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G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case
No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants,
the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the
time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because
of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the
Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such
denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and
well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the
following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT
-
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THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT
IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE
IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE
WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE.
(page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill
was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due
trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal,
presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision.
And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on
account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein
the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual
character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in
this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result
in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject
of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.).
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It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore
a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with
its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
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fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality
of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal
case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.)
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It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code.
It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this
Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.)
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The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this
case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might
not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by
law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage
to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only
through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack
of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the
more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that
of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights
because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed
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by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73
Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate
only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of
the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can
be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14,
1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived
from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of
Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction
or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling
that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that
the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by
law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions
to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-
delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is
not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not
for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'.
But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument
of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal
that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the
preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules
of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more
congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow
the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
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but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.
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It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that
Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code),
and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise
their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
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On the other hand,
the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of
real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
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WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance
with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT,
VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered on
November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch
II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private
respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot,
arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3
(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil
case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970,
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petitioner
elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on
September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending
the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
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On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as
damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner
has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in
the criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper;
and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus
(Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated
November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25, 1971.
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Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF
THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER
A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY
SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE
THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE.
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all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an independent civil
action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the
nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot,
in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile
and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there was a
direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private
respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito,
observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant
Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict.
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Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil
action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
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The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is readily discernible from the
foregoing codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621,
6
thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple imprudence. if we
were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by
law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution ofculpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to personsand damage
to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only
through the principle of civil hability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There
are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the
driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow
a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but
there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for
civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being
a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do
not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all
cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the
laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be
carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that
they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As
Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their
poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just
that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director."
(Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747)
that before third persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por
refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the
merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations
acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing
and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
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Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common
practice to seek damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done
by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under
the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-
establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action,
not depending on the issues, stations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida
52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article
2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the civil
action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to
"other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above
quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to
in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal
action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion
when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
10

(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as
enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons
but also damage to property.
7
It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and
"damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done
and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to
person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples
of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code
which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to
persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely abused
his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action
based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a
discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.

FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in
the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he
used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge.
Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car
where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach,
seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along
11

in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed
down another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the
same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When
the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet
came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell
violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car,
where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the
train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted
dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred
were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in
the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to
the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled
on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of
melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot
alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he
failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city
of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was
performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that
the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses
in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed
as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the
Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew
therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by
reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from
the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and
was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant
company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these
sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this
problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the
defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage,
and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the
breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That
12

is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be
rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil
Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to
use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points
out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the
difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an
obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in
the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that
article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a
contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already
formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties
are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases
imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to
persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the
principle of respondeat superior if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally
but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who
by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. One
who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method
of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that
the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the
master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the
selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the
scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the
contract between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves
the master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has
never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always
based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention,
has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant,
taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his
purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third
persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the
negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage.
True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent
13

in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care
and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has
held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta,
20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability
of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within
the scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant
or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast
to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the
negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally,
and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete
accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by
article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or
superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or
omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact,
is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of
exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the
breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has
its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to
others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute
the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those
rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful
intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured
party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from
contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
14

With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those person who
acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-
contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who,
by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is
wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the
contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents.
Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficientprima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the
burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a
case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it
exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71
[1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was
due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause
of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his
servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the
negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from
contract, the anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in
the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers
a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act
causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the
breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he
shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted,
juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their
contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or
servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection
and direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are
lost by reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to
permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the
payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the
clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere
incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain.
(Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November
15

20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of
the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected
defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as
those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to
carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done by
the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence
of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of
contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was not
liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact
that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been negligent in the
employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued
the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get
adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage.
The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903
are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover
damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving
defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages were
caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although
he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the owner a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act
complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of time that the owner by
his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is
true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the
facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of
the contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in
dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between
private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of
negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of
negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though
founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the
pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed
from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof
disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of
negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was,
16

therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether
negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the
source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is
always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the
defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to
exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his
servants, the practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred,
because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused
by its servants to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the
defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court would
have held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of
the breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and
control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader
than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety
and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the
fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of
its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to
maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case
(supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned.
It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities
in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We
are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this
proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular
instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it
came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from
trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its
platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered
any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its
duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work
on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
17

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight
from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not
the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809),
we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the
time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off
the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from
alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to
discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the
situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact
that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the
defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe
egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him
to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly
lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty
owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in
the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of
the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the
alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk
incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured
to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of
the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train
was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question
of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently
or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a
general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their
wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was
perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There
could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct
of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist
clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that
employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of
the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum
18

of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical
attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25,
and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.

G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
Some time in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a
FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon
his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S. Luna.
In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost
card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures
and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot
Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Filipino-American, and another
guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis
presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a telephone call
to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the
bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
In a letter, dated 11 October 1988, private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC
the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to
Luis. In his letter, dated 03 November 1988, Festejo, in part, said:
In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to
avert its unauthorized use (such as tagging the card as hotlisted), as it is always our intention to protect
our cardholders.
An investigation of your case however, revealed that FAREASTCARD failed to inform you about its security
policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the
possibility that it may have been you who was presenting the card at that time (for which reason, the
unfortunate incident occurred).
1

Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that private
respondents were "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King, Food and Beverage Manager of the
Intercontinental Hotel, wrote back to say that the credibility of private respondent had never been "in
question." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for damages
with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
19

On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering
FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages;
and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court
with this petition for review.
There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.
2
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
3
Exceptionally, in a contract
of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which
is presumed
4
) of the common carrier.
5

Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's
cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently
indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could
FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice
or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose
or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.
6

We are not unaware of the previous rulings of this Court, such as in American Express International,
Inc., vs.Intermediate Appellate Court (167 SCRA 209) and Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court(206 SCRA 408), sanctioning the application of Article 21, in relation to Article 2217 and
Article 2219
7
of the Civil Code to a contractual breach similar to the case at bench. Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we
are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its application can be
warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to
approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly,
Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case, give
way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages
in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his ponencia in Fores vs. Miranda
8
explained with great clarity the
predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have
repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil. 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26], 6599;
Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023), that moral damages are not recoverable
20

in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and
2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide as follows:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e.,
wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases"
used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused
contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes
the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual relations between the parties."
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a
passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206,
that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased" (Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil. 84,
Resolution on motion to reconsider, September 11, 1958). But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all
the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless
it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness
of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of
the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral
damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof
of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear
provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
xxx xxx xxx
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their
consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
21

It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the
mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in
bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but the fact must
be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the
contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching
a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort
9
even where there is a
pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA
143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This
doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act
or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test
(whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where,
without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an
actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of
quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their
contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be
held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.
The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a quo, affirmed by the appellate
court, to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for the
public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil
Code; seePrudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System, 148 SCRA 440; Lopez vs. Pan American World
Airways, 16 SCRA 431). In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are
granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice
(See Art. 2231, Civil Code; CLLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 655; Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778). In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code; PNB vs. Gen. Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449).
Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to
sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below (see De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
166).
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the
Civil Code providing thusly:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and
equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in
allowing the award thereof by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is given due course. The appealed decision is MODIFIED by deleting
the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to
22

pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal damages. In all other
respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila
1
sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00
by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare
between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,
2
the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate
his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his
seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento,
"many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso
was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and
plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
3

1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings"
4
of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the
appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based".
5
This is echoed
in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and
23

distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based";
6
and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall
contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it".
7

A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack.
8
The law, however,
solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is
drawn.
9
A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence
10
presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with
the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved".
11
This is but a
part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be
so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court
of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court
well observed, "There is no law that so requires".
12
Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision)
the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the
same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that
in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the
prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as
shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment.
13
If the court did not recite in the decision
the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not
mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence.
14
At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in
a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it.
15

Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement
of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon".
16
They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue".
17
A
question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties."
18

2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
19
That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court
to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact.
20

With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement
of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket
was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of
first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey,
particularly that from Saigon to Beirut".
21

And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
24

Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee
that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station
for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand
how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it
never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet
it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course
of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.
22

Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from
his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own
witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
x x x x x x x x x
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence
cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the
testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket
without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation
for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by
defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong.
23

We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the
judgment of the lower court.
24
Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that
the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the
assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all
error".
25
We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on
this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was
said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made
the basis of the conclusions of the trial court.
26

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding
the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the
hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy
matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that
25

there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have
long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe
the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the
Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled
to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight.
27
We perceive
no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by
petitioner.
28
Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took
a first class seat to provoke an issue".
29
And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the
Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the
Manager".
30
Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no
seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;
31
and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a
finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on
defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up
to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments
and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after
he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments brought
by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip
from Madrid to Manila.
32

x x x x x x x x x
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff
suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.
33

x x x x x x x x x
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
26

berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific
mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn
from the facts and circumstances set forth therein.
34
The contract was averred to establish the relation
between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner
on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso
was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man;
35
and (b) evidence of bad faith in
the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award
for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof
to conform to the evidence is not even required.
36
On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals
declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his
consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation
reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the
plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do
so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the
plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of
the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither.
37

The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if
the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already
been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and
to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others.
Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his
rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters
"O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise,
Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant,
testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has arranged with
you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
27

Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to the seat
occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any
right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which
he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could
have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did
not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par
(e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the
Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out
of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate,
using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".
38

It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the
term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager
not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary
will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist
class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
39

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the
Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with
the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the
plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class"
seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man"
whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this
"white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly
paid for, and for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.
40

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law.
41
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
42

6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation.
43
And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance
of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
28

any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier.
44

Thus, "Where a steamship company
45
had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a
tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check
was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting
and she was not ejected."
46
And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort".
47
And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect
his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that
as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there
was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to
him, as by calling him a lunatic,"
48
and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for
the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants
approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that
you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my
transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I
stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me because it was recorded in
French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the
notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony.
49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We
do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
49a

29

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae.
50
For, they grow "out of the
nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant".
51
The utterance of the purser
regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed.
52
It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It
forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have
been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that
no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
53
The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral
damages.
54

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and
equitable that attorneys' fees be given.
55
We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion
well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as
attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court.
56
The Court of Appeals did
not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto.
Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.
57

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.