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A Brief Guide to Embodied Cognition: Why You Are Not Your Brain
By Samuel McNerney | November 4, 2011 | 52
The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily those of Scientific American.
Print
Embodied cognition, the idea that the mind is not only connected to the
body but that the body inuences the mind, is one of the more counter-
intuitive ideas in cognitive science. In sharp contrast is dualism, a theory
of mind famously put forth by Rene Descartes in the 17
th
century when he
claimed that there is a great dierence between mind and body,
inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely
indivisible the mind or soul of man is entirely dierent from the body.
In the proceeding centuries, the notion of the disembodied mind
ourished. From it, western thought developed two basic ideas: reason is
disembodied because the mind is disembodied and reason is transcendent
and universal. However, as George Lako and Rafeal Nez explain:
Cognitive science calls this entire philosophical worldview into serious
question on empirical grounds [the mind] arises from the nature of our
brains, bodies, and bodily experiences. This is not just the innocuous and
obvious claim that we need a body to reason; rather, it is the striking
claim that the very structure of reason itself comes from the details of our
embodiment Thus, to understand reason we must understand the
details of our visual system, our motor system, and the general
mechanism of neural binding.
What exactly does this mean? It means that our cognition isnt conned to
our cortices. That is, our cognition is inuenced, perhaps determined by,
our experiences in the physical world. This is why we say that something
is over our heads to express the idea that we do not understand; we are
drawing upon the physical inability to not see something over our heads
and the mental feeling of uncertainty. Or why we understand warmth with
aection; as infants and children the subjective judgment of aection
almost always corresponded with the sensation of warmth, thus giving
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way to metaphors such as Im warming up to her.
Embodied cognition has a relatively short history. Its intellectual roots
date back to early 20
th
century philosophers Martin Heidegger, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and John Dewey and it has only been studied empirically in
the last few decades. One of the key gures to empirically study
embodiment is University of California at Berkeley professor George
Lako.
Lako was kind enough to
eld some questions over a
recent phone conversation,
where I learned about his
interesting history rst hand.
After taking linguistic
courses in the 1960s under
Chomsky at MIT, where he
eventually majored in
English and Mathematics, he
studied linguistics in grad
school at Indiana University.
It was a dierent world back
then, he explained, it was
the beginning of computer
science and A.I and the idea
that thought could be
described with formal logic
dominated much of
philosophical thinking.
Turing machines were
popular discussion topics, and the brain was widely understood as a
digital computational device. Essentially, the mind was thought of as a
computer program separate from the body with the brain as general-
purpose hardware.
Chomskys theory of language as a series of meaningless symbols t this
paradigm. It was a view of language in which grammar was independent
of meaning or communication. In contrast, Lako found examples
showing that grammar was depended of meaning in 1963. From this
observation he constructed a theory called Generative Semantics, which
was also disembodied, where logical structures were built into grammar
itself.
To be sure, cognitive scientists werent dualists like Descartes they
didnt actually believe that the mind was physically separate from the
body but they didnt think that the body inuenced cognition. And it was
during this time throughout the 60s and 70s -Lako realized the aws of
thinking about the mind as a computer and began studying embodiment.
The tipping point came after attending four talks that hinted at embodied
language at Berkeley in the summer of 1975. In his words, they forced
him to give up and rethink linguistics and the brain. This prompted him
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and a group of colleagues to start cognitive linguistics, which contrary to
Chomskyan theory and the entire mind as a computer paradigm, held that
semantics arose from the nature of the body. Then, in 1978, he
discovered that we think metaphorically, and spent the next year
gathering as many metaphors as he could nd.
Many cognitive scientists accepted his work on metaphors though it
opposed much of mainstream thought in philosophy and linguistics. He
caught a break on January 2
nd
1979, when he got a call from Mark
Johnson, who informed him that he was coming to Berkeley to replace
someone in the philosophy department for six months. Johnson had just
gotten his PhD from Chicago where he studied continental philosophy and
called Lako to see if he was interested in studying metaphors. What
came next was one of the more groundbreaking books in cognitive
science. After co-writing a paper for the journal of philosophy in the
spring of 1979, Lako and Johnson began working on Metaphors We Live
By, and managed to nish it three months later.
Their book extensively examined how, when and why we use metaphors.
Here are a few examples. We understand control as being UP and being
subject to control as being DOWN: We say, I have control over him, I
am on top of the situation, Hes at the height of his power, and, He
ranks above me in strength, He is under my control, and His power is
on the decline. Similarly, we describe love as being a physical force: I
could feel the electricity between us, There were sparks, and They
gravitated to each other immediately. Some of their examples reected
embodied experience. For example, Happy is Up and Sad is Down, as in
Im feeling up today, and Im feel down in the dumps. These
metaphors are based on the physiology of emotions, which researchers
such as Paul Eckman have discovered. Its no surprise, then, that around
the world, people who are happy tend to smile and perk up while people
who are sad tend to droop.
Metaphors We Live By was a game changer. Not only did it illustrate how
prevalent metaphors are in everyday language, it also suggested that a lot
of the major tenets of western thought, including the idea that reason is
conscious and passionless and that language is separate from the body
aside from the organs of speech and hearing, were incorrect. In brief, it
demonstrated that our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we
both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.
After Metaphors We Live By
was published, embodiment
slowly gained momentum in
academia. In the 1990s
dissertations by Christopher
Johnson, Joseph Grady and
Srini Narayanan led to a
neural theory of primary
metaphors. They argued that
much of our language comes
from physical interactions
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David - brain (Wikimedia Commons)
during the rst several years
of life, as the Aection is
Warmth metaphor
illustrated. There are many
other examples; we equate
up with control and down
with being controlled because stronger people and objects tend to control
us, and we understand anger metaphorically in terms of heat pressure
and loss of physical control because when we are angry our physiology
changes e.g., skin temperature increases, heart beat rises and physical
control becomes more diicult.
This and other work prompted Lako and Johnson to publish Philosophy
in the Flesh, a six hundred-page giant that challenges the foundations of
western philosophy by discussing whole systems of embodied metaphors
in great detail and furthermore arguing that philosophical theories
themselves are constructed metaphorically. Specically, they argued that
the mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious and
abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. Whats left is the idea that
reason is not based on abstract laws because cognition is grounded in
bodily experience (A few years later Lako teamed with Rafael Nez to
publish Where Mathematics Comes From to argue at great length that
higher mathematics is also grounded in the body and embodied
metaphorical thought).
As Lako points out, metaphors are more than mere language and
literary devices, they are conceptual in nature and represented physically
in the brain. As a result, such metaphorical brain circuitry can aect
behavior. For example, in a study done by Yale psychologist John Bargh,
participants holding warm as opposed to cold cups of coee were more
likely to judge a confederate as trustworthy after only a brief interaction.
Similarly, at the University of Toronto, subjects were asked to remember
a time when they were either socially accepted or socially snubbed. Those
with warm memories of acceptance judged the room to be 5 degrees
warmer on the average than those who remembered being coldly
snubbed. Another eect of Aection Is Warmth. This means that we both
physically and literary warm up to people.
The last few years have seen many complementary studies, all of which
are grounded in primary experiences:
Thinking about the future caused participants to lean slightly forward
while thinking about the past caused participants to lean slightly
backwards. Future is Ahead
Squeezing a soft ball inuenced subjects to perceive gender neutral
faces as female while squeezing a hard ball inuenced subjects to
perceive gender neutral faces as male. Female is Soft
Those who held heavier clipboards judged currencies to be more
valuable and their opinions and leaders to be more important. Important
is Heavy.
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Subjects asked to think about a moral transgression like adultery or
cheating on a test were more likely to request an antiseptic cloth after the
experiment than those who had thought about good deeds. Morality is
Purity
Studies like these conrm Lakos initial hunch that our rationality is
greatly inuenced by our bodies in large part via an extensive system of
metaphorical thought. How will the observation that ideas are shaped by
the body help us to better understand the brain in the future?
I also spoke with Term Assistant Professor of Psychology Joshua Davis,
who teaches at Barnard College and focuses on embodiment. I asked
Davis what the future of embodiment studies looks like (he is relatively
new to the game, having received his PhD in 2008). He explained to me
that although a lot of the ideas of embodiment have been around for a
few decades, theyve hit a critical mass whereas sensory inputs and
motor outputs were secondary, we now see them as integral to cognitive
processes. This is not to deny computational theories, or even
behaviorism, as Davis said, behaviorism and computational theories will
still be valuable, but, I see embodiment as a new paradigm that we are
shifting towards.
What exactly will this paradigm look like? Its unclear. But I was excited
to hear from Lako that he is trying to bring together neuroscience with
the neural theory of language and thought, through a new brain
language and thought center at Berkeley. Hopefully his work there, along
with the work of young professors like Davis, will allow us to understand
the brain as part of a much greater dynamic system that isnt conned to
our cortices.
The author would like to personally thank Professors Lako and Davis for
their time, thoughts, and insights. It was a real pleasure.
About the Author: Sam McNerney graduated from the greatest school on Earth, Hamilton College, where he
earned a bachelors in Philosophy. After reading too much Descartes and Nietzsche, he realized that his true
passion is reading and writing about cognitive science. Now, he is working as a science journalist writing about
philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. He has a column at CreativityPost.com and a blog at BigThink.com
called "Moments of Genius". He spends his free time listening to Lady Gaga, dreaming about writing bestsellers, and
tweeting @SamMcNerney. Follow on Twitter @SamMcNerney.
More
The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily those of Scientific American.
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52 Comments Add Comment
1. ehaaland
11:54 am 11/4/2011
Sure, of course we use metaphor in our language. And sure! Of
course, we use our bodies in defining our language. But this is not
the whole story of embodied cognition. This is simply one tiny little
aspect of what it means to be embodied and what it means to be a
cognitive organism.
Many philosophers and traditional cognitive scientists would agree
without issue that we are our bodies and are not just our brains;
however, so many people in both of those fields still insist that our
perception of the world outside ourselves is itself the product of a
symbol-crunching (what Anthony Chemero terms) mental
gymnastics that we are basic input-output processors with a central
planner that runs programs through the body. But this is not the case!
We, as action systems, do indeed see objects in our environments.
But we also perceive how our bodies are capable of interacting with
those objects to achieve a certain goal. These potentials for
coordinated action depend on the physiological characteristics of the
organism as well as the goal outcome that is desired by that same
organism. The behavioral repertoire of the organism places limits on
how it can interact with the aspects of its perceivable environment
and this is all the product of an embrained body and embodied
cognition. The body as a whole is what acts into the world and this is
the case regardless of the complexity of the organism; more complex
organisms are just able to act more complexly into the world!
There doesnt need to be some central organizer fulfilled by the
brain or the central nervous system. You are the organizer; your
body-en-total is the organizer. The elaborated nervous system of the
mammal, of the primate, of the human allows for an elaborated
understanding of ones relation to the world and affordances of
particular actions, but there is not some sort of neurally-represented
world constructed within the brain. You are a organism that
cognizes, that acts into the world. You are not just a body with a
brain that conceptualizes and mentates inside itself how the world
feels and how it is represented. Your brain is not a filtering machine
the sensors that your body is constructed of act as the foundation
for the emergent body itself and the body (as is presented out into
the world) is the filtering machine.
There is so much more to the embodied cognition concept that
people, like the author of this article, ignore.
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Link to this
2. redroo
11:57 am 11/4/2011
Very nice review of an otherwise difficult topic.
Im wondering how you see (if I can use that metaphor) the case of
Esref Armagan fitting with Embodied Cognition?
Armagan is a blind Turkish painter who is not only able to produce
images with the right shape and perspective but also with correct
colors that he has never seen?
http://www.mostlycolor.ch/2011/10/colorful-blind-painter.html
Thanks,
RR
Link to this
3. smcnerne
12:16 pm 11/4/2011
@ehaaland
Thank you for your thoughtful comment. You make some excellent
points. However, I think it is unfair to say that I ignore other
concepts having to do with embodied cognition. I cannot cover
everything with a limited space! As the title implies, it is meant to be
a brief guide to embodiment.
@redroo
Interesting case. I am not sure what to make of him other than the
fact that he doesnt necessarily need his eyes to see. Armagans
unique ability is probably best explained by someone who
understand the relevant neuroscience.
Link to this
4. brandon
2:04 pm 11/4/2011
cognition is grounded in bodily experience.
rationality is
greatly influenced by our bodies
Link to this
5. hnkelley
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7 of 38 20/08/14 10:14
2:11 pm 11/4/2011
I guess you could say I fall in the brain-as-computer camp, but I am
enjoying seeing the evidence pile up for this deeper understanding of
embodiment. And this brief guide is a good start for us newbies!
I do have to question the methodology of the metaphor research. We
do not grow up in a vacuum. We grow up, and learn our spoken and
body language in a culture. At the root level, our many different
cultures share quite a bit of common ground. So, how does this
testing remove that from the equation such that it can be determined
whether these metaphors are coming from embodiment instead of
from cultural learning? In other words, how can we determine that
this is coming from the physical body (including the brain, of
course) as opposed to being learned from an external source?
Link to this
6. brandon
2:12 pm 11/4/2011
cognition is grounded in bodily experience.
rationality is
greatly influenced by our bodies
sorry if this post shows up prematurely but I was having a bit of a
problem with my cursor display.
I would like to see the inclusion of people who have been paralyzed
all of their lives, or who were born with some perceptual defficiency,
or who lost some of that ability in their life, to determine if they are
any less/more cognitive or rational.
Link to this
7. hnkelley
2:18 pm 11/4/2011
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And now, an amusing (to me at least) note.
I love a good sci-fi, but I think this could really put the final nail in
the coffin for clones being true duplicates of the original. Think
about what embodiment implies. Your mind is not just living in the
brain, but your entire body. And your experiences affect your mind.
In some sense, weve known this, but we still freak out over having
someone duplicated via cloning. With embodiment, we have a better
understanding of this issue and can realize that, since the experiences
of the clone are vastly different that those of the original, the mind of
the clone cannot be a duplicate of the original at all.
But then, maybe sc-fi can put that to use for a good plot.
Link to this
8. smcnerne
3:54 pm 11/4/2011
@hnkelley
We know that they come from the physical body because many of
the metaphors require a physical body in order to make sense. In
other words, the phrase that went over my head wouldnt exist if
we didnt have bodies. The words themselves come from culture, but
conceptual metaphor comes from bodies.
I like your sci-fi idea.
Link to this
9. smcnerne
3:55 pm 11/4/2011
@brandon,
Thats a really good question. Let me know if you find any studies
on the matter
Link to this
10. Resuna
5:47 pm 11/4/2011
This seems to be confusing two completely different kinds of
information.
Materialism inherently implies that the mind is a function of the
brain.
How the mind organizes information and processes it, however, is
something that can be approached without concerning yourself with
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how the mind is actually implemented. The inputs and outputs of the
mind are based in the body, so whether the mind is the result of
electrochemical reactions in the brain, or some kind of spiritual
energy field, or even a computer simulation of a human its going
to be operating on the same raw material either way.
This does not mean the mind is a computer, mind you, just that its
possible to reason about it based on its inputs and outputs without
making assumptions about what it is.
Link to this
11. susip
9:47 pm 11/4/2011
Once the brain has a deep working understanding of new
information, or reconstruction of information, the brain seeks
efficiency. Metaphors are linguistically efficient. The body reacts
to experiences; the mind guides us to survive that experience, and
make sense of it.
My big question: WHERE is the mind located?
If anyone has ideas about where the mind can be found (body, brain,
thoughts, collective thinking).let me know!
Link to this
12. davidcpearce
1:26 am 11/5/2011
Some victims of locked in syndrome lack bodily sensation and
proprioception. But they are still fully functioning cognitive agents.
So I wonder if it wouldnt be more accurate to say that the brains
representation of the body powerfully influences the rest of the
mind? Its not as though the mind/brain has direct, non-inferential
access to the rest of the body.
Link to this
13. JustLooking
9:39 am 11/5/2011
Weve advanced enough in neuroscience to understand more about
cognition.
On perception try this experiment:
Think of some topic and how youd like for a listener to perceive it.
Now gather three listeners with relatively the same knowledge base
(education, exposure to same knowledge).
Person one, relay the topic without including any visual clues or
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words whatsoever.
Person two, rely the topic and include verbally spoken visual clues
or words.
Person three, show and audio visual presentation of the topic with all
the visual details to convey your message.
Which person will perceive your topic as you entended? Which
would use their own perception the most?
I think perception is only stored knowledge being retrieved based on
input given. Since the visual cortex plays a key role in all types of
knowledge we intake how its neuro connectors ties to the stored
knowledge creates a persons perception.
I think we gained the ability after we left primordial man. All that
meat and protein began to distinguished us from the other animals
and we developed an abilty to plan ahead, think.
We were already using autonomous biological systems and our
ability to think did not need to focus on survival so much, so we
began to think and created the beginings of religious thought. It took
several millennia before we began the beginnings of reason which
eventually created scientific principal.
Your knowledge and its neuro pathways determine how you
perceive life and everything in it. One with only Western knowledge
perceives differently than one with only Eastern knowledge. One
with both types of knowledge understand each of the other two but,
has a much broader perception of life and existence, he has the
knowledge base to.
Link to this
14. JustLooking
10:03 am 11/5/2011
What exactly does this mean? It means that our cognition isnt
confined to our cortices. That is, our cognition is influenced, perhaps
determined by, our experiences in the physical world.
How are we aware of this physical world if out cortices are
damaged? We need our cortices to even know that there is a physical
world.
All of our expeiences in the physical world come from intake,
process, match, output.
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11 of 38 20/08/14 10:14
The eyes scans light rays and send that data to the visual cortex, all
of the nerves send touch and feel data, the ears send sound wave
data, all this steaming data get processed by cortices. They put
relayed data together and based on the data have us perform some
response.
If my experiences with humanity were horrific I will not perceive
many events in the same manner as someone that can not even
phathom horrific humanity. Even showing them a video of the
horrors would not have them fully grasp teh event, they can at best
sympathize. Someone else that has experienced horrific humanity
would be able to empathize.
If all three of these people were together and watched the same war
film would would happen? The brain will have more data input from
the empathizers than it would from the sypathizer to create different
perceptions of similar shared events.
Link to this
15. mystery815
11:57 am 11/5/2011
A very interesting article, although riddled with numerous spelling
and grammatical errors. I am disturbed by the growing trend
whereby I see so many errors in major publications like this one. As
I am continually telling my high school, undergrad and grad
students: proofread, proofread, proofread! And then get someone
else to help you proofread. Its very distracting, and sometimes
detracts from the meaning when your reader has to work that hard to
get through your article. Otherwise: very interesting stuff.
Link to this
16. Zontar
12:18 pm 11/5/2011
Darmok and Jalad at Tanagra!
And while were at it, Ive always wondered whether everyone
sees the same colours in the same way in ones head. As far as we
know, nothing REALLY forces us to see blue as blue and not red.
That being said, given what we know about how our brains
rationalize colour, its fairly probable that we all interpret colours
in the same manner; its just that blue in one persons mind will look
like the red in anothers.
Temba, his arms wide open!
Z
Link to this
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17. barrycr
4:29 pm 11/5/2011
I have one question, which the following repeats in several different
forms.
[the mind] arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily
experiences. This is the striking claim that the very structure of
reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment.
Do we have scientific verification of the above statement, or is it
merely speculation? Please note there is a big difference between
scientific evidence and scientific verification.
It would appear reasonable to accept that a valid laboratory to
investigate the nature of mind would be our individual experiences.
And reviewing my own experiences (most of which likely match up
with yours), I have noted the following:
1. My experiences include perceptions (hearing etc.), thoughts,
memories, feelings, and emotions (this list could be expanded).
2. There is an underlying structure that influences the above
experiences. This structure is (in part) composed of my personality,
history (i.e., stress responses, learnings etc.) and the current state of
my physiology (tired or refreshed, sober or drunk, calm or anxious,
etc.)
3. Based on scientific data as well as my own experiences, this
structure appears to be the current state of my physiology.
However, I have also noted that at times I can experience a state of
awareness that, while not unconscious, does not contain any
experiences other than simple awareness. I am alert/awake, but
without being aware of thoughts, memories, perceptions etc. Yes,
they are potentially there (like the pressure of the chair against your
body as you read this, or your memory of what you ate yesterday)
but they do not express themselves. There is just awareness, a
sense that I am.
Whereas all the other experiences of mind clearly originate with my
physiology (in a manner not necessarily limited to the brain as noted
in the article) it is not clear to me that this non-experience or pure
awareness fits within the category.
Obviously I need a physiology to have that experience, but does it
originate with my physiology?
For the sake of clarity, let me present an analogy and re-phrase the
question for a third time.
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Compare a solid state radio with a solid state playback device (e.g.,
MP3 Player). In the one case the music we experience originates
with the device (MP3) whereas in the other it originates
independently (i.e., the radio signal).
Is my physiology like an MP3 player (as claimed in the quote above)
or a radio?
I think it is fair to claim that our physiology is far more sophisticated
than these solid state devices. It appears to me that our current tools
for investigating the relationship between physiology and mind are
comparable to investigating solid state devices with a hammer and
screw driver. We know we can impact the quality of the music by
poking the device, and could even determine which parts of the
device influence playback volume and frequency response. But these
tools would leave us a long way from truly understanding how solid
state devices works.
What evidence do we have that would clearly point to this most
basic experience of awareness as originating within the physiology?
Answers, comments or suggestions?
Link to this
18. charles000
5:26 pm 11/5/2011
A somewhat different, but parallel view of embodied cognition
could be seen as an artifact of what some have referred to as
quantum biology, the intersection of quantum physics and
biophysics, responding to and interacting with quantum
entanglement. There are many (including myself) who have
carefully considered cognition, and consciousness itself correlated
with quantum entanglement process dynamics.
Ill venture a bit further out on this limb, and attempt to offer the
notion that neuro-aesthetics, the linkage between contextual content
of perceived surroundings which invokes various forms of cognition
(voluntary and involuntary), and the resultant effects on state of
mind, is a crucial piece of this puzzle. These effects translate not
only into the realms of thought, reaction, emotional transitions and
the like, but also affect an invisible but very real quantum
entanglement signature.
This quantum entanglement signature in turn not only affects our
own localized perception of immediate surroundings, but also
interactively affects others around us.
There has been much speculation about the mechanisms of collective
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consciousness, influence of intentionality, and presence which often
appears to engage some form of interactive awareness which extends
beyond the range direct sensory cognition. This may be the
beginning edge of a Pandoras box of uncharted, but very intriguing
territory that is just beginning to unravel what has been confined to
the realms of mystery and philosophical constructs.
Just my 2 fempto cents worth of thought thrown into the mix, but
when I see the term embodied cognition and what I interpret to be
a sort of holographic rendering of perceived surroundings and
influences, the quantum biology entanglement model is the first
thing that comes to mind.
Link to this
19. pbecke
9:24 pm 11/5/2011
Prior to Descartes dualism, the heart had aways been considered the
seat of wisdom, I believe in all cultures.
However, with the advent of transplant surgery, there sems to have
been a constant stream of necessarily anecdotal evidence that a
transplanted kidney, for example, will often convey with it to its new
possessor at least some of the fairly distinctive personal tastes,
indeed, personality traits, of the donor.
Was not it not said of someone in the past that they were of this or
of that kidney. Certainly, as Aldous Huxley contended, mankind
has a deeper wisdom, often conveyed in their use of words, than is
understood in the present age.
Considering the precedence of the validity of our assumptions over
our capacity for remorseless logic, there is surely something more
than a little risible in the French word for scientist being sage.
Thank you, M. Descartes. That will be all.
Link to this
20. JRGrimmer
2:01 am 11/6/2011
I get the embodied mind argument, at a certain level it is trivial, our
minds do have bodies. And I even accept the metaphorical reasoning
arguments to a significant extent (Philosophy in the Flesh is a
great book!), but why does that mean that reasoning must be
independent of bodies?
Ask a math problem. I dont care how heavy your clipboard is, or
how warm your coffee, there will be a disembodied (correct)
answer! Or are we supposed to admit different correct answers
depending on each body?
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Link to this
21. smcnerne
3:04 am 11/6/2011
@barrycr We do have scientific evidence/verification that that quote
is more than speculation. I would point to the four studies I bullet
pointed in the article.
@charles000 Interesting ideas regarding quantum biology. Ive
never thought along those lines, sounds a little wishy washy but
maybe fruitful.
@pbecke I dont think there is any legitimate evidence that a kidney
translate carries with it traits from its donor. Not sure what you are
trying to say with your comment.
@JRGrimmer That there are objective truths to be know about the
universe (e.g, 1+1=2) does not undermine embodiment. A
disembodied answer, in other words, does not challenge
embodiment.
Link to this
22. jgrosay
3:44 pm 11/7/2011
It seems hard to maintain that the body, whatever is included in this
word for you, has no connection with the mind. Have you ever heard
about hypogonadal patients, or hyperthyroid or hypothyroid patients,
or about Organic Brain Syndrome, or about Corticosteroid-induced
psychosis ?. May be just the author of the title and summary of this
paper, this rememberances not continuing in the rest of the text,
speaks about different things that health care involved people do
when they use the word mind. Descartes described the
transmission of impulses along a nerve as a swelling that goes up or
down on it, but information belongs to a world completely different
to the neurons or integrated semiconductor chips its stored on.
Phylosophers, that once had genial intuitions on facts proven by
science many years after, is now a field completely different from
science and closer to literature, be it romantic o terror tales.
Philosophy is a mental product, thus non-palpable, and science deals
with material facts, numbers can be considered also material. Salut +
Link to this
23. Marc Levesque
11:21 am 11/8/2011
@barrycr
You mention in point 1. My experiences include perceptions
(hearing etc.), thoughts, memories, feelings, and emotions (this list
could be expanded)
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Can you include in that statement the experience of simple
awareness, just awareness, or sense of I am?
Concerning your mp3/radio question. In my opinion our experience
is made of, and from, internal and external experiences. So our
physiology is not like a radio or an mp3 (and not like a radio and an
mp3 because our selves are not built upon a separation between
physiology and experience).
974Q83256
Link to this
24. Marc Levesque
11:34 am 11/8/2011
Testing the comment line feed behavior. Testing the comment line
feed behavior. Testing the comment line feed behavior.
I just hit return key once. Was an empty line inserted?
I just hit the return key twice. It looks good in the comment input
box there is one empty line above this paragraph, but once the
comment is posted there will probably be two empty lines above this
paragraph?
Link to this
25. clangdon
9:36 pm 11/8/2011
Is it possible that some of the struggles I see with spelling and
grammar in my students are connected to the increase in attention
deficits that the body chatter is connected to chatter in how
the brain constructs its knowing of language patterns?
Link to this
26. epcharles
6:04 pm 11/9/2011
Additional discussion and analysis by Andrew Wilson, a British
perception-action researcher interested in embodiment, here:
http://psychsciencenotes.blogspot.com/2011/11/embodied-cognition-
is-not-what-you.html
And by Eric Charles, an American behaviorist, here:
http://fixingpsychology.blogspot.com/2011/11/embodied-
cognition.html
And a big Thank you to Sam, I was thrilled to see that youd
commented on Andrews blog!
Link to this
27. colonelslime
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5:54 pm 11/10/2011
Interesting article, but isnt this just an argument in semantics?
The notion that our worldview is heavily influenced by our bodies is
nor really surprising.Dont forget that a computer is just a machine
that analyses data based on internal logic. Where this logic comes
from, and how it functions, are wildly variable. To say the brain
behaves like a computer is not to say it is a PC. All these metaphors
we use are simply references to ideas that generalize across
humanity pretty easily, but but the fact that they arent culturally
universal indicates that these are really useful symbolic ideas that
permeate particular societies.
From what I understand about recent research on the brain (for a
good review, read Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain) its
basically a clusters of interlinked processors, each specializing in
heuristic learning of one kind or another, but each capable of
adapting itself to a whole different range of inputs. How are brain
goes about constructing its models, and how we come to understand
our world, is a function of all the data fed to our brain by our senses.
Add to this the fact the physical stimulus can trigger neurochemical
changes to alter behavior, and I dont think anyone can question the
fact that we are as much our bodies as we are our brains. But if you
took a brain from a newly formed fetus, and somehow hooked it up
to a different physical body, or just to a virtual one, it would develop
based on that input. Tests into heuristic AI (there was one in
particular about a robot with phantom limb syndrome I remember)
seem to confirm this. More importantly, a body lacking a brain
shows no outward signs of what we call cognition, whereas someone
who has lost parts of their body (but not so much as to inhibit
survival) can still display cognitive faculties similar to what they had
before.
A final note: Given the experiments you mentioned, one wonders if
human perception of the world is subject to some near-universal
similarities, due to our physiology predisposing our minds to certain
symbols (IE. important is heavy, future is forward, female is soft). I
can certainly see why our brains would symbolically link concepts
such as these. Makes you wonder what would happen if you took a
brain, even an adults, and radically changed the input information
being fed to it. Maybe the brain would just adapt without too much
transformative change, but it could also be that the brain would
begin to develop distinctly alien views on existence, based on its
altered body. Also makes one wonder what may happen if we ever
succeed in creating human-level AI, especially heuristically derived
ones. Maybe installing an artificial brain in a steamroller will
produce a being who views all problems as necessitating squishing,
since thats the only way it could interact with reality. (I was being a
little facetious in that last statement, but I do think the idea might be
interesting to explore)
Link to this
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28. bbremner
7:26 pm 11/10/2011
Why do we have a picture of Chomsky and not one of Lakoff?
Link to this
29. smcnerne
10:44 pm 11/10/2011
@colonelslime believe it or not, there are plenty of cognitive
psychologists who dont understand how much our world views are
influenced by our bodies.
@bbremner Couldnt get a good Lakoff photo royalty free. Dont
Noam look great though????
Link to this
30. colonelslime
3:47 am 11/11/2011
@smcnerne: Silly me, I thought scientists would try to be integrative
and holistic in their understanding of reality. I keep forgetting how
many people narrow their vision based on their field. Ive had
arguments with people about stuff like this before, and it always
floors me that someone can assume that they,and they alone, have an
understanding of how things work. Im just not programmed that
way
Link to this
31. smcnerne
11:43 am 11/11/2011
@colonelslime, But that is not to say that there isnt really incredible
work being done by psychologists who embrace computational
theories of mind, or even behaviorism.
Link to this
32. jatrudel
4:29 pm 11/11/2011
Hope Im not going off on too much of a tangent here. IMO, the
mind and body can be one while remaining simultaneously
disengaged, which I think the gentleman with the MP3 player was
trying to say. Today we take for granted we can communicate with
space probes millions of miles away. Its possible our physical realm
differs only depending on ones circumstances. Logic tells me it is
highly unlikely, however my own experiences say otherwise.
My out-of-body episode, an agnostic non-religious and fairly
unremarkable event given what transpired, occurred in my life one
time and one time only; it took place when I was eleven and
undergoing surgery for an appendectomy. It was not a dream. I
distinctly recall the shock I suddenly felt wash over me as I found
myself involuntarily leaving the table and floating up adjacent to the
huge chrome light fixture directly above. My dreams dont involve
tangible feelings. I could observe the people gathered round my
body below and hear them joking. I had no impression of being in or
out of my body or of any innate ability to employ any of my other
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senses, other than what I could see and hear; I became totally fixated
on wondering how it was that I could be looking at the back of this
light fixture ten feet above the operating table. I assume today what
happened was directly correlated to the anesthesia administered.
Was my mind creating a semi-psychotic state? Up until recently Ive
discussed this with very few people. At the time it occurred I tried
talking to everyone, my doctor, nurses, my parents, but it was
dismissed and ignored by all as the babbling of a child.
Im in my sixties now and here is what Ive learned since. I did meet
one other person well call Mike, who had said he knew someone
back in college who had the ability fall into a trance-like state and
travel out-of-body. Mike and his college friends decided to set up an
experiment to debunk this fellows claim. They arranged for this
person Ill call Max to do his thing from their dorm room in
Houston, and have him drop in on a hotel lobby in NYC where Mike
had an observer stationed on a pay phone. I guess from what Mike
said, Max successfully traversed thousands of miles, found the hotel
and described everything and everyone there with extreme accuracy.
Did he? I have no idea. For all I know it was a parlor trick.
Heres the part I found most interesting. In order for Max to have an
OOBE, he said he had to sit in a chair and be left alone to dwell in
his thoughts while he consciously lowered his heart rate. As he
approached near-death, only then would he be able to escape his
physical presence. he told the group to monitor his heart rate and
revive him if his heart stopped. That could correlate to my being
anesthetized; I later confirmed this with an anesthesiologist.
None of this is very scientific. I did run across a neurosurgeon who
has spent time investigating the part of the brain associated with
OOBEs. He said hes interviewed people who have had an OOBE
and mine was not unique. I think he said it was an area in the parietal
lobe. He did not believe there was an actual OOB event and he
assumes it was a projection of the mind and our imaginations.
The reason I regurgitate this now is because five yrs ago I suffered a
hemorrhagic brain infarction; Im partially handicapped on one side
in my fine motor control reflexes. My cognitive skills appear to have
remained untouched, but I question that because of what friends tell
me happened up until to two weeks later, which they say was when I
got back to being myself personality-wise. I recall none of it other
than realizing I was in trouble and calling 911. At the time the stroke
occurred I was left completely paralyzed on one side. That would be
traumatic for most, but as a runner my only all-consuming thought
was to get back as much physically as I possibly could as quickly as
I could. Its funny that the word paralysis has an entirely different
meaning to me today from what I had imagined it was a priori. To
wake up totally paralyzed is to feel nothing; absolutely nothing. Its
like half of you doesnt exist.
The brain has remarkable recuperative powers. They tell me neurons
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have only one task assigned to them in life, but in the case of trauma
the brain will re-circuit itself around the damaged cells, and adjacent
neurons will be reassigned to do two jobs. We have to teach them by
rote using repetitive movement, and although we feel absolutely
nothing, the muscles can still respond and communicate in reverse
and teach the brain how to reengage.
Im getting far away from the crux of this embodiment discussion
and I really didnt want to get lost in my personal situation. Ive
become engrossed in learning as much as I can about the brain.
Suffice it to say its an extraordinary organ, and Im afraid its
capable of doing so much more than we will ever know. I apologize
and hope I didnt take us too far off the trail.
Link to this
33. lesbrunswick
11:05 pm 11/14/2011
A very interesting article.
I think one implication is that, since our bodies are orderly and
largely identical, the structuralist claim that linguistic concepts are
entirely the product of the internal and entirely random operations of
language and hence entirely incommensurable between different
cultures is incorrect.
Link to this
34. colonelslime
1:56 pm 11/15/2011
@smcnerne:
No question (I am a fan of Hofsteader, and voraciously read
anything having to do with this subject), but I dont see why a a
scholar approaching from a computational viewpoint would feel the
need to discount the fact that our physiology affects our viewpoint.
Computational studies of human behavior point to the fact the our
brain functions by heuristics, and the information that the brain uses
for this learning process all filters through our body, both in
hormonal cues and external information filtered through our censors.
Its like trying to separate chemistry from physics: while they can be
view as different fields on different macro levels, the latter underlies
causation in the former, and cant be wholly ignored, even if a more
macro view sometimes benefits. Same thing with the mind\body
dichotomy: studying computational understandings of the human
mind doesnt require you to deny the effects of the body, even if
thats not your main focus.
Link to this
35. colonelslime
1:59 pm 11/15/2011
Oh, and Im sure that I could find, without looking too hard, a ton of
physiologists that totally discount, or at least dont understand, the
minds ability to influence physiological state. My first comment in
response to you is more of a general lament about modern science
than a specific dig at cognitive studies.
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Link to this
36. pbecke
2:27 pm 11/16/2011
@smcnerne
@pbecke I dont think there is any legitimate evidence that a kidney
translate carries with it traits from its donor. Not sure what you are
trying to say with your comment.
It makes no sense at all to discount copious anecdotal evidence.
In relation to the article under discussion, the experiment referred to
in the article linked below, apparently provides unambiguous
evidence that the mind is not coterminous with the brain, but, rather
that it acts as a kind of signal receiver, which, of course, is not to
deny the key role of the body by way of its interactions with the
mind, while we are alive in this life.
Link to this
37. pbecke
6:45 pm 11/16/2011
As a matter of fact, (though not of empirical science), it is the will,
and not the reasoning mind in the narrowest sense, which prompts us
to accept what are to become our fundamental assumptions; the
reason being that they too abstruse and profound for the rational
mind to grasp. So, in that sense, religions are indeed, wishful
thinking, as are all beliefs concerning a world-view. It just happens
that we believe that God made the truth to coincide with our nasic
religious beliefs. In any case, why should the truth be something not
to be wished for, not to hoped for, undesirable. In favour of what? A
cold, hard truth? But truth and our apprehension of it are vibrant
and dynamic. No computer is ever going to be independently
intelligent, as an adult human being is.
Also, where religion is concerned, personal belief has implications
for the conduct of that persons whole life. Changes in ones
world-view are no small matter
When asked the criterion he used in selecting his basic hypotheses,
Einstein replied that it was aesthetic. He also remarked: The
intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful
servant. We have created a society that honors the servant and has
forgotten the gift.
It was a sad occasion when the term, empirical science finally
overtook the plain term, science, as signifying knowledge, rather
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than a particular subdivision of knowledge. Scientism is evidently a
direct result of that weird, epistemological patricide.
So, Im sure I shall invites cries of, Thats not science! Peer
reviews? Woo Woo! Unicorns and pink pixies Nevertheless, Ill
soldier on and state the basic Christian theological definition of the
soul, as enunciated in the RC catechism. The soul consists of the
memory, the will and the understanding.
The ever-proliferating paradoxes (or as we call them in the Christian
Church: mysteries, since they defy reason and logic) at the
frontiers of modern science, although apparently resented by the
large scientism coterie, are, perforce, accepted by them, if only
because their careers depend upon it, and they simply refuse to
accept that they cannot, by very definition, be rendered intelligible to
the human mind, either now or in the distant future.
The brighter members of the scientific community, apparently,
privately, understand this, and simply use those paradoxical truths of
physics, whether at the quantum or the macrocosmic level.
However, it is not in the perceived, notoriously short-term interest of
the large corporations to have the certainties of the mechanistic
paradigm, on whose hegemony they and their advertisers still insist,
in practice. That white lab coat and test-tube held up to the light are
special.
Link to this
38. pbecke
6:50 pm 11/16/2011
I should have written:
However, it is not in the perceived, notoriously short-term interest
of the large corporations to have the certainties of the mechanistic
paradigm, on whose hegemony they and their advertisers still insist,
in practice, to be publicly questioned.
Link to this
39. colonelslime
10:47 am 11/17/2011
@ pbecke:
I doubt it is peer review which prompted the author to reject your
claim about organ transplants transferring personality traits.
To quote Roger Brinner (who, despite what the internet may say on
any given day, Im pretty sure is the originator of this phrase): The
plural of anecdote is not data
The authors (or my) disbelief in that statement comes form the fact
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that there are no theories which provide underlying causal
mechanism for the phenomenon you describe, and there is very little
to no verifiable evidence of it. Sophistic arguments about the nature
of truth are irrelevant. Science doesnt seek abstract truth, it seeks
the best available explanation for reality. For your explanation to
hold, evidence must be provided, otherwise I could claim that fairies
made my windows frost this morning. The last part of your post is a
classic appeal to conspiratorial thinking, and again undermines the
point you are trying to prove. Philosophic understandings of the
nature of consciousness are irrelevant here, unless they color
someones interpretation of data. Occams razor is not a tool of
corporate propaganda.
All this being said, bias is always possible in science, and thats why
the best policy is to keep an open mind. If you can provide verifiable
evidence for your claims, I will be more than happy to re-evaluate
my understanding of reality. But until you provide some form of
evidence other than second hand testimonials from a handful of
cases, Ill go with the understanding that requires the fewest
assumptions to function.
Link to this
40. colonelslime
10:54 am 11/17/2011
Nor do I disagree with Einstein. Intuition is a powerful tool. But
Einstein was not talking about supporting a theory in spite of
available evidence. Aesthetics are not irrelevant in explaining
reality, but they must take second place to cogency.
Link to this
41. colonelslime
10:54 am 11/17/2011
*cogency to available evidence
Link to this
42. pbecke
7:12 pm 11/17/2011
@Colonelslime
Sophistic arguments about the nature of truth are irrelevant. Science
doesnt seek abstract truth, it seeks the best available explanation for
reality.
This is as far as we need to go. You are evidently totally
unimpressed by my disquisition on the nature of science qua
knowledge, not a subdivion thereof, in terms of that particularly
gross, base sphere of knowledge we know as empirical science.
Truth is independent of peer reviews. The truths of Einsteins
relativity theories have never depended upon peer reviews for their
veracity. However, the progress of empirical science has been found
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to be highly dependent upon peer reviews, precisely because it
progresses incrementally in the most pedantic ways that can be
devised by the most anal of individuals.
Sophisticated areas of truth and knowledge, which, however, like the
humbler truths of empirical science do not essentially depend upon
peer reviews, are not susceptible to the physical measurements of
empirical science. It does not make then any less true, or the
knowledge thereof any less valid. They simply cant be proved.
When a person considers such claims, he must resort to a more
subtle use of his intelligence, combining his intuition and his store of
accumulated knowledge at a more abstruse level. Whether people
cling to scientism and scoff at such assertions or not, makes not the
slightest difference to the truth, least of all when it does not lend
itself to empirical investigation. The person making an assertion on
such a subject may be right or wrong, but scientism will a priori
blunt the intellectual capacity of anyone wishing to ponder the truth
of falsity of the matter.
Link to this
43. pbecke
7:25 pm 11/17/2011
@Colonelslime
As regards the corporate conspiracy, I found the following
endorsement on a Guardian Science thread encouraging:
consciousness is primary, matter is secondary
Amit Goswami
Thank you, itsawhiskymac.
Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood
it.
Are you guys such victims of the the zeitgeist sustained by
Einsteins naive realists that youve become blase about the
counter-rational nature of quantum physics?
Its not about intuition or hunches in relation to the paradoxes of
quantum physics, its not counter-intuitive; its about being
counter-rational, totally absurd.
Subliminally, physicists must have accepted the strictures of Bohr in
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this regard, since they accept the paradoxes as reality and
incorporate them in their overall contextual view, and are able to use
them to make further successful discoveries; but wittingly or
unwittingly, they and their careers are in thrall to the mechanistic
dinosaurs, who still fight tooth and nail against the clear implications
of Bohrs quantum paradigm.
The great extension of our experience in recent years has brought
light to the insufficiency of our simple mechanical conceptions and,
as a consequence, has shaken the foundation on which the customary
interpretation of observation was based.
If only.
The comprehensive purview and inerrance of science, as
predicated by mechanistic physics, is an essential tool of the large
corporations in their manufacture of consent; not unlike those
duplicitously-conceived, political surveys, the French had banned
before elections, until, I believe, Sarkozy, an alumnus of the CIA,
came along.
Once the corporations allow for intrinsically impenetrable mysteries
in science, it opens up the possibility of plausible moral objections to
their psychopathic ethos, and a potential reining in of them by
religion, in any number of areas, in which they are currently free to
continue to act without any kind of moral constraint.
paulbecke 01:19am Jan 24, 2011 GMT (#195 of 226) | Delete
According to Wiki, some physicists apparently felt that Bohms
theory looks contrived: It was deliberately designed to give
predictions which are in all details identical to conventional quantum
mechanics*.
Bohms aim was not to make a serious counterproposal but simply to
demonstrate that hidden-variable theories are indeed possible.
It seems Bohm, too, was of a mind to fall back on the big names in
the early development of quantum theory in the 1920s and 30s.
mmuskin 02:24am Jan 24, 2011 GMT (#196 of 226)
Hear, Hear, paulbecke. I entirely agree. The old Newtonian-style
clockwork universe was a convenient paridigm for its time but has
long been consigned to the historical dustbin by the best and most
astute scientists I have personally known. Among those who would
agree with us are my late good friends Richard Feynman, Max
Delbruck, Gene Shoemaker, and Roger Sperry, among many others
who happen not to have won Nobel prizes during their careers as
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professional scientists. Others Ive known, like Franz Zwicky, Fred
Thompson, Gene Amdahl, Michael Turner, and Kip Thorne, all of
whom Ive known personally and talked with extensively about their
own scientific specialties, agree that while science itself is not a
religion (and as Stephen Hawking recently commented, inciting
some public uproar among religious intolerants, that God was not
necessary for our physical universe to have been created)
consciousness itself cannot be totally divorced from the
comprehensive consideration of physical processes nor any of the
physical sciences.
Some pure mathematicians Ive known have been able to sustain for
themselves the delusion that not only is a mathematically (logically)
complete, self-consistent, and entirely valid structure of axioms,
theorems, and their relationships to each other possible to construct
and prove valid, but even that the application of such a mathematical
structure to the mechanistic and comprehensive description of
physical reality is valid, reliable, and unassailable in its potential
ability to predict the outcome of any physical process with absolute
certainty.
Whether or not one believes Einsteins famous statement that God
does not roll dice, which I dont think even Einstein himself
believed at the time (having read his excellent book The World As I
See It in which he clearly agrees with the scientists I mentioned
above), the mechanistically absolutist paradigm of physical law is
untenable and, as you mentioned, has been abused as a means of
imposing overly authoritative and oppressive constraints by
corporate, government, and ecclesiastic institutions upon the rest of
the human race in a truly psychopathic effort on their part to be free
of any restraint by other people or laws upon them accomplishing
their own selfish will in this world and remaining free of any true
accountability for having done such a rampantly abusive thing to
others on such a vast scale and for so tragically long.
The best physicists Ive met (or been fortunate enough to have
personally known) will, when the governmental and corporate
suits are not around, readily admit that this is the case, and that
freedom of expression is necessary but not by itself sufficient for
true excellence in the scholarly pursuit of the sciences.
Freedom of thought from these artificially narrow constraints and
popular fashions of the time, promoted so effectively throughout our
society by those who personally profit from discouraging or even
prohibiting an individuals free thought about science, law, ethics, or
the role of consciousness (however one wishes to define it) in what
we share as our common ground which we call reality. is also
necessary for such scholarly pursuits to yield valid results which can
successfully withstand arbitrarily rigourous testing and reliable
reproduction of scientific validation (or humane ethics, or equity at
law for that matter).
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Even a cursory study of the history of maths shows how European
scientists and mathematicians so long failed to discover the validity
and relevance of fundamental concepts like zero or the
imaginary numbers (as, for example, i is the square root of
negative one) that discussion of modern maths in ignorance of such
concepts is now rightfully seen as unacceptably clumsy and quite
backward.
Try solving simple quadratic equations (each of whose two roots are
not both real numbers) using only Roman numerals. Try explaining
calculus to someone ignorant of limits and the whole concept of
continuity in the very definition of integration. Its the same when
one reads (in my case English translations of) Einsteins original
1905 paper on Special Relativity or his 1915 paper on General
Relativity and notes how his immediate predecessors (including
Hertz and Lorentz) were so loathe to discard the false doctrine of an
alleged aether within which electromagnetic waves were supposed
to propagate through space. Several important experiments,
including the famous Michelson-Morley test, convinced Einstein and
eventually others that this aether did not exist and never had existed.
Electromagnetic energy could finally be accepted as capable of
propagating itself in a vacuum.
In older interpretations of chemistry, a mythical substance called
phlogiston was long thought to be the scientifically valid basis for
the combustion of flammable materials in fresh air. Once the crucial
discovery of free oxygen in the oxidation/reduction reactions which
we now know actually cause fire to burn was finally accepted and
the phlogiston paridigm discarded, real progress in the study of
chemical oxidation could proceed without interference from the
former believers in the false paradigm which had been holding back
chemical research.
For centuries, misconceptions like the sun revolving around the earth
or the energy generated by the sun being derived by the identical
chemical processes which caused fire to burn combustible materials
in air (instead of the nuclear fusion which we now know powers the
sun) were accepted and reasonable alternatives ridiculed as scientific
heresy until the more valid and real explanations successfully
replaced them. How are either maths or the physical sciences
supposed to progress unless true freedom of thought is not only
permitted but openly encouraged?
Link to this
44. pbecke
8:17 pm 11/17/2011
Epistemology in terms of empirical science seems to have come to a
sudden stop with the departure of Max Planck, sixty odd years ago.
As a man who has devoted his whole life to the most clear-headed
science, to the study of matter, I can tell you as a result of my
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research about atoms this much: There is no matter as such. All
matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings
the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar
system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the
existence of a conscious and intelligent mind. This mind is the
matrix of all matter.
Has any physicist taken the matter any further? On the contrary,
Planck is implicitly, roundly mocked as a believer in intelligent
design. As, of course, was Einstein, a mere deist. Not a pantheist but
a panentheist.
The first two paragraphs of Samuel McNerneys article are very
evocative of Plancks observations:
..George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez explain:
Embodied cognition, the idea that the mind is not only connected to
the body but that the body influences the mind, is one of the more
counter-intuitive ideas in cognitive science. In sharp contrast is
dualism, a theory of mind famously put forth by Rene Descartes in
the 17th century when he claimed that there is a great difference
between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature always
divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible the mind or soul of
man is entirely different from the body. In the proceeding centuries,
the notion of the disembodied mind flourished. From it, western
thought developed two basic ideas: reason is disembodied because
the mind is disembodied and reason is transcendent and universal.
However, as George Lakoff and Rafeal Nez explain:
Cognitive science calls this entire philosophical worldview into
serious question on empirical grounds [the mind] arises from the
nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experiences. This is not just
the innocuous and obvious claim that we need a body to reason;
rather, it is the striking claim that the very structure of reason itself
comes from the details of our embodiment Thus, to understand
reason we must understand the details of our visual system, our
motor system, and the general mechanism of neural binding.
Max Planck:
Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is
because, in the last analysis, we ourselves are part of nature and
therefore part of the mystery that we are trying to solve.
I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative
from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness.
Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing,
postulates consciousness.
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The testimonies of people who have suffered near-death
experiences suggest that they gave them a more profoundly
scientific understanding of consciousness than the naive realists,
as Einstein called them, the mockers of the great paradigm-changers
of the last century. No peer reviews.
The resurrection of the body in a form so glorified that it is beyond
our imagination, is an absolute tenet of the Christian faith, at least as
taught by the Catholic church. So, that too ties in. The angels are
pure spirits who only assume human form for our benefit. Their
proper milieu is evidently not this universe.
My apologies for this unpardonable digression from empirical
science cold hard reason. Not.
Link to this
45. colonelslime
10:48 pm 11/17/2011
@pbecke: you havent said anything I necessarily disagree with, but
you havent disputed my point either. I am not without a spiritual
side, and Im not a militant atheist obsessed with rationality.
Scientific theory is wholly incapable of providing any
epidemiological truths, as logic isnt self-proving and we cannot be
sure of anything we know. But, I have seen no evidence, peer
reviewed or otherwise, that supports your claim of character traits
being transferred by organ donation. AS I said, sophistic arguments
on the nature of truth are irrelevant to science and empiricism. This
does not making them irrelevant to human existence, but they dont
replace evidence and data. Using your own example, if someone
today were to claim some new equivalent of aether theory, in spite
of available evidence, would you defend them on epidemiological
grounds? Would you say simply that the current paradigm is simply
an entrenched heresy? Provide me some proof of your claims about
organ transplant, and I am open to changing my opinions on the
matter. You are right that the current obsession with peer review
amounts to little more than a fallacious appeal to authority.
However, peer review is not the same thing as statistically valid, and
there is ample evidence on how easy it is for the brain to fabricate
images and memories when it enters certain states. For me to accept
you claims, I must have more than just anecdotes, because of the
subjective and malleable nature of human experience and memory.
Link to this
46. colonelslime
10:54 pm 11/17/2011
Cursed autocorrect! I meant epistemological in both cases.
Link to this
47. colonelslime
11:35 pm 11/17/2011
Oh, I just thought of a better example. Dianetic by L. Ron Hubbard.
While anecdotes exists, I would hope we could both agree on the
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lack of evidence for its hypothesis.
Link to this
48. tsebas
9:50 pm 11/18/2011
@susip
Where is the mind, you ask. Sounds like you want to know where to
find some thing. Minds do not qualify as things, unless you want
to call it an abstract thing.
When we speak of the mind, we have nominalized a physiological
activity, basically the physiological activity of thinking, broadly
defined. The noun mind derives from the verb mind: mind how
you walk on the icy walkway; mind your manners; do you mind
if I open a window?.
The physiological activity of minding (thinking, remembering)
occurs as a bodily function. We dont think with our minds, we think
when we mind, and mind when we think.
Link to this
49. pbecke
10:11 am 12/4/2011
But, I have seen no evidence, peer reviewed or otherwise, that
supports your claim of character traits being transferred by organ
donation.
Did I suggest that your field of knowledge and experience were
pivotal to an understanding of truth? Did I suggest that evidence
peer reviewed or otherwise, that supports (my) your claim of
character traits being transferred by organ donation, even existed in
any codified form?
AS I said, sophistic arguments on the nature of truth are irrelevant
to science and empiricism.
You have the question round the wrong way? Is science and
empiricism relevant to observations concerning the nature of truth. It
would be nice to think it did. It should. Indeed, the former should be
the context. Einstein couldnt reproduce under laboratory conditions
the empirical evidence which finally led him to select the aesthetic
criterion as the preferred basis for his choice of hypotheses.
This does not making them irrelevant to human existence, but they
dont replace evidence and data.
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That would be to diminish their stature. You sound like the character
in Dickens who was obsessed with facts (meaning the basest and
most simplistically manageable)!
Using your own example, if someone today were to claim some
new equivalent of aether theory, in spite of available evidence,
would you defend them on epistemological grounds?
A very facile strawman that does your argument little credit. There
exists an almost infinite range of anecdotal evidence on all manner
of subjects, some, such as the existence of the USA, for example,
considered to be hard facts. If we have never been there, all our
anecdotal evidence, documentary or oral, indicates that its existence
is a hard fact.
When you were a young child and your mother came into the room
after being away for a while, was the little surge of love in your heart
a phantasm. Well, many of your confreres would assert with all the
bombast of the naive realist that it was all down to chemical
reactions, anyway, but it would not have been physiologically
measurable on any but the most perverse and inchoate empirical
level.
Would you consider a conviction of the existence of ghosts, global
throughout mans recorded history, anecdotal and as untrustworthy
as the existence of phlogiston or aether. The latter have been
disproved by empirical science (please, no sophistry about proof,
anyone), the former has not.
Indeed, contrary to your conviction, empirical science is not, nor
ever could be the centre and crown of science, properly so-called,
i.e. knowledge, again irrespective of any indication of your personal
apprehension of the scope of its validity or its stature within science,
properly-so-called.
Provide me some proof of your claims about organ transplant, and I
am open to changing my opinions on the matter.
The data concerning belief in the existence of ghosts, even if a figure
could be put on the number of such believers, would be enormous,
still without your personal opinion being germane to the matter.
You are right that the current obsession with peer review amounts
to little more than a fallacious appeal to authority.
No. You are quite wrong. You misread my point. Peer reviews are
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indeed an important tool in the necessarily slow, pedantic
establishment of empirical physical truths, because, except for the
occasions of paradigm shifts, science must proceed incrementally. A
Leggo set, if you will.
In mocking peer reviews, I was mocking the people who see it as a
tool for the estabishment of all knowledge, not merely empirical
science. The exclusive, empiricism-centred perspective on
epistemology. In my experience, hitherto, moreover, the ones who
excitedly cry, Appeal to authority! are the most supine of all
hostages to authority, dutifully reading their text books to pass their
exams, rather than in a bona fide quest for knowledge of truth for
its own sake. The same ones who usually cry, Peer review! Wheres
the peer review!
What an irony, point them to the beliefs of Max Planck, Niels Bohr
and Einstein, theyll cry Appeal to authority, while swallowing
whole, conjectures, such as the fabled primordial soup.
Link to this
50. Michal B.
Paradowski
8:00 am 01/4/2012
Obviously, all our experience is mediated/filtered/facilitated/biased
/whichever-other-term-you-prefer via our bodies (much of which
interaction may be perceived as biological _constraints_ imposed by
the architecture of the hardware just as our disposition impacts
our somatic state and performance). Taking as an example the realm
of speech competence and performance, consider for instance:
- lateralization and localization of the language faculty in neuronal
circuitry, as evidenced by i) language disorders from receptive and
expressive aphasias, Specific Language Impairment, and abnormal
language developed in individuals with left hemispherectomy to
other cases of people with normal nonverbal abilities but impaired
language and normal language but cognitive deficits (cf. the classic
Smith et al. (1993) study), and ii) fMRI studies showing activation
of certain brain areas involved in language processing,
- genetic influence on language (now considered in terms of
networks of gene interactions, rather than attempts to pin down an
isolated gene), or
- psychosomatic states and factors (fatigue, tedium, intoxication,
drugs, sudden changes of mind, haste, inattention, external
distractions) affecting language users output (the actual
deployment of their linguistic competence).
But there is much more to it than meets the eye, if I may perversely
use this metaphor. While one could try to argue that the body is just
a filter mediating sensory inputs, and that all memory, thought, and
knowledge are written into and rest in the brain, the tie is not
broken and is crucial in both information processing and action
execution. The notion of embodiment can well be substantiated in
the realm of language, with metaphors actually being a marginalif
anyindicator of the phenomenon. One of the most obvious areas
showing the tie is interaction between (context-bound) language
comprehension and production and sensorimotor activation,
manifested in both directions in motor resonance (motor
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performance modulated by e.g. priming), and in semantic resonance
(brain language areas associated with certain concepts getting
activated during sensorimotor action; for a representative overview
see for instance issue 112 (2010) of Brain & Language). Without
postulating embodiment, it would also be difficult to account for
such observed phenomena as verbalization of memory being
facilitated when assuming the original body position during recall (a
folk wisdom recurrent from Malaysian television language
programs for kids to rigorous scientific research such as Dijkstra et
al. 2007), expedition of linguistic tasks when these are
complemented by action, the interlacing of sensorimotor experiences
with cognition in episodic memory (memory of the context and
circumstances in which events happened), faster comprehension of
depictions of spatial associations than of descriptions of spatial
_dis_sociations, and speedier recognition of words with body-object
interaction than of ones without. On top of this, on the one hand it
has also been found that comprehension of action words deteriorates
after loss of procedural knowledge, while on the other clinical
studies indicate that processing of action concepts degrades if action-
or vision-related brain areas are lesioned in motor neuron diseases
and semantic dementia. A bonus argument for a link between
language and the body can be the parallel emergence of speech and
gesture in infancy.
I find this kind of evidence much more convincing than the
metaphorical examples by Lakoff and Johnson, as in their case the
claim for embodied cognition completely misses the point. Firstly, to
all accounts the metaphors brought up are not universal, but
culturally embedded (i.e. entrained); e.g. in Quechua and Aymara
the future is conceived of and encoded as being _behind_ us
(because it cannot be seen), and the past ahead of us (because it can).
For an example of the cultural grounding of gestures consider
nodding and shaking ones head: in most of Europe and beyond the
former signifies consent or acknowledgment, and the latter dissent or
denial, but this is the reverse in Bulgaria. This is why I would be
very cautious about talking of such universal primitives as future
is ahead or morality is purity the latter of which is a concept
impressed upon us by religions, but not necessarily innate (barring
the fact that the connection between using a Handi Wipe and
embodiment postulated in the original entry is rather strained
anyway). An even more compelling hint suggesting that using
metaphors to explain embodiment is a completely failed attempt is
evidence that while motor resonance has been observed in
neuroimaging and TMS studies when action words and concepts
were used in their _literal_ meaning, the effect apparently does
_not_ take place in metaphorical or idiomatic contexts (see Bergen
et al. 2007 or Rueschemeyer et al. 2010).
All the aforementioned observations merely point to a _link_
between language and the body. But that is still misses the key point
of embodied cognition, where the brain, the body, and the
environment _all_ form part of reasoning, heuristics, decision-
making and action execution. This is fantastically patent in robotics,
where during e.g. learning to walk the resultant neural network is
going to depend on the robots morphology; it is essential
particularly to soft robotics and morphological computation, where
there is no clear separation between the controller (orchestrator) and
hardware (morphology), and the tasks are distributed between the
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brain, body, and environment which is what us humans and
animals do all the time.
The reason why it is untenable to believe that organ transplant
receivers will have concurrently gained new experiences lies in the
fact that the physical make-up of the donated human organ is
qualitatively equivalent to that being replaced (when/if that was still
functioning normally). While the body mediates our experiences, our
memory and knowledge are still largely believed to be stored in the
neural circuitry (both in the case of declarative memory and motor
memory, albeit the consolidation and retention of the latter
unquestioningly require muscular involvement), and while there is a
link between neural and somatic responses, the surgery and
subsequent recuperation by design probably recreate most of the
links, however imperfectly. Moreover, most of the organs being
transplanted are not responsible for transmitting sensory impressions
anyway (except for pain, but that is not an organ-specific feature).
Regarding the role of the visual cortex in the processing and
acquisition of information, it is a well-known fact that the visual
modality dominates in society, preceding verbal, kinaesthetic and
tactile think of the frequent use of the form I see to mean I
understand. Within milliseconds one image can convey a very
complex, non-linear message, while the potential of expressing that
same content with e.g. words can be very limited and require many
hours or printed pages.
While most of us perceive colours in the same way (cf. e.g. studies
with Munsell colour tiles) independently of the language used or
cultural upbringing (the fact that a language may have no word for
e.g. sage or taupe, or that e.g. in desert countries warm colours
predominate and cold hues are underrepresented, does not mean that
the speakers of those lingos and inhabitants of the areas are unable to
distinguish those colours), it is estimated that around 8% of the male
and 0.5% of the female population suffer from some kind of colour
vision deficiency; van Gogh for one was most probably a case of
anomalous trichromacy. Naturally, those are considered anomalies.
As regards the awareness issue mentioned in this thread by
@charles000, if Im correct in taking it that you understand the
concept as e.g. the state of being on the verge between still asleep
and not yet wide awake, it is hardly conceivable to use this term in
abstraction from the body. Awareness in this sense always requires
_some_ minimal sensory input be it the rustle and bustle of the
household or the street noise, the ray of sun warming your cheek or
the cold draught giving you goose flesh, the itchiness of the blanket
on the prison bunk or the softness of the teddy, the pulsation of
blood in your veins, gravitation acting on your body, the smell of
oatmeal burning some impression must be there for you to talk of
awareness. You do mention awareness when you dispassionately
deliberate on Riemann hypothesis. This notion of self-awareness is
actually a crucial one in the field of robotics, as are embodiment and
multisensory integration.
Link to this
51. dancingwords
7:47 pm 05/30/2013
Im not a native speaker, so please excuse my clumsy way to
paraphrise thoughts.
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There is indeed a perspective and a major field for the embodied
cognition theory in the future. As its nowadays almost impossible
(or a clue for not beeing well informed) to deny the fact of mental
simulations while dealing with a concrete term or word (lets not
focus on the manner how its dealt with, like hearing, reading or
speaking), its almost impossible to explain the genesis and
treatment of abstract terms as well. And metaphores are partly
concrete and partly abstract, like a hybrid.
The more abstract a term is, the more lowers the mental simulation.
When we deal with a term like lemon fruit, almost (almost!) the
same neurons are shortly activated as when we actiually perceive a
lemon fruit, nevertheless these activations wont be conscious but
subconcious or something else. I like the metaphor neuronal
echoes. Of course, this perspective fits perfectly with the
sensualism and empirism of Locke and Hume, as its called ideas of
memory in opposition to impression or originary perceptions (in
husserls terminology). This almost might be the difference
between simply recording a caleidoscope of impressions coming
from an object and integrating these impressions in your mental
map, interpreting them instantly.
But what mirrorneurons or neuronal fields could be activated
while dealing with a word like freedom or health? How could such a
term be embodied? Either there is a seperate symbol language in
the mind or with a term like freedom comes a whole bunch of
neuronal activations, like the episodic memory, concepts of mankind
and living and so on (which are abstract themselves and activate
other conceptual maps, which have to activate others) But all at
the same time, within milliseconds? What pragmatic filters are there
and how does the brain decide which one to use in the context or
situation?
In other words: Is there a categorical difference between concrete
and abstract terms? Unlikely, because there are no borders but only a
continuum of abstraction. If abstract terms have their grounding in
embodied concrete terms, what means abstraction? What is that
operation the mind is capable of?
The answer might be the same as the one to the question, how
people with a perceptual handicap as deafness can be as intelligent
as others or even compensate this handicap: the human mind is
extremely powerful and can recombinate the material of impressions
creativly. As some people from other cultures might never
experience such a thing as a coconut, or have even seen a picture of
it, they can imagine such a thing, however it might look in their
inner world, just by recombinating the images of the fruits they
know.
As I for myself didnt know how a saphire looks since a week ago
(or Ive seen it and couldnt remember, I cant decide in this case), I
used this word several times in a conversation without having a
concrete image of it in my mind. A friend asks me then But how
did a saphire look for you then? And all I could answer was: Well,
like some jewellery, sparkling, pure, whatever I want to.
We can use terms of objects without the originary perceptions or
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impressions. And of course we can use terms of objects which dont
exist in the material world but only in our imagination or inner
world.
Abstract terms are by definition open or unfinished, which means
they can be filled individually like slots. Therefore, there is no such
thing as freedom or beauty, only similar, but different concepts of
freedom in every single subject. To say these concepts are embodied
means nothing else than the concepts are built by any individual
experience, by emotional introspection and affective perception of
the environment and recombinating these interpreted impressions.
This might be the key to the entire human evolution: the ability to
imagine things beyond our perceptions, but of course not without
other perceptions, things like mind, force, universe. This ability
might be called imagination, I prefer creative abstraction. But how
does the mind manage THAT? Its a miracle and maybe it should be.
Its the distinction between human beeings and artificial intelligence.
But the questions remains for the embodied cognition theory: How
does the mind deal with asbtract terms? Isnt it less neuronal
imaging, less a mental simulation, less understanding but more
feeling, anticipating, dancing around the meaning?
The fact that communications works sufficient has nothing to do
with the fact, that every subject has a different conceptual world
built in their minds. It only means that language is capable of
referring to these concepts and that they are in some kind not
entirely different.
Link to this
52. dancingwords
8:13 pm 05/30/2013
Oh and thanks a lot for the blog, Ive just fallen in love with the
embodiment perspective and devour anything I can find. It must
have been quite impressive to talk to Lakoff. Congratulations to that!
Link to this
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