Central African Republic Under The Seleka

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:
A COUNTRY IN THE HANDS

OF SELEKA WAR CRIMINALS
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Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore,
no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which
a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Article 3: Everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall
be prohibited in all their forms. Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
2 / Titre du rapport FIDH
Executive summary -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3
Introduction: An inevitable descent into chaos ----------------------------------------------------6
A State of emergencies -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------6
The Seleka rebellion --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8
Coup dtat of 24 March 2013 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10
Transitional framework -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
A tense political transition without a State ---------------------------------------------------------- 11
We have never experienced such violence -------------------------------------------------------- 11
FIDH fact-fnding mission ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12
I Country controlled by Seleka forces
Seleka: an obscure criminal force controlling the entire country -------------------------------- 14
Power in the hands of Seleka leaders ------------------------------------------------------------ 14
Organised and thriving international crime ----------------------------------------------------- 16
An abandoned population under Seleka control ---------------------------------------------------- 17
Defence and security forces absent --------------------------------------------------------------- 17
Inadequacies of the international communitys intervention measures ---------------------- 18
Limited mandate of the French Boali operation ------------------------------------------------ 20
II War crimes and serious human rights violations ------------------------------------------ 22
Murders, assassinations and shootings --------------------------------------------------------------- 22
Sexual crimes -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30
Abductions, confnements, ill-treatment and torture ----------------------------------------------- 31
Recruitment of minors --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
Burning of villages, widespread pillaging ----------------------------------------------------------- 33
Legal Classifcation ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
III Impunity for the most serious crimes ------------------------------------------------------ 42
A justice system affected by a ten-year crisis ------------------------------------------------------- 42
Selective and minimal justice ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43
Conclusion : A human rights roadmap is urgently needed ----------------------------------- 47
Recommendations ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 49
FIDH Central African Republic: A country in the hands of Seleka war criminals / 3
Executive summary
An FIDH international fact-fnding mission travelled to the Central African Republic (CAR)
between 3 and 13 July 2013. It established that the whole of the territory was still in the hands
of Seleka elements under the leadership of Central African, Chadian and Sudanese war lords,
several months after the rebel leaders had been installed in power. From the coup dtat to
the date of publication of this report, these Seleka elements, who were estimated in March
to number 5,000 and are believed to be three or four times that number, have committed the
gravest crimes which may be constitutive of international crimes against the civilian
population. The FIDH affrms that, given the current position relating to the undermining of
State services and the organising by the African Union of a mechanism to replace MICOPAX
with the setting up of the International Support Mission in the Central African Republic
(AFISM-CAR) (comprising elements of the Central African Multinational Force FOMAC),
the Central African population continues to live in considerable insecurity and the security of
the region is under threat.
While it has been diffcult since the regime of Franois Boziz was overturned on 24 March
2013 to measure the exact extent of the killings, following cross-checking of numerous pieces
of information, FIDH estimates that at least 400 murders have been committed by members of
the Seleka forces. During its mission, FIDH succeeded in gathering many testimonies about
civilians being shot dead. In particular, the mission focused on the killings on 28 June 2013 at
Gobongo, a neighbourhood of Bangui, where Seleka forces fred on a crowd of men, women and
children who were protesting at the assassination of a young man from their neighbourhood. At
least 6 civilians were killed and several dozens injured. Since the mission, other murders have
been carried out by Seleka elements, such as in the neighbourhood of Boy-Rabe in Bangui,
where at least ten people were killed on 20 August during a disarmament operation, and
also elsewhere in the provinces.
FIDH also confrms the high number of rapes committed by members of the Seleka forces in
Bangui. A reliable source recorded 82 cases of rape in the frst month following the arrival
of the rebels in the capital: a number which does not refect the gravity of the situation. In
addition, a large number of abductions of civilians by the Seleka were reported to members
of the mission, as well as cases of intimidation, abuse and arbitrary detention. The presence
of child soldiers in the ranks of the Seleka was also observed by FIDH.
FIDH also gathered testimony of villages being burned by Seleka forces. Along the Mbrs/
Kaga-Bandoro corridor travelled by the FIDH mission, 270 houses had been burned and 6
people killed in 6 villages by the Seleka on 14 April 2013 in reprisal for the murder of one
of their own.
Moreover, even though the countrys public and private assets were generally and systematically
looted in the days following the coup dtat for the rebels and war lords gain, the Seleka
forces, who have not been paid by those commanding them, continue robbing and racketeering
among the population.
FIDH is affrms that the crimes committed by the Seleka elements are done so with complete
impunity. In the provinces, where the Seleka hold absolute power and where the State is
4 / Central African Republic: A country in the hands of Seleka war criminals FIDH
entirely absent, security and justice are non-existent. In Bangui, at the time of the fact-fnding
mission, only 16 detention warrants had been confrmed by the state prosecutor. Those rare
Seleka elements actually arrested were for the most part confned to centres for disciplinary
training but escaped all forms of judicial process. Following protests from the international
community, a trial was begun against 24 members of the Seleka accused of criminal acts
during the Boy-Rabe killings in August 2013. It is very much an isolated example of criminal
proceedings given the extent of the violent acts committed throughout the country.
The Central African government is today incapable of protecting the population by re-esta-
blishing the forces of public law and order and by eliminating the impunity enjoyed by those
who commit the most serious crimes. The coffers are empty. At the time of the fact-fnding
mission, an institutional crisis centring on a charter for the transitional constitution was paraly-
sing the exercising of power, which was in tatters in Bangui and non-existent in the provinces.
The Head of State was seeking to establish his new-found powers and dismissed the powerful
rebel leader Dhaffane from the government, then illegally detained him.
In such circumstances, the MICOPAX forces and mandate were manifestly inadequate to ensure
the populations protection. The biggest contingent of its 1,000-strong force present in CAR
at the time of the fact-fnding mission was that from Chad, a fact which did not reassure the
population. There were just three provincial garrisons at Paoua, Kaga-Bandoro and Ndele with
far too limited a geographical sphere of operations. As regards the French soldiers from the
Boali operation, they were only patrolling Bangui and their mandate is restricted to ensuring
the security of the airport and French nationals. The deployment announced of a 3,650-strong
AFISM-CAR force to replace MICOPAX is welcomed by FIDH as a genuine effort by the
African Union to tackle the problem of CAR. But in the absence of any involvement by the
international community in its makeup, it cannot, in the current situation, meet the security
needs of the population.
Ensuring the protection of the population is an indispensable and urgent duty which cannot
be fulflled by the security measures currently in place. The civilian population has been aban-
doned and delivered into the hands of the Seleka criminal elements. The continuing anarchy
in the Central African Republic risks further undermining the country, exacerbating tensions
and preventing economic recovery, stated Eric Plouvier, member of the FIDH fact-fnding
mission. The presence of large numbers of weapons in CAR has, moreover, the potential to
destabilise security in the sub-region, he added.
FIDH is calling on the international community to place protecting the civilian population
at the top of its priorities concerning the situation in CAR. The United Nations and African
Union must support the setting up of AFISM-CAR, whose mandate and budget must be
capable of guaranteeing the population is protected throughout the country. This new force
must be accompanied by observers to ensure it fulfls its mandate in line with international
human rights law.
FIDH is calling on the international community to adopt sanctions against the Seleka leaders
and war lords, notably in the form of freezing their fnancial assets.
FIDH is calling for an effective operation to disarm the Seleka throughout the territory and to
re-establish the authority of the State throughout the whole country.
Given that eliminating the impunity of those who commit the most serious crimes is a prere-
quisite for security, FIDH is demanding that the International Criminal Court pay special
attention to and take particular action over the situation in CAR. The international community
and the government of the Central African Republic must also commit to putting in place a
specifc mixed jurisdiction which will allow perpetrators of crimes against international law
to be pursued and will thereby strengthen the national legal system.
Lastly, FIDH is calling on the transitional government authorities to guarantee respect for
international human rights law when setting up institutions, adopting legislation and imple-
menting policies.
Introduction:
An inevitable descent
into chaos
A State of emergencies
Factors contributing to chronic instability
Since 2001, the Central African Republic (CAR) has been experiencing extreme instability.
Attempted and actual coups dtat, offensives and counter-offensives carried out by armed
groups and the Central African Republic armed forces (FACA) have been accompanied by
serious human rights violations with the principal victims being the civilian population.
1

1. Cf. FIDH reports on serious human rights violations committed in CAR since 2001 (available on the FIDH website
at http://fdh.org/-Republique-centrafricaine,60-?id_mot=26):
- Dj-vu: Peace (dis)agreements that are detrimental to victims, December 2008
- Forgotten, stigmatised: the double suffering of victims of international crimes, October 2006
- Quelle justice pour les victimes de crimes de guerre ? [What justice for war crimes victims?], February 2004
- War Crimes in the Central African Republic, February 2003
- Discours et ralit : un foss bant [Discourse and reality: A yawning gap], February 2002
Multiple reasons are behind this chronic instability: elections cut short, lack of inclusive dialogue
with the opposition, poor governance, the non-existent authority of the State throughout the
territory, looting of natural resources, absence of an effective Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration (DDR) policy and real reform of the army and the security sector, failure
to protect fundamental freedoms and economic and social rights, impunity of perpetrators of
serious human rights violations and genuine carte blanche for them to be repeated.
Successive rebellions
Brought to power by a coup dtat in March 2003, President Boziz very quickly confronted rebel
movements in the northwest and northeast of the country: the Union des forces dmocratiques pour
le rassemblement (UFDR Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
2
), led by Damane Zakaria and
Michel Djotodia, and its allies in the Groupe daction patriotique pour la libration de Centrafrique
(GAPLC Patriotic Action Group for the Liberation of the Central Africa Republic), the Mouvement
des librateurs centrafricains pour la justice (MLCJ Movement of Central African Liberators for
Justice) and the Front dmocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC Central African Democratic
Front) headed by Abdoulaye Miskine. In 2006, fghting between the FACA and armed groups
intensifed to the extent that the French army and Chadian troops intervened in support of the regime.
Peace agreements and amnesties
On 2 February and 13 April 2007, the government signed peace agreements with the FDPC
and the UFDR respectively, providing for an amnesty for the rebels, a DDR programme and
the participation of militant political groups in managing the affairs of state.
But other rebel groups, such as the Arme populaire pour la restauration de la dmocratie
(APRD Peoples Army for the Restoration of Democracy), led by Jean-Jacques Demafouth,
and the Union des forces rpublicaines (UFR Republican Forces Union), led by Florian
Ndjadder, were still active in the northwest of the country.
On 9 May 2008, a ceasefre was signed between the government and the APRD. On 21 June 2008, a
peace agreement was signed between the government, the APRD and the UFDR which allowed for
the rehabilitation of soldiers dismissed from service, a DDR programme and a general amnesty law.
The Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP Convention of Patriots for
Justice and Peace), another rebel group, was created on 26 October 2008. This movement
originated in the Vakaga region in the northeast of the Central African Republic.
In December 2008, an inclusive political dialogue (comprising the democratic opposition, the armed
opposition, the presidential majority, public authorities, civil society and the group of centre parties)
recommended the setting up of a government of unity (formed in January 2009), legislative and
presidential elections in 2010 (which subsequently took place in 2011), the creation of a truth and
reconciliation commission (which has never seen the light of day) and reaffrmation of the process
to reform the security system.
2. The UFDR arose out of inter-ethnic confict in the north of the country. In 2002, the mayor of Birao, a member of the Gula ethnic
group, was assassinated by representatives of the Tacha ethnic group from Sudan. An alliance subsequently formed between the
Gula and Runga ethnic groups against the Tacha, before a confict arose that placed the two CAR ethnic groups in opposition. In
2005, the Gula called on the authorities in Bangui to negotiate with Sudan for compensation for the assassination of their mayor.
The Runga were excluded from the negotiations. In the absence of compensation despite the promises, the Gula formed the UFDR
and asked the Runga to join the movement. The latter refused. Confrontations then followed between the two ethnic groups and
in 2008 the armed CPJP group was formed, made up mainly of Runga from the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan.
Political tensions surrounding the 2011 presidential and legislative elections
At the general elections in January 2011, Franois Boziz was re-elected president in the frst round
with 64% of the votes. The results of the legislative elections excluded the opposition from the
National Assembly in favour of the presidential KNK party (kwa na kwa in Sango means work
and nothing but work). The opposition and civil society groups uncovered signifcant irregularities
in the election process, casting doubt on its credibility. The opposition responded by forming the
FARE 2011 coalition (Front pour lannulation et la reprise des lections Front supporting
annulling and rescheduling of the elections) and fresh tensions arose with the government in the
course of 2011, culminating in September 2012 in an agreement on electoral law reform and the
creation of a national authority for elections.
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process blocked
The DDR process has been blocked on numerous occasions since the 2008 peace agreements.
Re-launched in June 2011, it was making slow progress but doubts remained as to its effectiveness
given the small number of conventional weapons recovered and the absence of a real reintegration
plan for ex-fghters.
Attacks by the Lords Resistance Army
In September 2012, the Government placed 300 men at the service of the Regional Intervention Force
created by the African Union to counter the threat posed by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA),
led by Joseph Kony, under the terms of an international arrest warrant issued by the International
Criminal Court. These troops are based in Obo, in the Central African Republic prefecture of
Haut-Mbomou, where the Uganda Peoples Defence Force and military advisers from the United
States of America are also stationed.
According to a United Nations report
3
, in 2012, the LRA is believed to have carried out 48 attacks,
killing 24 people and abducting 85 others, some of whom were held for a short period, just long
enough for looted goods to be removed. An estimated 21,000 people have been displaced and
2,400 are refugees as a result of the LRAs activities in the Central African Republic.
The Seleka rebellion
August 2012 saw the opportunistic formation of the Seleka armed group (Seleka meaning
coalition or alliance in Sango), a gathering of rebel factions from several known militant
political movements and more recently created groups. Their shared objective is the effective
implementation of the 2007 and 2008 peace agreements. Following initial victories in the feld,
the movement became radicalised and transformed into a genuine rebellion, with its aim being
to overthrow President Franois Boziz.
Initial composition of the Seleka
At the end of 2012, at the time of the frst offensives, the Seleka comprised:
CPJP : The Convention, in its Seleka guise, is presided over by General Noureddine Adam,
who had nevertheless signed the 2008 Libreville peace agreement on 25 August 2012. The
3. The Secretary Generals report on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the activities of the United
Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Offce in the country, 21/12/12
movement essentially operated in the northeast. Its political wing was headed by the army
doctor Charles Massi, several times a minister, who died in unexplained circumstances a few
weeks after having been arrested at the border with Chad in 2010. His son, Eric Neris Massi,
during a broadcast on Radio France Internationale, gave the Seleka political ambitions by
calling for general Boziz to be overthrown.
UFDR : It was headed by Michel Am Nondroko Djotodia who was arrested with his spokes-
person Abakar Sabon by the Benin forces at the request of Bozizs government. They were
released in February 2008 after having agreed to take part in the peace agreements with the
Central African Republic government. He subsequently became consul in Nyala, capital of
South Darfur in Sudan. Founded in September 2006, the UFDR was essentially operating
in the Arab-speaking prefectures of Vagata and Haute Kotto in the northeast.
Some of the FDPC led by Abdoulaye Miskine. He and his men became known in 2002 as
back-up troops for the FACA in the fght against the Boziz rebels and are suspected of being
responsible for the massacre at the livestock market.
4
A further two, hitherto unknown, organisations joined these three: the Convention patriotique
du salut du kodro (CPSK Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country, kodro meaning
country in Sango, whose founder, Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane, became its president) and the
Alliance pour la renaissance et la refondation (A2R Alliance for Revival and Rebuilding), a
hitherto clandestine body which, on 18 March 2013, became the Mouvement pour la renaissance
et la refondation/Mouvement politique alternatif en RCA (M2R Movement for Revival and
Rebuilding/Alternative Political Movement in CAR), coordinated by Salvador Edjezekanne.
Initial offensives
On 10 December 2012, the Seleka rebel coalition launched a major armed offensive and rapidly
occupied the three main cities in the north and centre of the country to take up position in Sibut,
180 kilometres to the north of Bangui. The routed regular army was joined by reinforcements
from Cameroon, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville and Chad, serving alongside MICOPAX forces
(since 12 July 2008, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic
has been the responsibility of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). It
followed on from operation FOMUC, which was launched on 25 October 2002 by a decision of
CEMAC (Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community), and is made up of elements of the
Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) as well as troops from Uganda and South Africa.
Libreville agreement and setting up of the transitional government
On 11 January 2013, a statement of principle, ceasefre and political agreement to settle the
crisis were signed by the parties (Central African Republic government, representatives of
Seleka and the political opposition, in the presence of representatives of civil society), under
the auspices of ECCAS.
According to the terms of these:
President Franois Boziz would remain in power until the end of his mandate in 2016
A transitional government of national unity would be rapidly established for a pre-determined
period of 12 months and headed by an irrevocable prime minister from the opposition ranks
4. Cf. FIDH enquiry report: War Crimes in the central African Republic, February 2003.
The prime minister and other members of the government would not be eligible to stand as
candidates in the next presidential election
The role of the transitional government would notably be to organise upcoming legislative elections
The National Assembly would be dissolved and the legislative elections organised within
twelve months
An immediate ceasefre would be implemented which would be monitored by the intervention forces
The rebels would have to leave the towns and cities seized during the fghting
The departure of foreign troops was announced, with the exception of the FOMAC/MICOPAX forces
On 17 January, Nicolas Tiangaye (member of the political opposition, lawyer and former
president of the Central African League of Human Rights) was appointed prime minister.
Since the withdrawal of the Seleka rebel coalition from Damara (90 km north of Bangui) on
3 March, seven locations remain under their control: Kaga-Bandoro, Sibut, Alindao, Ndl,
Bria, Bambari and Soamoandja.
Coup dtat of 24 March 2013
Condemning the slow implementation of the provisions of the Libreville agreement (particularly
relating to the release of one political prisoner at a time and the continued presence of South
African troops), the Seleka rebel forces launched an assault on the capital. After a day of heavy
fghting on the outskirts of the city, the rebels entered Bangui virtually unopposed and took over
the presidential palace and the headquarters of national radio/television. On 24 March, President
Franois Boziz fed to Cameroon. Michel Djotodia set himself up as the presidents successor.
He announced his intention to suspend the constitution of 27 November 2004, to dissolve the
National Assembly and the government, though confrming the prime minister in his position,
and to lead a period of transition that would culminate in free, credible and transparent elections.
On 13 April 2013, Michel Djotodia was elected President of the Republic to acclaim and
applause at the frst session of the National Transitional Council.

Transitional framework
The ECCAS heads of state met on Thursday 18 April in NDjamena to establish a road map
for the new political transition in the Central African Republic. They agreed to renew the
Libreville agreements to provide a guideline for the new government. The new executive
of the Central African Republic, the President Michel Djotodia and Prime Minister Nicolas
Tiangaye saw the National Transitional Council increased from 105 to 135 members (with
effect from 12 May 2013), a measure which was imposed on them and designed to ensure the
concerns of the whole of the countrys civil and political society were represented. ECCAS
then decided to increase the FOMAC/MICOPAX forces from around 600 soldiers and police
to 2,000 men to re-establish order in Bangui and the rest of the country. At the summit, the
self-proclaimed president was recognised by Central African leaders. (At the time of publishing
this report, the president still has not been recognised by the African Union and the rest of the
international community.)
While the road map does include the issue of the populations security, it is worth pointing
out that it makes virtually no provision for protecting human rights, something which plays
a crucial role in conficts prevention and resolution. The ECCAS heads of state have not, in
fact, made any reference to the importance of rapidly re-establishing the rule of law, respect
for fundamental freedoms and the key factor of removing the impunity enjoyed by those
responsible for the most serious crimes.
A tense political transition without a State
The new government of the Central African Republic is managing a country where the autho-
rity of the State is virtually non-existent. This was the case prior to the Seleka offensive and
today it is even worse. As the Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, stressed to members of the
FIDH fact-fnding mission, There is no State. The national army has melted away. There is
no policing by forces of law and order. Its anarchy. In the provinces, there are no longer any
teachers or magistrates.
The States coffers are empty. They were reportedly looted by the Boziz regime before his
enforced departure and no further subsidy has been paid since the coup dtat, as a result of
pillaging by the Seleka forces and their grip on the country. Only the development and aid
programmes agreed by the international community, particularly the European Union (20
million in emergency aid provided by the EU to the Central African Republic since the start
of the year), enable the minimum of economic activity to be maintained. It is the Republic
of Congo and its President Sassou Nguesso who enabled CAR civil servants to obtain two
months outstanding salary in July 2013. This external support, however essential it is to the
population, has so far had no conditions attached, particularly as regards respect for human
rights, in a country where corruption and looting seem to undermine any guarantee of the
funds being used effectively for the beneft of the citizens.
Without funds of its own, it is diffcult for the government to implement a policy of reconstruc-
tion by extending the States authority over the whole country. According to partners present
in Bangui, the president has no general overall policy. His only political action seems to be
motivated by a desire to consolidate his power to satisfy his entourage, family, ethnic group
and the leaders of armed militias who have secured him his post. This attitude is paralysing
the ability of the Executive to exercise power by placing numerous obstacles in the way of
any action by the prime minister.
We have never experienced such violence
In the opinion of all stakeholders encountered during the FIDH fact-fnding mission to CAR
political and religious authorities, diplomats, humanitarian workers and representatives of
civil society the Central African Republic has never before known the level of violence
and insecurity it has been experiencing since the beginning of the year. The armed confict
between the forces loyal to the government and the Seleka rebels prior to the coup dtat
violated international humanitarian and human rights law. Since the coup dtat of 24 March
2013, Seleka elements have been in control of the entire country and have committed serious
violations of human rights, which may qualify as crimes under international law as well as
crimes under the terms of the Central African Republics Penal Code and the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court ratifed by CAR. Elements of the Seleka forces are making
themselves effectively responsible for murders, assassinations, abductions, arbitrary arrests
and detentions, abuse and torture, sexual crimes, forced recruitment of minors, armed robbery,
systematic and general looting and destruction of property.
FIDH fact-nding mission
The FIDH international fact-fnding mission was present in CAR between 3 and 13 July 2013.
It comprised Eric Plouvier, lawyer at the Paris Bar and on special assignment with FIDH,
Roch Euloge Nzobo, executive director of the Congolese Observatory for Human Rights
(OCDH Congo-Brazzaville) and Marceau Sivieude, FIDH Deputy Director of Operations
and Director of the Africa Desk of the International Secretariat. The mission worked in Bangui,
the capital, and in the prefecture of Nana-Grbizi along the Kaga-Bondoro/Mbrs corridor.
The main objective of the mission was to shed light on the serious acts of violence committed
by the Seleka, to establish responsibility and to envisage a road map for human rights for the
authorities and the international community, which would facilitate protection of the civilian
population, eliminate the impunity enjoyed by those who responsible for the most serious
crimes and consolidate the rule of law.
The members of the mission managed throughout their assignment to gather the testimonies of
victims or the families of victims of serious violations of human rights. FIDH, in accordance
with the wishes of those concerned, has chosen to preserve their anonymity to guarantee their
safety.
FIDH would like to thank the representatives of the Organisation pour la compassion et le
dveloppement des familles en dtresse (OCODEFAD Organisation for the Compassion and
Development of Families in Distress) and the Ligue centrafricaine des droits de lHomme
(LCDH Central African League of Human Rights), member organisations of FIDH, for their
important support in the work to establish the facts.
Furthermore, FIDH would like to thank the United Nations as well as MICOPAX, its mana-
gement in Bangui and its Congolese contingent in Kaga-Bandoro for having made it possible
for its mission members to carry out their work safely in the north of the country.
In addition, the mission members were able to meet with the following individuals:
- Prime Minister, Mr Nicolas Tiangaye
- State Prosecutor, Mr Alain Tolmo
- Central African Anti-crime Offce, Commander Mahamat Said Abdel Kain
- FOMAC, Brigadier General and Commander of FOMAC, Mr Jean-Flix Akaga; Chief of
Staff for the Armed Forces, Colonel Ngoie A-M Prosper; Chief of the Military Cabinet, Mr
Maurice Ntossui Ambassador of France, Mr Serge Mucetti
- Cooperation Attach in the Department for Cooperation and Cultural Affairs at the French
Embassy, Mr Xavier Henaut
- Central African Red Cross, National President, Mr Antoine Mbao Bogo
- Head of department for managing disasters and coordinating search and rescue, Mr Jean
Moise Modessi-Waguedo
- Community Hospital, Director, Romain Guitinzia
- Friendship Hospital, Dr Rock Mbetide
- European Union, Ambassador, Head of Delegation, Mr Guy Samzun
- United Nations, Offce for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Deputy Head, Mr Abdulaye
Sawadogo
- Organisation for the Compassion and Development of Families in Distress, President, Mrs
Bernadette Sayo
- Central African League of Human Rights, President, Mr Joseph Bindoumi; and several
Bureau members
- Central African Observatory for Human Rights (OCDH), President of Executive Council,
Mr Mathias Barthlemy Morouba; second Vice-president, Mr Albert Panda
- Movement for the Defence of Human Rights and Humanitarian Action, President, Mr Adolphe
Ngouyombo Yarakpa
- NGO network for the promotion and defence of human rights, General Secretary, Mr Anicet
Thierry Goue Moussangoe

FIDH thanks all these people for making themselves available to meet with members of the
fact-fnding mission.
I. Country controlled by
Seleka forces
Despite the presence of the international forces of FOMAC and from South Africa and the peace
agreements signed under the auspices of ECCAS, the Seleka rebels entered the capital and overthrew
the regime of Franois Boziz. The ex-leaders of the rebels now hold power, the presidency and
key posts in the government of national unity. Their men are deployed throughout the country.
FIDH focused one aspect of its inquiry on studying how the Seleka has organised itself since the
coup dtat and on the level of protection of the population, both in Bangui and the provinces, in
the face of these armed elements.
Seleka: an obscure criminal force controlling the entire country
Power in the hands of Seleka leaders
Seleka in power
Proclaiming himself president the day following the coup dtat on 25 March 2013, Michel
Djotodia, head of the UFDR, one of the rebel factions making up the Seleka, waited until 13 April
to see himself elected by acclamation by the National Transitional Council. He was subsequently
recognised by his peers in Central Africa as the head of the Central African Republic.
In accordance with the Libreville and Ndjamena agreements, Michel Djotodia confrmed from
the moment he took power that he would keep Nicolas Tiangaye in his post as prime minister and
called for the formation of a new government of national unity. This was formed on 31 March.
The most important posts were given to other leaders of the armed groups making up the Seleka.
Thus, of the 34 members, 9 were from the rebel coalition: Michel Djotodia, in addition to his
role as head of state was appointed Minister for Defence; Noureddine Adam, leader of the CPJP
armed group, was made Minister for Security; Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane, leader of the CPSK
group, was appointed Minister of Water and Forests; Gontran Djono was appointed Minister of
Mining and Christophe Gazam Betty Minister of Communication. A ministerial reshuffe took
place on 13 June 2013 which saw these ministers remaining in the same posts.
According to their functions, the head of state and some former rebel leaders are thus responsible
for the defence and security of the country.

The power of the Seleka leaders over their men
As the Seleka is a coalition of armed groups, each group leader exercised authority over his men.
Now that the coup dtat has been accomplished, the allegiance of the Seleka elements to individual
leaders remains a reality, as the FIDH mission members were able to verify. Thus, the commander
in charge of the Central African Anti-Crime Offce who met with the mission said he was one of
Noureddines men and had been put in offce by him. The colonel who leads the Seleka from Mbrs
and who was met by the mission also said that he followed his leader Noureddine. According to
several people who spoke with FIDH, each zone leader (or com-zone) in Bangui answers to a
particular leader of one of the Seleka militias. This obedience was also verifed when Dhaffane
was arrested and his men had withdrawn from Bangui beforehand, as they waited to see how the
situation with their leader would develop.
Yet, in the face of the serious security problem in the country, the president himself claims
that he is confronting Seleka elements who are out of control. While one can imagine that the
president and the other war leaders do not exercise authority directly over all Seleka elements,
the presidents declarations tend, on the other hand, to confrm that the head of state or one of
the rebel leaders can exercise control over some Seleka elements.
Pourtant, face au grave problme dinscurit dans le pays, le prsident lui-mme affrme quil
fait face des lments incontrls de la Slka. Si on peut imaginer que lautorit du prsident
ou des autres chefs de guerre ne sexerce pas directement sur lensemble des lments Slka,
contrario, les dclarations du prsident tendent confrmer quil existe bien des lments contrls
de la Slka sur lesquels le chef dEtat, ou un des chefs rebelles, peut exercer son pouvoir.
A president greedy for greater powers
According to the letter and spirit of the peace agreements, the transitional presidency was considered
an honorifc position. But Michel Djotodia, urged on by his partisans, does not seem to perceive it
as such and has, since frst taking over the role, attempted to acquire absolute power. The political
crisis surrounding the vote at the beginning of July by the National Transitional Council on the
Transitional Constitutional Charter intended to establish the transitional institutional framework
illustrates this perfectly. President Michel Djotodia opposed the initial text put forward by the
Council, which required any decision of the Executive signed by the president to be countersigned
by the prime minister. The president even attempted to put forward a new draft Charter to counter
the proposal and to introduce a motion of censure against the prime minister, when the latter could
not be dismissed from his post during the transitional period, as set out in the Libreville agreements.
While the initial framing of the Charter was fnally adopted by the Council, it was not certain at the
time of the mission that, despite the efforts of representatives of the international community, the
president would agree to bow to the text of the Charter, which he had eventually signed on 18 July.
While the battle for increased power is playing out at an institutional level, several events
demonstrate that it is also being played out between the different Seleka leaders.
Once in power, the head of state reached out to Abdoulaye Miskine, leader of the FDPC,
calling on him to return to Bangui. Miskine for a time had rallied to the Seleka coalition before
distancing himself due to differences of opinion. Following his refusal, Seleka elements
launched an attack against the FDPC rebels between 2 and 4 April 2013, killing numerous
militiamen and, according to some reports, wounding their leader.
The Central African Minister of Communication, Gazam Betty, announced on 30 June 2013 that the
Minister of Water and Forests, Mohamed Dhaffane, leader of the CPSK, one of the armed militias which
make up the Seleka, had been dismissed from his post and arrested the previous day. His brother had
also been arrested. According to the Minister of Communications public statement, Everything points
to General Dhaffane recruiting mercenaries and buying weapons [] it is not known for what purpose.
In addition, these mercenaries are committing acts which are out of control and tarnishing the image of
the president. Minister Dhaffane has been arrested and placed in custody while his house is searched.
According to information gathered by the members of the mission, Dhaffanes arrest is believed to have
taken place within the confnes of Roux camp, where the head of state resides. A meeting between the
two men reportedly went badly and the president then demanded that his guard arrest Dhaffane. Some
of those who spoke to the FIDH mission members suggested that the president had reacted badly to the
ministers statements on national radio and Radio France Internationale (RFI), calling for a meeting of
Seleka leaders to settle the security issue. A number of them had invested serious ambitions in Dhaffane
who had the potential to overshadow the presidents authority. This interpretation of events could explain
the speed of his arrest and detention, carried out illegally. (cf. Part III).
Organised and thriving international crime
International crime
In President Djotodias estimation, the Seleka war commanders were accompanied by 5,000
men when they entered Bangui on 24 March. It is worth pointing out that some of these men
did not stop in the capital but continued on their way to other prefectures, such as Lobaye,
with the aim of taking control of the whole territory.
According to the president, Seleka forces numbered 20,000 at the end of June and were spread
across the country. This increase is explained by individuals with no occupation rallying to the
Seleka cause, attracted by money and power. Testimonies gathered by the mission members mention
the enlisting, in what is sometimes described as spontaneous fashion, of young men from the
sub-region when the Seleka forces were transporting the loot taken from their towns and villages
to Chad, Sudan and South Sudan and to the north of CAR.
From what the members of the CAR fact-fnding mission were able to establish, the Seleka militias
comprise many nationalities. They describe themselves as Chadian, Central African and Sudanese.
Some speak neither Sango (the language spoken throughout CAR) nor French. Young boys and men
aged between 8 and 25 years (the Seleka include large numbers of child soldiers, cf. Part II), they
are heavily armed with submachine guns, guns, grenades and knives. In Bangui, they have a large
number of pick-up trucks, recognisable by daubs of paint and slogans such as sen fou la mort
[death doesnt give a damn], which carry submachine guns mounted on tripods, rocket launchers
and rockets. In the small villages, many use motorbikes. The Selekas attire is ill-assorted: combats,
former FACA uniforms, civilian gear, cheches or bare-headed, military footwear, trainers or sandals.

Com-zones
Members of the FIDH mission were able to confrm that the Seleka forces are organised by
zone or district, with each Seleka group having control over a limited territory. These different
groups seem to be fairly independent from each other. The groups, comprising between a
few to one hundred people, are led by com-zones, most of them taking the rank of colonel.
Captains are often to be found below them in the hierarchy.
Thus, talk may be heard in Bangui of troops belonging to Colonel Bichara, one of Noureddine
Adams men; of Colonel Mahamat Saleh, whose troops are said to form a regiment and support
service; and at the rescue services camp of General Moussa (a Sudanese according to the population).
At Bossangoa, the Seleka are under the leadership of Colonel Youssouf Amath. At Kaga-Bondoro,
where the mission travelled to, the com-zone is Colonel Abderhamane, a Chadian (according to
the population) who speaks neither Sango nor French and who is in charge of almost 100 Seleka.
The small group of Seleka in Mbrs
On 9 and 10 July 2013, the mission members travelled along the route from Kaga-Bondoro
to Mbrs. In Mbrs, they were received by 8 Seleka members who were well-armed young
men. There were reportedly 14 of them controlling the town and the roadblock in particular.
They had taken over the gendarmerie headquarters as their offce. The men were led by a
colonel, a tall, slender fgure measuring 1m90cm and with a slightly haggard air. He carried 4
small grenades clipped to his belt and a gun in a holster. He spoke Arabic and the inhabitants
called him the Sudanese. He reportedly took part in seizing Bangui before being placed
in this town. His deputy was a captain aged 25 who had been in Mbrs for 2 months. This
group also included an ex-FACA Red Beret who still wore the army uniform. The leader
confrmed to the FIDH mission members that they were not being paid by their superiors.
According to the inhabitants of neighbouring villages, the Mbrs roadblock made a great
deal of money for the Seleka. Money is extorted on the basis of the following rates:
- 250 CFA francs to pass on foot
- 500 CFA francs to pass on a bike
- 1000 CFA francs to pass in a vehicle
According to one testimony recorded by the mission members, the director of the hospital
in the town of Mbrs was killed by the Seleka as he tried to prevent the buildings solar
panels being stolen.
An abandoned population under Seleka control
Defence and security forces absent
The defence and security forces (the Central African armed forces [FACA] and the gendar-
merie), although French-trained and the object of a reform programme supported by FOMAC
(later MICOPAX) and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Offce in the Central African Republic
(BINUCA), have always been disliked by successive regimes in CAR. Perceived as a potential
threat to power, the countrys leaders have often penalised or prosecuted the generals and under-
mined their forces. Indeed, former presidents Ange-Flix Patass and Franois Boziz, being
mistrustful of their army, preferred to rely for their security on a presidential guard made up of
Chadian elements, French or Congolese mercenaries and additional Central African soldiers.
Franois Bozizs attitude towards the FACA in the midst of an all-out offensive by the Seleka
is therefore unsurprising: fearing mutiny in the ranks, the ex-president attacked the FACA on
several occasions, notably during his public speeches on 31 December 2012 and 8 March 2013,
accusing them of treason in the face of the enemys breakthrough. This is also the reason why
Boziz called on South African forces to try to counter the Selekas advance. This umpteenth
humiliation, the military collapse and the arrival of the Seleka in the capital pushed the Central
African Republics forces of law and order to desert their posts.
As the prime minister pointed out during his interview with FIDH, there is no longer an army
or police force in CAR. All have deserted the barracks in which the Seleka are now squatting
and not one has responded to the handful of media appeals made by the generals asking them
to return to their posts. As the mission observed more than three months after the coup dtat,
they are absent from the streets of Bangui and the various provincial towns and cities visited
by the mission. Many are still fearful for their safety. They were particularly targeted by the
rebellion. Ex-FACA soldiers have in fact been killed since 24 March, although it is not possible
to ascertain whether or not this was because of their status (cf. testimony of the murder of a
FACA soldier, Part II). They hide at home or have temporarily relocated. Many FACA offcers
took refuge in the MPoko camp which is the MICOPAX base. A delegation from the Central
African League of Human Rights visited the place and met with fve generals on 6 June 2013.
As MICOPAX wished them to leave the base to make room for the additional contingents
expected, the generals demanded that their security be assured before any departure.
There is, according to estimates by the French Embassy, a fairly able reserve force of between 4,000 and
5,000 men who could be assigned to protect the population when the Seleka are disbanded, disarmed
and helped to reintegrate. The idea, shared by certain authorities, of integrating Seleka elements into
the defence and security forces can only be viable if it includes genuine vetting, namely the excluding
of any individuals from this process believed to have committed human rights violations.
Inadequacies of the international communitys intervention measures
The Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) was
an essential but inadequate component of measures to protect the population at the time of
the FIDH mission. MICOPAX is to be replaced by the Support Mission to the Central African
Republic (AFISM-CAR), following a decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union on 19 July 2013.
Answering to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), MICOPAX,
which is a mission of the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC), offcially replaced
the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) on 12 July 2008, which was
itself created on 2 October 2002 by the Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community
(CEMAC). Benefting from EU fnancial support and French logistical support, MICOPAX was
mandated to consolidate the climate of peace and stability, to assist development of the political
process as a way of promoting human rights, to coordinate humanitarian aid and to take part in
the fght to eradicate HIV/AIDS. Its mandate was amended in 2013 to include implementing the
Libreville agreements between the Central African government and the Seleka rebel coalition.
The MICOPAX, South African and, to a lesser extent FACA troops, for some time prevented
the Seleka rebels from advancing on Bangui by organising buffer zones in Bambari and Sibut.
Some observers put forward the theory that, exasperated at a lack of willingness on the part
of President Boziz to implement the Libreville agreements, the ECCAS heads of state asked
MICOPAX to allow the rebels to pass through, thus enabling them to reach Bangui.
At the time of the mission, MICOPAX was made up of the following personnel: Gabon: 120;
Cameroon: 120; Chad: 442; Congo Brazzaville: 150 + 150 policemen; HQ staff: 28, making
a total of around 1,000 people. Just over 300 additional soldiers were expected (150 from
Gabon and 180 from Cameroon). Based in Bangui, MICOPAX had three units deployed in
Kaga-Bandoro, Paoua and Ndele.
Following its fact-fnding mission, FIDH was of the view that both the mandate and staffng
levels of MICOPAX were inadequate given the developments in the situation in CAR. Although
competent forces appreciated by the population (with the exception of the Chadian contingent,
cf. below), they could not in the circumstances guarantee the populations safety.
The MICOPAX mandate was based on peace-building and was thus unsuited to the new
circumstances following the coup dtat and the presence of heavily armed Seleka militias
throughout the territory. The mandate, which was overly vague, did not permit an optimum
response to the challenges brought about by this situation.
As regards MICOPAX staffng levels, a diplomat encountered by FIDH in Bangui stated that
before the coup dtat, security in the capital was provided by around 2,000 state and local
police offcers. In July, MICOPAX forces numbered around 700 in Bangui in what was a much
less secure environment.
For all that, MICOPAX was doing what it could in Bangui. As the members of the FIDH
mission were able to observe, it organised many highly visible patrols in the capital. It
successfully apprehended individuals civilian and Seleka accused of violent crimes and
delivered them to the Central African Anti-crime Offce. The killings in the neighbourhood
of Gobondo (cf. below) on 28 June 2013, during which 6 people lost their lives, provided
an opportunity for the MICOPAX commander to bang his fst on the table at the authorities.
In an emergency meeting with the president and all the Seleka generals, he reportedly
explained that the situation was about to degenerate into civil war if nothing changed. As a
result of this meeting, an operation was launched to force elements of the Seleka to disarm
and the idea was proposed of combined MICOPAX/Seleka patrols in the capital. However,
during the FIDH mission, many pick-up trucks still paraded around the city, flled with
heavily armed Seleka militiamen.
Outside the capital, MICOPAX was to be found in just three locations, although human
rights violations are being committed throughout the country (cf. Part II). And according to
information collected by the mission members, the MICOPAX contingents based in these
locations rarely conduct patrols beyond a 20 km radius of the base, leaving the inhabitants of
more remote villages completely at the mercy of the Seleka groups. In Kaga-Bandoro, where
the FIDH mission travelled to, the inhabitants of the town and the humanitarian workers there
were satisfed with the efforts of the MICOPAX troops. But it was clear that its numbers and
sphere of operations were totally inadequate and even useless for guaranteeing the security
of the population in the provinces.
Another problem lay in the quality of the MICOPAX troops. The citizens were not reassured
by the presence in large numbers (almost half the total number) of the Chadian contingent.
Indeed many testimonies reported collusion in acts including criminal acts between the
MICOPAX Chadians and the Chadian elements in the Seleka. This situation sometimes had
grave consequences: a Chad soldier with MICOPAX, who was out of uniform and riding his
motorbike in a neighbourhood of Bangui, was lynched and murdered by the population as he
was taken for a Seleka on a stolen vehicle. Furthermore, testimonies, which were confrmed
at the highest level of MICOPAX, time and again revealed that elements of MICOPAX were
reportedly making money from their mission by offering protection to private homes and
businesses.
Lastly, those interviewed by the FIDH mission pointed out MICOPAXs operational budget
was not suffcient to enable it to fulfl its mission properly.
In view of this situation, the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
of 19 July 2013 to replace MICOPAX by AFISM-CAR is welcomed by FIDH as a genuine
effort by the continent to respond to the situation of insecurity in CAR.
This mission, which will be deployed for an initial period of six months, is mandated to contribute
to: (i) protecting civilians and restoring security and public order by implementing appropriate
measures; (ii) stabilising the country and restoring the authority of the Central African State;
(iii) reforming and restructuring the defence and security sector; and (iv) creating conditions
favourable to delivering humanitarian aid to the populations in need. It will have a total staff
of 3,652, 3,500 in uniform (2,475 military personnel and 1,025 police) and 152 civilians.
Given the observations made above, FIDH does not believe that AFISM-CAR can claim, in
the current situation, to entirely satisfy the populations security requirements. The appeal
launched by the AU to the United Nations for fnancial and logistical support for AFISM-
CAR points to the fact that the planned mechanism and mandate cannot be fully implemented
without some contribution from the international community as a whole. In particular, there
will need to be an increase in the size of the military, police and civilian contingents to enable
their deployment throughout the entire country. Furthermore, no element of the AFISM-CAR
mandate relates to protecting human rights and consolidating the rule of law, and yet these are
essential for creating stability and building sustainable peace. FIDH also believes that such a
mission must be accompanied by an independent mechanism responsible for issuing public
reports on the implementing of AFISM-CARs mandate, in line with international humanitarian
law and human rights.
Limited mandate of the French Boali operation
There has been a French presence in CAR since 2002 as part of operation Boali. This was
intended to provide logistical, administrative, technical and, if required, operational support
to MICOPAX. In addition, the French soldiers undertake training of Central African forces
(FACA), while retaining the capacity to ensure the safety of French nationals should the
situation demand it.
5

It is precisely such a situation, linked to the Seleka offensive in December 2012, which led to
the deployment in Bangui of more than 300 French soldiers despatched from Gabon to reinforce
the 250-strong contingent already in the capital and to guarantee the safety of French citizens,
French diplomatic assets and MPoko airport. At the end of January 2013, these reinforcements
were stood down only to return at the end of March, on the eve of the coup dtat. Some of
these additional personnel have since left. Therefore at the end of June 400 French soldiers
were deployed in CAR.
During the coup dtat, the French in fact confned themselves to securing the airport and the
diplomatic assets, which prompted a few exchanges of fre with Seleka militias. Ensuring the
safety of the French citizens was, judging solely from their testimony, a much more compli-
cated exercise.
Since the coup dtat, French armoured vehicles have regularly patrolled the city, as the
5. French Ministry of Defence website: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres-operations/operation-boali-rca/
actualites/republique-centrafricaine-deploiement-de-moyens-supplementaires
members of the mission observed. This activity affords the Bangui population reassurance.
While the size of the operation Boali forces and the extent of its mandate are not enough to
guarantee the safety of the Central African population, FIDH considers it important that French
soldiers support the AFISM-CAR operations, particularly the disbanding and disarming of
Seleka in the capital, in addition to safeguarding their fellow citizens.
II. War crimes and serious
human rights violations
Between December 2012 and 23 March 2013, fghting between the forces loyal to President
Boziz and the Seleka rebels took place in violation of international law, with each camp being
potentially held responsible for serious violations of human rights and international huma-
nitarian law. On occasion, these acts could be classed as crimes under international law. The
primary victims were the civilian populations and FIDH has gathered testimonies to this effect.
In the current situation in which the Central African population is being systematically bled
dry by the Seleka given the absence of an adequate national and international force of public
order, the FIDH fact-fnding mission focused on what observers say is an unprecedented level
of serious human rights violations committed in CAR by Seleka militias since they arrived in
the capital and took control of the entire country.

Murders, assassinations and shootings
While it has been diffcult since the overthrow of the regime on 24 March 2013 to measure the
exact scale of such incidents, FIDH has managed to cross-check information which reveals that
at least 400 murders have been committed by the Seleka. This undoubtedly underestimates the
scale of the crimes. The number of people shot and wounded totals more than one thousand.
A - Bangui in the month following the coup dtat
According to information gathered by mission members, on 23 March 2013, during the rebel
offensive on Bangui, the Seleka troops reportedly met with a certain degree of resistance
several kilometres from the capital. In contrast, on 24 March the rebels apparently entered
Bangui without any real opposition as the FACA had deserted their posts, MICOPAX did not
respond and the French troops limited themselves to securing the airport.
And yet, the witness statements and statistics gathered by FIDH show that this arrival in Bangui
and the days which followed were accompanied by violence and the shooting and killing or
wounding of numerous civilians, as well as by accidents caused by rebel vehicles driven at
speed along the streets of the capital. It is therefore clear that the Seleka troops, even though
their leaders had seized power and they were themselves facing no opposing forces, were
guilty of murdering and assassinating civilians.

Statistics kept by the Central African Red Cross between 23 March and 30 April 2013 are
instructive in this regard.
Location Wounded Dead
National headquarters 864 163
1st District 11 07
2nd District 12 05
3rd District 31 04
4th District 36 25
5th District 22 16
6th District 12 05
7th District 57 11
8th District 04 20
Begoua 12 27
Bimbo 22 23
Total 1083 306
According to the Central African Red Cross, not all the deaths during this period were recorded.
And, according to the organisations president, virtually all those that were recorded are of
civilians: The Seleka prefer to recover the bodies of their troops themselves to throw them into
wells in particular, as a way of demonstrating they are invincible in the face of the enemy.
The list of admissions to the community hospital (one of the hospitals in Bangui with a trauma
unit) between 22 March and 24 April is also an instructive source of information.
Date Number
of injured
recorded
With bullet
wound
Hospitalised Deceased in
hospital
Body deposited
in the morgue
22/03/2013 09 9 2 0 0
24/03/2013 83 83 44 5 20
25/03/2013 53 53 16 - -
26/03/2013 30 30 11 5 5
27/03/2013 34 11 1 3
28/03/2013 37 11 1 0 -
29/03/2013 29 7 - - -
30/03/2013 45 32 - 2 1
31/03/2013 25 2 2 - 3
1er/04/2013 28 5 5 0 1
2/04/2013 18 5 5 0 0
3/04/2013 15 8 1 0 0
4/04/2013 15 6 1 0 0
5/04/2013 24 8 3 1 0
6/04/2013 28 5 8 0 0
7/04/2013
20 inc.
15 Seleka
4 2 1 0
8/04/2013 14 6 1 0 0
9/04/2013 13 3 0 1 0
10/04/2013 18 5 8 0 0
11/04/2013 23 17 (11 children) 3 2 0
12/04/2013 15 4 3 2 0
13/04/2013 30 11 8 2 5
14/04/2013 52 30 16 6 7
15/04/2013 15 5 6 2 2
Date Number
of injured
recorded
With bullet
wound
Hospitalised Deceased in
hospital
Body deposited
in the morgue
16/04/2013 21 9 10 1 0
17/04/2013 7 3 5 0 0
18/04/2013 6 1 1 1 1
19/04/2013 12 8 3 1 0
20/04/2013 9 1 0 1 0
21/04/2013 13 4 2 0 0
22/04/2013 24 8 7 1 1
23/04/2013 15 5 6 1 0
24/04/2013 19 4 4 1 2
Total 805 403 176 30 48
Detailed fgures supplied by the community hospital show that, for this same period, 272
people were injured as a result of being hit by a vehicle. These vehicles belonged to the Seleka
according to several testimonies.
A written testimony received by the Central African League gives an account of the violence with
which the Seleka entered the capital: According to Mr X, his son, Y, aged 34 and father of 10
children, was recruited by Mr M to ensure the security of two shops situated [], in view of the
rebel offensive on Bangui. To carry this out, Y was given the sum of 5,000 CFA francs to share
with other recruits. At 7:30 pm on 24 March 2013, according to the father, Seleka forces took over
the neighbourhood, shooting at anything that moved. His son was hit by a bullet and was taken to
the community hospital. Attached to the letter is a statement from the doctor on duty who confrms
the arrival of Y in hospital on 25 March 2013 and his death on 30 March as a result of a gunshot
wound to his head caused by a bullet which penetrated his skull and removed part of his brain.

A church shelled
During the interview with the director of the community hospital, FIDH was alerted to
the bloodshed which took place on 14 April 2013, when two shells fell on a church during
mass in the Cit Jean XXIII church in the fourth district of Bangui. The community hospital
recorded 3 deaths and 43 injured in the wake of this incident.
In Bangui from May to August 2013
Civilian murders and assassinations continued to be regularly committed by Seleka militiamen.
From information gathered, these murders and killings were committed during looting, racke-
teering and disarmament operations, and also targeted former agents of public order or were
carried out in reprisal for protests by the population.
The FIDH mission members heard numerous testimonies of cases of abduction by Seleka
forces. While some individuals were released a day or so after being abducted (cf. Part II. 2),
others were found dead in the hospital morgues. Witness statements have also told of execution
sites several kilometres from Bangui, where bodies were reportedly thrown in a river. The
members of the mission were not able to verify this information.
A family member of Corporal N, alias M, provided the Central African League of Human
Rights with a written account of the latters abduction and death. Born on 23 June 1985 in
Bangui, M, who had 6 children, lived in the Combattant quarter. M received a telephone call
from an individual who introduced himself as his two-man team partner and asked him to
meet opposite the town hall in the eighth district. Once there, he was seized and abducted by
the heavily armed Seleka who departed in two vehicles, one a car with registered plates and
the other a BJ 75 pick-up truck. He was taken away, having been beaten with rife butts in front
of several witnesses. After a search, the body of M was found in the morgue at the community
hospital where it had been deposited by the Central African Red Cross.
During its mission, FIDH focused particularly on the killings in the neighbourhood of Gobongo,
where Seleka forces fred on a crowd killing at least 6 and wounding many others.

FIDH enquiry into the killings in the neighbourhood of Gobongo in Bangui
on 28 June 2013
On the afternoon of 28 June 2013, in the neighbourhood of Gobongo in the fourth district
of Bangui, the inhabitants, the majority of them young men, erected barricades blocking the
traffc. They were protesting against the killing of a young man from their neighbourhood,
who had been abducted by Seleka forces as he was studying in class the previous day.
Relatives had found his body in the morgue of the community hospital.
This protest movement was violently suppressed by the Seleka who fred live ammunition
at the protesters, killing 6 (according to BINUCA) and wounding many others, some of
whom were still being treated in hospital. Of the wounded taken to the community hospital,
2 subsequently died from their injuries. The Seleka also looted shops and houses in the
neighbourhood until the arrival of MICOPAX troops at the end of the day, which led to
exchanges of gunfre and the killing and wounding of Seleka fghters, before the rebels
were dispersed.
According to the director of the community hospital, At around 1 pm on 28 June 2013,
the Central African Red Cross brought two bodies to the hospital in body bags. One of
the two had large holes in the head which looked like bullet entry and exit wounds. The
mission members saw photographs of the two bodies. From 3 pm people with gunshot
wounds began arriving at the hospital and this went on until the early hours of 29 June.
All told, the hospital recorded 22 wounded, 11 of them Seleka fghters, 10 civilians and
1 MICOPAX colonel shot in the hand when on patrol in the Gobongo neighbourhood. To
this count should be added three Seleka wounded who were transferred in the early hours
of 29 June to the community hospital from the friendship hospital, as well as two bodies
(1 a member of the Seleka and 1 civilian).
The mission collected the testimonies of civilians who were shot and wounded on 28
June 2013 and who were still being treated in the community hospital.
Mr A, 32 years old and of Central African nationality. It was around 4 pm in the neigh-
bourhood of Gobongo when I was about to get on the bus to go to the suburb of PK 12. As
the bus stopped, Seleka soldiers who were behind me prevented me getting on. They were
in a Toyota BJ 75, at least ffteen of them, heavily armed. They shot 4 people, including
me. I received a bullet in my right thigh. I fell to the ground. I was taken to the community
hospital in an ambulance.
Mr B, 21 years old. I was on the bus which Id caught in suburb PK 5 to get to PK 11.
In the Gobongo neighbourhood, the Seleka asked the driver to stop the bus and told the
passengers to get off. I tried to cross the road to leave when I was fred at. I was hit in
the thigh by a bullet. I have an open fracture and a large wound. I dont know who fred.
On 6 July, the FIDH mission travelled to the Gobongo neighbourhood to gather testimony
from the victims of the events of 28 June.
Mr C, 25 years old. He is a shopkeeper in the Gobongo neighbourhood. Bakaza Ghislain
is my friend. I know him well as we make clothes at his place. He was abducted by the
Seleka in his school. We his friends and family were trying to fnd out where he was
when we learned that his body had been found at the community hospital. I walked from
the Gobongo market to the hospital with four other friends: Bakazas younger brother,
C, M, G and A. Once there, we confrmed he was dead. We saw his body which was in a
bad way with knife wounds and bullet holes. He was still handcuffed behind his back. We
then set off back to Gobongo, crying and shouting: we were going to avenge his death. It
was quite a long walk of several kilometers and took about 30 minutes. At around 2 pm,
having reached Gobongo market, we set up barricades on the road using benches and
telephone boxes. Attracted by the noise, we were joined by a large crowd of inhabitants
from the neighbourhood, mums and dads, several hundred people. The witness then
states that he saw Seleka pick-ups arriving there with Dhaffane at the head. The mission
has otherwise been unable to confrm his presence. Dhaffane arrived with the Seleka
pick-ups (Land cruisers and military-coloured Patrols 10-13 people per vehicle) around
3 pm. We recognised him as wed seen him on television. He was wearing a boubou and
holding a weapon. He addressed us directly saying: youre stupid, youre going to pay. At
that moment, a young man threw a stone which hit him on the chest. Dhaffane fred into
the air and gave orders to his troops who began shooting. The crowd fed. I hid behind
the church in a house where a young brother and the owner were too. One of the Seleka
entered the house and struck me on the head with a Kalashnikov. I was treated in hospital
where I spent a day.
Mr D, 39 years old. A graduate in law and unemployed. I was born in Gobongo and I live
there. I was at home when I heard word of the death of Bakaza and the market uprising.
I stayed at home as the affair had nothing to do with me and I was afraid. Somewhere
between 3 and 4 pm, Seleka men began to make their way towards my house. I could see
them as my house is 15-20 metres from the main road. There must have been around one
hundred between the barricade and my house. They were in military gear and armed. So
I left the house, leaving my family there, to go deeper into the neighbourhood. They came
in my direction fring in the air. I was hiding behind a mango tree when I saw Seleka
militiamen approaching the house. A Seleka fred at the door. The bullet passed through
the door and I learned later that it wounded my daughter (17 years old) in the mouth
and broke 2 of her teeth. I saw the Seleka fghter enter my house. Later I was told that he
had entered my bedroom and had stolen around 150,000 CFA francs, income from sales
at the market. Two other members of the Seleka entered the house. According to my wife,
they wanted to dissuade the third one from looting the house. However, he went off with
the television set. I couldnt return home until 9 pm. The mission members were able to
observe the injury to Mr Ds daughter with their own eyes.
Mr E, 50 years old. A mechanic and father of a family of 3 children. I have always lived
in Gobongo. Around 2 pm, I was going to see my brother-in-law. I found myself near the
barricades. I found myself very close to the Seleka. I saw Dhaffane. I saw when he was
hit by a stone. He gave the signal. And the Seleka started fring real bullets. I saw three
people dead: a pregnant woman; a woman I knew because she sold porridge; a child. I
then skirted the neighbourhood to get to my home in Gobongo 3, near the parish church
where my wife and neighbours were. There were 6 of us. At 6 pm, 5 members of the Seleka
entered the house, breaking down the door. They demanded money: guinza. They were
in military gear. I think they were Chadian or Sudanese. They pushed us towards the
bedroom then asked us to come back out into the living room. At that point I was struck
on the head by a rife butt. The mission was able to observe the wound, which was still
gaping at the time the testimony was given, and the blood on the shorts of the witness.
I lost consciousness and then I recovered. I had lost a lot of blood. Look, my shorts still
have traces of blood on them.
A MICOPAX source confrms that their intervention involved patrolling Gobongo and
maintaining a stationary presence in Boy-Rabe, another location where similar events
linked to the death of the second young man found at the morgue appear to have taken
place. Exchanges of fre between Seleka and MICOPAX soldiers have been confrmed. The
same source confrms that there were wounded on the Seleka side and that it is possible
that Dhaffane was present at the location.

In the Provinces
The provinces, where State authority is completely lacking, are not spared from the murders
and assassinations of civilians. It is very diffcult to do an exhaustive report of the situation,
but according to the assigned observers, every large town and many villages have been affected
by these crimes.
For example, in the area of Mbrs Kaga-Bandoro visited by the FIDH mission, on April 14,
2013, the Slka set fre to 272 homes and killed 6 people in 6 villages in retribution for the
murder of a member of the Slka by villagers.
A number of written documents were presented to the mission by the bishop of Bossangoa and
the Central African League of Human Rights describing the crimes committed in the Ouham
region, in and around Bossangoa and Bouca. Most of the information obtained by the FIDH
mission mermbers may be lacking in detail, nonetheless, it important to report the recurrence of
criminal acts committed by the Slka, especially those of racketeering, pillage, and reprisals
for the resistance by villagers to Slka extortions.
For example, on March 28, 2013, according to a report written and presented to the LCDH
by a Bossangoa authority, 2 people were killed in the Lakouanga neighborhood of the 2nd
district of Bossangoa: Mr. Mbenam Dsir and Mr. Namdiro Sraphin.
April 11, 2013 is known as Black Thursday in Bossangoa. According to a document from
the bishop of Bossangoa, an altercation broke out on this market day between a fulani and an
anti-balaka (a type of peasant self-defense militia). This led to a fght in the bush between
the two people. The fulani was killed in the fght. One of his brothers went to report it to the
Slka based in Bossangoa who are led by Colonel Yusuf. According to the written document,
the reprisals consisted of:
- in the village of Yangana, located 18 kilometers from Bossangoa
- Pastor Simon Ganazoui was burned when his house was set ablaze
- Mr. Rubin Wandane, alias Algo, was burned when his house was set ablaze
- One women who was visiting her parents in the village was burned to death when
their house was set ablaze
- in the Boro neighborhood of Bossangoa
- the young Symphorian was shot dead
- in the Saint Charles Lwanga neighborhood in Bossangoa
- Philippe Youfeigame,a nurses-aide, was shot dead
- Gilbert Namgbei, alias Zoulou, was shot dead
According to the document from the Bossangoa authority, on April 15, three young children were
killed by gun fre in the Borro market cafeteria, next to the central mosque in Bossangoa.
According to the same report, three people were killed on April 18, in the Ben-Zamb route of
Bogato. They were Mr. Gbafo Simon, Mr. Nganazoui Privat and Mr. Ngaikoumon. Mr.Jean-
Didier Nambogoin and Mr. Fiozooi Kipou, were also killed on that day in the Bogore area.
On the same day, 34 houses were burned down in the area.
In another document submitted by the bishop of Bossangoa, there are details of atrocities which
took place on May 15, 2013 between 4 a.m. and 8 p.m. in the region of Bouca:
- Mr. Joseph Kossi died around 11 a.m. as a result of torture from the Slka.
- Mr. Paulin died from bullet wounds he received from the Slka around 8 a.m. He drove a
mototaxi and was a scout at the Catholic church.
- a young person from the Eglise des Frres was killed in his feld by a bullet from the Slka
who were chasing people escaping to the bush.
- One woman who was trying to fee, drowned with her baby while attempting to fnd a place
to cross the river in the morning.

The mission was also able to obtain information on the Slka killings of Sunday, May 19,
2013 in the Ouham-Bac route. The bishop of Bossangoa produced a document which lists
the following fgures and which also states that there are more.
VILLAGE KILLINGS
MEN WOMEN
BOMISSI - 1pregnant women
GBADOMA 1 -
GAYO 2 -
BEDORO 5 -
BOGONE 2 1
GBADE 6 -
GOLA 1 -
BOBERA 2 1
BODORE 2 1
TOTAL 21 4
Another list submitted to the mission shows the number of killings committed on the Mazare
route in the Bouca area (up to 50 km from Bouca).
VILLAGE DISTANCE FROM
BOUCA
NUMBER OF PER-
SONS KILLED
DAMBA KOZORO 50 Kms 1
SONGBAFO 45 kms 3
BOYAYANGUERE 22 Kms 1
BAABAWANGUE 12 kms 1
BAMBIA 8 kms 1
On June 2, Slka rebels went to the village of Gbigbi (located 7 km from Bouca) on the
Batangafo Bouca route, and killed one women and injured a young man called E K, a scout
with the Catholic church. They broke his tibia (Note: see the following report).
I have never seen such violence in the CAR. Patients with bullet wounds arrive here
every day ! The director of the community hospital.
Civilians receiving
treatment for
bullet wounds at
the community
hospital. Credit:
FIDH
Sexual crimes
Les statistiques rapportes par la Croix-Rouge centrafricaine prsentent 82 cas de viols recenss
dans Bangui entre le 24 mars et le 30 avril 2013 dans le seul mois qui a suivi larrive des
troupes Slka dans la capitale.
Location Number of rape cases
reported
1st District 5
2nd District 3
3rd District 17
4th District 6
5th District 16
6th District 4
7th District -
8th District 12
Begoua 19
Total 82
FIDH met with Doctor Rock Mbetide at the Friendship hospital. This doctor has provided
medical consultations to female rape victims since March 24, 2013. From March 24 to April
21, he reported 56 cases of rape committed by the Slka. More cases of sexual assault have
been reported since then. Except for the three minors (13, 15, and 17 years old), most of the
rape victims are adult females. Several cases of spousal rejection of rape victims have been
reported. One rape also resulted in the transmission of HIV. According to one practitioner, sexual
violence is prevalent in all the CAR provinces because of the Slka. The doctor expressed
his wish for the international community to provide support for treating the female victims
of sexual violence in all of the CAR, by opening several clinics that could provide medical
laboratory testing, free medication, and psychological assistance.
The following case of Mrs.F was reported in writing to the Central African League of Human
Rights: May 14, 2013, (...) I rose early in the morning, around 3 a.m. to take my sick child, age
one year and eight months, to the Emergency Health Centre in front of the National Assembly
building; the taxi let me out at the Place Omar Bongo. I walked, and when I arrived at the
cinquantenaire level, I was confronted by three of the Slka. They stopped and harassed me. I
told them that my child was ill and I was going to Emergency. They asked me for money and my
cellphone; I told them I had no money, only the small sum of 200 FCFA, change from my cost
of transport. They took the money and they made me fall by pushing me. One of them took the
child who was crying to let him go. The other two stripped me naked and forced intercourse on
me, one by one. The third one came back with the child and put her in my arms. While getting
up, one of them hit me with the butt of his rife behind my left knee. The perpetrators of this
crime against me must face justice and be punished according to the law; Included are medical
documentation and photo showing the serious injuries inficted on my body .
After examining the rare statistics that are available on the number of cases of sexual violence
reported since the coup dEtat, and the fact that many villages are located far from any stan-
ding, or mobile, health clinics, as well as the existence of a strong social taboo regarding rape,
dissuading victims to talk about it or seek treatment it is fair to conclude that this phenomenon
is widespread but is not refected in the reported fgures. We already know that, during the
previous conficts, especially during the one in 2002/2003, rape and other sexual crimes were
rampant and systematic, making up a majority of the criminal charges brought before the
International Criminal Court.
Abductions, connements, ill-treatment and torture
Abductions by the Slka are commonplace in Bangui since the coup dEtat and it is creating
panic among the population. People are targeted for supposedly having money, for their status
(i.e., ex-FACAs) or for behaviour considered to be contrary to Slka interests. Some of the
abductions end by executions. Other people are released after one or more days in hidden
detention and sometimes after undergoing torture or ill-treatment.
The mission was told a story by a mother whose son was taken away by the Slka. The son is
21 years old and refused to comment on his case. The facts are as follows: On March 28, 2013,
4 days after the rebels arrived in Bangui and took over, young X went to the internet caf in
the Benz-vi neighbourhood to go online. On leaving the caf, Slka rebels stopped him and
demanded money. Stating that he did not have any FCFA, they bound him up and dumped him
in the back of their pick-up truck. After several hours of driving around town, he was taken in
the evening to a detention centre which according to the mother could be the head place for
the Research and Investigation Section (SERI). Locked alone in a cell, the Slka apparently
threatened to insert a pepper into his anus. He was released the next morning.
Mr. AA also reported to the members of the mission about an abduction he witnessed. On
July 4, 2013, a youngster was taken by surprise in front of the community hospital by
the Slka photocopying a tract calling for a dead city day to denounce the crimes being
carried out by the Slka. They captured the youngster and then proceeded to get the chief
supervisor of the community hospital accusing him of giving the original tract to the boy.
Alerted and worried that the events would take a bad turn, Mr. AA asked the Slka if he could
accompany the supervisor and the boy. They were taken to Camp de Roux. There, they found
themselves facing some twenty men bearing arms who asked them to sit on the ground. Mr.
AA refused to listen to the order in spite of the arms pointed at him. Finally, they were led to
a room where at the end of a discussion, the boy fnally admitted that the tract was given to
him by the supervisors secretary (she had stopped coming to the hospital for fear of being
kidnapped by the Slka). On July 6, the chief supervisor and the boy were still at Camp de
Roux. They were to have had a hearing in front of the prosecutor of the Republic the night of
the 4th to the 5th of July.
On July 5, 2013, during the FIDH mission, an American journalist was an eyewitness to the
abduction of two men: Auguste, 35 years old, garage owner, living in the Miskine neighbourhood;
Raymond Moussa, between 35 and 38 35 years old, driver. The two men were bound up and
made to lay in the back of a pick-up truck by the Slka. According to the information gathered
from the onlookers, they were captured while they were reading the tract calling for a dead
city day denouncing the crimes committed by the Slka. According to the parents of both of
these men, they were taken to Camp de Roux.
Abductions, torture and ill-treatment also occur in the provinces. A document submitted by
the bishop of Bossangoa reports the following events which occurred on May 15, 2013 in
the region of Bouca.
- Mr.G. was abducted at 4a.m from his home along with 4 young members of his family who
had come to help him with the death of his grand-son. They were physically and psycho-
logically tortured for the entire day. They were released after paying a ransom of 75,000
FCFAs and 3 goats.
- Mr.H. was taken hostage and physically and psychologically tortured before being released
after an eleven hour detention period.
- Mr.I. was captured at 5a.m while going to mass. He was tortured all day. He was released
around 6p.m after handing over the sum of 15,000 FCFAs to the Slka. He still has the
markings of torture on his body.
- Mr.J. was captured at home at 6p.m. He was beaten, tortured and detained for three days
before being released after paying a ransom of 155,000 FCFAs.

Recruitment of minors
In a press release released on April 12, 2013, UNICEF reported there were 2,000 child soldiers
in armed forces, in rebel and in self-defense militia groups in Central Africa before the coup
dEtat. The organization denounces the ongoing recruitment of children by Slkas since
March 24, 2013.
6
UNICEF is conducting an operation to register child soldiers with the intent of providing them
with an area where they can sleep, be fed, and clothed. A second phase of the operation will be
to ask each child what is his goal in life , in order to re-orient them back into society. The
priority therefore, will be one of childrens schooling. And during this second phase, UNICEF
will begin the process of re-unifying children with their families.
The President would have personally handed over some ffty child soldiers to UNICEF on May
30th, at Camp de Roux. However, the Chief of State justifed the presence of children among the
ranks of the Slka by stating that everyone wanted to integrate this rebellion, that is why, in
spite of the fact that we returned these children, a few stayed until we reached Bangui , and added,
some of them are older than they appear, but they are small in stature. That is why people think
they are minors. The only way to know is through identifcation by UNICEF .
7
In Tiroungoulou, the cradle of Michel Djotodias rebellion, where the members of FIDH mission
managed managed to visit, a humanitarian reported that 74 youth from the village (between the ages
of 12 and 20) left to join the rebellion. The members of the mission were able to see for themselves
the presence of child soldiers among the Slka. In front of the entrance to the Central African Bureau
for the Prevention of Organised Crime (Offce centrafricain de rpression du banditisme), was a dirty
pick-up truck carrying some ffteen Slka rebels, two of whom were children, probably under 12 years
and armed with Kalashnikovs.
6. UNICEF communiqu ,April 12, 2013. http://www.unicef.fr/contenu/actualite-humanitaire-unicef/l-unicef-condamne-
le-recrutement-d-enfants-soldats-en-rca-2013-04-12
7. http://www.afrik.com/centrafrique-michel-djotodia-livre-des-enfants-soldats-a-l-unicef?utm_source=feedburner&utm_
medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+afrikfr+%28Afrik+VF%29
Burning of villages, widespread pillaging
Burning of villages
The members of FIDH mission were informed about several villages that were burned down by
the Slka since the coup dEtat. To confrm this, FIDH travelled on Kaga-Bondoro Mbrs
route where they were able to see that 6 villages (272 houses) were burned on April 14, 2013.
Six villages burned in the Kaga-Bondoro Mbrs region on April 14, 2013
On July 10, the members of the mission went along the Mbrs Kaga-Bondoro route (about
90 km). Between PK 5 and PK 18, FIDH travelled through several villages (Zaire; Yagassou;
Ndanika; Dimba; Maorka; Nguimallet), some of which were completely burned away, and
others which had many houses burned to the ground. The members of the mission were able
to obtain stories about the incidents from the rare residents who were still in the villages.
One young man who was met along side of the road close to the village of Zare recounted
it this way: Everything happened on April 14. In the Yagassou village, a youngster was
wearing a FACA cap. One of the Slka came up to him and threatened him by saying that
if he was wearing the cap, he should also have the uniform and arms. One father intervened
and said that the youngster did not carry arms and gave the Slka 20,000 FCFA to leave.
But the Slka fred at him. He was not killed. In revenge, the people, including women,
hurled themselves at the Slka, physically mutilating him and dumping the body pieces
into the bush. That was around 11 a.m. Later, another Slka entered the village. He
saw part of the dead body of the killed Slka in the mouth of a pig. Around 2 p.m. the
Slka returned to the village and burned everything down. They also burned down the
neighbouring villages. I think there were also two people shot to death in Nguimallet and
two wounded; 4 wounded in Yagassou; 5 wounded in Ndanika and 4 wounded in Maorka.
Before this, more than 1,500 people lived in the village of Zare. Now we are between 10
and 20. The Slka continue to threaten us. They came to see my cousin who owns cattle
and demanded 10,000 FCFA from him.
In the village of Zare (PK 9), the members of the mission met with Mr. K., 48 years old,
farmer and artisan. On April 14, a the Slka was at a pub. He saw a young man of
around 20 years old with a cap on his head. He asked him where he had obtained it. He
had found it near Mbala where some of the FACAs had been killed. The Slka hit the
young man. One of the villagers came to get between them. The Slka opened fre and
hit his jaw. Another villager went to get a pointed cane (a traditional rife) and killed the
Slka. The people took their machetes and cut him into pieces. That same day, other
Slka came to the village and saw the end of an arm with torn military cloth on it. They
set fre to the houses in Yagassou and Zaire. Nine houses were set on fre in Zaire. There
are 1,714 people living in the village of Zaire. Today, most of the villagers have taken
refuge in the bush between 2 and 5 km from the village .
The members of the mission were also able to confrm that the entire village of Yagassou
(PK 11) was burned down. About one hundred houses were destroyed. The village was
completely deserted.
In Danika (PK 13), the members of the mission found the same sight, about a dozen houses
burned down.
Between Danika and Nguimallet, in the village of Ndiba (or Dimba), a few houses were
burned. Mr. L., farmer, told the members of the mission that everyone was in the bush.
At PK 15, FIDH met with Mr. N. who comes from Nguimallet (at PK 18). He said that
all the villagers were in the bush. In his villages events, 2 were shot to death (namely
Gilberte and Jean-Pierre) and 3 wounded.
In Maorka, one villager, M.O., estimates that 18 homes were burned down. According to
him, more than 600 inhabitants live in the bush. Only three homes are inhabited. We are
20. We are scared of the Slka. The colonel from Mbrs comes to the village sometimes
to ask for money. He is tall and thin. They asked my older brother for money, for example.
And they took M.P., the village chief to Mbrs for discussions. He had to give them 25,000
FCFA. I think they will kill us if we do not give them money.
At Nguimallet (PK 18), the members of the mission met with Miss R., 16 years old.
According to her, there are 245 homes in her village. Forty-fve were burned down. There
were 2 people shot to death and 4 wounded on April 14, 2013. A reliable humanitarian
source working in the Kaga-Bandoro region estimated that 272 homes were burned down
between PK 5 and PK 18, on April 14, 2013, in reprisal for the murder of one Slka, and
estimates that 6 villagers were killed.
Humanitarian witness reports and the fact-fnding mission report of Human Rights Watch
8

also cite many cases of village burnings similar to those documented by FIDH on the Mbrs
Kaga-Bandoro route.
The bishop of Bossangoa also documented the destruction of villages in his diocese. During
his meeting with the FIDH mission, he indicated that on the Bouca-Bantangafo route (about 10
km), there are no more villages (a written document indicates that in the Zere area: 52 houses
as well as the market were burned down. In the Boubou area: 50 houses were burned down).
Every village was razed to the ground and emptied of its inhabitants who now live in the bush.
For the bishop, this is not a scorched earth policy but rather a policy of submission. Any
village that resists Slka pillage is burned to the ground.

8. http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2013/06/27/republique-centrafricaine-les-forces-de-la-seleka-tuent-des-dizaines-
depersonnes-et
The village of Gbigbi on the Bouca Batangafo route
The bishop of Bossangoa gave the mission an account of what happened in Gbigbi on the
Bouca-Batangafo route. One morning, the leader of the Slka came to the village and
gave a speech to the people on how to live together. In spite of the speech, the village was
pillaged that afternoon. But one man refused to have his house pillaged. He was killed
by one of the Slka. In revenge for his fathers murder, the son grabbed a rife and killed
the rebel. As a result, the Slka set fre to the whole village.
The members of the mission visited the community hospital on July 7 after being informed
by the bishop that someone who was wounded in the Gbigbi event was in intensive care in
the trauma unit. M.S., who was bedridden in Room 9, with a pin in his leg, recounted: I
live in Bouca. On June 2, I was shot in the leg by the Slka. That was the day the Slka
arrived and demanded that the villagers come out of the bush. When some came out, the
Slka pointed their guns at them. They stole 2 cows and 5 sheep from an owner. A member
of the family grabbed a gun and shot the Slka. That Sunday, 4 motorbikes ridden by
eight Slka men, returned to the village and others nearby. They set fre to the houses and
fred on the people. My oldest brothers wife, Irne, was killed, and I was shot in the leg .

Pillage
According to everyone who met with the mission in the CAR, the Slka have literally wiped
the country of its public and privately-owned possessions. Private homes were and continue
to be pillaged. No social class is spared. Public establishments (i.e. the mayors building,
government ministries) have been pillaged, as well as businesses and churches. The means of
transportation and communication have also been pillaged by the Slka. The Slka control
customs, border crossings, and the extraction sites of natural resources such as diamonds.
According to an offcial of MICOPAX who spoke to the mission, There is nothing left to take
. Yet, it continues. The population is also at the mercy of permanent racketeering, especially
at the barriers set up for entering and leaving towns and villages run by the Slka.
Mr. T. wrote an account of the pillage of his house to the Central African League of Human
Rights : On May 9, 2013, at about 23h30, Slka rebels burst into my concession located in
PK 11, heavily armed in a pick-up truck, while my wife, children and me were asleep. They
entered through the back door and shot at the protective grill and broke the door locks. They
entered the house and continued shooting in the living-room. There were 12 of them in the
house. I dont know how many were outside. The whole family was in terror. They put us all
in my room and threatened to kill us if we did not hand over money. They spoke Arabic. At
the same time, others were stealing everything we owned. They took my wife and made her
sit in front of us. Then they shot at her between the legs without hitting her and continued to
threaten us if we did not give them money. I gave all the money I had: 100,000 FCFA . Then
they left.
The following table is a list of property stolen from the Catholic community in Markounda.
It shows the extent to which the Slka pillages:

QUANTITY ITEM DESCRIPTION UNIT COST TOTAL COST
1 Vehicle Hi lux 4X4 18,000,000 18,000,000
2 Spare tires 125,000 250,000
1 Tool case 250,000 250,000
1 Tool case for water pump 250,000 250,000
2 Multi Usage GM Mill 650,000 1,300,000
2
Gas fridge 300L 550,000 1,1000,000
2 Generators 5 KVA
1,500,000 1,500,000
2
Gas stove 4 burners 275,000 550.000
1
Electric warmer 375,000 375,000
5
Whellbarrow 25,000 125,000
65
Sheet- metal 5,500 357,500
5 Ladders
85,000 425,000
2 Rolls of electrical wiring 2X1.5
47,500 95,000
100 Litres of gasoil
870 87,000
150 Litres of petrol
660 99,000
4 Filters
65,000 260,000
18 Doors
25,000 450,000
3 Windows
5,000 15 ,000
10 Empty drums 20L
1,500 15 ,000
6 Small empty drums
25,000 150 ,000
16 Wooden chairs
10 000 160, 000
12 Tables
40,000 480,000
3 Bags of cement
12,000 36,000
300 Empty bags
3,000 900,000
3 Rechargeable lamps
12,000 36,000
7 Suitcases
35,000 245,000
10 Hand bags
12,000 120,000
1 Camera
150,000 150,000
1 Cell phone (NOKIA)
24,000 24,000
6 Beds
35,000 210,000
15 Matresses
47,500 712,500
15 Blankets
12 ,000

180,000
16 Sets of sheets
12,000 192,000
12 Bedspreads
2,500 30,000
1 6 place Danish suite
120,000 120,000
15 Stepstool
500

7,500
2 Bicycle
65,000 130,000
15 Chapel pews
4,000 60,000
5 Bottles of mass wine
6,000 30,000
5 Communion Host Sachets
2,500 12,500
QUANTITY ITEM DESCRIPTION UNIT COST TOTAL COST
36 Boxes of candles
1,000

36,000
1 Clock
5,000

5,000
6 Large mats
5 ,000 30,000
3 Radios
7,500

22,500

5 Jets de bols
14,500

72,500
3 Dozen of glasses
10,500

31,500

60 Plates
1,200 72,000
30 Bowls
1,200 36,000
35 Dessert plates
1,600 56,000
48 Cups
1,000 48,000
48 Saucers
1,000 48,000
135 Covers
9,500

1,282,500
2 25 Kg bags of rice
25,000 50,000
3 Bags of cassava
10,000 30,000
1 Bags of corn
15,000 15,000

1 Containers of peanut oil (20L)
25,000

25,000
1 Bags of wheat four (25 kg)
30,000

30,000
1 Bags of sugar (25 kg)
26,000 26,000
2 Bags of salt (10 kg)
7,000 14,000

3 Cases of milk NIDO
13,500

40,500
1 Cases of sardines in oil
22,500

22 ,500

1 Cases of powdered soap
10 ,500

10 ,500
2 Cases of hand soap
25 ,000 50 ,000
3 Cases of dish soap
12 ,000 36 ,000
15 Bottles of table wine
5 ,000 75,000
10 Cases of vache qui rit
900 9,000
7 Cases of jam
2,800 19,600

5 Boxes of chocolate
2,400

12,000
6 Wrist watches
25,000 150,000
1 Case of common tools (HPV60, HPV100)
212,027 212,027

1 Case of common tools (mechanic)
187,250 187,250
Sisters' clothing
366,000 366,000

Sisters' shoes
144,000

144,000
Sisters' money
299,000 299,000
Kitchen utensils
260,000

260,000
5 Glass table carafes
5,500 27,500
17 Pails
2,000 34,000
25 Pans (Basins)
1,800

45,000

5 Thermos (large)
12,500 62,500

2 Thermos (small)
6,000 12,000
2 Iron (electric)
5,000 10,000
2 Iron (charcoal)
5,500 10,000
2 Sewing machines
65,000

130,000
16 Umbrellas
3,000 48,000
24 Towels
3,000 72,000
6 Alarm clocks
15,000

90,000
The archbishop of Bambari who met with the members of the mission also recounted the
armed robbery he experienced: They did a lot of pillaging in Bambari,. When the Slka
arrived to our town they came 3 times to visit the bishops quarters. They came to take money
and thurayas. They also emptied the storage of pharmacy. On the night of January 3, 2013, at
about 10-11pm, the Slka forced their way through the doors of the bishopry. They pillaged
the place. When they were about to leave, I heard one of them shout in Sango: There is still
the house there . They passed through the grill and made their way to the rear of the house.
I opened the door to let them in. They entered and searched the place. One of them asked me
to go down a small staircase. At frst, I refused. I saw a Slka grab his Kalashnikov the other
way around to get ready to hit. I made a sign to him not to do it. Finally, they forced me to go
down the steps. And on the frst step, I was hit with the butt of a gun on the head. I bled a lot.
They continued to search the house. They took my laptop computer and telephone. I do not
believe that this is an Islamic and anti-Christian criminal group, even though many Muslims
celebrated the arrival of the Slka in Bangui by saying: its our turn, now .
Items pillaged by the Slka are located in Seleka barracks and and in their leaders houses
(rumour has it that some twenty vehicles were discovered in the garden of the residence of
Dhaffane during a search ordered by the prosecutor of the Republic). Some are also trans-
ported by truck to the Slkas home towns and villages (in the north of the Central African
Republic, in Sudan, South Sudan and in Chad) where they are sold in the markets, as well as
in the neighbouring States.
FOMAC parking
On entering the MICOPAX compound, the members of the FIDH mission were surprised
to see a large automobile parking area with vehicles marked UN which were left there
by internationals to avoid their cars being stolen.
The NDjamena market
Offcials of the MICOPAX and villagers, confrmed to the members of the mission that
many vehicles loaded with goods were seen crossing the border and going towards Chad
and Sudan. A member of the Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human
Rights (Association tchadienne pour la promotion et la dfense des droits de lHomme -
ATPDH), a FIDH member organisation in Chad, stated that there is a market in NDjamena
known for selling stolen vehicles from Bangui that still have their Central African licenses
on them. Some humanitarian sources state that since the coup dEtat, they have seen many
vehicles of all types loaded with goods in Ndele and Tiroungoulou making their way to
neighbouring countries such as Chad and South Sudan.
Some towns are surprisingly prospering
One humanitarian told the members of the mission that in Boromota, Michel Djotodias
home village, there were no vehicles before the confict. Patients from neighbouring
villages arrived at the clinic on the back of donkeys. Today, they arrive by motorbike or
by car. There are thurayas everywhere. Businessis prospering.
Legal Classication
Murder, assassination, wounding and intentional battery, illegal arrests and confnements,
rape, acts of torture and inhuman treatment, are listed as criminal offences in the Central
African Criminal Code.
In the context of an armed confict which is not international in nature, the crimes cited above
and which have been attested to by members of the FIDH mission are considered war crimes,
according to Article 156 of the Central African Criminal Code which is in keeping with the 1949
Geneva Convention: in the case of an armed confict which is not of international character,
war crimes consist of serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949 namely any of the acts committed against persons taking no active part in
the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause.
These crimes, as well as the recruitment of minors, may also be classifed as war crimes
according to Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ratifed by the
CAR on October 3, 2001.
In addition to that, if some of these crimes were committed during a widespread and systematic
attack against civilians, they could be deemed to be crimes against humanity, as defned in
Article 7 in the same Statute.
International Criminal Court Statute
Article 7 Crimes against humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute, crime against humanity means any of the following
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(...)
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, ..... or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(...)
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health.
Article 8 War Crimes
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed
as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, war crimes means:
(...)
c) In the case of an armed confict not of an international character, serious violations of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat
by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(...)
d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conficts not of an international character and thus
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conficts not of an
international character, within the established framework of international law, namely,
any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and
personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with
international law;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given
to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed confict;
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art,
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick
and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defned
in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence
also constituting a
serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions;
vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of ffteen years into armed forces or
groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;
(...)
(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conficts not of an international character and thus
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conficts
that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed confict between
governmental authorities and organizedarmed groups or between such groups.
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to
maintain or reestablish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial
integrity of the State, by all legitimate means.
III. Impunity for the most
serious crimes
Without suffcient protection, the civilian population fall victim to the most serious crimes, which
can qualify as international crimes, committed by the Seleka. The FIDH fact-fnding mission
investigated the state of the fght against impunity in cases involving the perpetrators of the most
serious forms of crimes. The fght against impunity is essential to the safety of Central Africans
because of its positive consequences: prevention, determent, sanctions, and reconciliation.
A justice system affected by a ten-year crisis
During the course of the last ten years, the FIDH has conducted several fact-fnding missions to the
CAR and has on several occasions had to study the justice system in CAR and its ability to bring
to trial the perpetrators of the most serious forms of crimes committed during armed conficts.
The inability of the national justice system to try the perpetrators of
international crimes has been already brought to the fore
FIDH reports for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 analyse the judicial response to serious crimes
perpetrated by the troops loyal to the government and their associates the Banyamulengue (Congolese
mercenaries working for Jean-Pierre Bemba). The FIDH concluded that the justice system in CAR
was incapable of protecting victims rights for the following reasons: its lack of independence, its lack
of representation throughout the country, its lack of the means and the expertise needed to conduct
inquiries, and because of evident anomalies in its procedures. These conclusions infuenced the ICCs
decision to intervene in the CAR in 2002-2003. Acting on the basis of the principle of complementarity,
the ICC opened an investigation in 2007 and the trial against Jean-Pierre Bemba in November 2010.
The granting of amnesty and pardons
In 2008, in a context where serious crimes were being committed in the CAR during the armed confict
between forces loyal to the government and armed fghters FIDH publicly criticised the practice of
awarding amnesty to combatants on both sides during the peace negotiations. Such measures are not
conducive to the prevention of conficts,undermine victims rights to justice and are further proof that
authorities in the CAR lack the will to fght against impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious
crimes. This practice was followed by dialog and conciliation days during which former heads of
state and heads of national administrations asked the population to forgive them for the crimes they
had committed, but were free from any fear of prosecution. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
in this regard, provided for in the 2007 peace agreements was never established.
Unsurprisingly, failure to apply justice for the most serious crimes explains why for the last ten
years the people in power and those heading rebel factions have been the very same persons
who have committed serious human rights violations.
A judicial system affected by conict
During the course of the FIDH fact-fnding mission to CAR, the State Prosecutor, Alain Tolmo,
made the following comment, The country has undergone a social fracture which has had
an impact on the justice system . CAR has fve sitting judges, three investigating judges and a
judicial police force comprised of ten investigating offcers. Due to current events, all Prosecutors
are based in Bangui, making it impossible to serve justice in the provinces. While some form of
justice is available in Bangui, it appears the system lacks resources and is unable to adequately
deal with the scale of human rights violations or with the victims suffering. The justice system
is more inclined to prepare cases which are of interest to the President such as that of former
head of state Franois Boziz and of Dhaffane, the former rebel leader.

Selective and minimal justice
Boziz and Dhaffane: two sensitive cases
These two judicial cases are of particular interest to the state prosecutor. The frst case is that
of ousted president Franois Boziz who is currently living in exile. On 29 May 2013 an
international arrest warrant was issued against him for crimes against humanity and inciting
genocide. The State Prosecutor has charged the former head of state with 22 counts of homicide,
119 summary executions, 53 arbitrary arrests, and the destruction of 3,823 homes.
The second case concerns Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane, leader of the CPSK --an armed Seleka
faction-- and former Minister for Water and Forests under the national union government. He
was arrested on 29 June 2013 at Camp de Roux by Djotodias presidential guard.
The Dhaffane case
Dhaffane, then Minister of Water and Forests, made declarations over the radio (the French
international radio station RFI and on the Central African Radio) reacting to deadly shots fred
into a crowd by the Seleka on 28 June 2013 (See the Gobongo Killing, part II) which were the
subject of heated discussions held in Camp de Roux between himself and the head of state. The
discussions ended with Dhaffane leaving the room and slamming the door. The presidential guard
arrested him on the spot and held him in a closet at Camp de Roux. Unoffcially, he was accused
of offending the President, with several counts of vehicle theft and the recruitment of two Chadian
mercenaries. The head of state issued a public decree offcially dismissing him.
When the FIDH mission met with the state prosecutor Mr. Dhaffane had been in custody for
six days. When questioned on the matter by the FIDH, the State Prosecutor responded that Mr
Dhaffane was the subject of a raft of accusations and that the case was, according to him,
about to go before the courts. As for the legality of the arrest, the Prosecutor indicated to the
members of FIDH mission that Mr. Dhaffane was arrested by temporary offcers working
for the judicial police and went on to state that it was, Central African doctrine and
jurisprudence . When questioned about the time spent in custody for questioning, the State
Prosecutor pointed out that under CAR law a person may be held for a renewable period of 48
hours. He also confrmed that Dhaffane had not seen his lawyer but that his younger brother,
who had been arrested along with the Minister, had very briefy seen his own lawyer.
At the time the FIDH was conducting its fact-fnding mission both cases were the State Prosecutors
main focus of attention, for clearly political reasons. The administration of justice was clearly less
of a priority in cases where the most serious crimes had been committed by members of the Seleka.
18 persons prosecuted and 16 warrants for detention issued
Prosecutor Alain Tolmo indicated to the members of FIDH mission that as of 7 July 2013, there
were 18 persons being prosecuted on the basis of article 295 of the Central African Criminal
Code which reads that, Any manoeuvre or act that compromises public safety or causes
serious political turmoil, incites hate of the government or the breaking of the laws of the land
shall be punished with up to fve-year prison term . The prisons of Bimbo and Ngaragba had
been not working since 24 March, which is why these persons were being held at the Central
African Bureau for the Prevention of Organised Crime, (Offce centrafricaine de rpression
du banditisme - OCRB), at the Department of Research and Investigations (SERI) or at Camp
de Roux. The Prosecutor also confrmed that warrants for detention had been issued for 16
persons who, according to him, were civilians and members of the Seleka.

On 5 July the FIDH mission went to the premises of the OCRB.
The prisoners housed at the Central African Bureau for the prevention
of Organised Crime (OCRB)
On 5 July the FIDH mission went to the premises of the OCRB where the members of the
mission met with its commander, Mahamat Said Abdel Kain.
The commander has been a member of rebel forces CPJC for fve years which is currently
led by the Minister of Security, Noureddine Adam. Mahamat is 43 years old and is from Bria
located in the province of Ndl.He speaks Sango, Arabic and French. He comes from a family
of diamond miners. He explained that he joined the rebellion because of an act of injustice.
His nephew was killed in a mine by persons who had been identifed, and despite his repeated
requests, the State was unable to arrest them. He joined the rebellion during a rebel attack
which took place 28 km from the town of Brja in 2008. He became a lieutenant and then a
colonel. According to him, the CPJC was comprised of slightly less than 3,000 men (900 under
Nouredine and 1,700 under Aboulaye before Nouredine took over command). As a rebel he
was not paid wages. He explained to the members of FIDH mission that to eat, rebels would
build barricades that were used to extort 3,000 to 5,000 FCFA from passengers in vehicles. On
a good day they would collect between 100,000 to 200,000 FCFA. [] People gave because
they were afraid. He arrived in Bangui, via Bossembele and Bossangoa, on 24 March with
what by then had become the Slka. He indicated that the fghting on 23 March left 9 dead
among the Slka and 30 dead among the South African contingents, between PK 55 and PK 13.
He has been stationed at the OCRB since 12 April 2013. He was appointed commander on verbal
orders handed down by Noureddine Adam and the director general of the police, Mr. Ouanz.
He works in collaboration with State Prosecutor Tolmo and is the assistant to the director
general of the OCRB, Mr. Mazengu. He is assisted in his duties by 6 judicial police offcers.
The commander explained that when the Seleka, the general population or the FOMAC
have witnessed a crime or a misdemeanour they dial 119 (emergency calls) and ask the
OCRB to intervene; either he or his men go out to the places where exactions are committed.
According to the commander there have never been more than 50 prisoners housed at the
OCRB. When the FIDH went to the OCRB, there were 42 prisoners, six of whom had a
warrant of detention issued against them and one prisoner who had been sentenced. Some
of the prisoners had been there for over two months.
FIDH representatives were able to speak with three prisoners.
The frst prisoner, M. U., said that he was 15 years old (according to his fle he is 23). He
had been at the OCRB for two months and was accused of complicity in the pillaging a
house. The person who committed the crime remains at large. He stated that sometimes
he was given food and sometimes not and that his back hurt. He did not have a lawyer.
The second prisoner with whom FIDH representatives spoke had been accused of dealing
forged identity documents. He had not seen the prosecutor yet.
The third person, M. V., was sharing a cell that measured 2 x 4 metres with seven other
persons and that for the last 5 weeks. He had yet to meet with the prosecutor. A security
guard by trade, he had been accused, along with M.W. and M. AA, of pillaging the offces
of the manager of the Ledger Hotel.
The prisoner with whom the FIDH mission met stated that they had not been mistreated
by the guards and were allowed to leave their cells three hours per day.
According to the Prosecutor, members of the Seleka who are arrested are taken to the SERI or
to Camp de Roux. Based on the information gathered by the FIDH mission, members of the
Slka who are arrested are detained at these two locations to receive disciplinary training
and almost none are prosecuted.
With regard to the question asked by members of FIDH mission as to any judicial proceedings related
to the Gobongo killing which took place on 28 June 2013 (see part II), the Prosecutor explained
that there was an investigation underway which will probably be handed over to an investigating
judge. The FIDH has not been informed of any judicial follow-up, of any kind, to these events.
However, after the fact-fnding mission, the FIDH was informed that on 30 August 2013, trial opened
for 24 detainees, members of the Seleka who stood accused of pillaging and degrading property,
illegally obtaining property, acts that compromise security and incite hate of the institutions of the
Republic, and acts committed during the Boy-Rabe killing on 20 August 2013. These proceedings must
be hailed, although they were started after the international community had protested against the state
of impunity for the most serious crimes committed in the CAR and are far from corresponding to the
level of legal action required to satisfactorily deal with the scale of exactions committed in the country.
An incipient national inquiry commission
Decree no. 13.106 dated 22 May 2013, provides for the creation of a commission of inquiry
to be chaired by Magistrate Flammarion Goba. The decree stipulates that the mandate
of the commission is to:
Investigate crimes of blood, economic crimes, misdemeanours and additional forms
of human rights violations, and acts leading to property damage or personal harm,
committed since 2004;
Identify the perpetrators, accomplices, and victims of said crimes; and
Evaluate losses and injuries with a view to possible, future compensation.
The decree stipulates that to undertake these tasks, the commission shall hear victims complaints,
reports and facts and shall subsequently conduct hearings, interrogations, confrontations, and
shall travel to sites involved; for each case, fndings and minutes must be drafted.
According to the information gathered, but which could not be verifed by the members of
FIDH mission, the Commission has already received testimonies from several witnesses.
Notwithstanding, an informed interlocutor indicated to the FIDH mission that the resources
granted to the Commission to fulfl its mandate were insuffcient. There are also other obstacles
to the effective fulflment of its mandate: the security situation, the shortage of resources needed
for victims to travel, and the complete lack of protection for victims.
The reaction of the International Criminal Court
On 22 May 2007, The International Criminal Court reacted to the referral made by the Central
African authorities by opening an investigation into the crimes against humanity and the war
crimes committed during the 2002-2003 confict. To date, the results of the investigation have
led to prosecution of only one person, Jean-Pierre Bemba. His trial opened on 22 November
2010. The ICC is still has jurisdiction on the situation in the CAR. The ICC Trust Funds for
Victims runs support programmes for the victims of sexual crimes committed during the confict.
On 22 April 2013, the ICC Chief Prosecutor announced that, Those allegedly responsible for
crimes committed in the Central African Republic that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC,
will be prosecuted. The situation in the Central African Republic is deteriorating daily and
the number of civilian victims affected by serious crimes continues to rise. She added that
her offce continues to closely monitor allegations of crimes under the Courts jurisdiction
and specifcally made mention of attacks against civilians, including killings and pillaging in
the Central African Republic. The ICC prosecutor explained that, This Court exists to end
impunity for such crimes and our jurisdiction covers the whole of the Central African Republic.
The people of the Central African Republic have already suffered too much. I will not hesitate
to prosecute those responsible for their suffering, concluded Fatou Bensouda.
Conclusion: A human
rights roadmap is
urgently needed
Since the coup dtat on 24 March 2013, anarchy reigns in the CAR, consequently the law is
that of the strongest.
Authority can only be exercised in Bangui, and there it is divided among former rebel leaders
- frst among them is the president - and the prime minister. The State has no presence in the
rest of the country. Policy-making is overly active on theoretical aspects but is limited when
it comes to concrete action.
The ranks of the Seleka have increased since the rebel victory, by attracting the idle and
unemployed in the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, and Chad who have been
eager to join in the pillaging and racketeering. Seleka troops rule supreme over the country.
Because there is no army, no police and no justice system young people and children prey on
a defenceless population. They are heavily armed and ride on pick-up trucks and motorbikes,
killing, kidnapping and torturing for money or to snuff out any protests. They burn entire
villages and rape women. Such violations of human rights may qualify as international crimes.
While not all members of the Seleka are under the direct command of the former rebel leaders,
the latter seem to have nonetheless preserved their position of authority over most of the
commander of zones (known as com-zones) controlling a neighbourhood or a city with
their men. Because they have committed crimes against civilians they are criminally liable.
Given this state of chaos, the absolute priority is protecting the population; consequently it is
imperative to support and strengthen the AFISM-CAR mandate and forces. Its presence must
be increased throughout the country, and its patrols must be used to help to contain and disarm
the Seleka so that national public law enforcement authorities can return. Equally urgent is the
sanctioning of the persons who created this situation: the former rebel leaders and the com-
zones, and supporting the administration of international and national justice in bringing to
trial those responsible for the most serious crimes. The international community also needs
to act promptly on the implementation of a pluralist and transparent elections process which
does not include those involved in the transition.
Lasting security and peace cannot be built, however, without the implementation of a human
rights roadmap, the component of the peace agreements which has been overlooked. Transition
authorities must comply with their international obligations to protect human, civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights: freedom of expression, equality before the law, freedom
from discrimination, the right to education, the protection of womens rights, the right to an
adequate standard of living, etc. The international community must contribute to the imple-
mentation of this roadmap by studying the effciency of its funds and the possibility of creating
conditions for funding by calling on its private companies to adopt strategies which comply
with the principles of due diligence.
If the Central African Republic is to put a stop to the chaotic cycle the population is caught
in and which endangers security in the region, the leitmotif for transition authorities and the
international community must be the rule of law which is respectful of human rights.
Recommendations
The FIDH recommends
I. To the authorities of the Central African Republic
Protection of the population
Systematically and publicly condemn all violations of human rights perpetrated by members
of the Seleka.
Re-establish a national law enforcement corps as rapidly as possible and, along with inter-
national forces, engage in the effective containment and disarmament of the Seleka troops
In collaboration with the international community, engage in a true process of strengthening
the defence and law enforcement forces which includes training in human rights
Establish State authorities throughout the country (defence forces, law enforcement corps,
and justice) and services (schools, hospitals, etc.)
Facilitate and support the work of human rights NGOs, journalists and humanitarian workers
throughout the entire country
Fight to end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes
Prosecute and sanction the members of the Seleka accused of human rights violations and
international crimes
Strengthen the means of action of the commission of national inquiry and ensure that it has
the ability to establish the facts and determine liability for offences committed before and
after the coup dtat, regardless of the identity of those responsible
Plan for the implementation of a hybrid (national and international) court within the Central
African judicial system to try those accused of the most serious crimes on the basis of the
conclusions of the commission of national inquiry and of the fact-fnding mission of the
Offce of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Create, with support from the international community, a victims compensation fund
Enact legislation to fght sexual violence and to give women greater access to justice
Cooperate with the International Criminal Court, in compliance with principle of comple-
mentarity in the Rome Statute
The Administration of justice
Take all necessary measures to make arrests and detentions compliant with the Central
African criminal code of procedure and with the corresponding provisions in international
human rights law which are binding for the Central African Republic
Release all persons arbitrarily arrested or detained
Take all necessary measures to end acts of torture and ill-treatment in detention centres and
to expedite investigations of those who commit such acts
Close all illegal detention centres and re-open the prisons in Ngaragba and Bimbo
Draft an action plan aimed at strengthening justice, with support from the international
community
Take steps to abolish the death penalty as stated in the relevant resolutions of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights
Elections
Implement, from now on, the measures required to create a free, pluralist and transparent
elections process

Economic and social rights
Guarantee the payment of salaries for civil servants
Take all of the measures required to fght corruption
Fight against the illegal use of natural resources
Make public commercial contracts for exploitation of the countrys natural resources
The ratication of regional and international instruments
Ratify the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; the Protocol to the
African Charter on the rights of women in Africa; the Protocol to the African Charter on
the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, and make the declaration under Article
34.6 of the Protocol establishing the African Court, enabling individuals and NGOs to
have direct access to the Court; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Confict ; the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition
of the death penalty
II. Recommendations to the United Nations Security Council and
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
To remain seized of the situation in CAR and to condemn publicly all violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and human rights perpetrated in the country
Support and strengthen the mandate, staff and budget of the African-led International Support
Mission to the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR) to guarantee, before all else, protec-
tion of the population throughout the country; AFISM-CAR should:
- specifcally guarantee the protection of journalists and human rights defenders
- establish more provincial garrisons in the countrys main cities
- increase patrolling in a wide area around the garrison to prevent all acts of violence and
human rights violations
- support the implementation of the Libreville Agreements, which covers containing and
disarming the Seleka rebels
- guarantee the security of national institutions, of diplomatic offces and of international
institutions
- facilitate freedom of movement for people and goods
- Contribute to the fght against impunity, in particular through cooperation with Central
African and international justice, if applicable
- facilitate humanitarian operations and the work of the human rights organisations throu-
ghout the country
- Assign, to the AFISM-CAR a team of independent observers to guarantee that it fulfls its
mandate in accordance with international human rights law
Adopt sanctions, e.g. the freezing of fnancial assets, against individuals presumed responsible
for serious abuses of human rights, especially former rebel leaders and Seleka com-zones
Strengthen the means and the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Offce in the
Central African Republic (BINUCA) in particular:
- strengthen the effectiveness of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
process for the Seleka and other rebel fghters
- facilitate the reform of the security sector, including training defence and law enforcement
forces in human rights and international humanitarian law, and the establishment of an
effective vetting mechanism (exclusion from the defence and law enforcement forces of
any individual who has allegedly committed human rights violations)
- strengthen its action with regard to the fght against impunity, including for sexual crimes
- create a protection unit for human rights defenders
- include a training and capacity-building action for civil society organisations
- increase the number of investigations on the situation of human rights throughout the
country and provide for public access to the same
- encourage the authorities to harmonise national law with international law and to ratify
international instruments on the protection of human rights
- support the creation of a national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris
Principles
Encourage authorities to implement a human rights roadmap, including these recommendations
III. Recommendations to the United Nations Security Council
Publish, as quickly as possible, the report on the human rights situation in CAR
Appoint a Special Rapporteur on the situation in CAR
IV. Recommendations to the European Union
To remain seized of the situation in CAR and publicly condemn all violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights in the country
Provide fnancial support to the AFISM-CAR
Include human rights organisations in the strengthened policy dialogue process being held
with Central African authorities, and examine the possibility of conditioning aid, with the
exception of humanitarian aid, on compliance with a human rights roadmap
Guarantee that aid provided by the EU supports justice and the creation of a free and trans-
parent elections process
In light of commercial negotiations underway between the EU and the CAR, guarantee that
progress on human rights is examined and that the current human rights situation in CAR
is used as the baseline
Support civil society through the funding of action programmes for the protection of human
rights
V. Recommendations to the International Criminal Court
To the Ofce of the Prosecutor
Renew public statements on the Courts jurisdiction over crimes committed since 1 July
2012 in CAR, and specifcally since March 2013
Conduct a fact-fnding mission to CAR with a view to re-examining its jurisdiction over
crimes committed in CAR since March 2013
To the Ofce of the Registrar
Maintain the feld bureau operational and continue to provide information on the Courts
jurisdiction beyond the Bemba case
To the Trust Fund for victims
Continue to run projects to help victims of sexual crimes and extend them to include the
victims of sexual violence as of March 2013.
This publication was realised with the support of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs General Directorate
of Globalisation. The statements made in this publication are solely those of FIDH.
Establishing the facts
investigative and trial observation missions
Through activities ranging from sending trial observers to organising international investigative missions, FIDH has
developed, rigorous and impartial procedures to establish facts and responsibility. Experts sent to the feld give
their time to FIDH on a voluntary basis.
FIDH has conducted more than 1 500 missions in over 100 countries in the past 25 years. These activities reinforce
FIDHs alert and advocacy campaigns.
Supporting civil society
training and exchange
FIDH organises numerous activities in partnership with its member organisations, in the countries in which they
are based. The core aim is to strengthen the infuence and capacity of human rights activists to boost changes at
the local level
Mobilising the international community
permanent lobbying before intergovernmental bodies
FIDH supports its member organisations and local partners in their efforts before intergovernmental organisations.
FIDH alerts international bodies to violations of human rights and refers individual cases to them. FIDH also takes part in the
development of international legal instruments.
Informing and reporting
mobilising public opinion
FIDH informs and mobilises public opinion. Press releases, press conferences, open letters to authorities, mission
reports, urgent appeals, petitions, campaigns, website FIDH makes full use of all means of communication to
raise awareness of human rights violations.
Keep your eyes open
Imprimerie de la FIDH - Dpt lgal fvrier 2014 - FIDH (English ed.) ISSN 2225-1804 - Fichier informatique conforme la loi du 6 janvier 1978 (Dclaration N330 675)
Director of the publication: Karim Lahidji
Editor: Antoine Bernard
Authors: Roch Euloge NZobo, Eric Plouvier, Marceau Sivieude
Coordination: Hassatou Ba, Marceau Sivieude
Design: CBT
FIDH - International Federation for Human Rights
17, passage de la Main-dOr - 75011 Paris - France
CCP Paris : 76 76 Z
Tel: (33-1) 43 55 25 18 / Fax: (33-1) 43 55 18 80
www.dh.org
FIDH
human rights organisations
on
represents 178
continents
5
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 6: Everyone
has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. Article 7: All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration
and against any incitement to such discrimination. Article 8: Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. Article 9: No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. Article 10: Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. Article 11: (1) Everyone
charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
Find information concerning FIDHs 178 member organisations on www.dh.org
ABOUT FIDH
FIDH takes action for the protection of victims of human rights violations, for the
prevention of violations and to bring perpetrators to justice.
A broad mandate
FIDH works for the respect of all the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural
rights.
A universal movement
FIDH was established in 1922, and today unites 178 member organisations in
more than 100 countries around the world. FIDH coordinates and supports their
activities and provides them with a voice at the international level.
An independent organisation
Like its member organisations, FIDH is not linked to any party or religion and is
independent of all governments.
FIDH
human rights organisations
on
represents 178
continents
5

Central African Republic Under The Seleka

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:

A COUNTRY IN THE HANDS

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