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The Supreme Court ruled that a preventive suspension of an elected public official does not constitute an interruption of their term of office for purposes of the three-term limit. Respondent Wilfredo Asilo had served three consecutive terms as councilor from 1998 to 2007. During his third term in 2005, he was preventively suspended for 90 days by the Sandiganbayan due to a criminal case, but the Supreme Court lifted the suspension and he finished his term. Asilo then filed to run for the same position again in 2007. The Court found that a preventive suspension is a temporary incapacity, not an involuntary loss of title to office, so it does not effectively break the term. As Asilo had served three
The Supreme Court ruled that a preventive suspension of an elected public official does not constitute an interruption of their term of office for purposes of the three-term limit. Respondent Wilfredo Asilo had served three consecutive terms as councilor from 1998 to 2007. During his third term in 2005, he was preventively suspended for 90 days by the Sandiganbayan due to a criminal case, but the Supreme Court lifted the suspension and he finished his term. Asilo then filed to run for the same position again in 2007. The Court found that a preventive suspension is a temporary incapacity, not an involuntary loss of title to office, so it does not effectively break the term. As Asilo had served three
The Supreme Court ruled that a preventive suspension of an elected public official does not constitute an interruption of their term of office for purposes of the three-term limit. Respondent Wilfredo Asilo had served three consecutive terms as councilor from 1998 to 2007. During his third term in 2005, he was preventively suspended for 90 days by the Sandiganbayan due to a criminal case, but the Supreme Court lifted the suspension and he finished his term. Asilo then filed to run for the same position again in 2007. The Court found that a preventive suspension is a temporary incapacity, not an involuntary loss of title to office, so it does not effectively break the term. As Asilo had served three
F. ASILO G.R. No. 184836, 23 December 2009, EN BANC, (BRION, J.)
The preventive suspension of an elected public official does not constitute an interruption of the officials term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
Respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., et al. sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELEC in Asilos favour. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public official constitutes an interruption of the officials term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
The only interruption of a term that can exempt an elective official from the three-term limit rule is involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to the three-limit rule to occur. However, a preventive suspension, by its nature, is only a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term. It does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. The official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo. Thus, the preventive suspension imposed on Asilo does not constitute an effective interruption of the three-term limit rule. Asilo is disqualified by the Court to run in the immediate subsequent election following his three consecutive terms of service.
Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002 (Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit) Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Judicial Precedent and Prevention of Contradictory Judgments: An Expository Study of Compliance With Judicial Precedent in Malaysian and Nigerian Courts
United States v. James J. Mosbrucker Margaret Mosbrucker State of North Dakota Peter Hulm S & M Company J and S Mobil Homes Service, Inc., a Corporation Robert F. Holt, Doing Business as Credit Adjusters, Inc. Mandan Community Center Ray Hoffman Terry Gimbel Melvin Jahner Community Credit Union, of Bismarck United Accounts, Inc., a Corporation Ed Van Beek Gray Oil Company, a Corporation Mack & Associates, Inc., a Corporation Dakota Credit, Inc., a Corporation John Sullivan, Doing Business as Cannonball Ranch James Massett Northwest Tire, Inc., a Corporation Security State Bank, of New Salem Bank Center First Roger Hatzenbuehler, United States of America v. James J. Mosbrucker Margaret Mosbrucker, James J. Mosbrucker Margaret Mosbrucker v. United States, 340 F.3d 664, 1st Cir. (2003)