Describe the Administrative Code of 1987.

Held: The Code is a general law and incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles of governance (Third Whereas Clause, Administrative Code
of 1987) and embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve
the people. (Fourth Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) The Code is divided into
seven (7) boos. These boos contain provisions on the organi!ation, powers and general
administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the e"ecutive branch, the organi!ation
and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the
national government budget, as well as guidelines for the e"ercise b# administrative agencies of
$uasi%legislative and $uasi%judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration,
i.e., internal organi!ation, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects
of the functions performed b# administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside
government. (Ople v. Torres, G.. !o. 1"7#8$, %&l' "(, 1998 )*&no+,
-hat is Administrative *o.er/
Held: Administrative power is concerned with the wor of appl#ing policies and enforcing
orders as determined b# proper governmental organs. &t enables the 'resident to fi" a uniform
standard of administrative efficienc# and chec the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he
can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. (Ople v. Torres, G.. !o. 1"7#8$, %&l'
"(, 1998 )*&no+,
-hat is an Administrative Order/
Held: (n administrative order is an ordinance issued b# the 'resident which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. &t must be in harmon# with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carr#ing out the legislative polic#.
(Ople v. Torres, G.. !o. 1"7#8$, %&l' "(, 1998 )*&no+,
-hat is the Government of the ep&blic of the *hilippines/
Ans.: The overnment of the !epu"li# of the $hilippines refers to the corporate governmental
entit# through which the functions of the government are e"ercised throughout the 'hilippines,
including, save as the contrar# appears from the conte"t, the various arms through which
political authorit# is made effective in the 'hilippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous
regions, the provincial, cit#, municipal or baranga# subdivisions or other forms of local
government. (0ec. ")1+, 1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions, 23ec&tive Order !o. "9",
-hat is an A4enc' of the Government/
Ans.: A%en#& of the overnment refers to an# of the various units of the )overnment, including
a department, bureau, office, instrumentalit#, or government%owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein. (0ec. ")5+, 1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions, 23ec&tive
Order !o. "9",
-hat is a Department/
Ans.: 'epartment refers to an e"ecutive department created b# law. *or purposes of +oo &,,
this shall in#lude an# instrumentalit#, as herein defined, having or assigned the ran of a
department, regardless of its name or designation. (0ec. ")7+, 1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions,
23ec&tive Order !o. "9",
-hat is a 6&rea&/
Ans.: (ureau refers to an# principal subdivision or unit of an# department. *or purposes of
+oo &,, this shall in#lude an# principal subdivision or unit of an# instrumentalit# given or
assigned the ran of a bureau, regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case of
department%wide regional offices. (0ec. ")8+, 1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions, 23ec&tive Order !o.
"9",
-hat is an Office/
Ans.: )ffi#e refers, within the framewor of governmental organi!ation, to an# major functional
unit of a department or bureau in#ludin% regional offices. &t ma& also refer to an# position held
or occupied b# individual persons, whose functions are defined b# law or regulation. (0ec. ")9+,
1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions, 23ec&tive Order !o. "9",
-hat is a Government 1nstr&mentalit'/ -hat are incl&ded in the term Government
1nstr&mentalit'/
Ans.: ( %overnment instrumentalit& refers to an# agenc# of the national government, not
integrated within the department framewor, vested with special functions or jurisdiction b# law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, enjo#ing
operational autonom#, usuall# through a charter. The term includes regulator# agencies,
chartered institutions and government%owned or controlled corporations. (0ec. ")17+,
1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions, 23ec&tive Order !o. "9",
-hat is a e4&lator' A4enc'/
Ans.: ( re%ulator& a%en#& refers to an# agenc# e"pressl# vested with jurisdiction to regulate,
administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the
principal powers of which are e"ercised b# a collective bod#, such as a commission, board or
council. (0ec. ")11+, 1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions, 23ec&tive Order !o. "9",
-hat is a Chartered 1nstit&tion/
Ans.: ( #hartered institution refers to an# agenc# organi!ed or operating under a special charter,
and vested b# law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This
term includes state universities and colleges and the monetar# authorit# of the -tate. (0ection
")1"+, 1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions, 23ec&tive Order !o. "9",
-hat is a Government8O.ned or Controlled Corporation/
Ans.: overnment*owned or #ontrolled #orporation refers to an# agenc# organi!ed as a stoc or
non%stoc corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietar# in nature, and owned b# the )overnment directl# or through its instrumentalities
either wholl#, or, where applicable as in the case of stoc corporations, to the e"tent of at least
fift#%one (./) per cent of its capital stoc0 " " " (0ec. ")1(+, 1ntrod&ctor' *rovisions, 23ec&tive
Order !o. "9",
-hen is a Government8O.ned or Controlled Corporation deemed to be performin4
proprietar' f&nction/ -hen is it deemed to be performin4 4overnmental f&nction/
Held: )overnment%owned or controlled corporations ma# perform governmental or proprietar#
functions or both, depending on the purpose for which the# have been created. &f the purpose is
to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniar# profit, the function is proprietar#. &f it is in
the interest of health, safet# and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the
public in general, the function is governmental. 'owers classified as proprietar# are those
intended for private advantage and benefit. (6la9&era v. Alcala, "9$ 0CA (##, 5"$, 0ept. 11,
1998, 2n 6anc )*&risima+,
The *hilippine !ational ed Cross (*!C, is a 4overnment8o.ned and controlled
corporation .ith an ori4inal charter &nder .A. !o. 9$, as amended. 1ts charter, ho.ever,
.as amended to vest in it the a&thorit' to sec&re loans, be e3empted from pa'ment of all
d&ties, ta3es, fees and other char4es, etc. -ith the amendnt of its charter, has it been
:impliedl' converted to a private corporation;/
Held: The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private
in nature is simple. &s it created b# its own charter for the e"ercise of a public function, or b#
incorporation under the general corporation law1 Those with special charters are government
corporations subject to its provisions, and its emplo#ees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil
-ervice Commission. The '23C was not impliedl# converted to a private corporation simpl#
because its charter was amended to vest in it the authorit# to secure loans, be e"empted from
pa#ment of all duties, ta"es, fees and other charges, etc. (Camporedondo v. !<C, G.. !o.
1"9759, A&4. #, 1999, 1
st
Div. )*ardo+,
-hen ma' the Government not validl' invo=e the r&le that prescription does not r&n a4ainst
the 0tate/ 1ll&strative Case.
Held: 4hile it is true that prescription does not run against the -tate, the same ma# not be
invoed b# the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter.
4hile Camp 4allace ma# have belonged to the government at the time 3afael )alve!5s title was
ordered cancelled in 6and 3egistration Case 2o. 2%78/, the same no longer holds true toda#.
3epublic (ct 2o. 7997, otherwise nown as the +ase Conversion and :evelopment (ct of /;;9,
created the +ases Conversion and :evelopment (uthorit#. < " "
4ith the transfer of Camp 4allace to the +C:(, the government no longer has a right or interest
to protect. Conse$uentl#, the 3epublic is not a real part# in interest and it ma# not institute the
instant action. 2or ma# it raise the defense of imprescriptibilit#, the same being applicable onl#
in cases where the government is a part# in interest. " " ". +eing the owner of the areas covered
b# Camp 4allace, it is the +ases Conversion and :evelopment (uthorit#, not the )overnment,
which stands to be benefited if the land covered b# TCT 2o. T%.7/= issued in the name of
petitioner is cancelled.
2onetheless, it has been posited that the transfer of militar# reservations and their e"tensions to
the +C:( is basicall# for the purpose of accelerating the sound and balanced conversion of
these militar# reservations into alternative productive uses and to enhance the benefits to be
derived from such propert# as a measure of promoting the economic and social development,
particularl# of Central 6u!on and, in general, the countr#5s goal for enhancement (-ection 9,
3epublic (ct 2o. 7997). &t is contended that the transfer of these militar# reservations to the
Conversion (uthorit# does not amount to an abdication on the part of the 3epublic of its
interests, but simpl# a recognition of the need to create a bod# corporate which will act as its
agent for the reali!ation of its program. &t is conse$uentl# asserted that the 3epublic remains to
be the real part# in interest and the Conversion (uthorit# merel# its agent.
4e, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the +C:( is an entit# invested with a
personalit# separate and distinct from the government. < " "
&t ma# not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified
into governmental or constituent and proprietar# or ministrant. 4hile public benefit and public
welfare, particularl#, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central 6u!on,
ma# be attributable to the operation of the +C:(, #et it is certain that the functions performed
b# the +C:( are basicall# proprietar# in nature. The promotion of economic and social
development of Central 6u!on, in particular, and the countr#5s goal for enhancement, in general,
do not mae the +C:( e$uivalent to the )overnment. >ther corporations have been created b#
government to act as its agents for the reali!ation of its programs, the ---, )-&-, 2(4(-( and
the 2&(, to count a few, and #et, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing
functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government%function
corporations invested with governmental attributes. &t ma# thus be said that the +C:( is not a
mere agenc# of the )overnment but a corporate bod# performing proprietar# functions.
?aving the capacit# to sue or be sued, it should thus be the +C:( which ma# file an action to
cancel petitioner5s title, not the 3epublic, the former being the real part# in interest. >ne having
no right or interest to protect cannot invoe the jurisdiction of the court as a part# plaintiff in an
action. ( suit ma# be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real part# in interest. " "
"
?owever, +.(. ,ar#ha Transport Co., -n#. v. -AC is cited as authorit# that the 3epublic is the
proper part# to sue for the recover# of possession of propert# which at the time of the installation
of the suit was no longer held b# the national government bod# but b# the 'hilippine 'orts
(uthroti#. &n +.(. ,ar#ha, the Court ruled@
&t can be said that in suing for the recover# of the rentals, the 3epublic of the 'hilippines, acted
as principal of the 'hilippine 'orts (uthorit#, directl# e"ercising the commission it had earlier
conferred on the latter as its agent. 4e ma# presume that, b# doing so, the 3epublic of the
'hilippines did not intend to retain the said rentals for its own use, considering that b# its
voluntar# act it had transferred the land in $uestion to the 'hilippine 'orts (uthorit# effective
Aul# //, /;7B. The 3epublic of the 'hilippines had simpl# sought to assist, not supplant, the
'hilippine 'orts (uthorit#, whose title to the disputed propert# it continues to recogni!e. 4e
ma# e"pect the that the said rentals, once collected b# the 3epublic of the 'hilippines, shall be
turned over b# it to the 'hilippine 'orts (uthorit# conformabl# to the purposes of '.:. 2o. C.7.
+.(. ,ar#ha is, however, not on all fours with the case at bar. &n the former, the Court
considered the 3epublic a proper part# to sue since the claims of the 3epublic and the 'hilippine
'orts (uthorit# against the petitioner therein were the same. To dismiss the complaint in +.(.
,ar#ha would have brought needless dela# in the settlement of the matter since the ''( would
have to refile the case on the same claim alread# litigated upon. -uch is not the case here since
to allow the government to sue herein enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibilit#, a claim
which is not available to the +C:(. The rule that prescription does not run against the -tate
does not appl# to corporations or artificial bodies created b# the -tate for special purposes, it
being said that when the title of the 3epublic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial
bodies of its own creation, are in the same categor# as ordinar# persons. +# raising the claim of
imprescriptibilit#, a claim which cannot be raised b# the +C:(, the )overnment not onl# assists
the +C:(, as it did in +.(. ,ar#ha, it even supplants the latter, a course of action proscribed b#
said case.
Doreover, to recogni!e the )overnment as a proper part# to sue in this case would set a bad
precedent as it would allow the 3epublic to prosecute, on behalf of government%owned or
controlled corporations, causes of action which have alread# prescribed, on the prete"t that the
)overnment is the real part# in interest against whom prescription does not run, said
corporations having been created merel# as agents for the reali!ation of government programs.
&t should also be noted that petitioner is un$uestionabl# a bu#er in good faith and for value,
having ac$uired the propert# in /;87, or . #ears after the issuance of the original certificate of
title, as a third transferee. &f onl# not to do violence and to give some measure of respect to the
Torrens -#stem, petitioner must be afforded some measure of protection. (0hipside
1ncorporated v. Co&rt of Appeals, ($" 0CA ((5, >eb. "7, "771, (
rd
Div. )?elo+,
Disc&ss the nat&re and f&nctions of the !ational Telecomm&nications Commission (!TC,,
and anal'@e its po.ers and a&thorit' as .ell as the la.s, r&les and re4&lations that 4overn its
e3istence and operations.
Held: The 2TC was created pursuant to E"ecutive >rder 2o. .B8 " " ". &t assumed
the functions formerl# assigned to the +oard of Communications and the Communications
Control +ureau, which were both abolished under the said E"ecutive >rder. 'reviousl#, the
2TC5s function were merel# those of the defunct 'ublic -ervice Commission ('-C), created
under Commonwealth (ct 2o. /B8, as amended, otherwise nown as the 'ublic -ervice (ct,
considering that the +oard of Communications was the successor%in%interest of the '-C. Fnder
E"ecutive >rder 2o. /9.%(, issued in (pril /;C7, the 2TC became an attached agenc# of the
:epartment of Transportation and Communications.
&n the regulator# communications industr#, the 2TC has the sole authorit# to issue
Certificates of 'ublic Convenience and 2ecessit# (C'C2) for the installation, operation, and
maintenance of communications facilities and services, radio communications s#stems,
telephone and telegraph s#stems. -uch power includes the authorit# to determine the areas of
operations of applicants for telecommunications services. -pecificall#, -ection /8 of the 'ublic
-ervice (ct authori!es the then '-C, upon notice and hearing, to issue Certificates of 'ublic
Convenience for the operation of public services within the 'hilippines whenever the
Commission finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the authori!ation to do
business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. (Commonwealth A#t
.o. 1/0, 1e#tion 102a3) The procedure governing the issuance of such authori!ations is set forth
in -ection 9; of the said (ct " " ". (ep&blic v. 23press Telecomm&nication Co., 1nc., (7(
0CA (1#, %an. 1$, "77", 1
st
Div. )Anares80antia4o+,
1s the filin4 of the administrative r&les and re4&lations .ith the B* <a. Center the operative
act that 4ives the r&les force and effect/
Held: &n granting +a#antel the provisional authorit# to operate a CDT-, the 2TC
applied 3ule /., -ection 7 of its /;7C 3ules of 'ractice and 'rocedure, which provides@
-ec. 7. $rovisional !elief. G Fpon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at an#
stage thereafter, the +oard ma# grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief
pra#ed for, based on the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached
thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing which shall be called
within thirt# (7=) da#s from grant of authorit# ased for.
3espondent E"telcom, however, contends that the 2TC should have applied the
3evised 3ules which were filed with the >ffice of the 2ational (dministrative 3egister on
*ebruar# 7, /;;7. These 3evised 3ules deleted the phrase on its own initiative0 accordingl#, a
provisional authorit# ma# be issued onl# upon filing of the proper motion before the
Commission.
&n answer to this argument, the 2TC, through the -ecretar# of the Commission, issued
a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the /;;7 3evised 3ules have not been published in a
newspaper of general circulation, the 2TC has been appl#ing the /;7C 3ules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification b# the Commissioner of the
2TC stating that the 2TC was still governed b# the /;C7 3ules, clearl# indicate that the /;;7
3evised 3ules have not taen effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authorit# to
+a#antel. The fact that the /;;7 3evised 3ules were filed with the F' 6aw Center on *ebruar#
7, /;;7 is of no moment. There is nothing in the (dministrative Code of /;C7 which implies
that the filing of the rules with the F' 6aw Center is the operative act that gives the rules force
and effect. +oo ,&&, Chapter 9, -ection 7 thereof merel# states@
Filin%. G (/) Ever# agenc# shall file with the Fniversit# of the 'hilippines 6aw Center three (7)
certified copies of ever# rule adopted b# it. 3ules in force on the date of effectivit# of this Code
which are not filed within three (7) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of an#
sanction against an# part# or persons.
(9) The records officer of the agenc#, or his e$uivalent functionar#, shall carr# out the
re$uirements of this section under pain of disciplinar# action.
(7) ( permanent register of all rules shall be ept b# the issuing agenc# and shall be open to
public inspection.
The 2ational (dministrative 3egister is merel# a bulletin of codified rules and it is
furnished onl# to the >ffice of the 'resident, Congress, all appellate courts, the 2ational 6ibrar#,
other public offices or agencies as the Congress ma# select, and to other persons at a price
sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs (Administrative Code of 1987,
(oo4 5--, Chapter 6, 1e#tion 7). &n a similar case, we held@
This does not impl#, however, that the subject (dministrative >rder is a valid e"ercise of such
$uasi%legislative power. The original (dministrative >rder issued on (ugust 7=, /;C;, under
which the respondents filed their applications for importations, was not published in the >fficial
)a!ette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The $uestioned (dministrative >rder, legall#,
until it is published, is invalid within the conte"t of (rticle 9 of Civil Code, which reads@
(rticle 9. 6aws shall tae effect after fifteen da#s following the completion of their publication
in the >fficial )a!ette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the 'hilippines), unless it is
otherwise provided. < " "
The fact that the amendments to (dministrative >rder 2o. ->C'EC C;%=C%=/ were filed with,
and published b# the F' 6aw Center in the 2ational (dministrative 3egister, does not cure the
defect related to the effectivit# of the (dministrative >rder.
This Court, in Tanada v. Tuvera stated, thus@
4e hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivit#, which shall begin fifteen da#s after publication
unless a different effectivit# is fi"ed b# the legislature.
Covered b# this rule are presidential decrees and e"ecutive orders promulgated b# the 'resident
in the e"ercise of legislative power or, at present, directl# conferred b# the Constitution.
(dministrative 3ules and 3egulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement e"isting law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
&nterpretative regulations and those merel# internal in nature, that is, regulating onl# the
personnel of the administrative agenc# and not the public, need not be published. 2either is
publication re$uired of the so%called letters of instructions issued b# administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed b# their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
4e agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws.
The (dministrative >rder under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivit#, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an e"isting law
pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., '.:. /=7/, in relation to 6>& BBB and E> /77.
Thus, publication in the >fficial )a!ette or a newspaper of general circulation is a
condition sine 7ua non before statutes, rules or regulations can tae effect. This is e"plicit from
E"ecutive >rder 2o. 9==, which repealed (rticle 9 of the Civil Code, and which states that@
6aws shall tae effect after fifteen da#s following the completion of their publication either in
the >fficial )a!ette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the 'hilippines, unless it is
otherwise provided (+.). 688, 1e#tion 1).
The 3ules of 'ractice and 'rocedure of the 2TC, which implements -ection 9; of the
'ublic -ervice (ct, fall s$uarel# within the scope of these laws, as e"plicitl# mentioned in the
case of Tanada v. Tuvera.
>ur pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. (dministrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement e"isting law pursuant to
a valid delegation. The onl# e"ception are interpretative regulations, those merel# internal in
nature, or those so%called letters of instructions issued b# administrative superiors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed b# their subordinates in the performance of their duties
($9-:1A -nternational $la#ement ; 1ervi#es Corp. v. 1e#retar& of :a"or, .!. .o. 18<1//,
April /, 6881, <=0 1C!A 17/).
?ence, the /;;7 3evised 3ules should be published in the >fficial )a!ette or in a
newspaper of general circulation before it can tae effect. Even the /;;7 3evised 3ules itself
mandates that said 3ules shall tae effect onl# after their publication in a newspaper of general
circulation (1e#tion 68 thereof). &n the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the /;7C
3ules that govern. (ep&blic v. 23press Telecomm&nication Co., 1nc., (7( 0CA (1#, %an. 1$,
"77", 1
st
Div. )Anares80antia4o+,
?a' a person be held liable for violation of an administrative re4&lation .hich .as not
p&blished/
Held: 'etitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal e"action as
'>E( Demorandum Circular 2o. &&, -eries of /;C7, which enumerated the allowable fees which
ma# be collected from applicants, is void for lac of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
&n Tanada v. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows@
4e hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivit#, which shall begin fifteen da#s after publication
unless a different effectivit# date is fi"ed b# the legislature.
Covered b# this rule are presidential decrees and e"ecutive orders promulgated b# the 'resident
in the e"ercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validl# delegated b# the legislature
or, at present, directl# conferred b# the Constitution. (dministrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement e"isting law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
&nterpretative regulations and those merel# internal in nature, that is, regulating onl# the
personnel of the administrative agenc# and the public, need not be published. 2either is
publication re$uired of the so%called letter of instructions issued b# the administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed b# their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
(ppl#ing this doctrine, we have previousl# declared as having no force and effect the
following administrative issuances@ a) 3ules and 3egulations issued b# the Aoint Dinistr# of
?ealth%Dinistr# of 6abor and Emplo#ment (ccreditation Committee regarding the accreditation
of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories0 b) 6etter of &nstruction 2o. B/8 ordering the
suspension of pa#ments due and pa#able b# distressed copper mining companies to the national
government0 c) Demorandum Circulars issued b# the '>E( regulating the recruitment of
domestic helpers to ?ong Hong0 d) (dministrative >rder 2o. ->C'EC C;%=C%=/ issued b# the
'hilippine &nternational Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the
'eople5s 3epublic of China0 and e) Corporate Compensation Circular 2o. /= issued b# the
:epartment of +udget and Danagement discontinuing the pa#ment of other allowances and
fringe benefits to government officials and emplo#ees. &n all these cited cases, the administrative
issuances $uestioned therein were uniforml# struc down as the# were not published or filed
with the 2ational (dministrative 3egister as re$uired b# the (dministrative Code of /;C7.
'>E( Demorandum Circular 2o. 9, -eries of /;C7 must liewise be declared
ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the 2ational (dministrative 3egister.
'>E( Demorandum Circular 2o. 9, -eries of /;C7 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private emplo#ment agencies or authorit#
holders. Fnder the said >rder, the ma"imum amount which ma# be collected from prospective
*ilipino overseas worers is '9,.==.==. The said circular was apparentl# issued in compliance
with the provisions of (rticle 79 of the 6abor Code " " ".
&t is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivit#, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an e"isting law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that '>E(
(dministrative Circular 2o. 9, -eries of /;C7 has not as #et been published or filed with the
2ational (dministrative 3egister, the same is ineffective and ma# not be enforced. (*hilsa
1nternational *lacement and 0ervices Corporation v. 0ecretar' of <abor and 2mplo'ment,
($# 0CA 175, April 5, "771, (
rd
Div., )Gon@a4a8e'es+,
Does the p&blication re9&irement appl' as .ell to administrative re4&lations addressed onl' to
a specific 4ro&p and not to the 4eneral p&blic/
Held: The >ffice of the -olicitor )eneral liewise argues that the $uestioned
administrative circular is not among those re$uiring publication contemplated b# Tanada v.
Tuvera as it is addressed onl# to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.
(gain, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed onl# to a specified group, namel# private
emplo#ment agencies or authorit# holders, does not tae it awa# from the ambit of our ruling in
Tanada v. Tuvera. &n the case of $hil. Asso#iation of 1ervi#e +>porters v. Torres, the
administrative circulars $uestioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namel#
'hilippine and ?ong Hong agencies engaged in the recruitment of worers for ?ong Hong, and
still the Court ruled therein that, for lac of proper publication, the said circulars ma# not be
enforced or implemented.
>ur pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical. (dministrative rules
and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement e"isting law
pursuant to a valid delegation. The onl# e"ceptions are interpretative regulations, those merel#
internal in nature, or those so%called letters of instructions issued b# administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed b# their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. (dministrative Circular 2o. 9, -eries of /;C7 has not been shown to fall under an#
of these e"ceptions.
&n this regard, the -olicitor )eneral5s reliance on the case of ?ao4asin v. Commissioner of
Customs is misplaced. &n the said case, the validit# of certain Customs Demorandum >rders
were upheld despite their lac of publication as the# were addressed to a particular class of
persons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the
+ureau of Customs. (s such, the said Demorandum >rders clearl# fall under one of the
e"ceptions to the publication re$uirement, namel# those dealing with instructions from an
administrative superior to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a
circumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench. < " "
To summari!e, petitioner should be absolved from the three (7) counts of e"action as '>E(
(dministrative Circular 2o. 9, -eries of /;C7 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions
against petitioner for lac of publication. (*hilsa 1nternational *lacement and 0ervices
Corporation v. 0ecretar' of <abor and 2mplo'ment, ($# 0CA 175, April 5, "771, (
rd
Div.,
)Gon@a4a8e'es+,
?a' a s&ccessf&l bidder compel a 4overnment a4enc' to formali@e a contract .ith it
not.ithstandin4 that its bid e3ceeds the amo&nt appropriated b' Con4ress for the proCect/
Held: Enshrined in the /;C7 'hilippine Constitution is the mandate that no mone# shall be paid
out of the Treasur# e"cept in pursuance of an appropriation made b# law. (-ec. 9;I/J, (rticle ,&
of the /;C7 Constitution) Thus, in the e"ecution of government contracts, the precise import of
this constitutional restriction is to re$uire the various agencies to limit their e"penditures within
the appropriations made b# law for each fiscal #ear.
&t is $uite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the e"istence of appropriations
and the availabilit# of funds are indispensable pre%re$uisites to or conditions sine 7ua non for the
e"ecution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori
re$uisites to the validit# of the proposed contract. Fsing this as our premise, we cannot accede
to '?>T>H&2(5s contention that there is alread# a perfected contract. 4hile we held in
,etropolitan ,anila 'evelopment Authorit& v. @an#om +nvironmental Corporation that the
effect of an un$ualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of the bidder is to perfect a contract,
upon notice of the award to the bidder, however, such statement would be inconse$uential in a
government where the acceptance referred to is #et to meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise
is to allow a public officer to e"ecute a binding contract that would obligate the government in an
amount in e"cess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract was attempted to
be made. This is a dangerous precedent.
&n the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal re$uirements as earl# as
the bidding stage. The first step of a +ids and (wards Committee (+(C) is to determine whether
the bids compl# with the re$uirements. The +(C shall rate a bid passed onl# if it complies
with all the re$uirements and the submitted price does not e"ceed the approved budget for the
contract. (-mplementin% !ules and !e%ulations 2-!!3 for +>e#utive )rder .o. 606, supra.)
E"tant on the record is the fact that the ,3&- 'roject was awarded to '?>T>H&2( on
account of its bid in the amount of '8..CC +illion 'esos. ?owever, under 3epublic (ct 2o. C78=
(eneral Appropriations A#t, F? 6888, p. 1818, supra.), the onl# fund appropriated for the
project was '/ +illion 'esos and under the Certification of (vailable *unds (C(*) onl# '/.9
+illion 'esos was available. Clearl#, the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of
the entire ,3&- 'roject. There is no wa# that the C>DE6EC could enter into a contract with
'?>T>H&2( whose accepted bid was wa# be#ond the amount appropriated b# law for the
project. This being the case, the +(C should have rejected the bid for being e"cessive or should
have withdrawn the 2otice of (ward on the ground that in the e#es of the law, the same is null
and void.
Even the draft contract submitted b# Commissioner -adain that provides for a contract
price in the amount of '/.9 +illion 'esos is unacceptable. " " " 4hile the contract price under
the draft contract is onl# '/.9 +illion and, thus, within the certified available funds, the same
covers onl# 'hase & of the ,3&- 'roject, i.e., the issuance of identification cards for onl#
/,===,=== voters in specified areas. &n effect, the implementation of the ,3&- 'roject will be
segmented or chopped into several phases. 2ot onl# is such arrangement disallowed b# our
budgetar# laws and practices, it is also disadvantageous to the C>DE6EC because of the
uncertaint# that will loom over its moderni!ation project for an indefinite period of time. -hould
Congress fail to appropriate the amount necessar# for the completion of the entire project, what
good will the accomplished 'hase & serve1 (s e"pected, the project failed to sell with the
:epartment of +udget and Danagement. Thus, -ecretar# +enjamin :iono, per his letter of
:ecember /, 9===, declined the C>DE6EC5s re$uest for the issuance of the 2otice of Cash
(vailabilit# (2C() and a multi%#ear obligator# authorit# to assume pa#ment of the total ,3&-
'roject for lac of legal basis. Corollaril#, under -ection 77 of 3.(. 2o. C78=, no agenc# shall
enter into a multi%#ear contract without a multi%#ear obligational authorit#, thus@
-ECT&>2 77. Contra#tin% ,ulti*?ear $roAe#ts. B &n the implementation of multi%#ear
projects, no agenc# shall enter into a multi%#ear contract without a multi%#ear >bligational
(uthorit# issued b# the :epartment of +udget and Danagement for the purpose.
2otwithstanding the issuance of the multi%#ear >bligational (uthorit#, the obligation to be
incurred in an# given calendar #ear, shall in no case e"ceed the amount programmed for
implementation during said calendar #ear.
'etitioners are justified in refusing to formali!e the contract with '?>T>H&2(. 'rudence
dictated them not to enter into a contract not baced up b# sufficient appropriation and available
funds. :efinitel#, to act otherwise would be a futile e"ercise for the contract would inevitabl#
suffer the vice of nullit#. " " "
,eril#, the contract, as e"pressl# declared b# law, is ine"istent and void a" initio
(Arti#le 1/89 of the Civil Code of the $hilippines). This is to sa# that the proposed contract is
without force and effect from the ver# beginning or from its incipienc#, as if it had never been
entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either b# lapse of time or ratification.
&n fine, we rule that '?>T>H&2(, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the C>DE6EC to
formali!e the contract. -ince '?>T>H&2(5s bid is be#ond the amount appropriated b#
Congress for the ,3&- 'roject, the proposed contract is not binding upon the C>DE6EC and is
considered void " " ". (Commission on 2lections v. %&d4e ?a. <&isa D&iCano8*adilla, G..
!o. 1$199", 0ept. 18, "77", 2n 6anc )0andoval8G&tierre@+,
-hat is the remed' available to a part' .ho contracts .ith the 4overnment contrar' to the
re9&irements of the la. and, therefore, void ab initio/
Held: >f course, we are not sa#ing that the part# who contracts with the government has no
other recourse in law. The law itself affords him the remed#. -ection BC of E.>. 2o. 9;9
e"plicitl# provides that an# contract entered into contrar# to the above%mentioned re$uirements
shall be void, and Cthe offi#ers enterin% into the #ontra#t shall "e lia"le to the overnment or
other #ontra#tin% part& for an& #onse7uent dama%e to the same as if the transa#tion had "een
wholl& "etween private parties.D -o when the contracting officer transcends his lawful and
legitimate powers b# acting in e"cess of or be#ond the limits of his contracting authorit#, the
)overnment is not bound under the contract. &t would be as if the contract in such case were a
private one, whereupon, he binds himself, and thus, assumes personal liabilit# thereunder.
>therwise stated, the proposed contract is unenforceable as to the )overnment.
4hile this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpabilit# lies, however, the
constitutional mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public officers that public office is
a public trust and all public officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The authorit#
of public officers to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a heav# burden of
responsibilit#. &n the e"ercise of their contracting prerogative, the# should be the first judges of
the legalit#, propriet# and wisdom of the contract the# entered into. The# must e"ercise a high
degree of caution so that the )overnment ma# not be the victim of ill%advised or improvident
action. (Commission on 2lections v. %&d4e ?a. <&isa D&iCano8*adilla, G.. !o. 1$199",
0ept. 18, "77", 2n 6anc )0andoval8G&tierre@+,
Does the Commission on E&man i4hts have the po.er to adC&dicate/
Held: &n its >rder " " " den#ing petitioners5 motion to dismiss, the C?3 theori!es that
the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to mae C?3 a $uasi%judicial
bod#. This view, however, has not heretofore been shared b# this Court. &n Carino v.
Commission on 9uman !i%hts, the Court " " " has observed that it is onl# the first of the
enumerated powers and functions that bears an# resemblance to adjudication of adjudgment,
but that resemblance can in no wa# be s#non#mous to the adjudicator# power itself. The Court
e"plained@
" " " ITJhe Commission on ?uman 3ights " " " was not meant b# the fundamental law to be
another court or $uasi%judicial agenc# in this countr#, or duplicate much less tae over the
functions of the latter.
The most that ma# be conceded to the Commission in the wa# of adjudicative power is that it
ma# investigate, i.e., receive evidence and mae findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. +ut fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
liened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a $uasi%judicial agenc# or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controvers# is not a
judicial function, properl# speaing. To be considered such, the facult# of receiving evidence
and maing factual conclusions in a controvers# must be accompanied b# the authorit# of
appl#ing the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controvers# ma# be decided or
determined authoritativel#, finall# and definitivel#, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
ma# be provided b# law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. (1imon, @r. v.
Commission on 9uman !i%hts, 669 1C!A 117, 16=, @an. =, 199/, +n (an# 25itu%, @.3)
Does the Commission on E&man i4hts have C&risdiction to iss&e TO or .rit of preliminar'
inC&nction/
Held: &n +>port $ro#essin% Eone Authorit& v. Commission on 9uman !i%hts, the
Court " " " e"plained@
The constitutional provision directing the C?3 to Kprovide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection5
ma# not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or
writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have e"pressl# said so.
KAurisdiction is conferred onl# b# the Constitution or b# law.5 &t is never derived b#
implication.
Evidentl#, the Kpreventive measures and legal aid services5 mentioned in the Constitution refer
to e"trajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminar# injunction) which the C?3
ma# see from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. 2ot being a
court of justice, the C?3 itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminar#
injunction ma# onl# be issued Kb# the judge of an# court in which the action is pending Iwithin
his districtJ, or b# a Austice of the Court of (ppeals, or of the -upreme Court. " " ". ( writ of
preliminar# injunction is an ancillar# remed#. &t is available onl# in a pending principal action,
for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a part# thereto, and for no other
purpose.
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to an# appropriate agenc# of government. (0imon, %r. v. Commission on
E&man i4hts, ""9 0CA 117, 1(581($, %an. $, 1995, 2n 6anc )Fit&4, %.+,
Does the petition for ann&lment of proclamation of a candidate merel' involve the e3ercise b'
the CO?2<2C of its administrative po.er to revie., revise and reverse the actions of the
board of canvassers and, therefore, C&stifies non8observance of proced&ral d&e process, or
does it involve the e3ercise of the CO?2<2CGs 9&asi8C&dicial f&nction/
Held: Taing cogni!ance of private respondent5s petitions for annulment of petitioner5s
proclamation, C>DE6EC was not merel# performing an administrative function. The
administrative powers of the C>DE6EC include the power to determine the number and
location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of
voters, deputi!e law enforcement agencies and governmental instrumentalities to ensure free,
orderl#, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organi!ations or
coalition, accredit citi!en5s arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and
recommend to the 'resident the removal of or imposition of an# other disciplinar# action upon
an# officer or emplo#ee it has deputi!ed for violation or disregard of its directive, order or
decision. &n addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel
involved in the conduct of election. ?owever, the resolution of the adverse claims of private
respondent and petitioner as regards the e"istence of a manifest error in the $uestioned certificate
of canvass re$uires the C>DE6EC to act as an arbiter. &t behooves the Commission to hear both
parties to determine the veracit# of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a
manifest error. ?ence, the resolution of this issue calls for the e"ercise b# the C>DE6EC of its
$uasi%judicial power. &t has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that
it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the e"ercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed $uasi%judicial. The
C>DE6EC therefore, acting as $uasi%judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the re$uirements of
procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed b# private respondent. (>ederico 0.
0andoval v. CO?2<2C, G.. !o. 1((85", %an. "#, "777 )*&no+,
Disc&ss the contempt po.er of the Commission on E&man i4hts (CE,. -hen ma' it be
validl' e3ercised.
Held: >n its contempt powers, the C?3 is constitutionall# authori!ed to adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the 3ules of Court. (ccordingl#, the C?3 acted within its authorit# in
providing in its revised rules, its power to cite or hold an# person in direct or indirect contempt,
and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided
for in the 3ules of Court. That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to
appl# onl# to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to
carr# out its investigatorial powers. To e"emplif#, the power to cite for contempt could be
e"ercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said bod#, or who undul# withhold
relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the lie, in pursuing its
investigative wor. The order to desist (a semantic interpla# for a restraining order) in the
instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative
power that it does not possess. " " " (0imon, %r. v. Commission on E&man i4hts, ""9 0CA
117, 1(5, %an. $, 1995, 2n 6anc )Fit&4, %.+,
Disc&ss the Doctrine of *rimar' %&risdiction (or *rior esort,.
Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controvers# involving a $uestion which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especiall# where the $uestion demands the e"ercise of
sound administrative discretion re$uiring the special nowledge, e"perience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
&n recent #ears, it has been the jurisprudential trend to appl# this doctrine to cases involving
matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the $uestion
involved is also judicial in character. &t applies where a claim is originall# cogni!able in the
courts, and comes into pla# whenever enforcement of the claim re$uires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulator# scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative bod#0 in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative bod# for its view.
&n cases where the doctrine of primar# jurisdiction is clearl# applicable, the court cannot arrogate
unto itself the authorit# to resolve a controvers#, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an
administrative bod# of special competence. (Fillaflor v. CA, "87 0CA "97, Oct. 9, 199", (
rd

Div. )*an4aniban+,
Disc&ss the Doctrine of 23ha&stion of Administrative emedies. -hat are the e3ceptions
thereto/
Held: /. +efore a part# is allowed to see the intervention of the court, it is a pre%condition that
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. ?ence, if a
remed# within the administrative machiner# can still be resorted to b# giving the administrative
officer concerned ever# opportunit# to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remed# should be e"hausted first before the court5s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court5s jurisdiction is fatal to one5s cause of action. (ccordingl#, absent
an# finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lac of cause of action.
This doctrine of e"haustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal
reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remed# entails lesser e"penses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. &t is no less true to state that the courts of justice for
reasons of comit# and convenience will sh# awa# from a dispute until the s#stem of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agenc# concerned ever# opportunit# to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
This doctrine is disregarded@
when there is a violation of due process0
when the issue involved is purel# a legal $uestion0
when the administrative action is patentl# illegal amounting to lac or e"cess of jurisdiction0
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agenc# concerned0
when there is irreparable injur#0
when the respondent is a department secretar# whose acts as an alter e%o of the 'resident bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter0
when to re$uire e"haustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable0
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim0
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding0
when the rule does not provide a plain, speed# and ade$uate remed#, and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgenc# of judicial intervention.
(*aat v. CA, "## 0CA 1#7 )1997+,
9. 2on%e"haustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. &t onl# renders the action
premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a
part# has no cause of action to ventilate in court. (Carale v. Abarintos, "#9 0CA 1(", ?arch
(, 1997, (
rd
Div. )Davide+,