You are on page 1of 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24396 July 29, 1968
SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL., u!"# !" $! %&$'l( '") (o* +$& %&"&,+ o( 'll o+$&* -&*o" $'.!"#
/o00o" o* #&"&*'l !"+&*&+ 1!+$ $!0 !" '//o*)'"/& 1!+$ S&/. 12, Rul& 3, Rul& o( Cou*+, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
NATIONAL PO2ER CORPORATION '") A3MINISTRATOR O4 ECONOMIC COOR3INATION, respondents-
appellees.
Alafriz Law Ofces for petitioners-appellants.
The Government Corporate Counsel and Ofce of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.
4ERNAN3O, J.:
This declaratory relief proceedin !as started in the lo!er court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Po!er and
"evelop#ent Co#pany, both franchise holders of electric plants in $auna, to test the validity of a section of an
a#endatory act,
%
e#po!erin respondent National Po!er Corporation &in any contract for the supply of electric po!er
to a franchise holder,& receivin at least '() of its electric po!er and enery fro# it to re*uire as a condition that
such franchise holder &shall not reali+e a net pro,t of #ore than t!elve percent annually of its invest#ents plus t!o-
#onth operatin e-penses.& Respondent, under such provision, could li.e!ise &rene! all e-istin contracts !ith
franchise holders for the supply of electric po!er and enery,& so that the provisions of the Act could be iven
e/ect.
0
This statutory provision !as assailed on the round that, bein a rider, it is violative of the constitutional
provision re*uirin that a bill, !hich #ay be enacted into la!, cannot e#brace #ore than one sub1ect, !hich shall be
e-pressed in its title,
2
as !ell as the due process uarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners bein infrined upon.
The lo!er court sustained its validity. 3e sustain the lo!er court in this appeal.
4n the petition for declaratory relief, after the usual alleations as to parties, it !as stated that respondent National
Po!er Corporation &has for so#e years no! been, and still is, by virtue of si#ilar, valid and e-istin contracts entered
into by it !ith one hundred and thirty seven 5%267 natural persons and corporations distributed all over the country,
supplyin, distributin, servicin and sellin electric po!er and enery at ,-ed rites schedules to the latter !ho have
for so#e years no! been and still are, leally enaed in resupplyin, redistributin, reservicin and resellin the said
electric po!er and enery to individual custo#ers !ithin the coverae of their respective franchises.&
8
Petitioners are
included a#on the said %96 natural persons and entities.
'
Then, reference !as #ade to the particular contracts
petitioners entered into !ith respondent, the contracts to continue inde,nitely unless and until either party !ould ive
to the other t!o years previous notice in !ritin of its intention to ter#inate the sa#e.
:
After !hich, it !as noted that
on ;une %<, %9:(, an act authori+in the increase of the capital stoc. of the National Po!er Corporation to P%(( #illion
too. e/ect.
6
A year later, on ;une %6, %9:%, it !as alleed that the challened leislation beca#e a la!, purportedly to
increase further the authori+ed capital stoc., but includin the alleed rider referred to above, !hich, in the opinion of
petitioners, transressed the constitutional provision on the sub1ect #atter and title of bills as !ell as the due process
clause.
<
Mention !as then #ade of the National Po!er Corporation approvin a rate increase of at least %6.'), the
e/ectivity of !hich, !as at ,rst deferred to Nove#ber %, %9:0, then subse*uently to ;anuary %', %9:2, !ith the threat
that in case petitioners !ould fail to sin the revised contract providin for the increased rate, respondent National
Po!er Corporation !ould then cease &to supply, distribute and service electric po!er and enery to the#.&
9
That !ould be, in the opinion of petitioners, violative of their rihts, proceedin fro# leislation su/erin fro#
constitutional in,r#ities.
%(
A declaration of unconstitutionality !as therefore souht by the#. 4t !as prayed= &5%7 To
ive due course to this petition> 507 To issue a !rit of preli#inary in1unction, upon the postin of the re*uisite bond,
en1oinin respondent NPC fro# carryin or prosecutin its threat to enforce the provisions of the rider or ?ection 2 of
Republic Act No. 2(82 ... in the #anner stated in pararaph %< of this petition until this @onorable Court shall have
,nally decided or disposed, by ,nal 1ud#ent, of the issues raised in this petition> 527 After due hearin, to declare the
rider or ?ection 2 of Republic Act No. 2(82 null and void for bein illeal and unconstitutional, and to issue a
per#anent in1unction re*uirin respondent NPC to refrain fro# enforcin or i#ple#entin the provisions of the sa#e
la!.&
%%
?oon after, petitioner Philippine Po!er and "evelop#ent Co#pany #oved that insofar as it !as concerned, the case
be dis#issed, !hich #otion !as ranted by the lo!er court on ;anuary 0', %9:2.
%0
The sole petitioner is therefore
?antiao P. Alalayan, suin in his behalf and for the bene,t of all other persons havin co##on or eneral interest
!ith hi#. Respondent National Po!er Corporation ,led an opposition on Aebruary %', %9:2, opposin the issuance of a
!rit for preli#inary in1unction.
%2
Bn March 0%, %9:2, the lo!er court, considerin that there !as &no suCcient round
for the issuance of the !rit for preli#inary in1unction,& denied the sa#e.
%8
There !as in the ans!er, dated March 09, %9:2, an ad#ission of the #ain facts alleed, !ith a denial of the leal
conclusion !hich petitioner !ould deduce therefro#, respondent National Po!er Corporation upholdin the validity of
the challened provision. Then, ca#e a partial stipulation of facts sub#itted on Bctober %, %9:8, consistin of a
resolution of the Philippine Electric Plant B!ners Association to ta.e the necessary steps to stop respondent National
Po!er Corporation fro# enforcin its announced increase, sa#ples of contracts bet!een electric plant operators on
the one hand and respondent National Po!er Corporation on the other, the contract !ith petitioner Alalayan, dated
May 0:, %9':, sho!in that he did purchase and ta.e po!er and enery as follo!s= &?i-ty 5:(7 .ilo!atts and of not
less than %8(,((( .ilo!att-hours in any contract year at the rate of P%0(.(( per .ilo!att per year& payable in t!elve
e*ual #onthly install#ents, &plus an enery chare of P(.(%2 per .ilo!att hour, payable on the basis of #onthly
delivery&> a letter of ;une 00, %9:0 of respondent National Po!er Corporation to petitioner approvin his %6.') rate
increase of po!er so that beinnin ;uly %, %9:0, the de#and chare !ould be P%(.(( per .ilo!att per #onth and the
enery chare !ould be P(.(0 per .ilo!att hour> a letter of Auust %', %9:0, !herein respondent National Po!er
Corporation noti,ed petitioner that it deferred the e/ectivity of the ne! rates, but it !ill be enforced on Nove#ber %,
%9:0> a letter of ;une 0', %9:2 enforcin respondent National Po!er Corporation deferrin once aain the e/ectivity of
the ne! rates until ;anuary %, %9:8> as !ell as the conressional transcripts on @ouse Bill No. '266 and ?enate Bill No.
:%2, no! Republic Act No. 2(82.
%'
4n an order of Nove#ber ', %9:8, the lo!er court ave the parties a period of t!enty days !ithin !hich to sub#it
si#ultaneously their respective #e#oranda. After the sub#ission thereof, the lo!er court, in a decision of ;anuary 2(,
%9:', sustained the validity and constitutionality of the challened provision. @ence, this appeal.
As !as set forth earlier, this appeal cannot prosper. 3e share the vie! of the lo!er court that the provision in *uestion
cannot be i#puned either on the round of its bein violative of the constitutional re*uire#ent that a bill cannot
e#brace #ore than one sub1ect to be e-pressed in its title or by virtue of its alleed failure to satisfy the due process
criterion.
%. 3e consider ,rst the ob1ection that the statute in *uestion is violative of the constitutional provision that no bill
&!hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub1ect !hich shall be e-pressed in DitsE title ... &
%:
This
provision is si#ilar to those found in #any A#erican ?tate Constitutions. 4t is ai#ed aainst the evils of the so-called
o#nibus bills and lo-rollin leislation as !ell as surreptitious or unconsidered enact#ents.
%6
3here the sub1ect of a
bill is li#ited to a particular #atter, the la!#a.ers alon !ith the people should be infor#ed of the sub1ect of
proposed leislative #easures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in leislation, a rider
bein a provision not er#ane to the sub1ect #atter of the bill. Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision ob1ected
to is such a rider.
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or i#pede proper
leislation. To i#part to it a #eanin !hich is reasonable and not unduly technical, it #ust be dee#ed suCcient that
the title be co#prehensive enouh reasonably to include the eneral ob1ect !hich the statute see.s to e/ect !ithout
e-pressin each and every end and #eans necessary for its acco#plish#ent. Thus, #ere details need not be set forth.
The leislature is not re*uired to #a.e the title of the act a co#plete inde- of its contents. The provision #erely calls
for all parts of an act relatin to its sub1ect ,ndin e-pression in its title.
%<
More speci,cally, if the la! a#ends a section
or part of a statute, it suCces if reference be #ade to the leislation to be a#ended, there bein no need to state the
precise nature of the a#end#ent.
%9
4t !as in %92<, in Government v. Hon!on " Shanhai #an!$
0(
!here, for the ,rst ti#e after the inauuration of the
Co##on!ealth, this Court passed upon a provision of that character. 3e held there that the Reorani+ation
$a!,
0%
providin for the #ode in !hich the total annual e-penses of the Bureau of Ban.in could be rei#bursed
throuh assess#ent levied upon all ban.in institutions sub1ect to inspection by the Ban. Co##issioner !as not
violative of such a re*uire#ent in the ;ones $a!, the previous oranic act. ;ustice $aurel, ho!ever, viorously
dissented, his vie! bein that !hile the #ain sub1ect of the act !as reorani+ation, the provision assailed did not deal
!ith reorani+ation but !ith ta-ation. This case of Government v. Hon!on " Shanhai #an! !as decided by a bare
#a1ority of four 1ustices aainst three. Thereafter, it !ould appear that the constitutional re*uire#ent is to be iven
the liberal test as indicated in the #a1ority opinion penned by ;ustice Abad ?antos, and not the strict test as desired by
the #inority headed by ;ustice $aurel.
?uch a trend is #ade #anifest in the cases beinnin !ith ?u#ulon v. Co##ission on Elections,
00
up to and
includin %elwa v. Salas,
02
a %9:: decision, the opinion co#in fro# Chief ;ustice Concepcion. There is nothin
inLidasan v. Commission on &lections$
08
!here a statute
0'
!as annulled on this round, to indicate the contrary. As
aptly e-pressed by ;ustice ?anche+= &Bf course, the Constitution does not re*uire Conress to e#ploy in the title of an
enact#ent, lanuae of such precision as to #irror, fully inde- or cataloue all the contents and the #inute details
therein. 4t suCces if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional de#and that it infor# the leislators, the
persons interested in the sub1ect of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and conse*uences of the proposed la!
and its operation. And this, to lead the# to in*uire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the sa#e, ta.e
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the leislators.&
3e thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision !hich re*uires that any bill enacted into la! shall
e#brace only one sub1ect to be e-pressed in the title thereof.
0. Nor is petitioner any#ore successful in his plea for the nulli,cation of the challened provision on the round of his
bein deprived of the liberty to contract !ithout due process of la!.
4t is to be ad#itted of course that property rihts ,nd shelter in speci,c constitutional provisions, one of !hich is the
due process clause. 4t is e*ually certain that our funda#ental la! fra#ed at a ti#e of &surin unrest and
dissatisfaction&,
0:
!hen there !as the fear e-pressed in #any *uarters that a constitutional de#ocracy, in vie! of its
co##it#ent to the clai#s of property, !ould not be able to cope e/ectively !ith the proble#s of poverty and #isery
that unfortunately aFict so #any of our people, is not susceptible to the indict#ent that the overn#ent therein
established is i#potent to ta.e the necessary re#edial #easures. The fra#ers sa! to that. The !elfare state concept
is not alien to the philosophy of our Constitution.
06
4t is i#plicit in *uite a fe! of its provisions. 4t suCces to #ention
t!o.
There is the clause on the pro#otion of social 1ustice to ensure the !ell-bein and econo#ic security of all the
people,
0<
as !ell as the plede of protection to labor !ith the speci,c authority to reulate the relations bet!een
lando!ners and tenants and bet!een labor and capital.
09
This particulari+ed reference to the rihts of !or.in #en
!hether in industry and ariculture certainly cannot preclude attention to and concern for the rihts of consu#ers,
!ho are the ob1ects of solicitude in the leislation no! co#plained of. The police po!er as an attribute to pro#ote the
co##on !eal !ould be diluted considerably of its reach and e/ectiveness if on the #ere plea that the liberty to
contract !ould be restricted, the statute co#plained of #ay be characteri+ed as a denial of due process. The riht to
property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable e-tre#e.
4t is understandable thouh !hy business enterprises, not unnaturally evincin lac. of enthusias# for police po!er
leislation that a/ect the# adversely and restrict their pro,ts could predicate alleed violation of their rihts on the
due process clause, !hich as interpreted by the# is a bar to reulatory #easures. 4nvariably, the response fro# this
Court, fro# the ti#e the Constitution !as enacted, has been far fro# sy#pathetic. Thus, durin the Co##on!ealth,
!e sustained leislation providin for collective barainin,
2(
security of tenure,
2%
#ini#u# !aes,
20
co#pulsory
arbitration,
22
and tenancy reulation.
28
Neither did the ob1ections as to the validity of #easures reulatin the issuance
of securities
2'
and public services
2:
prevail.
Aor it is to be re#e#bered that the liberty relied upon is not freedo# of the #ind, !hich occupies a preferred position,
nor freedo# of the person, but the liberty to contract, associated !ith business activities, !hich, as has been so
repeatedly announced, #ay be sub1ected, in the interest of the eneral !elfare under the police po!er, to restrictions
varied in character and !ide ranin in scope as lon as due process is observed. 4n Calalan v. 3illia#s,
26
this Court
found no ob1ection to an enact#ent li#itin the use of and traCc in the national roads and streets as aainst the
assertion that the e-ercise of such an authority a#ounted to an unla!ful interference !ith leiti#ate business and
abrid#ent of personal liberty. The opinion by ;ustice $aurel e-plains !hy such an aru#ent !as far fro# persuasive.
Thus= &4n enactin said la!, therefore, the National Asse#bly !as pro#pted by considerations of public convenience
and !elfare. 4t !as inspired by a desire to relieve conestion of traCc, !hich is, to say the least, a #enace to public
safety. Public !elfare, then, lies at the botto# of the enact#ent of said la!, and the state in order to pro#ote the
eneral !elfare #ay interfere !ith personal liberty, !ith property, and !ith business and occupations. Persons and
property #ay be sub1ected to all .inds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the eneral co#fort, health, and
prosperity of the state ... &
2<
The above doctrine, valid then and e*ually valid no!, constituted #ore than suCcient
1usti,cation for statutes curtailin the liberty en1oyed by business enterprises, !hether conducted by natural or
1uridical persons, to satisfy the needs of public !elfare.
?o it continues to be under the Republic. This Court has invariably iven the seal of approval to statutes intended to
i#prove the lot of tenants,
29
!ho thereafter !ere iven the option to transfor# their relationship !ith lando!ners to
one of lease, !hich rant of authority !as sustained in %9:8.
8(
Retail trade !as nationali+ed, the #easure receivin
1udicial approval as aainst due process ob1ection,
8%
a decision foreshado!ed earlier !ith the favorable action ta.en on
leislation rantin preference to Ailipino citi+ens in the lease of public #ar.et stalls.
80
4t is easily understandable !hy
the reulation of practice of #edicine>
82
li#itation of the hours of labor>
88
i#position of price control>
8'
re*uire#ent of
separation pay for one #onth
8:
as !ell as a social security sche#e
86
cannot be i#puned as unconstitutional. 3hile
not e-haustive, the above decisions #anifest in no certain ter#s the inherent diCculty of assailin reulatory
leislation based on alleed denial of due process.
4t !ould thus appear that unless this Court is prepared to overturn a doctrine so ,r#ly adhered to in a nu#ber of cases
notable for the unani#ity of their response to an ob1ection si#ilar to the one here raised, petitioner Alalayan cannot
prevail. Certainly, this Court is not prepared to ta.e that step. Aor in the face of a constitutional provision that allo!s
deprivation of liberty, includin liberty of contract, as lon as due process is observed, the alleed nullity of a
leislative act of this character can only be sho!n if in fact there is such a denial. The relevant *uestion then is, !hat
does due process re*uireG
The holdin of this Court in &rmita-'alate Hotel and 'otel Operators Asso. v. Cit( 'a(or,
8<
sheds so#e liht. Thus=
&There is no controllin and precise de,nition of due process. 4t furnishes thouh a standard to !hich overn#ental
action should confor# in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. 3hat
then is the standard of due process !hich #ust e-ist both as a procedural and as substantive re*uisite to free the
challened ordinance, or any overn#ental action for that #atter, fro# the i#putation of leal in,r#ity suCcient to
spell its doo#G 4t is responsiveness to the supre#acy of reason, obedience to the dictates of 1ustice. Neatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process re*uire#ent, oCcial action, to paraphrase
Cardo+o, #ust not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. "ue process is thus hostile to any
oCcial action #arred by lac. of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identi,ed as freedo# fro# arbitrariness. 4t is the
e#bodi#ent of the sportin idea of fair play. 4t e-acts fealty &to those strivins for 1ustice& and 1udes the act of
oCcialdo# of !hatever branch &in the liht of reason dra!n fro# considerations of fairness that reHect Dde#ocraticE
traditions of leal and political thouht.& 4t is not a narro! or &technical conception !ith ,-ed content unrelated to
ti#e, place and circu#stances,& decisions based on such a clause re*uirin a &close and perceptive in*uiry into
funda#ental principles of our society.& Iuestions of due process are not to be treated narro!ly or pedantically in
slavery to for# or phrases.& .
The due process ob1ection is souht to be bolstered by an alleation that such po!er conferred in the challened
leislation to li#it the net pro,ts to &%0) annually of DpetitionerJsE invest#ents plus t!o-#onth operatin e-penses&
has a con,scatory aspect. This aru#ent has the rin of futility. Precisely, in 'anila &lectric Co. v. )u*lic Service
Commission,
89
this Court in an opinion by the present Chief ;ustice upheld such a ,ure as aainst the contention that
it !as rather too enerous to the public utility. To spea. of it as con,scatory then is to e#ploy the lanuae by
hyperbole. Moreover, in the absence any evidence to de#onstrate the alleed con,scatory e/ect of the provision in
*uestion, there !ould be no basis for its nulli,cation, in vie! of the !ell-.no!n presu#ption of validity that every
statute has in its favor.
'(
4n the liht of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for yieldin assent to the clai# of petitioner that the
leislation assailed contravenes the due process clause. +,wph-+../t
2. 3hile not e-plicitly avo!ed by petitioner, there is the inti#ation that to apply the challened leislation to contracts
then in e-istence !ould be an infrine#ent of the constitutional prohibition aainst any la! i#pairin the obliation of
contracts.
'%
No such fear need be entertained. A citation fro# a %98( decision of this Court, in)anasinan
Transportation Co. v. )u*lic Service Commission,
'0
is particularly relevant. 4n the lanuae of ;ustice $aurel, spea.in
for the Court= &Kpon the other hand, statutes enacted for the reulation of public utilities, bein a proper e-ercise by
the state of its police po!er, are applicable not only to those public utilities co#in into e-istence after its passae,
but li.e!ise to those already, e-istence established and in operation.&
'2
?uch a doctrine !as follo!ed in the case of a
tenancy leislation, the Conress undoubtedly havin in #ind and not havin failed to ta.e notice &of the e-istence of
contracts& !hich stipulated a division of the crops on a '(-'( basis and therefore #ust have intended to reulate the
sa#e. There !as thus no i#pair#ent of an obliation of contract, such an enact#ent under the police po!er bein
re#edial in nature, the non-applicability of !hich to e-istin conditions !ould be self-defeatin in character.
'8
4n A*e v. %oster 0heeler Corp.,
''
;ustice Barrera, spea.in for the Court, too. note of the contention &that as the
contracts of e#ploy#ent !ere entered into at a ti#e !hen there !as no la! rantin the !or.ers said riht, the
application as to the# of the subse*uent enact#ent restorin the sa#e riht constitutes an i#pair#ent of their
contractual obliations.& Then he, #ade clear !hy the Court !as of a contrary vie! as, &the constitutional uaranty of
non-i#pair#ent ... is li#ited by the e-ercise of the police po!er of the ?tate, in the interest of public health, safe,
#orals and eneral !elfare.& Thus !as reaCr#ed !hat previously had been announced as the rule. ?uch a doctrine
!as reiterated early this year in )hilippine American Life 1nsurance Co. v. Auditor General,
':
!here this Court found no
ob1ection to the applicability of the Marin $a!,
'6
even if it be assu#ed that a reinsurance treaty !as already in
e-istence and had i#posed the correspondin obliation on the parties prior to its enact#ent.
This is not to say that in each and every case the invocation of the protection of the non-i#pair#ent clause !ould be
unavailin once the leislation co#plained of is sho!n to be an e-ercise of the police po!er. Bther!ise, that !ould
render nuatory the constitutional uarantee of non-i#pair#ent, and for that #atter both the e*ual protection and
due process clauses !hich e*ually serve to protect property rihts. @ere, as in other cases !here overn#ental
authority #ay trench upon property rihts, the process of balancin, ad1ust#ent or har#oni+ation is called for.
2utter v. &ste*an
'<
lends support to such an approach. 4n that leadin case, the continued operation and enforce#ent
of the Moratoriu# Act
'9
!hich allo!ed an eiht-year period of race for the pay#ent of pre-!ar obliations on the part
of debtors !ho su/ered as a conse*uence of 3orld 3ar 44 !as, in a %9'2 decision, held &unreasonable and oppressive,
and should not be proloned a #inute loner& for bein violative of the constitutional provision prohibitin the
i#pair#ent of the obliation of the contracts &and, therefore, ... should be declared null and void and !ithout
e/ect.&
:(
As of the date of its enact#ent in %98<, the police po!er could be relied upon to sustain its validity, in vie!
of the serious econo#ic condition faced by the country upon liberation and the state of penury that then aFicted a
reater portion of the Ailipino people. By %9'2 ho!ever, the Moratoriu# Act could be rihtfully considered as an
infrine#ent of the non-i#pair#ent clause, as the econo#y had in the #ean!hile considerably chaned for the better.
There is no clearer instance then of the process of har#oni+ation and balancin !hich is incu#bent upon the 1udiciary
to underta.e !henever a reulatory #easure under the police po!er is assailed as violative of constitucess or e*ual
protection, all of !hich are intended to safeuard property rihts. Three leadin decisions of the Knited ?tates
?upre#e Court, @o#e Buildin L $oan Astional uarantees, !hether of non-i#pair#ent, dueprosociation v.
#laisdell,
:%
3e**ia v. 3ew 4or!,
:0
and 3orman v. #altimore and Ohio 2ailroad Co.$
:2
spea. si#ilarly.
Even if, therefore, reliance be had on the non-i#pair#ent clause by petitioner and the process of ad1ust#ent or
har#oni+ation be underta.en to ascertain !hether the applicability of the statutory provision assailed to e-istin
contracts !ould run counter to such a uarantee, still the sa#e conclusion e#eres. There is a failure to #a.e out a
case for its invalidity.
3@EREABRE, there bein no sho!in that ?ection 2 of Republic Act No. 2(82 is unconstitutional, the decision of the
lo!er court, dis#issin the petition, is aCr#ed. 3ith costs aainst petitioner Alalayan.
Concepcion$ C.5.$ 2e(es$ 5.#.L.$ 6izon$ 'a!alintal$ 7aldivar$ Sanchez$ Castro and Aneles$ 55.$ concur.
4oo+"o+&
%
?ection 2, Republic Act No. 2(82, approved ;une %6, %9:%, entitled &An Act to Aurther A#end Co##on!ealth
Act Nu#bered Bne @undred T!enty, as A#ended by Republic Act Nu#bered T!enty ?i- @undred and Aorty
Bne.&
0
?ection 2 of Republic Act No. 2(82 reads thus>
&?EC. 2. The National Po!er Corporation is hereby authori+ed to represent and transact for the bene,t
and in behalf of the public consu#ers, and it shall in any contract for the supply of electric po!er to a
franchise holder re*uire as a condition that the franchise holder, if it receives at least ,fty percent of
its electric po!er and enery fro# the National Po!er Corporation, shall not reali+e a net pro,t of #ore
than t!elve percent annually of its invest#ents plus t!o-#onth operatin e-penses. The National
Po!er Corporation shall rene! all e-istin contracts !ith franchise holder for the supply of electric
po!er and enery, in order to ive e/ect to the provisions hereof. 4n the event that the net pro,t as
veri,ed by the Public ?ervice Co##ission should e-ceed the said t!elve percent, the public ?ervice
Co##ission shall order such e-cess to be returned pro rata to the custo#ers either in cash or as credit
for future electric bills.&
2
Article M4, ?ection 0%, par. %, Constitution of the Philippines. The constitutional provision reads thus= &No bill
!hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub1ect !hich shall be e-pressed in the title of
the bill.&
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 156371 No.&0%&* 11, 1993
T8E P8ILIPPINE JU3GES ASSOCIATION, )uly *&-. %y !+ P*&!)&"+, 9ERNAR3O P. A9ESAMIS, :!/&-P*&!)&"+
(o* L&#'l A;'!*, MARIANO M. UMALI, 3!*&/+o* (o* P'!#, M'<'+!, '") P''y, M&+*o M'"!l', AL4RE3O C.
4LORES, '") C$'!*0'" o( +$& Co00!++&& o" L&#'l A!), JESUS G. 9ERSAMIRA, P*&!)!"# Ju)#& o( +$&
R&#!o"'l T*!'l Cou*+, 9*'"/$ 86, =u&>o" C!+y '") 9*'"/$& 165, 167 '") 166, P'!#, M&+*o M'"!l',
*&-&/+!.&ly? +$& NATIONAL CON4E3ERATION O4 T8E JU3GES ASSOCIATION O4 T8E P8ILIPPINES,
/o0-o&) o( +$& METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JU3GES ASSOCIATION *&-. %y !+ P*&!)&"+. REINATO
=UILALA o( +$& MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, M'"!l'@ T8E MUNICIPAL JU3GES LEAGUE O4 T8E
P8ILIPPINES *&-. %y !+ P*&!)&"+, TOMAS G. TALA:ERA@ %y +$&0&l.& '") !" %&$'l( o( 'll +$& Ju)#& o(
+$& R&#!o"'l T*!'l '") S$'*!A' Cou*+, M&+*o-ol!+'" T*!'l Cou*+ '") Mu"!/!-'l Cou*+ +$*ou#$ou+ +$&
Cou"+*y, petitioners,
vs.
8ON. PETE PRA3O, !" $! /'-'/!+y ' S&/*&+'*y o( +$& 3&-'*+0&"+ o( T*'"-o*+'+!o" '")
Co00u"!/'+!o", JORGE :. SARMIENTO, !" $! /'-'/!+y ' Po+0'+&* G&"&*'l, '") +$& P8ILIPPINE
POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUB, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the ;udiciary. 4t is asserted by the petitioners that this
hall#ar. of republicanis# is i#paired by the statute and circular they are here challenin. The ?upre#e Court is itself
a/ected by these #easures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a 1ude at the sa#e ti#e.
Knder our syste# of overn#ent, ho!ever, it cannot inhibit itself and #ust rule upon the challene, because no other
oCce has the authority to do so. 3e shall therefore act upon this #atter not !ith oCciousness but in the dischare of
an unavoidable duty and, as al!ays, !ith detach#ent and fairness.
The #ain taret of this petition is ?ection 2' of R.A. No. 62'8 as i#ple#ented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
throuh its Circular No.
90-0<. These #easures !ithdra! the fran.in privilee fro# the ?upre#e Court, the Court of Appeals, the Reional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the $and Reistration Co##ission and its
Reisters of "eeds, alon !ith certain other overn#ent oCces.
The petitioners are #e#bers of the lo!er courts !ho feel that their oCcial functions as 1udes !ill be pre1udiced by
the above-na#ed #easures. The National $and Reistration Authority has ta.en co##on cause !ith the# insofar as
its o!n activities, such as sendin of re*uisite notices in reistration cases, a/ect 1udicial proceedins. Bn its #otion, it
has been allo!ed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 62'8 on the rounds that= 5%7 its title e#braces #ore than one
sub1ect and does not e-press its purposes> 507 it did not pass the re*uired readins in both @ouses of Conress and
printed copies of the bill in its ,nal for# !ere not distributed a#on the #e#bers before its passae> and 527 it is
discri#inatory and encroaches on the independence of the ;udiciary.
3e approach these issues !ith one i#portant principle in #ind, to !it, the presu#ption of the constitutionality of
statutes. The theory is that as the 1oint act of the $eislature and the E-ecutive, every statute is supposed to have ,rst
been carefully studied and deter#ined to be constitutional before it !as ,nally enacted. @ence, unless it is clearly
sho!n that it is constitutionally Ha!ed, the attac. aainst its validity #ust be re1ected and the la! itself upheld. To
doubt is to sustain.
4
3e consider ,rst the ob1ection based on Article M4, ?ec. 0:5l7, of the Constitution providin that &Every bill passed by
the Conress shall e#brace only one sub1ect !hich shall be e-pressed in the title thereof.&
The purposes of this rule are= 5%7 to prevent hode-pode or &lo-rollin& leislation> 507 to prevent surprise or fraud
upon the leislature by #eans of provisions in bills of !hich the title ives no inti#ation, and !hich #iht therefore be
overloo.ed and carelessly and unintentionally adopted> and 527 to fairly apprise the people, throuh such publication of
leislative proceedins as is usually #ade, of the sub1ect of leislation that is bein considered, in order that they #ay
have opportunity of bein heard thereon, by petition or other!ise, if they shall so desire.
1
4t is the sub#ission of the petitioners that ?ection 2' of R.A. No. 62'8 !hich !ithdre! the fran.in privilee fro# the
;udiciary is not e-pressed in the title of the la!, nor does it reHect its purposes.
R.A. No. 62'8 is entitled &An Act Creatin the Philippine Postal Corporation, "e,nin its Po!ers, Aunctions and
Responsibilities, Providin for Reulation of the 4ndustry and for Bther Purposes Connected There!ith.&
The ob1ectives of the la! are enu#erated in ?ection 2, !hich provides=
The ?tate shall pursue the follo!in ob1ectives of a nation!ide postal syste#=
a7 to enable the econo#ical and speedy transfer of #ail and other postal #atters, fro# sender to
addressee, !ith full reconition of their privacy or con,dentiality>
b7 to pro#ote international interchane, cooperation and understandin throuh the unha#pered Ho!
or e-chane of postal #atters bet!een nations>
c7 to cause or e/ect a !ide rane of postal services to cater to di/erent users and chanin needs,
includin but not li#ited to, philately, transfer of #onies and valuables, and the li.e>
d7 to ensure that suCcient revenues are enerated by and !ithin the industry to ,nance the overall
cost of providin the varied rane of postal delivery and #essenerial services as !ell as the
e-pansion and continuous upradin of service standards by the sa#e.
?ec. 2' of R.A. No. 62'8, !hich is the principal taret of the petition, reads as follo!s=
?ec. 2'. 2epealin Clause. N All acts, decrees, orders, e-ecutive orders, instructions, rules and
reulations or parts thereof inconsistent !ith the provisions of this Act are repealed or #odi,ed
accordinly.
All fran.in privilees authori+ed by la! are hereby repealed, e-cept those provided for under
Co##on!ealth Act No. 0:', Republic Acts Nu#bered :9, %<(, %8%8, 0(<6 and '('9. The Corporation
#ay continue the fran.in privilee under Circular No. 2' dated Bctober 08, %966 and that of the Mice
President, under such arrane#ents and conditions as #ay obviate abuse or unauthori+ed use thereof.
The petitionersJ contention is untenable. 3e do not aree that the title of the challened act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not re*uired to be an inde- to the body of the act, or to be as co#prehensive as to cover every
sinle detail of the #easure. 4t has been held that if the title fairly indicates the eneral sub1ect, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to #islead the leislature or the people, there is suCcient
co#pliance !ith the constitutional re*uire#ent.
2
To re*uire every end and #eans necessary for the acco#plish#ent of the eneral ob1ectives of the statute to be
e-pressed in its title !ould not only be unreasonable but !ould actually render leislation i#possible.
3
As has been
correctly e-plained=
The details of a leislative act need not be speci,cally stated in its title, but #atter er#ane to the
sub1ect as e-pressed in the title, and adopted to the acco#plish#ent of the ob1ect in vie!, #ay
properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the sa#e act the #achinery by !hich the
act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to re#ove obstacles in the !ay of
its e-ecution. 4f such #atters are properly connected !ith the sub1ect as e-pressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special #ention in the title 5?outhern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, %6(
Aed. 60'7.
This is particularly true of the repealin clause, on !hich Cooley !rites= &The repeal of a statute on a iven sub1ect is
properly connected !ith the sub1ect #atter of a ne! statute on the sa#e sub1ect> and therefore a repealin section in
the ne! statute is valid, not!ithstandin that the title is silent on the sub1ect. 4t !ould be diCcult to conceive of a
#atter #ore er#ane to an act and to the ob1ect to be acco#plished thereby than the repeal of previous leislations
connected there!ith.&
4
The reason is that !here a statute repeals a for#er la!, such repeal is the e/ect and not the sub1ect of the statute>
and it is the sub1ect, not the e/ect of a la!, !hich is re*uired to be brieHy e-pressed in its title.
6
As observed in one
case,
6
if the title of an act e#braces only one sub1ect, !e apprehend it !as never clai#ed that every other act !hich
repeals it or alters by i#plication #ust be #entioned in the title of the ne! act. Any such rule !ould be neither !ithin
the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
3e are convinced that the !ithdra!al of the fran.in privilee fro# so#e aencies is er#ane to the acco#plish#ent
of the principal ob1ective of R.A. No. 62'8, !hich is the creation of a #ore eCcient and e/ective postal service syste#.
Bur rulin is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealin clause, ?ection 2' did not have to be e-pressly included in the
title of the said la!.
44
The petitioners #aintain that the second pararaph of ?ec. 2' coverin the repeal of the fran.in privilee fro# the
petitioners and this Court under E.B. 0(6, P" %<<0 and P" 0: !as not included in the oriinal version of ?enate Bill No.
60( or @ouse Bill No. 80((. As this pararaph appeared only in the Conference Co##ittee Report, its addition, violates
Article M4, ?ec. 0:507 of the Constitution, readin as follo!s=
507 No bill passed by either @ouse shall beco#e a la! unless it has passed three readins on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its ,nal for# have been distributed to its Me#bers three days
before its passae, e-cept !hen the President certi,es to the necessity of its i##ediate enact#ent to
#eet a public cala#ity or e#erency. Kpon the last readin of a bill, no a#end#ent thereto shall be
allo!ed, and the vote thereon shall be ta.en i##ediately thereafter, and the (easand na(s entered in
the ;ournal.
The petitioners also invo.e ?ec. 68 of the Rules of the @ouse of Representatives, re*uirin that a#end#ent to any bill
!hen the @ouse and the ?enate shall have di/erences thereon #ay be settled by a conference co##ittee of both
cha#bers. They stress that ?ec. 2' !as never a sub1ect of any disaree#ent bet!een both @ouses and so the second
pararaph could not have been validly added as an a#end#ent.
These aru#ent are unacceptable.
3hile it is true that a conference co##ittee is the #echanis# for co#pro#isin di/erences bet!een the ?enate and
the @ouse, it is not li#ited in its 1urisdiction to this *uestion. 4ts broader function is described thus=
A conference co##ittee #ay, deal enerally !ith the sub1ect #atter or it #ay be li#ited to resolvin
the precise di/erences bet!een the t!o houses. Even !here the conference co##ittee is not by rule
li#ited in its 1urisdiction, leislative custo# severely li#its the freedo# !ith !hich ne! sub1ect #atter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference co##ittee produces
une-pected results, results beyond its #andate, These e-cursions occur even !here the rules i#pose
strict li#itations on conference co##ittee 1urisdiction. This is sy#pto#atic of the authoritarian po!er
of conference co##ittee 5"avies, $eislative $a! and Process= 4n a Nutshell, %9<: Ed., p.<%7.
4t is a #atter of record that the conference Co##ittee Report on the bill in *uestion !as returned to and duly
approved by both the ?enate and the @ouse of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill !as enrolled !ith its certi,cation
by ?enate President Neptali A. Oon+ales and ?pea.er Ra#on M. Mitra of the @ouse of Representatives as havin been
duly passed by both @ouses of Conress. 4t !as then presented to and approved by President Cora+on C. A*uino on
April 2, %990.
Knder the doctrine of separation po!ers, the Court #ay not in*uire beyond the certi,cation of the approval of a bill
fro# the presidin oCcers of Conress. Casco )hilippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
7
laid do!n the rule that the enrolled
bill, is conclusive upon the ;udiciary 5e-cept in #atters that have to be entered in the 1ournals li.e the (eas and na(son
the ,nal readin of the
bill7.
8
The 1ournals are the#selves also bindin on the ?upre#e Court, as !e held in the old 5but still valid7 case of 8.S.
vs. )ons,
9
!here !e e-plained the reason thus=
To in*uire into the veracity of the 1ournals of the Philippine leislature !hen they are, as !e have said,
clear and e-plicit, !ould be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the oranic la!s by !hich the
Philippine Oovern#ent !as brouht into e-istence, to invade a coordinate and independent
depart#ent of the Oovern#ent, and to interfere !ith the leiti#ate po!ers and functions, of the
$eislature.
Applyin these principles, !e shall decline to loo. into the petitionersJ chares that an a#end#ent !as #ade upon the
last readin of the bill that eventually beca#e R.A. No. 62'8 and that copies thereof in its ,nal for# !ere not
distributed a#on the #e#bers of each @ouse. Both the enrolled bill and the leislative 1ournals certify that the
#easure !as duly enacted i.e., in accordance !ith Article M4, ?ec. 0:507 of the Constitution. 3e are bound by such
oCcial assurances fro# a coordinate depart#ent of the overn#ent, to !hich !e o!e, at the very least, a beco#in
courtesy.
444
The third and #ost serious challene of the petitioners is based on the e*ual protection clause.
4t is alleed that R.A. No. 62'8 is discri#inatory because !hile !ithdra!in the fran.in privilee fro# the ;udiciary, it
retains the sa#e for the President of the Philippines, the Mice President of the Philippines> ?enators and Me#bers of
the @ouse of Representatives, the Co##ission on Elections> for#er Presidents of the Philippines> the National Census
and ?tatistics BCce> and the eneral public in the ,lin of co#plaints aainst public oCces and oCcers.
15
The respondents counter that there is no discri#ination because the la! is based on a valid classi,cation in
accordance !ith the e*ual protection clause. 4n fact, the fran.in privilee has been !ithdra!n not only fro# the
;udiciary but also the BCce of Adult Education, the 4nstitute of National $anuae> the Teleco##unications BCce> the
Philippine "eposit 4nsurance Corporation> the National @istorical Co##ission> the Ar#ed Aorces of the Philippines> the
Ar#ed Aorces of the Philippines $adies ?teerin Co##ittee> the City and Provincial Prosecutors> the Tanodbayan
5BCce of ?pecial Prosecutor7> the Pabataan Baranay> the Co##ission on the Ailipino $anuae> the Provincial and
City Assessors> and the National Council for the 3elfare of "isabled Persons.
11
The e*ual protection of the la!s is e#braced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discri#ination o/ends the
re*uire#ents of 1ustice and fair play. 4t has nonetheless been e#bodied in a separate clause in Article 444 ?ec. %., of the
Constitution to provide for a #ore, speci,c uaranty aainst any for# of undue favoritis# or hostility fro# the
overn#ent. Arbitrariness in eneral #ay be challened on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed parta.es of an un!arranted partiality or pre1udice, the sharper !eapon to cut it do!n is the e*ual
protection clause.
Accordin to a lon line of decisions, e*ual protection si#ply re*uires that all persons or thins si#ilarly situated
should be treated ali.e, both as to rihts conferred and responsibilities i#posed,
12
?i#ilar sub1ects, in other !ords,
should not be treated di/erently, so as to ive undue favor to so#e and un1ustly discri#inate aainst others.
The e*ual protection clause does not re*uire the universal application of the la!s on all persons or thins !ithout
distinction. This #iht in fact so#eti#es result in une*ual protection, as !here, for e-a#ple, a la! prohibitin #ature
boo.s to all persons, reardless of ae, !ould bene,t the #orals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. 3hat the
clause re*uires is e*uality a#on e*uals as deter#ined accordin to a valid classi,cation. By classi,cation is #eant
the roupin of persons or thins si#ilar to each other in certain particulars and di/erent fro# all others in these sa#e
particulars.
13
3hat is the reason for the rant of the fran.in privilee in the ,rst placeG 4s the fran.in privilee e-tended to the
President of the Philippines or the Co##ission on Elections or to for#er Presidents of the Philippines purely as
acourtes( fro# the la!#a.in bodyG 4s it o/ered because of the importance or status of the rantee or because of
its need for the privileeG Br have the rantees been chosen pell-#ell, as it !ere, !ithout any basis at all for the
selectionG
3e re1ect outriht the last con1ecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a !hole !as carefully deliberated upon,
by the political depart#ents before it !as ,nally enacted. There is reason to suspect, ho!ever, that not enouh care or
attention !as iven to its repealin clause, resultin in the un!ittin !ithdra!al of the fran.in privilee fro# the
;udiciary.
3e also do not believe that the basis of the classi,cation !as #ere courtesy, for it is uni#ainable that the political
depart#ents !ould have intended this serious sliht to the ;udiciary as the third of the #a1or and e*ual depart#ents
the overn#ent. The sa#e observations are #ade if the i#portance or status of the rantee !as the criterion used for
the e-tension of the fran.in privilee, !hich is en1oyed by the National Census and ?tatistics BCce and even so#e
private individuals but not the courts of 1ustice.
4n our vie!, the only acceptable reason for the rant of the fran.in privilee !as the perceived need of the rantee
for the acco##odation, !hich !ould 1ustify a !aiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of
providin for a s#oother Ho! of co##unication bet!een the overn#ent and the people.
Assu#in that basis, !e cannot understand !hy, of all the depart#ents of the overn#ent, it is the ;udiciary, that has
been denied the fran.in privilee. There is no *uestion that if there is any #a1or branch of the overn#ent that needs
the privilee, it is the ;udicial "epart#ent, as the respondents the#selves point out. Curiously, the respondents !ould
1ustify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the ;udiciary the fran.in privilee
!hile e-tendin it to others less deservin.
4n their Co##ent, the respondents point out that available data fro# the Postal ?ervice BCce sho! that fro# ;anuary
%9<< to ;une %990, the total volu#e of fran. #ails a#ounted to P9(,808,%6'.((. Bf this a#ount, fran. #ails fro# the
;udiciary and other aencies !hose functions include the service of 1udicial processes, such as the intervenor, the
"epart#ent of ;ustice and the BCce of the B#buds#an, a#ounted to P<:,8<%,6'9. Aran. #ails co#in fro#the
;udiciary a#ounted to P62,'68,<:8.((, and those co#in fro# the petitioners reached the total a#ount of
P:(,99%,82%.((. The respondentsJ conclusion is that because of this considerable volu#e of #ail fro# the ;udiciary,
the fran.in privilee #ust be !ithdra!n fro# it.
The aru#ent is self-defeatin. The respondents are in e/ect sayin that the fran.in privilee should be e-tended
only to those !ho do not need it very #uch, if at all, 5li.e the !ido!s of for#er Presidents7 but not to those !ho need
it badly 5especially the courts of 1ustice7. 4t is li.e sayin that a person #ay be allo!ed cos#etic surery althouh it is
not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
4f the proble# of the respondents is the loss of revenues fro# the fran.in privilee, the re#edy, it see#s to us, is to
!ithdra! it altoether fro# all aencies of overn#ent, includin those !ho do not need it. The proble# is not solved
by retainin it for so#e and !ithdra!in it fro# others, especially !here there is no substantial distinction bet!een
those favored, !hich #ay or #ay not need it at all, and the ;udiciary, !hich de,nitely needs it. The proble# is not
solved by violatin the Constitution.
4n lu#pin the ;udiciary !ith the other oCces fro# !hich the fran.in privilee has been !ithdra!n, ?ection 2' has
placed the courts of 1ustice in a cateory to !hich it does not belon. 4f it reconi+es the need of the President of the
Philippines and the #e#bers of Conress for the fran.in privilee, there is no reason !hy it should not reconi+e a
si#ilar and in fact reater need on the part of the ;udiciary for such privilee. 3hile !e #ay appreciate the !ithdra!al
of the fran.in privilee fro# the Ar#ed Aorces of the Philippines $adies ?teerin Co##ittee, !e fail to understand
!hy the ?upre#e Court should be si#ilarly treated as that Co##ittee. And !hile !e #ay concede the need of the
National Census and ?tatistics BCce for the fran.in privilee, !e are intriued that a si#ilar if not reater need is not
reconi+ed in the courts of 1ustice.
5Bn second thouht, there does not see# to be any 1usti,able need for !ithdra!in the privilee fro# the Ar#ed
Aorces of the Philippines $adies ?teerin Co##ittee, !hich, li.e for#er Presidents of the Philippines or their !ido!s,
does not send as #uch fran. #ail as the ;udiciary.7
4t is !orth observin that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a overn#ent-controlled corporation, !as created and is
e-pected to operate for the purpose of pro#otin the public service. 3hile it #ay have been established pri#arily for
private ain, it cannot e-cuse itself fro# perfor#in certain functions for the bene,t of the public in e-chane for the
franchise e-tended to it by the overn#ent and the #any advantaes it en1oys under its charter.
14
A#on the services
it should be prepared to e-tend is free carriae of #ail for certain oCces of the overn#ent that need the fran.in
privilee in the dischare of their o!n public functions.
3e also note that under ?ection 9 of the la!, the Corporation is capitali+ed at P%( billion pesos, '') of !hich is
supplied by the Oovern#ent, and that it derives substantial revenues fro# the sources enu#erated in ?ection %(, on
top of the e-e#ptions it en1oys. 4t is not li.ely that the retention of the fran.in privilee of the ;udiciary !ill cripple the
Corporation.
At this ti#e !hen the ;udiciary is bein faulted for the delay in the ad#inistration of 1ustice, the !ithdra!al fro# it of
the fran.in privilee can only further deepen this serious proble#. The volu#e of 1udicial #ail, as e#phasi+ed by the
respondents the#selves, should stress the dependence of the courts of 1ustice on the postal service for
co##unicatin !ith la!yers and litiants as part of the 1udicial process. The ;udiciary has the lo!est appropriation in
the national budet co#pared to the $eislative and E-ecutive "epart#ents> of the P2(9 billion budeted for %992,
only .<8), or less than %), is alloted for the 1udiciary. 4t should not be hard to i#aine the increased diCculties of our
courts if they have to aC- a purchased sta#p to every process they send in the dischare of their 1udicial functions.
3e are unable to aree !ith the respondents that ?ection 2' of R.A. No. 62'8 represents a valid e-ercise of discretion
by the $eislature under the police po!er. Bn the contrary, !e ,nd its repealin clause to be a discri#inatory provision
that denies the ;udiciary the e*ual protection of the la!s uaranteed for all persons or thins si#ilarly situated. The
distinction #ade by the la! is super,cial. 4t is not based on substantial distinctions that #a.e real di/erences bet!een
the ;udiciary and the rantees of the fran.in privilee.
This is not a *uestion of !isdo# or po!er into !hich the ;udiciary #ay not intrude. 4t is a #atter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and po!er to correct.
4M
4n su#, !e sustain R.A. No. 62'8 aainst the attac. that its sub1ect is not e-pressed in its title and that it !as not
passed in accordance !ith the prescribed procedure. @o!ever, !e annul ?ection 2' of the la! as violative of Article 2,
?ec. %, of the Constitution providin that no person shall &be deprived of the e*ual protection of la!s.&
3e arrive at these conclusions !ith a full a!areness of the criticis# it is certain to provo.e. 3hile rulin aainst the
discri#ination in this case, !e #ay ourselves be accused of si#ilar discri#ination throuh the e-ercise of our ulti#ate
po!er in our o!n favor. This is inevitable. Criticis# of 1udicial conduct, ho!ever undeserved, is a fact of life in the
political syste# that !e are prepared to accept.. As 1udes, !e cannot debate !ith our detractors. 3e can only decide
the cases before us as la! i#poses on us the duty to be fair and our o!n conscience ives us the liht to be riht.
ACCBR"4NO$Q, the petition is partially ORANTE" and ?ection 2' of R.A. No. 62'8 is declared KNCBN?T4TKT4BNA$.
Circular No. 90-0< is ?ET A?4"E insofar as it !ithdra!s the fran.in privilee fro# the ?upre#e Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Reional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National $and Reistration Authority and its
Reister of "eeds to all of !hich oCces the said privilee shall be RE?TBRE". The te#porary restrainin order dated
;une 0, %990, is #ade per#anent.
?B BR"ERE".
3arvasa$ C.5.$ %eliciano$ )adilla$ #idin$ 2ealado$ 6avide$ 5r.$ 2omero$ 3ocon$ 'elo$ 9uiason$ )uno and :itu$ 55.$ concur.
#ellosillo$ 5.$ is on leave.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28589 O/+o%&* 26, 1967
9ARA LI3ASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Sunta( for petitioner.
#arrios and %ule for respondent.
SANC8EB, J.:
The *uestion initially presented to the Co##ission on Elections,
%
is this= 4s Republic Act 869(, !hich is entitled &An Act
Creatin the Municipality of "ianaton in the Province of $anao del ?ur&, but !hich includes barrios located in another
province N Cotabato N to be spared fro# attac. planted upon the constitutional #andate that &No bill !hich #ay be
enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub1ect !hich shall be e-pressed in the title of the bill&G Co#elecJs
ans!er is in the aCr#ative. B/shoot is the present oriinal petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Bn ;une %<, %9::, the Chief E-ecutive sined into la! @ouse Bill %086, .no!n as Republic Act 869(, no! in dispute.
The body of the statute, reproduced in haec ver*a, reads=
?ec. %. Barrios Toai, Madalu#, Bayana, $an.on, ?ara.an, Pat-bo, "ia.apan, Maabo, Tabanao, Tion.o,
Colodan, Paba#a.a!an, Papataan, Bonabon, Aipan, "ao!an, Ba.i.is, Bunabun, $osain, Mati#os and
Maolatun, in the Municipalities of Buti and Balabaan, Province of $anao del ?ur, are separated fro# said
#unicipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent #unicipality of the sa#e province to be .no!n
as the Municipality of "ianaton, Province of $anao del ?ur. The seat of overn#ent of the #unicipality shall be
in Toai.
?ec. 0. The ,rst #ayor, vice-#ayor and councilors of the ne! #unicipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred si-ty-seven eneral elections for local oCcials.
?ec. 2. This Act shall ta.e e/ect upon its approval.
4t ca#e to liht later that barrios Toai and Madalu# 1ust #entioned are !ithin the #unicipality of #uldon,)rovince of
Cota*ato, and that Bayana, $an.on, ?ara.an, Pat-bo, "ia.apan, Maabo, Tabanao, Tion.o, Colodan and
Paba#a.a!an are parts and parcel of another #unicipality, the #unicipality of )aran, also in the)rovince of
Cota*ato and not of $anao del ?ur.
Pro#pted by the co#in elections, Co#elec adopted its resolution of Auust %', %9:6, the pertinent portions of !hich
are=
Aor purposes of establish#ent of precincts, reistration of voters and for other election purposes, the
Co##ission RE?B$ME" that pursuant to RA 869(, the ne! #unicipality of "ianaton, $anao del ?ur shall
co#prise the barrios of Papataan, Bonabon, Aipan, "ao!an, Ba.i.is, Bunabun, $osain, Mati#os, and
Maolatun situated in the #unicipality of Balabaan, $anao del ?ur, the barrios of Toai and Madalu#
situated in the #unicipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayana, $an.on, ?ara.an, Pat-bo,
"ia.apan, Maabo, Tabanao, Tion.o, Colodan and Paba#a.a!an situated in the #unicipality of Paran,
also of Cotabato.
"oubtless, as the statute stands, t!elve barrios N in t!o #unicipalities in the province of Cotabato N are transferred
to the province of $anao del ?ur. This brouht about a chane in the boundaries of the t!o provinces.
Apprised of this develop#ent, on ?epte#ber 6, %9:6, the BCce of the President, throuh the Assistant E-ecutive
?ecretary, reco##ended to Co#elec that the operation of the statute be suspended until &clari,ed by correctin
leislation.&
Co#elec, by resolution of ?epte#ber 0(, %9:6, stood by its o!n interpretation, declared that the statute &should be
i#ple#ented unless declared unconstitutional by the ?upre#e Court.&
This triered the present oriinal action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara $idasan, a resident and ta-payer of the
detached portion of Paran, Cotabato, and a *uali,ed voter for the %9:6 elections. @e prays that Republic Act 869( be
declared unconstitutional> and that Co#elecJs resolutions of Auust %', %9:6 and ?epte#ber 0(, %9:6 i#ple#entin
the sa#e for electoral purposes, be nulli,ed.
%. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional re*uire#ent aforestated, that &DnEo bill !hich #ay be enacted into la! shall
e#brace #ore than one sub1ect !hich shall be e-pressed in the title of the bill.&
0
4t #ay be !ell to state, riht at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual li#itations upon leislative
po!er. %irst. Conress is to refrain fro# conlo#eration, under one statute, of heteroeneous sub1ects. Second. The
title of the bill is to be couched in a lanuae suCcient to notify the leislators and the public and those concerned of
the i#port of the sinle sub1ect thereof.
Bf relevance here is the second directive. The sub1ect of the statute #ust be &e-pressed in the title& of the bill. This
constitutional re*uire#ent &breathes the spirit of co##and.&
2
Co#pliance is i#perative, iven the fact that the
Constitution does not e-act of Conress the obliation to read durin its deliberations the entire te-t of the bill. 4n fact,
in the case of @ouse Bill %086, !hich beca#e Republic Act 869(, only its title !as read fro# its introduction to its ,nal
approval in the @ouse of Representatives
8
!here the bill, bein of local application, oriinated.
'
Bf course, the Constitution does not re*uire Conress to e#ploy in the title of an enact#ent, lanuae of such
precision as to #irror, fully inde- or cataloue all the contents and the #inute details therein. 4t suCces if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional de#and that it infor# the leislators, the persons interested in the
sub1ect of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and conse*uences of the proposed la! and its operation. And
this, to lead the# to in*uire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the sa#e, ta.e appropriate action thereon, and,
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the leislators.
:
4n our tas. of ascertainin !hether or not the title of a statute confor#s !ith the constitutional re*uire#ent, the
follo!in, !e believe, #ay be ta.en as uidelines=
The test of the suCciency of a title is !hether or not it is #isleadin> and, !hich technical accuracy is not
essential, and the sub1ect need not be stated in e-press ter#s !here it is clearly inferable fro# the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that the averae person readin it would not *e informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on in;uir( as to its contents$ or which is misleadin$ either in referrin to or indicatin
one su*<ect where another or di=erent one is reall( em*raced in the act$ or in omittin an( e>pression or
indication of the real su*<ect or scope of the act$ is *ad.
--- --- ---
4n deter#inin suCciency of particular title its su*stance rather than its form should *e considered$ and the
purpose of the constitutional re;uirement$ of ivin notice to all persons interested$ should *e !ept in mind *(
the court.
6
3ith the foreoin principles at hand, !e ta.e a hard loo. at the disputed statute. The title N &An Act Creatin the
Municipality of "ianaton, in the )rovince of Lanao del Sur&
<
N pro1ects the i#pression that solely the province of $anao
del ?ur is a/ected by the creation of "ianaton. Not the slihtest inti#ation is there that co##unities in the ad1acent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this ne! $anao del ?ur to!n. The phrase &in the Province of $anao del ?ur,&
read !ithout subtlety or contortion, #a.es the title #isleadin, deceptive. Aor, the .no!n fact is that the leislation
has a t!o-proned purpose co#bined in one statute= 5%7 it creates the #unicipality of "ianaton purportedly fro#
t!enty-one barrios in the to!ns of Buti and Balabaan, both in the province of $anao del ?ur> and 507 it also
dis#e#bers t!o #unicipalities in Cotabato, a province di/erent fro# $anao del ?ur.
The baneful e/ect of the defective title here presented is not so diCcult to perceive. ?uch title did not infor# the
#e#bers of Conress as to the full i#pact of the la!> it did not apprise the people in the to!ns of Buldon and Paran
in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is bein ta.en a!ay fro# their to!ns and
province and added to the ad1acent Province of $anao del ?ur> it .ept the public in the dar. as to !hat to!ns and
provinces !ere actually a/ected by the bill. These are the pressures !hich heavily !eih aainst the constitutionality
of Republic Act 869(.
RespondentJs stance is that the chane in boundaries of the t!o provinces resultin in &the substantial di#inution of
territorial li#its& of Cotabato province is &#erely the incidental leal results of the de,nition of the boundary& of the
#unicipality of "ianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are ta.en a!ay &need not
be e-pressed in the title of the la!.& This posture N !e #ust say N but e#phasi+es the error of constitutional
di#ensions in !ritin do!n the title of the bill. Transfer of a si+eable portion of territory fro# one province to another
of necessity involves reduction of area, population and inco#e of the ,rst and the correspondin increase of those of
the other. This is as i#portant as the creation of a #unicipality. And yet, the title did not reHect this fact.
Respondent as.s us to read %elwa vs. Salas, $-%:'%%, Bctober 09, %9::, as controllin here. The %elwa case is not in
focus. Aor there, the title of the Act 5Republic Act 8:9'7 reads= &An Act Creatin the Provinces of Benuet, Mountain
Province, 4fuao, and Palina-Apayao.& That title !as assailed as unconstitutional upon the aver#ent that the
provisions of the la! 5?ection, < thereof7 in reference to the elective oCcials of the provinces thus created, !ere not
set forth in the title of the bill. 3e there ruled that this pretense is devoid of #erit &for, surely, an Act creatin said
provinces #ust be e-pected to provide for the oCcers !ho shall run the a/airs thereof& N !hich is &#anifestly
er#ane to the sub1ect& of the leislation, as set forth in its title. The statute no! before us stands altoether on a
di/erent footin. The lu#pin toether of barrios in ad1acent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a
natural nor loical conse*uence of the creation of the ne! #unicipality of "ianaton. A chane of boundaries of the t!o
provinces #ay be #ade !ithout necessarily creatin a ne! #unicipality and vice versa.
As !e canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is dra!n to Hume vs. :illae of %ruitport, 0%9 N3 :8<, :89.
There, the statute in controversy bears the title &An Act to 4ncorporate the Millae of Aruitport, in the County of
Mus.eon.& The statute, ho!ever, in its section % reads= &The people of the state of Michian enact, that the follo!in
described territory in the counties of Mus.eon and Btta!a Michian, to !it= . . . be, and the sa#e is hereby
constituted a villae corporate, by the na#e of the Millae of Aruitport.& This statute !as challened as void by
plainti/, a resident of Btta!a county, in an action to restraint the Millae fro# e-ercisin 1urisdiction and control,
includin ta-in his lands. Plainti/ based his clai# on ?ection 0(, Article 4M of the Michian ?tate Constitution, !hich
reads= &No la! shall e#brace #ore than one ob1ect, !hich shall be e-pressed in its title.& The Circuit Court decree
voided the statute and defendant appealed. The ?upre#e Court of Michian voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The
follo!in, said in Hume, #ay !ell apply to this case=
4t #ay be that !ords, &An act to incorporate the villae of Aruitport,& !ould have been a suCcient title, and
that the !ords, &in the county of Mus.eon& !ere unnecessary> but !e do not aree !ith appellant that the
!ords last *uoted #ay, for that reason, be disrearded as surplusae.
. . . Knder the uise of discardin surplusae, a court cannot re1ect a part of the title of an act for the purpose
of savin the act. ?ch#al+ vs. 3oody, ': N.;. E*. :89, 29 A. '29.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to ?challene the attention of those a=ected *( the act to its
provisions.? ?avins Ban. vs. ?tate of Michian, 00< Mich. 2%:, 0(( N3 0:0.
The title here is restrictive. 1t restricts the operation of the act of 'us!eon count(. The act oes *e(ond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. 0ool($ supra@ ?The title is erroneous in the worst deree$ for it is
misleadin.?
9
?i#ilar statutes ai#ed at chanin boundaries of political subdivisions, !hich leislative purpose is not e-pressed in
the title, !ere li.e!ise declared unconstitutional.&
%(
3e rule that Republic Act 869( is null and void.
0. ?uestion !as #ade that Republic Act 869( #ay still be salvaed !ith reference to the nine barrios in the
#unicipalities of Buti and Balabaan in $anao del ?ur, !ith the #ere nulli,cation of the portion thereof !hich too.
a!ay the t!elve barrios in the #unicipalities of Buldon and Paran in the other province of Cotabato. The reasonin
advocated is that the li#ited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of $anao del ?ur.
3e are not un#indful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of lon standin, that !here a portion of a statute is
rendered unconstitutional and the re#ainder valid, the parts !ill be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld.
Blac., ho!ever, ives the e-ception to this rule, thus=
. . . But !hen the parts of the statute are so #utually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
induce#ents, or co#pensations for each other, as to !arrant a belief that the leislature intended the# as a
!hole, and that if all could not be carried into e/ect, the leislature !ould not pass the residue independently,
then, if so#e parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions !hich are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected, #ust fall !ith the#,
%%
4n substantially si#ilar lanuae, the sa#e e-ception is reconi+ed in the 1urisprudence of this Court, thus=
The eneral rule is that !here part of a statute is void, as repunant to the Branic $a!, !hile another part is
valid, the valid portion if separa*le fro# the invalid, #ay stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the
valid portion #ust be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Leislature
would have enacted it *( itself if the( had supposed that the( could not constitutionall( enact the other. . .
Enouh #ust re#ain to #a.e a co#plete, intelliible, and valid statute, !hich carries out the leislative intent.
. . . The lanuae used in the invalid part of the statute can have no leal force or eCcacy for any purpose
!hatever, and what remains must e>press the leislative will independentl( of the void part$ since the court
has no power to leislate, . . . .
%0
Could !e indule in the assu#ption that Conress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine
*arrios in the to!ns of Buti and Balabaan in $anao del ?ur into the to!n of "ianaton, if the twelve *arrios in the
to!ns of Buldon and Paran, Cotabato !ere to be e-cluded therefro#G The ans!er #ust be in the neative.
Municipal corporations perfor# t!in functions. %irstl(. They serve as an instru#entality of the ?tate in carryin out the
functions of overn#ent. Secondl(. They act as an aency of the co##unity in the ad#inistration of local a/airs. 4t is
in the latter character that they are a separate entity actin for their o!n purposes and not a subdivision of the
?tate.
%2
Conse*uently, several factors co#e to the fore in the consideration of !hether a roup of barrios is capable of
#aintainin itself as an independent #unicipality. A#onst these are population, territory, and inco#e. 4t !as
apparently these sa#e factors !hich induced the !ritin out of @ouse Bill %086 creatin the to!n of "ianaton.
?pea.in of the oriinal twent(-one *arrios !hich co#prise the ne! #unicipality, the e-planatory note to @ouse Bill
%086, no! Republic Act 869(, reads=
The territory is no! a proressive co##unity> the areate population is lare> and the collective inco#e is
suCcient to #aintain an independent #unicipality.
This bill, if enacted into la!, !ill enable the inhabitants concerned to overn the#selves and en1oy the
blessins of #unicipal autono#y.
3hen the foreoin bill !as presented in Conress, un*uestionably, the totality of the t!enty-one barrios N not nine
barrios N !as in the #ind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into la!, states that the seat of the overn#ent is in Toai, !hich is a barrio in the #unicipality of
Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a nu#ber of *uestions, thus= Could the observations as to
proressive co##unity, lare areate population, collective inco#e suCcient to #aintain an independent
#unicipality, still apply to a #otley roup of only nine barrios out of the t!enty-oneG 4s it fair to assu#e that the
inhabitants of the said re#ainin barrios !ould have areed that they be for#ed into a #unicipality, !hat !ith the
conse*uent duties and liabilities of an independent #unicipal corporationG Could they stand on their o!n feet !ith the
inco#e to be derived in their co##unityG @o! about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obliationsG
This Court #ay not supply the ans!er to any of these disturbin *uestions. And yet, to re#ain deaf to these proble#s,
or to ans!er the# in the neative and still clin to the rule on separability, !e are afraid, is to i#pute to Conress an
undeclared !ill. 3ith the .no!n pre#ise that "ianaton !as created upon the basic considerations of proressive
co##unity, lare areate population and suCcient inco#e, !e #ay not no! say that Conress intended to create
"ianaton !ith only nine N of the oriinal t!enty-one N barrios, !ith a seat of overn#ent still left to be con1ectured.
Aor, this unduly stretches 1udicial interpretation of conressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to
pass the line !hich circu#scribes the 1udiciary and tread on leislative pre#ises. Payin due respect to the traditional
separation of po!ers, !e #ay not no! #elt and recast Republic Act 869( to read a "ianaton to!n of nine instead of
the oriinally intended t!enty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a to!n at all, it is the function
of Conress, not of this Court, to spell out that conressional !ill.
Republic Act 869( is thus indivisible, and it is accordinly null and void in its totality.
%8
2. There re#ains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, na#ely, that petitioner has no substantial leal
interest adversely a/ected by the i#ple#entation of Republic Act 869(. ?tated di/erently, respondentJs pose is that
petitioner is not the real party in interest.
@ere the validity of a statute is challened on the round that it violates the constitutional re*uire#ent that the
sub1ect of the bill be e-pressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hines on !hether petitionerJs substantial rihts
or interests are i#paired by lac. of noti,cation in the title that the barrio in Paran, Cotabato, !here he is residin has
been transferred to a di/erent provincial hee#ony.
The riht of every citi+en, ta-payer and voter of a co##unity a/ected by leislation creatin a to!n to ascertain that
the la! so created is not dis#e#berin his place of residence &in accordance !ith the Constitution& is reconi+ed in
this 1urisdiction.
%'
Petitioner is a *uali,ed voter. @e e-pects to vote in the %9:6 elections. @is riht to vote in his o!n barrio before it !as
anne-ed to a ne! to!n is a/ected. @e #ay not !ant, as is the case here, to vote in a to!n di/erent fro# his actual
residence. @e #ay not desire to be considered a part of hitherto di/erent co##unities !hich are fanned into the ne!
to!n> he #ay prefer to re#ain in the place !here he is and as it !as constituted, and continue to en1oy the rihts and
bene,ts he ac*uired therein. @e #ay not even .no! the candidates of the ne! to!n> he #ay e-press a lac. of desire
to vote for anyone of the#> he #ay feel that his vote should be cast for the oCcials in the to!n before
dis#e#ber#ent. ?ince by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill #ust be sho!n in its title for the bene,t,
a#onst others, of the co##unity a/ected thereby,
%:
it stands to reason to say that !hen the constitutional riht to
vote on the part of any citi+en of that co##unity is a/ected, he #ay beco#e a suitor to challene the constitutionality
of the Act as passed by Conress.
Aor the reasons iven, !e vote to declare Republic Act 869( null and void, and to prohibit respondent Co##ission fro#
i#ple#entin the sa#e for electoral purposes.
No costs allo!ed. ?o ordered.
Concepcion$ C.5.$ 2e(es$ 5.#.L.$ 6izon$ 'a!alintal$ #enzon$ 5.).$ 7aldivar$ Castro and Aneles$ 55.$ concur.
?eparate Bpinions
4ERNAN3O, J., dissentin=
3ith reret and !ith due reconition of the #erit of the opinion of the Court, 4 ,nd #yself unable to ive #y assent.
@ence these fe! !ords to e-press #y stand.
Republic Act No. 869( deals !ith one sub1ect #atter, the creation of the #unicipality of "ianaton in the province of
$anao del ?ur. The title #a.es evident !hat is the sub1ect #atter of such an enact#ent. The #ere fact that in the body
of such statute barrios found in t!o other #unicipalities of another province !ere included does not of itself suCce for
a ,ndin of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invo.ed. At the #ost, the statute to be free fro# the
insubstantial doubts about its validity #ust be construed as not includin the barrios, located not in the #unicipalities
of Buti and Balabaan, $anao del ?ur, but in Paran and Baldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional re*uire#ent is that no bill !hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub1ect
!hich shall be e-pressed in the title of the bill.
%
This provision is si#ilar to those found in the Constitution of #any
A#erican ?tates. 4t is ai#ed aainst the evils, of the so-called o#nibus bills, and lo-rollin leislation, and aainst
surreptitious or unconsidered enact#ents.
0
3here the sub1ect of a bill is li#ited to a particular #atter, the #e#bers of
the leislature as !ell as the people should be infor#ed of the sub1ect of proposed leislative #easures. This
constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in leislation, a rider bein a provision not er#ane to
the sub1ect #atter of the bill.
4t is not to be narro!ly construed thouh as to cripple or i#pede proper leislation. The construction #ust be
reasonable and not technical. 4t is suCcient if the title be co#prehensive enouh reasonably to include the eneral
ob1ect !hich the statute see.s to e/ect !ithout e-pressin each and every end and #eans necessary for the
acco#plish#ent of that ob1ect. Mere details need not be set forth. The leislature is not re*uired to #a.e the title of
the act a co#plete inde- of its contents. The constitutional provision is satis,ed if all parts of an act !hich relates to its
sub1ect ,nd e-pression in its title.
2
The ,rst decision of this Court, after the establish#ent of the Co##on!ealth of the Philippines, in %92<, construin a
provision of this nature, Government v. Hon!on " Shanhai #an!,
8
held that the inclusion of ?ection %% of Act No.
8((6, the Reorani+ation $a!, providin for the #ode in !hich the total annual e-penses of the Bureau of Ban.in
#ay be rei#bursed throuh assess#ent levied upon all ban.in institutions sub1ect to inspection by the Ban.
Co##issioner !as not violative of such a re*uire#ent in the ;ones $a!, the previous oranic act. ;ustice $aurel,
ho!ever, viorously dissented, his vie! bein that !hile the #ain sub1ect of the act !as reorani+ation, the provision
assailed did not deal !ith reorani+ation but !ith ta-ation. 3hile the case ofGovernment vs. Hon!on " Shanhai
#an! !as decided by a bare #a1ority of four 1ustices aainst three, the present trend see#s to be that the
constitutional re*uire#ent is to be iven the liberal test as indicated in the #a1ority opinion penned by ;ustice Abad
?antos, and not the strict test as desired by the #a1ority headed by ;ustice $aurel.
?uch a trend has been reHected in subse*uent decisions beinnin !ith Sumulon v. Commission on &lections,
'
up to
and includin %elwa vs. Salas, a %9:: decision,
:
the opinion co#in fro# ;ustice Concepcion.
4t is true of course that in )hilconsa v. Gimenez,
6
one of the rounds on !hich the invalidity of Republic Act No. 2<2:
!as predicated !as the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retire#ent Act for senators and
representatives !as entitled &AN ACT AMEN"4NO ?KB-?ECT4BN 5c7, ?ECT4BN T3E$ME BA CBMMBN3EA$T@ ACT
NKMBERE" BNE @KN"RE" E4O@TQ-?4R, A? AMEN"E" BQ REPKB$4C ACT NKMBERE" T@4RTQ @KN"RE" N4NETQ-?4R.& As
!e noted, the pararaph in Republic Act No. 2<2: dee#ed ob1ectionable &refers to #e#bers of Conress and to
elective oCcers thereof !ho are not #e#bers of the Oovern#ent ?ervice 4nsurance ?yste#. To provide retire#ent
bene,ts, therefore, for these oCcials, !ould relate to a sub1ect #atter !hich is not er#ane to Co##on!ealth Act No.
%<:. 4n other !ords, this portion of the a#end#ent 5 re retire#ent bene,ts for Me#bers of Conress and appointive
oCcers, such as the ?ecretary and ?ereants-at-ar#s for each house7 is not related in any #anner to the sub1ect of
Co##on!ealth Act No. %<: establishin the Oovern#ent ?ervice 4nsurance ?yste# and !hich provides for both
retire#ent and insurance bene,ts to its #e#bers.& Nonetheless our opinion !as careful to note that there !as no
abandon#ent of the principle of liberality. Thus= &!e are not un#indful of the fact that there has been a eneral
disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision !ith reference to the sub1ect and title of the Act,
liberally.&
4t !ould follo! therefore that the challened leislation Republic Act No. 869( is not susceptible to the indict#ent that
the constitutional re*uire#ent as to leislation havin only one sub1ect !hich should be e-pressed in his title !as not
#et. The sub1ect !as the creation of the #unicipality of "ianaton. That !as e#bodied in the title.
4t is in the liht of the afore#entioned 1udicial decisions of this Court, so#e of the opinions co#in fro# 1urists
illustrious for their #astery of constitutional la! and their ac.no!leded erudition, that, !ith all due respect, 4 ,nd the
citation fro# Corpus 5uris Secundum, unnecessary and far fro# persuasive. The ?tate decisions cited, 4 do not dee#
controllin, as the freedo# of this Court to accept or re1ect doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.
3herein does the !ea.ness of the statute lie thenG To repeat, several barrios of t!o #unicipalities outside $anao del
?ur !ere included in the #unicipality of "ianaton of that province. That itself !ould not have iven rise to a
constitutional *uestion considerin the broad, !ell-hih plenary po!ers possessed by Conress to alter provincial and
#unicipal boundaries. 3hat 1usti,ed resort to this Court !as the conressional failure to #a.e e-plicit that such
barrios in t!o #unicipalities located in Cotabato !ould thereafter for# part of the ne!ly created #unicipality of
"ianaton, $anao del ?ur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it #ust be construed as to e-clude fro# "ianaton all of such
barrios #entioned in Republic Act No. 869( found in #unicipalities outside $anao del ?ur. As thus interpreted, the
statute can #eet the test of the #ost riid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the leislative intent. 3hat !as
created !as a ne! #unicipality fro# barrios na#ed as found in $anao del ?ur. This construction assures precisely that.
This #ode of interpretin Republic Act No. 869( ,nds support in basic principles underlyin precedents, !hich if not
precisely controllin, have a persuasive rin. 4n 2adiowealth v. Areado,
<
certain provisions of the Ad#inistrative
Code !ere interpreted and iven a &construction !hich !ould be #ore in har#ony !ith the tenets of the funda#ental
la!.& 4n Sanchez v. L(on Construction,
9
this Court had a si#ilar rulin= &Article 2(0 of the Code of Co##erce #ust be
applied in consonance !ith Dthe relevantE provisions of our Constitution.& The above principle ained acceptance at a
#uch earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a %9%2 decision, 4n re OuariSa=
%(
&4n construin a statute
enacted by the Philippine Co##ission !e dee# it our duty not to ive it a construction !hich !ould be repunant to
an Act of Conress, if the lanuae of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conHict !ith the
hiher la!. 4n doin so, !e thin. !e should not hesitate to disreard contentions touchin the apparent intention of the
leislator !hich !ould lead to the conclusion that the Co##ission intended to enact a la! in violation of the Act of
Conress. @o!ever specious the aru#ent #ay be in favor of one of t!o possible constructions, it #ust be
disrearded if on e-a#ination it is found to rest on the contention that the leislator desined an atte#pt to transcend
the rihtful li#its of his authority, and that his apparent intention !as to enact an invalid la!.&
A#erican ?upre#e Court decisions are e*ually e-plicit. The then ;ustice, later Chief ;ustice, ?tone, construed statutes
&!ith an eye to possible constitutional li#itations so as to avoid doubts as to DtheirE validity.&
%%
Aro# the pen of the
articulate 1urist, Aran.furter=
%0
&Accordinly, the phrase &lobbyin activities& in the resolution #ust be iven the
#eanin that #ay fairly be attributed to it, havin special reard for the principle of constitutional ad1udication !hich
#a.es it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction #ay raise serious constitutional *uestions
avoided by another.& @is opinion in the Ru#ely case continues !ith the above pronounce#ent of ?tone and t!o other
for#er Chief ;ustices= &4n the !ords of Mr. Chief ;ustice Taft, J5i7t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to
reach conclusion !hich !ill avoid serious doubt of their constitutionalityJ, Rich#ond ?cre! Anchor Co. v. Knited ?tates,
06' K? 22%, 28:, 8< ?. Ct. %98, %9<, 60 $. ed. 2(2. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief ;ustice @uhes, &if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court !ill ,rst ascertain !hether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by !hich the *uestion #ay be avoided.J Cro!ell v. Benson, 0<', 09:, 6: $. ed. '9<, and cases
cited.& The prevailin doctrine then as set forth by ;ustice Clar. in a %9:2 decision,
%2
is that courts &have consistently
souht an interpretation !hich supports the constitutionality of leislation.& Phrased di/erently by ;ustice "oulas, the
1udiciary favors &that interpretation of leislation !hich ives it the reater chane of survivin the test of
constitutionality.&
%8
4t !ould follo! then that both Philippine and A#erican decisions unite in the vie! that a leislative #easure, in the
lanuae of Man "evanter &should not be iven a construction !hich !ill i#peril its validity !here it is reasonably open
to construction free fro# such peril.&
%'
Republic Act No. 869( as above construed incurs no such ris. and is free fro#
the peril of nullity.
?o 4 !ould vie! the #atter, !ith all due ac.no!led#ent of the practical considerations clearly brouht to liht in the
opinion of the Court.
4oo+"o+&
%
@ereinafter referred to as Co#elec.
0
Article M4, ?ec. 0%5%7, Philippine Constitution.
2
?tilit+ vs. ?chiardien, 8( ?3 0d 2%', 2%6, 20(.
8
Conressional Record, Mol. 4, No. 8(, p. <> Mol. 4, No. '(, pp. 8(-8%.
'
?ection %<, Article M4 of the Constitution, provides=
&?ec. %<. All appropriation, revenue or tari/ bills, bills authori+in increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills, shall oriinate e-clusively in the @ouse of Representatives, but the ?enate #ay propose or concur !ith a#end#ents.&
:
Midal de Roces vs. Posadas, '< Phil. %(<, %%%-%%0> 4chon vs. @ernande+, %(% Phil. %%'', %%<<-%%9(.
6
<0 C.;.?. pp. 2:', 26(> e#phasis supplied.
<
E#phasis ours.
9
E#phasis supplied.
%(
E-a#ples= 3ilco- vs. Paddoc., 2% N3 :(9, !here the statute entitled &An act #a.in an appropriation of state s!a#p lands to aid the
county of Oratiot in i#provin the channel of Maple river . . .& but the body of the act a/ected another county other than Oratiot.
?tate vs. Burr, 02< P '<', the statute entitled &An act to a#end ?ecs. 82%< and 8206 of the Codes of Montana relatin to chanin
the boundaries of Aerus and ;udith Basin countries& !as rendered void because the body of the act included the boundaries of
Petroleu# county.
Atchison vs. Pearney County, 8< P '<2, !here the title of the act purported to attach Pearney county to Ainney county the body of
the act attached it to @a#ilton county.
?tate vs. Nelson, 9< ?o. 6%', the title of the act purportin to alter or rearrane the boundaries of "ecatur city and the body of the
act !hich actually di#inished the boundary lines of the city !ere considered by the court as dealin !ith inconruous #atters. The
readin of the for#er !ould ive no clear suestion that the latter !ould follo! and be #ade the sub1ect of the act. ;ac.son, Cler.
vs. ?herrod, 90 ?o. 8<%> City of Ensley vs. ?i#pson, '0 ?o. :%, cited.
Aairvie! vs. City of "etroit, %%2 N3 2:<, !here the title ave notice that the entire villae of Aairvie! is anne-ed to "etroit !hen the
body a/ected only a portion.
%%
Blac., 4nterpretation of $a!s, 0d. ed., p. %%:.
%0
Barra#eda vs. Moir, 0' Phil. 88, 86-8<, ;uoted in Oovern#ent vs. ?priner 5'( Phil. 0'9, 090> e#phasis supplied7.
%2
McIuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., pp. 8':-8:8.
%8
4n the case of Au*ua vs. City of Mobile, %0% ?o. :9:, it !as asserted that the portion of the statute e-cludin a territory fro# Mobile !hich
!as not e-press in the title &An act to alter and rearrane the boundary lines of the city of Mobile in the state of Alaba#a& should be the only
portion invalidated. The court, usin the test !hether or not after the ob1ectionable feature is stric.en o/ there !ould still re#ain an act
co#plete in itself, sensible, capable of bein e-ecuted, ruled that there can be no sereation of that portion dealin !ith the e-cluded
territory fro# that dealin !ith additional territory because these t!o #atters are all e#braced and inter#inled in one section dealin !ith
the corporate li#its of the city.
4n the case of Enle vs. Bonnie, 0(8 ?3 0d 9:2, the statute involved !as entitled &An Act relatin to cities&. ?ection 8 thereof
&re*uires the creation of a #unicipality on petition of a #a1ority of voters or '(( voters.& But so#e of the provisions !ere er#ane
to the title of the la!. This statute !as declared void in toto. The Court of Appeals of Pentuc.y ruled as follo!s=
&The 1ud#ent declared only ?ection 8 Drelative to the creation of a #unicipality on petition of the votersE to be void and the
re#ainder valid. 3hile so#e of the provisions of the act are er#ane to the title, since they deal !ith the classi,cation of cities to
be created, they see# #erely to har#oni+e other sections of the statute !hich they a#end !ith a ne! creation of cities other than
si-th class to!ns. To re#ove only ?ection 8 !ould be li.e ta.in the #otor of an auto#obile !hich leaves the #achine of no use. 3e
are *uite sure that these provisions !ould not have been enacted !ithout ?ection 8> hence, they too #ust fall.&
%'
Macias vs. The Co##ission on Elections, $-%<:<8, ?epte#ber %8, %9:%.
%:
Broo.s vs. @ydorn, 80 N3 %%00, %%02-%%08> Aairvie! vs. City of "etroit, %%2 N3 2:<, 26(.
%
Art. M4, ?ec. 0%, par. %, Constitution.
0
Oovern#ent v. @on.on L ?hanhai Ban. 5%92<7, :: Phil. 8<2.
2
People vs. Carlos 5%9867, 6< Phil. '2'.
8
:: Phil. 8<2.
'
62 Phil. 5%9807 00<.
:
$-0:'%%, Bctober 09, %9:(. The other cases that #ay be cited follo!s People v. Carlos 5%9867, 6< Phil. '2'> Nuval v. de la Auente 5%9'27, 90
Phil. %(68> 4chon v. @ernande+ 5%9'%7, %(% Phil. %%''> Cordero v. Cabatuando, $-%8'80, Bct. 2%, %9:0> Municipality of ;ose Pananiban v.
?hell Co#pany, $-%<289, ;uly 2(, %9::.
6
$-0220:, "ece#ber %<, %9:'.
<
<: Phil. 809 5%9'(7.
9
<6 Phil. 2(9 5%9'(7, Cf . City of Manila v. Arellano $a! Collees, 4nc. 5%9'(7, <' Phil. ::2.
%(
08 Phil. 26. ;ustice Carson !ho penned the opinion cited Blac. on 4nterpretation of $a!s to this e/ect= &@ence it follo!s that the courts !ill
not so construe the la! as to #a.e it conHict !ith the constitution, but !ill rather put such an interpretation upon it as !ill avoid conHict !ith
the constitution and ive it full force and e/ect, if this can be done !ithout e-travaance. 4f there is doubt, or uncertainty as to the #eanin of
the leislature, if the !ords or provisions of the statute are obscure, or if the enact#ent is fairly susceptible of t!o or #ore constructions, that
interpretation !ill be adopted !hich !ill avoid the e/ect of unconstitutionality, even thouh it #ay be necessary, for this purpose, to disreard
the #ore usual or apparent i#pact of the lanuae e#ployed.&
%%
$ucas v. Ale-ander 5%90<7. 069 K? '62, '66-'6<, citin Knited ?tates e- rel. Atty. Oen. v. "ela!are L @. Co. 0%2 K? 2::, 8(6, 8(<, '2 $. ed.
<2:, <8<, <89, 09 ?up. Ct. Rep. '06= Knited ?tates v. ?tandard Bre!ery, 0'% K? 0%(, 00(, :8 $. ed. 009, 02', 8( ?up. Ct. Rep. %29> Te-as v.
Eastern Te-as R. Co. 0'< K? 0(8, 0%6, :: $. ed. '::, '60, 80 ?up. Ct. Rep. 0<%> Bratton v. Chandler, 0:( K? %%(, %%8, :6 $. ed. %'6, %:%, 82
?up. Ct. Rep. 82> Pana#a R. Co. v. ;ohnson, 0:8 K? 26', 29(, :< $. ed. 68<, 6'8, 88 ?up. Ct. Rep. 29%.
%0
Knited ?tates v. Ru#ely 5%9'27, 28' K? 8%, 8'.
%2
Knited ?tates v. National "airy Product Corp. 262 K? 09, 20.
%8
&> parte Endo 5%9887, 202 K? 0<2, 099-2((.
%'
Chippe!a 4ndians v. Knited ?tates 5%9267, 2(% K? 2'<, 26:.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN 9ANC
G.R. No. 148665 No.&0%&* 19, 2551
JOSEP8 EJERCITO ESTRA3A, petitioner,
vs.
SAN3IGAN9AYAN CT$!*) 3!.!!o"D '") PEOPLE O4 T8E P8ILIPPINES, respondents.
" E C 4 ? 4 B N
9ELLOSILLO, J.:
;B@N ?TKART M4$$, in his essay On Li*ert(, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rihts of the individual
fro# the vast po!ers of the ?tate and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he dra!s a sacrosanct line
de#arcatin the li#its on individuality beyond !hich the ?tate cannot tread - assertin that &individual spontaneity&
#ust be allo!ed to Hourish !ith very little reard to social interference - he veritably ac.no!ledes that the e-ercise
of rihts and liberties is i#bued !ith a civic obliation, !hich society is 1usti,ed in enforcin at all cost, aainst those
!ho !ould endeavor to !ithhold ful,ll#ent. Thus he says -
The sole end for which man!ind is warranted$ individuall( or collectivel($ in interferin with the li*ert( of action of an(
of their num*er$ is self-protection. The onl( purpose for which power can *e rihtfull( e>ercised over an( mem*er of a
civilized communit($ aainst his will$ is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illi#itable riht of the ?tate to self-preservation. 3ith the end of
#aintainin the interity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the ?tate to for#ulate a syste# of la!s that
!ould co#pel obeisance to its collective !isdo# and inHict punish#ent for non-observance.
The #ove#ent fro# MillJs individual liberalis# to unsyste#atic collectivis# !rouht chanes in the social order,
carryin !ith it a ne! for#ulation of funda#ental rihts and duties #ore attuned to the i#peratives of conte#porary
socio-political ideoloies. 4n the process, the !eb of rihts and ?tate i#positions beca#e tanled and obscured,
en#eshed in threads of #ultiple shades and colors, the s.ein irreular and bro.en. Antaonis#, often outriht
collision, bet!een the la! as the e-pression of the !ill of the ?tate, and the +ealous atte#pts by its #e#bers to
preserve their individuality and dinity, inevitably follo!ed. 4t is !hen individual rihts are pitted aainst ?tate
authority that 1udicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner ;oseph E1ercito Estrada, the hihest-ran.in oCcial to be prosecuted under RA 6(<( 5An Act 6eAnin and
)enalizin the Crime of )lunder7,
%
as a#ended by RA 6:'9,
0
!ishes to i#press upon us that the assailed la! is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line !hich divides the valid fro# the constitutionally in,r#.
@e therefore #a.es a strinent call for this Court to sub1ect the Plunder $a! to the crucible of constitutionality #ainly
because, accordin to hi#, 5a7 it su/ers fro# the vice of vaueness> 5b7 it dispenses !ith the &reasonable doubt&
standard in cri#inal prosecutions> and, 5c7 it abolishes the ele#ent of mens rea in cri#es already punishable
under The 2evised )enal Code, all of !hich are purportedly clear violations of the funda#ental rihts of the accused to
due process and to be infor#ed of the nature and cause of the accusation aainst hi#.
?peci,cally, the provisions of the Plunder $a! clai#ed by petitioner to have transressed constitutional boundaries are
?ecs. %, par. 5d7, 0 and 8 !hich are reproduced hereunder=
Section +. - - - - 5d7 &4ll-otten !ealth& #eans any asset, property, business, enterprise or #aterial possession of any
person !ithin the purvie! of ?ection T!o 507 hereof, ac*uired by hi# directly or indirectly throuh du##ies, no#inees,
aents, subordinates andTor business associates by any co#bination or series of the follo!in #eans or si#ilar
sche#es=
5%7 Throuh #isappropriation, conversion, #isuse, or #alversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury>
507 By receivin, directly or indirectly, any co##ission, ift, share, percentae, .ic.bac.s or any other for# of
pecuniary bene,t fro# any person andTor entity in connection !ith any overn#ent contract or pro1ect or by
reason of the oCce or position of the public oCce concerned>
527 By the illeal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonin to the National Oovern#ent or
any of its subdivisions, aencies or instru#entalities, or overn#ent o!ned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries>
587 By obtainin, receivin or acceptin directly or indirectly any shares of stoc., e*uity or any other for# of
interest or participation includin the pro#ise of future e#ploy#ent in any business enterprise or underta.in>
5'7 By establishin aricultural, industrial or co##ercial #onopolies or other co#binations andTor
i#ple#entation of decrees and orders intended to bene,t particular persons or special interests> or
5:7 By ta.in advantae of oCcial position, authority, relationship, connection or inHuence to un1ustly enrich
hi#self or the#selves at the e-pense and to the da#ae and pre1udice of the Ailipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines.
?ection 0. "e,nition of the Cri#e of Plunder, Penalties. - An( pu*lic ofcer who$ *( himself or in connivance with
mem*ers of his famil($ relatives *( afnit( or consanuinit($ *usiness associates$ su*ordinates or other persons$
amasses$ accumulates or ac;uires ill-otten wealth throuh a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
descri*ed in Section + BdC hereof$ in the areate amount or total value of at least Aft( million pesos
B)DE$EEE$EEE.EEC shall *e uilt( of the crime of plunder and shall *e punished *( reclusion perpetua to death. An(
person who participated with the said pu*lic ofcer in the commission of an o=ense contri*utin to the crime of
plunder shall li!ewise *e punished for such o=ense. 1n the imposition of penalties$ the deree of participation and the
attendance of mitiatin and e>tenuatin circumstances as provided *( the 2evised )enal Code shall *e considered
*( the court. The court shall declare an( and all ill-otten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
includin the properties and shares of stoc!s derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State Bunderscorin suppliedC.
Section F. 2ule of &vidence. - %or purposes of esta*lishin the crime of plunder$ it shall not *e necessar( to proveeach
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufcient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy Bunderscorin
suppliedC.
Bn 8 April 0((% the BCce of the B#buds#an ,led before the ?andianbayan eiht 5<7 separate 4nfor#ations,
doc.eted as= 5a7 Cri#. Case No. 0:''<, for violation of RA 6(<(, as a#ended by RA 6:'9> 5b7 Cri#. Cases Nos. 0:''9
to 0:':0, inclusive, for violation of ?ecs. 2, par. 5a7, 2, par. 5a7, 2, par. 5e7 and 2, par. 5e7, of RA 2(%9 5Anti-Graft and
Corrupt )ractices Act7, respectively> 5c7 Cri#. Case No. 0:':2, for violation of ?ec. 6, par. 5d7, of RA :6%2 5The Code of
Conduct and &thical Standards for )u*lic Ofcials and &mplo(ees7> 5d7 Cri#. Case No. 0:':8, for Per1ury 5Art. %<2
of The 2evised )enal Code7> and, 5e7 Cri#. Case No. 0:':', for 4lleal Kse Bf An Alias 5CA No. %80, as a#ended by RA
:(<'7.
Bn %% April 0((% petitioner ,led an Omni*us 'otion for the re#and of the case to the B#buds#an for preli#inary
investiation !ith respect to speci,cation &d& of the chares in the 4nfor#ation in Cri#. Case No. 0:''<> and, for
reconsiderationTreinvestiation of the o/enses under speci,cations &a,& &b,& and &c& to ive the accused an opportunity
to ,le counter-aCdavits and other docu#ents necessary to prove lac. of probable cause. Noticeably, the rounds
raised !ere only lac. of preli#inary investiation, reconsiderationTreinvestiation of o/enses, and opportunity to prove
lac. of probable cause. The purported a#biuity of the chares and the vaueness of the la! under !hich they are
chared !ere never raised in that Omni*us 'otion thus indicatin the e-plicitness and co#prehensibility of the
Plunder $a!.
Bn 0' April 0((% the ?andianbayan, Third "ivision, issued a Resolution in Cri#. Case No. 0:''< ,ndin that &a
probable cause for the o/ense of P$KN"ER e-ists to 1ustify the issuance of !arrants for the arrest of the accused.& Bn
0' ;une 0((% petitionerJs #otion for reconsideration !as denied by the ?andianbayan.
Bn %8 ;une 0((% petitioner #oved to *uash the 4nfor#ation in Cri#. Case No. 0:''< on the round that the facts
alleed therein did not constitute an indictable o/ense since the la! on !hich it !as based !as unconstitutional for
vaueness, and that the A#ended 4nfor#ation for Plunder chared #ore than one 5%7 o/ense. Bn 0% ;une 0((% the
Oovern#ent ,led its Opposition to the 'otion to 9uash, and ,ve 5'7 days later or on 0: ;une 0((% petitioner sub#itted
his 2epl( to the Opposition. Bn 9 ;uly 0((% the ?andianbayan denied petitionerJs 'otion to 9uash.
As concisely delineated by this Court durin the oral aru#ents on %< ?epte#ber 0((%, the issues for resolution in the
instant petition for certiorari are= 5a7 The Plunder $a! is unconstitutional for bein vaue> 5b7 The Plunder $a! re*uires
less evidence for provin the predicate cri#es of plunder and therefore violates the rihts of the accused to due
process> and, 5c7 3hether Plunder as de,ned in RA 6(<( is a malum prohi*itum, and if so, !hether it is !ithin the
po!er of Conress to so classify it.
Preli#inarily, the !hole a#ut of leal concepts pertainin to the validity of leislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a leislative #easure is presu#ed to be in har#ony !ith the Constitution.
2
Courts invariably train their
sihts on this funda#ental rule !henever a leislative act is under a constitutional attac., for it is the postulate of
constitutional ad1udication. This stron predilection for constitutionality ta.es its bearins on the idea that it is
forbidden for one branch of the overn#ent to encroach upon the duties and po!ers of another. Thus it has been said
that the presu#ption is based on the deference the 1udicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the leislature.
4f there is any reasonable basis upon !hich the leislation #ay ,r#ly rest, the courts #ust assu#e that the leislature
is ever conscious of the borders and edes of its plenary po!ers, and has passed the la! !ith full .no!lede of the
facts and for the purpose of pro#otin !hat is riht and advancin the !elfare of the #a1ority. @ence in deter#inin
!hether the acts of the leislature are in tune !ith the funda#ental la!, courts should proceed !ith 1udicial restraint
and act !ith caution and forbearance. Every intend#ent of the la! #ust be ad1uded by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity bein a #easure of last resort. 4n construin therefore the provisions of a statute, courts
#ust ,rst ascertain !hether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the *uestion of constitutionality.
4n La 8nion Credit Cooperative$ 1nc. v. 4aranon
8
!e held that as lon as there is so#e basis for the decision of the
court, the constitutionality of the challened la! !ill not be touched and the case !ill be decided on other available
rounds. Qet the force of the presu#ption is not suCcient to catapult a funda#entally de,cient la! into the safe
environs of constitutionality. Bf course, !here the la! clearly and palpably transresses the hallo!ed do#ain of the
oranic la!, it #ust be struc. do!n on siht lest the positive co##ands of the funda#ental la! be unduly eroded.
Merily, the onerous tas. of rebuttin the presu#ption !eihs heavily on the party challenin the validity of the
statute. @e #ust de#onstrate beyond any tine of doubt that there is indeed an infrine#ent of the constitution, for
absent such a sho!in, there can be no ,ndin of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if !ell-founded, !ill hardly suCce.
As tersely put by ;ustice Malcol#, &To )ou%+ ! +o u+'!".&
'
And petitioner has #iserably failed in the instant case to
dischare his burden and overco#e the presu#ption of constitutionality of the Plunder $a!.
As it is !ritten, the Plunder $a! contains ascertainable standards and !ell-de,ned para#eters !hich !ould enable the
accused to deter#ine the nature of his violation. ?ection 0 is suCciently e-plicit in its description of the acts, conduct
and conditions re*uired or forbidden, and prescribes the ele#ents of the cri#e !ith reasonable certainty and
particularity. Thus -
+. That the o=ender is a pu*lic ofcer who acts *( himself or in connivance with mem*ers of his famil($
relatives *( afnit( or consanuinit($ *usiness associates$ su*ordinates or other personsG
H. That he amassed$ accumulated or ac;uired ill-otten wealth throuh a com*ination or series of the
followin overt or criminal acts@ BaC throuh misappropriation$ conversion$ misuse$ or malversation of pu*lic
funds or raids on the pu*lic treasur(G B*C *( receivin$ directl( or indirectl($ an( commission$ ift$ share$
percentae$ !ic!*ac! or an( other form of pecuniar( *eneAts from an( person andIor entit( in connection with
an( overnment contract or pro<ect or *( reason of the ofce or position of the pu*lic ofcerG BcC *( the illeal
or fraudulent conve(ance or disposition of assets *elonin to the 3ational Government or an( of its
su*divisions$ aencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
su*sidiariesG BdC *( o*tainin$ receivin or acceptin directl( or indirectl( an( shares of stoc!$ e;uit( or an(
other form of interest or participation includin the promise of future emplo(ment in an( *usiness enterprise
or underta!inG BeC *( esta*lishin aricultural$ industrial or commercial monopolies or other com*inations
andIor implementation of decrees and orders intended to *eneAt particular persons or special interestsG or BfC
*( ta!in advantae of ofcial position$ authorit($ relationship$ connection or inJuence to un<ustl( enrich
himself or themselves at the e>pense and to the damae and pre<udice of the %ilipino people and the 2epu*lic
of the )hilippinesG and$
K. That the areate amount or total value of the ill-otten wealth amassed$ accumulated or ac;uired is at
least )DE$EEE$EEE.EE.
As lon as the la! a/ords so#e co#prehensible uide or rule that !ould infor# those !ho are sub1ect to it !hat
conduct !ould render the# liable to its penalties, its validity !ill be sustained. 4t #ust suCciently uide the 1ude in its
application> the counsel, in defendin one chared !ith its violation> and #ore i#portantly, the accused, in identifyin
the real# of the proscribed conduct. 4ndeed, it can be understood !ith little diCculty that !hat the assailed statute
punishes is the act of a public oCcer in a#assin or accu#ulatin ill-otten !ealth of at leastP'(,(((,(((.(( throuh
a series or co#bination of acts enu#erated in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, of the Plunder $a!.
4n fact, the a#ended 4nfor#ation itself closely trac.s the lanuae of the la!, indicatin !ith reasonable certainty the
various ele#ents of the o/ense !hich petitioner is alleed to have co##itted=
&The undersined B#buds#an, Prosecutor and B4C-"irector, EP4B, BCce of the B#buds#an, hereby accuses
for#er PRESI3ENT O4 T8E REPU9LIC O4 T8E P8ILIPPINES, ;oseph E1ercito Estrada, a...a. JA?4BNO ?A$BNOAJ and
a...a. J;B?E ME$AR"E,J toether !ith ;ose J;inoyJ Estrada, Charlie JAtonJ An, Ed!ard ?erapio, Qolanda T. Ricaforte,
Al#a Alfaro, ;B@N "BE a...a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ra#os Tan or Mr. Ky, ;ane "oe a...a. "elia Ra1as, and
;ohn 3OES L ;ane "oes, of the cri#e of Plunder, de,ned and penali+ed under R.A. No. 6(<(, as a#ended by ?ec. %0 of
R.A. No. 6:'9, co##itted as follo!s=
That durin the period fro# ;une, %99< to ;anuary 0((%, in the Philippines, and !ithin the 1urisdiction of this @onorable
Court, accused ;oseph E1ercito Estrada, T8EN A PRESI3ENT O4 T8E REPU9LIC O4 T8E P8ILIPPINES, by
hi#self AN"TBR in CONNI:ANCEECONSPIRACY !ith his co-accused, 28O ARE MEM9ERS O4 8IS 4AMILY,
RELATI:ES 9Y A44INITY OR CONSANGUINITY, 9USINESS ASSOCIATES, SU9OR3INATES AN3EOR OT8ER
PERSONS, 9Y TAFING UN3UE A3:ANTAGE O4 8IS O44ICIAL POSITION, AUT8ORITY, RELATIONS8IP,
CONNECTION, OR IN4LUENCE, did then and there !illfully, unla!fully and cri#inally a#ass, accu#ulate and
ac*uire 9Y 8IMSEL4, 3IRECTLY OR IN3IRECTLY, ill-otten !ealth in the areate a#ount orTOTAL :ALUE o(
4OUR 9ILLION NINETY SE:EN MILLION EIG8T 8UN3RE3 4OUR T8OUSAN3 ONE 8UN3RE3 SE:ENTY T8REE
PESOS AN3 SE:ENTEEN CENTA:OS 5P8,(96,<(8,%62.%67, #ore or less,T8ERE9Y UNJUSTLY ENRIC8ING
8IMSEL4 OR T8EMSEL:ES AT T8E EGPENSE AN3 TO T8E 3AMAGE O4 T8E 4ILIPINO PEOPLE AN3 T8E
REPU9LIC O4 T8E P8ILIPPINES, throuh ANY OR A co#bination OR A series of overt OR cri#inal acts, OR
SIMILAR SC8EMES OR MEANS, described as follo!s=
5a7 by receivin OR collectin, directly or indirectly, on SE:ERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN T8E AGGREGATE
AMOUNT O4 4I:E 8UN3RE3 4ORTY-4I:E MILLION PESOS C P 646,555,555.55D, MORE OR LESS, 4ROM
ILLEGAL GAM9LING IN T8E 4ORM O4 GI4T, S8ARE, PERCENTAGE, FICF9ACF OR ANY 4ORM O4
PECUNIARY 9ENE4IT, 9Y 8IMSEL4 AN3EOR in connection !ith co-accused C8ARLIE AATONGA ANG, 5ose
L5ino(L &strada, Qolanda T. Ricaforte, Ed!ard ?erapio, AN3 JO8N 3OES AN3 JANE 3OES, in
consideration O4 TOLERATION OR PROTECTION O4 ILLEGAL GAM9LING>
5b7 by 3I:ERTING, RECEI:ING, #isappropriatin, convertin OR #isusin 3IRECTLY OR IN3IRECTLY,
for 8IS OR T8EIR PERSONAL ain and bene,t, public funds in the a#ount of BNE @KN"RE" T@4RTQ M4$$4BN
PE?B? 5P%2(,(((,(((.((7, #ore or less, representin a portion of the T2O 8UN3RE3 MILLION PESOS
CP 255,555,555.55D tobacco e-cise ta- share allocated for the province of 4locos ?ur under R.A. No. 6%6%, %y
$!0&l( '")Eo* in connivance !ith co-accused Charlie JAtonJ An, Al#a Alfaro, JO8N 3OE '.<.'. Eleuterio
Ra#os Tan or Mr. Ky, ;ane "oe a...a. "elia Ra1as, AN3 OT8ER JO8N 3OES H JANE 3OES> 5italic supplied7.
5c7 by directin, orderin and co#pellin, 4OR 8IS PERSONAL GAIN AN3 9ENE4IT, the Oovern#ent ?ervice
4nsurance ?yste# 5O?4?7 TO PURC8ASE 361,878,555 S8ARES O4 STOCFS, MORE OR LESS, and the
?ocial ?ecurity ?yste# 5???7, 209,<'',((( S8ARES O4 STOCF, MORE OR LESS, O4 T8E 9ELLE
CORPORATION IN T8E AMOUNT O4 MORE OR LESS ONE 9ILLION ONE 8UN3RE3 T2O MILLION NINE
8UN3RE3 SIGTY 4I:E T8OUSAN3 SIG 8UN3RE3 SE:EN PESOS AN3 4I4TY CENTA:OS
CP 1,152,966,657.65D AN3 MORE OR LESS SE:EN 8UN3RE3 4ORTY 4OUR MILLION SIG 8UN3RE3
T2EL:E T8OUSAN3 AN3 4OUR 8UN3RE3 4I4TY PESOS C P 744,612,465.55D, RESPECTI:ELY, OR A
TOTAL O4 MORE OR LESS ONE 9ILLION EIG8T 8UN3RE3 4ORTY SE:EN MILLION 4I:E 8UN3RE3
SE:ENTY EIG8T T8OUSAN3 4I4TY SE:EN PESOS AN3 4I4TY CENTA:OS C P 1,847,678,567.65D@ AN3
9Y COLLECTING OR RECEI:ING, 3IRECTLY OR IN3IRECTLY, 9Y 8IMSEL4 AN3EOR IN CONNI:ANCE
2IT8 JO8N 3OES AN3 JANE 3OES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES 9Y REASON O4 SAI3
PURC8ASES O4 S8ARES O4 STOCF IN T8E AMOUNT O4 ONE 8UN3RE3 EIG8TY NINE MILLION
SE:EN 8UN3RE3 T8OUSAN3 PESOS C P 189,755,555.55D MORE OR LESS, 4ROM T8E 9ELLE
CORPORATION 28IC8 9ECAME PART O4 T8E 3EPOSIT IN T8E E=UITA9LE-PCI 9ANF UN3ER T8E
ACCOUNT NAME AJOSE :ELAR3E>J
5d7 by un1ustly enrichin hi#self 4ROM COMMISSIONS, GI4TS, S8ARES, PERCENTAGES, FICF9ACFS, OR
ANY 4ORM O4 PECUNIARY 9ENE4ITS, IN CONNI:ANCE 2IT8 JO8N 3OES AN3 JANE 3OES, in the
a#ount of MORE OR LESS T@REE B4$$4BN T3B @KN"RE" T@4RTQ T@REE M4$$4BN BNE @KN"RE" ABKR
T@BK?AN" BNE @KN"RE" ?EMENTQ T@REE PE?B? AN" ?EMENTEEN CENTAMB? 5P2,022,%(8,%62.%67 AN3
3EPOSITING T8E SAME UN3ER 8IS ACCOUNT NAME AJOSE :ELAR3EA AT T8E E=UITA9LE-PCI 9ANF.&
3e discern nothin in the foreoin that is vaue or a#biuous - as there is obviously none - that !ill confuse
petitioner in his defense. Althouh sub1ect to proof, these factual assertions clearly sho! that the ele#ents of the
cri#e are easily understood and provide ade*uate contrast bet!een the innocent and the prohibited acts. Kpon such
une*uivocal assertions, petitioner is co#pletely infor#ed of the accusations aainst hi# as to enable hi# to prepare
for an intellient defense.
Petitioner, ho!ever, be!ails the failure of the la! to provide for the statutory de,nition of the ter#s &co#bination& and
&series& in the .ey phrase &a co#bination or series of overt or cri#inal acts& found in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, and ?ec. 0, and
the !ord &pattern& in ?ec. 8. These o#issions, accordin to petitioner, render the Plunder $a! unconstitutional for
bein i#per#issibly vaue and overbroad and deny hi# the riht to be infor#ed of the nature and cause of the
accusation aainst hi#, hence, violative of his funda#ental riht to due process.
The rationali+ation see#s to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void #erely because
eneral ter#s are used therein, or because of the e#ploy#ent of ter#s !ithout de,nin the#>
:
#uch less do !e have
to de,ne every !ord !e use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory co##and re*uirin the leislature
to de,ne each and every !ord in an enact#ent. Conress is not restricted in the for# of e-pression of its !ill, and its
inability to so de,ne the !ords e#ployed in a statute !ill not necessarily result in the vaueness or a#biuity of the
la! so lon as the leislative !ill is clear, or at least, can be athered fro# the !hole act, !hich is distinctly e-pressed
in the Plunder $a!.
Moreover, it is a !ell-settled principle of leal her#eneutics that !ords of a statute !ill be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and sini,cation,
6
unless it is evident that the leislature intended a technical or special
leal #eanin to those !ords.
<
The intention of the la!#a.ers - !ho are, ordinarily, untrained philoloists and
le-icoraphers - to use statutory phraseoloy in such a #anner is al!ays presu#ed. Thus, 3ebsterJs Ne! Colleiate
"ictionary contains the follo!in co##only accepted de,nition of the !ords &co#bination& and &series=&
Com*ination - the result or product of co#binin> the act or process of co#binin. To com*ine is to brin into such
close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a nu#ber of thins or events of the sa#e class co#in one after another in spatial and te#poral succession.
That Conress intended the !ords &co#bination& and &series& to be understood in their popular #eanins is pristinely
evident fro# the leislative deliberations on the bill !hich eventually beca#e RA 6(<( or the Plunder $a!=
DE!"E#$%!&'( &) %*E "!+$,E#$ +&,,!%%EE &' J-(%!+E, . ,ay /00/
2&). 1S162O@ 1 am <ust intriued aain *( our deAnition of plunder. 0e sa( TH2O8GH A CO'#13AT1O3 O2 S&21&S O%
O:&2T O2 C21'13AL ACTS AS '&3T1O3&6 13 S&CT1O3 O3& H&2&O%. 3ow when we sa( com*ination$ we actuall( mean
to sa($ if there are two or more means$ we mean to sa( that num*er one and two or num*er one and somethin else
are included$ how a*out a series of the same actM %or e>ample$ throuh misappropriation$ conversion$ misuse$ will
these *e included alsoM
2&). GA2C1A@ 4eah$ *ecause we sa( a series.
2&). 1S162O@ Series.
2&). GA2C1A@ 4eah$ we include series.
2&). 1S162O@ #ut we sa( we *ein with a com*ination.
2&). GA2C1A@ 4es.
2&). 1S162O@ 0hen we sa( com*ination$ it seems that -
2&). GA2C1A@ Two.
2&). 1S162O@ 3ot onl( two *ut we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
2&). GA2C1A@ 3o$ no$ not twice.
2&). 1S162O@ 3ot twiceM
2&). GA2C1A@ 4es. Com*ination is not twice - *ut com*ination$ two acts.
2&). 1S162O@ So in other words$ thatNs it. 0hen we sa( com*ination$ we mean$ two di=erent acts. 1t cannot *e a
repetition of the same act.
2&). GA2C1A@ That *e referred to series$ (eah.
2&). 1S162O@ 3o$ no. Supposin one act is repeated$ so there are two.
2&). GA2C1A@ A series.
2&). 1S162O@ ThatNs not series. 1ts a com*ination. #ecause when we sa( com*ination or series$ we seem to sa( that
two or more$ di *aM
2&). GA2C1A@ 4es$ this distinuishes it reall( from ordinar( crimes. That is wh($ 1 said$ that is a ver( ood suestion
*ecause if it is onl( one act$ it ma( fall under ordinar( crime *ut we have here a com*ination or series of overt or
criminal acts. So > > > >
2&). GA2C1A@ Series. One after the other eh di....
S&3. TA3A6A@ So that would fall under the term ?seriesM?
2&). GA2C1A@ Series$ oo.
2&). 1S162O@ 3ow$ if it is a com*ination$ ano$ two misappropriations....
2&). GA2C1A@ 1ts not... Two misappropriations will not *e com*ination. Series.
2&). 1S162O@ So$ it is not a com*inationM
2&). GA2C1A@ 4es.
2&). 1S162O@ 0hen (ou sa( com*ination$ two di=erentM
2&). GA2C1A@ 4es.
S&3. TA3A6A@ Two di=erent.
2&). 1S162O@ Two di=erent acts.
2&). GA2C1A@ %or e>ample$ ha...
2&). 1S162O@ 3ow a series$ meanin$ repetition...
6&L1#&2AT1O3S O3 S&3AT& #1LL 3O. OKK$ P 5une +QRQ
S&3ATO2 'AC&6A@ 1n line with our interpellations that sometimes ?one? or ma(*e even ?two? acts ma( alread( result
in such a *i amount$ on line HD$ would the Sponsor consider deletin the words ?a series of overt or$? to read$
therefore@ ?or conspirac( CO''1TT&6 *( criminal acts such as.? 2emove the idea of necessitatin ?a series.? An(wa($
the criminal acts are in the plural.
S&3ATO2 TA3A6A@ That would mean a com*ination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
TH& )2&S16&3T@ )ro*a*l( two or more would *e....
S&3ATO2 'AC&6A@ 4es$ *ecause ?a series? implies several or man(G two or more.
S&3ATO2 TA3A6A@ Accepted$ 'r. )resident > > > >
TH& )2&S16&3T@ 1f there is onl( one$ then he has to *e prosecuted under the particular crime. #ut when we sa( ?acts
of plunder? there should *e$ at least$ two or more.
S&3ATO2 2O'8LO@ 1n other words$ that is alread( covered *( e>istin laws$ 'r. )resident.
Thus !hen the Plunder $a! spea.s of &co#bination,& it is referrin to at least t!o 507 acts fallin under di/erent
cateories of enu#eration provided in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, e.., raids on the public treasury in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, subpar. 5%7,
and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonin to the National Oovern#ent under ?ec. %, par. 5d7, subpar. 527.
Bn the other hand, to constitute a series& there #ust be t!o 507 or #ore overt or cri#inal acts fallin under the sa#e
cateory of enu#eration found in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, say, #isappropriation, #alversation and raids on the public treasury,
all of !hich fall under ?ec. %, par. 5d7, subpar. 5%7. Merily, had the leislature intended a technical or distinctive #eanin
for &co#bination& and &series,& it !ould have ta.en reater pains in speci,cally providin for it in the la!.
As for &pattern,& !e aree !ith the observations of the ?andianbayan
9
that this ter# is suCciently de,ned in ?ec. 8,
in relation to ?ec. %, par. 5d7, and ?ec. 0 -
> > > > under Sec. + BdC of the law$ a LpatternL consists of at least a com*ination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in su*sections B+C to BPC of Sec. + BdC. Secondl($ pursuant to Sec. H of the law$ the pattern of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or oal which is to ena*le the pu*lic ofcer to amass$ accumulate
or ac;uire ill-otten wealth. And thirdl($ there must either *e an Loverall unlawful schemeL or Lconspirac(L to achieve
said common oal. As commonl( understood$ the term Loverall unlawful schemeL indicates a Leneral plan of action or
methodL which the principal accused and pu*lic ofcer and others connivin with him follow to achieve the aforesaid
common oal. 1n the alternative$ if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used *( multiple
accused var($ the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspirac( to attain a common oal.
@ence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the la! does not ive a fair !arnin and suCcient notice of !hat it see.s
to penali+e. Knder the circu#stances, petitionerJs reliance on the &void-for-vaueness& doctrine is #anifestly
#isplaced. The doctrine has been for#ulated in various !ays, but is #ost co##only stated to the e/ect that a statute
establishin a cri#inal o/ense #ust de,ne the o/ense !ith suCcient de,niteness that persons of ordinary intellience
can understand !hat conduct is prohibited by the statute. 4t can only be invo.ed aainst that specie of leislation that
is utterly vaue on its face, i.e., that !hich cannot be clari,ed either by a savin clause or by construction.
A statute or act #ay be said to be vaue !hen it lac.s co#prehensible standards that #en of co##on intellience
#ust necessarily uess at its #eanin and di/er in its application. 4n such instance, the statute is repunant to the
Constitution in t!o 507 respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties tareted by
it, fair notice of !hat conduct to avoid> and, it leaves la! enforcers unbridled discretion in carryin out its provisions
and beco#es an arbitrary He-in of the Oovern#ent #uscle.
%(
But the doctrine does not apply as aainst leislations
that are #erely couched in i#precise lanuae but !hich nonetheless specify a standard thouh defectively phrased>
or to those that are apparently a#biuous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The ,rst #ay be &saved&
by proper construction, !hile no challene #ay be #ounted as aainst the second !henever directed aainst such
activities.
%%
3ith #ore reason, the doctrine cannot be invo.ed !here the assailed statute is clear and free fro#
a#biuity, as in this case.
The test in deter#inin !hether a cri#inal statute is void for uncertainty is !hether the lanuae conveys a
suCciently de,nite !arnin as to the proscribed conduct !hen #easured by co##on understandin and practice.
%0
4t
#ust be stressed, ho!ever, that the &vaueness& doctrine #erely re*uires a reasonable deree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or #athe#atical e-actitude, as petitioner see#s to suest. Ale-ibility,
rather than #eticulous speci,city, is per#issible as lon as the #etes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
An act !ill not be held invalid #erely because it #iht have been #ore e-plicit in its !ordins or detailed in its
provisions, especially !here, because of the nature of the act, it !ould be i#possible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, !e aree !ith, hence !e adopt, the observations of Mr. ;ustice Micente M. Mendo+a durin the deliberations
of the Court that the alleations that the Plunder $a! is vaue and overbroad do not 1ustify a facial revie! of its
validity -
The void-for-vaueness doctrine states that &a statute !hich either forbids or re*uires the doin of an act in ter#s so
vaue that #en of co##on intellience #ust necessarily uess at its #eanin and di/er as to its application, violates
the ,rst essential of due process of la!.&
%2
The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that &a overn#ental
purpose #ay not be achieved by #eans !hich s!eep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedo#s.&
%8
A facial challene is allo!ed to be #ade to a vaue statute and to one !hich is overbroad because of possible &chillin
e/ect& upon protected speech. The theory is that &D!Ehen statutes reulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitatin the statutes in a sinle prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected e-pression is dee#ed to 1ustify allo!in attac.s on
overly broad statutes !ith no re*uire#ent that the person #a.in the attac. de#onstrate that his o!n conduct could
not be reulated by a statute dra!n !ith narro! speci,city.&
%'
The possible har# to society in per#ittin so#e
unprotected speech to o unpunished is out!eihed by the possibility that the protected speech of others #ay be
deterred and perceived rievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory e/ects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Cri#inal statutes have eneral in terrorem e/ect resultin fro# their
very e-istence, and, if facial challene is allo!ed for this reason alone, the ?tate #ay !ell be prevented fro# enactin
la!s aainst socially har#ful conduct. 4n the area of cri#inal la!, the la! cannot ta.e chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vaueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testin the validity of penal statutes. As the K.?. ?upre#e Court put it, in an opinion by Chief ;ustice Rehn*uist, &!e
have not reconi+ed an JoverbreadthJ doctrine outside the li#ited conte-t of the Airst A#end#ent.&
%:
4n #roadric! v.
O!lahoma,
%6
the Court ruled that &clai#s of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involvin statutes
!hich, by their ter#s, see. to reulate only spo.en !ords& and, aain, that &overbreadth clai#s, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed !hen invo.ed aainst ordinary cri#inal la!s that are souht to be applied to protected conduct.&
Aor this reason, it has been held that &a facial challene to a leislative act is the #ost diCcult challene to #ount
successfully, since the challener #ust establish that no set of circu#stances e-ists under !hich the Act !ould be
valid.&
%<
As for the vaueness doctrine, it is said that a litiant #ay challene a statute on its face only if it is vaue in
all its possible applications. &A plainti/ !ho enaes in so#e conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot co#plain of the
vaueness of the la! as applied to the conduct of others.&
%9
4n su#, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vaueness are analytical tools developed for testin &on their
faces& statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in A#erican la!, Airst A#end#ent cases. They cannot be
#ade to do service !hen !hat is involved is a cri#inal statute. 3ith respect to such statute, the established rule is
that &one to !ho# application of a statute is constitutional !ill not be heard to attac. the statute on the round that
i#pliedly it #iht also be ta.en as applyin to other persons or other situations in !hich its application #iht be
unconstitutional.&
0(
As has been pointed out, &vaueness challenes in the Airst A#end#ent conte-t, li.e overbreadth
challenes typically produce facial invalidation, !hile statutes found vaue as a #atter of due process typically are
invalidated DonlyE Jas appliedJ to a particular defendant.&
0%
Conse*uently, there is no basis for petitionerJs clai# that
this Court revie! the Anti-Plunder $a! on its face and in its entirety.
4ndeed, &on its face& invalidation of statutes results in stri.in the# do!n entirely on the round that they #iht be
applied to parties not before the Court !hose activities are constitutionally protected.
00
4t constitutes a departure fro#
the case and controversy re*uire#ent of the Constitution and per#its decisions to be #ade !ithout concrete factual
settins and in sterile abstract conte-ts.
02
But, as the K.?. ?upre#e Court pointed out in 4ouner v. Harris
08
DTEhe tas. of analy+in a proposed statute, pinpointin its de,ciencies, and re*uirin correction of these de,ciencies
before the statute is put into e/ect, is rarely if ever an appropriate tas. for the 1udiciary. The co#bination of the
relative re#oteness of the controversy, the i#pact on the leislative process of the relief souht, and above all the
speculative and a#orphous nature of the re*uired line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
.ind of case that is !holly unsatisfactory for decidin constitutional *uestions, !hichever !ay they #iht be decided.
Aor these reasons, &on its face& invalidation of statutes has been described as &#anifestly stron #edicine,& to be
e#ployed &sparinly and only as a last resort,&
0'
and is enerally disfavored.
0:
4n deter#inin the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions !hich are alleed to have been violated in a case #ust be e-a#ined in the liht of the
conduct !ith !hich the defendant is chared.
06
4n liht of the foreoin dis*uisition, it is evident that the purported a#biuity of the Plunder $a!, so tenaciously
clai#ed and arued at lenth by petitioner, is #ore i#ained than real. A#biuity, !here none e-ists, cannot be
created by dissectin parts and !ords in the statute to furnish support to critics !ho cavil at the !ant of scienti,c
precision in the la!. Every provision of the la! should be construed in relation and !ith reference to every other part.
To be sure, it !ill ta.e #ore than nitpic.in to overturn the !ell-entrenched presu#ption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder $a!. A fortiori, petitioner cannot fein inorance of !hat the Plunder $a! is all about. Bein one
of the ?enators !ho voted for its passae, petitioner #ust be a!are that the la! !as e-tensively deliberated upon by
the ?enate and its appropriate co##ittees by reason of !hich he even reistered his aCr#ative vote !ith full
.no!lede of its leal i#plications and sound constitutional anchorae.
The parallel case of Galleo v. Sandian*a(an
0<
#ust be #entioned if only to illustrate and e#phasi+e the point that
courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the la! itself is so i#perfect and de,cient in its
details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that !ill support and ive it e/ect. 4n that case,
petitioners Galleo and Aoncillo challened the constitutionality of ?ec. 2, par. 5e7, of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
)ractices Act for bein vaue. Petitioners posited, a#on others, that the ter# &un!arranted& is hihly i#precise and
elastic !ith no co##on la! #eanin or settled de,nition by prior 1udicial or ad#inistrative precedents> that, for its
vaueness, ?ec. 2, par. 5e7, violates due process in that it does not ive fair !arnin or suCcient notice of !hat it
see.s to penali+e. Petitioners further arued that the 4nfor#ation chared the# !ith three 527 distinct o/enses, to !it=
5a7 ivin of &un!arranted& bene,ts throuh #anifest partiality> 5b7 ivin of &un!arranted& bene,ts throuh evident
bad faith> and, 5c7 ivin of &un!arranted& bene,ts throuh ross ine-cusable nelience !hile in the dischare of
their oCcial function and that their riht to be infor#ed of the nature and cause of the accusation aainst the# !as
violated because they !ere left to uess !hich of the three 527 o/enses, if not all, they !ere bein chared and
prosecuted.
4n dis#issin the petition, this Court held that ?ec. 2, par. 5e7, of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt )ractices Act does not
su/er fro# the constitutional defect of vaueness. The phrases &#anifest partiality,& &evident bad faith,& and &ross
and ine-cusable nelience& #erely describe the di/erent #odes by !hich the o/ense penali+ed in ?ec. 2, par. 5e7, of
the statute #ay be co##itted, and the use of all these phrases in the sa#e 4nfor#ation does not #ean that the
indict#ent chares three 527 distinct o/enses.
The !ord Jun!arrantedJ is not uncertain. 4t see#s lac.in ade*uate or oCcial support> un1usti,ed> unauthori+ed
53ebster, Third 4nternational "ictionary, p. 0'%87> or !ithout 1usti,cation or ade*uate reason 5Philadelphia
Ne!spapers, 4nc. v. K? "ept. of ;ustice, C.". Pa., 8(' A. ?upp. <, %0, cited in 3ords and Phrases, Per#anent Edition, Mol.
82-A %96<, Cu#ulative Annual Poc.et Part, p. %97.
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Oraft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and #a.e unla!ful the
act of the public oCcer in=
- - - or ivin any private party any un!arranted bene,ts, advantae or preference in the dischare of his oCcial,
ad#inistrative or 1udicial functions throuh #anifest partiality, evident bad faith or ross ine-cusable nelience, - - -
5?ection 2 DeE, Rep. Act 2(%9, as a#ended7.
4t is not at all diCcult to co#prehend that !hat the afore*uoted penal provisions penali+e is the act of a public oCcer,
in the dischare of his oCcial, ad#inistrative or 1udicial functions, in ivin any private party bene,ts, advantae or
preference !hich is un1usti,ed, unauthori+ed or !ithout 1usti,cation or ade*uate reason, throuh #anifest partiality,
evident bad faith or ross ine-cusable nelience.
4n other !ords, this Court found that there !as nothin vaue or a#biuous in the use of the ter# &un!arranted& in
?ec. 2, par. 5e7, of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt )ractices Act, !hich !as understood in its pri#ary and eneral
acceptation. Conse*uently, in that case, petitionersJ ob1ection thereto !as held inade*uate to declare the section
unconstitutional.
Bn the second issue, petitioner advances the hihly stretched theory that ?ec. 8 of the Plunder $a! circu#vents the
i##utable obliation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constitutin the cri#e of
plunder !hen it re*uires only proof of a pattern of overt or cri#inal acts sho!in unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy -
S&C. F. Rule of Evidence. - %or purposes of esta*lishin the crime of plunder$ it shall not *e necessar( to prove each
and ever( criminal act done *( the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspirac( to amass$ accumulate or
ac;uire ill-otten wealth$ it *ein sufcient to esta*lish *e(ond reasona*le dou*t a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspirac(.
The runnin fault in this reasonin is obvious even to the si#plistic #ind. 4n a cri#inal prosecution for plunder, as in all
other cri#es, the accused al!ays has in his favor the presu#ption of innocence !hich is uaranteed by the Bill of
Rihts, and unless the ?tate succeeds in de#onstratin by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an ac*uittal.
09
The use of the &reasonable doubt& standard is indispensable to co##and the
respect and con,dence of the co##unity in the application of cri#inal la!. 4t is critical that the #oral force of cri#inal
la! be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt !hether innocent #en are bein conde#ned. 4t is
also i#portant in our free society that every individual oin about his ordinary a/airs has con,dence that his
overn#ent cannot ad1ude hi# uilty of a cri#inal o/ense !ithout convincin a proper fact,nder of his uilt !ith
ut#ost certainty. This &reasonable doubt& standard has ac*uired such e-alted stature in the real# of constitutional la!
as it ives life to the 6ue )rocess Clause !hich protects the accused aainst conviction e-cept upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the cri#e !ith !hich he is chared.
2(
The follo!in e-chanes
bet!een Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Oarcia on this score durin the deliberations in the Hoor of the @ouse of
Representatives are elucidatin -
"E$4BERAT4BN? BA T@E @BK?E BA REPRE?ENTAT4ME? BN RA 6(<(, 9 Bctober %99(
'2. AL#A3O@ 3ow$ 'r. Spea!er$ it is also elementar( in our criminal law that what is alleed in the information must *e
proven *e(ond reasona*le dou*t. 1f we will prove onl( one act and And him uilt( of the other acts enumerated in the
information$ does that not wor! aainst the riht of the accused especiall( so if the amount committed$ sa($ *(
falsiAcation is less than )+EE million$ *ut the totalit( of the crime committed is )+EE million since there is
malversation$ *ri*er($ falsiAcation of pu*lic document$ coercion$ theftM
'2. GA2C1A@ 'r. Spea!er$ not ever(thin alleed in the information needs to *e proved *e(ond reasona*le dou*t.
0hat is re;uired to *e proved *e(ond reasona*le dou*t is ever( element of the crime chared. %or e>ample$ 'r.
Spea!er$ there is an enumeration of the thins ta!en *( the ro**er in the information S three pairs of pants$ pieces of
<ewelr(. These need not *e proved *e(ond reasona*le dou*t$ *ut these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for
which he was chared <ust *ecause$ sa($ instead of K pairs of diamond earrins the prosecution proved two. 3ow$ what
is re;uired to *e proved *e(ond reasona*le dou*t is the element of the o=ense.
'2. AL#A3O@ 1 am aware of that$ 'r. Spea!er$ *ut considerin that in the crime of plunder the totalit( of the amount is
ver( important$ 1 feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to *e ta!en sinl(. %or instance$ in the act of *ri*er($
he was a*le to accumulate onl( )DE$EEE and in the crime of e>tortion$ he was onl( a*le to accumulate )+ million. 3ow$
when we add the totalit( of the other acts as re;uired under this *ill throuh the interpretation on the rule of
evidence$ it is <ust one sinle act$ so how can we now convict himM
'2. GA2C1A@ 0ith due respect$ 'r. Spea!er$ for purposes of provin an essential element of the crime$ there is a need
to prove that element *e(ond reasona*le dou*t. %or e>ample$ one essential element of the crime is that the amount
involved is )+EE million. 3ow$ in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total
amount would *e )++E or )+HE million$ *ut there are certain acts that could not *e proved$ so$ we will sum up the
amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. 3ow$ if the amount involved in these transactions$ proved
*e(ond reasona*le dou*t$ is )+EE million$ then there is a crime of plunder 5underscorin supplied7.
4t is thus plain fro# the foreoin that the leislature did not in any #anner refashion the standard *uantu# of proof in
the cri#e of plunder. The burden still re#ains !ith the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or
ele#ent necessary to constitute the cri#e.
The thesis that ?ec. 8 does a!ay !ith proof of each and every co#ponent of the cri#e su/ers fro# a dis#al
#isconception of the i#port of that provision. 3hat the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
nu#ber of acts suCcient to for# a co#bination or series !hich !ould constitute a pattern and involvin an a#ount of
at least P'(,(((,(((.((. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleed in the 4nfor#ation to have been
co##itted by the accused in furtherance of the overall unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy to a#ass, accu#ulate or
ac*uire ill-otten !ealth. To illustrate, supposin that the accused is chared in an 4nfor#ation for plunder !ith havin
co##itted ,fty 5'(7 raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these ,fty 5'(7 raids, it bein
suCcient to prove by pattern at least t!o 507 of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they a#ounted
to at least P'(,(((,(((.((.
2%
A readin of ?ec. 0 in con1unction !ith ?ec. 8, brins us to the loical conclusion that &pattern of overt or cri#inal acts
indicative of the overall unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy& inheres in the very acts of accu#ulatin, ac*uirin or
a#assin hidden !ealth. ?tated other!ise, such pattern arises !here the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts as de,ned in ?ec. %, par. 5d7. Pattern is #erely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent !ith reason and co##on sense. There !ould be no other e-planation for a
co#bination or series of
overt or cri#inal acts to stash P'(,(((,(((.(( or #ore, than &a sche#e or conspiracy to a#ass, accu#ulate or ac*uire
ill otten !ealth.& The prosecution is therefore not re*uired to #a.e a deliberate and conscious e/ort to prove pattern
as it necessarily follo!s !ith the establish#ent of a series or co#bination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitionerJs contentions on the purported defect of ?ec. 8 is his sub#ission that &pattern& is &a very
i#portant ele#ent of the cri#e of plunder>& and that ?ec. 8 is &t!o proned, 5as7 it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive ele#ent of the cri#e,& such that !ithout it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ 1n other words$ cannot an accused *e convicted under the )lunder Law without appl(in Section
F on the 2ule of &vidence if there is proof *e(ond reasona*le dou*t of the commission of the acts complained ofM
ATT4. AGA#13@ 1n that case he can *e convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the 2evised )enal Code$ *ut not
plunder.
58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ 1n other words$ if all the elements of the crime are proved *e(ond reasona*le dou*t without
appl(in Section F$ can (ou not have a conviction under the )lunder LawM
ATT4. AGA#13@ 3ot a conviction for plunder$ (our Honor.
58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ Can (ou not disreard the application of Sec. F in convictin an accused chared for violation of
the )lunder LawM
ATT4. AGA#13@ 0ell$ (our Honor$ in the Arst place Section F la(s down a su*stantive element of the law > > > >
58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ 0hat 1 said is - do we have to avail of Section F when there is proof *e(ond reasona*le dou*t on
the acts chared constitutin plunderM
ATT4. AGA#13@ 4es$ (our Honor$ *ecause Section F is two proned$ it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
su*stantive element of the crime of plunder. So$ there is no wa( *( which we can avoid Section F.
58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ #ut there is proof *e(ond reasona*le dou*t insofar as the predicate crimes chared are
concerned that (ou do not have to o that far *( appl(in Section FM
ATT4. AGA#13@ 4our Honor$ our thin!in is that Section F contains a ver( important element of the crime of plunder and
that cannot *e avoided *( the prosecution.
20
3e do not subscribe to petitionerJs stand. Pri#arily, all the essential ele#ents of plunder can be culled and understood
fro# its de,nition in ?ec. 0, in relation to ?ec. %, par. 5d7, and &pattern& is not one of the#. Moreover, the epiraph and
openin clause of ?ec. 8 is clear and une*uivocal=
S&C. F. Rule of Evidence . - %or purposes of esta*lishin the crime of plunder > > > >
4t purports to do no #ore than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a cri#inal case for plunder. Bein a
purely procedural #easure, ?ec. 8 does not de,ne or establish any substantive riht in favor of the accused but only
operates in furtherance of a re#edy. 4t is only a #eans to an end, an aid to substantive la!. 4ndubitably, even !ithout
invo.in ?ec. 8, a conviction for plunder #ay be had, for !hat is crucial for the prosecution is to present suCcient
evidence to enender that #oral certitude e-acted by the funda#ental la! to prove the uilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, even rantin for the sa.e of aru#ent that ?ec. 8 is Ha!ed and vitiated for the reasons
advanced by petitioner, it #ay si#ply be severed fro# the rest of the provisions !ithout necessarily resultin in the
de#ise of the la!> after all, the e-istin rules on evidence can supplant ?ec. 8 #ore than enouh. Besides, ?ec. 6 of
RA 6(<( provides for a separability clause -
?ec. 6. ?eparability of Provisions. - 4f any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circu#stance
is held invalid, the re#ainin provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or
circu#stances shall not be a/ected thereby.
4#plicit in the foreoin section is that to avoid the !hole act fro# bein declared invalid as a result of the nullity of
so#e of its provisions, assu#in that to be the case althouh it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should
accordinly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doin so, the ob1ectives of the statute can best be
achieved.
As reards the third issue, aain !e aree !ith ;ustice Mendo+a that plunder is a malum in se !hich re*uires proof of
cri#inal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurrin Bpinion -
- - - Precisely because the constitutive cri#es are mala in se the ele#ent of mens rea #ust be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. 4t is note!orthy that the a#ended infor#ation allees that the cri#e of plunder !as
co##itted &!illfully, unla!fully and cri#inally.& 4t thus allees uilty .no!lede on the part of petitioner.
4n support of his contention that the statute eli#inates the re*uire#ent of mens rea and that is the reason he clai#s
the statute is void, petitioner cites the follo!in re#ar.s of ?enator TaSada #ade durin the deliberation on ?.B. No.
622=
?ENATBR TAUA"A . . . And the evidence that !ill be re*uired to convict hi# !ould not be evidence for each and every
individual cri#inal act but only evidence suCcient to establish the conspiracy or sche#e to co##it this cri#e of
plunder.
22
@o!ever, ?enator TaSada !as discussin V8 as sho!n by the succeedin portion of the transcript *uoted by petitioner=
?ENATBR RBMK$B= And, Mr. President, the Oentle#an feels that it is contained in ?ection 8, Rule of Evidence, !hich, in
the Oentle#anJs vie!, !ould provide for a speedier and faster process of attendin to this .ind of casesG
?ENATBR TAUA"A= Qes, Mr. President . . .
28
?enator TaSada !as only sayin that !here the chare is conspiracy to co##it plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every cri#inal act done to further the sche#e or conspiracy, it bein enouh if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ci#inal acts indicative of the overall unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy. As far as
the acts constitutin the pattern are concerned, ho!ever, the ele#ents of the cri#e #ust be proved and the
re*uisite mens rea #ust be sho!n.
4ndeed, V0 provides that -
Any person !ho participated !ith the said public oCcer in the co##ission of an o/ense contributin to the cri#e of
plunder shall li.e!ise be punished for such o/ense. 4n the i#position of penalties, the deree of participation and the
attendance of #itiatin and e-tenuatin circu#stances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered
by the court.
The application of #itiatin and e-tenuatin circu#stances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-
Plunder $a! indicates *uite clearly that mens rea is an ele#ent of plunder since the deree of responsibility of the
o/ender is deter#ined by his cri#inal intent. 4t is true that V0 refers to &any person !ho participates !ith the said
public oCcer in the co##ission of an o/ense contributin to the cri#e of plunder.& There is no reason to believe,
ho!ever, that it does not apply as !ell to the public oCcer as principal in the cri#e. As ;ustice @ol#es said= &3e aree
to all the eneralities about not supplyin cri#inal la!s !ith !hat they o#it, but there is no canon aainst usin
co##on sense in construin la!s as sayin !hat they obviously #ean.&
2'
Ainally, any doubt as to !hether the cri#e of plunder is a malum in se #ust be dee#ed to have been resolved in the
aCr#ative by the decision of Conress in %992 to include it a#on the heinous cri#es punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Bther heinous cri#es are punished !ith death as a straiht penalty in R.A. No. 6:'9. Referrin to
these roups of heinous cri#es, this Court held in )eople v. &cheara(=
2:
The evil of a cri#e #ay ta.e various for#s. There are cri#es that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because
life !as callously ta.en or the victi# is treated li.e an ani#al and utterly dehu#ani+ed as to co#pletely disrupt the
nor#al course of his or her ro!th as a hu#an bein . . . . ?een in this liht, the capital cri#es of .idnappin and
serious illeal detention for ranso# resultin in the death of the victi# or the victi# is raped, tortured, or sub1ected to
dehu#ani+in acts> destructive arson resultin in death> and dru o/enses involvin #inors or resultin in the death
of the victi# in the case of other cri#es> as !ell as #urder, rape, parricide, infanticide, .idnappin and serious illeal
detention, !here the victi# is detained for #ore than three days or serious physical in1uries !ere inHicted on the
victi# or threats to .ill hi# !ere #ade or the victi# is a #inor, robbery !ith ho#icide, rape or intentional #utilation,
destructive arson, and carnappin !here the o!ner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is .illed or raped,
!hich are penali+ed by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are cri#es, ho!ever, in !hich the abo#ination lies in the sini,cance and i#plications of the sub1ect cri#inal
acts in the sche#e of the larer socio-political and econo#ic conte-t in !hich the state ,nds itself to be strulin to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileed #asses. Reelin fro# decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
ban.rupted the overn#ent and i#poverished the population, the Philippine Oovern#ent #ust #uster the political !ill
to dis#antle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, reed and syndicated cri#inality that so deeply entrenched itself in
the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. D3ith the overn#entE terribly lac.in the #oney to provide
even the #ost basic services to its people, any for# of #isappropriation or #isapplication of overn#ent funds
translates to an actual threat to the very e-istence of overn#ent, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
overns over. Mie!ed in this conte-t, no less heinous are the e/ects and repercussions of cri#es li.e *uali,ed bribery,
destructive arson resultin in death, and dru o/enses involvin overn#ent oCcials, e#ployees or oCcers, that their
perpetrators #ust not be allo!ed to cause further destruction and da#ae to society.
The leislative declaration in R.A. No. 6:'9 that plunder is a heinous o/ense i#plies that it is a malum in se. Aor !hen
the acts punished are inherently i##oral or inherently !ron, they are mala in se
26
and it does not #atter that such
acts are punished in a special la!, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate cri#es are #ainly mala in se.
4ndeed, it !ould be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as thouh they are #ere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncin Chec. $a! 5B.P. Bl. 007 or of an ordinance aainst 1ay!al.in, !ithout reard to the inherent !ronness of
the acts.
To clinch, petitioner li.e!ise assails the validity of RA 6:'9, the a#endatory la! of RA 6(<(, on constitutional rounds.
?uCce it to say ho!ever that it is no! too late in the day for hi# to resurrect this lon dead issue, the sa#e havin
been eternally consined by )eople v. &cheara(
2<
to the archives of 1urisprudential history. The declaration of this
Court therein that RA 6:'9 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the ?tate, and beco#es, by necessary
e/ect, assi#ilated in the Constitution no! as an interal part of it.
Bur nation has been rac.ed by scandals of corruption and obscene proHiacy of oCcials in hih places !hich have
sha.en its very foundation. The anato#y of raft and corruption has beco#e #ore elaborate in the corridors of ti#e as
unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive #ore and #ore inenious !ays to bil. the co/ers of the overn#ent. "rastic
and radical #easures are i#perative to ,ht the increasinly sophisticated, e-traordinarily #ethodical and
econo#ically catastrophic lootin of the national treasury. ?uch is the Plunder $a!, especially desined to disentanle
those hastly tissues of rand-scale corruption !hich, if left unchec.ed, !ill spread li.e a #alinant tu#or and
ulti#ately consu#e the #oral and institutional ,ber of our nation. The Plunder $a!, indeed, is a livin testa#ent to the
!ill of the leislature to ulti#ately eradicate this scoure and thus secure society aainst the avarice and other
venalities in public oCce.
These are ti#es that try #enJs souls. 4n the chec.ered history of this nation, fe! issues of national i#portance can
e*ual the a#ount of interest and passion enerated by petitionerJs ino#inious fall fro# the hihest oCce, and his
eventual prosecution and trial under a virinal statute. This continuin saa has driven a !ede of dissension a#on
our people that #ay liner for a lon ti#e. Bnly by respondin to the clarion call for patriotis#, to rise above
factionalis# and pre1udices, shall !e e#ere triu#phant in the #idst of fer#ent.
PREMISES CONSI3ERE3, this Court holds that RA 6(<( other!ise .no!n as the Plunder $a!, as a#ended by RA
6:'9, is CBN?T4TKT4BNA$. Conse*uently, the petition to declare the la! unconstitutional is "4?M4??E" for lac. of
#erit.
?B BR"ERE".
Buena, and "e $eon, ;r., ;;., concur.
"avide, ;r. C.;., Melo, Iuisu#bin, ;;., 1oin concurrin opinion of ;. Mendo+a.
Puno, Mitu, ;;., concurred and 1oins ;. Mendo+aJs concurrin opinion.
Papunan, Pardo, ?andoval-Outierre+, Qnares-?antiao, ;;., see dissentin opinion.
Mendo+a, ;., please see concurrin opinion.
Pananiban ;., please see separate concurrin opinion.
Carpio, ;., no part. 3as one of the co#plainants before B#buds#an.
5!ith dissentin opinion7
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
?ECBN" "4M?4BN
G.R. No. L-26661 4&%*u'*y 27, 1976
T8E PEOPLE O4 T8E P8ILIPPINES, plainti/-appellant,
vs.
2ENCESLAO ALMUETE 4ERNAN3O 4RON3A, 4AUSTO 3URION '") CIPRIANO 4RON3A, defendants-appellees.
Sol!/!+o* G&"&*'l A"+o"!o P. 9'**&)o, A!+'"+ Sol!/!+o* G&"&*'l A"+o"!o G. I%'**' '") Sol!/!+o* :!/&"+& A.
To**& (o* appellant.
E0!l!'"o 3. C'+&ll'"& (o* appellees.

A=UINO, J.:
3enceslao Al#uete Aernando Aronda, Cipriano Aronda and Aausto "urion !ere chared !ith a violation of section 29 of
the Aricultural Tenancy $a!. 4t !as alleed in the infor#ation that in "ece#ber, %9:2, in MuSo+, Nueva Eci1a the
accused bein tenants of Mararita Aernando in her riceland, !ithout notice to her or !ithout her consent, pre-
threshed a portion of their respective harvests of ,ve 5'7 cavans of palay each to her da#ae in the a#ount of
P%<6.'( at P%0.'( a cavan 5Cri#inal Case No. ?"-%69, Court of Airst 4nstance of Nueva Eci1a, ?to. "o#ino Branch M47.
Kpon arrain#ent the accused pleaded not uilty. They ,led #otion for a bill of particulars as to the e-act date of the
co##ission of the o/ense chared. The lo!er court denied their #otion because they had already entered their plea.
Thereafter, they -,led a #otion to *uash the infor#ation on that rounds 5%7 that it does not allee facts suCcient to
constitute the cri#e chared> 507 that there is no la! punishin it, and 527 that the court has, no 1urisdiction over the
alleed ti#e The ,scal opposed the #otion.
The lo!er court ranted the #otion and dis#issed the infor#ation in its order of Auust %%, %9::. 4t held that the
infor#ation is basically de,cient because it does not describe t lie circu#stances under !hich the cavans of palay
!ere found in the possession of the accused tenants> it does not specify the date areed upon for the threshin of the
harvests, and it does not allee that the palay found in the tenantsJ possession e-ceeded ten percent of their net share
based on the last nor#al harvest.
The prosecution appealed fro# the order of dis#issal. The ?olicitor Oeneral arues in his brief that the infor#ation in
this case allees all the ele#ents of the o/ense de,ned in section 29 of Republic Act No. %%99, as a#ended of
Republic Act No. 00:2. ?ections 29 and '6 of the sa#e la! reads as follo!s=
?EC. 29. )rohi*ition on )re-threshin. N 4t shall be unla!ful for either the tenant or landholder, !ithout #utual
consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any ti#e previous to the date set for its threshin- That if the tenant
n food for his fa#ily and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to allo! the tenant to reap or
thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for its threshin, the tenant can reap or thresh not #ore than ten
percent of his net share in the last nor#al harvest after ivin notice thereof to the landholder or his representative.
Any violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and penali+ed in accordance !ith this Act andTor under
the eneral provisions of la! applicable to that act co##itted.
?EC. '6. )enal )rovision. N Miolation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of this Act shall be
punished by a ,ne not e-ceedin t!o thousand pesos or i#prison#ent not e-ceedin one year, or both, in the
discretion of the Court. ... I
3e hold that the order of dis#issal should be aCr#ed because as held in )eople vs. Adillo, $-02M, Nove#ber 06,
%96', a case si#ilar to the instant case, section 99 !as i#pliedly repealed by the Aricultural $and Refor# Code of
%9:2, as a#ended by Republic Act No. :2<9 %:< B.O. 9%'7 and as i#ple#ented by Presidential "ecrees Nos. 0, 06 and
2%:. That Code !as already in force !hen the act co#plained of !as co##itted. The repeal #ay be rationali+ed in this
#anner=
The prohibition aainst pre-reapin or pre-threshin found in section 29 of the Aricultural Tenancy $a! of %9'8 is
pre#ised on the e-istence of the rice share tenancy syste#. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder fro# defraudin each other in the division of the harvests.
The Aricultural $and Refor# Code superseded the Aricultural Tenancy $a! 5e-cept as *uali,ed in sections 8 and 2'
of the Code7. The Code instituted the leasehold syste# and abolished share tenancy sub1ect to certain conditions
indicated in section 8 thereof. 4t is sini,cant that section 29 is not reproduced in the Aricultural $and Refor# Code
!hose section %60 repeals &all la!s or part of any la! inconsistent !ith& its provisions.
Knder the leasehold syste# the prohibition aainst pre-threshin has no, #ore raison dJetre because the lessee is
obliated to pay a ,-ed rental as prescribed in section 28 of the Aricultural $and Refor# Code, or the Code of
Ararian Refor#s, as redesinated in Republic Act No. :2<9 !hich too. e/ect on ?epte#ber %(, %96%. Thus, the leal
#a-i#, cessante ratione leis, cessat ipsa le- 5the reason for the la! ceasin, the la! itself also ceases7. applies to
this case.
?ection 8 of the Code of Ararian Refor#s declared aricultural share tenancy throuhout the country as contrary to
public policy and auto#atically converted it to aricultural leasehold. Presidential "ecree No. 0 proclai#ed the entire
country &as a land refor# area&. Presidential "ecree No. 06 e#ancipated the tenant fro# the bondae of the soil. And
Presidential "ecree No. 2%: interdicted the e1ect#ent or re#oval of the tenant-far#er fro# his far#holdin until the
pro#ulation of the rules and reulations i#ple#entin Presidential "ecree No. 06. 5?ee People vs. Adillo, supra7.
The leislative intent not to punish any#ore the tenantJs act of pre- reapin and pre-threshin !ithout notice to the
landlord is inferable fro# the fact that, as already noted, the Code of Ararian Refor#s did not reenact section 29 of
the Aricultural Tenancy $a! and that it abolished share tenancy !hich is the basis for penali+in clandestine pre-
reapin and pre-threshin.
All indications point to a deliberate and #anifest leislative desin to replace the Aricultural Tenancy $a! !ith the
Code of Ararian Refor#s, for#erly the Aricultural $and Refor# Code, at least as far as ricelands are concerned.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reapin and pre-threshin !ithout notice to the landlord, !hich is an o/ense
under the Aricultural Tenancy $a!, had ceased to be an o/ense under the subse*uent la!, the Code of Ararian
Refor#s. To prosecute it as an o/ense !hen the Code of Ararian Refor#s is already in force !ould be repunant or
abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and !ould subvert the #anifest leislative intent not to punish any#ore
pre-reapin and pre-threshin !ithout notice to landholder.
4t is a rule of leal her#eneutics that &an act !hich purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a
repeal of anythin o#itted !hich !as contain in the old act and not included in the a#endatory act& 5Cra!ford,
Construction of ?tatutes, p. :0% cited in the Adillo case7.
A subse*uent statute, revisin the !hole sub1ect #atter of a for#er statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for
it, operates to repeal the for#er statute& 5<0 C.;.?. 8997. JThe revisin statute is in e/ect a Jleislative declaration that
!hatever is e#braced in the ne! statute shall prevail, and !hatever is e-cluded therefro# shall be discarded& 5<0
C.;.?. '((7.
The repeal of appeal la! deprives the courts of 1urisdiction to punish persons chared !ith a violation of the old penal
la! prior to its repeal 5People vs. Ta#ayo, :% Phil. 00'> People vs. ?indion and Pastor, 66 Phil. %(((> People vs.
Binuya, :% Phil. 0(<> K.?. vs. Reyes, %( Phil. 802> K.?. vs. Acade#ia, %( Phil. 82%. ?ee dissent in $ari#as vs. "irector
of Prisons, '6 Phil. 086, 0'0, 0'87.
3@EREABRE, the order of dis#issal is aCr#ed !ith costs de oAcio.
?B BR"ERE".
%ernando BChairmanC$ Antonio$ Concepcion$ 5r. and 'artin$ 55.$ concur.
#arredo$ 5.$ too! no part.
'artin$ 5.$ was desinated to sit in the Second 6ivision.
4oo+"o+&
W AppelleesJ contention that the Court of Airst 4nstance had no 1urisdiction over the o/ense because inferior courts have
1urisdiction over o/ense in !hich the penalty is i#prison#ent for not #ore than three years, or a ,ne of not #ore
three thousand pesos, or both such ,ne and i#prison#ent and that it is the MuSo+ #unicipal court that has 1urisdiction
is !ron. The Court of Airst 4nstance has concurrent 1urisdiction !ith the inferior court in ## in !hich the penalty
provided by la! is i#prison#ent for #ore than si- #onths, or a ,ne of-#ore than t!o hundred pesos 5?ec. 88DfE,
;udiciary $a!7.
The $a!phil Pro1ect - Arellano $a! Aoundation
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153982 3&/&0%&* 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AU3IT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, throuh a petition for certiorari$ see.s to nullify the decision of the Co##ission on Audit 5CBA, for
brevity7 e#bodied in its 6th 4ndorse#ent, dated ;anuary %:, %990, denyin his clai# for rei#burse#ent under ?ection
:99 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code 5RAC7, as a#ended, in the total a#ount of P8(,<2%.((.
Petitioner is a "irector 44 of the National Bureau of 4nvestiation 5NB47. @e !as hospitali+ed for cholecystitis fro# March
0:, %99( to April 6, %99(, on account of !hich he incurred #edical and hospitali+ation e-penses, the total a#ount of
!hich he is clai#in fro# the CBA.
Bn May %%, %99(, in a #e#orandu# to the NB4 "irector, Alfredo ?. $i# 5"irector $i#, for brevity7, he re*uested
rei#burse#ent for his e-penses on the round that he is entitled to the bene,ts under ?ection :99
1
of the RAC, the
pertinent provisions of !hich read=
?ec. :99. Allowances in case of in<ur($ death$ or sic!ness incurred in performance of dut(. N 3hen a
person in the service of the national overn#ent of a province, city, #unicipality or #unicipal district
is so in1ured in the perfor#ance of duty as thereby to receive so#e actual physical hurt or !ound, the
proper @ead of "epart#ent #ay direct that absence durin any period of disability thereby occasioned
shall be on full pay, thouh not #ore than si- #onths, and in such case he #ay in his discretion also
authori+e the pay#ent of the #edical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital
fees of the in1ured person. Absence in the case conte#plated shall be chared ,rst aainst vacation
leave, if any there be.
--- --- ---
4n case of sic.ness caused by or connected directly !ith the perfor#ance of so#e act in the line of
duty, the "epart#ent head #ay in his discretion authori+e the pay#ent of the necessary hospital fees.
"irector $i# then for!arded petitionerJs clai#, in a %st 4ndorse#ent dated ;une 00, %99(, to the ?ecretary of ;ustice,
alon !ith the co##ent, bearin the sa#e date, of Oerarda Oalan, Chief, $E" of the NB4, &reco##endin favorable
action thereof&. Aindin petitionerJs illness to be service-connected, the Co##ittee on Physical E-a#ination of the
"epart#ent of ;ustice favorably reco##ended the pay#ent of petitionerJs clai#.
@o!ever, then Kndersecretary of ;ustice ?ilvestre @. Bello 444, in a 8th 4ndorse#ent dated Nove#ber 0%, %99(, returned
petitionerJs clai# to "irector $i#, havin considered the state#ents of the Chair#an of the CBA in its 'th 4ndorse#ent
dated %9 ?epte#ber %99(, to the e/ect that the RAC bein relied upon !as repealed by the Ad#inistrative Code of
%9<6.
Petitioner then re-sub#itted his clai# to "irector $i#, !ith a copy of Bpinion No. 62, ?. %99%
2
dated April 0:, %99% of
then ?ecretary of ;ustice Aran.lin M. "rilon 5?ecretary "rilon, for brevity7 statin that &the issuance of the
Ad#inistrative Code did not operate to repeal or abreate in its entirety the Revised Ad#inistrative Code, includin the
particular ?ection :99 of the latter&.
Bn May %(, %99%, "irector $i#, under a 'th 4ndorse#ent trans#itted ane! MecanoJs clai# to then Kndersecretary
Bello for favorable consideration. Knder a :th 4ndorse#ent, dated ;uly 0, %99%, ?ecretary "rilon for!arded petitionerJs
clai# to the CBA Chair#an, reco##endin pay#ent of the sa#e. CBA Chair#an Eufe#io C. "o#ino, in his 6th
4ndorse#ent of ;anuary %:, %990, ho!ever, denied petitionerJs clai# on the round that ?ection :99 of the RAC had
been repealed by the Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6, solely for the reason that the sa#e section !as not restated nor re-
enacted in the Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6. @e co##ented, ho!ever, that the clai# #ay be ,led !ith the E#ployeesJ
Co#pensation Co##ission, considerin that the illness of "irector Mecano occurred after the e/ectivity of the
Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6.
Eventually, petitionerJs clai# !as returned by Kndersecretary of ;ustice Eduardo Montenero to "irector $i# under a
9th 4ndorse#ent dated Aebruary 6, %990, !ith the advice that petitioner &elevate the #atter to the ?upre#e Court if
he so desires&.
Bn the sole issue of !hether or not the Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6 repealed or abroated ?ection :99 of the RAC,
this petition !as brouht for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his clai# on ?ection :99 of the RAC, as a#ended, and on the afore#entioned Bpinion No. 62, ?.
%99% of ?ecretary "rilon. @e further #aintains that in the event that a clai# is ,led !ith the E#ployeesJ Co#pensation
Co##ission, as suested by respondent, he !ould still not be barred fro# ,lin a clai# under the sub1ect section.
Thus, the resolution of !hether or not there !as a repeal of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code of %9%6 !ould decide the
fate of petitionerJs clai# for rei#burse#ent.
The CBA, on the other hand, stronly #aintains that the enact#ent of the Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6 5E-ec. Brder
No. 0907 operated to revo.e or supplant in its entirety the Revised Ad#inistrative Code of %9%6. The CBA clai#s that
fro# the &!hereas& clauses of the ne! Ad#inistrative Code, it can be leaned that it !as the intent of the leislature
to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the CBA *uestions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the ?ecretary of
;ustice in decidin the #atter. $astly, the CBA contends that e#ploy#ent-related sic.ness, in1ury or death is
ade*uately covered by the E#ployeesJ Co#pensation Prora# under P.". :0:, such that to allo! si#ultaneous
recovery of bene,ts under both la!s on account of the sa#e continency !ould be unfair and un1ust to the
Oovern#ent.
The *uestion of !hether a particular la! has been repealed or not by a subse*uent la! is a #atter of leislative intent.
The la!#a.ers #ay e-pressly repeal a la! by incorporatin therein a repealin provision !hich e-pressly and
speci,cally cites the particular la! or la!s, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed.
3
A declaration in a
statute, usually in its repealin clause, that a particular and speci,c la!, identi,ed by its nu#ber or title, is repealed is
an e-press repeal> all others are i#plied repeals.
4
4n the case of the t!o Ad#inistrative Codes in *uestion, the ascertain#ent of !hether or not it !as the intent of the
leislature to supplant the old Code !ith the ne! Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealin clause of the
ne! Code. This provision is found in ?ection 06, Boo. M44 5Ainal Provisions7 of the Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6 !hich
reads=
?ec. 06. 2epealin Clause. N All la!s, decrees, orders, rules and reulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent !ith this Code are hereby repealed or #odi,ed accordinly.
The *uestion that should be as.ed is= 3hat is the nature of this repealin clauseG 4t is certainly not an e-press
repealin clause because it fails to identify or desinate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
6
Rather, it is
an e-a#ple of a eneral repealin provision, as stated in Bpinion No. 62, ?. %99%. 4t is a clause !hich predicates the
intended repeal under the condition that substantial conHict #ust be found in e-istin and prior acts. The failure to
add a speci,c repealin clause indicates that the intent !as not to repeal any e-istin la!, unless an irreconcilable
inconcistency and repunancy e-ist in the ter#s of the ne! and old la!s.
6
This latter situation falls under the cateory
of an i#plied repeal.
Repeal by i#plication proceeds on the pre#ise that !here a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the
part of the leislature to abroate a prior act on the sub1ect, that intention #ust be iven e/ect.
7
@ence, before there
can be a repeal, there #ust be a clear sho!in on the part of the la!#a.er that the intent in enactin the ne! la!
!as to abroate the old one. The intention to repeal #ust be clear and #anifest>
8
other!ise, at least, as a eneral
rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the ,rst act and !ill continue so far
as the t!o acts are the sa#e fro# the ti#e of the ,rst enact#ent.
9
There are t!o cateories of repeal by i#plication. The ,rst is !here provisions in the t!o acts on the sa#e sub1ect
#atter are in an irreconcilable conHict, the later act to the e-tent of the conHict constitutes an i#plied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the !hole sub1ect of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it !ill operate to repeal the earlier la!.
15
4#plied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency ta.es place !hen the t!o statutes cover the sa#e sub1ect #atter> they
are so clearly inconsistent and inco#patible !ith each other that they cannot be reconciled or har#oni+ed> and both
cannot be iven e/ect, that is, that one la! cannot be enforced !ithout nullifyin the other.
11
Co#parin the t!o Codes, it is apparent that the ne! Code does not cover nor atte#pt to cover the entire sub1ect
#atter of the old Code. There are several #atters treated in the old Code !hich are not found in the ne! Code, such
as the provisions on notaries public, the leave la!, the public bondin la!, #ilitary reservations, clai#s for sic.ness
bene,ts under ?ection :99, and still others.
Moreover, the CBA failed to de#onstrate that the provisions of the t!o Codes on the #atter of the sub1ect clai# are in
an irreconcilable conHict. 4n fact, there can be no such conHict because the provision on sic.ness bene,ts of the nature
bein clai#ed by petitioner has not been restated in the Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6. @o!ever, the CBA !ould have
Ks consider that the fact that ?ection :99 !as not restated in the Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6 #eant that the sa#e
section had been repealed. 4t further #aintained that to allo! the particular provisions not restated in the ne! Code to
continue in force arues aainst the Code itself. The CBA anchored this aru#ent on the !hereas clause of the %9<6
Code, !hich states=
3@EREA?, the e/ectiveness of the Oovern#ent !ill be enhanced by a ne! Ad#inistrative Code !hich
incorporate in a uniAed document the #a1or structural, functional and procedural principles and rules
of overnance> and
--- --- ---
4t arues, in e/ect, that !hat is conte#plated is only one Code N the Ad#inistrative Code of %9<6. This contention is
untenable.
The fact that a later enact#ent #ay relate to the sa#e sub1ect #atter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself
suCcient to cause an i#plied repeal of the prior act, since the ne! statute #ay #erely be cu#ulative or a
continuation of the old one.
12
3hat is necessary is a #anifest indication of leislative purpose to repeal.
13
3e co#e no! to the second cateory of repeal N the enact#ent of a statute revisin or codifyin the for#er la!s on
the !hole sub1ect #atter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code !as intended to cover the !hole sub1ect to
be a co#plete and perfect syste# in itself. 4t is the rule that a subse*uent statute is dee#ed to repeal a prior la! if the
for#er revises the !hole sub1ect #atter of the for#er statute.
14
3hen both intent and scope clearly evidence the idea
of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are o#itted fro# the revised act are dee#ed
repealed.
16
Aurther#ore, before there can be an i#plied repeal under this cateory, it #ust be the clear intent of the
leislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act.
16
Accordin to Bpinion No. 62, ?. %99% of the ?ecretary of ;ustice, !hat appears clear is the intent to cover only those
aspects of overn#ent that pertain to ad#inistration, orani+ation and procedure, understandably because of the
#any chanes that transpired in the overn#ent structure since the enact#ent of the RAC decades of years ao. The
CBA challenes the !eiht that this opinion carries in the deter#ination of this controversy inas#uch as the body
!hich had been entrusted !ith the i#ple#entation of this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The
CBA relied on the rule in ad#inistrative la! enunciated in the case of Sison vs.)anramu(en
17
that in the absence of
palpable error or rave abuse of discretion, the Court !ould be loathe to substitute its o!n 1ud#ent for that of the
ad#inistrative aency entrusted !ith the enforce#ent and i#ple#entation of the la!. This !ill not hold !ater. This
principle is sub1ect to li#itations. Ad#inistrative decisions #ay be revie!ed by the courts upon a sho!in that the
decision is vitiated by fraud, i#position or #ista.e.
18
4t has been held that Bpinions of the ?ecretary and
Kndersecretary of ;ustice are #aterial in the construction of statutes in pari materia.
19
$astly, it is a !ell-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by i#plication are not favored.
25
The
presu#ption is aainst inconsistency and repunancy for the leislature is presu#ed to .no! the e-istin la!s on the
sub1ect and not to have enacted inconsistent or conHictin statutes.
21
This Court, in a case, e-plains the principle in detail as follo!s= &Repeals by i#plication are not favored, and !ill not be
decreed unless it is #anifest that the leislature so intended. As la!s are presu#ed to be passed !ith deliberation
!ith full .no!lede of all e-istin ones on the sub1ect, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passin a statute it !as
not intended to interfere !ith or abroate any for#er la! relatin to so#e #atter, unless the repunancy bet!een the
t!o is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincin, and Ho!in necessarily fro# the lanuae used, unless
the later act fully e#braces the sub1ect #atter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
peradventure rene!ed. @ence, every e/ort #ust be used to #a.e all acts stand and if, by any reasonable
construction, they can be reconciled, the later act !ill not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
22
Reardin respondentJs contention that recovery under this sub1ect section shall bar the recovery of bene,ts under the
E#ployeesJ Co#pensation Prora#, the sa#e cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article %62, Chapter 44, Title 44
5dealin on E#ployeesJ Co#pensation and ?tate 4nsurance Aund7, Boo. 4M of the $abor Code, as a#ended by P.".
%90%, e-pressly provides that &the pay#ent of co#pensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of bene,ts as
provided for in ?ection :99 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code . . . !hose bene,ts are ad#inistered by the syste#
5#eanin ??? or O?4?7 or by other aencies of the overn#ent.&
3@EREABRE, pre#ises considered, the Court resolves to ORANT the petition> respondent is hereby ordered to ive due
course to petitionerJs clai# for bene,ts. No costs.
?B BR"ERE".
3arvasa$ C.5.$ Cruz$ %eliciano$ )adilla$ #idin$ Gri.o-A;uino$ 2ealado$ 6avide$ 5r.$ 2omero$ 3ocon$ #ellosillo and 'elo$ 55.$
concur.
Gutierrez$ 5r.$ 5.$ concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
?ECBN" "4M4?4BN
G.R. No. L-38736 M'y 21, 1984
4ELIPE G. TAC-AN, petitioner,
vs.
8ONORA9LE COURT O4 APPEALS '") ELEUTERIO ACOPIA3O, MAGIMINO ACOPIA3O, +$& SPOUSES JESUS
PAG8ASIAN '") PILAR LI9ETARIO, respondents.
Liliano #. 3eri for petitioner.
:ic T. Laca(a for private respondents.
A9A3 SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner, Aelipe O. Tac-An, is a la!yer !hose services !ere enaed by the brothers Eleuterio Acopiado and
Ma-i#ino Acopiado !ho !ere accused of frustrated #urder and theft of lare cattle before the Municipal Court of Ne!
PiSan, Xa#boana del Norte in March, %9:(.
Bn April 8, %9:(, Tac-An caused a docu#ent entitled, &"eed of Iuitclai#& to be thu#b-#ar.ed by the Acopiado
brothers !hereby for the su# of P%,0((.(( representin his fees as their la!yer in the cri#inal cases, they conveyed
to hi# a parcel of land !ith an area of three hectares. The docu#ent !as ac.no!leded before Notary Public Paci,co
Ci#afranca on the sa#e date !ho e-plained its contents to the Acopiados.
Bn April :, %9:(, or t!o days after the e-ecution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-An that they !ere ter#inatin his
services because their !ives and parents did not aree that the land be iven to pay for his services. They also said
that they had hired another la!yer, a relative, to defend the#. But Tac-An continued to represent the#.
4n the case for frustrated #urder, the Acopiados !ere ac*uitted. The cases for theft of lare cattle !ere dis#issed due
to the desistance of the co#plainants.
Bn April 0, %9:%, Eleuterio sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-An to ;esus Pahasian and Pilar
$ibetario but the latter did not ta.e possession thereof.
4n ;une, %9:8, Tac-An appointed 4rineo Mille1o, a barrio captain, as his overseer in the land. Bn ;uly 0, %9:8, Tac-An also
secured the approval of the Provincial Oovernor of Xa#boana del Norte to the "eed of Iuitclai#. And on Bctober 6,
%9:8, Tac-An ,led a co#plaint aainst the Acopiado brothers, Pahasian and $ibetario in the CA4 of Xa#boana del
Norte. @e prayed that he be declared the o!ner of the land> that the sale #ade in favor of Pahasian and o!ner
$ibetario be annulled> and that he be paid da#aes, attorneyJs fees, etc.
The Court of Airst 4nstance decided in favor of Tac-An !hereupon the Acopiados, et al. appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals voided the transfer of the land to Tac-An but held that for his services in the cri#inal cases he
!as entitled to the areed upon a#ount of P%,0((.((. The 1ud#ent of the Court of Appeals reads as follo!s=
3@EREABRE, the 1ud#ent appealed fro# is hereby reversed and set aside. 4n lieu thereof, another
one is rendered orderin the defendants Acopiados to pay the plainti/ the su# of P%,0((.(( !ith
interest at a leal rate fro# the date of the ,nality of this 1ud#ent until full pay#ent thereof. No
pronounce#ent as to costs. 5Rollo, pp. 8(-8%.7
Petitioner Tac-An prays that the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the Court of Airst
4nstance be upheld instead.
The petition is not i#pressed !ith #erit.
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the Acopiado brothers fully understood the tenor of the "eed of Iuitclai#
!hich they e-ecuted. But the Court of Appeals also found as a fact that the Acopiado brothers are Non-Christians,
#ore speci,cally ?ubanons, and that each is #arried to a ?ubanon. And because they are Non-Christians, the Court of
Appeals applied ?ection %8' of the Ad#inistrative Code of Mindanao and ?ulu !hich reads as follo!s=
?ec. %8'. Contracts with 3on-Christians re;uisites. -- ?ave and e-cept contracts of sale or barter of
personal property and contracts of personal service co#prehended in chapter seventeen hereof no
contract or aree#ent shall be #ade in the "epart#ent by any person !ith any Moro or other non-
Christian tribe or portion thereof the "epart#ent or !ith any individual Moro or other non-Christian
inhabitants of the sa#e for the pay#ent or delivery of #oney or other thins of value in present or in
prospective, or in the #anner a/ectin or relatin to any real property, unless such contract or
aree#ent be e-ecuted and approved as follo!s=
--- --- ---
5b7 4t shall be e-ecuted before a 1ude of a court of record, 1ustice or au-illiary 1ustice of the peace, or
notary public, and shall bear the approval of the provincial overnor !herein the sa#e !as e-ecuted
or his representative duly authori+ed in !ritin for such purpose, indorsed upon it.
4t should be stated that under ?ection %8: of the sa#e Code, contracts or aree#ents #ade in violation of ?ec. %8'
shall be &null and void.&
4t should be recalled that on ;uly 0, %9:8, Tac-An secured the approval of the Provincial Oovernor of Xa#boana del
Norte to the "eed of Iuitclai# and that should have satis,ed the re*uire#ent of ?ec. %8' of the Ad#inistrative Code
for Mindanao and ?ulu. But it appears that on April %0, %9:', !hile Tac-AnJs suit !as pendin in the trial court, the
Oovernor of Xa#boana del Norte revo.ed his approval for the reasons stated therein.
The petitioner no! asserts that the revocation of the approval !hich had been iven by the Provincial Oovernor has no
leal e/ect and cannot a/ect his riht to the land !hich had already vested. But as ;ustice Conrado M. Mas*ue+, !ith
;ustices Mateo Canonoy and A#eur,na M. @errera concurrin, said=
The approval by Provincial Oovernor Aelipe A+cuna appearin on the face of the "eed of Iuitclai#
5E-h. &E &7 #ade on ;uly 0, %9:8 #ay no loner be relied upon by the plainti/ in vie! of the revocation
thereof by the sa#e oCcial on April %0, %9:' 5E-h. 87. The revocation !as based on the round that
the sinature of Oovernor A+cuna !as obtained thru a false representation to the e/ect that the
alleed transaction !as leal and voluntary !hen in truth and in fact, as found out later, the said
parcel of land !as the sub1ect #atter of a court litiation> and, #oreover, the non-Christian vendors
!ere not brouht before hi# for interroation, con,r#ation or rati,cation of the alleed deed of
*uitclai#. The fact that the revocation !as #ade after the ,lin of instant action on Bctober %(, %9:8
does not vitiate the aforesaid action of the Provincial Oovernor. ?ini,cantly, no atte#pt !as #ade to
disprove the truth of the reasons stated in the certi,cate of revocation 5E-h. 87. 5Rollo, p. 26.7
The petitioner also arues that the Ad#inistrative Code of Mindanao and ?ulu !as repealed on ;une %9, %9:' by
Republic Act No, 80'0, hence the approval of the Provincial Oovernor beca#e unnecessary. ?uCce it to say that at
ti#es #aterial to the case, i.e. !hen the "eed of Iuitclai# !as e-ecuted, !hen the approval by the Provincial
Oovernor !as iven and !hen the approval !as revo.ed, ?ections %8' and %8: of the Ad#inistrative Code of
Mindanao and ?ulu !ere in full force and e/ect and since they !ere substantive in nature the repealin statute cannot
be iven retroactive e/ect. 4t should also be stated that the land in *uestion #ust be presu#ed to be con1ual in
nature and since the spouses of the Acopiado brothers did not consent to its transfer to the petitioner, the transaction
!as at least voidable.
3@EREABRE ,ndin the petition to be lac.in in #erit, the sa#e is hereby dis#issed !ith costs aainst the petitioner.
?B BR"ERE".
'a!asiar$ A;uino$ Concepcion$ 5r.$ Guerrero$ and 6e Castro$ 55.$ concur.
&scolin$ 5.$ too! no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9637 A-*!l 35, 1967
AMERICAN 9I9LE SOCIETY, plainti/-appellant,
vs.
CITY O4 MANILA, defendant-appellee.
Cit( %iscal &uenio Aneles and 5uan 3a*on for appellant.
Assistant Cit( %iscal Arsenio 3a.awa for appellee.
4ELIG, J.?
Plainti/-appellant is a forein, non-stoc., non-pro,t, reliious, #issionary corporation duly reistered and doin
business in the Philippines throuh its Philippine aency established in Manila in Nove#ber, %<9<, !ith its principal
oCce at :2: 4saac Peral in said City. The defendant appellee is a #unicipal corporation !ith po!ers that are to be
e-ercised in confor#ity !ith the provisions of Republic Act No. 8(9, .no!n as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
4n the course of its #inistry, plainti/Js Philippine aency has been distributin and sellin bibles andTor ospel portions
thereof 5e-cept durin the ;apanese occupation7 throuhout the Philippines and translatin the sa#e into several
Philippine dialects. Bn May 09 %9'2, the actin City Treasurer of the City of Manila infor#ed plainti/ that it !as
conductin the business of eneral #erchandise since Nove#ber, %98', !ithout providin itself !ith the necessary
MayorJs per#it and #unicipal license, in violation of Brdinance No. 2(((, as a#ended, and Brdinances Nos. 0'09,
2(0< and 22:8, and re*uired plainti/ to secure, !ithin three days, the correspondin per#it and license fees, toether
!ith co#pro#ise coverin the period fro# the 8th *uarter of %98' to the 0nd *uarter of %9'2, in the total su# of
P',<0%.8' 5Anne- A7.
Plainti/ protested aainst this re*uire#ent, but the City Treasurer de#anded that plainti/ deposit and pay under
protest the su# of P',<9%.8', if suit !as to be ta.en in court reardin the sa#e 5Anne- B7. To avoid the closin of its
business as !ell as further ,nes and penalties in the pre#ises on Bctober 08, %9'2, plainti/ paid to the defendant
under protest the said per#it and license fees in the afore#entioned a#ount, ivin at the sa#e ti#e notice to the
City Treasurer that suit !ould be ta.en in court to *uestion the leality of the ordinances under !hich, the said fees
!ere bein collected 5Anne- C7, !hich !as done on the sa#e date by ,lin the co#plaint that ave rise to this action.
4n its co#plaint plainti/ prays that 1ud#ent be rendered declarin the said Municipal Brdinance No. 2(((, as
a#ended, and Brdinances Nos. 0'09, 2(0< and 22:8 illeal and unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered
to refund to the plainti/ the su# of P',<9%.8' paid under protest, toether !ith leal interest thereon, and the costs,
plainti/ further prayin for such other relief and re#edy as the court #ay dee# 1ust e*uitable.
"efendant ans!ered the co#plaint, #aintainin in turn that said ordinances !ere enacted by the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila by virtue of the po!er ranted to it by section 0888, subsection 5#-07 of the Revised Ad#inistrative
Code, superseded on ;une %<, %989, by section %<, subsection 5%7 of Republic Act No. 8(9, .no!n as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, and prayin that the co#plaint be dis#issed, !ith costs aainst plainti/. This ans!er !as
replied by the plainti/ reiteratin the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances.
Before trial the parties sub#itted the follo!in stipulation of facts=
CBME NB3 the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their undersined attorneys and respectfully sub#it
the follo!in stipulation of facts=
%. That the plainti/ sold for the use of the purchasers at its principal oCce at :2: 4saac Peral, Manila, Bibles,
Ne! Testa#ents, bible portions and bible concordance in Enlish and other forein lanuaes i#ported by it
fro# the Knited ?tates as !ell as Bibles, Ne! Testa#ents and bible portions in the local dialects i#ported
andTor purchased locally> that fro# the fourth *uarter of %98' to the ,rst *uarter of %9'2 inclusive the sales
#ade by the plainti/ !ere as follo!s=
9uarter Amount of Sales
8th *uarter %98' P%,088.0%
%st *uarter %98: 0,0(:.<'
0nd *uarter %98: %,9'(.2<
2rd *uarter %98: 0,02'.99
8th *uarter %98: 2,0':.(8
%st *uarter %986 %2,08%.(6
0nd *uarter %986 %',668.''
2rd *uarter %986 %8,:'8.%2
8th *uarter %986 %0,'9(.98
%st *uarter %98< %%,%82.9(
0nd *uarter %98< %8,6%'.0:
2rd *uarter %98< 2<,222.<2
8th *uarter %98< %:,%69.9(
%st *uarter %989 02,96'.%(
0nd *uarter %989 %6,<(0.(<
2rd *uarter %989 %:,:8(.69
8th *uarter %989 %',9:%.2<
%st *uarter %9'( %<,':0.8:
0nd *uarter %9'( 0%,<%:.20
2rd *uarter %9'( 0',((8.''
8th *uarter %9'( 8',0<6.90
%st *uarter %9'% 26,<8%.0%
0nd *uarter %9'% 09,%(2.9<
2rd *uarter %9'% 0(,%<%.%(
8th *uarter %9'% 00,9:<.9%
%st *uarter %9'0 02,((0.:'
0nd *uarter %9'0 %6,:0:.9:
2rd *uarter %9'0 %6,90%.(%
8th *uarter %9'0 08,%<(.60
%st *uarter %9'2 09,'%:.0%
0. That the parties hereby reserve the riht to present evidence of other facts not herein stipulated.
3@EREABRE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be set for hearin so that the parties #ay present further
evidence on their behalf. 5Record on Appeal, pp. %'-%:7.
3hen the case !as set for hearin, plainti/ proved, a#on other thins, that it has been in e-istence in the Philippines
since %<99, and that its parent society is in Ne! Qor., Knited ?tates of A#erica> that its, contiuous real properties
located at 4saac Peral are e-e#pt fro# real estate ta-es> and that it !as never re*uired to pay any #unicipal license
fee or ta- before the !ar, nor does the A#erican Bible ?ociety in the Knited ?tates pay any license fee or sales ta- for
the sale of bible therein. Plainti/ further tried to establish that it never #ade any pro,t fro# the sale of its bibles,
!hich are disposed of for as lo! as one third of the cost, and that in order to #aintain its operatin cost it obtains
substantial re#ittances fro# its Ne! Qor. oCce and voluntary contributions and ifts fro# certain churches, both in
the Knited ?tates and in the Philippines, !hich are interested in its #issionary !or.. Reardin plainti/Js contention of
lac. of pro,t in the sale of bibles, defendant retorts that the ad#issions of plainti/-appellantJs lone !itness !ho
testi,ed on cross-e-a#ination that bibles bearin the price of 6( cents each fro# plainti/-appellantJs Ne! Qor. oCce
are sold here by plainti/-appellant at P%.2( each> those bearin the price of Y8.'( each are sold here at P%( each>
those bearin the price of Y6 each are sold here at P%' each> and those bearin the price of Y%% each are sold here at
P00 each, clearly sho! that plainti/Js contention that it never #a.es any pro,t fro# the sale of its bible, is evidently
untenable.
After hearin the Court rendered 1ud#ent, the last part of !hich is as follo!s=
As #ay be seen fro# the repealed section 5#-07 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code and the repealin portions
5o7 of section %< of Republic Act No. 8(9, althouh they see#inly di/er in the !ay the leislative intent is
e-pressed, yet their #eanin is practically the sa#e for the purpose of ta-in the #erchandise #entioned in
said leal provisions, and that the ta-es to be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentae
raduated ta-es 5?ec. 2 of Brdinance No. 2(((, as a#ended, and ?ec. %, Oroup 0, of Brdinance No. 0'09, as
a#ended by Brdinance No. 22:87.
4N M4E3 BA T@E ABREOB4NO CBN?4"ERAT4BN?, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that this case should
be dis#issed, as it is hereby dis#issed, for lac. of #erits, !ith costs aainst the plainti/.
Not satis,ed !ith this verdict plainti/ too. up the #atter to the Court of Appeals !hich certi,ed the case to Ks for the
reason that the errors assined to the lo!er Court involved only *uestions of la!.
Appellant contends that the lo!er Court erred=
%. 4n holdin that Brdinances Nos. 0'09 and 2(((, as respectively a#ended, are not unconstitutional>
0. 4n holdin that subsection #-0 of ?ection 0888 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code under !hich Brdinances
Nos. 0'90 and 2((( !ere pro#ulated, !as not repealed by ?ection %< of Republic Act No. 8(9>
2. 4n not holdin that an ordinance providin for ta-es based on ross sales or receipts, in order to be valid
under the ne! Charter of the City of Manila, #ust ,rst be approved by the President of the Philippines> and
8. 4n holdin that, as the sales #ade by the plainti/-appellant have assu#ed co##ercial proportions, it cannot
escape fro# the operation of said #unicipal ordinances under the cloa. of reliious privilee.
The issues. N As #ay be seen fro# the proceedin state#ent of the case, the issues involved in the present
controversy #ay be reduced to the follo!in= 5%7 !hether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 2(((, as
a#ended, and 0'09, 2(0< and 22:8, are constitutional and valid> and 507 !hether the provisions of said ordinances
are applicable or not to the case at bar.
?ection %, subsection 567 of Article 444 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, provides that=
567 No la! shall be #ade respectin an establish#ent of reliion, or prohibitin the free e-ercise thereof, and
the free e-ercise and en1oy#ent of reliious profession and !orship, !ithout discri#ination or preference, shall
forever be allo!ed. No reliion test shall be re*uired for the e-ercise of civil or political rihts.
Predicated on this constitutional #andate, plainti/-appellant contends that Brdinances Nos. 0'09 and 2(((, as
respectively a#ended, are unconstitutional and illeal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for
reliious censorship and restrain the free e-ercise and en1oy#ent of its reliious profession, to !it= the distribution and
sale of bibles and other reliious literature to the people of the Philippines.
Before enterin into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, 3e shall ,rst consider the provisions of the
*uestioned ordinances in relation to their application to the sale of bibles, etc. by appellant. The records, sho! that by
letter of May 09, %9'2 5Anne- A7, the City Treasurer re*uired plainti/ to secure a MayorJs per#it in connection !ith the
societyJs alleed business of distributin and sellin bibles, etc. and to pay per#it dues in the su# of P2' for the
period covered in this litiation, plus the su# of P2' for co#pro#ise on account of plainti/Js failure to secure the
per#it re*uired by Brdinance No. 2((( of the City of Manila, as a#ended. This Brdinance is of eneral application and
not particularly directed aainst institutions li.e the plainti/, and it does not contain any provisions !hatever
prescribin reliious censorship nor restrainin the free e-ercise and en1oy#ent of any reliious profession. ?ection %
of Brdinance No. 2((( reads as follo!s=
?EC. %. PERM4T? NECE??ARQ. N 4t shall be unla!ful for any person or entity to conduct or enae in any of the
businesses, trades, or occupations enumerated in Section K of this Ordinance or other *usinesses$ trades$ or
occupations for which a permit is re;uired for the proper supervision and enforcement of e>istin laws and
ordinances overnin the sanitation$ securit($ and welfare of the pu*lic and the health of the emplo(ees
enaed in the *usiness speciAed in said section K hereof$ 34T@BKT A4R?T @AM4NO BBTA4NE" A PERM4T
T@EREABR ARBM T@E MAQBR AN" T@E NECE??ARQ $4CEN?E ARBM T@E C4TQ TREA?KRER.
The business, trade or occupation of the plainti/ involved in this case is not particularly #entioned in ?ection 2 of the
Brdinance, and the record does not sho! that a per#it is re*uired therefor under e-istin la!s and ordinances for the
proper supervision and enforce#ent of their provisions overnin the sanitation, security and !elfare of the public and
the health of the e#ployees enaed in the business of the plainti/. @o!ever, sections 2 of Brdinance 2((( contains
ite# No. 69, !hich reads as follo!s=
69. All other businesses, trades or occupations not
#entioned in this Brdinance, e-cept those upon !hich the
City is not e#po!ered to license or to ta- P'.((
Therefore, the necessity of the per#it is #ade to depend upon the po!er of the City to license or ta- said business,
trade or occupation.
As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila re*uired the society to pay fro# the 8th *uarter of %98'
to the %st *uarter of %9'2 in the su# of P',<0%.8', includin the su# of P'( as co#pro#ise, Brdinance No. 0'09, as
a#ended by Brdinances Nos. 0669, 0<0% and 2(0< prescribes the follo!in=
?EC. %. AEE?. N ?ub1ect to the provisions of section '6< of the Revised Brdinances of the City of Manila, as
a#ended, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for enain in any of the businesses or occupations belo!
enu#erated, *uarterly, license fees based on ross sales or receipts reali+ed durin the precedin *uarter in
accordance !ith the rates herein prescribed= PRBM4"E", @B3EMER, That a person enaed in any businesses
or occupation for the ,rst ti#e shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable ross sales or receipts for
the ,rst *uarter beinnin fro# the date of the openin of the business as indicated herein for the
correspondin business or occupation.
- - - - - - - - -
ORBKP 0. N Retail dealers in ne! 5not yet used7 #erchandise, !hich dealers are not yet sub1ect to the
pay#ent of any #unicipal ta-, such as 5%7 retail dealers in eneral merchandise> 507 retail dealers e-clusively
enaed in the sale of . . . boo.s, includin stationery.
- - - - - - - - -
As #ay be seen, the license fees re*uired to be paid *uarterly in ?ection % of said Brdinance No. 0'09, as a#ended,
are not i#posed directly upon any reliious institution but upon those enaed in any of the business or occupations
therein enu#erated, such as retail &dealers in eneral #erchandise& !hich, it is alleed, cover the business or
occupation of sellin bibles, boo.s, etc.
Chapter :( of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code !hich includes section 0888, subsection 5#-07 of said leal body, as
a#ended by Act No. 2:'9, approved on 6ecem*er R$ +QHQ, e#po!ers the Municipal Board of the City of Manila=
5M-07 To ta- and ,- the license fee on 5a7 dealers in ne! auto#obiles or accessories or both, and 5b7 retail
dealers in ne! 5not yet used7 #erchandise, !hich dealers are not yet sub1ect to the pay#ent of any #unicipal
ta-.
Aor the purpose of ta-ation, these retail dealers shall be classi,ed as 5%7 retail dealers in eneral #erchandise,
and 507 retail dealers e-clusively enaed in the sale of 5a7 te-tiles . . . 5e7 boo.s, includin stationery, paper
and oCce supplies, . . .= PRBM4"E", @B3EMER, That the com*ined total ta> of an( de*tor or manufacturer$ or
*oth$ enumerated under these su*sections Bm-+C and Bm-HC$ whether dealin in one or all of the articles
mentioned herein$ SHALL 3OT #& 13 &TC&SS O% %1:& H8362&6 )&SOS )&2 A338'.
and appelleeJs counsel #aintains that City Brdinances Nos. 0'09 and 2(((, as a#ended, !ere enacted in virtue of the
po!er that said Act No. 2::9 conferred upon the City of Manila. Appellant, ho!ever, contends that said ordinances are
loner in force and e/ect as the la! under !hich they !ere pro#ulated has been e-pressly repealed by ?ection %(0
of Republic Act No. 8(9 passed on 5une +R$ +QFQ, .no!n as the Revised Manila Charter.
Passin upon this point the lo!er Court cateorically stated that Republic Act No. 8(9 e-pressly repealed the
provisions of Chapter :( of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code but in the opinion of the trial ;ude, althouh ?ection 0888
5#-07 of the for#er Manila Charter and section %< 5o7 of the ne! see#inly di/er in the !ay the leislative intent !as
e-pressed, yet their #eanin is practically the sa#e for the purpose of ta-in the #erchandise #entioned in both
leal provisions and, conse*uently, Brdinances Nos. 0'09 and 2(((, as a#ended, are to be considered as still in full
force and e/ect uninterruptedly up to the present.
Bften the leislature, instead of si#ply a#endin the pre-e-istin statute, !ill repeal the old statute in its
entirety and by the sa#e enact#ent re-enact all or certain portions of the pree-istin la!. Bf course, the
proble# created by this sort of leislative action involves #ainly the e/ect of the repeal upon rihts and
liabilities !hich accrued under the oriinal statute. Are those rihts and liabilities destroyed or preservedG The
authorities are divided as to the e/ect of si#ultaneous repeals and re-enact#ents. ?o#e adhere to the vie!
that the rihts and liabilities accrued under the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes fro# !hich they
spran are actually ter#inated, even thouh for only a very short period of ti#e. Others$ and the( seem to *e
in the ma<orit($ refuse to accept this view of the situation$ and conse;uentl( maintain that all rihts an
lia*ilities which have accrued under the oriinal statute are preserved and ma( *e enforced$ since the re-
enactment neutralizes the repeal$ therefore$ continuin the law in force without interruption. 5Cra!ford-
?tatutory Construction, ?ec. 2007.
AppellantJs counsel states that section %< 5o7 of Republic Act No, 8(9 introduces a ne! and !ider concept of ta-ation
and is di/erent fro# the provisions of ?ection 08885#-07 that the for#er cannot be considered as a substantial re-
enact#ent of the provisions of the latter. 3e have *uoted above the provisions of section 08885#-07 of the Revised
Ad#inistrative Code and 3e shall no! copy hereunder the provisions of ?ection %<, subdivision 5o7 of Republic Act No.
8(9, !hich reads as follo!s=
5o7 To ta- and ,- the license fee on dealers in eneral #erchandise, includin i#porters and indentors, e-cept
those dealers !ho #ay be e-pressly sub1ect to the pay#ent of so#e other #unicipal ta- under the provisions
of this section.
"ealers in eneral #erchandise shall be classi,ed as 5a7 !holesale dealers and 5*7 retail dealers. Aor purposes
of the ta- on retail dealers, eneral #erchandise shall be classi,ed into four #ain classes= na#ely 5%7 lu-ury
articles, 507 se#i-lu-ury articles, 527 essential co##odities, and 587 #iscellaneous articles. A separate license
shall be prescribed for each class but !here co##odities of di/erent classes are sold in the sa#e
establish#ent, it shall not be co#pulsory for the o!ner to secure #ore than one license if he pays the hiher
or hihest rate of ta- prescribed by ordinance. 3holesale dealers shall pay the license ta- as such, as #ay be
provided by ordinance.
Aor purposes of this section, the ter# &Oeneral #erchandise& shall include poultry and livestoc., aricultural
products, ,sh and other allied products.
The only essential di/erence that 3e ,nd bet!een these t!o provisions that #ay have any bearin on the case at bar,
is that, !hile subsection 5#-07 prescribes that the co#bined total ta- of any dealer or #anufacturer, or both,
enu#erated under subsections 5#-%7 and 5#-07, !hether dealin in one or all of the articles #entioned therein,shall
not *e in e>cess of )DEE per annum, the correspondin section %<, subsection 5o7 of Republic Act No. 8(9, does not
contain any li#itation as to the a#ount of ta- or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annu#. @ence, and in
accordance !ith the !eiht of the authorities above referred to that #aintain that &all rihts and liabilities !hich have
accrued under the oriinal statute are preserved and #ay be enforced, since the reenact#ent neutrali+es the repeal,
therefore continuin the la! in force !ithout interruption&, 3e hold that the *uestioned ordinances of the City of
Manila are still in force and e/ect.
Plainti/, ho!ever, arues that the *uestioned ordinances, to be valid, #ust ,rst be approved by the President of the
Philippines as per section %<, subsection 5ii7 of Republic Act No. 8(9, !hich reads as follo!s=
5ii7 To ta-, license and reulate any business, trade or occupation bein conducted !ithin the City of Manila,not
otherwise enumerated in the precedin su*sections$ includin percentae ta>es *ased on ross sales or
receipts$ su*<ect to the approval of the )2&S16&3T$ e>cept amusement ta>es.
but this re*uire#ent of the PresidentJs approval !as not contained in section 0888 of the for#er Charter of the City of
Manila under !hich Brdinance No. 0'09 !as pro#ulated. Any!ay, as stated by appelleeJs counsel, the business of
&retail dealers in eneral #erchandise& is e-pressly enu#erated in subsection 5o7, section %< of Republic Act No. 8(9>
hence, an ordinance prescribin a #unicipal ta- on said business does not have to be approved by the President to be
e/ective, as it is not a#on those referred to in said subsection 5ii7. Moreover, the *uestioned ordinances are still in
force, havin been pro#ulated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila under the authority ranted to it by la!.
The *uestion that no! re#ains to be deter#ined is !hether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or
unconstitutional if applied to the alleed business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines by a
reliious corporation li.e the A#erican Bible ?ociety, plainti/ herein.
3ith reard to Brdinance No. 0'09, as a#ended by Brdinances Nos. 0669, 0<0% and 2(0<, appellant contends that it
is unconstitutional and illeal because it restrains the free e-ercise and en1oy#ent of the reliious profession and
!orship of appellant.
Article 444, section %, clause 567 of the Constitution of the Philippines afore*uoted, uarantees the freedo# of reliious
profession and !orship. &Reliion has been spo.en of as a profession of faith to an active po!er that binds and
elevates #an to its Creator& 5Alipay vs. Rui+, :8 Phil., 0(%7.4t has reference to oneJs vie!s of his relations to @is
Creator and to the obliations they i#pose of reverence to @is bein and character, and obedience to @is 3ill
5"avis vs. Beason, %22 K.?., 2807. The constitutional uaranty of the free e-ercise and en1oy#ent of reliious
profession and !orship carries !ith it the riht to disse#inate reliious infor#ation. Any restraints of such riht can
only be 1usti,ed li.e other restraints of freedo# of e-pression on the rounds that there is a clear and present daner
of any substantive evil !hich the ?tate has the riht to prevent&. 5TaSada and Aernando on the Constitution of the
Philippines, Mol. %, 8th ed., p. 0967. 4n the case at bar the license fee herein involved is i#posed upon appellant for its
distribution and sale of bibles and other reliious literature=
4n the case of 'urdoc! vs. )enns(lvania, it !as held that an ordinance re*uirin that a license be obtained
before a person could canvass or solicit orders for oods, paintins, pictures, !ares or #erchandise cannot be
#ade to apply to #e#bers of ;ehovahJs 3itnesses !ho !ent about fro# door to door distributin literature
and solicitin people to &purchase& certain reliious boo.s and pa#phlets, all published by the 3atch To!er
Bible L Tract ?ociety. The &price& of the boo.s !as t!enty-,ve cents each, the &price& of the pa#phlets ,ve
cents each. 4t !as sho!n that in #a.in the solicitations there !as a re*uest for additional &contribution& of
t!enty-,ve cents each for the boo.s and ,ve cents each for the pa#phlets. $esser su# !ere accepted,
ho!ever, and boo.s !ere even donated in case interested persons !ere !ithout funds.
Bn the above facts the ?upre#e Court held that it could not be said that petitioners !ere enaed in
co##ercial rather than a reliious venture. Their activities could not be described as e#braced in the
occupation of sellin boo.s and pa#phlets. Then the Court continued=
&3e do not #ean to say that reliious roups and the press are free fro# all ,nancial burdens of overn#ent.
?ee Gros<ean vs. American )ress Co., 096 K.?., 022, 0'(, <( $. ed. ::(, ::<, ': ?. Ct. 888. 3e have here
so#ethin *uite di/erent, for e-a#ple, fro# a ta- on the inco#e of one !ho enaes in reliious activities or a
ta- on property used or e#ployed in connection !ith activities. 4t is one thin to i#pose a ta- on the inco#e or
property of a preacher. 4t is *uite another to e-act a ta- fro# hi# for the privilee of deliverin a ser#on. The
ta- i#posed by the City of ;eannette is a Hat license ta-, pay#ent of !hich is a condition of the e-ercise of
these constitutional privilees. The po!er to ta- the e-ercise of a privilee is the po!er to control or suppress
its en1oy#ent. . . . Those !ho can ta- the e-ercise of this reliious practice can #a.e its e-ercise so costly as
to deprive it of the resources necessary for its #aintenance. Those !ho can ta- the privilee of enain in
this for# of #issionary evanelis# can close all its doors to all those !ho do not have a full purse. ?preadin
reliious beliefs in this ancient and honorable #anner !ould thus be denied the needy. . . .
4t is contended ho!ever that the fact that the license ta- can suppress or control this activity is uni#portant if
it does not do so. But that is to disreard the nature of this ta-. 4t is a license ta- N a Hat ta- i#posed on the
e-ercise of a privilee ranted by the Bill of Rihts . . . The po!er to i#pose a license ta- on the e-ercise of
these freedo# is indeed as potent as the po!er of censorship !hich this Court has repeatedly struc. do!n. . . .
4t is not a no#inal fee i#posed as a reulatory #easure to defray the e-penses of policin the activities in
*uestion. 4t is in no !ay apportioned. 4t is Hat license ta- levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of
activities !hose en1oy#ent is uaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and reliion and inevitably
tends to suppress their e-ercise. That is al#ost unifor#ly reconi+ed as the inherent vice and evil of this Hat
license ta-.&
Nor could disse#ination of reliious infor#ation be conditioned upon the approval of an oCcial or #anaer
even if the to!n !ere o!ned by a corporation as held in the case of 'arsh vs. State of Ala*ama 520: K.?.
'(%7, or by the Knited ?tates itself as held in the case of Tuc.er vs. Te-as 520: K.?. '%67. 4n the for#er case
the ?upre#e Court e-pressed the opinion that the riht to en1oy freedo# of the press and reliion occupies a
preferred position as aainst the constitutional riht of property o!ners.
&3hen !e balance the constitutional rihts of o!ners of property aainst those of the people to en1oy freedo#
of press and reliion, as !e #ust here, !e re#ain #indful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred
position. . . . 4n our vie! the circu#stance that the property rihts to the pre#ises !here the deprivation of
property here involved, too. place, !ere held by others than the public, is not suCcient to 1ustify the ?tateJs
per#ittin a corporation to overn a co##unity of citi+ens so as to restrict their funda#ental liberties and the
enforce#ent of such restraint by the application of a ?tate statute.& 5TaSada and Aernando on the Constitution
of the Philippines, Mol. %, 8th ed., p. 2(8-2(:7.
?ection 06 of Co##on!ealth Act No. 8::, other!ise .no!n as the National 4nternal Revenue Code, provides=
?EC. 06. EREMPT4BN? ARBM TAR BN CBRPBRAT4BN?. N The follo!in orani+ations shall not be ta-ed under
this Title in respect to inco#e received by the# as such N
5e7 Corporations or associations orani+ed and operated e-clusively for reliious, charitable, . . . or educational
purposes, . . .= Provided, ho!ever, That the inco#e of !hatever .ind and character fro# any of its properties,
real or personal, or fro# any activity conducted for pro,t, reardless of the disposition #ade of such inco#e,
shall be liable to the ta- i#posed under this Code>
AppellantJs counsel clai#s that the Collector of 4nternal Revenue has e-e#pted the plainti/ fro# this ta- and says that
such e-e#ption clearly indicates that the act of distributin and sellin bibles, etc. is purely reliious and does not fall
under the above leal provisions.
4t #ay be true that in the case at bar the price as.ed for the bibles and other reliious pa#phlets !as in so#e
instances a little bit hiher than the actual cost of the sa#e but this cannot #ean that appellant !as enaed in the
business or occupation of sellin said &#erchandise& for pro,t. Aor this reason 3e believe that the provisions of City of
Manila Brdinance No. 0'09, as a#ended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doin so it !ould i#pair its free
e-ercise and en1oy#ent of its reliious profession and !orship as !ell as its rihts of disse#ination of reliious beliefs.
3ith respect to Brdinance No. 2(((, as a#ended, !hich re*uires the obtention the MayorJs per#it before any person
can enae in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enu#erated therein, 3e do not ,nd that it i#poses any
chare upon the en1oy#ent of a riht ranted by the Constitution, nor ta- the e-ercise of reliious practices. 4n the
case of Coleman vs. Cit( of Grifn, %<9 ?.E. 806, this point !as elucidated as follo!s=
An ordinance by the City of OriCn, declarin that the practice of distributin either by hand or other!ise,
circulars, handboo.s, advertisin, or literature of any .ind, !hether said articles are bein delivered free, or
!hether sa#e are bein sold !ithin the city li#its of the City of OriCn, !ithout ,rst obtainin !ritten
per#ission fro# the city #anaer of the City of OriCn, shall be dee#ed a nuisance and punishable as an
o/ense aainst the City of OriCn, does not deprive defendant of his constitutional riht of the free e>ercise
and en<o(ment of reliious profession and worship$ even thouh it prohi*its him from introducin and carr(in
out a scheme or purpose which he sees At to claim as a part of his reliious s(stem.
4t see#s clear, therefore, that Brdinance No. 2((( cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plainti/
?ociety. But as Brdinance No. 0'09 of the City of Manila, as a#ended, is not applicable to plainti/-appellant and
defendant-appellee is po!erless to license or ta- the business of plainti/ ?ociety involved herein for, as stated before,
it !ould i#pair plainti/Js riht to the free e-ercise and en1oy#ent of its reliious profession and !orship, as !ell as its
rihts of disse#ination of reliious beliefs, 3e ,nd that Brdinance No. 2(((, as a#ended is also inapplicable to said
business, trade or occupation of the plainti/.
3herefore, and on the strenth of the foreoin considerations, 3e hereby reverse the decision appealed fro#,
sentencin defendant return to plainti/ the su# of P',<9%.8' unduly collected fro# it. 3ithout pronounce#ent as to
costs. 4t is so ordered.
#enzon$ )adilla$ 'ontema(or$ #autista Anelo$ La*rador$ Concepcion and &ndencia$ 55.$ concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11666 J'"u'*y 6, 1917
T8E UNITE3 STATES, plainti/-appellee,
vs.
GA9INO SOLIMAN, defendant-appellant.
%rancisco Sevilla for appellant.
Attorne(-General Avance.a for appellee.
CARSON, J.?
The evidence of record conclusively discloses that the defendant and appellant in this case, Oabino ?oli#an, testifyin
in his on behalf in the course of another cri#inal case in !hich he, !ith several others, !as chared !ithestafa, s!ore
falsely to certain #aterial alleations of fact.
Bn that occasion he testi,ed falsely that a s!orn state#ent o/ered in evidence in support of the chare of estafa,
!hich !as in e/ect an e-tra1udicial confession of his uilt, had not been e-ecuted voluntarily, and that its e-ecution
had not been procured by the police by the use of force, inti#idation and proloned torture.
The trial 1ude !ho presided in the for#er case ac*uitted the accused on the round that there !as roo# for
reasonable doubt as to !hether the e-tra1udicial confession had been #ade voluntarily, and his action in this reard
clearly establishes the #ateriality of the false testi#ony sub#itted in that case> #oreover, the #ateriality of the
evidence is #anifest !ithout considerin the 1ud#ent in the case in !hich it !as sub#itted, since, if accepted as
true, this false testi#ony necessarily had the e/ect of renderin !holly inco#petent the evidence as to the
e-tra1udicial confession !hich other!ise !ould al#ost conclusively sustain and necessitate a conviction. 5K.
?. vs.EstraSa, %: Phil. Rep., '0(.7
There can be no doubt that the accused !as uilty of the cri#e of per1ury as de,ned and penali+ed in section 2 of Act
No. %:96 and that the sentence of si- #onthsJ i#prison#ent and P2(( ,ne i#posed by the trial 1ude !as correctly
i#posed under the provisions of that statute.
4t appears ho!ever that since 1ud#ent !as entered in this case on Nove#ber 02, %9%', section 2 of Act No. %:96 has
been e-pressly repealed by the enact#ent of the Ad#inistrative Code, !hich beca#e e/ective on ;uly %, %9%:, and it
has been suested that the 1ud#ent convictin and sentencin the accused under the provisions of that statute
should not be sustained, and that the repeal of the statute should be held to have the e/ect of re#ittin and
e-tinuishin the cri#inal responsibility of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed la! prior to the
enact#ent of the Ad#inistrative Code. 3e cannot aree !ith the proposition thus stated.
4n the case of Knited ?tates vs. Cuna 5%0 Phil. Rep., 08%7, !e held as follo!s=
The rule of interpretation of Enlish and A#erican co##on la!, by virtue of !hich the repeal of a la!
prescribin penalties is held to have the e/ect of re#ittin or e-tinuishin any penalty, loss of rihts or
responsibility incurred under such la!, as to all persons !ho have not been convicted and sentenced under the
provisions of such la! prior to the enact#ent of the repealin la!, is not and has not been the accepted
doctrine in these 4slands.
3here an Act of the Co##ission or of the Philippine $eislature !hich penali+es an o/ense, such repeal does
not have the e/ect of thereafter deprivin the courts of 1urisdiction to try, convict and sentence o/enders
chared !ith violations of the old la! prior to its repeal.
A *uestion does arise, ho!ever, as to the penalty !hich should be i#pose upon the convict.
4f the repealin statute provides or has the e/ect of providin ne! penalties for the co##ission of the acts penali+ed
under the repealed statute, should the penalty be i#posed in accordance !ith the old or the ne! statuteG
Article % of the Penal Code in force in these 4slands de,nes cri#es and #isde#eanors as voluntary acts or o#issions
penali+ed by la!> and co#ple#entary to this provision, article 0% provides that no cri#e or #isde#eanor shall be
punished !ith a penalty !hich has not been prescribed by la! prior to its co##ission. 4n accordance !ith these
provisions the *uestion !hether an act is punishable or not depends upon the *uestion !hether or not at the time of
its commission, there !as a la! in force !hich penali+ed it> this rule bein #odi,ed, ho!ever, by article 00 of the
sa#e code, !hich provides that penal la!s shall have a retroactive e/ect in so far as they favor persons convicted of a
cri#e or #isde#eanor.
The courts of ?pain and the learned co##entators on ?panish la! have construed these provisions to #ean that such
penal la!s are to be iven a retroactive e/ect only in so far as they favor the defendant chared !ith a cri#e or a
#isde#eanor, and that, !hen a penal la! is enacted repealin a prior la!, such repeal does not have the e/ect of
relievin an o/ender in !hole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old la!, unless the ne! la! favors the
defendant by di#inishin the penalty or doin a!ay !ith it altoether, and then only to the e-tent to !hich the ne!
la! is favorable to the o/ender. 4n other !ords, that the enact#ent of ne! penal la!s, not!ithstandin the fact that
they contain eneral repealin clauses, doe not deprive the courts of 1urisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons
chared !ith violations of the old la! prior to the date !hen the repealin la! oes into e/ect, unless the ne! la!
!holly fails to penalties the acts !hich constituted the o/ense de,ned and penali+ed in the repealed la!.
Thus Pacheco, co##entin upon the ne! Penal Code of %<8<-%<'(, of !hich article '(: provided that all eneral
penal la!s !ere repealed by its publication, says=
At this ti#e !hen the Penal Code is bein put into e/ect and iven force, !e have in fact t!o cri#inal la!s in
?pain, and close attention is necessary to apply the# properly. There #ay be prosecutions !hich it is
necessary to dis#iss, as, for e-a#ple, those for sodo#y> others !hich it #ay be necessary to decide in
confor#ity !ith the provisions of the ne! codes, as, for e-a#ple, those for carryin concealed !eapons> and
others !hich #ust be 1uded in accordance !ith the old provisions, as, for e-a#ple. #any cases of robbery.
The rules of procedure in one or other #anner bein furnished us by the for#er article 5article %9 of the Penal
Code of ?pain identical !ith article 0% of the Penal Code of the Philippines7, and the present article 5article 0(
of the Penal Code of ?pain and article 00 of the Philippine Code7. @as the code increased the penaltyG Then it
is not applicable to cri#es co##itted prior to its enact#ent. @as it e-tinuished or di#inished the#G Then it is
clearly applicable to the#. 5% Pacheco, 09:.7
And a si#ilar construction !as placed upon the provisions of the Penal Code of %<6( by the supre#e court of ?pain.
Article :0: of this code 5!hich is substantially identical !ith article '(: of the Penal Code of %<8< and article :%% of
the Penal Code of the Philippine 4slands7 repealed all eneral penal la!s prior to its pro#ulation, but the court held
that, !here a cri#e !as co##itted prior to the publication of the refor#ed code, the penalty prescribed by the code of
%<'( 5the code prior to that of %<6(7 bein #ore favorable to the accused, that #ust be applied. 5"ecision of the
supre#e court of ?pain, %6th of ;anuary, %<62.7
3e conclude therefore that in any case in !hich a statute prescribin a penalty for the co##ission of a speci,c
o/ense is repealed, and in !hich the ne! statute provides ne! and distinct penalties for the co##ission of such
o/ense, the penalty !hich #ust be i#posed on one !ho co##itted the o/ense prior to the enact#ent of the
repealin statute is that one !hich is #ore favorable to the convict. 5K. ?. vs. Cuna, %0 Phil. Rep., 08%.7
4t see#s i#portant, then, to deter#ine !hether the repeal of section 2 of Act No. %:96 by the enact#ent of the
Ad#inistrative Code had the e/ect of providin ne! and distinct penalties for the co##ission of the cri#e of per1ury,
and !hether the ne! penalties are or are not #ore favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those i#posed by
the trial 1ude.
?ection 2 of Act No. %:96, !hich de,ned and penali+ed the cri#e of per1ury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code
de,nin and penali+in the cri#e of per1ury, not e-pressly, but by i#plication, and !e are of opinion that the repeal of
Act No. %:96 revived those provisions of the code. 5K. ?. vs. Concepcion, %2 Phil. Rep., 808> K. ?. vs.EstraSa, %: Phil.
Rep., '0(.7
4n the absence of the #ost e-press lanuae to the contrary it !ill not be presu#ed that it !as the intention of the
leislator to let false s!earin as to a #aterial #atter in a court of 1ustice o unpunished, and such !ould be the e/ect
of the repeal of section 2 of Act No. %:96, unless !e held that the repeal had the e/ect of revivin the old statute.
At the co##on la! the repeal of a repealin act revived the for#er act 5: Co., %99> % Oray, %:2> 6 3. L ?., 0:2> 0
Blac.stone, 20> '8 N. ;. $. ;., %6'7> and the ?upre#e Court of the Knited ?tates has held that the repeal of a repealin
la! has this e/ect, unless the lanuae of the repealin statute or so#e eneral statute provides other!ise. 5K.
?. vs. Btis, %0( K. ?., '0 D%%'E.7
Manifestly, !ith this rule in #ind, section %0 of the Ad#inistrative Code 5Act No. 0:'67 !hich is found in Article 444,
DChapter 4E dealin !ith the for# and e/ect of la!s in eneral, provides that &!hen a la! !hich e-pressly repeals a
prior la! is itself repealed the la! ,rst repealed shall not be thereby revived unless e-pressly so provided.& Aro# !hich
it #ay fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force !here a la! !hich repeals a prior la!, not e-pressly but by
i#plication, it itself repealed> and that in such cases the repeal of the repealin la! revives the prior la!, unless the
lanuae of the repealin statute provides other!ise.
Applyin this rule, !e conclude that the e-press repeal of section 2 of Act No. %:96 by the enact#ent of the
Ad#inistrative Code 5Act No. 0:'67 revived the provisions of the Penal Code touchin per1ury, !hich !ere the#selves
repealed, not e-pressly but by i#plication, by the enact#ent of Act No. %:96.
A co#parison of the penalties prescribed in the Penal Code for the co##ission of the acts of !hich the accused in the
case at bar !as convicted, ivin hi# as !e should the bene,t of the provisions of Act No. 0%80, discloses that the
penalty prescribed therein is less than that i#posed upon the appellant under the provisions of section 2 of Act No.
%:96, and !e conclude fro# !hat has been said already that the penalty i#posed by the court belo! should be
revo.ed and that in lieu thereof the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be i#posed upon the convict.
A *uestion has been raised as to !hether, ad#ittin that the provisions of the Penal Code touchin per1ury have been
revived, the accused can be convicted and penali+ed thereunder, it appearin that at the ti#e !hen he testi,ed falsely
he !as testifyin in his o!n behalf in a cri#inal case in !hich he hi#self !as the accused, on trial for the co##ission
of a rave o/ense.
4n the case of Knited ?tates vs. Outierre+ 5%0 Phil. Rep., '097, !e said, spea.in throuh Chief ;ustice Arellano, that,
&Per1ury co##itted by a party in his o!n cause !ould not be punishable under ?panish leislation, because in said
leislation no one !as a !itness in his o!n cause, and could not therefore beco#e uilty of ivin false testi#ony in a
civil cause in !hich he !as either the plainti/ or the defendant> but under the procedure in force by virtue of Act No.
%9(, a party to a suit #ay testify in his o!n behalf, and if he declares falsely under oath as a !itness in his o!n cause,
li.e any other !itness, he incurs the penalty by !hich false testi#ony in civil #atters is repressed and punished. This
court has so held, it bein a settled rule, that the false testi#ony iven by a litiant as a !itness constitutes the cri#e
of ivin false testi#ony inas#uch as such a declaration, accordin to the ne! la!s in force, #ay deter#ine a
1ud#ent in his favor and to the pre1udice of the adverse party, and that a litiant !ho, in s!orn testi#ony iven by
hi# as a !itness in a civil cause, shall pervert the truth and ive false testi#ony, incurs as such !itness the penalties
i#posed by article 20% of the Penal Code.&
Analoous reasonin leads to a li.e conclusion as to the cri#inal liability for per1ury of a defendant in a cri#inal case
testifyin falsely in his o!n behalf. Knder the provisions of Oeneral Brders No. '< an accused person #ay, if he so
desires, testify under oath in his o!n behalf, and in that event, &if he declares falsely as a !itness in his o!n cause,
li.e any other !itness, he incurs the penalty by !hich false testi#ony& in cri#inal #atters &is repressed and punished.&
4t has been suested that such a rulin !ill have a tendency to e-pose accused persons to ve-atious cri#inal
prosecutions by prosecutin oCcers, !ho, havin failed to secure a conviction on the oriinal chare, #ay be disposed
to institute cri#inal prosecutions for per1ury fro# a vindictive un!illinness to let the defendant escape scot free fro#
the #eshes of the la!. 4t is said also that the fear of subse*uent prosecution for per1ury !ill tend to e#barrass accused
persons in their e/orts to defend the#selves by testifyin in their o!n behalf. But si#ilar ob1ections #ay be advanced
aainst the prosecution of any of the !itnesses called for the defense on chares of per1ury, and it #ust not be
forotten that the riht of an accused person to testify under oath in his o!n behalf is secured to hi#, not that he #ay
be enabled to introduce false testi#ony into the record, but to enable hi# to spread upon the record the truth as to
any #atter !ithin his .no!lede !hich !ill tend to establish his innocence.
Bf course #uch #ust be left to the ood sense and sound 1ud#ent of the prosecutin oCcer in deter#inin !hether
a prosecution for per1ury should be instituted aainst an accused person !hose testi#ony in his o!n behalf !ould
see# to be per1ured.
"ue reard for the situation in !hich an accused person ,nds hi#self !hen testifyin in his o!n behalf in a cri#inal
proceedin !ill restrain a prudent prosecutin oCcer fro# the ,lin of chares of per1ury in every case in !hich he
#ay have reason to believe that the accused has not adhered strictly to the truth, in his an-iety to shield hi#self fro#
punish#ent. But !hen, as in the case at bar, an accused person voluntarily oes upon the !itness stand and falsely
i#putes so#e other person the co##ission of a rave o/ense, it !ould see# to be hihly proper that he should be
called to account in a cri#inal action for per1ury upon the co#plaint of the person aainst !ho# such false chares
are #ade.
Article 2%9 of the Penal Code is as follo!s=
Any person !ho shall ive false testi#ony in favor of a defendant in a cri#inal case shall su/er a penalty
ranin fro# arresto ma(or in its #a-i#u# deree to prision correccional in its #ediu# deree and a ,ne of
not less than three hundred and seventy-,ve and not #ore than three thousand seven hundred and
,ftypesetas, if the case !ere for a felony, and the penalty of arresto ma(or if it !ere for a #isde#eanor.
3e conclude that the 1ud#ent of conviction entered in the court belo! should be aCr#ed but that the sentence
i#posed therein should be reversed, and that ivin the accused the bene,t of the provisions of Act No. 0%80, a
penalty of 8 #onths and % day of arresto ma(or and a ,ne of P6' !ith subsidiary i#prison#ent as prescribed by la!
should be i#posed upon hi# in lieu of that i#posed by the trial 1ude, !ith the costs of this instance de ofcio. ?o
ordered.
Torres$ 5ohnson and Araullo$ 55.$ concur.
S&-'*'+& O-!"!o"
MORELAN3, J., dissentin=
4 aree that the provisions of the Penal Code relative to false s!earin !ere revived by the repeal of Act No. %:96 by
the Ad#inistrative Code.
4 cannot believe, ho!ever, that the Penal Code intended to include a defendant in a cri#inal action a#on those !ho
are to be punished for false s!earin.
The defendant in the case at bar is chared !ith havin s!orn falsely !hen testifyin in his o!n behalf !hile on trial
chared !ith estafa, in that, on that trial, he testi,ed that a certain !ritten confession of his uilt alleed to have been
#ade by hi# and put in evidence aainst hi# !as false in its state#ent of the facts and had been obtained fro# hi#
by threats, inti#idation and violence.
Bn the trial for estafa the court accepted as a true enouh of the testi#ony of the accused as to the #anner in !hich
the confession had been obtained to raise in his #ind a reasonable doubt as to the voluntary character of the
confession> and, there not bein other evidence suCcient to sustain a conviction, the accused !as ac*uitted.
4 cannot brin #yself to believe, as 4 have already stated, that the provisions of the Penal Code de,nin false s!earin
include the false testi#ony of a defendant in a cri#inal action iven in his o!n behalf.
4n the ,rst place, the !ordin of the la! does not include hi#. Article 2%9 provides=
Any person !ho shall ive false testi#ony in favor of a defendant in a cri#inal case shall su/er a penalty
ranin fro# arresto ma(or in its #a-i#u# deree to prision correccional in its #ediu# deree and a ,ne of
not less than three hundred and seventy-,ve and not #ore than three thousand seven hundred and
,ftypesetas, if the case !ere for a felony, and the penalty of arresto ma(or if it !ere for a #isde#eanor.
The lanuae itself plainly sho!s that the &person !ho shall ive false testi#ony& is not the defendant in the action
but a di/erent person N a witness and not a part(, an outsider and not one !hose life or liberty depends on the result
of the action.
4n the second place, the defendant in a cri#inal action could not be a !itness !hen the Penal Code !as adopted and,
accordinly, the fra#ers of the Penal Code could not have conte#plated hi# as the &person !ho shall ive false
testi#ony.& 5K. ?. vs. Outierre+, %0 Phil. Rep., '09.7
Thirdly, there is a reason iven by Miada !hy the ?panish la! did not punish a party for false s!earin even in those
proceedins in !hich false s!earin !as punishable and in !hich he !as allo!ed to testify. 4n volu#e 0 of his
co##entaries on the Penal Code, at pae 8:' and 8::, he puts this *uestion &3ill a party !ho testi,es falsely in his
ans!ers to interroatories prepared in a civil case be uilty of false s!earinG& And ans!ers it as follo!s=
4t is !orth !hile to consider this *uestion here !as !e have recently seen a 1ude in this city order prepared a
copy of the testi#ony iven by a defendant in ans!er to interroatories prepared in a civil suit as a basis for a
cri#inal action aainst hi# because the 1ude believed that he had testi,ed falsely in ans!erin said
interroatories. A part( !ho testi,es falsely in reply to interroatories cannot be prosecuted for false s!earin
for the si#ple reason that he is not a !itness, for, as the "iest says, nullus indoneus testis in re sua
intelliitur> and, besides, if the leislator had !ished to punish the per1ury of a party he !ould have done so by
includin in the Penal Code a special provision to that e/ect, as !as done in the Arench Penal Code by art. 2::.
The ?panish la! too. into consideration the frailty of hu#an nature> it believed that a false oath iven by
a part( !as suCciently punished by his conscience, especially in vie! of the fact that, as a learned author has
said, for a #an to testify aainst hi#self for #ere love of or respect for the truth is certainly heroic, and by
reason of the very fact that it is heroic no one should be conde#ned cri#inally for not doin it.
4f it is true that it !as not the intention of the fra#ers of the Penal Code to #a.e a defendant in a cri#inal action !ho
should testify falsely in his o!n behalf uilty of per1ury, the #ere fact of #a.in hi# a co#petent !itness in the case
is not suCcient to include hi# !ithin the provisions relatin to false s!earin, !hen, but for the fact of bein a
co#petent !itness, he !ould not be included. 4f there is any doubt that a iven class of person is included in a penal
provision it should be e-cluded.
Aor the reason stated, 4 have rave doubts of the intention of the ?panish la!#a.ers to include a defendant in a
cri#inal action as one of the &!itnesses& !ho could co##it the cri#e of false s!earin> and it is the ?panish la! of
cri#es !e are applyin and not the A#erican la! of the co#petency of !itnesses. The intention of the la! bein to
e-clude a part( fro# its operation, that intention cannot loically be held to have been chaned by ivin the party an
additional attribute. Althouh he #ay be #ade a !itness he still re#ains a party> and Miada says that the ?panish la!
never intended to hold a defendant !ho testi,ed falsely to save his nec. fro# the allo!s to the sa#e responsibility as
a #ere !itness !ho has absolutely nothin to lose by his testi#ony.
Oroi+ard #a.es a suestion !hich approaches the *uestion in hand very closely and sho!s the trend of 1udicial as
!ell as leislative thouht on the sub1ect under discussion. ?pea.in of the person !ho, under the Penal Code, #ay be
punished for false s!earin, he says &There is one e-ception !hich !e could have !ished our code to #a.e in
connection !ith the #atter !e are discussin, and that is that its provisions shall not apply to those !itnesses !hose
honor !ould be sullied by the truth or !ho, if they testi,ed truthfully, !ould be e-posed to the ris. of a cri#inal
prosecution. Nor should he be held to ans!er to a chare of false s!earin !ho testi,es falsely to save his parents, his
brothers or sisters, or his relations !ithin the fourth deree. The la! should not so far foret the po!er and inHuence of
personal interest and fa#ily ties as to re*uire as a leal duty so#ethin !hich not all reard even as a #oral duty.
Blood has its la!. . . .&
?panish la! and ?panish leal thouht are aainst the position of the court in this case. A#erican la! does not
e-pressly, or even clearly, underta.e to chane it. Ma.in a person a !itness does not deprive hi# of his character as
a party> and it is precisely in his character as a party that the ?panish la! protects hi#.
The case of Knited ?tates vs. Outierre+, already cited, is not conclusive of the case before us. There the false testi#ony
!as iven in a civil action. @ere it !as iven in a cri#inal action.
There is stron doubt in #y #ind also !ith respect to the correct resolution of another *uestion presented in this case
!hich has been decided by this court adversely to the defendant. As 4 have already stated, the defendant in this case
is on trial for per1ury for havin testi,ed falsely in a cri#inal action in !hich he !as a defendant chared !ith the
cri#e of estafa. The testi#ony !hich he ave and !hich is alleed in the present action to have been false related, as
already stated, to the voluntary and spontaneous character of a !ritten confession !hich he is alleed to have #ade
!ith reard to the co##ission of the cri#e !ith !hich he !as chared. @e contended, as a !itness for hi#self on his
trial for estafa, that the confession !as false in its state#ent of facts and had been obtained fro# hi# by threats,
inti#idation and violence. @e !as ac*uitted in that case upon the round that his testi#ony in that reard !as true, or
!as of such a character as to produce in the #ind of the court doubt suCcient to re*uire an ac*uittal. The 1ude !ho
presided at the trial of the accused for estafa presided also at the trial of the accused for per1ury. 4n his opinion
ac*uittin the defendant of the chare of estafa the court said, spea.in of the alleed confession and of the
testi#ony relatin to it iven in that case=
This is not a ne! occurrence in this court. 4t is fre*uently resorted to in i#portant cases, !here confessions
have been secured by the secret service. 3e are fully convinced that every precaution is ta.en by the chief of
the ?ecret ?ervice Bureau !ith a vie! to avoidin the #altreat#ent of persons !ho have been apprehended
by that Bureau, and !ho are under suspicion of cri#e, and in the #a1ority of cases !e pay no heed to the
testi#ony of cri#inals !ho have co#e to loo. upon this alleation of #altreat#ent as a stoc. defense. But in
this case there !ere so#e circu#stances in connection !ith the testi#ony of the defendants !hich raised a
rave doubt at least as to the voluntary character and spontaneity of these confessions, and in vie! therefore,
of this rave doubt, and of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence enerally, the defendants are
ac*uitted and the costs are ta-ed de ofcio.
4n the present case the sa#e 1ude says !ith reard to the sa#e #atter=
4n the case in !hich the defendant !as chared !ith estafa and in !hich he is accused of havin testi,ed
falsely, the case turned larely upon the truth of the confessions of the defendant and his codefendants, !hich
!ere alleed to have been #ade !hile they !ere under detention in secret service head*uarters. 4f it !ere
true that such confessions !ere e-tracted under threats and torture, it is unnecessary to state that it !ould be
a very serious #atter. 4ndeed the court considered it so serious at the ti#e the accused in *uestion !as tried
!ith his codefendants, that it preferred to enter an ac*uittal rather than to ris. a conviction on confessions
!hich appear to be tainted !ith this suspicion.&
4 a# inclined to believe that the ,ndin of the trial court in the case of estafa !ith reard to the testi#ony of the
defendant in relation to the confession is a bar to a subse*uent trial of the sa#e defendant for per1ury for ivin the
testi#ony to !hich the ,ndin of the court relates. 4n the case of Cooper vs. Co##on!ealth 5%(: Py., 9(97 it appeared
that the appellant in that case and one $ibbie Purvis !ere 1ointly indicted in the Ro!an Circuit Court for the o/ense of
adultery. The trial under that indict#ent resulted in a verdict of ac*uittal for appellant. The rand 1ury of Ro!an County
thereupon reported an indict#ent aainst hi# in !hich it !as chared that, upon the trial of appellant and $ibbie
Purvis upon the chare of adultery, &he did .no!inly, !illfully, and corruptly s!ear that he had not had carnal se-ual
intercourse !ith $ibbie Purvis, !hen sa#e !as false and untrue, and !as .no!n by hi# to be false and untrue.& The
trial under this indict#ent resulted in a verdict of uilty, and 1ud#ent sentencin appellant to con,ne#ent in the
penitentiary !as entered and the case ca#e to the ?upre#e Court of the ?tate of Pentuc.y upon an appeal fro# that
1ud#ent. 4n its opinion for a reversal the court said=
The principal *uestion to be considered is the e/ect !hich is to be iven to the indict#ent, trial, verdict and
1ud#ent of ac*uittal of appellant under the indict#ent for adultery, as it is #anifest that appellant can not be
uilty in this case if he !as innocent of the chare contained in the indict#ent.
@is uilt or innocence of the o/ense of havin had carnal se-ual intercourse !ith $ibbie Purvis !as the e-act
*uestion !hich !as tried in the ,rst proceedin, and as a result of that trial the defendant !as found not uilty.
4n order to convict hi# in this case, it !as necessary for the 1ury to believe that he !as uilty of the identical
o/ense for !hich he had been tried and ac*uitted under the other indict#ent, as it is evident that, if he !as
innocent of havin had carnal se-ual intercourse !ith $ibbie Parvis, he !as not uilty of false s!earin !hen
he stated that he had not had such intercourse !ith her. 3e therefore have, as a result of the trial of appellant
under these t!o indict#ents, a verdict and 1ud#ent ,ndin hi# not uilty of the o/ense of havin had carnal
se-ual intercourse !ith $ibbie Purvis, and in the second case a verdict and 1ud#ent ,ndin hi# uilty of false
s!earin !hen he testi,ed that he had not had such intercourse !ith her> in other !ords, the ,rst 1ury found
hi# innocent of the #isde#eanor !ith !hich he !as chared, and the second 1ury found hi# uilty of the
felony because he testi,ed that he !as not uilty of such #isde#eanor. 4t certainly !as never intended that
the eninery of the la! should be used to acco#plish such inconsistent results. 4t appears to us fro# the
conHictin character of the testi#ony in the case upon the *uestion of defendantJs uilt or innocence that a
verdict of the 1ury #iht have been upheld in the ,rst case !hether it found one !ay or the other, but certainly
the ,ndin of the 1ury #ust be conclusive of the fact considered as aainst the Co##on!ealth, and preclude
any further prosecution !hich involves the ascertain#ent of such fact.
--- --- ---
Appellant in this case had already been tried and ac*uitted of the o/ense of havin had carnal se-ual
intercourse !ith $ibbie Purvis, and the 1ud#ent in that case is res <udicata aainst the Co##on!ealth, and
he can not aain be put on trial !here the truth or falsity of the chare in that indict#ent is the ist of the
*uestion under investiation. 4t therefore follo!s that appellant !as entitled to a pere#ptory instruction to the
1ury to ,nd hi# not uilty.
4n the case of Knited ?tates vs. Butler 52< Aed. Rep., 89<7 a defendant, !ho had been ac*uitted upon an indict#ent for
sellin li*uors !ithout pay#ent of the special ta- re*uired by la!, !as subse*uently put upon trial for per1ury for
havin s!orn upon his preli#inary e-a#ination before a co##issioner that he did not sell. 4t !as held that his
ac*uittal for sellin li*uor !as a conclusive ad1udication in his favor upon the subse*uent trial for per1ury, and that the
Oovern#ent could not sho! that his oath !as false. 4n that case the court said=
But 4 a# clearly of the opinion that upon the trial of this case the defendant !ould be entitled to sho! that he
had been ac*uitted of the o/ense concernin !hich he is chared to have co##itted per1ury, and that such
ac*uittal !ould be conclusive. 3henever the sa#e fact has been put in issue bet!een the sa#e parties, the
verdict of the 1ury upon such issue is a co#plete estoppel. This case contains all the ele#ents of a plea ofres
<udicata> the parties as the sa#e> the point issue, viz, !hether he did in fact sell li*uor, is the sa#e, and the
*uantu# of proof re*uisite in both cases is also the sa#e. @ad he s!orn before the co##issioner that he had
paid his ta- and had been ac*uitted by the 1ury upon the round that he did not sell li*uor, the issue !ould
have been di/erent, and perhaps such di/erence #iht have been sho!n by parol, but in this case the t!o
issues !ere identically the sa#e.
4n Co##on!ealth vs. Ellis 5%:( Mass., %:'7, it !as held that the record of the conviction and sentence of a father upon
a co#plaint, under the statute of %<<', c. %6:, for unreasonably nelectin to support his #inor child, !as conclusive
evidence that the paternity of the child !as deter#ined, and the father !as estopped to set up the illeiti#acy of the
child as a defense to a subse*uent co#plaint under the sa#e statute for a si#ilar o/ense. 4n arrivin at this conclusion
the court said=
The *uestion of the paternity of the child !as necessarily involved in the prior conviction of the defendant.
That fact havin been deter#ined, it cannot aain be litiated bet!een the sa#e parties unless a di/erent rule
applies to cri#inal proceedins fro# that !hich obtains in civil proceedins. ?ee ?ly vs. @unt, %'9 Mass., %',
and cases cited. 4t is !ell settled that the rule is the sa#e in both classes of cases. Thus, in
Co##on!ealth vs. Evans, %(% Mass., 0', it !as held, on the trial of an indict#ent for #anslauhter, that the
record of a conviction of the defendant for the assault !hich caused the death !as conclusive evidence that
the assault !as un1usti,able. ?o in Co##on!ealth vs. Aeld#an, %2% Mass., '<<, !here the defendant !as
indicted for an assault upon a public oCcer, co##itted !hile the defendant !as under arrest for drun.enness>
it !as held that a record of his conviction and sentence for drun.enness at the ti#e of his arrest !as
conclusive evidence of that fact.
4n the case of Co/ey vs. Knited ?tates 5%%: K. ?. 82:7 the principal *uestion presented for deter#ination !as stated by
the court as follo!s=
The principal *uestion is as to the e/ect of the indict#ent, trial, verdict and 1ud#ent of ac*uittal set up in the
fourth pararaph of the ans!er. The infor#ation is founded on sections 20'6, 28'(, and 28'2> and there is no
*uestion, on the aver#ents in the ans!er, that the fraudulent acts and atte#pts and intents to defraud,
alleed in the prior cri#inal infor#ation and covered by the verdict and 1ud#ent of ac*uittal, e#braced all of
the acts, atte#pts and intents averred in the infor#ation in this suit.
The *uestion, therefore, is distinctly presented, !hether such 1ud#ent of ac*uittal is a bar to this suit. 3e are
of opinion that it is.
4t is true that section 20'6, after denouncin the sinle act of a distiller defraudin or atte#ptin to defraud
the Knited ?tates of the ta- on the spirits distilled by hi#, declares the conse*uences of the co##ission of the
act to be= 5%7 That certain speci,c property shall be forfeited, and 507 that the o/ender shall be ,ned and
i#prisoned. 4t is also true that the proceedin to enforce the forfeiture aainst the res na#ed #ust be a
proceedin in rem and a civil action> !hile that to enforce the ,ne and i#prison#ent #ust be a cri#inal
proceedin, as !as held by this court in The Pal#yra 5%0 3heat., %, %8 D0' K. ?., b.. :, $. ed. '2%, '2'E7. Qet,
!here an issue raised as to the e-istence of the act or fact denounced has been tried in a cri#inal proceedin,
instituted by the Knited ?tates, and a 1ud#ent of ac*uittal has been rendered in favor of a particular person,
that 1ud#ent is conclusive in favor of such person, on the subse*uent trial of a suit in rem by the Knited
?tates, !here, as aainst hi#, the e-istence of the sa#e act or fact is the #atter in issue, as a cause for the
forfeiture of the property prosecuted in such suit in rem. 4t is ured as a reason for not allo!in such e/ect to
the 1ud#ent, that the ac*uittal in the cri#inal case #ay have ta.en place because of the rule re*uirin uilt
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt> and that, on the sa#e evidence, on the *uestion of preponderance of
proof, there #iht be a verdict for the Knited ?tates, in the suit in rem. Nevertheless, the fact or act has been
put in issue and deter#ined aainst the Knited ?tates> and all that is i#posed by the statute, as a
conse*uence of uilt, is a punish#ent therefor. There could be no ne! trial of the cri#inal prosecution after
the ac*uittal in it> and a subse*uent trial of the civil suit a#ounts substantially to the sa#e thin, !ith a
di/erence only in the conse*uences follo!in a 1ud#ent adverse to the clai#ant.
3hen an ac*uittal in a cri#inal prosecution in behalf of the Oovern#ent is pleaded or o/ered in evidence, by
the sa#e defendant, in an action aainst hi# by an individual, the rule does not apply, for the reason that the
parties are not the sa#e> and often for the additional reason that a certain intent #ust be proved to support
the indict#ent, !hich need not be proved to support the civil action. But upon this record, as !e have already
seen, the parties and the #atter in issue are the sa#e.
3hether a conviction on an indict#ent under section 20'6 could be availed of as conclusive evidence, in la!,
for a conde#nation, in a subse*uent suit in rem under that section, and !hether a 1ud#ent of forfeiture in a
suit in rem under it !ould be conclusive evidence, in la!, for a conviction on a subse*uent indict#ent under it,
are *uestions not no! presented.
The conclusion !e have reached is in consonance !ith the principles laid do!n by this court in Oelston vs.@oyt
52 3heat., 08: D%: K. ?., b.. 8, $. ed., 2<%E7. 4n that case @oyt sued Oelston the collector, and ?chenc. the
surveyor, of the Port of Ne! Qor., in trespass, for ta.in and carryin a!ay a vessel. The defendants pleaded
that they had sei+ed the vessel, by authority of the President, as forfeited for a violation of the statute aainst
,ttin out a vessel to co##it hostilities aainst a friendly forein po!er, and that she had been so ,tted out
and !as forfeited. At the trial it !as sho!n that after sei+ure, the vessel !as proceeded aainst by the Knited
?tates, by libel, in the Knited ?tates "istrict Court, for the alleed o/ense, and @oyt had clai#ed her and she
!as ac*uitted and ordered to be restored, and a certi,cate of reasonable cause of sei+ure !as denied. The
defendants o/ered to prove facts sho!in the forfeiture. The trial court e-cluded the evidence. 4n this court,
the *uestion !as presented !hether the sentence of the district court !as or !as not conclusive on the
defendants, on the *uestion of forfeiture. This court held that the sentence of ac*uittal, !ith a denial of a
certi,cate of reasonable cause of sei+ure, !as conclusive evidence that no forfeiture !as incurred, and that
the sei+ure !as tortious> and that these *uestions could not aain be litiated in any foru#.
This doctrine is peculiarly applicable to a case li.e the present, !here, in both proceedins, cri#inal and civil,
the Knited ?tates is the party on one side and this clai#ant the party on the other. The 1ud#ent of ac*uittal
in the cri#inal proceedin ascertained that the facts !hich !ere the basis of that proceedin, and are the
basis of this one, and !hich are #ade by the statute the foundation of any punish#ent, personal or pecuniary,
did not e-ist. This !as ascertained once for all, bet!een the Knited ?tates and the clai#ant, in the cri#inal
proceedin, so that the facts can not aain be litiated bet!een the#, as the basis of any statutory
punish#ent denounced as a conse*uence of the e-istence of the facts. This is a necessary result of the rules
laid do!n in the unani#ous opinion of the 1udes in the case of 2e> vs. 6uchess of Uinston 50( @o!ell, ?t. Tr.,
2'', '2<7, and !hich !ere for#ulated thus= the 1ud#ent of a court of concurrent 1urisdiction, directly upon
the point, is as a plea a bar, or as evidence conclusive, bet!een the sa#e parties, upon the sa#e #atter
directly in *uestion in another court> and the 1ud#ent of a court of e-clusive 1urisdiction, directly upon the
point, is, in li.e #anner, conclusive upon the sa#e #atter, bet!een the sa#e parties, co#in incidentally in
*uestion in another court for a di/erent purpose. 4n the present case, the court is the sa#e court and had
1urisdiction> and the 1ud#ent !as directly on the point no! involved and bet!een the sa#e parties.
4n a case before Mr. ;ustice Miller and ;ude "illon 5K. ?. vs. McPee, 8 "ill., %0<7, the defendant had been
convicted and punished under a section of the Revised ?tatutes, for conspirin !ith certain distillers to defraud
the Knited ?tates, by unla!fully re#ovin distilled spirits !ithout pay#ent of the ta-es thereon. @e !as
after!ards sued in a civil action by the Knited ?tates, under another section, to recover a penalty of double the
a#ount of the ta-es lost by the conspiracy and fraud. The t!o alleed transactions !ere but one> and it !as
held that the suit for the penalty !as barred by the 1ud#ent in the cri#inal case. The decision !as put on the
round that the defendant could not be t!ice punished for the sa#e cri#e, and that the for#er conviction and
1ud#ent !ere a bar to the suit for the penalty.
4 a# rather inclined to believe that these decisions cover the case at bar. 4t is true that the fact deter#ined by the
court on the trial for estafa !as not a fact necessary to be alleed in the infor#ation charin the cri#e as an
essential ele#ent thereof> and that conse*uently it !as not one of the facts necessary to be established in order to
convict. Reasonin fro# these facts it #iht be clai#ed that, !hether the confession o/ered in evidence in the estafa
case !as voluntary or !as obtained by threat, inti#idation and violence, !as not the fact in issue on that trial, and
that, therefore, the 1ud#ent in the estafa case deter#inin that *uestion !as not a bar to the presentation of the
sa#e *uestion in the present action for per1ury. 4 a# of the opinion, ho!ever, that the principles enunciated in the
cases cited, and especially the Co/ey case, are suCciently broad to cover the case at bar. 4t is !ell settled that a riht,
*uestion or fact de,nitely put in issue and directly deter#ined by a court of co#petent 1urisdiction, as a round of
recovery, cannot be discussed in a subse*uent suit bet!een the sa#e parties or their privies> and that even if the
second suit is for a di/erent cause of action, the riht, *uestion, or fact once so deter#ined #ust, as bet!een the
sa#e parties or their privies, be ta.en as conclusively established, so lon as the 1ud#ent in the ,rst suit re#ains
un#odi,ed. This is substantially the rule stated in the case of ?outhern Paci,c Railroad vs. Knited ?tates 5%:< K. ?., %7.
4t is clear fro# the decision of the trial court in the estafa case that the *uestion #ost stronly fouht by the parties in
that action !as !hether or not the confession !as voluntary or had been obtained by threats, inti#idation and
violence. The evidence !hich the Oovern#ent !as able to produce !as, apart fro# the confession, insuCcient to
convict> and, as a necessary conse*uence, !hether or not the defendant !as convicted in that case depended, in the
#ain, upon the character of the confession. 4n all respects an issue !as 1oined by the parties !ith reference thereto
5$i+arraa @er#anos vs. Qap Tico, 08 Phil. Rep., '(87. 4t !as accepted by both parties and a lare part of the evidence
in the estafa case, so far as !e can 1ude fro# the opinion of the trial court in that case, related to that issue. The
*uestion of fact involved !as decided adversely to the Oovern#ent and, as !e have seen fro# the opinion of the trial
court in that and the present case, the ac*uittal !as based !holly upon the defeat of the Oovern#ent on that issue.
4t !ould see# to #e, therefore, that the character of the confession !as as thorouhly litiated and decided by the
trial court as if it had been a fact necessary to have been alleed in the infor#ation to describe the cri#e souht to be
chared. 4f that is so then the Oovern#ent in the present case cannot be allo!ed to put that *uestion aain in issue
and can not be heard to chare that the testi#ony iven by the defendant in relation thereto !as false.
Aor these reason 4 a# of the opinion that the conviction can not stand and that the accused should be ac*uitted.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 111597 July 25, 1994
MAYOR PA9LO P. MAGTAJAS H T8E CITY O4 CAGAYAN 3E ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. H P8ILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AN3 GAMING
CORPORATION,respondents.
A;uilino G. )imentel$ 5r. and Associates for petitioners.
2.2. Torral*a " Associates for private respondent.

CRUB, J.:
There !as instant opposition !hen PAOCBR announced the openin of a casino in Caayan de Bro City. Civic
orani+ations anrily denounced the pro1ect. The reliious ele#ents echoed the ob1ection and so did the !o#enJs
roups and the youth. "e#onstrations !ere led by the #ayor and the city leislators. The #edia tru#peted the
protest, describin the casino as an a/ront to the !elfare of the city.
The trouble arose !hen in %990, Hush !ith its tre#endous success in several cities, PAOCBR decided to e-pand its
operations to Caayan de Bro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a buildin belonin to Pryce Properties
Corporation, 4nc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and e*uipped the sa#e, and prepared to
inauurate its casino there durin the Christ#as season.
The reaction of the ?anunian Panlunsod of Caayan de Bro City !as s!ift and hostile. Bn "ece#ber 6, %990, it
enacted Brdinance No. 22'2 readin as follo!s=
BR"4NANCE NB. 22'2
AN BR"4NANCE PRB@4B4T4NO T@E 4??KANCE BA BK?4NE?? PERM4T AN" CANCE$$4NO ER4?T4NO
BK?4NE?? PERM4T TB ANQ E?TAB$4?@MENT ABR T@E K?4NO AN" A$$B34NO TB BE K?E" 4T? PREM4?E?
BR PBRT4BN T@EREBA ABR T@E BPERAT4BN BA CA?4NB.
BE 4T BR"A4NE" by the ?anunian Panlunsod of the City of Caayan de Bro, in session asse#bled
that=
?ec. %. N That pursuant to the policy of the city bannin the operation of casino !ithin its territorial
1urisdiction, no business per#it shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the
operation of casino !ithin the city li#its.
?ec. 0. N That it shall be a violation of e-istin business per#it by any persons, partnership or
corporation to use its business establish#ent or portion thereof, or allo! the use thereof by others for
casino operation and other a#blin activities.
?ec. 2. N PENA$T4E?. N Any violation of such e-istin business per#it as de,ned in the precedin
section shall su/er the follo!in penalties, to !it=
a7 ?uspension of the business per#it for si-ty 5:(7 days for the ,rst
o/ense and a ,ne of P%,(((.((Tday
b7 ?uspension of the business per#it for ?i- 5:7 #onths for the second
o/ense, and a ,ne of P2,(((.((Tday
c7 Per#anent revocation of the business per#it and i#prison#ent of
Bne 5%7 year, for the third and subse*uent o/enses.
?ec. 8. N This Brdinance shall ta.e e/ect ten 5%(7 days fro# publication thereof.
Nor !as this all. Bn ;anuary 8, %992, it adopted a sterner Brdinance No. 226'-92 readin as follo!s=
BR"4NANCE NB. 226'-92
AN BR"4NANCE PRB@4B4T4NO T@E BPERAT4BN BA CA?4NB AN" PRBM4"4NO PENA$TQ ABR M4B$AT4BN
T@EREABR.
3@EREA?, the City Council established a policy as early as %99( aainst CA?4NB under its Resolution
No. 009'>
3@EREA?, on Bctober %8, %990, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 0:62, reiteratin its
policy aainst the establish#ent of CA?4NB>
3@EREA?, subse*uently, thereafter, it li.e!ise passed Brdinance No. 22'2, prohibitin the issuance of
Business Per#it and to cancel e-istin Business Per#it to any establish#ent for the usin and allo!in
to be used its pre#ises or portion thereof for the operation of CA?4NB>
3@EREA?, under Art. 2, section 8'<, No. 587, sub pararaph M4 of the $ocal Oovern#ent Code of %99%
5Rep. Act 6%:(7 and under Art. 99, No. 587, Pararaph M4 of the i#ple#entin rules of the $ocal
Oovern#ent Code, the City Council as the $eislative Body shall enact #easure to suppress any
activity ini#ical to public #orals and eneral !elfare of the people andTor reulate or prohibit such
activity pertainin to a#use#ent or entertain#ent in order to protect social and #oral !elfare of the
co##unity>
NB3 T@EREABRE,
BE 4T BR"A4NE" by the City Council in session duly asse#bled that=
?ec. %. N The operation of a#blin CA?4NB in the City of Caayan de Bro is hereby prohibited.
?ec. 0. N Any violation of this Brdinance shall be sub1ect to the follo!in penalties=
a7 Ad#inistrative ,ne of P',(((.(( shall be i#posed aainst the proprietor, partnership or corporation
underta.in the operation, conduct, #aintenance of a#blin CA?4NB in the City and closure thereof>
b7 4#prison#ent of not less than si- 5:7 #onths nor #ore than one 5%7 year or a ,ne in the a#ount of
P',(((.(( or both at the discretion of the court aainst the #anaer, supervisor, andTor any person
responsible in the establish#ent, conduct and #aintenance of a#blin CA?4NB.
?ec. 2. N This Brdinance shall ta.e e/ect ten 5%(7 days after its publication in a local ne!spaper of
eneral circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, !here it !as 1oined by PAOCBR as intervenor and
supple#ental petitioner. Their challene succeeded. Bn March 2%, %992, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the !rit prayed for to prohibit their enforce#ent.
1
Reconsideration of this decision !as denied on
;uly %2, %992.
2
Caayan de Bro City and its #ayor are no! before us in this petition for revie! under Rule 8' of the Rules of
Court.
3
They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holdin that=
%. Knder e-istin la!s, the ?anunian Panlunsod of the City of Caayan de Bro does not have the
po!er and authority to prohibit the establish#ent and operation of a PAOCBR a#blin casino !ithin
the CityJs territorial li#its.
0. The phrase &a#blin and other prohibited a#es of chance& found in ?ec. 8'<, par. 5a7, sub-par. 5%7
N 5v7 of R.A. 6%:( could only #ean &illeal a#blin.&
2. The *uestioned Brdinances in e/ect annul P.". %<:9 and are therefore invalid on that point.
8. The *uestioned Brdinances are discri#inatory to casino and partial to coc.,htin and are therefore
invalid on that point.
'. The *uestioned Brdinances are not reasonable, not consonant !ith the eneral po!ers and
purposes of the instru#entality concerned and inconsistent !ith the la!s or policy of the ?tate.
:. 4t had no option but to follo! the rulin in the case of #asco$ et al. v. )AGCO2$ O.R. No. 9%:89, May
%8, %99%, %96 ?CRA '2 in disposin of the issues presented in this present case.
PAOCBR is a corporation created directly by P.". %<:9 to help centrali+e and reulate all a#es of chance, includin
casinos on land and sea !ithin the territorial 1urisdiction of the Philippines. 4n #asco v. )hilippine Amusements and
Gamin Corporation,
4
this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the bene,ts of the entity
to the national econo#y as the third hihest revenue-earner in the overn#ent, ne-t only to the B4R and the Bureau of
Custo#s.
Caayan de Bro City, li.e other local political subdivisions, is e#po!ered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the $ocal Oovern#ent Code. 4t is e-pressly vested !ith the police po!er under !hat is .no!n as the
Oeneral 3elfare Clause no! e#bodied in ?ection %: as follo!s=
?ec. %:. N Oeneral 3elfare. N Every local overn#ent unit shall e-ercise the po!ers e-pressly
ranted, those necessarily i#plied therefro#, as !ell as po!ers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its eCcient and e/ective overnance, and those !hich are essential to the pro#otion of the eneral
!elfare. 3ithin their respective territorial 1urisdictions, local overn#ent units shall ensure and
support, a#on other thins, the preservation and enrich#ent of culture, pro#ote health and safety,
enhance the riht of the people to a balanced ecoloy, encourae and support the develop#ent of
appropriate and self-reliant scienti,c and technoloical capabilities, i#prove public #orals, enhance
econo#ic prosperity and social 1ustice, pro#ote full e#ploy#ent a#on their residents, #aintain
peace and order, and preserve the co#fort and convenience of their inhabitants.
4n addition, ?ection 8'< of the said Code speci,cally declares that=
?ec. 8'<. N Po!ers, "uties, Aunctions and Co#pensation. N 5a7 The ?anunian Panlunsod, as the
leislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
eneral !elfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to ?ection %: of this Code and in the proper
e-ercise of the corporate po!ers of the city as provided for under ?ection 00 of this Code, and shall=
5%7 Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an eCcient and e/ective city overn#ent,
and in this connection, shall=
--- --- ---
5v7 Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and i#pose
appropriate penalties for habitual drun.enness in public places,
varancy, #endicancy, prostitution, establish#ent and #aintenance of
houses of ill repute,am*lin and other prohibited a#es of chance,
fraudulent devices and !ays to obtain #oney or property, dru
addiction, #aintenance of dru dens, dru pushin, 1uvenile
delin*uency, the printin, distribution or e-hibition of obscene or
pornoraphic #aterials or publications, and such other activities
ini#ical to the !elfare and #orals of the inhabitants of the city>
This section also authori+es the local overn#ent units to reulate properties and businesses !ithin their territorial
li#its in the interest of the eneral !elfare.
6
The petitioners arue that by virtue of these provisions, the ?anunian Panlunsod #ay prohibit the operation of
casinos because they involve a#es of chance, !hich are detri#ental to the people. Oa#blin is not allo!ed by
eneral la! and even by the Constitution itself. The leislative po!er conferred upon local overn#ent units #ay be
e-ercised over all .inds of a#blin and not only over &illeal a#blin& as the respondents erroneously arue. Even if
the operation of casinos #ay have been per#itted under P.". %<:9, the overn#ent of Caayan de Bro City has the
authority to prohibit the# !ithin its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the $ocal Oovern#ent Code.
4t is sub#itted that this interpretation is consonant !ith the policy of local autono#y as #andated in Article 44, ?ection
0', and Article R of the Constitution, as !ell as various other provisions therein see.in to strenthen the character of
the nation. 4n ivin the local overn#ent units the po!er to prevent or suppress a#blin and other social proble#s,
the $ocal Oovern#ent Code has reconi+ed the co#petence of such co##unities to deter#ine and adopt the
#easures best e-pected to pro#ote the eneral !elfare of their inhabitants in line !ith the policies of the ?tate.
The petitioners also stress that !hen the Code e-pressly authori+ed the local overn#ent units to prevent and
suppress a#blin and other prohibited a#es of chance, li.e craps, baccarat, blac.1ac. and roulette, it
#eant allfor#s of a#blin !ithout distinction. 8*i le> non distinuit$ nec nos distinuere de*emos.
6
Bther!ise, it
!ould have e-pressly e-cluded fro# the scope of their po!er casinos and other for#s of a#blin authori+ed by
special la!, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so si#ply #eans that the local overn#ent units
are per#itted to prohibit all .inds of a#blin !ithin their territories, includin the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the $ocal Oovern#ent Code, it is pointed out, had the e/ect of #odifyin the charter of the PAOCBR.
The Code is not only a later enact#ent than P.". %<:9 and so is dee#ed to prevail in case of inconsistencies bet!een
the#. More than this, the po!ers of the PAOCBR under the decree are e-pressly discontinued by the Code insofar as
they do not confor# to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. 5f7 of its repealin clause readin as follo!s=
5f7 All eneral and special la!s, acts, city charters, decrees, e-ecutive orders, procla#ations and
ad#inistrative reulations, or part or parts thereof !hich are inconsistent !ith any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or #odi,ed accordinly.
4t is also #aintained that assu#in there is doubt reardin the e/ect of the $ocal Oovern#ent Code on P.". %<:9, the
doubt #ust be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance !ith the direction in the Code callin for its liberal
interpretation in favor of the local overn#ent units. ?ection ' of the Code speci,cally provides=
?ec. '. Rules of 4nterpretation. N 4n the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the follo!in rules
shall apply=
5a7 An( provision on a power of a local overnment unit shall *e li*erall( interpreted in its favor$ and in
case of dou*t$ an( ;uestion thereon shall *e resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower
local overnment unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the e-istence of the po!er shall be
interpreted in favor of the local overn#ent unit concerned>
--- --- ---
5c7 The eneral welfare provisions in this Code shall *e li*erall( interpreted to ive more powers to
local overnment units in acceleratin econo#ic develop#ent and upradin the *uality of life for the
people in the co##unity> . . . 5E#phasis supplied.7
Ainally, the petitioners also attac. a#blin as intrinsically har#ful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and
several decisions of this Court e-pressive of the eneral and oCcial disapprobation of the vice. They invo.e the ?tate
policies on the fa#ily and the proper upbrinin of the youth and, as #iht be e-pected, call attention to the old case
of 8.S. v. Salaveria,
7
!hich sustained a #unicipal ordinance prohibitin the playin of panuinue. The petitioners
decry the i##orality of a#blin. They also i#pun the !isdo# of P.". %<:9 5!hich they describe as &a #artial la!
instru#ent&7 in creatin PAOCBR and authori+in it to operate casinos &on land and sea !ithin the territorial
1urisdiction of the Philippines.&
This is the opportune ti#e to stress an i#portant point.
The #orality of a#blin is not a 1usticiable issue. Oa#blin is not illeal per se. 3hile it is enerally considered
ini#ical to the interests of the people, there is nothin in the Constitution cateorically proscribin or penali+in
a#blin or, for that #atter, even #entionin it at all. 4t is left to Conress to deal !ith the activity as it sees ,t. 4n the
e-ercise of its o!n discretion, the leislature #ay prohibit a#blin altoether or allo! it !ithout li#itation or it #ay
prohibit so#e for#s of a#blin and allo! others for !hatever reasons it #ay consider suCcient. Thus, it has
prohibited <ueten and monte but per#its lotteries, coc.,htin and horse-racin. 4n #a.in such choices, Conress
has consulted its o!n !isdo#, !hich this Court has no authority to revie!, #uch less reverse. 3ell has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the #erits of conHictin theories.
8
That is the preroative of the political depart#ents.
4t is settled that *uestions reardin the !isdo#, #orality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the
1udiciary but #ay be resolved only by the leislative and e-ecutive depart#ents, to !hich the function belons in our
sche#e of overn#ent. That function is e-clusive. 3hichever !ay these branches decide, they are ans!erable only to
their o!n conscience and the constituents !ho !ill ulti#ately 1ude their acts, and not to the courts of 1ustice.
The only *uestion !e can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Brdinance No. 22'' and Brdinance No.
226'-92 as enacted by the ?anunian Panlunsod of Caayan de Bro City. And !e shall do so only by the criteria
laid do!n by la! and not by our o!n convictions on the propriety of a#blin.
The tests of a valid ordinance are !ell established. A lon line of decisions
9
has held that to be valid, an ordinance
#ust confor# to the follo!in substantive re*uire#ents=
%7 4t #ust not contravene the constitution or any statute.
07 4t #ust not be unfair or oppressive.
27 4t #ust not be partial or discri#inatory.
87 4t #ust not prohibit but #ay reulate trade.
'7 4t #ust be eneral and consistent !ith public policy.
:7 4t #ust not be unreasonable.
3e bein by observin that under ?ec. 8'< of the $ocal Oovern#ent Code, local overn#ent units are authori+ed to
prevent or suppress, a#on others, &a#blin and other prohibited a#es of chance.& Bbviously, this provision
e-cludes a#es of chance !hich are not prohibited but are in fact per#itted by la!. The petitioners are less than
accurate in clai#in that the Code could have e-cluded such a#es of chance but did not. 4n fact it does. The
lanuae of the section is clear and un#ista.able. Knder the rule of noscitur a sociis, a !ord or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or iven the sa#e #eanin of, !ords !ith !hich it is associated. Accordinly, !e conclude
that since the !ord &a#blin& is associated !ith &and other prohibited a#es of chance,& the !ord should be read as
referrin to only illeal a#blin !hich, li.e the other prohibited a#es of chance, #ust be prevented or suppressed.
3e could stop here as this interpretation should settle the proble# *uite conclusively. But !e !ill not. The viorous
e/orts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Caayan de Bro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy,
deserve #ore than short shrift fro# this Court.
The apparent Ha! in the ordinances in *uestion is that they contravene P.". %<:9 and the public policy e#bodied
therein insofar as they prevent PAOCBR fro# e-ercisin the po!er conferred on it to operate a casino in Caayan de
Bro City. The petitioners have an inenious ans!er to this #isivin. They deny that it is the ordinances that have
chaned P.". %<:9 for an ordinance ad#ittedly cannot prevail aainst a statute. Their theory is that the chane has
been #ade by the $ocal Oovern#ent Code itself, !hich !as also enacted by the national la!#a.in authority. 4n their
vie!, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but #erely &#odi,ed pro tanto& in the sense that PAOCBR
cannot no! operate a casino over the ob1ection of the local overn#ent unit concerned. This #odi,cation of P.". %<:9
by the $ocal Oovern#ent Code is per#issible because one la! can chane or repeal another la!.
4t see#s to us that the petitioners are playin !ith !ords. 3hile insistin that the decree has only been &#odi,edpro
tanto,& they are actually aruin that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the
Code has shorn PAOCBR of all po!er to centrali+e and reulate casinos. ?trictly spea.in, its operations #ay no! be
not only prohibited by the local overn#ent unit> in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by
?ection 8'< of the Code if the !ord &shall& as used therein is to be iven its accepted #eanin. $ocal overn#ent units
have no! no choice but to prevent and suppress a#blin, !hich in the petitionersJ vie! includes both leal and
illeal a#blin. Knder this construction, PAOCBR !ill have no #ore a#es of chance to reulate or centrali+e as they
#ust all be prohibited by the local overn#ent units pursuant to the #andatory duty i#posed upon the# by the Code.
4n this situation, PAOCBR cannot continue to e-ist e-cept only as a toothless tier or a !hite elephant and !ill no
loner be able to e-ercise its po!ers as a pri#e source of overn#ent revenue throuh the operation of casinos.
4t is note!orthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. 5f7 of the repealin clause, conveniently discardin the rest of
the provision !hich painsta.inly #entions the speci,c la!s or the parts thereof !hich are repealed 5or #odi,ed7 by
the Code. ?ini,cantly, P.". %<:9 is not one of the#. A readin of the entire repealin clause, !hich is reproduced
belo!, !ill disclose the o#ission=
?ec. '28. Repealin Clause. N 5a7 Batas Pa#bansa Bl. 226, other!ise .no!n as the &$ocal
Oovern#ent Code,& E-ecutive Brder No. %%0 5%9<67, and E-ecutive Brder No. 2%9 5%9<<7 are hereby
repealed.
5b7 Presidential "ecree Nos. :<8, %%9%, %'(< and such other decrees, orders, instructions, #e#oranda
and issuances related to or concernin the baranay are hereby repealed.
5c7 The provisions of ?ections 0, 2, and 8 of Republic Act No. %929 reardin hospital fund> ?ection 2, a
527 and b 507 of Republic Act. No. '886 reardin the ?pecial Education Aund> Presidential "ecree No.
%88 as a#ended by Presidential "ecree Nos. ''9 and %68%> Presidential "ecree No. 02% as a#ended>
Presidential "ecree No. 82: as a#ended by Presidential "ecree No. ''<> and Presidential "ecree Nos.
2<%, 82:, 8:8, 866, '0:, :20, 6'0, and %%2: are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and e/ect.
5d7 Presidential "ecree No. %'98 is hereby repealed insofar as it overns locally-funded pro1ects.
5e7 The follo!in provisions are hereby repealed or a#ended insofar as they are inconsistent !ith the
provisions of this Code= ?ections 0, %:, and 09 of Presidential "ecree No. 6(8> ?ections %0 of
Presidential "ecree No. <6, as a#ended> ?ections '0, '2, ::, :6, :<, :9, 6(, 6%, 60, 62, and 68 of
Presidential "ecree No. 8:2, as a#ended> and ?ection %: of Presidential "ecree No. 960, as a#ended,
and
5f7 All eneral and special la!s, acts, city charters, decrees, e-ecutive orders, procla#ations and
ad#inistrative reulations, or part or parts thereof !hich are inconsistent !ith any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or #odi,ed accordinly.
Aurther#ore, it is a fa#iliar rule that i#plied repeals are not lihtly presu#ed in the absence of a clear and
un#ista.able sho!in of such intention. 4n Lichauco " Co. v. Apostol,
15
this Court e-plained=
The cases relatin to the sub1ect of repeal by i#plication all proceed on the assu#ption that if the act
of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the la!#a.in po!er to abroate the prior la!,
this intention #ust be iven e/ect> but there #ust al!ays be a suCcient revelation of this intention,
and it has beco#e an unbendin rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a for#er la!
!ill not be i#puted to the $eislature !hen it appears that the t!o statutes, or provisions, !ith
reference to !hich the *uestion arises bear to each other the relation of eneral to special.
There is no suCcient indication of an i#plied repeal of P.". %<:9. Bn the contrary, as the private respondent points
out, PAOCBR is #entioned as the source of fundin in t!o later enact#ents of Conress, to !it, R.A. 62(9, creatin a
Board of Clai#s under the "epart#ent of ;ustice for the bene,t of victi#s of un1ust punish#ent or detention or of
violent cri#es, and R.A. 6:8<, providin for #easures for the solution of the po!er crisis. PAOCBR revenues are tapped
by these t!o statutes. This !ould sho! that the PAOCBR charter has not been repealed by the $ocal Oovern#ent Code
but has in fact been i#proved as it !ere to #a.e the entity #ore responsive to the ,scal proble#s of the overn#ent.
4t is a canon of leal her#eneutics that instead of pittin one statute aainst another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts #ust e-ert every e/ort to reconcile the#, re#e#berin that both la!s deserve a beco#in
respect as the handi!or. of a coordinate branch of the overn#ent. Bn the assu#ption of a conHict bet!een P.". %<:9
and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to ive e/ect to both by har#oni+in
the# if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the proble# at hand is to hold that
under the $ocal Oovern#ent Code, local overn#ent units #ay 5and indeed #ust7 prevent and suppress all .inds of
a#blin !ithin their territories e-cept only those allo!ed by statutes li.e P.". %<:9. The e-ception reserved in such
la!s #ust be read into the Code, to #a.e both the Code and such la!s e*ually e/ective and #utually co#ple#entary.
This approach !ould also aCr# that there are indeed t!o .inds of a#blin, to !it, the illeal and those authori+ed by
la!. $eali+ed a#blin is not a #odern concept> it is probably as old as illeal a#blin, if not indeed #ore so. The
petitionersJ suestion that the Code authori+es the# to prohibit all .inds of a#blin !ould erase the distinction
bet!een these t!o for#s of a#blin !ithout a clear indication that this is the !ill of the leislature. Plausibly,
follo!in this theory, the City of Manila could, by #ere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity ?!eepsta.es BCce
fro# conductin a lottery as authori+ed by R.A. %%:9 and B.P. 80 or stop the races at the ?an $a+aro @ippodro#e as
authori+ed by R.A. 2(9 and R.A. 9<2.
4n liht of all the above considerations, !e see no !ay of arrivin at the conclusion ured on us by the petitioners that
the ordinances in *uestion are valid. Bn the contrary, !e ,nd that the ordinances violate P.". %<:9, !hich has the
character and force of a statute, as !ell as the public policy e-pressed in the decree allo!in the playin of certain
a#es of chance despite the prohibition of a#blin in eneral.
The rationale of the re*uire#ent that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
overn#ents are only aents of the national overn#ent. $ocal councils e-ercise only deleated leislative po!ers
conferred on the# by Conress as the national la!#a.in body. The deleate cannot be superior to the principal or
e-ercise po!ers hiher than those of the latter. 4t is a heresy to suest that the local overn#ent units can undo the
acts of Conress, fro# !hich they have derived their po!er in the ,rst place, and neate by #ere ordinance the
#andate of the statute.
Municipal corporations o!e their oriin to, and derive their po!ers and rihts !holly fro# the
leislature. 4t breathes into the# the breath of life, !ithout !hich they cannot e-ist. As it creates, so it
#ay destroy. As it #ay destroy, it #ay abride and control. Knless there is so#e constitutional
li#itation on the riht, the leislature #iht, by a sinle act, and if !e can suppose it capable of so
reat a folly and so reat a !ron, s!eep fro# e-istence all of the #unicipal corporations in the ?tate,
and the corporation could not prevent it. 3e .no! of no li#itation on the riht so far as to the
corporation the#selves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the #ere tenants at !ill of the
leislature.
11
This basic relationship bet!een the national leislature and the local overn#ent units has not been enfeebled by the
ne! provisions in the Constitution strenthenin the policy of local autono#y. 3ithout #eanin to detract fro# that
policy, !e here con,r# that Conress retains control of the local overn#ent units althouh in sini,cantly reduced
deree no! than under our previous Constitutions. The po!er to create still includes the po!er to destroy. The po!er
to rant still includes the po!er to !ithhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution,
li.e the direct confer#ent on the local overn#ent units of the po!er to ta-,
12
!hich cannot no! be !ithdra!n by
#ere statute. By and lare, ho!ever, the national leislature is still the principal of the local overn#ent units, !hich
cannot defy its !ill or #odify or violate it.
The Court understands and ad#ires the concern of the petitioners for the !elfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the !elfare of Caayan de Bro City !ill be endanered by the openin of the casino. 3e share the
vie! that &the hope of lare or easy ain, obtained !ithout special e/ort, turns the head of the !or.#an&
13
and that
&habitual a#blin is a cause of la+iness and ruin.&
14
4n )eople v. Gorostiza,
16
!e declared= &The social scoure of
a#blin #ust be sta#ped out. The la!s aainst a#blin #ust be enforced to the li#it.& Oeore 3ashinton called
a#blin &the child of avarice, the brother of ini*uity and the father of #ischief.& Nevertheless, !e #ust reconi+e the
po!er of the leislature to decide, in its o!n !isdo#, to leali+e certain for#s of a#blin, as !as done in P.". %<:9
and i#pliedly aCr#ed in the $ocal Oovern#ent Code. That decision can be revo.ed by this Court only if it contravenes
the Constitution as the touchstone of all oCcial acts. 3e do not ,nd such contravention here.
3e hold that the po!er of PAOCBR to centrali+e and reulate all a#es of chance, includin casinos on land and sea
!ithin the territorial 1urisdiction of the Philippines, re#ains uni#paired. P.". %<:9 has not been #odi,ed by the $ocal
Oovern#ent Code, !hich e#po!ers the local overn#ent units to prevent or suppress only those for#s of a#blin
prohibited by la!.
Casino a#blin is authori+ed by P.". %<:9. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be a#ended or
nulli,ed by a #ere ordinance. @ence, it !as not co#petent for the ?anunian Panlunsod of Caayan de Bro City to
enact Brdinance No. 22'2 prohibitin the use of buildins for the operation of a casino and Brdinance No. 226'-92
prohibitin the operation of casinos. Aor all their praise!orthy #otives, these ordinances are contrary to P.". %<:9 and
the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
3@EREABRE, the petition is "EN4E" and the challened decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AAA4RME", !ith
costs aainst the petitioners. 4t is so ordered.
3arvasa$ C.5.$ %eliciano$ #idin$ 2ealado$ 2omero$ #ellosillo$ 'elo$ 9uiason$ )uno$ :itu$ Uapunan and
'endoza$ 55.$ concur.
5!ith separate opinions7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24675 3&/&0%&* 14, 1979
ORTIGAS H CO., LIMITE3 PARTNERS8IP, plainti/-appellant,
vs.
4EATI 9ANF AN3 TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
2amirez " Ortias for appellant.
Ta.ada$ Teehan!ee " Carreon for appellee.

SANTOS, J.:
An appeal interposed on ;une 02, %9:' by plainti/-appellant, Brtias L Co., $i#ited Partnership, fro# the decision of
the Court of Airst 4nstance of Ri+al, Branch M4, at Pasi, @on. Andres Reyes presidin, !hich dis#issed its co#plaint in
Civil Case No. 66(:, entitled, &Brtias L Co#pany, $i#ited Partnership, plainti/, v. Aeati Ban. and Trust Co#pany,
defendant,& for lac. of #erit.
The follo!in facts N a reproduction of the lo!er courtJs ,ndins, !hich, in turn, are based on a stipulation of facts
entered into by the parties are not disputed. Plainti/ 5for#erly .no!n as &Brtias, Madrial y Cia&7 is a li#ited
partnership and defendant Aeati Ban. and Trust Co., is a corporation duly orani+ed and e-istin in accordance !ith
the la!s of the Philippines. Plainti/ is enaed in real estate business, developin and sellin lots to the public,
particularly the @ih!ay @ills ?ubdivision alon Epifanio de los ?antos Avenue, Mandaluyon, Ri+al.
1
Bn March 8, %9'0, plainti/, as vendor, and Auusto Padilla y Aneles and Natividad Aneles, as vendees, entered into
separate aree#ents of sale on install#ents over t!o parcels of land, .no!n as $ots Nos. ' and :, Bloc. 2%, of the
@ih!ay @ills ?ubdivision, situated at Mandaluyon, Ri+al. Bn ;uly %9, %9:0, the said vendees transferred their rihts
and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one E##a Chave+. Kpon co#pletion of pay#ent of the purchase price,
the plainti/ e-ecuted the correspondin deeds of sale in favor of E##a Chave+. Both the aree#ents 5of sale on
install#ent7 and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that=
%. The parcel of land sub1ect of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer e-clusively for residential
purposes, and she shall not be entitled to ta.e or re#ove soil, stones or ravel fro# it or any other lots
belonin to the ?eller.
0. All buildins and other i#prove#ents 5e-cept the fence7 !hich #ay be constructed at any ti#e in
said lot #ust be, 5a7 of stron #aterials and properly painted, 5b7 provided !ith #odern sanitary
installations connected either to the public se!er or to an approved septic tan., and 5c7 shall not be at
a distance of less than t!o 507 #eters fro# its boundary lines.
2
The above restrictions !ere later annotated in TCT Nos. %(%'(9 and %(%'%% of the Reister of "eeds of Ri+al, coverin
the said lots and issued in the na#e of E##a Chave+.
3
Eventually, defendant-appellee ac*uired $ots Nos. ' and :, !ith TCT Nos. %(%:%2 and %(:(90 issued in its na#e,
respectively and the buildin restrictions !ere also annotated therein.
4
"efendant-appellee bouht $ot No. ' directly
fro# E##a Chave+, &free fro# all liens and encu#brances as stated in Anne- J"J,
6
!hile $ot No. : !as ac*uired fro#
Republic Alour Mills throuh a &"eed of E-chane,& Anne- &E&.
6
TCT No. %(%6%9 in the na#e of Republic Alour Mills
li.e!ise contained the sa#e restrictions, althouh defendant-appellee clai#s that Republic Alour Mills purchased the
said $ot No. : &in ood faith. free fro# all liens and encu#brances,& as stated in the "eed of ?ale, Anne- &A&
7
bet!een
it and E##a Chave+.
Plainti/-appellant clai#s that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. %(%'(9, %(%'%%, %(%6%9, %(%:%2, and %(:(90
!ere i#posed as part of its eneral buildin sche#e desined for the beauti,cation and develop#ent of the @ih!ay
@ills ?ubdivision !hich for#s part of the bi landed estate of plainti/-appellant !here co##ercial and industrial sites
are also desinated or established.
8
"efendant-appellee, upon the other hand, #aintains that the area alon the !estern part of Epifanio de los ?antos
Avenue 5E"?A7 fro# ?ha! Boulevard to Pasi River, has been declared a co##ercial and industrial +one, per
Resolution No. 06, dated Aebruary 8, %9:( of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyon, Ri+al.
9
4t allees that plainti/-
appellant Jco#pletely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facin Epifanio de los ?antos
Avenue&
15
and the sub1ect lots thereunder !ere ac*uired by it &only on ;uly 02, %9:0 or #ore than t!o 507 years after
the area ... had been declared a co##ercial and industrial +one ...
11
Bn or about May ', %9:2, defendant-appellee bean layin the foundation and co##enced the construction of a
buildin on $ots Nos. ' and :, to be devoted to ban.in purposes, but !hich defendant-appellee clai#s could also be
devoted to, and used e-clusively for, residential purposes. The follo!in day, plainti/-appellant de#anded in !ritin
that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the co##erical buildin on the said lots. The latter refused to co#ply
!ith the de#and, contendin that the buildin !as bein constructed in accordance !ith the +onin reulations,
defendant-appellee havin ,led buildin and plannin per#it applications !ith the Municipality of Mandaluyon, and it
had accordinly obtained buildin and plannin per#its to proceed !ith the construction.
12
Bn the basis of the foreoin facts, Civil Case No. 66(:, supra, !as sub#itted in the lo!er court for decision. The
co#plaint souht, a#on other thins, the issuance of &a !rit of preli#inary in1unction ... restrainin and en1oinin
defendant, its aents, assins, and those actin on its or their behalf fro# continuin or co#pletin the construction of
a co##ercial ban. buildin in the pre#ises ... involved, !ith the vie! to co##andin the defendant to observe and
co#ply !ith the buildin restrictions annotated in the defendantJs transfer certi,cate of title.&
4n decidin the said case, the trial court considered, as the funda#ental issue, !hether or not the resolution of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyon declarin $ots Nos. ' and :, a#on others, as part of the co##ercial and industrial
+one of the #unicipality, prevailed over the buildin restrictions i#posed by plainti/-appellant on the lots in
*uestion.
13
The records do not sho! that a !rit of preli#inary in1unction !as issued.
The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dis#issed the co#plaint, holdin that the sub1ect restrictions !ere
subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 06, supra. 4t predicated its conclusion on the e-ercise of police po!er of the
said #unicipality, and stressed that private interest should &bo! do!n to eneral interest and !elfare. & 4n short, it
upheld the classi,cation by the Municipal Council of the area alon Epifanio de los ?antos Avenue as a co##ercial and
industrial +one, and held that the sa#e rendered &ine/ective and unenforceable& the restrictions in *uestion as aainst
defendant-appellee.
14
The trial court decision further e#phasi+ed that it &assu#es said resolution to be valid,
considerin that there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to !hether the sa#e is null and void.
16
Bn March 0, %9:', plainti/-appellant ,led a #otion for reconsideration of the above decision,
16
!hich #otion !as
opposed by defendant-appellee on March %6, %9:'.
17
4t averred, a#on others, in the #otion for reconsideration that
defendant- appellee &!as duty bound to co#ply !ith the conditions of the contract of sale in its favor, !hich conditions
!ere duly annotated in the Transfer Certi,cates of Title issued in her 5E##a Chave+7 favor.& 4t also invited the trial
courtJs attention to its clai# that the Municipal Council had 5no7 po!er to nullify the contractual obliations assu#ed
by the defendant corporation.&
18
The trial court denied the #otion for reconsideration in its order of March 0:, %9:'.
19
Bn April 0, %9:' plainti/-appellant ,led its notice of appeal fro# the decision dis#issin the co#plaint and fro# the
order of March 0:, %9:' denyin the #otion for reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal bond.&
25
Bn
April %8, the appeal !as iven due course
21
and the records of the case !ere elevated directly to this Court, since only
*uestions of la! are raised.
22
Plainti/-appellant allees in its brief that the trial court erred N
4. 3hen it sustained the vie! that Resolution No. 06, series of %9:( of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyon, Ri+al declarin $ots Nos. ' and :, a#on others, as part of the co##ercial and
industrial +one, is valid because it did so in the e-ercise of its police po!er> and
44. 3hen it failed to consider !hether or not the Municipal Council had the po!er to nullify the
contractual obliations assu#ed by defendant-appellee and !hen it did not #a.e a ,ndin that the
buildin !as erected alon the property line, !hen it should have been erected t!o #eters a!ay fro#
said property line.
23
The defendant-appellee sub#itted its counter-assin#ent of errors. 4n this connection, 3e already had occasion to
hold in 2elativo v. Castro
24
that &547t is not incu#bent on the appellee, !ho occupies a purely defensive position, and is
see.in no aCr#ative relief, to #a.e assin#ents of error, &
The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are= 5%7 !hether Resolution No. 06 s-%9:( is a valid e-ercise of police po!er>
and 507 !hether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obliations assu#ed by defendant-
appellee.
%. The contention that the trial court erred in sustainin the validity of Resolution No. 06 as an e-ercise of police po!er
is !ithout #erit. 4n the ,rst place, the validity of the said resolution !as never *uestioned before it. The rule is that the
*uestion of la! or of fact !hich #ay be included in the appellantJs assin#ent of errors #ust be those !hich have
been raised in the court belo!, and are !ithin the issues fra#ed by the parties.
26
The ob1ect of re*uirin the parties to
present all *uestions and issues to the lo!er court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable the
lo!er court to pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal #ay deter#ine !hether or not such rulin !as
erroneous. The re*uire#ent is in furtherance of 1ustice in that the other party #ay not be ta.en by surprise.
26
The rule
aainst the practice of blo!in &hot and cold& by assu#in one position in the trial court and another on appeal !ill, in
the !ords of Elliot, prevent deception.
27
Aor it is !ell-settled that issues or defenses not raised
28
or properly
litiated
29
or pleaded
35
in the Court belo! cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.
4n this particular case, the validity of the resolution !as ad#itted at least i#pliedly, in the stipulation of facts belo!.
!hen plainti/-appellant did not dispute the sa#e. The only controversy then as stated by the trial court !as !hether
or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyon ... !hich declared lots Nos. 8 and ' a#on others, as a
part of the co##ercial and industrial +one of the #unicipality, prevails over the restrictions constitutin as
encu#brances on the lots in *uestion.
31
@avin ad#itted the validity of the sub1ect resolution belo!, even if i#pliedly,
plainti/-appellant cannot no! chane its position on appeal.
But, assu#in aruendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plainti/-appellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of
the #unicipal resolution in *uestion, 3e are of the opinion that its posture is unsustainable. ?ection 2 of R.A. No. 00:8,
other!ise .no!n as the $ocal Autono#y Act,&
32
e#po!ers a Municipal Council &to adopt +onin and subdivision
ordinances or reulations&>
33
for the #unicipality. Clearly, the la! does not restrict the e-ercise of the po!er throuh
an ordinance. Therefore, rantin that Resolution No. 06 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a reulatory #easure !ithin
the intend#ent or a#bit of the !ord &reulation& under the provision. As a #atter of fact the sa#e section declares
that the po!er e-ists &5A7ny provision of la! to the contrary not!ithstandin ... &
An e-a#ination of ?ection %0 of the sa#e la!
34
!hich prescribes the rules for its interpretation li.e!ise reveals that
the i#plied po!er of a #unicipality should be &liberally construed in its favor& and that &5A7ny fair and reasonable
doubt as to the e-istence of the po!er should be interpreted in favor of the local overn#ent and it shall be presu#ed
to e-ist.& The sa#e section further #andates that the eneral !elfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt,
so as to ive #ore po!er to local overn#ents in pro#otin the econo#ic conditions, social !elfare and #aterial
proress of the people in the co##unity. The only e-ceptions under ?ection %0 are e-istin vested rihts arisin out of
a contract bet!een &a province, city or #unicipality on one hand and a third party on the other,& in !hich case the
oriinal ter#s and provisions of the contract should overn. The e-ceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
0. 3ith reard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obliations assu#ed by the
defendant-appellee Z referrin to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the correspondin
Transfer Certi,cates of Title issued to defendant-appellee Z it should be stressed, that !hile non-i#pair#ent of
contracts is constitutionally uaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled !ith the leiti#ate
e-ercise of police po!er, i.e., &the po!er to prescribe reulations to pro#ote the health, #orals, peace, education,
ood order or safety and eneral !elfare of the people.
36
4nvariably described as &the #ost essential, insistent, and
illi#itable of po!ers&
36
and &in a sense, the reatest and #ost po!erful attribute of overn#ent,
37
the e-ercise of the
po!er #ay be 1udicially in*uired into and corrected only if it is capricious, J!hi#sical, un1ust or unreasonable, there
havin been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional uarantee.
38
As this Court
held throuh ;ustice ;ose P. Ben+on in )hilippine Lon 6istance Compan( vs. Cit( of 6avao$ et al.
39
police po!er &is
elastic and #ust be responsive to various social conditions> it is not, con,ned !ithin narro! circu#scriptions of
precedents restin on past conditions> it #ust follo! the leal proress of a de#ocratic !ay of life.& 3e !ere even
#ore e#phatic in :da. de Genuino vs. The Court of Ararian 2elations$ et al.,
45
!hen 3e declared= &3e do not see
!hy public !elfare !hen clashin !ith the individual riht to property should not be #ade to prevail throuh the
stateJs e-ercise of its police po!er.
Resolution No. 06, s-%9:( declarin the !estern part of hih!ay '8, no! E. de los ?antos Avenue 5E"?A, for short7
fro# ?ha! Boulevard to the Pasi River as an industrial and co##ercial +one, !as obviously passed by the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyon, Ri+al in the e-ercise of police po!er to safeuard or pro#ote the health, safety, peace, ood
order and eneral !elfare of the people in the locality, ;udicial notice #ay be ta.en of the conditions prevailin in the
area, especially !here lots Nos. ' and : are located. The lots the#selves not only front the hih!ay> industrial and
co##ercial co#ple-es have Hourished about the place. E"?A, a #ain traCc artery !hich runs throuh several cities
and #unicipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless strea# of traCc and the resultin activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or !elfare of the residents in its route. @avin been e-pressly
ranted the po!er to adopt +onin and subdivision ordinances or reulations, the #unicipality of Mandaluyon,
throuh its Municipal Jcouncil, !as reasonably, if not perfectly, 1usti,ed under the circu#stances, in passin the sub1ect
resolution.
The scope of police po!er .eeps e-pandin as civili+ation advances, stressed this Court, spea.in thru ;ustice $aurel in
the leadin case of Calalan v. 0illiams et al.$
41
Thus-
As !as said in the case of 6o**ins v. Los Aneles 5%9' K? 002, 02< 89 $. ed. %:97, Lthe riht to
e>ercise the police power is a continuin one$ and a *usiness lawful toda( ma( in the future$ *ecause
of chaned situation$ the rowth of population or other causes$ *ecome a menace to the pu*lic health
and welfare$ and *e re;uired to (ield to the pu*lic ood.J And in People v. Po#ar 58: Phil. 88(7, it !as
observed that Ladvancin civilization is *rinin within the scope of police power of the state toda(
thins which were not thouht of as *ein with in such power (esterda(. The develop#ent of
civili+ation7, the rapidly increasin population, the ro!th of public opinion, !ith an increasin desire
on the part of the #asses and of the overn#ent to loo. after and care for the interests of the
individuals of the state, have brouht !ithin the police po!er #any *uestions for reulation !hich
for#erly !ere not so considered.
42
5E#phasis, supplied.7
Thus, the state, in order to pro#ote the eneral !elfare, #ay interfere !ith personal liberty, !ith property, and !ith
business and occupations. Persons #ay be sub1ected to all .inds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
eneral co#fort health and prosperity of the state
43
and to this funda#ental ai# of our Oovern#ent, the rihts of the
individual are subordinated.
44
The need for reconcilin the non-i#pair#ent clause of the Constitution and the valid e-ercise of police po!er #ay also
be leaned fro# Helverin v. 6avis
46
!herein Mr. ;ustice Cardo+o, spea.in for the Court, resolved the conHict
&bet!een one !elfare and another, bet!een particular and eneral, thus N
Nor is the concept of the eneral !elfare static. 3eeds that were narrow or parochial a centur( ao
ma( *e interwoven in our da( with the well-*ein of the nation 3hat is critical or urent chanes !ith
the ti#es.
46
The #otives behind the passae of the *uestioned resolution bein reasonable, and it bein a & leiti#ate response to
a felt public need,&
47
not !hi#sical or oppressive, the non-i#pair#ent of contracts clause of the Constitution !ill not
bar the #unicipalityJs proper e-ercise of the po!er. No! Chief ;ustice Aernando puts it aptly !hen he declared= &Police
po!er leislation then is not li.ely to succu#b to the challene that thereby contractual rihts are rendered
nuatory.&
48
Aurther#ore, 3e restated in )hilippine American Life 1ns. Co. v. Auditor General
49
that la!s and reservation of
essential attributes of soverein po!er are read into contracts areed upon by the parties. Thus N
Not only are e-istin la!s read into contracts in order to ,- obliations as bet!een the parties, but the
reservation of essential attri*utes of soverein power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
leal order. The policy of protectin contracts aainst i#pair#ents presupposes the #aintenance of a
overn#ent by virtue of !hich contractual relations are !orth!hile Z a overn#ent !hich retains
ade*uate authority to secure the peace and ood order of society.
Aain, 3e held in Li*eration Steamship Co.$ 1nc. v. Court of 1ndustrial 2elations,
65
throuh ;ustice ;.B.$. Reyes, that ...
the la! for#s part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly e-cluded therefro# in those cases !here such
e-clusion is allo!ed.& The decision in 'aritime Compan( of the )hilippines v. 2eparations Commission$
61
!ritten for
the Court by ;ustice Aernando, no! Chief ;ustice, restates the rule.
Bne last observation. Appellant has placed un*uali,ed reliance on A#erican 1urisprudence and authorities
62
to bolster
its theory that the #unicipal resolution in *uestion cannot nullify or supersede the aree#ent of the parties e#bodied
in the sales contract, as that, it clai#s, !ould i#pair the obliation of contracts in violation of the Constitution. ?uch
reliance is #isplaced.
4n the ,rst place, the vie!s set forth in A#erican decisions and authorities are not per se controllin in the Philippines,
the la!s of !hich #ust necessarily be construed in accordance !ith the intention of its o!n la!#a.ers and such intent
#ay be deduced fro# the lanuae of each la! and the conte-t of other local leislation related
thereto.
63
and #uress$ et al v. 'aarian$ et al.$
66
t!o Bf the cases cited by plainti/-appellant, lend support to the
conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e. that the #unicipal resolution supersedesTsupervenes over the contractual
underta.in bet!een the parties. 6olan v. #rown, states that &E*uity !ill not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the
use of property by in1unction where the propert( has so chaned in character and environment as to ma!e it unAt or
unproAta*le for use should the restriction *e enforced$ but !ill, in such a case, leave the co#plainant to !hatever
re#edy he #ay have at la!.
66
5E#phasis supplied.7 @ence, the re#edy of in1unction in 6olan vs. #rown !as denied on
the speci,c holdin that &A rantor #ay la!fully insert in his deed conditions or restrictions !hich are not aainst
public policy and do not #aterially i#pair the bene,cial en1oy#ent of the estate.
67
Applyin the principle 1ust stated
to the present controversy, 3e can say that since it is no! unpro,table, nay a ha+ard to the health and co#fort, to use
$ots Nos. ' and : for strictly residential purposes, defendants- appellees should be per#itted, on the strenth of the
resolution pro#ulated under the police po!er of the #unicipality, to use the sa#e for co##ercial purposes.
4n #uress v. 'aarian et al. it !as, held that &restrictive covenants runnin !ith the land are bindin on all
subse*uent purchasers ... & @o!ever, ?ection 02 of the +onin ordinance involved therein contained
a proviso e-pressly declarin that the ordinance !as not intended &to interfere !ith or abroate or annul any
ease#ents, covenants or other aree#ent bet!een parties.&
68
4n the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the
sub1ect resolution.
4t is, therefore, clear that even if the sub1ect buildin restrictions !ere assu#ed by the defendant-appellee as vendee
of $ots Nos. ' and :, in the correspondin deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certi,cates of Title Nos. %(%:%2 and
%(:(90, the contractual obliations so assu#ed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 06, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyon, !hich has validly e-ercised its police po!er throuh the said resolution. Accordinly, the buildin
restrictions, !hich declare $ots Nos. ' and : as residential, cannot be enforced.
4N M4E3 BA T@E ABREOB4NO, the decision appealed fro#, dis#issin the co#plaint, is hereby AAA4RME". &!ithout
pronounce#ent as to costs.
?B BR"ERE".

'a!asiar$ Antonio$ Concepcion$ 5r.$ %ernandez$ Guerrero$ 6e Castro and 'elencio-Herrera$ 55.$ concur.
Teehan!ee V and A;uino$55.$ too! no part.
S&-'*'+& O-!"!o"

9ARRE3O, J., concurrin=
4 hold it is a #atter of public .no!lede that the place in *uestion is co##ercial. 4t !ould be !orse if the sa#e !ere to
be left as residential and all around are already co##ercial.
4ERNAN3O, +.J., concurrin=
The e-haustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by ;ustice Ouiller#o ?. ?antos co##ends itself for approval. 4
feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yieldin concurrence, The observation, ho!ever, in the dissent of ;ustice Micente Abad
?antos relative to restrictive covenants calls, to #y #ind, for further reHection as to the respect to !hich they are
entitled !henever police po!er leislation, !hether on the national or local level, is assailed. Before doin so,
ho!ever, it #ay not be a#iss to consider further the e/ect of such all-e#bracin attribute on e-istin contracts.
%. Reference !as #ade in the opinion of the Court to )hilippine American Life 1nsurance Compan( v. Auditor
General.
1
The ponente in that case !as ;ustice ?anche+. A concurrence ca#e fro# #e. 4t contained this *uali,cation=
&4t cannot be said, !ithout renderin nuatory the constitutional uarantee of non-i#pair#ent, and for that #atter
both the e*ual protection and due process clauses !hich e*ually serve to protect property rihts, that at the #ere
invocation of the police po!er, the ob1ection on non-i#pair#ent rounds auto#atically loses force. @ere, as in other
cases !here overn#ental authority #ay trench upon property rihts, the process of balancin, ad1ust#ent or
har#oni+ation is called for.
2
After referrin to three leadin 8nited States Supreme Court decisions$ Home #uildin
and Loan Association v. #laisdell$
1
3e**ia v. 3ew 4or!$
4
and 3orman v. #altimore and Ohio 2ailroad Co.,
6
4 stated= &All
of the above decisions reHect the vie! that an enact#ent of a police po!er #easure does not per se call for the
overrulin of ob1ections based on either due process or non-i#pair#ent based on either due process or non-
i#pair#ent rounds. There #ust be that balancin, or ad1ust#ent, or har#oni+ation of the conHictin clai#s posed by
an e-ercise of state reulatory po!er on the one hand and assertion of rihts to property, !hether of natural or of
1uridical persons, on the other. JThat is the only !ay by !hich the constitutional uarantees #ay serve the hih ends
that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus e/ectively preclude ally abusive e-ercise of overn#ental
authority.&
6
Nor did #y concurrence stop there= &4n the opinion of the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief ;ustice
@uhes, there !as this understandable stress on balancin or har#oni+in, !hich is called for in litiations of this
character= JThe policy of protectin contracts aainst i#pair#ent presupposes the #aintenance of a overn#ent by
virtue of !hich contractual relations are !orth!hile a overn#ent !hich retains ade*uate authority to secure the
peace and ood order of society. This principle of har#oni+in the constitutional prohibition !ith the necessary
residuu# of state po!er has had proressive reconition in the decisions of this Court.J Also to the sa#e e/ect=
JKndoubtedly, !hatever is reserved of state po!er #ust be consistent !ith the fair intent of the constitutional
li#itation of that po!er. The reserve po!er cannot be construed so as to destroy the li#itation, nor is the li#itation to
be construed to destroy the reserved po!er in its essential aspects. JThey #ust be construed in har#ony !ith each
other. This principle precludes a construction !hich !ould per#it the ?tate to adopt as its policy the repudiation of
debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of #eans to enforce the#. But it does not follo! that conditions #ay
not arise in !hich a te#porary restraint of enforce#ent #ay be consistent !ith the spirit and purpose of the
constitutional provision and thus be found to be !ithin the rane of the reserved po!er of the ?tate to protect the vital
interests of the co##unity.J Aurther on, Chief ;ustice @uhes li.e!ise stated= J4t is #anifest fro# this revie! of our
decisions that there has been a ro!in appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of ,ndin round for a
rational co#pro#ise bet!een individual rihts and public !elfare. &
7
This is the concludin pararaph of #y
concurrence in the Philippine A#erican $ife 4nsurance Co. case= &4f e#phasis be therefore laid, as this concurrin
opinion does, on the pressin and inescapable need for such an approach !henever a possible collision bet!een state
authority and an assertion of constitutional riht to property #ay e-ist, it is not to depart fro# !hat sound
constitutional orthodo-y dictates. 4t is rather to abide by !hat is co#pels. 4n litiations of this character then, perhaps
#uch #ore so than in other disputes, !here there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the 1udiciary cannot
escape !hat @ol#es ,tly referred to as the soverein preroative of choice, the e-ercise of !hich #iht possibly be
i#puned if there be no atte#pt, ho!ever sliht, at such an e/ort of ad1ustin or reconcilin the respective clai#s of
state reulatory po!er and constitutionally protected rihts.&
8
4 adhere to such a vie!. This is not to say that there is a departure therefro# in the able and scholarly opinion of
;ustice ?antos. 4t is #erely to stress !hat to #y #ind is a funda#ental postulate of our Constitution. The only point 4
!ould !ish to add is that in the process of such balancin and ad1ust#ent, the present Constitution, the Philippine
A#erican $ife 4nsurance Co. decision havin been pro#ulated under the %92' Charter, leaves no doubt that the clai#
to property rihts based on the non-i#pair#ent clause has a lesser !eiht. Aor as e-plicitly provided by our present
funda#ental la!= &The ?tate shall pro#ote social ;ustice to ensure the dinity, !elfare, and security of all the people.
To!ards this end, the
?tate shall reulate the ac*uisition, o!nership, use, en1oy#ent, and disposition of private property, and e*uitably
di/use property o!nership and pro,ts.
9
0. No! as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by @art and ?ac.s under the cateory of &private directive
arrane#ents. &
15
Throuh the# people are enable to aree on ho! to order their a/airs. They could be utili+ed to
overn their a/airs. They could be utili+ed to overn their future conduct. 4t is a !ell-.no!n fact that the co##on la!
relies to a reat e-tent on such private directive arrane#ents to attain a desirable social condition. More speci,cally,
such covenants are an i#portant #eans of orderin one aspect of property relationships. Throuh the#, there could
be deli#itation of land use rihts. 4t is *uite understandable !hy the la! should ordinarily accord the# deference, 4t
does so, it has been said, both on rounds of #orality and utility. Nonetheless, there are li#its to the literal
enforce#ent of their ter#s. To the e-tent that they inore technoloical or econo#ic proress, they are not
auto#atically entitled to 1udicial protection. Clearly, they #ust &spea. fro# one point of ti#e to another.&
11
The
parties, li.e all #ortal, do not have the po!er of predictin the future !ith unfailin certainty. 4n cases therefore !here
societal !elfare calls for police po!er leislation, the parties adversely a/ected should reali+e that arrane#ents
dealin !ith property rihts are not i#pressed !ith sanctity. That approach, in #y vie!, !as the uidin principle of
the opinion of the Court. f fence #y full and entire concurrence.
A9A3 SANTOS, J:, dissentin=
Althouh Resolution No. 06, series of %9:(, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyon, Ri+al, is valid until other!ise
declared, 4 do not believe that its enact#ent !as by virtue of the police po!er of that #unicipality. 4 do not here
dispute the concept of police po!er as stated in )rimicias vs. %uoso, <( Phil. 66 5%98<7 for as a #atter of fact 4 accept
it. And 4 aree also that it is elastic and #ust be responsive to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in)L6T vs. Cit( of
6avao, $-02(<(, Bct. 0:, %9:', %' ?CRA 088. But Resolution No. 06, cannot be described as pro#otive of the health,
#orals, peace, education, ood order or safety and eneral !elfare of the people of Mandaluyon. Bn the contrary, its
e/ect is the opposite. Aor the serenity, peace and *uite of a residential section !ould by the resolution be replaced by
the chaos, tur#oil and fren+y of co##erce and industry. 3here there !ould be no industrial and noise pollution these
bane of so-called proress !ould no! pervade and su/ocate the environ#ent to the detri#ent of the ecoloy. To
characteri+e the ordinance as an e-ercise of police po!er !ould be retroressive. 4t !ill set bac. all the e/orts of the
Ministry of @u#an ?ettle#ents to i#prove the *uality of life especially in Metro Manila. 4t !ill #a.e Metro Manila, not
the city of #an as envisioned by its Oovernor but a city of co##erce and industry.
Considerin, therefore, that Resolution No, 0-% !as not enacted in the leiti#ate e-ercise of police po!er, it cannot
i#pair the restrictive covenants !hich o !ith the lands that !ere sold by the plainti/-appellant. 4 vote for the reversal
of the appealed decision.
J S&-'*'+& O-!"!o"
9ARRE3O, J., concurrin=
4 hold it is a #atter of public .no!lede that the place in *uestion is co##ercial. 4t !ould be !orse if the sa#e !ere to
be left as residential and all around are already co##ercial.
4ERNAN3O, +.J., concurrin=
The e-haustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by ;ustice Ouiller#o ?. ?antos co##ends itself for approval. 4
feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yieldin concurrence, The observation, ho!ever, in the dissent of ;ustice Micente Abad
?antos relative to restrictive covenants calls, to #y #ind, for further reHection as to the respect to !hich they are
entitled !henever police po!er leislation, !hether on the national or local level, is assailed. Before doin so,
ho!ever, it #ay not be a#iss to consider further the e/ect of such all-e#bracin attribute on e-istin contracts.
%. Reference !as #ade in the opinion of the Court to )hilippine American Life 1nsurance Compan( v. Auditor
General.
1
The ponente in that case !as ;ustice ?anche+. A concurrence ca#e fro# #e. 4t contained this *uali,cation=
&4t cannot be said, !ithout renderin nuatory the constitutional uarantee of non-i#pair#ent, and for that #atter
both the e*ual protection and due process clauses !hich e*ually serve to protect property rihts, that at the #ere
invocation of the police po!er, the ob1ection on non-i#pair#ent rounds auto#atically loses force. @ere, as in other
cases !here overn#ental authority #ay trench upon property rihts, the process of balancin, ad1ust#ent or
har#oni+ation is called for.
2
After referrin to three leadin 8nited States Supreme Court decisions$ Home #uildin
and Loan Association v. #laisdell$
1
3e**ia v. 3ew 4or!$
4
and 3orman v. #altimore and Ohio 2ailroad Co.,
6
4 stated= &All
of the above decisions reHect the vie! that an enact#ent of a police po!er #easure does not per se call for the
overrulin of ob1ections based on either due process or non-i#pair#ent based on either due process or non-
i#pair#ent rounds. There #ust be that balancin, or ad1ust#ent, or har#oni+ation of the conHictin clai#s posed by
an e-ercise of state reulatory po!er on the one hand and assertion of rihts to property, !hether of natural or of
1uridical persons, on the other. JThat is the only !ay by !hich the constitutional uarantees #ay serve the hih ends
that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus e/ectively preclude ally abusive e-ercise of overn#ental
authority.&
6
Nor did #y concurrence stop there= &4n the opinion of the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief ;ustice
@uhes, there !as this understandable stress on balancin or har#oni+in, !hich is called for in litiations of this
character= JThe policy of protectin contracts aainst i#pair#ent presupposes the #aintenance of a overn#ent by
virtue of !hich contractual relations are !orth!hile a overn#ent !hich retains ade*uate authority to secure the
peace and ood order of society. This principle of har#oni+in the constitutional prohibition !ith the necessary
residuu# of state po!er has had proressive reconition in the decisions of this Court.J Also to the sa#e e/ect=
JKndoubtedly, !hatever is reserved of state po!er #ust be consistent !ith the fair intent of the constitutional
li#itation of that po!er. The reserve po!er cannot be construed so as to destroy the li#itation, nor is the li#itation to
be construed to destroy the reserved po!er in its essential aspects. JThey #ust be construed in har#ony !ith each
other. This principle precludes a construction !hich !ould per#it the ?tate to adopt as its policy the repudiation of
debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of #eans to enforce the#. But it does not follo! that conditions #ay
not arise in !hich a te#porary restraint of enforce#ent #ay be consistent !ith the spirit and purpose of the
constitutional provision and thus be found to be !ithin the rane of the reserved po!er of the ?tate to protect the vital
interests of the co##unity.J Aurther on, Chief ;ustice @uhes li.e!ise stated= J4t is #anifest fro# this revie! of our
decisions that there has been a ro!in appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of ,ndin round for a
rational co#pro#ise bet!een individual rihts and public !elfare. &
7
This is the concludin pararaph of #y
concurrence in the Philippine A#erican $ife 4nsurance Co. case= &4f e#phasis be therefore laid, as this concurrin
opinion does, on the pressin and inescapable need for such an approach !henever a possible collision bet!een state
authority and an assertion of constitutional riht to property #ay e-ist, it is not to depart fro# !hat sound
constitutional orthodo-y dictates. 4t is rather to abide by !hat is co#pels. 4n litiations of this character then, perhaps
#uch #ore so than in other disputes, !here there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the 1udiciary cannot
escape !hat @ol#es ,tly referred to as the soverein preroative of choice, the e-ercise of !hich #iht possibly be
i#puned if there be no atte#pt, ho!ever sliht, at such an e/ort of ad1ustin or reconcilin the respective clai#s of
state reulatory po!er and constitutionally protected rihts.&
8
4 adhere to such a vie!. This is not to say that there is a departure therefro# in the able and scholarly opinion of
;ustice ?antos. 4t is #erely to stress !hat to #y #ind is a funda#ental postulate of our Constitution. The only point 4
!ould !ish to add is that in the process of such balancin and ad1ust#ent, the present Constitution, the Philippine
A#erican $ife 4nsurance Co. decision havin been pro#ulated under the %92' Charter, leaves no doubt that the clai#
to property rihts based on the non-i#pair#ent clause has a lesser !eiht. Aor as e-plicitly provided by our present
funda#ental la!= &The ?tate shall pro#ote social ;ustice to ensure the dinity, !elfare, and security of all the people.
To!ards this end, the
?tate shall reulate the ac*uisition, o!nership, use, en1oy#ent, and disposition of private property, and e*uitably
di/use property o!nership and pro,ts.
9
0. No! as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by @art and ?ac.s under the cateory of &private directive
arrane#ents. &
15
Throuh the# people are enable to aree on ho! to order their a/airs. They could be utili+ed to
overn their a/airs. They could be utili+ed to overn their future conduct. 4t is a !ell-.no!n fact that the co##on la!
relies to a reat e-tent on such private directive arrane#ents to attain a desirable social condition. More speci,cally,
such covenants are an i#portant #eans of orderin one aspect of property relationships. Throuh the#, there could
be deli#itation of land use rihts. 4t is *uite understandable !hy the la! should ordinarily accord the# deference, 4t
does so, it has been said, both on rounds of #orality and utility. Nonetheless, there are li#its to the literal
enforce#ent of their ter#s. To the e-tent that they inore technoloical or econo#ic proress, they are not
auto#atically entitled to 1udicial protection. Clearly, they #ust &spea. fro# one point of ti#e to another.&
11
The
parties, li.e all #ortal, do not have the po!er of predictin the future !ith unfailin certainty. 4n cases therefore !here
societal !elfare calls for police po!er leislation, the parties adversely a/ected should reali+e that arrane#ents
dealin !ith property rihts are not i#pressed !ith sanctity. That approach, in #y vie!, !as the uidin principle of
the opinion of the Court. f fence #y full and entire concurrence.
A9A3 SANTOS, J:, dissentin=
Althouh Resolution No. 06, series of %9:(, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyon, Ri+al, is valid until other!ise
declared, 4 do not believe that its enact#ent !as by virtue of the police po!er of that #unicipality. 4 do not here
dispute the concept of police po!er as stated in )rimicias vs. %uoso, <( Phil. 66 5%98<7 for as a #atter of fact 4 accept
it. And 4 aree also that it is elastic and #ust be responsive to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in)L6T vs. Cit( of
6avao, $-02(<(, Bct. 0:, %9:', %' ?CRA 088. But Resolution No. 06, cannot be described as pro#otive of the health,
#orals, peace, education, ood order or safety and eneral !elfare of the people of Mandaluyon. Bn the contrary, its
e/ect is the opposite. Aor the serenity, peace and *uite of a residential section !ould by the resolution be replaced by
the chaos, tur#oil and fren+y of co##erce and industry. 3here there !ould be no industrial and noise pollution these
bane of so-called proress !ould no! pervade and su/ocate the environ#ent to the detri#ent of the ecoloy. To
characteri+e the ordinance as an e-ercise of police po!er !ould be retroressive. 4t !ill set bac. all the e/orts of the
Ministry of @u#an ?ettle#ents to i#prove the *uality of life especially in Metro Manila. 4t !ill #a.e Metro Manila, not
the city of #an as envisioned by its Oovernor but a city of co##erce and industry.
Considerin, therefore, that Resolution No, 0-% !as not enacted in the leiti#ate e-ercise of police po!er, it cannot
i#pair the restrictive covenants !hich o !ith the lands that !ere sold by the plainti/-appellant. 4 vote for the reversal
of the appealed decision.
J4oo+"o+&
1 Record on Appeal, p. 110.
2 Id., pp. 4-5. Emphasis supplied.
3 Id pp. 111-112.
4 Id., p. 112.
5 Id., p. 80.
6 Id., p. 86.
7 Id., p. 94.
8 Id., pp. 11 2-113.
9 Id., pp. 60 and 113.
10 rie! !or "e!endan#-Appellee, p. 2.
11 Id, p. 3.
12 Record on Appeal, pp. 113-114.
13 Id., p. 114.
14 Id., pp. 114-115.
15 Id., p. 114.
16 Id., p. 116.
17 Id., p.118.
18 Id., p. 117.
19 Id., p. 127.
20 Id., pp. 127-129.
21 Id., p. 130.
22 Ibid.
23 $ee rie! !or "e!endan#-Appellee, pp. 30-31.
24 76 %hil. 563, 567 &1946'.
25 $ec. 18, Rule 46, Re(ised Rules o! )our#* +an ,achan (. "e la +rinidad 3 %hil. 684, &1946'.
26 -rancisco, +he Re(ised Rules o! )our#, .ol. 111, 1968 Ed., p. 648, ci#in/ 0ones (. $e1mour, 95 Ar#. 593, 597, 130 $.2. 560.
27 Id., pp.638-649, ci# Ellio# on Appella#e %rocedure, 416-417.
28 $umerari3, et al. (s. "e(elopmen# an4 o! #he %hilippines, et al., 5-23764, "ec. 26, 1967, 21 $)RA 13746 $an ,i/uel re7er1, et al. (s. .da. de 0o(es. et al., 5-24258, 0une 26, 1968, 23 $)RA 1093, 1097. $ee also
+uason (s. 8on. Arca, et al., 5- 24346, 0une 29, 1968, 23 $)RA 1308, 1312.
29 %laridel $ure#1 and 9ns. )o. (s. )ommissioner o! 9n#ernal Re(enue, 5-21520, "ec. 11, 1967, 21 $)RA 1187.
30 ,anila %or# $er(ice, e# al (s, )our# o! Appeals, et al., 521890, ,arch 29. 1968, 22 $)RA 1364.
31 Record on Appeal, p. 114.
32 $ec. 3 reads6
$ec. 3. Addi#ional po7ers o! pro(incial :oards, municipal :oards or ci#1 councils and municipal and re/ularl1 or/ani3ed municipal dis#ric# councils.
;;; ;;; ;;;
%o7er #o adop# 3onin/ and plannin/ ordinances. An1 pro(ision o! la7 #o #he con#rar1 no#7i#hs#andin/ ,unicipal oards or )i#1 )ouncils in ci#ies, and ,unicipal )ouncils in municipali#ies are here:1 au#hori3ed #o adop#
3onin/ and su:di(ision ordinances or re/ula#ions !or #heir respec#i(e ci#ies and municipali#ies su:<ec# #o #he appro(al o! #he )i#1 ,a1or or ,unicipal ,a1or, as #he case ma1 :e. )i#ies and municipali#ies ma1, ho7e(er,
consul# #he =a#ional %lannin/ )ommission on ma##ers per#ainin/ #o plannin/ and 3onin/. &Emphasis supplied'.
33 Emphasis supplied.
34 +he !ull #e;# o! $ec#ion 12 !ollo7s6
$E). 12. Rules !or #he 9n#erpre#a#ion o! #he 5ocal Au#onom1 Ac#. >
1. 9mplied po7er o! a pro(ince, a ci#1 or municipali#1 shall :e li:erall1 cons#rued in i#s !a(or. An1 !air and reasona:le dou:# as #o #he e;is#ence o! #he po7er should :e in#erpre#ed in!a(or o! #he local /o(ernmen# and i# shall :e
presumed #o e;is#.
2. +he /eneral 7el!are clause :e li:erall1 in#erpre#ed in case o! local /o(ernmen#s in promo#in/ #he economic condi#ion, social 7el!are and ma#erial pro/ress o! #he people in #he communi#1.
3. .es#ed ri/h#s e;is#in/ a# #he #ime o! #he promul/a#ion o! #his arisin/ ou# o! a con#rac# :e#7een a pro(ince, ci#1 or municipali#1 on one hand and #hird par#1 on #he o#her, should :e /o(erned :1 #he ori/inal #erms and
pro(isions o! #he same, and in no case 7ould #his ac# in!rin/e e;is#in/ ri/h#.
&7i#h more sourcessss'