A.

Obligations_In General



Villaroel v. Estrada
[No. 47362. December 19, 1940]

JOHN F. VILLARROEL, appellant vs. BERNARDINO ESTRADA, appealed.

Facts:
1. On May 9, 1912, Alejandra F. Callao, mother of defendant John F. Villarroel,
obtained from the spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina a loan of P1, 000
payable after seven years.
2. Alejandra died, leaving as sole heir to the defendant. Spouses Mariano Estrada
and Severina also died, leaving as sole heir to the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada.
3. On August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document by which the applicant
must declare in the amount of P1, 000, with an interest of 12 percent per year.
4. The Court of First Instance of Laguna, which was filed in this action, condemn
the defendant to pay the claimed amount of P1, 000 with legal interest of 12
percent per year since the August 9, 1930 until full pay.
5. Villaroel appealed the sentence.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to prescription may be waived or renounced.
Held:
Yes. The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. As a general rule,
when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But
a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and
enforceable.
Therefore, where the party acknowledges
(1) The correctness of the debt and;
(2) promises to pay it after the same has been prescribed and;
(3) and with the full knowledge of the prescription; he thereby waives the benefit of prescription.
Issue:
Whether or not the rule that a new promise to pay a debt required to be made
by the same person obligated or otherwise legally authorized by it is applicable.
Held:
No. the present case is not required in compliance with the obligation of the
originally required but which would give it voluntarily assumed this obligation.

Issue:
Whether or not the Action of the Court of First Instance of Laguna is
Appropriate.

Held:
Yes. This action is not based on the original obligation contracted by the mother
of the defendant, which has already prescribed, but in which the defendant contracted
the August 9, 1930 by assuming the fulfillment of that obligation, as prescribed.

Decision:
Affirmed

Note:
Art. 1424. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive
prescription, the obligor who voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what he
has delivered or the value of the service he has rendered.
Fulfillment of natural obligation: (Any of the following must be done voluntarily)

1. Delivery of the thing
2. Performance of an act
3. Giving of a security
4. Execution of a document
5. Abandonment of a right
6. Mere promise to perform the obligation



ANSAY V. NDC

On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955.
The court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss dismissed the petition.
A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because
their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural
obligation.

HELD:
1. NATURAL OBLIGATIONS; ELEMENT OF; VOLUNTARY FULFILLMENT; WHEN
RETENTION CAN BE ORDERED. An element of natural obligation before it can be
cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Retention can be ordered
only after there has been voluntary performance.
2. ID.; BONUS NOT DEMANDABLE AND ENFORCEABLE; EXCEPTION. A bonus is
not a demandable and enforceable obligation, except when it is made a part of the
wage or salary compensation. (Philippine Education Co. vs. CIR and the Union of
Philippine Education Co. Employees (NLU), 92 Phil., 381; 48 Off. Gaz. 5278.) Hence, the
grant thereof does not generally constitute a natural obligation on the part of the
company.
Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such
claimed bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural
obligation that they discussed in their brief, this Court feels it urgent to reproduce at
this point, the definition and meaning of natural obligation.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil
obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not
being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action
to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they
authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof"
It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable
by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered
but only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no
voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.
At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine Education
Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees (NUL) (92 Phil., 381;
48 Off. Gaz., 5278) "From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation.
It is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary compensation."
And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National Labor Union,
et al., 95 Phil., 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:.
"Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or
compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on equitable
consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in succeeding two
years from low salaried employees due to salary increases."
still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one, and hence
the ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the present action.
Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.



DBP v. Confessor
161 SCRA 307 (1988)
Petition for review on certiorari
GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:
On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained
an agricultural loan from DBP, in the sum of P2,000, as evidenced by a promissory
note, whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten
(10) equal yearly amortizations.
After ten years, the debt remained unpaid. Confessor, now a Congressman,
executed a second promissory note acknowledging the loan and promising to pay the
same before June 15, 1961.
Still not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the DBP filed a
complaint against the spouses for the payment of the loan.

ISSUE:
W/N prescription had barred the complaint.

HELD:
No. Prescription was renounced when Confessor signed the second promissory
note.
The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Prescription is deemed to
have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which imply the
abandonment of the right acquired.
The Court ruled that when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be
enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed
debt would be valid and enforceable.
The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. A new
express promise to pay a debt barred ... will take the case from the operation of the
statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation
merely bars the remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is something more than
a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wit a pre-existing debt which is a
sufficient consideration for the new the new promise; upon this sufficient consideration
constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action.