Академический Документы
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Alana Miller
2008
1
ENQUIRY
W ASHINGTON U NIVERSITY ’ S
U NDERGRADUATE P HILOSOPHY J OURNAL
For this issue, the editors would like to acknowledge the Philosophy
Department at Washington University in St. Louis, particularly Arnon Cahen, Dr.
Marilyn Friedman and Dr. Mark Rollins. We would also like to thank Mike Rogger
at Midtown Printing.
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3
INTUITIVE PROBLEMS FOR AND A CIRCULARITY ISSUE IN
KANT’S DETERMINATION OF IMPERFECT DUTIES
Michael McEvilly
I. Introduction
This essay will focus on the first formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, with
particular reference to his explanation of imperfect duties; those that arise from
contradictions of the will. First, I will give a brief overview of this formulation, as well as
introduce the second formulation including Kant’s four examples – two contradictions in
conception and two contradictions of will. I will attempt to bring into light intuitive
problems with Kant's latter examples, as well as show how actions appear meaningless if
everyone does duty for duty's sake (which may cause agents to lose their idea of freedom,
upon which Kant's theory relies). Finally, we will look at how the will's use in the categorical
imperative – which establishes imperfect duties - is circular insofar as it ascertains duties
upon which it relies to function properly.
V. Conclusion
Kant's metaphysics of morals goes out of its way to remove the agent's motivations
from the moral equation, to show us that we are obligated to act out of duty alone. Not only
does this seem counter-intuitive, as our motive set is usually comprised by our inclinations,
emotions for others, and personal projects, but it seems as though if everyone acted out of
duty alone, actions would become meaningless, even if Kant calls them good. Moreover,
there is ambiguity in the concept of imperfect duties. If it is my imperfect duty to cultivate
not only my own talents but the talents of others, which ones should I cultivate and to what
extent and in what circumstance? Even if the second formulation tells me to treat myself and
others as ends unto ourselves, this only tells us what is morally permissible, not necessarily
what we ought to do in every circumstance. Finally, there is something strange about using
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the will as a test within the categorical imperative, as the categorical imperative determines
our duties, but the will is supposed to only do duties for the sake of duty alone. If an agent can
will prior to knowing what all of her obligations are, even to the extent of determining other
obligations, there seems to be a causal problem in the way Kant lays out his categorical
imperative and, specifically, the test for imperfect duties.
Notes
1 Immanuel Kant, from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Deontology
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing., 2003), 11
2 Ibid. 12.
3 Ibid. 13.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. 17.
6 Ibid. 19.
7 Ibid.
8 These three forms are found at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Robert Johnson, "Kant's Moral Philosophy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2008 Edition),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/kant-moral/
9 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Christine M.
Korsgaard. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 33.
10 Immanuel Kant, from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Deontology
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing., 2003), 14.
12
Elissa Rosenbaum
13
ON MINK COATS AND CHEESEBURGERS:
A REEVALUATION OF THE CRITERION FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS IN
FRANS DE WAAL’S PRIMATES AND PHILOSOPHERS
Jessica Goldkind
I. Introduction
Primates and Philosophers is primatologist Frans de Waal's answer to the question of
the origin of morality. De Waal reacts to what he calls Veneer Theory, the belief that
morality is a tenuous social structure we impose on our selfish, asocial human nature (de
Waal 3-12). He argues that humans are social creatures by nature and that morality is the
product of evolved, emotion-based mechanisms starting with emotional contagion and
empathy (39). His proof is the documentation of these mechanisms and basic senses of
retribution, fairness, and community concern in nonhuman primates.
In his convincing argument to disprove Veneer Theory, de Waal illustrates the
great extent to which apes and some other mammals feel emotional as well as physical pain,
are self-aware, have expectations of fairness, and even construct rudimentary cultural and
political systems (76). These capabilities call into question the morality of the way humans
treat animals, including, for example, the contentious use of animals in invasive medical
research. Thus, while de Waal's book illuminates the question of the origin of morality, it
complicates the question of the scope of its application.
In this paper, I will develop a new approach to the ethical treatment of animals by
exploring the underlying criteria we use to determine rights. I will first discuss and criticize
the positions on animal rights defended by de Waal and his critic Peter Singer. I argue that
de Waal and Singer's distinction between rights and obligation is improper, and I will prove
that de Waal's criterion of "responsibility" is not an appropriate criterion for the discussion
of animal rights. Next, I will outline what I believe to be a more honest and just conception
of rights and their inherence. As will become clear, the conclusions that can be drawn from
this debate have profound implications not only for nonhuman animals, which are the
newest fringe of our moral framework, but also for everyone affected by society's
conception of rights.
14
De Waal is sensitive to the implications of the research he presents on the question
of animal rights, and he addresses the issue in depth. After evidencing that nonhuman
primates have very similar emotional and social lives to humans, he qualifies,
it remains a big leap to say that the only way to ensure their decent
treatment is to give them rights and lawyers… rights are part of a
social contract that makes no sense without responsibilities (76-7).
Here, he establishes that responsibility to the community is the criterion for rights. What
does he mean by responsibility? The concept has two components: The first is duty, an
individual's expected active and beneficial role in his surroundings, namely society. The
second component of responsibility is accountability, which requires that the subject be in
physical and mental control of himself and understand the consequences of his actions.
I believe that de Waal has in mind the first component, because he uses the plural -
"responsibilities", i.e. duties – whereas the accountability facet would be referred to in the
generic singular, "responsibility." Additionally, one paragraph before the above quote de
Waal admits that animals do possess some level of accountability: "We now use terms like
'planning' and 'awareness' in relation to animals. They are believed to understand the
effects of their own actions, to communicate emotions and make decisions" (76). In my
critique, I will discuss how both components of responsibility factor into the criterion for
rights.
De Waal also scrutinizes our conception of animal rights in practice:
Indeed, giving animals rights relies entirely upon our good will.
Consequently, animals will have only those rights that we can handle.
One won't hear much about the rights of rodents to take over our
homes, of starlings to raid cherry trees, or of dogs to decide their
owner's walking route. Rights selectively granted are, in my book, no
rights at all (77).
His vivid theoretical scenarios test the bounds of our instinct to give animals rights. De Waal
has claimed that emotional instincts such as empathy and guilt are the foundation of morality.
Thus, if the above cases (eg. rodents taking over our homes) trigger in us a sense of
entitlement rather than guilt or empathy for the animals, this may be an indication that
animals do not fit into our schema for rights.
Although de Waal rejects the notion of animal rights, he proposes that humans adopt
a sense of obligation that would include limiting unnecessary pain. This sense of obligation,
or "ethic of caring," is ill-defined; the ambiguity allows de Waal leeway in his admirable tight-
rope walk between the benefits of animal research for humans, on the one hand, and
avoiding the painful maltreatment of animals on the other. "For most people, [– de Waal and
15
Singer included – the balance] is a matter of degree, not of absolutes" (78).
In his response to de Waal's book, bioethicist Peter Singer agrees that it is best to
view "animal rights" in terms of human obligations, although he differs from de Waal in that
he sees value in laws that would help prevent animal suffering (153). He rejects de Waal's
criterion of responsibility by pointing to cases of humans who are not capable of giving to
society or being accountable for their actions, but are nevertheless granted rights (156).
Singer also astutely attacks de Waal's argument that "rights selectively granted are,
in my book, no rights at all." He reminds us that
all rights are selectively granted. Babies don't have the right to vote,
and people who, as a result of mental illness or abnormality, have a
tendency to violent antisocial behavior, may lose the right to liberty.
This doesn't mean that the rights to vote, or to liberty, are 'no rights
at all' (154).
In that vein, we must remember that the discussion of morality is an exploration of the ought
rather than of the current reality. For instance, it is true that most people do not let their dogs
choose their walking routes. Analyzing the example closely, we may decide that either dogs
have no claim to the right to choose their walking route, or that we ought to be letting them
choose their route or ought not be creating this domestication-induced conflict of interests
in the first place. The current nature of reality does not determine what should be the nature
of reality.
In lieu of a responsibility criterion, Singer establishes a criterion of pain: beings
have the right to be spared unnecessary pain. This criterion is self-evident (we should avoid
pain simply because pain is bad) and indiscriminate ("we should consider similar
experiences of pain to be equally bad, whatever the species of the being who feels the pain")
(157).
Defining "necessary" pain is a more difficult matter. De Waal and Singer lean
toward opposite sides of the spectrum, with de Waal favoring human needs and Singer
defending animals' wellbeing. The former asserts that, "our first moral obligation is to
members of our own species" (78). He places moral value on loyalty and the contract we hold
with those in our group. Singer replies forcefully, "Why should the fact that nonhuman
animals are not members of our species justify us in giving less weight to their interests
than we give to the similar interests of members of our own species?" (156). In order to
apply his stance, we would need be able to understand and then to compare qualitatively the
pain felt by animals with the pain felt by humans in cases of conflict. In my critique, I will
note the important shortcomings of Singer's pain criterion.
16
III. A critique of de Waal and Singer
De Waal judges animals against a criterion of responsibility. However, we do not
grant humans rights according to their contributions to society. In the United States, the
legal age for alcohol consumption is 21, while legal adulthood, voting and the ability to serve
in the military begin earlier, at age 18. In this instance, rights are withheld from fully
contributing and accountable members of society. Similarly, the right to vote is restricted to
citizens even if non-citizen residents have proven to be fully contributing members of the
country. Conversely, minors are granted rights but have no legal duties or accountability - in
criminal cases, their adult caregiver is generally responsible for their crimes. Singer adds to
that proof the rights of "humans with severe intellectual disabilities" who are likewise not
accountable for their actions (156).
Responsibility is often not the determining factor for rights in practice, and nor
should it be. De Waal writes that, "rights are part of a social contract that makes no sense
without responsibilities." It is here that I find it necessary to divide rights into two
categories: inherent and social rights. Inherent rights are personal freedoms that a social
context infringes upon, whereas social rights are those abilities that a social context provides.
For example, a being is free to live without being killed until other beings (the social
context) threaten that freedom. We do not owe our lives to society inherently. Right to life is
thus an inherent right. Freedom to vote is an ability that the social context provides by
creating a political system. The right to vote is thus a social right. Inherent rights are
dependent on society in that without society threatening a given freedom, it would not be
considered a right to maintain that freedom. But, unlike de Waal claims, it is not the case that
inherent rights should rely on society granting them in return for a contribution.
With regard to the accountability aspect of responsibility, it does not make sense to
withhold rights that will not threaten others and therefore do not necessitate accountability.
We can argue for an animal's right to freedom of movement without extending that to
extremes that would put others in danger. In other words, we may decide that a chimpanzee
has the right to not be caged, without giving it a driver's license or letting it roam urban
streets. Rights that do not yield potentially dangerous power should not mandate
accountability of the subject.
Another paramount theoretical argument against the responsibility criterion is what
we can call the inherent value criterion. Christine M. Korsgaard, another of the ethicists to
comment on de Waal's book, writes, "According to Kant, morality demands that we treat
other people as ends in themselves, never merely as means to our own ends" (101). We
17
consider an action moral if it is motivated not by self-interest, but by altruism, which
recognizes the value of another independent of what we gain from him. De Waal's
responsibility criterion values others based on their contribution to society, a means to a
self-interested end. A true moral system admits the value of life and happiness (at least the
absence of pain) regardless of what an individual gives in return. Therefore, social
responsibility cannot be the sole basis for a moral system.
When applied to animal ethics, de Waal's rights criterion of social membership
assumes an additional flaw. De Waal argues that animals will never be full-fledged members
of our society, and that therefore they do not have rights. But they are full-fledged members
of their society. In most actual cases, humans entered their lives and societies by capturing
them and bringing them into human civilization; considering this part of the picture, it does
not make sense to judge animals' rights in terms of their relation to human society. We must
return to the distinction between inherent and social rights, or given rights and taken rights.
Before entering human society, animals have the freedom to live, move, reproduce, seek
pleasure and avoid pain. Because human society did not give the animal those abilities, we
should not allow ourselves free reign to infringe on those freedoms until the animals prove
their membership in our society.
De Waal (and Singer, less so) reframes the debate in terms of human obligations to
animals instead of animal rights. I argue that the distinction between a right and an
obligation is only semantic. In truth, they are each other's opposite. To have a right means
that it is the obligation of others to do or to refrain from doing something that affects you. My
right to freedom of movement is equal to your obligation to not cage me, and my right to vote
is equal to the government's obligation to provide me a ballot and count my vote.
Obligations are subject to violation, but so are rights. And obligations, like rights, have moral
weight. That is to say, if someone fails to fulfill an obligation in this context, we judge their
failure as immoral. So the discussion of what is moral and immoral to do to animals has the
same implications whether it is phrased in terms of obligations or rights.
Singer's criterion of pain also leaves questions unanswered. One major gap is that
many rights are not based on pain avoidance. Life, which we consider the most basic right,
could be justifiably terminated with a painless lethal injection under the pain criterion. The
size of cages/"habitats" at the zoo does not cause pain, per se, but it certainly limits what
would be the animal's natural course of movement. Perhaps anesthetized neutering of pets
does not cause physical or emotional pain, but it irreversibly denies the animal the right to
reproduce.
The pain criterion, which recognizes similar pain as equally bad between all species,
18
seems to promise an apples-to-apples comparison in cases where animal and human
interests conflict. But it only aids our debate when what is at risk is single-variable, one-
dimensional pain. In medical research using animals, consider factors such as the number of
animals harmed, the scale of pain dealt, the number of current and future people that could
benefit from the research, the emotional pain of the ill humans and their families, whether
benefits of the research are a guarantee, who will have long-term memory of the pain, etc. It
is near impossible to reduce two situations to similar experiences of pain. Thus, most of the
debates within animal ethics are not illuminated by Singer's criterion.
Sources
De Waal, Frans. Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2006
Korsgaard, Christine M. Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action.
In Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, edited by Frans de Waal, Stephen
Macedo, and Josiah Ober, 98-119. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Singer, Peter. "Morality, Reason, and the Rights of Animals." In Primates and Philosophers: How
Morality Evolved, edited by Frans de Waal, Stephen Macedo, and Josiah Ober, 140-58. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006.
20
Chris Willcox
21
A PROOF ENOUGH FOR MILL’S UTILITARIAN PRINCIPLE
Min Seong Kim
It is contended that Mill's Proof of Utility suffers from the is-ought problem. The
proponents of Mill's utilitarianism rarely attend to the is-ought problem, or so it seems to
me. It is almost as if the is-ought problem has been solved, dissolved, or forgotten. Yet, if it
has been solved, I have not encountered a solution; if dissolved, I have not heard of a
satisfactory account of its dissolution.
In this paper I rekindle the problem once again, first, by offering an interpretation
of Hume's original presentation of the problem and then by turning to Mill's Proof of Utility
and explain why it might be seen as suffering from the is-ought problem. Then I consider
the kind of a justification for the Proof that Mill seems to endorse, which I call Psychological
Justification. Finally, I will consider an additional justification—a kind of pragmatic
justification—for one of the problematic premises of the Proof of Utility. I conclude that
despite these efforts to augment it, Mill's Proof of Utility cannot escape the is-ought
problem.
24
other words, questions what things are desirable”3; I believe it is generally accepted that
questions about moral ends are questions about what things are good. If these two additional
premises are accepted, then the following equation obtains, roughly, at least: moral
ends=what things are desirable=what things are good: these terms are largely
interchangeable. If Mill is correct about this interchangeability, it would seem that the move
from C1 to C2 is unproblematic because he is merely substituting 'desirable' with its
conceptual equivalent, 'good'.
The real problem with Mill's Proof is in its inference of C1 from P1and P2. The word
'desirable' is used in the descriptive sense (the is sense) in the premises, while the same
word is used in a prescriptive sense (the ought sense) in C1 and consequently, C2. Mill's
proof seems to be subject to the is-ought problem. The Proof of Utility must establish that
one ought to desire happiness, and this is what C 1 and C 2 together imply. For Mill, as it has
already been pointed out, it is a simple truth that happiness is desirable (worthy of desire)
and what's worthy of desire is what's good and what's good ought to be desired. Yet,
'desirable' as it is used in P1 and P2 merely says that happiness is desirable (capable of being
desired), just as something is visible when it can be seen and audible when it can be heard.
There is no explanation why this move from 'desirable' (capable of being desired) to
'desirable' (ought to be desired) is legitimate. This problem has been pointed out by
countless essays written on Mill, so I believe this brief account suffices.
I believe that Mill tries to deal with this problem of moving from one kind of
'desirable' to another kind of 'desirable' in his text. What I offer here is my interpretation of
his defense. I will hereafter refer to Mill's line of argument Psychological Justification.
Psychological Justification would proceed like this: 'Ought' implies 'can'. What is
implied by 'ought' implies 'can' is this: in the statement p ought to do x, the only candidates
for x are the things that p is capable of doing. I have stated that, roughly, end of morality=what
things are desirable=what things are good. Thus, by saying that happiness is desirable, Mill is
saying that happiness is the end of morality. This can be put in other words: one ought to
desire happiness. I have said that in statement of the form p ought to do x, the only candidates
for x are those that p is capable of doing. Similarly, in the statement of the form q ought to
desire y, the only candidate for y are those that q is capable of desiring.
That was the groundwork for Psychological Justification. For the details, I turn to
the text:
…if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not
25
either a part of happiness or a means of happiness…we can have no
other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things
desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the
promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct;
from whence it necessarily follows that it must
be the criterion of morality…4
Mill claims that by matter of psychological fact, the only thing a human being is capable of
desiring at all is happiness. It follows that the only thing that is even possible to be desired
by a human being as an end is happiness. If there is such a thing as an end of morality, then
the only candidate for being that end is happiness. It does not make sense, given Mill's view
of human psychology, to demand that anything other than happiness be crowned as the end of
morality. If one accepts that there is an end of morality at all, then one must accept that
happiness is the end of morality. To say that happiness is the end of morality is no different
from saying that happiness ought to be desired. Hence the following can be said to be true on
Mill's account: if one accepts that there is an end of morality at all, he must also accept that one
ought to desire happiness.
It seems that the success of the Psychological Justification hinges on the truth of
Mill's claim on human psychology, that happiness is the only thing desired by human beings.
This is an empirical question. The question that is interesting from a philosophical point of
view is this: granted that Mill is correct about human psychology, does it save Mill's Proof of
Utility from the is-ought problem? I am skeptical that it does.
As I have set it out, Psychological Justification poses a dilemma. The first option is to
accept that there is such a thing as an end of morality. Taking the first option, then you must
accept happiness is the only candidate for being that end. This is the option that Mill thinks
is reasonable and convincing. Yet there is an alternative option that is overlooked by Mill:
reject that there is such a thing as an end of morality. I suggest that further considerations of
the issues at hand would prompt one to take the alternative option.
26
C1 (from P1 and P2) happiness is desirable
C2 (from C 1) happiness is a good
We have seen how a move from the two premises to C1 is problematic due to the dual nature
of the word 'desirable'; but we can add another premise of the following sort, which I call the
end of morality thesis, since it explicitly defines what is good:
P0 The end of morality thesis: the good is what is worthy of
desire; things that are worthy of desire are the things that
are desired.
Mill needs something like P0, that would provide the 'reason' that Hume demands: given P0,
the transition from an is-statement to an ought-statement is justified. P0 links the 'desirable'
of P1 to the 'desirable' of C1. The resulting proof (the Proof plus P0) is obviously question
begging. If P0 is true, then there is no is-ought problem and Mill's proof is deductively valid.
Of course, the way I have set up Psychological Justification would avert Mill from begging
the question, since he would just have to say that if you accept that there is an end of morality,
then accept utilitarianism. Prima facie, he has not begged the question.
5
Nevertheless, Mill must presuppose something like P0 , which would permit the is-
ought transition, in order for the Proof to work. Without assuming something like P0, which
would legitimize the transition from the is-statement of P1and P2 to an ought-statement of C1
and C2,
Mill's proof would not be valid. I consider, therefore, P0 to be the suppressed premise of the
Proof of Utility.
The gist of Psychological Justification was that if one accepts that there is an end of
morality at all, he must also accept that one ought to desire happiness. It seems that the
statement is actually a bi-conditional. Mill takes the consequent, one ought to desire happiness,
to be true; but Mill's support for one ought to desire happiness is given by the means of Mill's
Proof that includes as its premise P0, which posits the end of morality thesis. Herein lays the
problem for Mill: he thinks he can get away with accepting the consequent and leaving the
antecedent an open question; but Mill's argument for the consequent (the Proof)
presupposes the antecedent(P0 is a suppressed premise of the Proof). So if Mill takes the
consequent to be true, he also has to assume the truth of the antecedent. If I'm right about
this, the following must also be true for Mill that if one ought to desire happiness, then there is
an end of morality. Thus it is shown that the conditional which connects one ought to desire
happiness and there is an end of morality is a bi-conditional. Given Mill's position, he is
bound to accepting both that one ought to desire happiness and that there is an end of morality
(or reject both—a path I doubt he would endorse).
27
Hence the bi-conditional relation that I have just uncovered means that if one
accepts that one ought to desire happiness, one must also accept that there is such a thing as the
end of morality. Since Mill holds that one ought to desire happiness is true, he must accept that
there is an end of morality. But that there is an end of morality as stated by P0 cannot be
independently argued for (that is, argued for without reverting to the truth of one ought to
desire happiness, which would lead to circularity since the argument for one ought to desire
happiness presupposes P0). There is neither a proof nor a reason available for believing that
P0 is true. P0 is exactly the kind of relation between an is and an ought that Hume finds utterly
mysterious. But if P0 is not true, it follows that a key tenet of utilitarianism is not true.
One should begin to see why I doubted that Psychological Justification would allow
Mill to bypass the is-ought problem. Mill's commitment to the truth of one ought to desire
happiness forces him to assume P0 for logical reasons, regardless of whether his claims about
human psychology are true or not. The conclusion that I draw is this: something like P0 is
needed in order to make Mill's Proof deductively valid; however, there is no proof for P0,
thus Mill's Proof is not valid. In the following section, I consider what I call the pragmatic
justification for P0, which is
intended to give reasons for accepting P0. My consideration leads to the conclusion that one
should reject such a way of justifying P0.
29
establishing that induction is rational is a desideratum because if induction is irrational, then
human beings are irrational (since we must rely on induction whenever we make a claim
about the unobserved as we very often do). Nevertheless, when it comes to P0, I am doubtful
that its pragmatic justification can be considered as a proof enough.
I can happily grant that the pragmatic justification for P0 satisfies the first criterion.
There is no deductive proof for P0 (if there was one, there would be no is-ought problem).
However, I contend that the second criterion is not satisfied. In the case involving
induction, the pragmatic justification was a proof enough because human beings cannot do
without induction—there is no alternative way of making claims about the unobserved.
Failure to justify the rationality of induction undermines our humanity in some significant
way (since it can be argued that if induction is irrational, then human beings are irrational).
One might argue that utilitarianism cannot do without P0, and since we need an ethical
theory, P0 should be granted for the sake of the best ethical theory (and those sympathetic
toward utilitarianism would argue that utilitarianism is the best ethical theory). This line of
argument is simply not convincing: the truth of P0 would make utilitarianism a coherent
theory, but the falsehood of P0 does not rule out all ethical theories. If P0 is false, then we
should look to other ethical theories. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that the failure to
justify P0 would undermine our humanity in any significant way, in the same way as the
failure to justify induction might. It is, after all, an open question whether the refutation of
utilitarianism would diminish humanity in any way. The lack of justification for P0 might be
pointing to a loophole in utilitarianism. This should motivate us either to consider other
ethical theories that do not posit P0 or adopt a kind of skepticism about ethics (if one believes
that utilitarianism is the only convincing normative ethical theory), not grant P0 for the sake
of utilitarianism. It is simply not obvious whether the truth of P0 is a desideratum, whence I
conclude that a pragmatic justification of P0 is not a proof enough for P0, according to the
criteria I have proposed.
32
Notes
1 I can see how one might object that 'not-ought' is not 'ought not', and that a 'not-
ought' statement is not a type of ought-statement at all.
2 John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism" reprinted in Consequentialism, ed. Stephen
Darwall (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 50.
3 Mill, 50.
4 Mill, 54.
5 I am inclined to say that Mill actually does presuppose P0. Recall that he wrote:
"questions about ends are, in other words, questions what things are desirable" (Mill
50). P0 is a restatement of this thought, when 'desirable' is read as 'desired'
(whereas in section II, I read 'desirable' as 'worthy of desire.') In any case, what
Mill actually meant by this statement is not much of a concern for me, because I
think Mill must presuppose something like P0.
6 Peter F. Strawson. "The 'Justification of Induction'," in Probability, Confirmation,
and Simplicity: Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic, ed. M. Foster and M.
Martin (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1966), 440-450.
Sources
Mill, John Stuart. "Utilitarianism." In Consequentialism, edited by Stephen Darwall, 32-63. Ox-
ford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.
Strawson, Peter F. "The 'Justification of Induction'." In Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity:
Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic, edited by M. Foster and M. Martin, 440-
450, New York: The Odyssey Press, 1966.
Cohon, Rachel. "Hume's Moral Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/. (accessed March 29, 2008).
33
Sharon Barbour
34
CAUSALITY BETWEEN MOTIVATION AND CAPACITY
IN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM
Ariel Savransky
Abstract
Characteristics of Autism
Autism is a disorder characterized by "disturbances in cognition and behavior in the
absence of obvious physical and brain dysmorphology" (Tager-Flusberg, 1999). According
to the DSM IV, the three major features of autistic individuals are impairments in social
interactions, impairments in communication and "restricted, repetitive and stereotyped
patterns of behavior, interests and activities" (Tager-Flusberg, 1999). In order to further
define these three broad attributes, the DSM IV specifies certain actions which qualify as
fulfilling the umbrella characteristics. Autistic individuals display irregular behavior in
engaging in nonverbal actions including those actions which define social interactions such
as gaze fixation and gestures.
Additionally, autistic individuals are unable to form relationships with peers due to
their failure to reciprocate actions of their peers. It is also observed that autistic children "do
not know how to make friends or to engage others in their activities or play. They tend to be
rigid and do not easily learn socially appropriate behavior, such as initial greetings" (Tager-
35
Flusberg, 1999). Furthermore, the essential component of relationships, language, is usually
abnormal in autistic individuals. The ability to conduct a conversation is impaired. Autistic
individuals also fail to partake in "make believe play" and "imitative behaviors" which are
characteristic of one's age group. They also tend to be abnormally occupied with certain
interests as well as displaying an attachment to irregular routines which do not serve a
purpose. Autistic individuals may also display irregular motor movements such as flapping of
fingers when excited. They may also display an irregular focus with certain parts of objects.
There are also various other abnormalities including irregular sleeping and eating patterns
as well as certain behavioral issues, which may be representative of certain individuals with
autism.
Motivation Imbalance
It is thought that by ten months old, a system which is key in ensuring that a child is
36
able to participate in activities which involve approach tendencies, emerges involving the
frontal area of the brain. If this area is disturbed early on, the reward value of certain stimuli
will not be appropriately normal which will create an "affective social motivation imbalance
that results in a robust decrease in the tendency to direct attention to social stimuli."
(Mundy). Because of this imbalance, the autistic infant will not initiate joint attention
interactions which will then lead to a "reduction in social information input to the child that
results in a marginalization of subsequent social-cognitive and social behavior development"
(Mundy & Neal, 2001). A child's preferences are going to be abnormal from this early age. A
child will choose not to pay attention to social stimuli and will in turn not have certain social
experiences. A child's early social experiences affect the information which enters into their
brains, which further affects their ability to socially interact and thus will affect their
preferences for certain social stimuli. They will then not pay attention to the stimuli which
would affectively condition a child to develop the ability to initiate joint attention and
advance further in social development.
Conclusions
Thus once again, capacity and motivation become intertwined in an inseparable
loop, which equally affect the social development of autistic individuals. A deficit in either
the domain of capacity or the domain of motivation would be potent, contributing to the
further development of the course of this disorder. Capacity and motivation interact in order
to guide the course of social withdrawal which occurs with a diagnosis of autism. Thus, upon
this conclusion, it is important to consider both the capacity and the motivation aspects when
thinking about the next steps to take in deciding how to minimize the symptoms of those
individuals with autism. When taking into account capacity and motivation, it is essential to
target motivational aspects and capacity aspects of acquiring social information in order for
there to be a chance that an individual born with autism may overcome the social deficits of
this disorder.
Conclusion
After considering the question of whether autism is a disorder of capacity or
motivation, it is apparent that in order to effectively target the major deficits present in
autism, both capacity and motivation must be taken into account. This allows for multiple
explanations of the disorder to be involved in the methods that are used to work with autism.
When looking at the disorder from these different perspectives, ways in which we can work
on detecting autism at an earlier stage in the life of an infant can be proposed. This early
44
intervention, as a key to effectively treating this disorder, seems more probable after
incorporating the implications of autism as a disorder of both motivation and of capacity.
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