Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO !"OT!S # COR$O%!, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-!"# filed before Branch "$, R%C Ro&as Cit',
Ro(elio Ba'otas ' Cordova )as char(ed )ith Rape and eventuall'
convicted thereof on *une "+, "++" in a decision penned b' *ud(e Manuel
E. Auta,a'. Pendin( appeal of his conviction, Ba'otas died on -ebruar' .,
"++! at
the National Bilibid /ospital due to cardio respirator' arrest secondar' to
hepatic encephalopath' secondar' to hipato carcinoma (astric malin(erin(.
Conse0uentl', the 1upreme Court in its Resolution of Ma' !2, "++!
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. /o)ever, it re0uired the
1olicitor 3eneral to file its comment )ith re(ard to Ba'otas4 civil liabilit'
arisin( from his commission of the offense char(ed.
In his comment, the 1olicitor 3eneral e&pressed his vie) that the death of
accused-appellant did not e&tin(uish his civil liabilit' as a result of his
commission of the offense char(ed. %he 1olicitor 3eneral, rel'in( on the
case of People v. Sendaydiego
1
insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of revie)in( his conviction b' the lo)er court on
)hich the civil liabilit' is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the vie) of
the 1olicitor 3eneral ar(uin( that the death of the accused )hile ,ud(ment
of conviction is pendin( appeal e&tin(uishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invo5ed the rulin( of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia
2
)hich held that the
civil obli(ation in a criminal case ta5es root in the criminal liabilit' and,
therefore, civil liabilit' is e&tin(uished if accused should die before final
,ud(ment is rendered.
6e are thus confronted )ith a sin(le issue7 8oes death of the accused
pendin( appeal of his conviction e&tin(uish his civil liabilit'9
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue )as settled in
the affirmative. %his same issue posed therein )as phrased thus7 8oes the
death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibilit' and his civil
liabilit' as a conse0uence of the alle(ed crime9
It resolved this issue thru the follo)in( dis0uisition7
Article :+ of the Revised Penal Code is the controllin( statute. It
reads, in part7
Art. :+. o! criminal liability is totally e"tinguished.
; Criminal liabilit' is totall' e&tin(uished7
". B' the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties< and as to the pecuniar' penalties liabilit'
therefor is e&tin(uished onl' )hen the death of the
offender occurs before final ,ud(ment<
6ith reference to Castillo4s criminal liabilit', there is no
0uestion. %he la) is plain. 1tatutor' construction is
unnecessar'. 1aid liabilit' is e&tin(uished.
%he civil liabilit', ho)ever, poses a problem. 1uch liabilit' is
e&tin(uished onl' )hen the death of the offender occurs before
final ,ud(ment. 1addled upon us is the tas5 of ascertainin( the
le(al import of the term =final ,ud(ment.= Is it final ,ud(ment as
contradistin(uished from an interlocutor' order9 >r, is it a
,ud(ment )hich is final and e&ecutor'9
6e (o to the (enesis of the la). %he le(al precept contained in
Article :+ of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is
lifted from Article "! of the 1panish El Codi(o Penal de ":#2
)hich, in part, recites7
?a responsabilidad penal se e&tin(ue.
". Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas
personales siempre, ' respecto a las pecuniarias,
solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido
sentencia firme.
&&& &&& &&&
%he code of ":#2 . . . it )ill be observed emplo's the term
=sentencia firme.= 6hat is =sentencia firme= under the old
statute9
@@AIII Enciclopedia *uridica EspaBola, p. .#, furnishes the
read' ans)er7 It sa's7
1EN%ENCIA -IRME. ?a sentencia 0ue ad0uiere la
fuerCa de las definitivas por no haberse utiliCado por
las partes liti(antes recurso al(uno contra ella
dentro de los terminos ' plaCos le(ales concedidos
al efecto.
=1entencia firme= reall' should be understood as one )hich is
definite. Because, it is onl' )hen ,ud(ment is such that, as
Medina ' Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed ; =en
condena determinada<= or, in the )ords of 3roiCard, the (uilt of
the accused becomes ; =una verdad le(al.= Prior thereto,
should the accused die, accordin( to Aiada, =no ha'
le(almente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad
criminal de nin(una clase.= And, as *ud(e Dapunan )ell
e&plained, )hen a defendant dies before ,ud(ment becomes
e&ecutor', =there cannot be an' determination b' final ,ud(ment
)hether or not the felon' upon )hich the civil action mi(ht arise
e&ists,= for the simple reason that =there is no part' defendant.=
EI Dapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. .!". 1enator
-rancisco holds the same vie). -rancisco, Revised Penal
Code, Boo5 >ne, !nd ed., pp. :F+-:$2G
%he le(al import of the term =final ,ud(ment= is similarl'
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles #! and #: of that
le(al bod' mention the term =final ,ud(ment= in the sense that it
is alread' enforceable. %his also brin(s to mind 1ection #, Rule
""$ of the Rules of Court )hich states that a ,ud(ment in a
criminal case becomes final =after the lapse of the period for
perfectin( an appeal or )hen the sentence has been partiall' or
totall' satisfied or served, or the defendant has e&pressl'
)aived in )ritin( his ri(ht to appeal.=
B' fair intendment, the le(al precepts and opinions here
collected funnel do)n to one positive conclusion7 %he term final
,ud(ment emplo'ed in the Revised Penal Code means
,ud(ment be'ond recall. Reall', as lon( as a ,ud(ment has not
become e&ecutor', it cannot be truthfull' said that defendant is
definitel' (uilt' of the felon' char(ed a(ainst him.
Not that the meanin( thus (iven to final ,ud(ment is )ithout
reason. -or )here, as in this case, the ri(ht to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessit', cover =both the criminal and the
civil aspects of the case.= People vs. #usico ENovember +,
"+.!G, ! >.3., No. "22, p. +$.. 1ee also7 People vs. $oll, $:
Phil., $!$, $.< %rancisco, Criminal Procedure, "+F: ed., Aol. I,
pp. !., !$. Correctl', *ud(e Dapunan observed that as =the
civil action is based solel' on the felon' committed and of )hich
the offender mi(ht be found (uilt', the death of the offender
e&tin(uishes the civil liabilit'.= I Dapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, supra.
/ere is the situation obtainin( in the present case7 Castillo4s
criminal liabilit' is out. /is civil liabilit' is sou(ht to be enforced
b' reason of that criminal liabilit'. But then, if )e dismiss, as )e
must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, )e )ill
be faced )ith the anomalous situation )hereb' )e )ill be
called upon to clamp civil liabilit' in a case )here the source
thereof ; criminal liabilit' ; does not e&ist. And, as )as )ell
stated in &autista' et al. vs. (strella' et al., CA-3.R.
No. "+!!$-R, 1eptember ", "+F:, =no part' can be found and
held criminall' liable in a civil suit,= )hich solel' )ould remain if
)e are to divorce it from the criminal proceedin(.=
%his rulin( of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case
&
)as adopted b' the
1upreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. &onifacio
Alison' et al.,
4
People of the Philippines v. )aime )ose' et al.
'
and People
of the Philippines v. Satorre
(
b' dismissin( the appeal in vie) of the death
of the accused pendin( appeal of said cases.
As held b' then 1upreme Court *ustice -ernando in the Alison case7
%he death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison havin( been
established, and considerin( that there is as 'et no final
,ud(ment in vie) of the pendenc' of the appeal, the criminal
and civil liabilit' of the said accused-appellant Alison )as
e&tin(uished b' his death EArt. :+, Revised Penal Code< Re'es4
Criminal ?a), "+#" Rev. Ed., p. #"#, citin( People v. Castillo
and >femia C.A., F$ >.3. .2.FG< conse0uentl', the case
a(ainst him should be dismissed.
>n the other hand, this Court in the subse0uent cases of &uenaventura
&elamala v. $arcelino Polinar
7
and *amberto Torri+os v. The onorable
Court of Appeals
)
ruled differentl'. In the former, the issue decided b' this
court )as7 6hether the civil liabilit' of one accused of ph'sical in,uries )ho
died before final ,ud(ment is e&tin(uished b' his demise to the e&tent of
barrin( an' claim therefore a(ainst his estate. It )as the contention of the
administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final
,ud(ment e&tin(uished all criminal and civil liabilities resultin( from the
offense, in vie) of Article :+, para(raph " of the Revised Penal Code.
/o)ever, this court ruled therein7
6e see no merit in the plea that the civil liabilit' has been
e&tin(uished, in vie) of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of "+F2 ERep. Act No. :$G that became operative
ei(hteen 'ears after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out b'
the Court belo), Article of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for dama(es on account of ph'sical in,uries, entirel'
separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. . In cases of defamation, fraud, and ph'sical
in,uries, a civil action for dama(es, entirel' separate
and distinct from the criminal action, ma' be
brou(ht b' the in,ured part'. 1uch civil action shall
proceed independentl' of the criminal prosecution,
and shall re0uire onl' a preponderance of evidence.
Assumin( that for lac5 of e&press reservation, Belamala4s civil
action for dama(es )as to be considered instituted to(ether
)ith the criminal action still, since both proceedin(s )ere
terminated )ithout final ad,udication, the civil action of the
offended part' under Article ma' 'et be enforced separatel'.
In Torri+os, the 1upreme Court held that7
&&& &&& &&&
It should be stressed that the e&tinction of civil liabilit' follo)s
the e&tinction of the criminal liabilit' under Article :+, onl' )hen
the civil liabilit' arises from the criminal act as its onl' basis.
1tated differentl', )here the civil liabilit' does not e&ist
independentl' of the criminal responsibilit', the e&tinction of the
latter b' death, ipso facto e&tin(uishes the former, provided, of
course, that death supervenes before final ,ud(ment. %he said
principle does not appl' in instant case )herein the civil liabilit'
sprin(s neither solel' nor ori(inall' from the crime itself but from
a civil contract of purchase and sale. EEmphasis oursG
&&& &&& &&&
In the above case, the court )as convinced that the civil liabilit' of the
accused )ho )as char(ed )ith estafa could li5e)ise trace its (enesis
to Articles "+, !2 and !" of the Civil Code since said accused had
s)indled the first and second vendees of the propert' sub,ect matter
of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded7 =Conse0uentl', )hile
the death of the accused herein e&tin(uished his criminal liabilit'
includin( fine, his civil liabilit' based on the la)s of human relations
remains.=
%hus it allo)ed the appeal to proceed )ith respect to the civil liabilit' of the
accused, not)ithstandin( the e&tinction of his criminal liabilit' due to his
death pendin( appeal of his conviction.
%o further ,ustif' its decision to allo) the civil liabilit' to survive, the court
relied on the follo)in( ratiocination7 1ince 1ection !", Rule of the Rules
of Court
9
re0uires the dismissal of all mone' claims a(ainst the defendant
)hose death occurred prior to the final ,ud(ment of the Court of -irst
Instance EC-IG, then it can be inferred that actions for recover' of mone'
ma' continue to be heard on appeal, )hen the death of the defendant
supervenes after the C-I had rendered its ,ud(ment. In such case,
e&plained this tribunal, =the name of the offended part' shall be included in
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the le(al representative or the
heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-
appellants.=
It is, thus, evident that as ,urisprudence evolved from Castillo to %orri,os,
the rule established )as that the survival of the civil liabilit' depends on
)hether the same can be predicated on sources of obli(ations other than
delict. 1tated differentl', the claim for civil liabilit' is also e&tin(uished
to(ether )ith the criminal action if it )ere solel' based thereon, i.e., civil
liabilit' e" delicto.
/o)ever, the 1upreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego' et al.
10
departed
from this lon(-established principle of la). In this case, accused
1enda'die(o )as char(ed )ith and convicted b' the lo)er court of
malversation thru falsification of public documents. 1enda'die(o4s death
supervened durin( the pendenc' of the appeal of his conviction.
%his court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss 1enda'die(o4s
appeal but onl' to the e&tent of his criminal liabilit'. /is civil liabilit' )as
allo)ed to survive althou(h it )as clear that such claim thereon )as
e&clusivel' dependent on the criminal action alread' e&tin(uished. %he
le(al import of such decision )as for the court to continue e&ercisin(
appellate ,urisdiction over the entire appeal, passin( upon the correctness
of 1enda'die(o4s conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the
purpose of determinin( if he is civill' liable. In doin( so, this Court issued a
Resolution of *ul' :, "+## statin( thus7
%he claim of complainant Province of Pan(asinan for the civil
liabilit' survived 1enda'die(o because his death occurred after
final ,ud(ment )as rendered b' the Court of -irst Instance of
Pan(asinan, )hich convicted him of three comple& crimes of
malversation throu(h falsification and ordered him to indemnif'
the Province in the total sum of P$",2.:.! Eshould be
PF#,2.:.!G.
%he civil action for the civil liabilit' is deemed impliedl'
instituted )ith the criminal action in the absence of e&press
)aiver or its reservation in a separate action E1ec. ", Rule """
of the Rules of CourtG. %he civil action for the civil liabilit' is
separate and distinct from the criminal action EPeople and
Manuel vs. Coloma, "2F Phil. "!:#< Roa vs. 8e la CruC, "2#
Phil. :G.
6hen the action is for the recover' of mone' and the defendant
dies before final ,ud(ment in the Court of -irst Instance, it shall
be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especiall'
provided in Rule :# of the Rules of Court E1ec. !", Rule of
the Rules of CourtG.
%he implication is that, if the defendant dies after a mone'
,ud(ment had been rendered a(ainst him b' the Court of -irst
Instance, the action survives him. It ma' be continued on
appeal E%orri,os vs. Court of Appeals, ?-.2$, >ctober !.,
"+#F< $# 1CRA +.G.
%he accountable public officer ma' still be civill' liable for the
funds improperl' disbursed althou(h he has no criminal liabilit'
EH.1. vs. Elvina, !. Phil. !2< Philippine National Ban5 vs.
%u(ab, $$ Phil. F:G.
In vie) of the fore(oin(, not)ithstandin( the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased 1enda'die(o insofar as his criminal
liabilit' is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue e&ercisin(
appellate ,urisdiction over his possible civil liabilit' for the
mone' claims of the Province of Pan(asinan arisin( from the
alle(ed criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had
been instituted a(ainst him, thus ma5in( applicable, in
determinin( his civil liabilit', Article 2 of the Civil Code . . . and,
for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court
)ithin ten E"2G da's of the names and addresses of the
decedent4s heirs or )hether or not his estate is under
administration and has a dul' appointed ,udicial administrator.
1aid heirs or administrator )ill be substituted for the deceased
insofar as the civil action for the civil liabilit' is concerned E1ecs.
"$ and "#, Rule , Rules of CourtG.
1ucceedin( cases
11
raisin( the identical issue have maintained adherence
to our rulin( in Sendaydiego< in other )ords, the' )ere a reaffirmance of
our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liabilit' solel' anchored on
the criminal Ecivil liabilit' e" delictoG is e&tin(uished upon dismissal of the
entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But )as it ,udicious to have abandoned this old rulin(9 A re-e&amination of
our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old rulin(.
%o restate our resolution of *ul' :, "+## in Sendaydiego7 %he resolution of
the civil action impliedl' instituted in the criminal action can proceed
irrespective of the latter4s e&tinction due to death of the accused pendin(
appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code and
1ection !", Rule of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides7
6hen a separate civil action is brou(ht to demand civil liabilit'
arisin( from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedin(s are
instituted durin( the pendenc' of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall li5e)ise be sufficient to prove
the act complained of.
Clearl', the te&t of Article 2 could not possibl' lend support to the rulin( in
Sendaydiego. No)here in its te&t is there a (rant of authorit' to continue
e&ercisin( appellate ,urisdiction over the accused4s civil liabilit' e" delicto
)hen his death supervenes durin( appeal. 6hat Article 2 reco(niCes is an
alternative and separate civil action )hich ma' be brou(ht to demand civil
liabilit' arisin( from a criminal offense independentl' of an' criminal action.
In the event that no criminal proceedin(s are instituted durin( the pendenc'
of said civil case, the 0uantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act
)ill have to be that )hich is compatible )ith civil liabilit' and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of (uilt be'ond reasonable doubt.
Citin( or invo5in( Article 2 to ,ustif' the survival of the civil action despite
e&tinction of the criminal )ould in effect merel' be( the 0uestion of )hether
civil liabilit' e" delicto survives upon e&tinction of the criminal action due to
death of the accused durin( appeal of his conviction. %his is because
)hether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liabilit' e" delicto is
e&tin(uished b' the death of the accused )hile his conviction is on appeal.
Article :+ of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter7
Art. :+. o! criminal liability is totally e"tinguished. ; Criminal
liabilit' is totall' e&tin(uished7
". B' the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties< and
as to pecuniar' penalties, liabilit' therefor is e&tin(uished onl'
)hen the death of the offender occurs before final ,ud(ment<
&&& &&& &&&
/o)ever, the rulin( in Sendaydiego deviated from the e&pressed intent of
Article :+. It allo)ed claims for civil liabilit' e" delicto to survive b' ipso
facto treatin( the civil action impliedl' instituted )ith the criminal, as one
filed under Article 2, as thou(h no criminal proceedin(s had been filed but
merel' a separate civil action. %his had the effect of convertin( such claims
from one )hich is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirel' ne) and separate one, the prosecution of )hich does not even
necessitate the filin( of criminal proceedin(s.
12
>ne )ould be hard put to
pinpoint the statutor' authorit' for such a transformation. It is to be borne in
mind that in recoverin( civil liabilit' e" delicto, the same has perforce to be
determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court4s
pronouncement of the (uilt or innocence of the accused. %his is but to
render fealt' to the intendment of Article "22 of the Revised Penal Code
)hich provides that =ever' person criminall' liable for a felon' is also civill'
liable.= In such cases, e&tinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused pendin( appeal inevitabl' si(nifies the concomitant e&tinction of
the civil liabilit'. $ors Omnia Solvi. 8eath dissolves all thin(s.
In sum, in pursuin( recover' of civil liabilit' arisin( from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liabilit' is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that )hen the criminal action is
e&tin(uished b' the demise of accused-appellant pendin( appeal thereof,
said civil action cannot survive. %he claim for civil liabilit' sprin(s out of and
is dependent upon facts )hich, if true, )ould constitute a crime. 1uch civil
liabilit' is an inevitable conse0uence of the criminal liabilit' and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceedin(. %his is to be
distin(uished from that )hich is contemplated under Article 2 of the Civil
Code )hich refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not
dra) its life from a criminal proceedin(. %he 1enda'die(o resolution of *ul'
:, "+##, ho)ever, failed to ta5e note of this fundamental distinction )hen it
allo)ed the survival of the civil action for the recover' of civil liabilit' e"
delicto b' treatin( the same as a separate civil action referred to under
Article 2. 1urel', it )ill ta5e more than ,ust a summar' ,udicial
pronouncement to authoriCe the conversion of said civil action to an
independent one such as that contemplated under Article 2.
Ironicall' ho)ever, the main decision in 1enda'die(o did not appl' Article
2, the resolution of *ul' :, "+## not)ithstandin(. %hus, it )as held in the
main decision7
1enda'die(o4s appeal )ill be resolved onl' for the purpose of
sho)in( his criminal liabilit' )hich is the basis of the civil
liabilit' for )hich his estate )ould be liable.
1&
In other )ords, the Court, in resolvin( the issue of his civil liabilit',
concomitantl' made a determination on )hether 1enda'die(o, on the basis
of evidenced adduced, )as indeed (uilt' be'ond reasonable doubt of
committin( the offense char(ed. %hus, it upheld 1enda'die(o4s conviction
and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liabilit'. Conse0uentl',
althou(h Article 2 )as not applied in the final determination of
1enda'die(o4s civil liabilit', there )as a reopenin( of the criminal action
alread' e&tin(uished )hich served as basis for 1enda'die(o4s civil liabilit'.
6e reiterate7 Hpon death of the accused pendin( appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is e&tin(uished inasmuch as there is no lon(er a
defendant to stand as the accused< the civil action instituted therein for
recover' of civil liabilit' e" delicto is ipso facto e&tin(uished, (rounded as it
is on the criminal.
1ection !", Rule of the Rules of Court )as also invo5ed to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of *ul' :, "+##. In citin( 1ec.
!", Rule of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil
actions of the t'pe involved in Sendaydiego consist of mone' claims, the
recover' of )hich ma' be continued on appeal if defendant dies pendin(
appeal of his conviction b' holdin( his estate liable therefor. /ence, the
Court4s conclusion7
=6hen the action is for the recover' of mone'= =and the
defendant dies before final ,ud(ment in the court of -irst
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especiall' provided= in Rule :# of the Rules of Court E1ec. !",
Rule of the Rules of CourtG.
%he implication is that, if the defendant dies after a mone'
,ud(ment had been rendered a(ainst him b' the Court of -irst
Instance, the action survives him. It ma' be continued on
appeal.
1adl', reliance on this provision of la) is misplaced. -rom the standpoint of
procedural la), this course ta5en in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As
correctl' observed b' *ustice Re(alado7
&&& &&& &&&
I do not, ho)ever, a(ree )ith the ,ustification advanced in both
Torri+os and Sendaydiego )hich, rel'in( on the provisions of
1ection !", Rule of the Rules of Court, dre) the strained
implication therefrom that )here the civil liabilit' instituted
to(ether )ith the criminal liabilities had alread' passed be'ond
the ,ud(ment of the then Court of -irst Instance Eno) the
Re(ional %rial CourtG, the Court of Appeals can continue to
e&ercise appellate ,urisdiction thereover despite the
e&tin(uishment of the component criminal liabilit' of the
deceased. %his pronouncement, )hich has been follo)ed in the
Court4s ,ud(ments subse0uent and consonant to Torri+os and
Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as bein(
clearl' erroneous and un,ustifiable.
1aid 1ection !" of Rule is a rule of civil procedure in ordinar'
civil actions. %here is neither authorit' nor ,ustification for its
application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
to(ether )ith and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there an'
authorit' in la) for the summar' conversion from the latter
cate(or' of an ordinar' civil action upon the death of the
offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedl' instituted in a criminal proceedin( for
recover' of civil liabilit' e" delicto can hardl' be cate(oriCed as an ordinar'
mone' claim such as that referred to in 1ec. !", Rule enforceable before
the estate of the deceased accused.
>rdinar' mone' claims referred to in 1ection !", Rule must be vie)ed in
li(ht of the provisions of 1ection F, Rule :$ involvin( claims a(ainst the
estate, )hich in Sendaydiego )as held liable for 1enda'die(o4s civil
liabilit'. =6hat are contemplated in 1ection !" of Rule , in relation to
1ection F of Rule :$,
14
are contractual mone' claims )hile the claims
involved in civil liabilit' e" delicto ma' include even the restitution of
personal or real propert'.=
1'
1ection F, Rule :$ provides an e&clusive
enumeration of )hat claims ma' be filed a(ainst the estate. %hese are7
funeral e&penses, e&penses for the last illness, ,ud(ments for mone' and
claim arisin( from contracts, e&pressed or implied. It is clear that mone'
claims arisin( from delict do not form part of this e&clusive enumeration.
/ence, there could be no le(al basis in E"G treatin( a civil action e" delicto
as an ordinar' contractual mone' claim referred to in 1ection !", Rule of
the Rules of Court and E!G allo)in( it to survive b' filin( a claim therefor
before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
e&tin(uished upon e&tinction of the criminal action en(endered b' the
death of the accused pendin( finalit' of his conviction.
Accordin(l', )e rule7 if the private offended part', upon e&tinction of the
civil liabilit' e" delicto desires to recover dama(es from the same act or
omission complained of' he must sub,ect to 1ection ", Rule """
1(
E"+:F
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amendedG file a separate civil action, this
time predicated not on the felon' previousl' char(ed but on other sources
of obli(ation. %he source of obli(ation upon )hich the separate civil action
is premised determines a(ainst )hom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from ,uasi-delict or
ma', b' provision of la), result in an in,ur' to person or propert' Ereal or
personalG, the separate civil action must be filed a(ainst the e&ecutor or
administrator
17
of the estate of the accused pursuant to 1ec. ", Rule :# of
the Rules of Court7
1ec. ". Actions !hich may and !hich may not be brought
against e"ecutor or administrator. ; No action upon a claim for
the recover' of mone' or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced a(ainst the e&ecutor or administrator< but actions
to recover real or personal propert', or an interest therein, from
the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an in+ury to person or property' real or personal'
ma' be commenced a(ainst him.
%his is in consonance )ith our rulin( in Belamala
1)
)here )e held that, in
recoverin( dama(es for in,ur' to persons thru an independent civil action
based on Article of the Civil Code, the same must be filed a(ainst the
e&ecutor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not
a(ainst the estate under 1ec. F, Rule :$ because this rule e&plicitl' limits
the claim to those for funeral e&penses, e&penses for the last sic5ness of
the decedent, ,ud(ment for mone' and claims arisin( from contract,
e&press or implied. Contractual mone' claims, )e stressed, refers onl' to
purely personal obligations other than those )hich have their source in
delict or tort.
Conversel', if the same act or omission complained of also arises from
contract, the separate civil action must be filed a(ainst the estate of the
accused, pursuant to 1ec. F, Rule :$ of the Rules of Court.
-rom this len(th' dis0uisition, )e summariCe our rulin( herein7
". 8eath of the accused pendin( appeal of his conviction e&tin(uishes his
criminal liabilit' as )ell as the civil liabilit' based solel' thereon. As opined
b' *ustice Re(alado, in this re(ard, =the death of the accused prior to final
,ud(ment terminates his criminal liabilit' and only the civil liabilit' directly
arisin( from and based solel' on the offense committed, i.e., civil liabilit' e"
delicto in senso strictiore.=
!. Corollaril', the claim for civil liabilit' survives not)ithstandin( the death
of accused, if the same ma' also be predicated on a source of obli(ation
other than delict.
19
Article ""F# of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obli(ation from )hich the civil liabilit' ma' arise as a result of
the same act or omission7
aG ?a) 20
bG Contracts
cG Iuasi-contracts
dG . . .
eG Iuasi-delicts
. 6here the civil liabilit' survives, as e&plained in Number ! above, an
action for recover' therefor ma' be pursued but onl' b' )a' of filin( a
separate civil action and sub,ect to 1ection ", Rule """ of the "+:F Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. %his separate civil action ma' be
enforced either a(ainst the e&ecutorJadministrator or the estate of the
accused, dependin( on the source of obli(ation upon )hich the same is
based as e&plained above.
.. -inall', the private offended part' need not fear a forfeiture of his ri(ht to
file this separate civil action b' prescription, in cases )here durin( the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its e&tinction, the private-
offended part' instituted to(ether there)ith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liabilit' is deemed interrupted durin(
the pendenc' of the criminal case, conformabl' )ith provisions of Article
""FF
21
of the Civil Code, that should thereb' avoid an' apprehension on a
possible privation of ri(ht b' prescription.
22
Appl'in( this set of rules to the case at bench, )e hold that the death of
appellant Ba'otas e&tin(uished his criminal liabilit' and the civil liabilit'
based solel' on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Conse0uentl', the appeal
is hereb' dismissed )ithout 0ualification.
6/ERE->RE, the appeal of the late Ro(elio Ba'otas is 8I1MI11E8 )ith
costs de oficio.
1> >R8ERE8.
-arvasa' C.).' %eliciano' Padilla' &idin' .egalado' /avide' )r.'
&ellosillo' $elo' 0uiason' Puno' 1itug' 2apunan and $endo3a' )).'
concur.
Cru3' ).' is on leave.

*
Foot+ote,
" Nos. ?-!F!, ?-!F and ?-!F., :" 1CRA "!2.
! No. !!!""-R, November ., "+F+, F$ >.3. No. !, p. .2.F.
supra.
. ?-2$"!, April !#, "+#!, .. 1CRA F!.
F No. ?-!:+#, *une "#, "+#$, #" 1CRA !#.
$ No. ?-!$!:!, Au(ust !#, "+#$, #! 1CRA .+.
# No. ?-!.2+:, November ":, "+$#, !" 1CRA +#2.
: No. ?-.2$, >ctober !., "+#F, $# 1CRA +..
+ 1ec. !". 4here claim does not survive. ; 6hen the action is
for recover' of mone', debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final ,ud(ment in the Court of -irst
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especiall' provided in these rules.
"2 Supra.
"" People v. Badeo, 3.R. No. #!++2, November !", "++", !2.
1CRA "!!< Petralba v. 1andi(anba'an, 3.R. No. :"#, Au(ust
"$, "++", !22 1CRA $..< 8umlao v. Court of Appeals, No. ?-
F"$!F, >ctober F, "+::, "$$ 1CRA !$+< Rufo Mauricio
Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. ?-#FF#,
November !#, "+:#, "FF 1CRA #"!< People v. 1alcedo, No. ?-
.:$.!, *une !!, "+:#, "F" 1CRA !!2< People v. Pancho, No.
?-!F2#, November ., "+:$, ".F 1CRA !< People v. Navoa,
No. ?-$#+$$, 1eptember !:, "+:., "! 1CRA ."2< People v.
Asibar,
No. ?-#!FF, >ctober !, "+:!, ""# 1CRA :F$< People v. %irol,
No. ?-2F:, *anuar' ", "+:", "2! 1CRA FF:< and People v.
?lamoso, No. ?-!.:$$, *ul' ", "+#+, +" 1CRA $..
"! *ustice Barredo in his concurrin( opinion observed that7
. . . this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liabilit'
arisin( from a criminal offense )ithout the need of an' criminal
proceedin( to prove the commission of the crime as such, that
is )ithout havin( to prove the criminal liabilit' of the defendant
so lon( as his act causin( dama(e or pre,udice to the offended
part' is proven b' preponderance of evidence.
" Supra, p. "..
". 1ec. F. Claims !hich must be filed under the notice. 5f not
filed' barred< e"ceptions. ; All claims for mone' a(ainst the
decedent, arisin( from contract, e&press or implied, )hether the
same be due, not due, or contin(ent, all claims for funeral
e&penses and e&penses for the last sic5ness of the decedent,
and ,ud(ment for mone' a(ainst the decedent, must be filed
)ithin the time limited in the notice< other)ise the' are barred
forever, e&cept that the' ma' be set forth as counterclaims in
an' action that the e&ecutor or administrator ma' brin( a(ainst
the claimants. 6here an e&ecutor or administrator commences
an action, or prosecutes an action alread' commenced b' the
deceased in his lifetime, the debtor ma' set forth b' ans)er the
claims he has a(ainst the decedent, instead of presentin( them
independentl' to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims ma' be set off a(ainst each other in such action< and if
final ,ud(ment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount
so determined shall be considered the true balance a(ainst the
estate, as thou(h the claim had been presented directl' before
the court in the administration proceedin(s. Claims not 'et due,
or contin(ent, ma' be approved at their present value.
"F As e&plained b' ). Re(alado in the deliberation of this case.
"$ 1ec. ". 5nstitute of criminal and civil actions. ; 6hen a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recover' of
civil liabilit' is impliedl' instituted )ith the criminal action, unless
the offended part' )aives the civil action, reserves his ri(ht to
institute it separatel', or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
1uch civil action includes recover' of indemnit' under the
Revised Penal Code, and dama(es under Article !, , . and
!"#$ of the Civil Code of the Philippines arisin( from the same
act or omission of the accused.
A )aiver of an' of the civil actions e&tin(uishes the others. %he
institution of, or the reservation of the ri(ht to file, an' of said
civil actions separatel' )aives the others.
%he reservation of the ri(ht to institute the separate civil actions
shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affordin( the offended part'
a reasonable opportunit' to ma5e such reservation.
In no case ma' the offended part' recover dama(es t)ice for
the same act or omission of the accused.
6hen the offended part' see5s to enforce civil liabilit' a(ainst
the accused b' )a' of moral, nominal, temperate or e&emplar'
dama(es, the filin( fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the ,ud(ment e&cept
in an a)ard for actual dama(es.
In cases )herein the amount of dama(es, other than actual, is
alle(ed in the complaint or information, the correspondin( filin(
fees shall be paid b' the offended part' upon the filin( thereof
in court for trial.
"# *ustice Re(alado cited the Court4s rulin( in &elamala that
since the dama(es sou(ht, as a result of the felon' committed
amounts to in,ur' to person or propert', real or personal, the
civil liabilit' to be recovered must be claimed a(ainst the
e&ecutorJadministrator and not a(ainst the estate.
": 5bid.
"+ *ustice Aitu( )ho holds a similar vie) stated7 =%he civil
liabilit' ma' still be pursued in a separate civil action but it must
be predicated on a source of obli(ation other than delict, e&cept
)hen b' statutor' provision an independent civil action is
authoriCed such as, to e&emplif', in the instance enumerated in
Article of the Civil Code.= *ustice Re(alado stressed that7
Conversel', such civil liabilit' is not e&tin(uished and survives
the deceased offender )here it also arises simultaneousl' from
or e&ists as a conse0uence or b' reason of a contract, as in
Torri+os< or from la), as stated in Torri+os and in the concurrin(
opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the Civil Code<
or from a 0uasi-contract< or is authoriCed b' la) to be pursued
in an independent civil action, as in &elamala. Indeed, )ithout
these e&ceptions, it )ould be unfair and ine0uitable to deprive
the victim of his propert' or recover' of dama(es therefor, as
)ould have been the fate of the second vendee in Torri+os or
the provincial (overnment in Sendaydiego.=
!2 1ee Articles "+, !2, !", ", !, , ., !"#$ of the Civil
Code< see related provisions of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, particularl' 1ec. ", Rule """.
!" Art. ""FF. %he prescription of actions is interrupted )hen
the' are filed before the court, )hen there is a )ritten
e&tra,udicial demand b' the creditors, and )hen there is an'
)ritten ac5no)led(ment of the debt b' the debtor.
!! As e&plained b' ). Aitu( in the deliberation of this case.
5 People vs. Bayotas
FACTS
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted
thereof. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died in the National
Bilibid Hospital
due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supree Court in its
Resolution
disissed the criinal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor !eneral to
"le its coent with regard to Bayotas# civil liability arising fro his
coission of the
o$ense charged. %n his coent, the Solicitor !eneral e&pressed his view
that the death
of accused'appellant did not e&tinguish his civil liability as a result of his
coission of
the o$ense charged. (he Solicitor !eneral, relying on the case of People v.
Sendaydiego
insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing
his conviction
by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the
accused'appellant,
on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor !eneral arguing that
the death of
the accused while )udgent of conviction is pending appeal e&tinguishes
both his
criinal and civil penalties. %n support of his position, said counsel invo*ed
the ruling of
the Court of +ppeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the
civil obligation in
a criinal case ta*es root in the criinal liability and, therefore, civil
liability is
e&tinguished if accused should die before "nal )udgent is rendered.
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS
Whether the death o the a!!"sed pe#d$#% appeal o h$s !o#v$!t$o#
e&t$#%"$sh h$s
!$v$l l$a'$l$ty.
()*+ING & RATI) +ECI+EN+I
,es. +rticle -. of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. %t reads,
in
part/ Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguised. ! Criminal liability
is totally
extinguised" #$.% &y te deat of te convict' as to te personal penalties(
and as to te pecuniary
penalties liability terefor is extinguised only wen te deat of te
o)ender occurs before *nal +udgment(
(he legal precept contained in this +rticle is lifted fro +rticle 012 of the
Spanish 3l
Codigo Penal de 0-45. +ccordingly, SC rule/ if the private o$ended party,
upon
e&tinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover daages fro
the same act or
omission complained of' he ust sub)ect to Section 0, Rule 000 60.-7 Rules
on Criinal
Procedure as aended8 "le a separate civil action, this tie predicated not
on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation. (he source of
obligation upon
which the separate civil action is preised deterines against who the
sae shall be
enforced. %f the sae act or oission coplained of also arises fro ,uasi-
delict or ay,
by provision of law, result in an in)ury to person or property 6real or
personal8, the
separate civil action ust be "led against the e&ecutor or adinistrator of
the estate of
the accused pursuant to Sec. 0, Rule -4 of the Rules of Court/ Sec. 0.
Actions wic may
and wic may not be brougt against executor or administrator. 9 No
action upon a clai for
the recovery of oney or debt or interest thereon shall be coenced
against the
e&ecutor or adinistrator: but actions to recover real or personal property,
or an interest
therein, fro the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an
in+ury to person or property' real or personal' ay be coenced against
hi.
(his is in consonance with our ruling in Belaala where we held that, in
recovering
daages for in)ury to persons thru an independent civil action based on
+rticle 11 of the
Civil Code, the sae ust be "led against the e&ecutor or adinistrator of
the estate of
deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 7, Rule -; because
this rule
e&plicitly liits the clai to those for funeral e&penses, e&penses for the
last sic*ness of
the decedent, )udgent for oney and clais arising fro contract, e&press
or iplied.
Contractual oney clais, we stressed, refers only to purely personal
obligations other than
those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the sae act or oission coplained of also arises fro
contract, the
separate civil action ust be "led against the estate of the accused,
pursuant to Sec. 7,
Rule -; of the Rules of Court.
Summary of .ules"
0. <eath of the accused pending appeal of his conviction e&tinguishes his
criinal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. +s opined by
=ustice Regalado, in
this regard, >the death of the accused prior to "nal )udgent terinates his
criinal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising fro and based solely on
the o$ense
coitted, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.>
2. Corollarily, the clai for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of accused, if
the sae ay also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
,- +rticle
0074 of the Civil Code enuerates these other sources of obligation fro
which the civil
liability ay arise as a result of the sae act or oission/
6a8 ?aw 6b8 Contracts .c8 @uasi'contracts .d8 . . . .e8 @uasi'delicts
1. Ahere the civil liability survives, as e&plained in Nuber 2 above, an
action for
recovery therefor ay be pursued but only by way of "ling a separate civil
action and
sub)ect to Section 0, Rule 000 of the 0.-7 Rules on Criinal Procedure as
aended.
(his separate civil action ay be enforced either against the
e&ecutorBadinistrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the sae is
based as e&plained above.
C. Dinally, the private o$ended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
"le this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the
criinal action and prior to its e&tinction, the private'o$ended party
instituted together
therewith the civil action. %n such case, the statute of liitations on the civil
liability is
deeed interrupted during the pendency of the criinal case, conforably
with
provisions of +rticle 0077 /, of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. //
+pplying this set of rules to the case at bench, SC held that the death of
appellant
Bayotas e&tinguished his criinal liability and the civil liability based solely
on the act
coplained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby disissed
without
quali"cation.