rock, Colorado August 19, 2014 Special Election, (the Election), alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

This urgent matter pertains to controversy surrounding Colorado constitutional violations in
the Election as a result of flawed ballot handling in the ongoing Election currently being conducted
by the Town of Castle Rock. Mail ballot processing is occurring daily and is planned to continue
through the close of polls on Tuesday evening, August 19, 2014. As of August 14, 2014 over
3,250 ballots had been processed through the ballot scanner. The ballot processing to date has
violated all voters rights to a secret ballot, and that violation will result in an election outcome that
cannot be certified and will be required to be voided by the Court. This petition seeks the early
termination and voiding of the Election.
Town officials were informed in writing on August 2, 2014, prior to any ballot processing,
that constitutional violations related to secrecy in voting would likely occur if ballots were
#



processed as planned. Numerous warnings and complaints by citizens and voters regarding voter
privacy and ballot secrecy were rebuffed and ignored by Town officials, as they executed flawed
procedures that compromised the voters rights to a secret ballot.
The petitioner seeks this courts immediate order requiring that all ballot counting and
processing be stopped and the election officials be ordered not to certify the election, and that the
Town Council be ordered to call a new election for the earliest reasonable date.

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. This in an action pursuant 31-10-1401 C.R.S., for the resolution of an election controversy
related to the conduct of the election in a manner, if allowed to continue, will very likely
result in an invalid election that cannot be certified because of material violations of
Colorado election law, the Town of Castles Election Code and the Colorado Constitution.

2. The clerk, the election commissioners and the election judges have deprived and continue
to deprive voters of their right to secrecy in voting under the Article VII, Section 8 of the
Colorado Constitution, virtually assuring that the ultimate election results must be declared
void ab initio. Taylor v. Pile, 391 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo. 1964).

3. This petition seeks an immediate order of this court to protect the rights of every voter to
vote an absolutely secret ballot by terminating the current election and declaring the
election void ab initio.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. Petitioner MARILYN R MARKS (Marks) is a registered elector of Colorado, and
resides in Denver, Colorado.

5. Marks is the Registered Agent of the issue committee Committee for Constitutional
Rights (the Committee) for the August 19, 2014 Special Election (the Election.)
formed pursuant to the Town Election Code.

6. Respondent TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK (the Town) is a Colorado home rule
municipal corporation located in Douglas County, Colorado.

7. Respondent SALLY MISARE (Misare) is the appointed Town Clerk of the Town.
Misare is sued in her official capacity only.


$



8. Respondent JUDY CRENSHAW (Cresnshaw) is an appointed election commissioner
of the Town, and is sued in her official capacity only. On information and belief,
Crenshaw is a resident of the Town.

9. Respondent BETTY COX (Cox) is an appointed election commissioner of the Town,
and is sued in her official capacity only. On information and belief, Cox is a resident of
the Town.

10. Respondent JIM HENDERSON (Henderson) is an appointed election commissioner
of the Town, and is sued in her official capacity only. On information and belief,
Henderson is a resident of the Town.

11. Respondent RYAN REILLY (Reilly) is an appointed election commissioner of the
Town, and is sued in her official capacity only. On information and belief, Reilly is a
resident of the Town.

12. Respondent RYAN REILLY (Reilly) is an appointed election commissioner of the
Town, and is sued in her official capacity only. On information and belief, Reilly is a
resident of the Town.

13. Respondent BRIAN TOBLER (Tobler) is an appointed election commissioner of the
Town, and is sued in her official capacity only. On information and belief, Tobler is a
resident of the Town.

14. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under Article VI, Section 9, of the
Colorado Constitution and 31-10-1401 C.R.S., which provides that this court has
jurisdiction over the dispute at issue.

GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

15. The Election is an all mail ballot election where each eligible elector was to be mailed
a ballot under provisions of the Town Code.

16. On information and belief eligible electors were mailed ballots in late July 2014.

17. Ballots may be returned by mail or by in-person delivery.

18. The Town will accept delivery of ballots in their sealed envelopes until 7 p.m. August
%



19, 2014.

19. On information and belief the Town had received over 5,200 ballots by August 14,
2014.

20. On information and belief the Town has approximately 31,000 registered active voters.

21. There are two ballot questions on the ballot and no candidates for office:

A. REFERENDUM ON ORDINANCE NO. 2014-03

SHALL TOWN COUNCIL ORDINANCE 2014-03 BE APPROVED WHICH ORDINANCE REVOKES THE
AUTHORITY OF- THE TOWN MANAGER UNDER THE MUNICIPAL CODE TO PROHIBIT THE OPEN
CARRYING OF FIREARMS WITHIN MUNICIPAL BUILDINGS, PARKS, RECREATION AREAS AND OTHER
MUNICIPAL PROPERTIES OWNED OR OPERATED BY THE TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK?
YES ___ NO ___

B. HOME RULE CHARTER AMENDMENT

SHALL THE TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK HOME RULE CHARTER BE AMENDED BY ADDING A NEW
SECTION 1-5 TO READ AS FOLLOWS?
Section 1-5. Constitutional Rights.
Any restriction or limitation on the rights of citizens to keep and bear firearms enacted by the Town Council
shall require the approval of the registered electors as a referred measure under Section 15-4 of this Charter.
This Section shall not apply to Town Council action which makes unlawful the discharge or brandishing of
firearms. This Section shall govern and control over Articles II and VII or any other conflicting provision of this
Charter, and shall apply only to Council action taken after its adoption.
1. YES ____ NO __

22. Each ballot is constructed with one uniquely numbered detachable stub.

23. Each ballot issued to a voter is accounted for by use of the numbered stub which
unique number is entered into the poll book alongside the voters name.

24. The ballot packet mailed to voters contained a ballot, a return envelope, and one page
of voter instructions.

25. The ballot packet did not contain a secrecy envelope or sleeve, as defined in 31-10-
907(5) C.R.S.

26. On information and belief the ballot, when issued and mailed, was folded with the
ballot content to be voted showing on the outer surfaces of the ballot, with a blank
reverse side showing on the folded inside surfaces of the ballot.

&




27. On information and belief, the majority of electors inserted their voted ballot into the
return envelope folding them in the manner in which they were originally folded with
voted side out and with the identifying ballot stub attached.

28. The Towns Code, in a departure from state law, does not require the use of secrecy
sleeves if the ballot can be folded to conceal the electors vote. (2.01.140(A) Castle
Rock Municipal Code.)

29. Ballot processing began on August 7, 2014 by election judges selected, hired and
trained by Misare.

30. On information and belief, judges opening the ballot return envelopes, verifying the
stub number, unfolding the ballot and detaching the stub had visual access to
identifiable voted ballots with the voters marked choices at numerous stations in the
ballot processing. At times, voters names were called out in the ballot processing
room by judges while the exposed voted ballot was being reviewed by the judges. This
identifiable ballot information was also visible to watchers and media observers.

31. Judges processes for handling ballots bypassed the traditional use of the secrecy sleeve
which is routinely used to conceal the voted ballot while only the detachable stub is
visible, verified against the poll book and then removed to de-identify the ballot.

32. The process by which the judges routinely opened and processed the ballots allowed
the judges, other judges, and any nearby staff, watchers or media observers to
determine how individual electors had voted.

33. The process adopted by the judges was the standard process planned and executed
through August 12, 2014 when ballot envelope opening was temporarily halted.

34. Petitioner learned on August 2, 2014 that voters were not provided with secrecy
sleeves in their ballot packet and the ballots were folded vote side out.

35. On August 2, 2014 Marks wrote Clerk Misare, Town Attorney Slentz, and Town
Council members in an email and stated her concerns about the lack of secrecy sleeves
and the implications for compromised voter privacy. (Exhibit 1) Marks requested that
a copy of her email statement be sent to the Election Commission, (the
Commission.)

36. The Towns website (http://www.crgov.com/index.aspx?nid=101 states that the

'



Election Commission is responsible for all activities and duties relating to elections
within the Town, including the establishment of election districts.

37. Petitioner received no responses to her concerns from the Election Commission (the
Commission), Town Council, or the Clerk.

38. No later than August 2, 2014 the citizens of Castle Rock became increasingly aware of
the planned ballot processing procedures without secrecy sleeves, and the anticipated
compromise of voters rights to a secret ballot. Beginning then and through the date of
this filing, the compromise of ballot secrecy has been the subject of numerous local
radio broadcasts, online news reports, newspaper articles, social media, and personal
conversations, causing the secrecy issue to be known to a wide audience of voters prior
to Election Day when the ballots are required to be received by the clerk.

39. On August 8, Marks filed a complaint (Exhibit 2)with the Election Commission
regarding secret ballot violations and other significant election quality problems that
she had observed. Various other committees and individuals co-signed the complaint
as co-complainants, requesting a hearing on the record.

40. On August 8 at 5 pm, the Commission held a public meeting with proper public notice
to promulgate a new watcher and media observer rule. The Commission stated that
they had no authority to hear election complaints, and indicated that procedures in
doubt regarding voter privacy would not be taken under consideration.

41. Patrick Neville, (Neville), Castle Rock voter and authorized watcher for the issue
committee Power to the Peoples Constitution Committee, reported to the
Commission and Misare during public comment session of the meeting that in his
watching the ballot processing, he had been able to observe a large number of
identifiable ballots as a result of the lack of secrecy sleeves and reckless handling of
ballots by the judges, exposing the votes and ballot number simultaneously which he
was able to ascertain. He reported that judges called out names and numbers of some
voters while their voted ballot content was exposed to judges and watchers. Neville
reported that at times he could see the votes on one only question and sometimes on
both questions. The Commission did not respond to Nevilles concerns.


42. Petitioner formed the issue committee, Committee for Constitutional Rights on August
7, 2014 as the registered agent, but was not permitted to act as a watcher on behalf of
the committee.


(



43. On August 10, on behalf of the Committee and three other issue committees filed a
demand letter (Exhibit 3) with the Town and Commission seeking immediate
resolution to the urgent issue of violations of the secret ballot, and threatening this
litigation to resolve the urgent issue of constitutional violations of voters rights to a
secret ballot.

44. On August 11, Committee watcher Jess Loban (Loban) and media observer John
Rush (Rush) observed the ballot processing activities between approximately 8:30
a.m and 9:45 a.m. They reported to the Committee, and on radio show Rush to
Reason that the majority of ballots are subject to a process that discloses the voters
private choices to judges and observing watchers. Rush recorded detailed video
recordings of the procedures, documenting the routine exposure of traceable ballots to
election judges. During the watching process Loban voiced his objections to the
disclosures of the voters traceable ballot, but was ignored by the judges.

45. On August 14, 2014 Misare announced and demonstrated a new process (Retrofit
process) during a public demonstration that attempts to insert ballots as they are
opened into secrecy sleeves in a blind process that purportedly does not allow the
judges to have visual access to how individual voters voted.

46. The Retrofit process was announced as effective immediately and to apply to all
unopened and incoming ballots. It was announced that approximately 2,000 unopened
ballots were on hand as of August 13, 2014 yet to be processed, and for which the
process would be used.

47. At the August 14, 2014 demonstration Misare announced to the small group of
listeners that voters who have already cast ballots will be allowed to retrieve their
unopened ballots and be issued a replacement ballot with a secrecy sleeve. The
announced intent was to continue processing of ballots beginning August 15, 2014
despite the opportunity for voters to retrieve unprocessed ballots, creating an incentive
for voters to rush to retrieve their ballot before it was processed. No plans are available
for how this information is to be communicated to voters.

48. After the meeting, Petitioner raised additional objections with Town Attorney Bob
Slentz, (Slentz) stating that treating voters in such disparate manners would likely
invite Equal Protection claims from voters. Marks objected to Slentz that the plan as
announced would create at least five different classes of voters with differing levels of
protection of their voting rights:

a. Voters who voted assuming the secrecy of their ballot, whose ballots have
now been processed, subject to secrecy violations, and cannot be retrieved by
)



the voter

b. Voters who were aware of ballot secrecy compromises and voted with the
knowledge that their vote could be determined, and whose ballots are not yet
processed when they attempt to retrieve their ballot, and are afforded the
opportunity to vote a replacement secret ballot.

c. Voters who had voted aware of the secrecy compromises, whose ballots have
been processed and wish to retrieve their ballots to fully vote their conscience
with a secret ballot, and cannot retrieve them because they have been
processed.

d. Voters who receive information of the opportunity to retrieve their ballots only
after the close of the election.

e. Voters who have not yet cast their ballots who can now vote a secret ballot.

49. The original process for handling ballots by the election judges subject to watcher and
media observation was the adopted and intentional procedure designed by the Clerk
and other election officials and does not protect the voters rights to a secret ballot.

50. The processing steps that exposed the voters identifiable voted ballot were not
deviations from adopted policy or procedure.

51. The policy and procedure employed by the judges until August 13, 2014 allowed
judges and watchers to ascertain the identity of the voters and their ballot choices.

52. Petitioner and other citizens and issue committees have requested that Town officials,
including the election commissioners, address these concerns in time to salvage the
election by submitting numerous emails, formal complaints, requests for meetings,
public testimony, and pleas for meetings to resolve the issues without litigation. All
such efforts have been met with minimal substantive response or interest.

APPLICABLE STATUTORY AND CONSTIUTIONAL PROVISIONS

53. The Town is required to conduct its elections under the provisions of its Home-Rule
Charter (the Charter), the Towns election code (the Town Code), the Rules
adopted by the election commission (the Rules), and the Colorado Municipal
Election Code (the State Code), (31-10-101 et seq).


*



54. The Town Code does not require secrecy sleeves if the ballot can be folded to conceal
the electors vote. (Town Code 2.01.140(A))

55. The Election Commission is created by the Towns Home Rule Charter. The Charters
Article IV Section 4-4(b) provides that The Election Commission shall have charge
of all activities and duties required of it by this Charter and by ordinances relating to
the conduct of elections in the Town. In any case where election procedure is in doubt,
the Election Commission shall prescribe the procedure to be followed.

56. Section 31-10-1538, C.R.S provides that Article 10 of Title 31] shall be liberally
construedso that fraud and corruption in municipal elections may be prevented.

57. Article VII, Section 11, of the Colorado Constitution provides that the general
assembly shall pass laws to secure the purity of elections and guard against the abuses
of the elective franchise.

58. Article VII, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution provides that [a]ll elections by the
people shall be by ballot, and in case paper ballots are required to be used, no ballots
shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the
person casting it. COLO. CONST Art. VII, Sec 8

59. Section 31-10-1401(1) provides that, When any controversy arises between any
official charged with any duty or function under this article and any candidate or other
person, the district court, upon the filing of a verified petition by any such official or
person setting forth in concise form the nature of the controversy and the relief sought,
shall issue an order commanding the respondent in such petition to appear before the
court and answer under oath to such petition.

60. The Colorado Supreme Court has held, relying in part on Article VII, Section 8 of the
Colorado Constitution, that the secrecy of the ballot is guaranteed the citizen, that
ballots marked in such a way that it may be revealed how a particular voter voted
violate the constitutional requirement of a secret ballot, and that when the ballots cast in
an election were not secret ballots, it is the duty of Colorado courts to declare such
election void. Taylor v. Pile, 391 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo. 1964) (emphasis added).

61. The right to a secret ballot was recently reaffirmed in the recent case of Jones v.
Samora, 318 P.3d 462 (2014).

62. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
mandates that [n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
"+



protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend XIV 1.

63. 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that [e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other p roceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C.
1983.
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Resolution of Election Controversy)

64. Petitioner re-alleges here each of the foregoing paragraphs of the Verified Petition.

65. Section 31-10-1401(1) provides that, When any controversy arises between any
official charged with any duty or function under this article and any candidate or other
person, the district court, upon the filing of a verified petition by any such official or
person setting forth in concise form the nature of the controversy and the relief sought,
shall issue an order commanding the respondent in such petition to appear before the
court and answer under oath to such petition.

66. Because of the approved but improper by approved procedure that was used to process
at least the first 3,268 ballots, and the desperate treatment now unavoidable for all other
voters, the election is fatally flawed and cannot be properly tabulated, certified or
verified.

67. Given that the lack of voter privacy and opportunity to vote a secret ballot was well-
publicized during the voting period, thousands of voters were likely aware of the lack of
secrecy when considering whether to vote and whether they could freely vote their
conscience.

68. The ballot has not been a secret ballot since the beginning of the ballot processing
period.

69. Because of the chilling effect of the loss of ballot secrecy, the tabulations of the ballots
after Election Day cannot then be interpreted to reflect a free and fair vote of Castle
Rock electors.


""



70. Without the intervention of this Court, election officials plan to proceed to attempt to
tabulate and certify this fatally flawed election, but will be unable to determine the
number of votes properly cast as secret ballots.

71. Article VII, Section 8, of the Colorado Constitution provides that [a]ll elections by the
people shall be by ballot, and in case paper ballots are required to be used, no ballots
shall marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person
casting it.

72. Secrecy of ballots is guaranteed to Colorado citizens, and an election must be declared
void where the right to a secret ballot has been denied. Taylor v. Pile, 391 P.2d 670, 673
(Colo. 1964)

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows:

A. That this Court immediately enter an order directing the Respondents to cease all
ballot processing and counting activities and terminate the election.
B. That this Court enter a declaratory judgment that the election cannot proceed and is
void ab initio.
C. That this Court order the Town to reschedule the Election for the earliest practical
date.
D. That this Court order such other and further relief as the Court deems just and
appropriate.

Respectfully submitted this 15
th
day of August, 2014.

Marilyn R. Marks
891 14
th
Street, #1916
Denver, Colorado 80202
Email: Marilyn@AspenOffice.com
(970) 404 2225


VERIFICATION
"#




The facts set forth in the foregoing VERIFIED PETITION FOR RESOLUTION OF
ELECTION CONTROVERSY PURSUANT TO 31-10-1401are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, information and belief.



______________________________________
Marilyn Marks


STATE OF COLORADO )
)ss.
COUNTY OF __________ )

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before this ____ day of
______________, 20___, by _________________________________.

Witness my hand and official seal.

My commission expires:________________.


_______________________________________
Notary Public




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Ms Misare and Mr. Slentz,
I am deeply involved in election quality work in Colorado. The Special Election in Castle Rock has
recently come to my attention via phone calls and emails I have received from concerned citizens who
know my work in this field.
Castle Rock voters are fortunate to have the flexibility that the Home Rule charter permits to create
specific election quality controls that are not embedded in the new HB14-1164. Given the importance of
this election to the community and the high profile of this election, I would like to respectfully suggest that
Council and the Election Commission consider promptly establishing the following controls that may help
mitigate some of the degradation of controls brought about by HB14-1164 this year.
1. Missing Secrecy Sleeves. We have been made aware that mail ballots were apparently mailed to
voters without secrecy sleeves, which are required by both the CR code and the Municipal
Election Code and the SOS Mail ballot rules. Before ballot envelopes are opened by the judges,
please put into place work-arounds to assure that voted content of identifiable ballots is
concealed from the judges, staff, and watchers when stubs are attached and envelopes nearby.
As you are probably aware, failure to do so can result in potentially voided elections due to
violation of voters rights to an absolutely secret ballot. There are numerous work-arounds I can
suggest if you have not already devised a solution for this apparent oversight. Voters are quickly
losing confidence in the privacy of their mail ballots considering the many instances of careless
ballot processing. Bypassing the use of secrecy sleeves does not help their confidence level, when
non-compliance is so wide-spread across the state.
2. No Signature Verification. It is my understanding that the Town has chosen not to do signature
verification, although all ballots are mail-in ballots are there is no identification or chain or custody
documentation otherwise required. Given the ease of signature forgery and harvesting of discarded
ballots without such controls, I would suggest that Castle Rock adopt signature verification procedures
immediately just as municipalities such as Aspen and Colorado Springs have done. The Secretary of
State will make all Castle Rock voters signature records readily available in easily searchable PDF
format at a nominal (if any) charge. This would give judges and voters greater assurance that only
eligible electors are voting.

3.. Third Party Delivery of Ballots. The new municipal election code provisions do not permit in person
delivery of mail ballots except by the VOTER. This is presumably because there are no signature checks
or other I.D checks. Only the voter is to return his ballot by in person delivery. He is not to have his
spouse or friend deliver it. I note that in contrast, the Castle Rock election code allows for third party
delivery of ballots, without chain of custody documentation or signature verification. This encourages
ballot harvesting and fraud. Again, I urge signature verification at a minimum. Better practice would be to
have both signature verification and chain of custody documentation on the envelopes as has been
required for absentee ballots in the municipal election code for yearslisting the name and address of
the deliverer of the ballots.
4. Early Counting of Ballots While early counting is allowed by the new provisions of the code,
almost all experts and election judge manuals recommend against this questionable practice. I
Exhibit 1
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have watched it fail numerous times when trusted judges hint or even disclose outright how
trends are going, and activists act on that information. It is human nature and the risk is just not
worth the convenience of having early results to report. I urge you not to count ballots until
election day.
5. Issue committees and watchers. Watcthers need enough available access to witness and verify
each step in the conduct of the election. That generally requires watchers at each judges stationnot
merely one per room. I encourage you and the Election Commission to adopt rules for full transparency
for the watchers and media observers, as the SOS Rules provide.
If the Election Commission adopts as much as possible of the SOS Rules, many more vulnerabilities
created by the municipal election code will be repaired.
Please send a copy of this note to the Towns election commissioners.
Please feel free to call me if you wish to discuss. 970 404 2225
Marilyn Marks
891 14th Street
Unit 1916
Denver CO 80202

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Fileu with Castle Rock Election Commission
August 19, 2u14 Special Election

August 8, 2u14

Beai Election Commissioneis:

This complaint coveis six mateiial issues cuiiently in uoubt oi uispute iequiiing
immeuiate guiuance anu iesolution by the Election Commission:

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1. Neuia 0bseiveis' Access to Election Piocessing
2. Issue Committee's iights to appoint an auequate numbei of watcheis
S. Electionic iecoiuing by Watcheis0bseiveis in ballot piocessing aieas

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4. violation of voteis' Constitutional Rights to a Seciet Ballot
S. Signatuie veiification
6. Eaily Counting of Ballots


Issues 1.2.S weie iaiseu in the Complaint fileu by Ken Claik (uiassioots Rauio
ColoiauoFieeuom S6u) !" $%& The Committee foi Constitutional Rights anu The
Committee foi the Piotection of 0ui Seconu Amenument anu othei co-complainants
below suppoit anu incoipoiate the Claik complaint in this complaint as Exhibit 1.
See auuenuum below to complaint iegaiuing Issue #2.

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Watcheis iepoiteu touay (August 7, 2u14) the ability to see how inuiviuual voteis
voteu because of the lack of seciecy sleeves oi alteinative woik-aiounus to guaiu
votei piivacy.

The Town has been iepeateuly waineu of this constitutional violation anu askeu to
immeuiately auuiess it. To uate the Cleik anu Council have iefuseu to uo so.

The mail ballots have been uistiibuteu to voteis without a seciecy sleeve on the
theoiy that it is "not iequiieu" given the instiuctions to the voteis to folu the ballot
so that the ballot contents coulu not be ievealeu. Theie aie seveial pioblems with
this piocess:

Exhibit 2
a. The ballots aie not easily iefolueu by the votei to cieate a "blank" facing
page foi iemoval fiom the envelope.

b. The instiuctions aie not cleai. It is likely that most voteis will not
unueistanu that the ballot must be folueu uiffeiently than it came to
them. Watchei iepoits inuicate that the vast majoiity of voteis uiu not
heeu this implieu suggestion to iefolu theii ballots, ienueiing them
exposeu to juuges anu watcheis when extiacteu fiom the envelope.

c. The ietuineu iefolueu voteu ballot is uifficult to stiip of its uetachable
stub without juuges seeing the ballot because the stub uoes not appeai to
be visible above the ballot itself.

u. Cleik Nisaie iepoiteu on the ballot hanuling pioceuuie on Tuesuay
evening anu iepoiteu that iuentifiable ballot stubs aie left on the ballot
uuiing the initial stages of piocessing. This makes it easy foi juuges, staff
anu watcheis to see how the iuentifiable votei maikeu his ballot.

Coloiauans have a long helu wiite to a seciet ballot. The state Constitution pioviues:

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",! *$%%)" )5 ",! 6!.+)( 4$+"1(7 1"&8 9."14%! :;;< =!4"1)( >

The Castle Rock ballot as iepoiteuly hanuleu is ceitainly iuentifiable, piimaiily uue
to the piopei use of seciecy sleeves. Cleik Nisaie uesciibeu the piocess foi the
Town Council anu stateu that the ballots aie iemoveu fiom the envelopes with the
iuentifiable stubs attacheu. This was confiimeu by Watchei Patiick Neville.

}uuges anu watcheis shoulu nevei be able to uiscein a voteis' vote, iegaiuless of
oaths taken oi juuges' honest intentions. voteis expect anu uemanu that juuges anu
watcheis be unable to leain how they vote theii mail ballot. It has a chilling effect on
voteis if they aie awaie that juuges anu watcheis can ueteimine how they vote.

The absolute piivacy of the voteis' choices is so funuamental to oui system of self-
goveinance that the Coloiauo Supieme Couit has helu that elections aie to be ?)10!0
when theie aie such wiuespieau violations of ballot seciecy. In shoit, the iisk of the
consequences of constitutional violations can haiuly be woith the "convenience" of
avoiuing the use of seciecy sleeves.

Refeience points foi Commissioneis' consiueiations

The mail ballot plan issueu by the Secietaiy of State iequiies juiisuictions filing
such a plan to affiim the following:

'@A& B!+4.16"1)( )5 6.)4!0C.!+ ") !(+C.! 6.1?$42 *2 C+! )5 $ +!4.!42 +%!!?! ). +!4.!42 !(?!%)6!
&' (!)!*+*,- ./0-!& )$,,'" "!%% 1'2 "1! !%!)"'( +'"!0 DE%!$+! .!$0 $(0 1(014$"! 2)C.
4)-6%1$(4! *2 4,!4/1(7 ",! *)FG3

H) 6.)"!4" ",! ?)"!.I+ 6.1?$42< $ +!4.!42 +%!!?! ). !(?!%)6! 31%% *! 1(4%C0!0 1(
",! -$1% *$%%)" 6$4/$7!& J=!4"1)( @KL&MK@NOD@G< P&Q&=&R8

!" $%&'( )*+,-'* ./*01 2-+%0*3+ &/%-4+ '5 '6* &5"'0%07( %+ 0*&*"'/7 %+ 899:( '6* ;5<" =+*)
+*&0*&7 +/**>*+ %") %$$-04*) '6* $5//5<-"? '5 '6* @*&0*'%07 5$ @'%'*A

Describe the procedures to ensure privacy by use of a secrecy sleeve or secrecy
envelope so that receiving judges cannot tell how the elector voted.

S$4, *$%%)" 6$4/$7! 31%% 1(4%C0! $ +!4.!42 !(?!%)6! $(0 ?)"!. 1(+".C4"1)(+ $+ ") ,)3 ")
1(+!." ",! ?)"!0 *$%%)" 1(") ",! +!4.!42 !(?!%)6! +) ",$" ",! *$%%)" +"C* 31%% *! ?1+1*%!
31",)C" ,$?1(7 ") .!-)?! ",! *$%%)" 5.)- ",! !(?!%)6!&8 JE$7! M< SF,1*1" T&R


The Secietaiy of State only yesteiuay (August 7, 21u4) pioposeu the following iule
foi auoption:

!"#"! %&'() (*(+',-. /012(3 4(),&5 '6( (*(+'-)73
(*,2,8,*,'5 %.1 3,2.%'0)(9 '6( +-0.'5 +*(): ;03' 1,33-+,%'(
%.1 3(2)(2%'( '6( ;%,* 8%**-' )('0). (.4(*-<( &)-; '6(
3(+)(+5 3*((4( %.1 % 4-'(1 8%**-' ,. % ;%..() '6%' (.30)(3
.- <()3-. ,3 %8*( '- 1('();,.( 6-= %. ,.1,4,10%* 4-'(1"

The iecently passeu Nunicipal Nail Ballot Election piovisions in BB14-1164 iequiie
that a seciecy sleeve be incluueu in the voteis' mail ballot packet. While Castle Rock
has, in its coue, cieateu an exception to state law foi ballots that "can" be folueu to
conceal the vote, the cuiient Castle Rock ballot uoes not meet eithei stiict oi
"substantial compliance " stanuaius.

Pioposeu Solution

Retuineu ballot envelopes can be openeu "blinuly" (without juuges' ability to see
what they aie opening) anu inseiteu into a seciecy sleeve with the ballot stub at the
top, piefeiably peeking out ovei the sleeve. The ballots can then be piocesseu by
veiifying the stub numbei against the envelope anu poll book. The stubs shoulu be
uetacheu anu ietaineu. The voteu ballots shoulu iemain in the seciecy sleeve.

The voteu ballots (insiue the seciecy sleeve) shoulu be lockeu up anu sealeu in a
tiansfei case anu openeu again on Election Bay in the afteinoon, iemoveu fiom the
seciecy sleeves, anu feu into the Accu-vote scanneitabulatoi by the juuges. The
scanneitabulation can be peifoimeu at the time that the polls aie closing. This
pioviues much bettei contiol ovei ballot seciecy anu ovei machine
softwaiehaiuwaie secuiity.



93 F&7(-%6/# D#/&E&$-%&'(

Theie is little ieason to avoiu this simple anu inexpensive election secuiity
pioceuuie that is iequiieu in most Coloiauo elections.

The Town's position is that signatuie veiification is "not iequiieu" anu "cannot" be
peifoimeu without a legislative change to the Town coue. We uisagiee, as the Town
Coue ceitainly allows signatuie veiification anu uoes not piohibit it. We believe that
logical aiguments can be maue eithei way as to whethei the Town Coue "iequiies"
signatuie veiification. uoou public policy anu election secuiity expectations stiongly
uictate that signatuies shoulu be veiifieu, paiticulaily because the Town, using its
Bome Rule authoiity, uiluteu the state law on thiiu paity ueliveiy of ballots as one
mitigation tool to lack of signatuie veiification.

Backgiounu

Signatuie veiification compaiing ballot ietuin envelopes to the votei iegistiation
iecoiu is iequiieu foi all county, school boaiu, state anu feueial elections. Signatuie
veiification is also iequiieu foi municipal elections when the election is cooiuinateu
oi opeiateu by the County Cleik. Theiefoie in almost all Bouglas County
municipalities, signatuie veiification is peifoimeu. In some othei municipal
inuepenuent elections, signatuies aie expoiteu fiom the votei iegistiation system
anu piepaieu foi the municipalities by theii County Cleiks at veiy low (oi no) cost.
Foi example, Aspen anu Coloiauo Spiings (two gieatly contiasting size
municipalities) iequiie such veiification.

Castle Rock maileu ovei Su,uuu mail ballots. 0vei 2u,uuu such ballots aie expecteu
to lanu as live ballot packets in tiash bins, uiscaiueu by uninteiesteu voteis.
Without signatuie veiification, the live packets piesent an invitation to easy election
fiauu.

veiification is Peimitteu by Coue

The Town's Coue pioviues

Once the ballot is returned, an election judge shall first verify the submitted
ballot by comparing the information on the return envelope with the registration
records to determine whether the ballot was submitted by an eligible elector who
had not previously voted in the election. "

The signatuie on the ietuin envelope can ceitainly be inteipieteu to be infoimation
that is iequiieu to be veiifieu against the votei iegistiation iecoiu signatuie.

HC#%C#/ %C-% .#/&E&$-%&'( &8 +-(0-%'/I '/ ',%&'(-" &8 *, 0'/4": -(0 /#J6&/#8 -
0#$&8&'( KI %C# !"#$%&'( *'0#3

LC# '%C#/ J6#8%&'( K#E'/# %C# *'++&88&'( &8 &E %C# .#/&E&$-%&'( &8 ('% /#J6&/#0:
8C'6"0 &% K# ,#/E'/+#0 -8 - 7''0 ,/-$%&$# %' ,/'%#$% %C# J6-"&%I 'E %C# #"#$%&'(.

}uuges' Signatuie veiification Tiaining

Basic signatuie veiification tiaining is ioutinely given to election juuges in Coloiauo
elections. The tiaining time is less than Su minutes.

Recommenueu Resolution

Theie is simply no ieason to avoiu veiifying signatuies, paiticulaily aftei Castle
Rock uegiaueu the state statute's mail ballot chain of custouy contiols. The piocess
shoulu begin immeuiately foi Nonuay's ballot piocessing. Alieauy piocesseu
envelopes can be veiifieu ietioactively. If a laige numbei of signatuies aie
unveiifiable, then measuies can be taken to attempt to mitigate the concein. It is fai
bettei to know now than latei if theie aie unveiifiable signatuies.

Baving the public unueistanu this contiol is in place will enhance votei confiuence
anu will uetei those who woulu take auvantage of this vulneiability.

M3 !-/"I *'6(%&(7 'E G-""'%8

While the Castle Rock coue allows "eaily counting" of ballots staiting 1S uays befoie
election uay, it is a veiy questionable piactice that leaus to high iisk of compiomiseu
election integiity anu almost no benefit. Eaily counting leaus to the ability of
insiueis to know anu act on the eaily vote tienus.

The ballots aie feu thiough the Accu-vote scannei tabulatoi as they aie being
piocesseu uaily. The scannei collects the votes cast. Theie is no ieason to iun the
scannei until the polls aie closeu. Theie aie numeious secuiity piotocols with
scanning ovei a peiiou of uays. All the scanning can be accomplisheu easily on
Election afteinoon anu evening.

0n Tuesuay, August S, Cleik Nisaie misiepiesenteu to the Council the natuie of the
ballot piocessing with the Accu-vote scanneitabulatoi. Cleik Nisaie claimeu that
the Accu-vote scannei meiely counts the numbei of pieces of papei until Election
Night when she inseits a "piogiamming caius" to stait the accumulation of votes.
0bviously the scanneitabulatoi uoes not woik in that mannei, anu it is uncleai
why Cleik Nisaie woulu have misiepiesenteu the scanneitabulatoi opeiations.

Pioposeu Resolution

Rathei than exploiing the motives of the eaily scanning anu vote accumulation, anu
the ielateu misiepiesentations, the Election Commission shoulu simply iequiie that
the ballots be secuieu (in seciecy sleeves) in sealeu tiansfei cases anu feu thiough
the ballot scannei on Election Bay afteinoon oi evening (bettei). Auequate contiols
shoulu be installeu to avoiu chain of custouy compiomises of the memoiy caius
involveu.

The Accu-vote scannei will opeiate at a thioughput iate of appioximately 1,2uu
ballots pei houi. The entiie election can be tabulateu in a mattei of a few houis.


#;3 500#(06+ NNH-%$C#/ A&7C%8 &886#

The Commission is to consiuei whethei an Issue Committee may appoint multiple
watcheis to act on behalf of the Committee, with one watchei alloweu at the
piocessing centei at any one time. The Cleik questions whethei the Coue allows foi
moie than one alteinate watchei. The Cleik is failing to iecognize the that aichaic
watchei language was wiitten foi polling place elections that happeneu between 7
a.m. anu 7 p.m. on a single Election Bay. The cuiient election ballots weie maileu in
late }uly , anu canvass will continue until late August. No two inuiviuuals can be
expecteu to be available foi watching eveiy uay foi a month. It is only ieasonable
anu faii to allow multiple watcheis in any oiganization.

The S0S Rules ceitainly contemplate that multiple watcheis may be appointeu.

It is also necessaiy that watcheis be alloweu to be posteu simultaneously at all
ballot uiop-off location, ieplacement ballot location anu ballot piocessing centeis.

LC# !"#$%&'( *'++&88&'( 8C'6"0 +-2# $"#-/ %C-% - B-%$C#/ E/'+ #-$C
$'++&%%## B&"" K# -""'B#0 8&+6"%-(#'68"I -% #.#/I ,CI8&$-" K-""'% C-(0"&(7
"'$-%&'(3

The 0nifoim Election Coue makes cleai that the watcheis have statutoiy iights in
elections goveineu by Coloiauo's piimaiy election coue "to witness anu veiify each
step in the conuuct of the election. " Without auequate ability to appoint watcheis
capable of obseiving at all locations, the watcheis cannot fulfill theii
iesponsibilities.

@($'/,'/-%&'( 'E 56768% 9 *'+,"-&(% E&"#0 KI 1#( *"-/2 !" $%5

The attacheu complaint (Exhibit 1) is heieby incoipoiateu into this complaint anu
all such issues in uoubt piesenteu in that complaint iequiiing iesolution aie issues
foi ueteimination unuei this complaint as well.

Respectfully submitteu,


Naiilyn Naiks
Registeieu agent foi The Committee foi Constitutional Rights
NaiilynAspen0ffice.com


Ken Claik
Registeieu Agent
The Committee foi the Piotection of 0ui Seconu Amenument
Kenken-claik.com

Exhibit 1 August S complaint (incoipoiateu heie-in) anu S0S Watchei Rules

Exhibit 2 2uu6 Nail ballot plan foi Castle Rock






August 1u, 2u14

Castle Rock Town Council
1uu Wilcox Stieet
Castle Rock, Coloiauo 8u1u4

via email TownCouncilBiiectCRgov.com

Re: violations of voteis' Constitutional Rights

Beai Nayoi Bonahue anu Council Nembeis:

This lettei constitutes oui uemanu that the Town Council, Town Cleik, Election Commission anu
Election }uuges immeuiately take all necessaiy actions to stop the exposuie of iuentifiable voteu
ballots uuiing the piocessing of ballots ieceiveu in the August 19, 2u14 Special Election anu to
iemeuy ongoing constitutional violations. The unueisigneu paities have an unuisputeu inteiest
in piotecting the voting iights of Castle Rock electois, anu theiefoie iequest youi uigent
attention to this mattei to avoiu litigation seeking to obtain a couit oiuei to piotect voteis' iights
in this election.

Constitutional Issue in Contioveisy

The piimaiy thiust of this lettei is in ielation to the Town's ongoing violations of Coloiauo
voteis' constitutional iights to absolute seciecy of theii cast ballots. The violations geneiateu by
the failuie to pioviue voteis with seciecy sleeves must be iemeuieu immeuiately to avoiu iisking
the valiuity anu ceitification of the election.

We call youi attention to the fact that the Coloiauo Supieme Couit has iuleu on such violations
as iecently as this yeai in the context of voiuing elections, such as Castle Rock's, wheie
iuentifiable voteu ballots aie exposeu to election officials. The August 19 election shoulu be
immeuiately safeguaiueu fiom such iisks of being invaliuateu because of violations of voteis'
constitutional iights. Without attention anu action by Town officials, voteis' piivacy will be
fuithei compiomiseu anu the Town's election will be put at fuithei iisk.

We aie confiuent that the Town's anu Election Commission's attoineys aie familiai with
applicable case law iegaiuing the constitutional violations we allege. We have also pieviously
pioviueu the Town with a copy of the Supieme Couit's uecision (Tayloi v. Pile, 1S4 Colo. S16
(1964)) ueclaiing it the "uuty of the couit" to voiu an election wheie ballot seciecy is wiuely
compiomiseu, in which the Couit agieeu that:

An election wherein ballots are numbered in such a manner
that the vote of any person thereafter may be determined
by comparison with the number on the ballot and the poll
registration book is contrary to the state of Colorado's
Exhibit 3


constitutional and statutory guarantee of a secret ballot and,
therefore, void ab initio.


Anu iuleu, The use of marked ballots' by which the vote of every elector
could be ascertained resulted in a void election.

Bespite numeious iecent objections foimally iaiseu by citizens, the Town's officials continue to
biush asiue votei piivacy issues involving guaianteeu constitutional iights to a seciet ballot,
placing the election at auuitional iisk of being voiueu.

Backgiounu

As has been iepeateuly communicateu to Council anu the Elections Commission since August 1
oi befoie, we stiongly object to the Town's uecision to avoiu using seciecy sleeves with mail
ballots, coupleu with the issuance of the ballot folueu in such a mannei as to expose voteu ballot
content to juuges anu watcheis. Bespite oui objections foimally communicateu piioi to ballot
envelope opening, envelopes aie being openeu by juuges exposing the supposeuly absolute
seciet contents of the ballot to juuges anu watcheis. At times, the voteis' name is calleu out as
the exposeu ballot is hanuleu. We uigently seek an immeuiate anu peimanent enu to these
violations of voteis' iights guaianteeu by the Coloiauo Constitution.

We iecognize that in a uepaituie fiom state law, the Castle Rock Election Coue uoes not iequiie
the use of seciecy sleeves. Bowevei, that piovision is conuitioneu on the ballot being folueu in a
mannei to conceal the votes. Castle Rock's ballots aie "#$ folueu in that mannei, anu when
iemoveu fiom the envelope, the voteu contents aie visible simultaneously with the votei
iuentification numbei. Watcheis have obseiveu this piactice on Fiiuay, anu uiu obseive how
inuiviuual voteis voteu anu have iepoiteu the conuitions to the Election Commission via foimal
complaint uateu August 7, 2u14 anu oial testimony.

Theie is no assuiance that the Election Commission will consiuei anu act on complaints fileu on
this mattei, given theii August 7 statement that they uo not have juiisuiction to auuiess
complaints. We wish to avoiu litigation on this mattei, but all effoits to solve this seiious
compiomise of ballot seciecy thiough auministiative channels have been unpiouuctive to uate,
anu geneially been met with no iesponse at all.

Recommenueu Auministiative Solution

We stiongly piefei an auministiative solution to litigation to iesolve this ciucial but impoitant
contioveisy iegaiuing constitutional voting iights. We piopose the following solution, anu
believe that theie aie alteinative viable auministiative solutions as well.

As stateu in testimony to the Town Council on August S anu to the Election Commission on
August 8, theie aie simple, inexpensive "woikaiounus" available to pioviue votei piivacy as
iequiieu by Coloiauo law. Foi example, uuiing the envelope opening piocess, the ballots coulu


be "blinuly" iemoveu fiom the envelope anu inseiteu in a seciecy sleeve uesigneu to
accommouate the ballot with the uetachable stub visible ovei the uppei euge of the sleeve. The
piocessing can then take place to piotect votei piivacy as it piesumably woulu have occuiieu if
the seciecy sleeve hau been useu by the votei. Theie aie othei woikaiounus available as well,
howevei, we uemanu that any such woikaiounu incluue the safeguaiu that votes not be visible
oi otheiwise known to those hanuling the iuentifiable ballots.

If such a solution is implementeu, we iequest that all ballots that have been openeu anu
piocesseu piioi to the time of implementation be segiegateu anu not comingleu with those foi
which impioveu seciecy contiols will be useu. This coulu be impoitant in the event of a post-
election legal challenge alleging ballot seciecy violations.

veiification of Auministiative Solution

0pon the Town's agieement to implement ballot seciecy contiols, we iequiie that each of issue
committees be peimitteu to use at least one watchei pei committee who may be a Coloiauo
iegisteieu votei ("Coloiauo votei Watchei" -- not limiteu to Castle Rock voteis) to obseive
ongoing ballot piocessing to ensuie that pioceuuies aie implementeu anu maintaineu
thioughout the election. The iuentifieu Coloiauo votei Watchei shoulu be peimitteu to act as a
watchei foi the committee at any time uuiing the conuuct of the election.

The implementation anu oveisight of this constitutional iight to a seciet ballot is impeiative anu
uigent, anu has significant legal implications. Theiefoie, we iequiie that the violations be
iemeuieu immeuiately with oveisight anu veiification
by knowleugeable anu expeit watcheis that we select. We have maue uiligent effoits to locate
Castle Rock voteis who aie both available foi watching the piocessing anu aie knowleugeable in
election law, iegulations anu pioceuuies. We have founu no available Castle Rock voteis meeting
these qualifications who can fill this iesponsibility on a volunteei basis. Theiefoie, veiification
of iemeuies iequiies that we appoint knowleugeable Coloiauo voteis as watcheis, not limiteu to
Castle Rock votei iolls.

This "Coloiauo votei qualification" is consistent with the Secietaiy of State's Rule 1.1.SS (c)
% &'()*"+$'& ,+$-.'/ "''& "#$ 0' + /'()&'"$ #1 $.' -#2"$3 .' #/ (.' )( &'()*"+$'& )" +( 4#"*
+( .' #/ (.' )( +" '4)*)04' '4'-$#/ )" $.' 5$+$' #1 6#4#/+&#7


Note that if these ballot questions hau been on the Novembei, 2u14 cooiuinateu Bouglas County
ballot, oui issue committees woulu have the iight to appoint watcheis fiom any county in the
state.

It is impiopei foi oui oveisight iights to be uiminisheu by the Town's uecision to conuuct the
election locally iathei than uuiing a cooiuinateu election.

We believe that the Election Commission has the authoiity to appiove this technical uepaituie
fiom the iecently enacteu Rule unuei the ciicumstances, oi iepeal that poition of the iule,
paiticulaily given that no inteiesteu paities' iights aie compiomiseu, but only expanueu.



Alteinate veiification 0veisight

uiven the uigency of the application of a solution anu the neeu foi expeit oveisight, an
acceptable alteinative woulu be to allow the iegisteieu agent of each committee, iegaiuless of
hishei iesiuency, to act as the authoiizeu watchei foi veiification of the iemeuies. Allowing the
issue committee's iegisteieu agent to act on his own behalf to veiify the piopei piocessing of
ballots is piactical, logical anu consistent with the language of Castle Rock's election coue:

2.01.030 Watchers.
87 9+-. :)"$'/'($'& ;+/$3: )" $.' -+(' #1 +" )((2' )" + <#," '4'-$)#" )( '"$)$4'& $# +;;#)"$ #"' =>?
/'*)($'/'& '4'-$#/ #1 $.' <#," $# +-$ )" .)( #/ .'/ 0'.+41 +$ $.' 0+44#$ ;/#-'(()"* -'"$'/ +"& ;#44)"*
;4+-'7 52-. :)"$'/'($'& ;+/$3: (.+44 @'+" + :/'*)($'/'& +*'"$: +( &'1)"'& )" %/$)-4' A #1 $.)( 6.+;$'/
,.# .+( 1241)44'& $.' 1)4)"* +"& #$.'/ /'B2)/'@'"$( #1 %/$)-4' A7

A iegisteieu agent who uoes not iesiue in Castle Rock shoulu not be iequiieu to appoint an agent
to iepiesent him oi hei when they themselves aie available foi watchei uuty. Registeieu agents
who aie not themselves Castle Rock voteis anu who aie without access to knowleugeable
volunteei watcheis in Castle Rock aie piejuuiceu in theii anu theii committee's ability to
monitoi the election in a piactical mannei. Foi example, uata fieely anu immeuiately available to
a watchei without cost is not available on the same basis to the issue committee.

The Town's unfaii exclusion of iegisteieu agents as watcheis piejuuices ceitain committees as it
effectively iequiies them to make significant anu costly unplanneu expenuituies to engage the
seivices of local electois, such as attoineys, to peifoim tasks that can be peifoimeu by the
committee's iegisteieu agent as a volunteei.

In fact, uuiing the August S, 2u14 Council meeting, Ken Claik (a Benvei iesiuent anu Coloiauo
votei) was tolu by Council that he woulu be alloweu access into the ballot piocessing aiea as an
authoiizeu obseivei if he weie the iegisteieu agent of an issue committee. Be piomptly foimeu
such an issue committee anu became the iegisteieu agent. Bowevei, the veiy next uay the
Election Commission auopteu a Rule iequiiing that watcheis be Castle Rock electois, effectively
ieneging on Council's assuiances to Ni. Claik. 0n Fiiuay August 8, Ni. Bon Nulligan, the
iegisteieu agent foi issue committee Fieeuom Foi Castle Rock, was uenieu access as a watchei
uue to his iesiuency uespite his iesponsibilities as the iegisteieu agent of the committee.

Pioviuing equal access foi all iegisteieu agents of issue committees woulu solve numeious
pioblems in this election. No voteis oi issue committees woulu be uisauvantageu by pioviuing
equal access to all iegisteieu agents.

Fuithei Piotecting votei Rights to Ballot Seciecy

Bunuieus if not thousanus of Castle Rock eligible electois aie now awaie of the violations of
votei piivacy occuiiing in this election. As a iesult, voteis may be hesitant to fieely vote theii
conscience, oi to paiticipate in this election. We offei the following iecommenuations to attempt
to piotect against successful post-election challenges that iisk election invaliuation:



1. Pioviue messages on the Town's website auvising voteis to folu theii ballots in ieveise,
(with illustiations) anu place voteu ballots in a sepaiate envelope, oi to come by Town
Ball oi Bouglas County Elections foi a seciecy sleeve.

2. Pioviue a seciecy sleeve anu a ieplacement ballot envelope foi each votei who seeks one
at Town Ball.

S. Post staff oi juuges at ballot uiop-off sites to offei ieplacement ballot envelopes anu
seciecy sleeves.

4. Peimit voteis who have cast theii ballots $.+$ .+C' "#$ 3'$ 0''" ;/#-'(('& to ietiieve them
in the still-sealeu envelopes anu vote a ieplacement ballot in piivate with appiopiiate
seciecy piotections. (This pioviues some piotection fiom the latei claim that the voteis'
vote was compiomiseu by feai of the lack of seciecy.)

S. Peimit voteis who have not voteu to vote a tiauitional polling place seciet ballot without
a ietuin envelope oi an attacheu iuentifiable stub in a ballot box in Town Ball. (This
pioviues some piotection fiom post-election claims of the inability to vote a seciet ballot.)

The above measuies woulu also communicate the Town's commitment to votei piivacy.

Request

Please auuiess this mattei with the election officials Nonuay moining, August 11. If pioceuuies
aie left unchangeu this mattei is likely to iequiie emeigency litigation unuei CRS S1-1u-14u1.
uiven the pioceuuies being useu now, this election is at iisk of being invaliuateu puisuant to a
post-election challenge on constitutional giounus. The voice of the voteis is essential anu must
not be enuangeieu in this ieckless way. If acceptable auministiative solutions cannot be ieacheu
immeuiately to piotect the voteis' constitutional voting iights, Town 0fficials leave us no choice
but to seek a couit oiuei.

We aie happy to talk with you about these conceins anu solutions at youi eailiest convenience.
!"#$% '()* #$+, -' #*, ./0" )-" +-1, - 2,)$'$/" /" #*,', $''(,'3 0, (45, #*, $++,2$-#,
),''-#$/" /6 /7,"$"5 /6 8-%%/# ,"9,%/7,': We have no objection to pie-opening piocesses
continuing until iesolutions can be ieacheu.

If auuitional suppoiting infoimation is iequiieu in oiuei to ieach youi uecision to halt these
piactices, we aie piepaieu to supply the factual basis anu consiueiable legal authoiity. Please
contact Naiilyn Naiks (97u 4u4 222S) foi suppoiting infoimation if it woulu be helpful.

Respectfully,


Naiilyn Naiks
Registeieu Agent, Committee foi Constitutional Rights.




(Signatuie on file)
Ken Claik
Registeieu Agent, Committee foi the Piotection of 0ui Seconu Amenument



(Signatuie on file)
Bon Nulligan
Registeieu Agent, Fieeuom foi Castle Rock (Issue Committee)



CC: Sally Nisaie, via mail
Bob Slentz, via email