* FACTS:

In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of American-English origin) has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of embers of the
!egislature ("ongressional Pork #arrel)$ %o&e'er, it has also come to refer to
certain funds to the E(ecuti'e$ )he "ongressional Pork #arrel can be traced from
Act *+,, (Public -orks Act of ./00), the 1upport for !ocal 2e'elopment Pro3ects
during the arcos period, the indanao 2e'elopment 4und and 5isayas
2e'elopment 4und and later the "ountry&ide 2e'elopment 4und ("24) under the
"ora6on A7uino presidency, and the Priority 2e'elopment Assistance 4und under
the 8oseph Estrada administration, as continued by the 9loria-acapagal Arroyo and
the present #enigno A7uino III administrations$
)he Presidential Pork #arrel 7uestioned by the petitioners include the alampaya
4und and the Presidential 1ocial 4und$ )he alampaya 4und &as created as a
special fund under 1ection :, Presidential 2ecree (P2) /.+ by then-
President 4erdinand arcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate
go'ernment e;orts relating to the e(ploration, e(ploitation, and de'elopment of
indigenous energy resources 'ital to economic gro&th$ )he Presidential 1ocial 4und
&as created under 1ection .0, )itle I5, P2 .:</ (./:*) or the "harter of the
Philippine Amusement and 9aming "orporation (PA9"=>), as amended by P2 .//*
issued in ./:?$ )he Presidential 1ocial 4und has been described as a special funding
facility managed and administered by the Presidential anagement 1ta; through
&hich the President pro'ides direct assistance to priority programs and pro3ects not
funded under the regular budget$ It is sourced from the share of the go'ernment in
the aggregate gross earnings of PA9"=>$
='er the years, pork funds ha'e increased tremendously$ In .//<, an anonymous
source later identi@ed as former arikina "ity >omeo "anda6o re'ealed that huge
sums of go'ernment money &ent into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks$ In
0++,, se'eral citi6ens sought the nulli@cation of the P2A4 as enacted in the 0++,
9eneral Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the 1upreme "ourt
dismissed the petition$ In 8uly 0+.*, the Aational #ureau of In'estigation (A#I)
began its probe into allegations that the go'ernment has been defrauded of some
P.+ #illion o'er the past .+ years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
la&makers and 'arious go'ernment agencies for scores of ghost pro3ects$ )he
in'estigation &as spa&ned by s&orn aBda'its of si( &histle-blo&ers &ho declared
that 8!A "orporation C 8!A standing for 8anet !im Aapoles C had s&indled billions of
pesos from the public co;ers for ghost pro3ects using no fe&er than 0+ dummy
non-go'ernment organi6ations for an entire decade$ In August 0+.*, the
"ommission on Audit ("oA) released the results of a three-year audit in'estigation
co'ering the use of legislatorsD P2A4 from 0++E to 0++/, or during the last three (*)
years of the Arroyo administration$
As for the Presidential Pork #arrel, &histle-blo&ers alleged that FaGt least P/++
illion from royalties in the operation of the alampaya gas pro3ect intended for
agrarian reform bene@ciaries has gone into a dummy FA9=G$
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
.$) -hether or not (-=A) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions in'ol'e an
actual and 3usticiable contro'ersy
0$) -=A the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy sub3ect
to 3udicial re'ie&
*$) -=A petitioners ha'e legal standing to sue
,$) -=A the .//, 2ecision of the 1upreme "ourt (the "ourt) on Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 0+.0 2ecision of the "ourt
on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Manageent (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the pork
barrel system under the principles of res !udicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Por Barrel!
-=A the 0+.* P2A4 Article and all other "ongressional Pork #arrel !a&s similar to it
are unconstitutional considering that they 'iolate the principles ofHconstitutional
pro'isions onI
.$) Iseparation of po&ers
0$) Inon-delegability of legislati'e po&er
*$) Ichecks and balances
,$) Iaccountability
?$) Ipolitical dynasties
<$) Ilocal autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Por Barrel!
-=A the phrasesJ
(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President
under 1ection : of P2 /.+ relating to the alampaya 4unds, and
(b) to @nance the priority infrastructure de'elopment pro3ects and to @nance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authori6ed by the =Bce of the President of the Philippines under 1ection .0
of P2 .:</, as amended by P2 .//*, relating to the Presidential 1ocial 4und,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislati'e
po&er
* "E#$ A%$ &ATI':
A. Procedural Issues
Ao 7uestion in'ol'ing the constitutionality or 'alidity of a la& or go'ernmental act
may be heard and decided by the "ourt unless there is compliance &ith
the legal re(uisites )or *udicial in(uir+, namelyJ (a) there must be an actual
case or controvers+ calling for the e(ercise of 3udicial po&erK (b) the
person challenging the act must ha'e the standing to 7uestion the 'alidity of the
sub3ect act or issuanceK (c) the 7uestion of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest o,,ortunit+K and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the 'ery lis mota of the case$
.$) -ES. There e.ists an actual and *usticiable controvers+ in these
cases. )he re7uirement of contrariet+ o) legal rights is clearly satis@ed
by the antagonistic ,ositions o) the ,arties on the constitutionalit+ o) the
Por Barrel S+ste/.! Also, the 7uestions in these consolidated cases are ri,e
)or ad*udication since the challenged )unds and the ,rovisions allo0ing )or
their utili1ation C such as the 0+.* 9AA for the P2A4, P2 /.+ for the alampaya
4unds and P2 .:</, as amended by P2 .//*, for the Presidential 1ocial 4und C are
currentl+ e.isting and o,erationalK hence, there e(ists an immediate or
threatened in3ury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these
public funds$
As for the P2A4, the "ourt dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had
been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents$ A
case beco/es /oot 0hen there is no /ore actual controvers+ bet0een the
,arties or no use)ul ,ur,ose can be served in ,assing u,on the
/erits. )he respondentsD ,ro,osed line2ite/ budgeting sche/e &ould
not terminate the contro'ersy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said re)or/ is geared to0ards the 3456 budget7 and not the
3458 P$AF Article &hich, being a distinct sub*ect /atter, re/ains legall+
e9ective and e.isting. Aeither &ill the PresidentDs declaration that he had
already abolished the P2A4 render the issues on P2A4 moot precisely
because the E.ecutive branch o) govern/ent has no constitutional
authorit+ to nulli)+ or annul its legal e.istence.
E'en on the assumption of mootness, ne'ertheless, 3urisprudence dictates that
the Lmoot and academicD principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the "ourt in resol'ing a case$ The Court 0ill decide cases7 other0ise
/oot7 i):
i$) There is a grave violation o) the Constitution: )his is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners C they essentially allege grave violations o)
the Constitution 0ith res,ect to the ,rinci,les o) se,aration o) ,o0ers7
non2delegabilit+ o) legislative ,o0er7 checs and balances7 accountabilit+
and local autono/+.
ii$) The e.ce,tional character o) the situation and the ,ara/ount ,ublic
interest is involved: )his is also apparent from the nature of the interests
in'ol'ed C the constitutionalit+ o) the ver+ s+ste/ 0ithin 0hich signi:cant
a/ounts o) ,ublic )unds have been and continue to be utili1ed and
e.,ended undoubtedly presents a situation of e(ceptional character as &ell as a
matter of paramount public interest$ )he present petitions, in fact, ha'e been
lodged at a ti/e 0hen the s+ste/;s <a0s have never be)ore been
/agni:ed$ )o the "ourtDs mind, the coalescence o) the CoA &e,ort7 the
accounts o) nu/erous 0histle2blo0ers7 and the govern/ent;s o0n
recognition that re)or/s are needed to address the re,orted abuses o)
the P$AF! demonstrates a ,ri/a )acie ,attern o) abuse &hich only
underscores the importance of the matter$
It is also by this @nding that the "ourt @nds petitionersD claims as not merely
theori6ed, speculati'e or hypothetical$ =f note is the &eight accorded by the "ourt
to the @ndings made by the "oA &hich is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of
the go'ernment$ if only for the purpose of 'alidating the e(istence of an actual and
3usticiable contro'ersy in these cases, the Court dee/s the :ndings under the
CoA &e,ort to be su=cient.
iii$) >hen the constitutional issue raised re(uires )or/ulation o) controlling
,rinci,les to guide the bench7 the bar7 and the ,ublic: )his is applicable
largely due to the ,ractical need )or a de:nitive ruling on the systemDs
constitutionality$ )here is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relati'e to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public, not 3ust for the e(peditious resolution of the
anticipated disallo&ance cases, but more importantly, so that the go'ernment may
be guided on ho& public funds should be utili6ed in accordance &ith constitutional
principles$
i'$) The case is ca,able o) re,etition +et evading revie0. )his is called for by
the recognition that the ,re,aration and ,assage o) the national budget is7
b+ constitutional i/,ri/atur7 an a9air o) annual occurrence. )he myriad of
issues underlying the manner in &hich certain public funds are spent, if not resol'ed
at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not e'ade
3udicial re'ie&$
0$) -ES. The intrinsic constitutionalit+ o) the Por Barrel S+ste/! is not
an issue de,endent u,on the 0isdo/ o) the ,olitical branches o)
govern/ent but rather a legal one 0hich the Constitution itsel) has
co//anded the Court to act u,on. 1crutini6ing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of go'ernment are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an e(ercise of 3udicial po&er$ ore
importantly, the present "onstitution has not only 'ested the 8udiciary the right to
e(ercise 3udicial po&er but essentially makes it a duty to proceed there&ith (1ection
., Article 5III of the ./:E "onstitution)$
*$ -ES. Petitioners ha'e suBcient locus standi to @le the instant cases$ Petitioners
ha'e come before the "ourt in their respecti'e capacities as citi6en-ta(payers and
accordingly, assert that they dutifully contribute to the co;ers of the Aational
)reasury$ As ta.,a+ers7 the+ ,ossess the re(uisite standing to (uestion the
validit+ o) the e.isting Por Barrel S+ste/! under 0hich the ta.es the+
,a+ have been and continue to be utili1ed. )hey are bound to su;er from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the "ourt so rules$ In'ariably, ta(payers
ha'e been allo&ed to sue &here there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deMected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are &asted through the enforcement of an in'alid or unconstitutional
la&, as in these cases$
oreo'er, as citi6ens, petitioners ha'e e7ually ful@lled the standing re7uirement
gi'en that the issues the+ have raised /a+ be classi:ed as /atters o)
transcendental i/,ortance7 o) overreaching signi:cance to societ+7 or o)
,ara/ount ,ublic interest. )he "oA "hairpersonDs statement during the =ral
Arguments that the present contro'ersy in'ol'es not FmerelyG a systems failure
but a complete breakdo&n of controls ampli@es the seriousness of the issues
in'ol'ed$ Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
e(penditure of public funds is the mortal &ound inMicted upon the fundamental la&
by the enforcement of an in'alid statute$
,$) %'. =n the one hand, res judicata states that a 3udgment on the merits in a
pre'ious case rendered by a court of competent 3urisdiction &ould bind a
subse7uent case if, bet&een the @rst and second actions, there e(ists
an identit+ of parties, of sub3ect matter, and of causes of action$ This re(uired
identit+ is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP in'ol'ed constitutional
challenges against the .//, "24 Article and 0++, P2A4 Article respecti'ely$
%o&e'er, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire
Pork #arrel 1ystem$ Also, the ruling in !AP is essentially a dismissal based on a
procedural technicality C and, thus, hardly a 3udgment on the merits$ Thus7 res
judicata cannot a,,l+.
=n the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-
litigate &here the sa/e (uestions relating to the same e'ent ha'e been put
for&ard by the parties similarly situated as in a pre'ious case litigated and decided
by a competent court$ Absent an+ ,o0er)ul countervailing considerations7
lie cases ought to be decided alie. Philconsa &as a limited response to
a separation of po&ers problem, speci@cally on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identi@cation authority to embers of "ongress$ 'n the contrar+7 the
,resent cases call )or a /ore holistic e.a/ination o) ?a@ the inter2
relation bet&een the "24 and P2A4 Articles &ith each other, formati'e as they are
of the entire Pork #arrel 1ystem as 0ell as ?b@ the intra2relation of post-
enactment measures contained &ithin a particular "24 or P2A4 Article, including
not only those related to the area of pro3ect identi@cation but also to the areas of
fund release and realignment$ )he comple(ity of the issues and the broader legal
analyses herein &arranted may be, therefore, considered as a ,o0er)ul
countervailing reason against a 0holesale a,,lication o) the stare decisis
,rinci,le.
In addition, the "ourt obser'es that the Philconsa ruling 0as actuall+ riddled
0ith inherent constitutional inconsistencies 0hich si/ilarl+ countervail
against a )ull resort to stare decisis. 1ince the "ourt no& bene@ts from
hindsight and current @ndings (such as the "oA >eport), it must ,artiall+ abandon
its ,revious ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the ,ost2enact/ent
identi:cation authorit+ o) Ae/bers o) Congress on the guise that the
sa/e 0as /erel+ reco//endator+.
Again, since LAMP &as dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not
set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substanti'e
issues in these cases, stare decisis &ould not apply$
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Por Barrel!
.$) -ES. At its core, legislators have been consistentl+ accorded ,ost2
enact/ent authorit+ to identi)+ the ,ro*ects they desire to be funded through
'arious "ongressional Pork #arrel allocations$ Nnder the 0+.* P2A4 Article, the
statutory authority of legislators to identify pro3ects post-9AA may be construed
from 1pecial Pro'isions . to * and the second paragraph of 1pecial Pro'ision ,$
!egislators ha'e also been accorded ,ost2enact/ent authorit+ in the areas
of )und release (1pecial Pro'ision ? under the 0+.* P2A4
Article) and realign/ent (1pecial Pro'ision ,, paragraphs . and 0 under the 0+.*
P2A4 Article)$
)hus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authori6ed to participate in
the various o,erational as,ects o) budgeting, including the e'aluation of
&ork and @nancial plans for indi'idual acti'ities and the regulation and release of
funds, in violation o) the se,aration o) ,o0ers ,rinci,le$ )hat the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition co'ers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the la&$ )o&ards this end, the "ourt must
therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa$ )he "ourt also points out that respondents
ha'e failed to substantiate their position that the identi@cation authority
of legislators is only of recommendatory import$
In addition to declaring the 0+.* P2A4 Article as &ell as all other pro'isions of la&
&hich similarly allo& legislators to &ield any form of post-enactment authority in
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the "ourt also declared
that in)or/al ,ractices7 through 0hich legislators have e9ectivel+ intruded
into the ,ro,er ,hases o) budget e.ecution7 /ust be dee/ed as acts o)
grave abuse o) discretion amounting to lack or e(cess of 3urisdiction and,
hence, accorded the sa/e unconstitutional treat/ent$
0$) -ES. )he 0+.* P2A4 Article violates the ,rinci,le o) non2delegabilit+ since
legislators are e9ectivel+ allo0ed to individuall+ e.ercise the ,o0er
o) a,,ro,riation, 0hich7 as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. )he
po&er to appropriate must be e(ercised only through legislation, pursuant to
1ection 0/(.), Article 5I of the ./:E "onstitution &hich statesJ Ao money shall be
paid out of the )reasury e(cept in pursuance of an appropriation made by la&$
)he ,o0er o) a,,ro,riation, as held by the "ourt in Bengzon v. Secretary of
"ustice and #nsular Auditor, in'ol'es ?a@ setting a,art b+ la0 a certain
su/ from the public re'enue for ?b@ a s,eci:ed ,ur,ose. Under the 3458
P$AF Article7 individual legislators are given a ,ersonal lu/,2su/
)und from &hich the+ are able to dictate ?a@ ho0 /uch from such fund &ould
go to ?b@ a s,eci:c ,ro*ect or bene:ciar+ that they themsel'es also determine$
1ince these t0o acts co/,rise the e.ercise o) the ,o0er o)
a,,ro,riation as described in Bengzon, and gi'en that the 3458 P$AF Article
authori1es individual legislators to ,er)or/ the sa/e, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been con)erred the ,o0er to legislate 0hich the
Constitution does not7 ho0ever7 allo0.
*$) -ES. Nnder the 3458 P$AF Article7 the a/ount o) P36.BC
Billion onl+ a,,ears as a collective allocation li/it since the said amount
&ould be further di'ided among indi'idual legislators &ho &ould then
recei'e personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the 9AA is
passed, e;ecti'ely appropriate P2A4 funds based on their o&n discretion$ As
these inter/ediate a,,ro,riations are /ade b+ legislators onl+ a)ter the
DAA is ,assed and hence7 outside o) the la07 it means that the actual ite/s
o) P$AF a,,ro,riation 0ould not have been 0ritten into the
Deneral A,,ro,riations Bill and thus e9ectuated 0ithout veto
consideration$ )his kind of lump-sumHpost-enactment legislati'e identi@cation
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget &ithin a budget
&hich subverts the ,rescribed ,rocedure o) ,resent/ent and conse(uentl+
i/,airs the President;s ,o0er o) ite/ veto$ As petitioners aptly point out, the
President is forced to decide bet&een (a) accepting the entire P0,$ E/ #illion P2A4
allocation &ithout kno&ing the speci@c pro3ects of the legislators, &hich may or may
not be consistent &ith his national agenda and (b) re3ecting the &hole P2A4 to the
detriment of all other legislators &ith legitimate pro3ects$
E'en &ithout its post-enactment legislati'e identi@cation feature, the 3458 P$AF
Article 0ould re/ain constitutionall+ <a0ed since the lu/,2su/ a/ount o)
P36.BC Billion 0ould be treated as a /ere )unding source allotted )or
/ulti,le ,ur,oses o) s,ending (i$e$ scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preser'ation of historical materials, construction of roads, Mood control,
etc)$ )his setup connotes that the a,,ro,riation la0 leaves the actual a/ounts
and ,ur,oses o) the a,,ro,riation )or )urther deter/ination and,
therefore, does not readil+ indicate a discernible ite/ 0hich /a+ be sub*ect
to the President;s ,o0er o) ite/ veto.
)he same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the "oA "hairperson relays,
limitFedG state auditors from obtaining rele'ant data and information that &ould aid
in more stringently auditing the utili6ation of said 4unds$ Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a line by line budget or amount per proposed
program, acti'ity or pro3ect, and per implementing agency$
,$) -ES. )o a certain e(tent, the conduct o) oversight 0ould be tainted as said
legislators7 0ho are vested 0ith ,ost2enact/ent authorit+7 0ould7 in
e9ect7 be checing on activities in 0hich the+ the/selves ,artici,ate$ Also,
this 'ery same concept of post-enactment authori6ation runs afoul of 1ection .,,
Article 5I of the ./:E "onstitution &hich pro'ides thatJ IFA 1enator or ember of
the %ouse of >epresentati'esG shall not inter'ene in any matter before any oBce of
the 9o'ernment for his pecuniary bene@t or &here he may be called upon to act on
account of his oBce$ Allo&ing legislators to inter'ene in the 'arious phases
of pro3ect implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue ad'antage of
their o&n oBce$
%o&e'er, the "ourt cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority andHor the indi'idual legislatorDs control of his P2A4 per se &ould allo&
him to perpetrate himself in oBce$ )his is a matter &hich must be analy6ed based
on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis$
Also, &hile the "ourt accounts for the possibility that the close operational pro(imity
bet&een legislators and the E(ecuti'e department, through the formerDs post-
enactment participation, may a;ect the process of impeachment, this matter
largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
#arrel 1ystemDs intrinsic constitutionality$ As such, it is an improper sub3ect of
3udicial assessment$
?$) %'. 1ection 0<, Article II of the ./:E "onstitution is considered as not self-
e(ecuting due to the 7ualifying phrase as may be de@ned by la&$ In this respect,
said pro'ision does not, by and of itself, pro'ide a 3udicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely speci@es a guideline for legislati'e or e(ecuti'e
action$ )herefore, since there appears to be no standing la& &hich crystalli6es the
policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the "ourt must defer from ruling on
this issue$
In any e'ent, the "ourt @nds the abo'e-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculati'e since it has not been properly demonstrated ho& the Pork #arrel 1ystem
&ould be able to propagate political dynasties$
<$) -ES. )he "ourt, ho&e'er, @nds an inherent defect in the system &hich actually
belies the a'o&ed intention of making e7ual the une7ual
(Philconsa$ .//,)$ )he gauge o) P$AF and C$F allocationEdivision is based
solel+ on the )act o) o=ce7 0ithout taing into account the s,eci:c
interests and ,eculiarities o) the district the legislator re,resents. As a
result, a district representati'e of a highly-urbani6ed metropolis gets the same
amount of funding as a district representati'e of a far-Mung rural pro'ince &hich
&ould be relati'ely underde'eloped compared to the former$ )o add, &hat rouses
gra'er scrutiny is that e'en 1enators and Party-!ist >epresentati'es C and in some
years, e'en the 5ice-President C &ho do not represent any locality, recei'e funding
from the "ongressional Pork #arrel as &ell$
)he "ourt also obser'es that this concept of legislator control underlying the "24
and P2A4 conMicts &ith the functions of the 'arious !ocal 2e'elopment "ouncils
(!2"s) &hich are already legally mandated to assist the corresponding sanggunian
in setting the direction of economic and social de'elopment, and coordinating
de'elopment e;orts &ithin its territorial 3urisdiction$ "onsidering that !2"s are
instrumentalities &hose functions are essentially geared to&ards managing local
a;airs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be o'erridden nor
duplicated by indi'idual legislators, &ho are national oBcers that ha'e no la&-
making authority e(cept only &hen acting as a body$
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Por Barrel!
-ES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: )he phrase and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President under 1ection : of P2 /.+
constitutes an undue delegation of legislati'e po&er insofar as it does not la+
do0n a su=cient standard to ade(uatel+ deter/ine the li/its o) the
President;s authorit+ 0ith res,ect to the ,ur,ose )or 0hich the
Aala/,a+a Funds /a+ be used. As it reads, the said phrase gi'es the President
&ide latitude to use the alampaya 4unds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in e;ect, allo&s him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the pur'ie& of
the la&$
That the sub*ect ,hrase /a+ be con:ned onl+ to energ+ resource
develo,/ent and e.,loitation ,rogra/s and ,ro*ects o) the govern/ent!
under the ,rinci,le o) ejusdem generis7 meaning that the general &ord or
phrase is to be construed to include C or be restricted to C things akin
to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those speci@cally mentioned, is
belied b+ three ?8@ reasonsJ @rst, the phrase energy resource de'elopment and
e(ploitation programs and pro3ects of the go'ernment states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of speci@c
things from &hich the general phrase for such other purposes may be limitedK
second, the said ,hrase also e.hausts the class it re,resents, namely energy
de'elopment programs of the go'ernmentK and, third, the E.ecutive de,art/ent
has used the Aala/,a+a Funds )or non2energ+ related ,ur,oses under the
sub*ect ,hrase, thereby contradicting respondentsD o&n position that it is limited
only to energy resource de'elopment and e(ploitation programs and pro3ects of
the go'ernment$
%o&e'er, the rest of 1ection :, insofar as it allo&s for the use of the alampaya
4unds to @nance energy resource de'elopment and e(ploitation programs and
pro3ects of the go'ernment, remains legally e;ecti'e and subsisting$
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund% 1ection .0 of P2 .:</, as amended by
P2 .//*, indicates that the Presidential 1ocial 4und may be used to F@rst,G @nance
the priority infrastructure de'elopment pro3ects and Fsecond,G to @nance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authori6ed by the =Bce of the President of the Philippines$
)he second indicated purpose ade7uately curtails the authority of the President to
spend the Presidential 1ocial 4und only for restoration purposes &hich arise from
calamities$ The :rst indicated ,ur,ose7 ho0ever7 gives hi/ carte
blanche authorit+ to use the sa/e )und )or an+ in)rastructure ,ro*ect he
/a+ so deter/ine as a ,riorit+$ 5erily, the la0 does not su,,l+ a
de:nition o) ,riorit+ in)rastructure develo,/ent ,ro*ects! and
hence, lea'es the President &ithout any guideline to construe the same$ )o note,
the deli/itation o) a ,ro*ect as one o) in)rastructure! is too broad o)
a classi:cation since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility$ )hus, the
,hrase to :nance the ,riorit+ in)rastructure develo,/ent ,ro*ects! /ust
be stricen do0n as unconstitutional since C similar to 1ection : of P2 /.+ - it
lies inde,endentl+ un)ettered b+ an+ su=cient standard o) the delegating
la0. As they are se'erable, all other pro'isions of 1ection .0 of P2 .:</, as
amended by P2 .//*, remains legally e;ecti'e and subsisting$