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A THEOLOGICAL
ENQUIRY
Andrew Thomas
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy
May 200
Abstract
!hat is the significance of the deployment of madness in the early "hristian ascetic
e#perience of holiness$ The first %y&antine holy fools ' themselves critics of monastic orders
' represent the consistent and logical conclusion of the theology and practice of the early
"hristian ascetics( and in particular that of the followers of Anthony and Pachomius) The
flight to the desert of the first "hristian anchorites and coenobites was an attempt to transform
the e#perience and theology of holiness in church and society by transgressing the rules and
thoughts of the city in a practical outwor*ing of negative theology) The transgressive
behaviour of the holy fools renewed that transformation by accepting neither secular nor
religious truth and life) !here desert fathers and mothers had transformed the production of
norms by their obedience and ascetic transcendence of human life( holy fools undermined the
religious production of norms through their masterless obedience( defeat of vainglory( and
foreignness to self) The transformation of the production of ethical *nowledge amongst early
"hristian ascetics ' through control of passions( representations( and silence ' was followed
through by the holy fools+ apophatic babble and re,ection of religious loci of *nowledge
production in liturgy( confession( religious community and ecclesial authority) As a
continuation of ascetic methods of reforming the self+s relation to society by brutal truth-
telling and truth-hearing( the holy fools used self-ostracising insult and laughter to follow
divine truth into the periphery without legislating universal modesty and submission to group
truths) As such( the holy fools e#emplify the practices most idealised in early "hristian
asceticism ' humility( suspicion of fi#ed orders and truths( apophatic criti.ue of doctrine and
legislation ' with renewed innovation and commitment to city life) They applied the strategic
moves and principles of negative theology to the "hristian theology and practice of holiness
through aspiring to desert freedom( the practice of ignorance( and the unserious self)
Table of Contents
Abstract))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))2
Table of "ontents)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))/
Abbreviations 0Ancient 1iterature2))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))3
Ac*nowledgements))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))4
Introduction...............................................................................................................................8
1: Becoin! Unnor"#...........................................................................................................$%
5)56 Negative 7bedience))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))28
1.1.1: Understanding Obedience......................................................................................31
1.1.2: Political Obedience................................................................................................36
1.1.3: Foolery as Religious Emancipation.......................................................................4
5)26 9oolery and negations6 the shape of ascetic re,ection)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))33
1.2.1: !egati"e #$eology..................................................................................................4%
1.2.2: &pop$atic 'i"ersity................................................................................................(3
5)/6 Ascetic Positivism6 the sine .ua non of renunciation))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))):;
1.3.1: Place.......................................................................................................................()
1.3.2: Prayer.....................................................................................................................61
1.3.3: *lot$ing Practices..................................................................................................64
5)36 <mpty 9ools6 =ainglory))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))48
5):6 Distracting >oliness6 Dissociation))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))8:
$: &r"cti'ed I!nor"nce............................................................................................................8(
2)56 Practices of Thought in the Desert))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))));:
2.1.1: Praise and +lame: spea,ing et$ics........................................................................-6
2.1.2: 'eat$: escaping .rom et$ics...................................................................................)1
2.1.3: /it$dra0al .rom t$e 0orld: c$allenging et$ics...................................................1(
2)26 Ascetic <pistemology))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))50;
2)/6 The !or* of a ?ilence)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))55;
2.3.1: 1aying !o to #$eology.........................................................................................11-
2.3.2: +abbling against t$e 2ac$ine..............................................................................12-
2.3.3: #elling 1ilence......................................................................................................136
2.3.4: E..usi"e 1ilence....................................................................................................141
%: T)e Un'eriou' Se#*............................................................................................................1+,
/)56 @nowledge and truth6 the insult))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))53
/)26 9earing ?peech))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))54/
3.2.1: 3ying.....................................................................................................................166
3.2.2: 4alues...................................................................................................................1%
3.2.3: E5perts..................................................................................................................1%3
/)/6 >umour)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))588
3.3.1: #$e obligation to laug$........................................................................................1-4
3.3.2: 1toc, comic .orms.................................................................................................1)
3.3.3: #$e Po0er o. t$e *omic.......................................................................................1)(
/)36 The Unserious ?elf))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))20/
3.4.1: 6umility and t$e *$ristian 1tory.........................................................................2%
3.4.2: 6umility and 7race..............................................................................................2-
3.4.3: 6umility and unserious speec$............................................................................211
Conc#u'ion..............................................................................................................................$1(
Bi-#io!r".)/..........................................................................................................................$10
Abbreviations (Ancient Literature)
Unless otherwise indicated( translations are those listed in the bibliography)
Numbering in ancient te#ts is in general according to chapter) The anonymous collection of
apop$t$egmata partum is numbered according to !ard+s edition)
Aeference to Bree* and 1atin te#ts has been to Migne( unless otherwise indicated)
&cta 1anctorum &cta 1anctorum
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9 &pop$t$egmata Patrum 8alp$.9
lib. grad. liber graduum
$. mon. $istoria monac$orum in &egypto
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9 &pop$t$egmata Patrum 87,. syst.9
". dan. scet. "ita 'anielis 1cetiotis
&pop$. Patr. 83at9 &pop$t$egmata Patrum 83at.9
&pop$. Patr. 8anon9 &pop$t$egmata Patrum 8anon9
Athanasius Ale#andrinus ". &nton. 4ita &ntonii
Augustinus >ipponensis c. mend. contra mendacium
Enc$. Enc$iridion
de ci". dei de ci"itate dei contra paganos
con.. *on.essionum
doctr. c$r. 'e 'octrina *$ristiana
lib.art. de libero arbitrio
mend. de mendacio
op. mon. de opere monac$orum
de trin de trinitate
%arsanuphius and Cohannes resp. responsiones
%asilius Magnus leg. lib. gent. ad adolescentes de legendis libris
gentilium
ascet. 1 sermo asceticus 1
ascet 2 sermo asceticus 2
d. bapt. de baptismo libro duo
ascet. disc. sermo eiusdem de ascetica disciplina
$om. 1 $omilia 1 ad"ersus eos :ui irascuntur
$om. 2 $omilia 2 de $umilitate
reg. .us. regulae .usius tractatae
moral. moralia
renunt sermo de renuntiatione saeculi
;ud. de ;udicio dei
"assianus Cohannes de institutis 'e institutis coenobiorum
*ollationes *ollationes
"icero Marcus Tullius tusc. disp. #usculanae 'isputationes
"lemens Ale#andrinus str. stromateis
"limacus Dohn scal. scala paradisi
Denys Areopagitus c.$. de caelesti $ierarc$ia
d.n. de di"inis nominibus
e.$. de ecclesiastica $ierarc$ia
myst. de mystica t$eologia
Diogenes 1aertius "it. p$il. 4itae P$ilosop$orum
<pictetus Enc$. Enc$eiridion
<vagrius Ponticus de orat. 'e oratione
de.in. de.initiones
e5cerpts e5cerpts
sent. ad "irg. 1ententiae ad "irginem
par. ad mon Paraenesis ad monac$os
$ypo. $ypotyposes
ep. ad mel. Epistula ad 2elaniam
ep. epistula
cap. paraen. *apita paraenetica
Pra,t. Pra,ti,os
oct. spir. de octo spiritibus malitiae
de "itiis 'e "itiis :uae opposita sunt "irtutibus
de mal. cog. 'e malignis cogationibus
s,em. 1,emmata
sc$ol. in eccl. 1c$olia in Ecclesiasten
sc$ol. in luc. 1c$olia in 3ucam
cap. 555iii capitula 555iii
Eulog. Eulogios
sent. ad mon. 1ententiae ad monac$os
<vagrius ?cholasticus $.e. $istoria ecclesiastica
Bregorius Magnus 3ib. Reg. Past.3iber Regul< Pastoralis
>ieronymus ep. epistula
". Pauli) "ita 1ancti Pauli Eremitae
1eontius <piscopus Neapolitanus ". 1ym. "ita 1ymeonis 1ali
Ma#imus "onfessor carit. 1=4 capitum de caritate :uattuor centuriae
Moschus Dohn prat. pratum spirituale
Ni*ephoros "it. and. "ita andreii
Palladius $. 3aus. $istoria 3ausiaca
Aufinus 6ist. 2onac$. 6istoria 2onac$orum in &egypto
Thomas A.uinas summa t$eologiae summa t$eologiae
Eosimas allo:uia allo:uia
Acknowledgements
?i# years have now passed since C e#plained to my wife that C could not write a
doctoral thesis because C did not have an idea) ?ince that time( C have benefited from
conversations with friends( colleagues( students and strangers that have managed to persuade
me that this was a correct assessment of the situation( but that C should still write)
To wor* and thin* several hundred miles from your academic home is always a
challenge( and the Department of Theology and Aeligious ?tudies 0not least the ever helpful
and sympathetic Danet 1ongley2 have been more than accommodating) A special than*s must
go to my supervisor Philip Boodchild( who has always been polite enough to ma*e my
glaring mista*es seem natural ones( and who has never given a comment that has not been
worth acting on) >is *een discernment( absurdly well informed thought( and his patient(
effective academic effort will always stand out in my mind as a model of philosophical wor*)
Aecent years have also seen the development of an enormously resourceful group of
research students at the department( and C have gained a great deal from their passion and
insight into the tas* of doing good theology and philosophy) The all too rare conversations C
have had with Ale# Andrews( Deff %iebighauser( Anthony Paul ?mith( Michael 7+Neill
%urns( %en @aut&er( and Thomas 1ynch have been both inspiring and informative)
C owe a further debt of gratitude to the 9aculty of Theology at the University of 7slo)
Not only have they generously e#tended library hospitality even when C have not had formal
lin*s to the institution( but C have been accepted into their academic discussions both over
lunch and in seminars) Cn particular( ?turla ?tFlsett( @,etil >afstad( <spen Dahl and Trygve
!yller have encouraged me( indicated new avenues of research( and listened to my often
incoherent thoughts on sub,ects that C really had nothing to do with) A further gathering that
has been an enormous help is the sporadic meeting of the 7slo Patristics reading group) ?tig
9rGyshov has been especially helpful( not least in chec*ing my often s*etchy understanding of
Bree* te#ts)
A source of constant inspiration has been my daughter ?unniva Brace( to whom C
have read everything from 9oucault to Teresa of Avila) ?he has been good enough to decorate
my writings and has proclaimed her agreement to our neighbours at the top of her voice)
The people that to whom my wor* owes most( though( are those who have bothered
to say no) 9riends and family who have not bought into my self-created genius cult and have
forced me to ,ustify my arguments and give up those that no longer hold water) !ithout these(
my thoughts would have long ago spiralled off into self-glorifying nonsense) My than*s go
especially to >arald Torgauten( Tom "lar*( and most of all to my ever honest( ever surprising
wife( >elene Thomas) These have long been my readers and my audience( and they are
responsible for my coherence) The remaining nonsense is all of my own creating( but C hope
that they will continue the wor* they have started in helping me to eradicate it)
Introduction
The holy fool is no stranger to the modern world) The name is used to describe
beatni*s( truth-telling weirdos( and modern ascetics) Ct doesn+t matter what you are reacting
to( so long as you challenge established truths in innovative ways( you are a holy fool)
This study is based on the assumption that it does matter what you are reacting to) The
starting point determines the range of answers available) ?pea*ing of the holy fools of late
anti.uity in the same breath as modern <uropean gurus and even early modern Aussian holy
fools implies abandoning a specific starting point) Ct ma*es transformation an unchanging
absolute rather than a negotiation of particular differences on the basis of shared practices and
thoughts)
C will here be considering the holy fools of late anti.uity and the early Middle Ages in
the <astern reaches of the >oly Aoman <mpire) Their situation is stri*ing not ,ust because
these figures are the earliest source for the Hholy fool+( but also because of their starting point)
The first %y&antine fools react against early "hristian asceticism) They emerge from the
monastic movements of <gypt( Palestine and ?yria)
Ct is the nature of early "hristian asceticism that ma*es what follows more than a list
of ways in which holy fools differ from their predecessors) At the time of our holy fools(
<astern mon*s and nuns had developed a sophisticated technology of personal and social
transformation that baptised the philosophy of late anti.uity in developing the church+s
theology( ethos( and interpretation of ?cripture) Their holiness was characterised by
discipline( disconnection( and self-mastery) Ct is in these terms that the holy fools attempt to
transform the "hristian e#perience of the holy)
Another assumption6 the "hristian e#perience of the holy is historically mediated)
There is nothing necessary( nothing timeless about it) !e e#perience the holy ' rightly or
wrongly ' in conte#t) Perhaps it will be called a >egelian starting point( but it is also founded
on the dogma of the infinity and ine#haustibility of Bod( who always e#ceeds and transcends
our current thoughts)
Ct is because of the theological practice of the early "hristian ascetics that holy fools '
who mar* their departure precisely from the norms( *nowledge( and saintly selfhood of
monasticism ' are called holy rather than simply foolish) Ct does not simply ta*e a trailbla&ing
holy man to transform the e#perience of holiness) Ct ta*es a transformed reception too)
I"ontinuity is but the phenomenon of a discontinuity)J
5
C will therefore attempt to draw up the common features and conversions enacted in
the emergence of the holy fools amongst early "hristian ascetics) ?hared theologies made it
possible for contemporaries to identify them as holyK conversions are what catch our attention
and theirs( constituting a criti.ue that elicits transformation) !e could say that the one ma*es
them holy( whilst the other ma*es them foolish)
The tas* is therefore restricted to the earliest "hristian holy fools) Parallels in other
religions( places( and times are no doubt interesting( and may even help us to understand the
material in hand) These are not( however( the domain of this study) Two reasons motivate the
choice6 firstly( in order to posit a genuine parallel( a thoroughgoing understanding is
necessary of each phenomenon( so that the parallel itself adds no new *nowledge concerning
either of them( but mere illustrations of particular features) ?econdly( even though the theme
of this wor* is ostensibly a set of historical religious figures( my underlying interest is an
understanding of the e#perience and theology of holiness( as it is negotiated in Theology+s
classical era( in the wa*e of one of the most far-reaching transformations "hristianity has
undergone( namely the birth of monasticism)
<ven this restriction is not enough( though) There have been a number of
interpretations of "hristian foolishness that have included everything from %iblical material(
through %y&antine holy fools( to modern religious radicals)
2
These wor*s attempt to draw up a
"hristian theology of holy madness) !hilst useful studies in themselves( demonstrating the
range of phenomena we are inclined to call foolish and holy( there tends to be very little to
unite the phenomena described) "hristians are called mad all the time( but that doesn+t ma*e
them holy) 7n the other hand( counter-cultural holy men and women have emerged( noticed
and unnoticed( in most historical eras( without their having anything in common with the
%y&antine holy fools)
?imilarly( madness in itself has been praised as holy in different conte#ts in church
history( without any obvious reference to each other or significant common features)
%y&antine hagiographers praised holy fools for pretending to be mad in order to hide their
holinessK
/
<rasmus praises madness because of its refusal of Aenaissance theological self-
righteousnessK
3
modern charismatic "hristians praise madness because it overcomes
5
9oucault( 582 L545M6 533( my translation)
2
Typical e#amples are the post-modern Phan( 2005 and the historical ?award( 5;0)
/
Dagron( 50)
3
in <rasmus( 5;L5:50M)
inhibitions for the sa*e of worship)
:
Therefore( this study will concentrate on the uni.ue
theology of one of these groups ' namely the early "hristian %y&antine holy fools ' in order
to e#amine that way of thin*ing in all its specificity) The common features of a "hristian
theology of madness will have to wait for another day)
<ven at this degree of specificity( however( we will have to ma*e some distinctions)
The delimiting of this field has caused enormous problems in the secondary literature( and
any preliminary definition of holy fools is bound to rule out or include figures that are
relevant) ?o C shall impose an arbitrary distinction( and remain alert to its contingency
throughout) C propose to include in this study all hagiography that includes the appellation
Hsalos+(
4
which came to be used for holy fools by the <astern church) "hronologically( C will
be considering all holy fools up until and including the time of ?ymeon the holy fool) After
?ymeon( there was very little foolish hagiography until ?t Andrew ?alos( three hundred years
after 1eontius+ silly scribblings)
8
This definition has the disadvantage of including certain desert fathers who clearly do
not adopt the lifestyle of a holy fool)
;
?ince these instances do not describe a holy man or
woman pretending to be mad for any long time( we can however discount them from our
description of holy foolery) !e are loo*ing primarily at people who adopt this way of life as a
vocation rather than as a last resort on one occasion) The other disadvantage is that it e#cludes
the story of Antiochus( recorded by Dohannes "limacus(
"limacus( scal.: ?tep 3) A possible reference to Antiochus may be behind ?ymeon+s comments in ?ymeon the
New Theologian 5;06 =C);)
50
Te#t( translation and commentary can be found in Ayden+s edition) cf) Ni*ephoros( "it. and.
Firstly( and most importantly( Andrew does not arise from a monastic community or
lifestyle) >e receives a divine calling whilst living as a slave in "onstantinople) All the fools
in our period either live amongst religious or have been religious themselves)
1econdly( Andrew ' though himself originally from ?cythia ' does not move to the
place where he wor*s as a holy fool6 he lives in "onstantinople both before and after his call
to be a fool) Cn contrast( the early holy fools are anonymous and un*nown in the place where
they begin their calling) ?ymeon( for e#ample( moves from <dessa to <mesa( via a long stay
in the desert)
#$irdly( Andrew does not resemble a mon*( but a prophet) !hilst we can and will
interpret the early holy fools as adopting a particular mode of asceticism( Andrew ?alos is to
be interpreted against the bac*ground of other framewor*s) >e foretells events in the city( and
a large part of his life is ta*en up with an elaborate apocalypse)
Fourt$ly( Andrew ta*es foolish disciples) >e is emulated) The earliest holy fools only
reveal their way of life reluctantly and by divine command( and when they do( they do not
recommend it to anyone else)
These features force me to agree with Brosdidier de Matons(
55
who in his seminal
wor* on holy foolery and Andrew ?alos in particular argued that the hagiography of the
Mediaeval %y&antine fools is of an entirely different genre and character to its forerunners) Cts
mode of edification is at odds with that of the hagiography of early holy fools) !e could say
that whilst writings concerning Andrew ?alos draw the reader into its description( as*ing her
to become a holy fool( and thus describable by the hagiographer( the early fools retain the
reader-te#t relation) The aim in writing about the early fools is that the reader may *now that
there are holy fools) Ct is not that the reader may become one)
To the e#tent that later interpretations of holy fools similarly disregard their relation to
asceticism( they are similarly irrelevant to this study) Ct is perhaps surprising to note( however(
that the lin* to monasticism is more resilient in interpretations than in practice) ?ymeon the
new theologian( for e#ample( associates pretending to be mad 0ooio,2 not with supernatural
speech( but with a monastic economy of vainglory and control of the passions( albeit in
condemning the practice)
52
?imilarly( Dostoevs*y+s holy fools are often 0but not always2
55
de Matons( 580( e)g) on p/2;6 Hstarting out with the most original *ind of saint hagiography has to offer(
LAndrew ?alos+ hagiographerM ends up by giving holiness its most banal( conventional( and even most false
image)+ 0my translation2
52
?ymeon the New Theologian( 5;06 PP=CCC)52) Cvanov notes further fool-li*e activity in hagiography about
?ymeon the New Theologian( which falls outside the confines of this wor*( for the above-mentioned reasons)
Cvanov 2004 L53M6 583-5;2)
compared with and set in the conte#t of monasticism6 the e#egetical problems involved in
identifying authentic holy fools notwithstanding( de .acto fools 0who were generally
identifiable and *nown figures in Dostoevs*y+s Aussia2 appear in the conte#t of monasteries(
with and over against the conventional religious)
5/
!hen later interpetations refer to holy
foolishness as a way of relating to "hristian asceticism( then( they will also be relevant to the
study of the earliest holy fools)
!hat do these restrictions leave us with$ Cf we are to only regard those stories written
before 1eontius of Neapolis that use the word Hsalos+ to refer to those that embrace the life of
feigning madness for "hrist+s sa*e( a coherent group of te#ts emerges6
Csidora of Tabennesiotes( who was abused by her entire monastery for her madness
until her holiness is revealed by an angel to Piteroum 0cf) below( on page 232K
53
Abba Mar* the fool who moved to Ale#andria to play the fool at the baths of
>ippo( and who was discovered by Abba Daniel of ?cetisK
5:
the anonymous mon* living in the community around abba ?ilvanus in Palestine
who laughed and fooled around in public( but in private counted his good and bad
thoughts by ma*ing piles of pebbles( only allowing himself to eat if the good
outweighed the badK
54
?ymeon the holy fool( whose long "ita by 1eontius of Neapolis
58
represents Hthe
pinnacle of the literary development of the ideas of holy foolery+
5;
describing a
flight from the world through the common life( the desert( and the madness of the
city( where ?ymeon moc*s( steals( and shits his way through the last days of his life
in a fest of holy foolishness( always hiding( always provocative)
5/
9ather Therapon is a monastic authority and holy fool in Dostoevs*y( 53L5;;0M6 C=)5K ?emyon Qa*ovlevich
the holy fool ' though treated as a prophet ' is attended by mon*s( and connected to a local monastery6
Dostoevs*y( 2000L5;82M6 CC):)ii
53
&pop$. Patr. 83at9: P=CCC)5 Palladius( $. 3aus.: PPC=)
5:
cf) now the e#cellent critical collection by %ritt Dahlman of the Daniel te#ts6 ". dan. scet. The story of Mar*
the holy fool appears in chapter 2)
54
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: =CCC)/2
58
1eontius( ". 1ym.( based at least partly on the short chapter on H?ymeon the mon*+ in <vagrius ?cholasticus(
$.e.: C=)/3)
5;
Cvanov( 2004L53M6 5/0( italics original)
?o the holy fools material itself ,ustifies an e#amination of the te#ts that appear at this
time 0from the fourth to the seventh century2 and location 0<gypt and ?yria2 of transitions6
from anti.uity to the Middle AgesK from pagan Aome to the >oly Aoman <mpireK from
philosophy to doctrineK between the <astern empire and the orientK between the diaphysite
orthodo# world and the multiplying orthodo#ies around monophysitismK between the
"hristian <ast and the Muslim <ast) Ct is in this conte#t that the holy fools appear and
establish a place for themselves in religious consciousness)
There are generally three academic tas*s attempted regarding the holy fools material6
describing a previously un*nown set of te#ts(
5
which has now been largely achieved in the
online edition of @reuger+s commentary and translation of 1eontius+ 3i.e o. 1ymeon
20
and the
magisterial translations of the sayings of the desert fathers and mothers by %enedicta !ardK
25
identifying an historical and notional conte#t in which to understand them( for e#ample
amongst the desert fathers and mothers(
22
cynic philosophers(
2/
the religious phenomena of
cra&y-wise gurusK
23
and elucidating the significance of the holy fools in the grammar of a
particular practice or doctrine( assuming the details of a conte#t and logic in order to ma*e the
meanings of the te#ts emerge in that discussion)
2:
Now that we have established the set of
data( what conte#ts will we be setting them in( and how will the te#ts be approached$
A good analysis will have to argue both for a conte#t and for an understanding of that
conte#t) The reading suggested here will be against the bac*ground of "hristian asceticism as
one step in the developing conception of the philosophical life) The holy fools will be
portrayed as an internal criti.ue of "hristian monasticism understood as philosophical
practice)
The approach will therefore owe a great deal to Michel 9oucault+s interrogations of
philosophical practice in its relation to truth-telling) 9oucault+s historical writings danced
around the "hristian asceticism of late anti.uity without ever directly addressing it in any
systematic study)
24
>is concerns regarding the literature are fairly clear( however( and his
5
<#amples of this approach include AydRn( 5;5 9rGyshov( 200/ !are( 2000 ?yr*in( 5;2)
20
http6SSwww)escholarship)orgSeditionsSview$docCdOft4*3008s#TbrandOucpress( the online version of @rueger(
54)
25
!ard( 58: !ard( 200/)
22
Borainoff( 5;/6 ch) 5 Cvanov( 2004L53M6 chs) 5 and 2)
2/
@rueger( 54)
23
%outenoff( 200/ 9euerstein( 55( who is followed by Phan( 2005)
2:
Dagron( 50 "erteau( 58)
24
@ey te#ts are6 9oucault 58( 54 L5;3M( 2000 L5;5M( 2000c L5;2M( 2000a L5;/M( 2000b L5;/M( 2000
L5;:M( 200: L2005M6 lectures on 23
th
9ebruary( /
rd
March and 50
th
March( 02008a2 L5;0M( 2008b L5;0M( and
especially 2008 L2003M6 lectures from the 5
st
9ebruary to the ;
th
March( and 2006 lectures from 2
th
9ebruary and
2;
th
March)
approach to it was demonstrated both in his short analyses and in his wor* on the philosophy
of late anti.uity)
28
The method adopted here is perhaps best demonstrated in the two
tra,ectories of Platonic thought outlined in 9oucault+s final lecture series)
?ocrates+ psychagogical practice lies at the heart of much of 9oucault+s later thought(
stretched as it was between analyses of Platonism on the one hand and @ant+s article on
<nlightenment on the other)
2;
An important point made in the analyses of the ?ocratic
dialogues is that the great philosopher is not simply repeating the Delphic command to *now
yourself( but that he wanders the streets of Athens encouraging young and old rather to ta*e
care of themselves 0the Icare of the selfJ6 t ititio t ouou2) This care generated two ma,or
implications for platonic thought( two forms of telling the truth about the self in order to
mould the aesthetics of e#istence) 9oucault therefore outlines two modes of giving an account
of oneself)
9irstly( the philosopher can give an account of himself through an understanding and
elaboration of the being of the soul) ?ocratic truth-telling gives way to metaphysics) 9oucault
associates this tra,ectory with the &lcibiades( but its tra,ectory is clear in neoplatonism)
&lcibiades was important as a dialogue because it came first in the later pedagogical lists)
2
The truth-telling philosopher wor*s on his way of life by placing himself in an ontological
order( and by appealing to a different world( the realm of the soul)
?econdly( the philosopher may give an account of himself through a description of and
wor* on his life 0io,2( the interrogation of forms of life) 7ne+s self is .uestioned according
to the measure of virtue( but more enduringly according to truth) !hat *ind of life is
necessary in order for me to be able to spea* the truth$ 9oucault roots this tra,ectory in the
dialogue 3ac$es( although its heirs are the practical philosophers of late anti.uity( and in
particular the "ynics( late ?toics( and early "hristian ascetics)
!hilst these two traditions are no doubt related ' indeed 9oucault+s histories spea*
primarily of the roots of the ascetic tradition in &lcibiades rather than in 3ac$es until the 5;3
lectures ' their relation is fle#ible and varied) There is no specific metaphysic of the soul and
the other world that applies to one specific way of life) They are reconfigured again and again
in the history of the soul)
28
Cn particular( see 9oucault 52a L5;3M( 54 L5;3M( 2000c L5;2M( 2000 L5;/M( 200: L2005M( 200( and
Pearson 2005)
2;
The transition from the one to the other can be seen in a variety of te#ts from the 5;0s6 9oucault 5;/( 2008
L50M( 200;6 lectures from the :
th
and 52
th
Danuary)
2
9oucault mentions 7lympiodorus and Proclus in 9oucault 200: L2005M6 580) ?ee his longer analyses in the
first two lectures( and comparisons scattered throughout these lectures)
The following analyses of holy fools and early "hristian asceticism will be primarily
guided by the concerns of the latter tra,ectory) !here theories of the soul and the other world
are treated( it will be for the sa*e of the understanding of the truth-telling that concerns and is
produced by the true way of life)
A number of conse.uences follow from this focus) 9irstly( the traditional division of
Patristics into the more theoretical te#ts of Augustine( the "appadocian fathers( etc over
against the hagiographical te#ts of church histories( stories and sayings of mon*s( and so on
will not hold) The theory and practice of the self are constantly playing off each other)
Metaphysical theories of the other world and the eternal soul have practical implications for
ascetic heroes( and particular practices of death and hope will sometimes re.uire a particular
metaphysic( and sometimes allow metaphysical fle#ibility) Neither can be studied in isolation)
?econdly( "hristian asceticism can not be read as a mere continuation of either the
platonic tradition or the cynic ascetic tradition) Cn the monastic "hristianity of late anti.uity(
the possibility of truth-telling re.uired a particular ascetic practice( and ascetic practice
produced and assumed a set of truth games) !hilst "ynic philosophers more or less ignored
metaphysics( and neoplatonists eschewed the radical life transformations of cynics and
mon*s( "hristian philosophers united the life of withdrawal with the life of the soul) The
desert is where you save your soul)
/0
Thirdly( theology contains a vital reference to practice in two directions) 7n the one
hand( truth-telling is grounded in practice) 7nly particular games of truth and habits of
mastery over one+s thought will allow the emergence of truth about the other life of Bod and
the soul) 7n the other hand( life is assessed not only against the standards of truth( but against
those of the divine life) Cn short( truth produces and is produced by holiness)
Cllustrations of this principle can be found in the analysis of dispassion 0below( section
2)5)26 Death6 escaping from ethics2) The notion of the dispassion of Bod has troubled
theologians for some time) Brounding it in the practice of dispassion will add to our
understanding of how ancient theologians thought through the attribute( for e#ample
demonstrating that it is by no means incommensurate with love( that it is concerned with
social convention( manipulation( and *nowledge) 7n the other hand( the practice itself is
driven to a great e#tent because of the theology of divine impassibility)
A further illustration concerns the account given below of negative theology( or
apophaticism 0section C)2)5 below2) !hilst the theme will first be confronted in practical
/0
9oucault 2006 22;)
terms ' the re,ection of the city( particular forms of life( and conventional shapes of holiness
as non-divine ' ascetic practice is both driven by and a mode of producing intellectual
apophaticism) 9or this reason( we will first confront it in the section on ways of transforming
norms and then later in the description of the transformation of *nowledge)
9oucault himself did not directly address the emergence of early "hristian asceticism
0by which C mean both the anchoritic movements of Anthony and the cenobitic institutions of
Pachomius as they arose in the <astern stretches of the <mpire at the turn of the fourth
century2( he challenged his hearers to ta*e it seriously( and confessed that what he was saying
on the sub,ect was highly provisional)
/5
9or these reasons( the following analyses will not be
restricted to 9oucault+s own conclusions( for the following reasons)
9oucault+s concern with "hristianity was determined by surrounding analyses) ?o
instead of establishing fine lines of logical progression in thought and practice( he often
presented "hristianity as a fairly flat figure stretching from late anti.uity to the Aenaissance)
A case in point is his account of obedience) >e describes the practice of total obedience as a
precursor to the governmental systems that united practices of asceticism to civic loyality) To
this purpose( 9oucault+s histories portray one form of obedience to ecclesiastic authorities as a
mode of heteronomy) Cn fact( obedience was only allied to institutional hierarchy in certain
conte#ts 0namely particular cenobitic institutions2 and some time after the emergence of
monasticism) The obedience elaborated as a practice of the self amongst early "hristian
ascetics was long entirely independent of ecclesiastical order( and chapter one below sets out
a grammar of obedience at odds with 9oucault+s depressing picture of a governmental
techni.ue that in practice undermined the self confidence produced by mystical e#perience)
/2
Cnstead of aping 9oucault+s critical studies( then( we will embrace his program of re-
launching the .uestion of what way of life is necessary for telling the truth( what techni.ues
allow a transformation of morals( and what relation to the self is generated by these
transformations$ !e will e#amine the hagiographical and theoretical reflections on asceticism
as interrogations of life and self)
The .uestion that is being as*ed throughout these tas*s is6 what is the significance of
the deployment of madness in the "hristian e#perience of holiness$ Addressing this .uestion
will further involve steering between the two tendencies to assert an absolute brea* with the
contemporary religious practice( and so to deny the fool+s holiness( and the tendency to claim
/5
Cn 9oucault 2006 20)
/2
9oucault 2006 /02-/0;) "f) also the governmental analysis of obedience in lectures of 9oucault 2008 L2003M6
22
nd
9ebruary and 5
st
March)
complete continuity with e#isting e#perience of holiness( and so to deny the fool+s
foolishness)
The identification of transformations in the e#perience of holiness presents three
primary sub-.uestions6
5) >ow are the norms of the holy and the unholy transformed$
2) >ow is the *nowledge of the holy transformed$
/) >ow is the relation of the self to society in its holy and profane manifestations
reconfigured$
//
%ecause these three elements of e#perience ' norms( *nowledge( and the self+s
relation to society ' are all addressed at a profound level by the early "hristian ascetics( the
transformation elicited by the holy fools is unli*ely to be limited to simple transitions in
practical norms( the assertion of one voice in the discussion of religious *nowledge( and the
institution of one new social form of religion) Cnstead( attention will be directed to the ways in
which early "hristian ascetics and holy fools ali*e transform and undermine the activities that
ma*e norms( *nowledge( and the self-society relation possible) !hat does this mean in
practice$
1. Cn addressing norm-ma*ing activities( the holy fools insert their abnormality into the
way of life of the desert fathers and mothers through their development of the discipline of
obedience( their practices of radical dissociation( and their solutions to the practical problem
of vainglory) These disciplines are themselves practices that ma*e it possible to ta*e a critical
stance to systems of norms) 7bedience ' a dominating theme throughout ascetic literature in
late anti.uity and the early middle ages ' denies the necessity of an agent+s actions being
entirely motivated by their own will) %y brac*eting the moral ,udgment of the obedient mon*
or nun( a space for critical assessment of that ,udgment is carved out) Dissociation has a
similar function( where the moral agent becomes a stranger to herself in order to wor* on her
thought and action( and how they relate to one another) The problem of vainglory is not
simply concerned with morality( but the effects a moral action can have on the self) These are
all disciplines that wor* on norm-ma*ing activity) They do not merely change the morality
//
The a#es used here are adapted from those outlined by 9oucault in his lectures of 5;/6 cf) 9oucault( 200;6
3-8)
they have received) They are ways in which morality as such can be e#amined( assessed( and
transformed)
Against this bac*ground( the holy fools appear as challenging the holiness of ascetic
norm-ma*ing activity) They clearly embrace aspects of the religious life( but in such a way as
to clash with the values and traditions of mainstream "hristian monasticism) %y echoing
classic instances of obedient acts( practising absolute dissociation( and playing around the sin
of vainglory( they modify the way in which holiness had come to be e#perienced) They
represent a challenge to "hristian asceticism from within) This challenge is the sub,ect of part
one)
$. >ow is *nowledge of the holy produced and transformed by the holy fools$ A *ey
mode of gaining control over the production of *nowledge amongst the early "hristian
ascetics was mastery over the passions) Disciplines and practices were deployed to have an
effect on passions( which in turn allowed the thin*ing agent to e#ercise choice on how things
were represented) The ascetic production and criti.ue of *nowledge was activated both in the
realm of social *nowledge ' reconceptualising money( gender( politics ' and in that of
theology)
The holy fools continue this program of denying the institutions and practices that
support *nowledge by .uestioning the *nowledge of both the religious and secular realms)
They undermine the practices and *nowledge that configure gender( mar*et( and religion
through playing with and ma*ing contingent divisions that seemed necessary) Cn their
freedom from passion( they refuse to let holiness underwrite the present) Bod-tal* ta*es place
within the conte#t of established values and meanings) The attribution of goodness to Bod
then orders hierarchies of goodness and godliness in the world) Cn this respect( the social order
of "hristendom in late anti.uity was a theological order) >oly fools can be seen enacting a
practical apophatic theology that ta*es seriously the challenges posed by the conventions and
practices intertwined with meanings and utterances) !ith their denial of forms of life and
their play on religious acts( they perform the twin elements of apophaticism6 criti.ue and play(
or the "ia negati"a and the "ia dissimilis) Ct is such practices of *nowledge that we will
discuss in part two)
%. The holy fools address the problem of the self+s relation to society by their approach
to the universal demand of holiness) The early "hristian ascetics had appropriated the
philosophical techni.ue of fearless speech by transforming it into a hermeneutic) The
"hristian is obliged to hear true speech from anyone) The location of heroic *nowledge had
thereby been transferred from the individual philosophical spea*er to the mass of listeners(
thus posing the problem that had been underlying ancient philosophy ever since ?ocrates6 if
social and personal transformation is to be valued( who is to be re.uired and who enabled to
attain to those values$
The issue determines the holiness and the possibility of holiness for both religious and
secular) Cf the infinite demands of self-*nowledge and self-transformation are universally
obliging( then everyone has to be a mon*) Cf they apply only to a few( then the political and
personal power that results from philosophical and ascetic techni.ues is restricted to a few
aristocrats) These problems are particularly relevant to the range( public communication( and
obligations of the dogma( techni.ues( and e#perts of philosophy( and are relevant as a
framewor* of interpretation both for ancient truth-telling techni.ues and for ascetic
techni.ues of ethics li*e the humour and humility of early "hristian ascetics and holy fools) Cf
humility is a resource for the brac*eting and transformation of norms and *nowledge( how is
that resource affected if it becomes a demand rather than a choice$ And what are the political
implications of restricting the demand to a specific group of religious$
The holy fools+ response to the challenge of universal asceticism betrays a more
sophisticated approach to the self+s relation to society than might be e#pected 0outside the
ecclesiological debate ta*ing place at the time between Augustine and Pelagius2) Cn particular(
their practice of humility owes more to their fidelity to the "hristian story than to the political
and utilitarian techni.ues of their secular counterparts) As such( they are acutely aware of the
dangers of ascetic and philosophical accounts of the self that appeal to a momentous identity
that must be defended and ta*en seriously) These problems and issues are addressed in part
three)
All these three .uestions ' concerning norms( *nowledge( and the self+s relation to
society ' are part of a larger investigation6 what role does the asceticism inhabited and
transformed by the holy fools play in the theology and e#perience of holiness of their time$ Cn
order to ma*e sense whilst treating the historical problems of the bac*ground and contribution
of holy fools( C will need to assume an understanding of asceticism) Ct is unavoidable ' and
desirable ' that the understanding of asceticism be transformed by these accounts) Ct is also
necessary to mar* out a starting point)
Cn what follows( C will start by assuming that asceticism is a form of self-training that
encompasses techni.ues of physical regulation 0what one eats( where one stays( what one
produces and says2 and rational practice 0what one thin*s and says( how one feels( when and
to whom one gives an account of oneself2 with a view to determining the shape of one+s life)
Cn the conte#t of the "hristian tradition( C am particularly interested in those who aspired to
live a Hphilosophical life+( cultivating virtual and real solitude and practicing spiritual
disciplines such as fasting and regular prayer) This tradition culminates in( but is not restricted
to( the two precedents set by Pachomius 0who founded monastic institutions of the common
life ' the Hcenobites+2 and Anthony 0who initiated the tradition of "hristian desert hermits '
the Hanchorites+2) Ct is to the immediate forerunners of these 0e)g) 7rigen( "lement2 and more
importantly their e#plicit successors 0e)g) the desert fathers and mothers( %asil of "aesarea(
<vagrius of Pontus2 that C refer when C mention Hearly "hristian ascetics)+
This is not to say that the thesis is purely concerned with practical matters rather than
theoretical ' orthopra#y rather than orthodo#y( as theologians have become accustomed to
divide the field) Ct is doubtful whether this *ind of division is ever valid6 certainly the
purposes of this discussion would be hopelessly thwarted if we were to thin* the practical
elements entirely independently of the dogmatic( or "ice "ersa) Cndeed( to ta*e one e#ample(
the discussion of dispassion 0Bree*6 apat$eia2 has been repeatedly confused in secondary
literature by ignorance of either practical or dogmatic issues( instead of letting ascetic practice
throw light on the dogma of Bod+s impassibility( and vice versa) A proper integration of these
issues will attribute to dispassion a clearer relation to love( and to practical dispassion its
active character 0on which( cf) below( on page 5052)
?tudying "hristian theology and e#perience of holiness will re.uire dovetailing
considerations of practice and theory) Aecent theories of holiness have been dominated by the
description of e#perience6 holiness has become the preserve of anthropologists and
phenomenologists) Cn what follows( these approaches are partially undermined( partially
transcended) Undermined because there is no theory of an ahistorical( non-transformable
founding sub,ect behind the account given here of norms( *nowledge( and self and society)
<verything is negotiated) Transcended because the ob,ects of study are ta*en seriously as
theoreticians of holiness rather than simply vessels of e#perience)
The e#perience of holiness is intimately involved with the *nowledge of Bod)
Theology and holiness are ine#tricably lin*ed) 9or all their reticence regarding the discussion
of Bod-tal*( the desert fathers and mothers alter the way in which theology is thought by their
transformation of the practice of holiness) !itnesses can be found to this historically '
Athanasius+ thought was influenced enormously by his relationship with Anthony the Breat
and his own encounter with the desert ' and logically ' the characteristics of a holy Bod that
are ruled out by theology are bound to be selected according to criteria determined by one+s
e#perience of holy renunciation) 1inguistic reference is part of an entire language( and there
are no sections of a language that are entirely segregated from the whole( least of all the
various elements of religious language)
7ne final note on the normativity of the holy fools) !hilst C have focused on these
particular figures out of scholarly affection( C am not attempting here to present them as model
theologians or "hristians) C do not claim to Hhave found( on all essential points( the final
solution of the problems+ of Theology with this thesis)
/3
Cnstead( the portrayal of asceticism
throughout the wor* attempts to steer between the do#ological view of asceticism that has
become typical of certain Hpoetic+ ethical thin*ers(
/:
and the un.uestioning critical view that
assumes we *now precisely what is wrong with asceticism without having to state it)
Cn theological terms( this thesis is written under the aegis of the doctrine of creatio e5
ni$ilo) Nothing is assumed to be evil at the outset( but neither is anything unambiguous) <ven
the modern prison can be a tool for art and a beautiful life
/4
K even heartfelt worship of Bod
can become the conte#t of oppression and slavery) A paradigmatic case of non-evil
ambiguous practice is the ascetic aspiration to humility)
>umility is a recurring theme in this thesis) Ct is the virtue lying behind the criti.ue of
norms inherent in the foolish re,ection of vainglory in part oneK it drives the positing of
contingency in the criti.ue of *nowledge in part twoK it ultimately becomes problematic as
constituting the relation of the self to society in part three) Ct plays a vital distinguishing role
in the practice of negative theology6 is Bod un*nowable because our *nowledge is faulted or
because ?he is mysterious$
/8
Ct is the main ob,ective of most of the ascetic techni.ues we shall
spea* of in this study) Ct is also( however( a main ob,ective for techni.ues of governmentality6
that we should *now our tiny and insignificant place in the world) The negotiation of these
difficulties ' between abandoning humility and manipulating itK between espousing it and
enforcing it ' is an ongoing problem solved neither by the holy fools nor by any theory of
asceticism that C have encountered)
The merit of the holy fools is their assertion of contingency in an established ascetic
order) The contemporary relevance of this study of asceticism could be brought out by a study
/3
!ittgenstein( 545L525M6 introduction)
/:
This would apply to anyone wanting to construct their Hlife as a wor* of art+( but C am thin*ing specifically of
Nehamas( 5; McBushin( 2008 7U1eary( 2002)
/4
see 7scar !ilde+s ecstatic appreciation of his prison e#perience in de pro.undis6 !ilde( 2008L55/M)
/8
This is the theme in Turner+s recent magisterial treatment in Turner( 2003( where he suggests that we should
not thin* Bod to e#ist in a banal contained way( but that we have never really understood e#istence)
of the ways in which we are tempted and re.uired to reflect upon our own training of the self
today( which could include analyses of popular psychology( secular repentance( care
institutions( or national insurances)
/;
Cn order to see how these disciplines are neither evil nor
unambiguous( though( they will have to appear in their contingency and e#posure to
description) Cn short( their holiness must be ta*en away) Ct is precisely this process ' the
deprivation of the holiness of everyday values ' that the holy fools enable) Not in order to
condemn 0mon*s( for e#ample( are both ridiculed and commended2( but in order to clear a
space for thought( laughter and evaluation) Cn order to see the world as creation6 as divine( but
not Bod)
Ct is in the conte#t of this ambiguity and art that the holy fools have a great deal to say
about contemporary and ancient asceticism( through their infinite demands( their
transcendence of ethics( their laughter( and their moc*ery of heterogeneity) That is the tenor
of my dodgy do#ology)
/;
in short( it could include all the devices and domains studied by contemporary governmentality studies 0C am
thin*ing particularly of those inspired by foucauldians "olin Bordon and Ni*olas Aose2( for which( see %arry( et
al)( 54 %urchell( et al)( 55)
2/
1: Becoming Unnormal
!it( an Ht be thy will( put me into good foolingV Those wits that thin* they have thee(
do very oft prove foolsK and C( that am sure C lac* thee( may pass for a wise manK for
what says Wuinapalus$ H%etter a witty fool than a foolish wit)+
5
!hat is the nature of the transgression of holy fools$ At what level is their challenge
to the norms of their ascetic bac*ground pitched$ >ow do they conform to and transform the
tradition of ascetic self-ostracism( and what practices allow this transformation$
Cn this first part( we will address the way in which norms are formed( enforced( and
transgressed in the ascetic conte#t in which holy fools narratives are set) !e will set aside the
various debates on specific casuistry ' how long a mon* should fast for( how to deal with
persistent family trouble( whether to visit other mon*s ' and focus on attitudes to rulings(
issues of conformity( and the ,udgement of success and failure in ascetic morality) Attention
will in this way not simply be paid to the fact of the transformation of holiness( but its
technology)
Cn order to e#amine norms at such a level( we will first elucidate a prominent mode of
moral action in the asceticism of late anti.uity( namely obedience( and as* how it was
transformed in the tradition of the holy fools) Then we will turn to the minimalist trend in
monasticism( and in particular what was reserved from the ma#im to renounce all received
norms) This will reveal an entire economy of conformity and transcendence regarding ascetic
rules) 9inally( we will address two interpretations of holy fools+ relation to their ascetic
bac*ground( in terms of the casuistry of vainglory 0itself a mode of relating to moral value2(
and the practice of dissociation from self and society)
A note on ascetic sources6 this part will primarily consist in an interpretation of the
&pop$t$egmata Patrum collections) A strange choice( perhaps( because they are famously
unreliable as historical material)
2
They originated as oral tradition( and we only have te#tual
translations)
/
They cover an e#tensive period of time 0at least the length of the fourth century2(
and there is substantial evidence of heavy editing on the part of later generations)
5
?ha*espeare( 5;6 CC):
2
?ee Aubenson( 5:6 5; for some reasons for this)
/
Cntroduction to the te#tual problems can be found in Buy+s introduction to the Bree* ?ystematic te#ts( in
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: 2/-/:( and in "hryssavgis( 200/6 -55 >armless( 20006 3;3-3;4)
23
Their status in the tradition( however( is unparalleled) 1ater witnesses such as Eosimus
0.l) 38:-:2:2
3
( fathers %arsanuphius and Dohn 0.l) :20-::0$2
:
( Dohn Moschus 0.l) :8;-452
4
and
Dohannes "limacus 0:8:-4:02
8
demonstrate the stature of the te#ts in the period of ?ymeon of
<mesa 0portrayed as living around ::0K presented by <vagrius ?cholasticus as a contemporary
of %arsanuphius2 and his hagiographers 0<vagrius ?cholasticus( .l) :0-400K 1eontius of
Napolis( .l) 435-432) The fame of the desert fathers and mothers 0who are more or less
defined for later generations by these te#ts2 was such that some of the most renowned church
fathers and mothers 0Derome( <vagrius Ponticus( Dohn "hrysostom( "assian2 were connected
to them) !e also have records of various ,ourneys into the desert on the part of prominent
theologians and "hristian figures)
;
There is good reason to believe that versions of these te#ts
were being read by those who read holy fool hagiography( and indeed those who witnessed
holy fools 0to the e#tent that the hagiography reflects historical e#perience2)
Ct should further be noted that the very earliest holy fool ' which is to say 0in this
thesis2( the first story illustrating the word Hsalos+ ' comes from a story which found its way
into the 1atin collection of the &pop$t$egmata Patrum) The story of the nun from the
Tabennesiotes cloister( whom later tradition named Csidora( is probably to be found in its
earliest form in Palladius+ 3ausiac 6istory)
:
Augustinus( lib.art.: CCC)vii)25) This e#pression of cosmology appears throughout the corpus( e)g) in Augustinus(
de trin.: =)5 0prologue2 Augustinus( de ci". dei: P)( PCC)5(3)
4
Diogenes( "it. p$il.: =CC)5)500)
8
Diogenes( "it. p$il.: P)5//)
;
"icero( tusc. disp.: C=)=CCC)
9
"lemens( str.: C)58( my translation.
;
!e can thus see that both philosophers and theologians of the Bree* and 1atin world
of late anti.uity used the practice of praise and blame to identify and e#press the good in the
world and to establish a moral language concerning actions)
50
Cn the light of this standard e#pression of late anti.ue ethics( the practice of early
"hristian ascetics stands out as unusual) To re,ect praise and blame is not a simple act of
modesty6 that would only account for the re,ection of praise) To re,ect blame as well is to
refuse to accept potentially useful criticism) Ct is the re,ection of moral ,udgment per se) ?o
desert fathers refuse to blame themselves( in a phrase reminiscent of Paul)
55
Cn order to grasp
this re,ection( we need to understand it as a reaction against the ethical *nowledge of late
anti.ue society itself( rather than as simply the association of a favourable self-assessment
with vanity( flattery( or self-deception)
This is not to say that the re,ection of praise is the innovation of early "hristian
ascetics6 we may see a similar re,ection in many of the sources ,ust appealed to) !e could say
that on the level of principle( praise and blame was the way in which to thin* ethics( whereas
on the level of practice( it was re,ected)
Amongst stoic philosophers( for e#ample( this was all a part of the program originating
in Plato of separating oneself from the opinions of the masses) A philosopher is to guard his
thought by not engaging in conversation that is entirely independent of truth( the *ind of
conversation that in fact ensures the smooth running of society)
52
>ence the philosophical
topos of the re,ection of small tal*)
%ut rarely( and when occasion re.uires you to tal*( tal*( indeed( but about no ordinary topics)
Do not tal* about gladiators( or horse-races( or athletes( or things to eat and drin* ' topics that
arise on all occasionsK but above all( do not tal* about people( either blaming( or praising( or
comparing them) Cf( then( you can( by your own conversation bring over that of your
companions to what is seemly) %ut if you happen to be left alone in the presence of aliens( *eep
silence)
5/
The avoidance of praise and blame also comes under the theme of re,ecting imperfect
goods) The praise of other people is a temptation( a good that seems satisfying but which can
50
9or further e#amples of uncritical use of praise and blame for the substantives Hgood+ and Hbad+( see <vagrius(
ep. ad mel.: /3( :0( :3 <vagrius( sc$ol. in eccl.: :5( :2( :4 0:56 Ht|oi, poyooiv C t toivtoi,+ 2
55
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Paphnutius /( Agathon 2 O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: PC)2 O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: PC);
%asilius( $om. 2 and Paul+s statements in 5 "orinthians 3)/)
52
This understanding of opinion and society has most recently been put forward in %adiou( 2005L5;M) "f) the
>adot .uotation above( on page /)
5/
<pictetus( Enc$.: ###iii)
0
not be relied upon( as others can be mista*en either in their good opinion of you 0flattery2 or
in their bad 0resentment2)
?igns of one who is ma*ing progress are6 >e censures no one( praises no one( blames no one(
finds fault with no one( says nothing about himself as though he were somebody or *new
something) !hen he is hampered or prevented( he blames himself) And if anyone compliments
him( he smiles to himself at the person complimentingK while if anyone censures him( he ma*es
no defense)
53
%oth these tendencies can be seen amongst the early "hristian ascetics) Their practice
of silence is particularly imposed in relation to small tal* and the assessment of others) The
theme of being entirely neutral to praise and blame is also attested6
Mee*ness is a permanent condition of that soul which remains unaffected by whether or not it is
spo*en well of( whether or not it is honoured or praised) X The first stage of blessed patience is
to accept dishonour with bitterness and anguish of soul) The intermediate stage is to be free
from pain amid all such things) The perfect stage( if that is attainable( is to thin* of dishonour as
praise) 1et the first re,oice and the second be strong( but blessed be the third( for he e#ults in the
1ord)
5:
There is reason to believe( however( that certain desert "hristians achieved this
independence in ,udgement more thoroughly than their secular counterparts) !here <pictetus(
for e#ample( accepts all negative ,udgement dealt him by strangers and ignores flattery( early
"hristian ascetics had an altogether more neutral attitude) The e#amination of conscience was
an established practice amongst early "hristian ascetics( but when it comes to reacting to
flattery( young mon*s are encouraged to disregard all thoughts of guilt) The good is good
whether it is done in order to achieve glory or for its own sa*e)
54
?o the practice of praise and blame is both less and more than we originally implied) Ct
is less than a "hristian contribution to the problem of ethical reference6 praise and blame were
a mode of e#pressing *nowledge of morality common to a wide variety of thin*ers in late
anti.uity) Ct is more than a form of e#pressing values6 conceptualising the practice enabled
thin*ers to isolate and assess their development of ethical *nowledge) ?o that discussion of
53
<pictetus( Enc$.: #lviii) 7ther e#amples of re,ecting praise as an imperfect good can be found among both the
philosophers and theologians of late anti.uity6 <vagrius( de orat.: 30 Moschus( prat.: 5:/)
5:
"limacus( scal.: ?tep ;)) "f) also ?tep 2:( $. mon.: P)55 %arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 352)
54
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: PCCC)4( 5 O &pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Poemen :5( ?arah 8 O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: PCCC)4
%arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 20 "limacus( scal.: ?tep 526 Hif a few drops of vainglory fall on you( what
harm$ Provided of course( that you become a source of profit to many)+
5
the praiseworthiness of certain practices or phenomena could then develop into discussion of
the usefulness of moral assessment) !hilst ancient philosophers too* sceptical attitudes
towards the usefulness of positive moral assessment( early "hristian ascetics adopted a critical
stance towards moral *nowledge per se( as it was e#pressed in the practices of praise and
blame) This is the first aspect to be noted of the ascetic practice of moral *nowledge)
2.1.2: %eat#: escaping (rom et#ics
There is more to be said about this technological stance( however) !e are interested
not simply in the fact of a critical distance between the ascetic and the construction of
*nowledge) There still remains the .uestion of how this critical distance was conceived) !hat
practices motivated( produced( and enacted the ascetic scepticism towards moral *nowledge$
The practice of death has already been mentioned elsewhere in this thesis 0cf) above(
on page 342) Death was a multivalent notion in the practice of early "hristian ascetics(
however) !e saw how it related to Bod+s ,udgement and acted as a place-holder for
transcendence in the desert and madness) Ct also has a function with regard to the practice of
human ,udgement)
The force of spea*ing death in the above-mentioned practices has been death as the
locus of ,udgement and death as the lac* of being) Cn other conte#ts( however( it is thought as
independence from the desire of the world) Death is not concerned with status or ,udgement)
Ct is of another order( which can not compete or react to the blessings and abuses of the world)
"rucially for us( death is not affected by praise or blame) The paradigmatic story that
demonstrates this( whilst found in many forms and sources( probably derives from the
teaching of Macarius the <gyptian 0c) /00-/02)
A brother came to see Abba Macarius the <gyptian( and said to him( HAbba( give me a word(
that C may be saved)+ ?o the old man said( HBo to the cemetery and abuse the dead)+ The brother
went there( abused them and threw stones at themK then he returned and told the old man about
it) The latter said to him( HDidn+t they say anything to you$+ >e replied( HNo)+ The old man said(
HBo bac* tomorrow and praise them)+ ?o the brother went away and praised them( calling them(
HApostles( saints and righteous men)+ >e returned to the old man and said to him( HC have
complimented them)+ And the old man said to him( HDid they not answer you$+ The brother said
no) The old man said to him( HQou *now how you insulted them and they did not reply( and how
you praised them and they did not spea*K so you too if you wish to be saved must do the same
2
and become a dead man) 1i*e the dead( ta*e no account of either the scorn of men or their
praises( and you can be saved)
58
>ere the ideal is a paralysis of all feelings that react to praise and blame) The image
implies a non-reaction to the movements of the passions provo*ed by others 0as we saw in the
case of the obedient mon* above( on page /32) Macarius e#horts the mon* to be at a
completely other level to the ,udgements of men) The aim is not a positive virtue 0mee*ness(
generosity2( but complete neutrality)
5;
7ther versions of this story are more stri*ing in their refusal to recommend a particular
way of life) Ct becomes obvious that this is not a specific and concrete "hristian virtue when
Anoub uses the e#ample of a stone idol to demonstrate the monastic life)
5
>ere once again(
the emphasis is put on negative virtues6 HDid it get angry$ No) Did it refuse to forgive$ No)+
Anoub+s fellow mon*s are being e#horted to inaction)
=ersions of this edificatory story can be discovered in foundational te#ts for ancient
"hristian asceticism) Macarius the <gyptian was the leaderSinitiator of the famous ?cetis
community( and Anoub is spea*ing to the community around Poemen( responsible for
preserving the sayings of the desert fathers)
20
?o it perhaps comes as no surprise that the story
should e#emplify a virtue central to the monastic enterprise( namely that of apat$eia) Cf we
are to understand the force of death in its meaning of the re,ection of values( we must see it in
its relation to the re,ection of passions) This *ind of interpretation of death will be vindicated
if it is also the case that the practice of apat$eia in late anti.ue asceticism also functioned to
negate the canons of *nowledge and veridiction practiced in the society of late anti.uity)
>ow is the virtue of apat$eia related to the re,ection of moral *nowledge amongst
early "hristian ascetics$ The understanding of the early "hristian concept of apat$eia is
fraught with difficulties) Ct is set in a web of meanings with a long history(
25
and even longer
conse.uences)
A few problems should be highlighted at the outset) The first is a commonplace of
modern literature on the topic6 whilst it is tempting to translate the Bree* apat$eia 0and the
1atin impassibilis2 with the <nglish Hapathy+( such an understanding would serve only to ta*e
58
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Macarius 2/ O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P)38)
5;
"limacus( scal.: ?tep ;)
5
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Anoub 5 O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: P=)55 O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P=)52) "f) also the
comparison of death and the eradication of passions in ?ymeon the New Theologian 5;06 PPC=)/)
20
According to >armless( 20006 3;3)
25
A large part of this history is traced in ?orab,i( 20006 C draw on his wor* particularly in reference to the ancient
philosophers in this section)
/
us further from that of the early "hristian ascetics( for whom the attainment of apat$eia was
the result of e#treme effort and ascetic e#ertion)
A further distraction in these studies has been the relation of the doctrine to
Pelagianism) Although not always ac*nowledged e#plicitly( the pelagian debate must be the
cause of such studies
22
that avidly pursue the .uestion of whether a human can attain to
apat$eia in this life( to which <vagrius of Pontus ' the most prominent theorist of the sub,ect
' was frustratingly ambiguous) This .uestion need not detain us long6 it is usually associated
with the understanding of apat$eia as a condition of prayer ' and so related to the later
tradition of hesychasm in %y&antine theology
2/
' rather than a practice of asceticism( and so
does not affect our .uestion) Ct is clearly a practical ideal for Bod and humanity( whether it is
achievable on earth or not( and that is enough for our argument)
A good translation may therefore be Hdispassion+) This has a number of advantages6
firstly( it is borne out by etymology 0pat$os D passion2K secondly( it answers to the
bac*ground( entrenched as it is in the .uestion of human passionsK thirdly( it reflects the
practical implications of the concept 0which we will e#amine below2K and fourthly( it solves
the problem of partial apat$eia( as the soul can achieve freedom from some passions and not
others( and still grammatically be attributed with apat$eia ' dissociated from a passion)
23
Cn our literature( the passions were almost e#clusively understood as a problem and an
e#cess( and whatever the tradition they inherited may have thought about the desirability or
otherwise of the passions( certainly the desert fathers and mothers with few e#ceptions
2:
understood them as part of the networ* of sin and temptation)
The technology developed for dealing with passions in anti.uity was already comple#
by the time of the birth of monasticism with ?t Anthony the Breat) "ertain ?toic philosophers
had boiled the e#perience of negative passions down to two ,udgements6 an evaluation of the
favourability of the circumstances( and the appropriateness of a response) Cn this respect(
passions could be isolated( discussed( and acted upon) Ct is this *ind of attitude that constitutes
the ancient technologies of the self(
24
or Htherapies of the emotions+ in ?orab,i+s phrase)
28
22
Aasmussen( 200: is typical in this respect)
2/
9or which( cf) 1oss*y( 584)
23
1inge has a similar account( whereby apat$eia can be thought both as techni.ue and as condition - 1inge(
20006 ::8)
2:
Noted in !are( 5; !illiams( 5/)
24
9oucault( 2000cL5;2M)
28
?orab,i( 2000)
3
That passions can be treated and manipulated was the consensus view amongst ancient
philosophers( and by far the most important method was to introduce further passions)
2;
The
schools of philosophy would then differ as regards ta#onomy of passions( the role of the will
in passions( and the ideal attitude towards passions( all in relation to their various theories of
the soul) 7ne debate( for e#ample( was the e#tent to which passions should be eliminated
0apat$eia2( or controlled 0metriopat$eia2( a discussion which was to survive into the theology
of early "hristian ascetics)
The early "hristian ascetics retained this attitude towards the passions as another
aspect of the "hristian philosophy) Cn order to understand the ideal of apat$eia( we shall have
to give an account of their thought concerning the passions)
The passions were regularly thought of in terms of politics) Ct was not simply a
.uestion of suffering from distasteful passions( but of ruling them( or being ruled) !hilst
treatments and ideals concerning passions varied in anti.uity( most early "hristian ascetics
held this in common6 that the passions are to be defeated
2
and governed)
/0
Cn their turn(
passions can dominateK
/5
enslaveK
/2
attac*(
//
and move)
/3
At this point the uniformity ceases( however) "hristian treatments of passions are
almost as wide-ranging as those of the ancient philosophers) A diverse collection of sayings
such as the &pop$t$egmata Patrum
/:
brings out a number of contrasts nicely)
5) 7ne solution to the affliction of the passions is to Hlove LagapAsonM all conflicting
passions( and your passions will abate+)
/4
Another passage( in an e.uivalent conte#t
0a list of e#hortations to a young mon* in the form of commands( all in the aorist
imperative2 recommends e#actly the opposite6 Hhate the passionsV+)
/8
2) 7n the level of cosmology( there is disagreement as to the nature of the passions6
whilst one mon* categorises three distinct forms of attac*( whereby the flesh is
2;
cf) 7lympiodorus+ summary in ?orab,i( 20006 chapter 5)
2
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: PC=)22 <vagrius( de orat.: 5/:)
/0
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: C=):8 <vagrius( sc$ol. in luc.: 3 <vagrius( e5cerpts: 2/)
/5
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: C)55)
/2
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: PC)/5 lib. grad.: =CC); <vagrius( de orat.: 85)
//
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: =CC)52)
/3
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: CP)2:f <vagrius( de orat.: 8/)
/:
for the formation of the &pop$t$egmata Patrum( see above( on page 2/)
/4
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: =):/)
/8
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: PC):0)
:
different from passions which are different from demons(
/;
others refer specifically
to Hthe passions of the flesh+)
/
/) There is also a variety of ta#onomies of passions) 7n the one hand( passions are
simply negative attitudes and actions( li*e 0predictably2 fornication( unbridled
speechSgossip( and vainglory)
30
7n the other( they appear as direct temptations
towards good things li*e money( honour( and rest)
35
?ome of the mon*s appear to
ma*e finer distinctions between passions( whereby they each represent various
routes to wrongdoing)
32
The .uestion of responding to passions( however( did form a discussion that drew
various schools of asceticism together( with a common language and aim( in spite of the
varying theories and cosmologies underlying them) 7ut of the different accounts of the
passions( there arise debates over specific .uestions of application) The mon*s discuss the
e#tent to which they should yield to the passions(
3/
how to trace the origin of the passions(
33
and of course how to oppose them( to gain control over them) !hilst theories diverged( the
shared pro,ect of dealing with passions enabled a conversation)
The advice given is in *eeping with the ascetic techni.ues we have seen above) The
mon* is told to guard the heart
3:
so the passion does not produce *nowledge in the eyes( the
tongue( and pass into deeds) Ct is also important to spea* one+s passion(
34
,ust as they would
spea* or write their thoughts 0cf) above( on page 482) Again( the desert fathers and mothers
were a lot clearer about the technology of the passions than they were about their theory and
nature) Thoughts had to be *ept free from passions( or they would draw the ascetic into
illusions about self and the world) The practice of dispassion was the most important
technology of *nowledge amongst early "hristian ascetics)
/;
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: =):3)
/
ta pat$A tAs sar,os6 &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: C=)20K pat$A ta sar,i,A6 &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: PC)/4 <vagrius(
cap. paraen.: CCC)4) HPassions of the soul+ is also a standard e#pression6 %arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 82
"limacus( scal.: ?teps 3 and 5:)
30
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: =)/3( P)55S3( =CCC)4)
35
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: PC)/0)
32
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: =):5)
3/
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P)/;)
33
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: CCC):0( =)/8 <vagrius( Eulog.: 2)/5)
3:
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P=CCC)2/( cf) above( on page :;)
34
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: =CC))
4
7ne of the most sophisticated thin*ers concerning the passions in late anti.uity is
numbered amongst the desert fathers( namely <vagrius of Pontus 0.l. /;:-/2) Drawing upon
a wealth of learning from the philosophical schools( and having sat at the feet of central desert
fathers such as Macarius of Ale#andria and Macarius the Breat of <gypt( he was to e#ert an
influence upon "hristianity entirely out of proportion with the number of wor*s preserved
under his name) Cn the <ast( he was a main proponent of the 7rigenist school( and the hero of
church historian and politician AufinusK in the !est( he provides the inspiration for the wor*
of his disciple( Dohn "assian) Cn his wor*( we find that rare phenomenon6 a consistent and
systematised ascetic theology)
<vagrius Ponticus is perhaps most famous for being the "hristian originator of the
seven deadly sins( although he started with a list of nine( which he then boiled down to eight
38
0Bregory the Breat reduced them further to seven2( and didn+t ,ust term them vices 0although
his successors in both <ast and !est did2) <vagrius Ponticus is uni.ue in holding to a
ta#onomy of passions( thus helping us to understand apat$eia better)
Apart from his boo* on the nine vices(
3;
<vagrius Ponticus is fairly consistent with his
list of eight( which are6
5) gluttony
2) fornication
/) avarice 0philarguria ' literally Hlove of money+2
3) sadness
:) anger
4) acedia 0listnessness ' the Hmidday demon+2
8) vainglory
;) pride)
3
They correspond 0somewhat artificially2 to eight virtues6
:0
5) abstinence
2) chastity
/) freedom from possessions
3) ,oy
38
The Height vices+ survived for some time in the <astern ascetic tradition6 "limacus( scal.: ?tep 5/( although he
sides with BregoryUs seven in ?tep 22)
3;
<vagrius( de "itiis)
3
A list that echoes this can be found in %arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 5/8%6 Hgluttony( fornication( avarice(
sorrow( despondency( anger( wrath( gossip( hatred( vainglory( pride+
:0
<vagrius( de "itiis)
8
:) patience
4) perseverance
8) freedom from vainglory
;) humility)
Cn this way( the eight list up the plural and various ways in which an ascetic can be led
astray) !hilst it is tempting to treat these as an e#haustive list( <vagrius Ponticus+ comments
on these 0which act as a framewor* for various parts of his writings2 enlarge on and e#pand
the list e#tensively) %esides the ninth temptation of ,ealousy 0opposed to Hfreedom from
,ealousy+2
:5
( he also writes of the passions of licentiousness(
:2
irascibility(
:/
and others)
?o is this a list of passions$ 7r a list of eight deadly sins$ The .uestion is at times
difficult to answer6 some of <vagrius Ponticus+ treatments of this list ta*e the form of sayings
selected under these categories( so the definition of the categories is entirely editorial) The
most obvious reference for the list( for e#ample( is a boo* that bears the title H7n the <ight
Thoughts+)
:3
?ome manuscripts( however( have the title H7n the <ight ?pirits of !ic*edness+(
and the te#t opens 0with the chapter on gluttony2 with the words6
5) Abstinence is the origin of fruitfulness( the blossom and beginning of the practical life) S 2)
>e who controls the stomach diminishes the passionsK he who is overcome by food gives
increase to pleasures) S /) HAmale* was the first of the nations+ 0Num) 236202K and gluttony is
t$e .irst o. t$e passions)
::
?o the titles suggest conceiving of gluttony as a thought or a spirit of wic*edness(
whereas the contents immediately suggest understanding it as a passion) Ct is not always
editing that throws up problems( however) Cn general( the items in the list are e#plicitly given
four different manifestations6 vice( thought( passion( and demonSspirit) %ut when <vagrius
Ponticus is writing about the items themselves( he does not seem to care which of these he is
referring to) The list of nine refers e#plicitly to vices( and yet when describing the interaction
between vainglory( ,ealousy( and pride( he calls them Hthe three-strand chain of vices( the
threefold poisonous mi#ture of passions( the threefold tongue of heretics)+
:4
?imilarly( in the Pra,ti,os( <vagrius Ponticus uses the list to describe thoughts
0e#haustively6 unli*e the multiform passions( there are only eight possible categories of
:5
<vagrius( de "itiis: ;)
:2
<vagrius( oct. spir.: 2)50)
:/
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: 5/)
:3
<vagrius( oct. spir.
::
<vagrius( oct. spir.: 5( emphasis mine)
:4
<vagrius( de "itiis: 8)
;
Hthought+2( together with their remedies( before changing tac* in order to move on to the
sub,ect of passions) >e introduces the fifth thought of anger( however( with the words H&nger
is a passion that arises very .uic*ly)+
:8
All these factors have led commentators to assume
0rather bra&enly2 that passions( thoughts( demons( and vices are the same thing for <vagrius
Ponticus)
:;
<vagrius Ponticus+ lists are therefore not the place to loo* for a consistent theory of
how thoughts( passions( demons( and sins relate) All we can say from these te#ts is that they
all can manifest in instances of one of the 0at least2 eight categories described above) This
does not( however( mean that <vagrius Ponticus has no theory for how the thoughts and
passions wor*ed) 7utside of the lists themselves( he has a very coherent account 0pace
?inc*ewitc&2)
:
Cn order to discern this( however( we will need to pay very close attention to
his use of the terms Hthought+( passion+( Hvice+ and Hdemon+ and concentrate less on which
temptation is being treated at the time) The ,ustification for this e#egesis is the hermeneutical
assumption that a te#t is coherent rather than incoherent) Assuming that the author neglected
to distinguish between the passion of gluttony and the thought of gluttony simply because he
was elucidating gluttony rather than thoughts and passions( what distinctions does he ma*e
when e#plaining thoughts and passions$
Ct is my hypothesis that <vagrius Ponticus not only systematised the temptations into
eight 0or more2 *inds( but that he in turn systematised them into four different manifestations)
?o in all( <vagrius Ponticus is noticing at least /2 03#;2 operations6 the thought( passion(
demon( and vice of gluttony( then the thought( passion( demon and vice of fornication( and so
on)
?orab,i
40
has argued that <vagrius Ponticus+ Hthoughts+ are his conception of what
?eneca calls Hfirst movements+( which is to say the involuntary reaction to an e#ternal
phenomenon( for e#ample salivating at the smell of lamb chops( tensing one+s muscles on
hearing a gunshot( etc) They are unavoidable( they resemble more substantial emotions
0eagerness( fear2( and they may only last a moment)
!hether or not all these thoughts trouble the soul is not within our powerK but it is for us to
decide if they are to linger within us or not and whether or not they stir up the passions)
45
:8
<vagrius( Pra,t.: 55( emphasis mine)
:;
!are( 5;6 /58f Aasmussen( 200:6 53)
:
?in*ewic&( 200/6 intro( p) ##v) 1inge also claims that <vagrius pursues no ideas in a systematically connected
way in 1inge( 20006 :35)
40
?orab,i( 20006 /:f)
45
<vagrius( Pra,t.: 4)
?o much for the relation between thoughts and passions) The picture is elaborated
somewhat when <vagrius Ponticus applies it to perception and interpretation) >ere the
distinction is not simply one of succession( but of mental act) !hilst he simply appeared
confused in his account of the eight categories above( the acuity of this analysis of perception
is remar*able) Cn his account of the phenomenology of the temptation of greed( he
distinguishes precisely the elements we attempted to prise apart above6
?uppose the thought of avarice is sent by Lthe enemyMK distinguish within this thought the mind
that received it( the mental representation of gold( the gold itself( and the passion of avariceK
then as* which of these elements is a sin) Cs it the mind$ %ut how$ Ct is the image of Bod) %ut
can it be the mental representation of gold$ And who in his right mind would ever say this$
Does the gold itself constitute sin$ Then for what purpose was it created$ Ct follows therefore
that the fourth element is the cause of the sin( namely( that which is not an ob,ect with
substantial subsistence( nor the mental representation of an ob,ect( nor even the incorporeal
mind( but a pleasure hostile to humanity( born of free will( and compelling the mind to ma*e
improper use of the creatures of Bod6
42
>ere the relation between thoughts( passions( and sins is cleared up) The innocent
mind innocuously represents a morally neutral ob,ect( but the representation is attached to the
passion of avarice( which compels to sinful action) !e have a se.uence of thought-passion-
vice) The .uestion of demons is also implied) Time and again( demons are portrayed as
suggesting a thought or a passion 0more often than not( the two are connected in the memory2(
and the ascetic may decide what to do about this new *nowledge) The passion would then
have the character of a Hfirst movement+ that reacts to the initial thought) %y inserting a moral
evaluation in the middle of this se.uence( <vagrius Ponticus is ma*ing an attempt to gain
control over his *nowledge) !hilst assuming an analysis of human action that involves a self
beset with e#ternal and historical constraints( he resists a deterministic account that assumes
the passi"ity of the self) The passions denote a motivation to action and ,udgement that is not
constituted by the moral agent( and as such threaten the ascetic+s freedom) %ut where freedom
is threatened( it can also resist) 9or this reason( a control over and renunciation of the passions
is in *eeping with self-determination)
This portrayal of the demons in <vagrius Ponticus elaborates on the .uestion of
agency that has been implicit throughout the discussion of the passions) The ascetics struggle
against demons not simply because of the process demon-thought-passion-sin) They struggle
42
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: 5)
500
for self-determinacy)
4/
They struggle for the control of their own thoughts) <vagrius Ponticus+
advice is not simply HDo not fall into sin+( but H!e must not obey themV+)
43
The ideal ascetic
is not simply good( but is H*ingless+)
4:
<vagrius Ponticus+ ascetico-technical brilliance is not limited to his ta#onomy of the
passions however) >e furthers the ascetic tradition with his methods of achieving dispassion)
As we saw above( analysis and the e#amination of thoughts and conscience is an important
aspect of this( which will form an element of a number of different methods) 7ne techni.ue
he is well *nown for( though( is that of using the demons against each other)
This particular method of attaining to dispassion ta*es advantage of the theories
outlined above6 the passions and thoughts can be divided up according to the same categories
as the demons and vices) Not all thoughts are sinful( however) And not all categories are
compatible) ?o if one is able to have a thought without it eliciting a passion( then that thought
is morally neutral) Cf it is a *ind of temptation incompatible with that of the current enemy
0<vagrius Ponticus recommends the use of anger against tempting demonsK
44
one can imagine
it being particularly effective against sadness or acedia 0the si#th vice( on page 422( it can be
used against that enemy( even if they do not have the same status 0e)g) a thought against a
demon( etc2)
The demon of vainglory is opposed to the demon of fornication( and it is impossible for them to
attac* the soul at the same time( since the former promises honours and the latter is the
forerunner of dishonour) Therefore( if one of these approaches and presses hard upon you( then
fashion within yourself the thoughts of the opposing demon) And if you should be able( as the
saying goes( to *noc* out one nail with another( *now that you are near the frontiers of
impassibility Lapat$eiaM( for your mind found the strength to annihilate the thoughts of the
demon by means of human thoughts)
48
>ere the distinction between demons and thoughts is employed effectively) The
demon is not the same as( but ma*es use of thoughts) 9ar from mi#ing up the various forms in
4/
<vagrius( sc$ol. in luc.: 3)
43
<vagrius( Pra,t.: 22K "f) also the theme in the lib. grad.: P=)4( et passim Moschus( prat.: 3:)
4:
abasileutos ' <vagrius( cap. 555iii: 5)/) cf) also <vagrius( $ypo.: /( where apat$eia is associated with
resistance to principalities and powers)
44
<vagrius( sc$ol. in eccl.: :4 <vagrius( de.in.: 55)
48
<vagrius( Pra,t.: :;) "f) also <vagrius( e5cerpts: 3/ 0fornication against vainglory2) "limacus attempts to
combat vainglory with gluttony( but without the nuanced distinction between vice and passion6 "limacus( scal.:
?tep 53) >e does the same with the demons and passions of vainglory and anger in ?tep 22( and the thoughts and
demons of gluttony and vainglory in ?tep 24)
505
which fornication can manifest itself( this techni.ue is reliant upon clear distinctions in the
cosmology of the passions( thoughts( and demons)
Cn spite of the at times rather vague cosmology( and the wor*+s resistance to .uestions
concerning perfection and the enumeration of passions( <vagrius Ponticus+ writings
e#emplify a thoroughgoing ascetic theory and a systematic phenomenology of the mind) >is
thoughts concerning dispassion reveal a technology of ob,ective *nowledge( where passions
are neutralised for the sa*e of the cultivation of freedom and virtue) !here passions( reacting
immediately to praise and blame( draw the ascetic towards evaluation and desire( ascetic
practices resist relating to the world in such an unreflective way( based on the *nowledge of
received values)
The early "hristian ascetics+ dispassion was not a virtue of passive spiritual docility(
but a practice designed to have an effect on *nowledge( as a form of scepticism and criti.ue
of *nowledges that appear as given( mediated by tradition and habit) As 9oucault describes
the concept among ?toics and <picureans( HNot having passions is no longer having any
passivity+)
4;
Ct is not an adherence to the soul over against fleshly passionK it is not static
tran.uillity( and it is not a divine lac* of activity) All these attitudes might be complicit with
the world+s *nowledge) The difficulty of holding these two thoughts together ' that dispassion
means non-reaction to provocation and that it is a robust state of activity ' has caused a
number of problems in the secondary literature)
4
This analysis does not simply rely upon the theories of <vagrius Ponticus) The refusal
of passions was always meant to wor* against inactivity) 7ne of the passions to be re,ected is
that of rest 0Bree*6 anapausis2( which hinders the ascetic from progressing)
80
The passion of
vainglory is particularly dangerous for god-tal*( as it persuades the thin*er that he has arrived
at the right concept of Bod)
85
?o the person who is free from the passions would naturally not
be inactive) <vagrius Ponticus+ fifth temptation is sadness) The passion of sadness is
characterised by encumbrance and lac* of movement) Ct is li*e apat$eia+s evil twin6
82
it
resembles dispassion but is in reality a muffling of all virtue and goodness) ?omething similar
could be said for the passion of acedia 0vice 4( on page 42)
8/
4;
9oucault( 2008L2003M6 58;)
4
Aasmussen( 200:6 5:: "hryssavgis( 200/6 :;) Ct lies at the root of modern theology+s an#ieties concerning the
impassibility of Bod)
80
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: PC)/0) ?leep is also counted a passion in %arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 254)
85
<vagrius( de orat.: 82f( 554)
82
<vagrius( oct. spir.: 52 0:)5:2) A point also made in 1inge( 20006 :43n/2)
8/
<vagrius( oct. spir.: 54 08)202 )
502
The grammar of the passion of vainglory has the same structure) Ascetics who listen to
praise for their actions have no further need of struggle) They have arrived at their ob,ective
and received their reward) 9or this reason( <vagrius Ponticus does not simply recommend
secrecy and humility against vainglory and pride( but also perseverance)
83
The point about perseverance( the infinity of Bod always being more abundant and
more fascinating than our desire and progress can attain to( is brought out by other
theologians contemplating Bod+s infinitude) Ct is perhaps this *ind of thought that founds the
refusal of sadness and rest in the desert fathers and mothers) The contemplative life is not a
life at rest( but a Hrenewal of wonder+( as one author has put it( commenting on Bregory of
Nyssa)
8:
Ct is perhaps not surprising that the secondary literature struggles with this concept of
active impassibility) The difficulty is not simply attested at the level of techni.ue( but also
finds its conte#t at the level of cosmology) Arguments were raging in the cities whilst the
gnomic statements of the &pop$t$egmata Patrum were being composed( and one of the
crucial .uestions in these discussions was how Bod( who is impassible( could be an active
creating force in the world) !hat is the nature of Bod+s action$ The traditional way to solve
this problem was by way of divine logos or energy( a demiurge or a spirit of Bod) %ut when
the "hristological version of this argument developed on the basis of the history of the son of
Bod and the divinity of the word of Bod( the same problem arose) Cf the logos is divine( how
can it be active and still impassible$ This *ind of .uestion led the Arians to deny the divinity
of "hrist and the orthodo# to re-interpret impassibility)
There are( as we have now seen( a number of reasons to interpret the practices of the
early "hristian ascetics as e#ercises in control( criti.ue( and ob,ectivity) Ct should be
sufficient( therefore( to embrace the mastery of the passions without having to write off
passions as a whole) ?orab,i traces this option through anti.ue philosophy( and argues that it
was embraced by a number of theologians connected with asceticism( including %asil the
Breat( in his ascetic rules)
84
Cf that option was available to desert "hristians( and given the
stamp of orthodo#y by such authorities( why is it that the word for moderation of passion '
metriopat$eia ' does not appear once in the &pop$t$egmata Patrum( whilst apat$eia is a
firmly established aspiration$
83
<vagrius( Eulog.: 5/( 20) >e is followed by ?ymeon the New Theologian 5;06 C=):)
8:
!illiams( 5/6 235)
84
?orab,i( 20006 /2) @allistos !are argues something similar for Abba Csaias and Theodoret of "yrus in !are(
5;( and Aowan !illiams portrays the discussion of this sub,ect between Bregory of Nyssa and his sister
Macrina in !illiams( 5/6 esp) pp2/4f)
50/
<#planation could ta*e various avenues here) ?elf-mastery was simply one step
towards dispassion) Aegulating one+s life in order to get rid of the passions was crucial to the
ascetic life)
88
?elf mastery was not the end( but the means) !hilst ancient "hristian ascetics
cannot be divorced from their philosophical bac*ground( their appropriation was a "hristian
one6 the aim of apat$eia is love)
8;
9reedom of thought was decisive) An ascetic should try to be free from the passions in
order to thin* freely) ?o we have a tentative view of the progress of the ascetic6 self mastery
leads to dispassion( which leads to free thoughts( and prayer) Thoughts become bound to one
thing and static when that thing is represented with passion) The mind that has *nowledge of
an item with passion becomes bound to that insignificant item( and gives it more attention
than it is worth purely on account of its use for the mind as an ob,ect of passion)
8
7nly by
throwing off the passion can the mind move on( and retain its fle#ibility and freedom)
;0
7nly
by re,ecting passionate *nowledge is the person in a position to love)
The area in which the early "hristian ascetics were clearest in their need to re,ect the
passions was in their understanding of representation) This in turn is where their struggle for
ob,ectivity is itself most clear( and their function as world-re,ecting free thin*ers most on trial)
!e have already seen over 0on page 2 <vagrius Ponticus+ conception of the relation
between passionate representation and sin) The sight of gold is not sinful e#cept insofar as the
passions represent it to us as for us( an ob,ect of my pleasure) >ere the passions are the names
given to a *ind of capitalist Hseeing as+)
;5
The vision of the world without passion would be
one of e#treme intimacy and un*nowing( whereas with the passions( the world becomes a set
of concepts of things to be used( sub,ected( bought and sold)
;2
This is the e#planation both of
<vagrius Ponticus+ te#ts on sin in representation and the story of abba Abraham .uoted above
0on page /42( which continues with the words
HAgain( you are wal*ing in the road and you see stones and shards( and amongst them gold6 do
you have the power in your mind to thin* them of e.ual value$+ And he said( HNo( but C will
88
<vagrius( Pra,t.: /:)
8;
<vagrius( Pra,t.: ;5( ;3)
8
%asilius( $om. 1)
;0
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: 22( 30)
;5
cf) Mar#( 5;56 chapter on UThe Nature and Browth of "apitalU) "f) also on %ataille( below( on page 550)
;2
Hit is possible to remember gold with greed and without greed( and similarly in the case of other things)+
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: 3 cf) also 1inge( 20006 :43) The conse.uence of this is to ma*e no distinction between
people( as regards whether they are enemies or friends( helpful or adverse6 %arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 4;
Ma#imus( carit. 1=4: C)2:)
503
ma*e war against the thought so as not to ta*e it)+ The old man said( H%ehold therefore( the
passion lives( but is chained)+
;/
?o the understandings of gender(
;3
economic value( and political utility
;:
are
determined by the passions) The practice of apat$eia involves thin*ing things without their
implications and meanings for the activity of evaluation and e#change) The passionless
ascetic receives only Hbare representations+)
;4
!hilst it would be claiming too much to say that passions are identical to
representations( they are certainly lin*ed at many points in the desert corpus) Passions are
associated with mental images in the memory that distract from prayer(
;8
and <vagrius
Ponticus uses the language of Himpassioned representation+ again and again)
;;
There also
appears to have been a debate in his circles as to whether it is the passion or the representation
that comes first)
;
Cmages with passions are a particular problem when addressing the mind towards
Bod)
0
Cn <vagrius Ponticus( this is given three reasons( in terms of practice( theology( and
mental acts) 9irstly( it is distracting to thin* about images when one is attempting to direct
one+s thought to a Bod whom one has not seen)
5
?econdly( it is not in *eeping with the
principles of negative theology to have an image in one+s mind whilst praying) Bod is without
image( so all representations are necessarily not to do with prayer)
2
9inally( <vagrius
Ponticus anticipates Augustine+s doctrine of the image of Bod being seen in the soul only
when the soul remembers( understands( and loves Bod)
/
To pray to Bod is to withdraw into
oneself( and Hpassionate attachments to material things+ distort the soul+s capacity to act as a
reflection of Bod( ma*ing it incapable of prayer)
3
%eing aware of the significance of this Hseeing as+ becomes a rule in <vagrius
Ponticus) !hilst *eeping to the idea that the bare perception of an item is human and
;/
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P)5 0my translation2 O &pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Abraham 5 O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: P)5:)
;3
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: /)
;:
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: 24)
;4
<vagrius( e5cerpts: 52 <vagrius( de orat.: ::f) >ere C use "asiday+s translation in "asiday( 20046 52) "f)
?ymeon the New Theologian+s condemnation of seeing things Hin accordance with their passionate desires)+ in
?ymeon the New Theologian 5;06 PPC=)/)
;8
&pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: CC)22 <vagrius( de mal. cog.: /f)
;;
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: 3(:/(:3(85 <vagrius( s,em.: 54)
;
<vagrius( Pra,t.: /8)
0
<vagrius( Eulog.: /0 <vagrius( sent. ad "irg.: 4 <vagrius( de mal. cog.: 54( /4( and ?ymeon the New
Theologian 5;06 PPC=)/f)
5
<vagrius( Pra,t.: 2/) "f) also "limacus( scal.: ?tep 2;)
2
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: 2 <vagrius( de orat.: 44 <vagrius( sc$ol. in eccl.: /:)
/
Augustinus( de trin.: 5:)
3
<vagrius( par. ad mon: 2): <vagrius( ep. ad mel.: 2/)
50:
innocent( he attributes *nowledge associated with ac.uisition( en,oyment( and esteem to
demonic thoughts( and the *nowledge of the perception as a sign of the nature of things and
spiritual principles 0essentially perception informed by scriptural e#egesis2 to angelic
thoughts)
:
The bare thought and the angelic thought are not associated with passions) %ut the
demonic thought is all to do with passions of ,ealousy( ac.uisition( and vainglory) Although
<vagrius Ponticus doesn+t ascribe to the practice of measuring the passions( his ideal of
freedom from the passions is associated with brac*eting *nowledge of values( measuring
thoughts( and determining one+s own life)
2.1.3: )it#dra*al (rom t#e *orld: c#allenging et#ics
!hat was the meaning of apat$eia for the ethical *nowledge of the desert fathers and
mothers$ Ct is clear that dispassion amongst the desert "hristians ' and especially <vagrius
Ponticus ' was a polyvalent ideal) There was general agreement( though( that the passions
were bound up with pre,udice and *nowing the world as something to be used) Cn re,ecting
the passions( they were attempting to gain control over and direction to their actions and
understanding) Dispassion was an ideal of an active life of non-passivity) This understanding
and lifestyle was still a significant part of the *nowledge and discipline of early "hristian
ascetics 0pace 9oucault2)
4
Dispassion is also a mode of emancipation from the *nowledge mediated by social
living) Passions define things as beneficial for me as a member of the e#change society) They
define people as useful for marriage 0fornication2( politics 0pride2( and honour 0vainglory2(
8
and things as sellable 0avarice2 or consumable 0gluttony2( etc) Dispassion signifies withdrawal
from these e#changes( engendering ob,ectivity) Dispassion leaves the world as it is6 for this is
the only way in which it can be beautiful)
;
9or these five causes men love one another( whether it be to their praise or their blame6 namely(
for Bod+s sa*e( as the virtuous man loves everybody and as the man who is not yet possessed of
virtue loves the virtuous manK or for natural reasons( as parents love their children and vice
versaK or for vainglory( as the man that is e#tolled loves the e#tollerK or for avarice( as one loves
a wealthy man for benefits receivedK or for love of pleasure( as the man who cares only for his
:
<vagrius( de mal. cog.: ;( .uoted below( on page 50;)
4
H!hat does the absence of pat$A( of passions( mean for "hristianity$ <ssentially it means renunciation of
egoism( of my own singular will)+ 9oucault( 2008L2003M6 58;) cf) Macrina+s argument against passive passion in
!illiams( 5/6 2/8)
8
Hthe wages of vainglory+6 <vagrius( ep.: 8)5)
;
7n this approach to art( cf) 9ried( 2008)
504
belly and things of se#) The first is praiseworthy( the second is in between( the rest belong to the
passions)
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Daniel / O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: P=)53 O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P=)5:)
50
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Csidore the Priest 5( Moses /( Phortas 5 &pop$. Patr. 83at9: P=):2( ;3)
55
&pop$. Patr. 83at9: P=)43 O &pop$. Patr. 8anon9: 583 O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P=);/)
52
%asilius( $om. 1)
5/
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Moses 3( ?erapion 3 <vagrius( Eulog.: 24)28 %asilius( moral.: 1PPCC)
5:/
truth+
53
) 9or this reason( Macarius the Breat would not spea* to people who approached him
with fear and honour( but if he was offered the greeting( HAbba( when you were a camel-
driver( and stole nitre and sold it again( did not the *eepers beat you$+
5:
then he would open
up and welcome the hec*ler)
The mon* should be humble in this way( *eeping silence when beaten and abused( and
offering no retaliation) 7nly in this way would he benefit his soul)
54
Nisterus the "enobite 0i)e)
who lived in a community2 was *nown for his reticence in the face of arguments and trouble)
!hen approached( he e#plained his actions by li*ening himself to a don*ey( who remains
silent though beaten and ill-treated)
58
<nduring insults therefore refers bac* to another of the monastic techni.ues discussed
above( namely freeing oneself from passion)
5;
Nisterus is another of the e#emplars of
apat$eia who wanted to be li*e gravestones( statues( or idols in their dispassion as regards
praise and blame 0cf) above( on page 52) The mon*+s attitude towards the insult becomes one
more facet of the collection of techni.ues associated with that ideal6 HDust as a dead man feels
no praise or insult( so a man of faith disdains esteem and dishonour)+
5
The desert fathers and mothers also used the acceptance of insults to oppose the
temptation to deal out ,udgements) Abba Moses instructs his disciples to accept abuse in order
to avoid ,udgement of others) As soon as one accepts responsibility for what one is being
accused of in an insult( one receives forgiveness from Bod) %ut it is still necessary to
concentrate on one+s own sins to prevent the attention from turning to others for the sa*e of
hatred or slander) Cnsults are accepted to avoid ,udgement( ,ust as freedom from passions is
pursued to establish ob,ectivity)
?o how is the insulting behaviour of the early "hristian ascetics different from that of
their philosophical counterparts$ "hristian practice is stri*ingly similar to that of the "ynic
philosophers( who can be thought of as the aggressors of ancient philosophy) These &any
thin*ers spo*e out their doctrines and perceptions regardless of the conse.uences of insulting
*ings( transgressing taboos( and challenging accepted truths) The two person relation of truth
teller to student was similarly an attempt to find the truth regardless of the potential damage
53
%asilius( $om. 1)
5:
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Macarius the Breat /5K cf) also Agathon : O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: P)50 O &pop$. Patr.
8alp$9: P)52)
54
<vagrius( Eulog.: 3)3 &pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Anthony 5:( Eacharias /( Csaiah 5 O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: =CCC)2(
P=)58 O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: =CCC)2( P=)5 %arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 52:( 2/8 "limacus( scal.:
?teps 2( 3 and ; Ma#imus( carit. 1=4: C)2; Moschus( prat.: 204
58
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Nisterus the "enobite 2 O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: P=)/0 O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P=)34)
5;
Passion is the defining feature of an insult+s power according to %asilius( $om. 1)
5
<vagrius( par. ad mon: CC)53)
5:3
done to either party) The danger is that the one hearing the truth will be so offended by the
truth that they abandon the .uest( and in the worst case attac* the truth-teller) Cn both
conte#ts( the results ta*e place in the hearer of the truth( but the philosophical hero is the
spea*er of truth)
!ith the ascetic tradition we have summarised here( the hero-role has been transferred
to the hearer of truth6 hearing insults gives you treasure in heaven)
20
The spea*er of the insult
is no longer in focus( even in the case of a spiritual leader insulting a mon* in order to give
him Hfre.uent opportunities to gain crowns X through having to put up with insults(
dishonour( contempt( and moc*ery)+
25
Cn contrast to cynic philosophers( the ascetic "hristians
of late anti.uity do not in general go into the city and proclaim their offensive truths) Cnstead(
they withdraw to the desert in order to hear them) Cn this respect( the practice has become a
good deal more individual( and less committed to the transformation of a community) The
implications of truth-telling for democracy have become less evident)
7n the other hand( by releasing the role of truth teller from its connection to the brave
philosopher( they idealise the attitude of the community) Ct is no longer an isolated practice of
truth-telling( it is a virtue that anyone can have) Anyone can hear the truth( because everyone
is offended at some point) The element of courage is still intact( but it has become the courage
of hearing rather than that of spea*ing6 H!ith unsha*eable courage they accepted the
criticisms of the superior and indeed of those far below him in ran*)+
22
The desert fathers and
mothers do not adhere to fearless speech( but to fearless hermeneutics) Dare to hear truth that
you would ordinarily dismiss) Assume that everyone is reasonable and worth listening to) Do
not let the boundaries of your world and your view of the self get in the way of your .uest for
truth)
The transition is also one of internalisation) Although the element of courage has been
moved from speech to hearing( the ob,ect of fear has remained the same( namely the fear of
damage to one+s self( and one+s own anger and reprisals) 9earless hermeneutics is thus a
practice of the self( whereby one ta*es a decision to e#pose one+s self to the insult in order to
eradicate self-image as a hindrance in the .uest for truth) Ct still re.uires an e#ternal agent( but
only because of inner wea*ness) Cf we were able to be imaginative enough in our self-criti.ue(
other people would not be necessary)
20
%arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 52:( ?ymeon the New Theologian 5;06 C=)52)
25
"limacus( scal.: ?tep 3)
22
"limacus( scal.: ?tep 3)
5::
There are two *inds of disregard of oneself6 one is from within the heart( and the other from
in,uries received from the outside) The second is greater( namely the one that comes from the
outside) 9or the one that comes from the heart re.uires less labor than the one that comes from
other people( because the latter creates more pain in the heart)
2/
The danger of reprisals is nevertheless entirely necessary6 anger and provocation
manifest the interruption and transformation of one relation of the self to shared values) The
self is mediated by and in *eeping with the meanings and transactions of a society( so that
e#periencing insults as offensive mar*s the transgression of s$ared boundaries) 9lattery
therefore becomes an e#pression of positive evaluation within those shared values that
confirms those values( whereas an insult e#presses a negative evaluation according to shared
values that can call them into .uestion) Cf C do not share the value assumed by the flattery or
insult( then neither can C be provo*ed or soothed by it) Ct is actually very difficult to insult a
foreigner) C am not insulted when a Norwegian calls me unsporty( ,ust as a Norwegian is not
insulted when C call them a bad sport) !e do not share those values) ?o insults and flattery are
not only practices of the self( but ways of relating to and accepting shared values) Detachment
regarding insult and flattery implies revaluation of those values)
!e can( therefore( plot the insult on a logic of truth-telling) <arly philosophers
discover that truth is difficult to hear) They introduce techni.ues to overcome the
stubbornness of belief in assumed truths 0?ocratic irony( mathematical proofs( insults2) The
insult forces the thin*er to reveal and challenge their own beliefs) The thin*er enlists the help
of truth-tellers to challenge the beliefs and practices that they do not see and cannot change
because of their own convictions and self-image) "hristian thin*ers see that the insult has this
function regardless of its spea*er) They embrace the insult as a practice of truth-hearing(
ma*ing the role of the truth-teller redundant) They identify the hindrance to truth-hearing as
the vainglory of the listener rather than the flattery of the spea*er)
?omeone who notices that he is easily overcome by pride( a nasty temper( malice( and
hypocrisy( and who thin*s of defending himself against these by unsheathing the double-edged
sword of mee*ness and patience( such a man if he wishes to brea* free entirely from these vices
ought to go live in a monastery( as if it were a fuller+s shop of salvation) Cn particular( he should
choose the most austere place) >e will be spiritually stretched and beaten by the insults( in,uries(
and rebuffs of the brothers) >e may even be physically beaten( trampled on( and *ic*ed( so that
he may wash out the filth still lying in the sentient part of his soul) There is an old saying that
2/
%arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 28;)
5:4
reproof is the washtub for the soul+s passions( and you ought to believe it( for people in the
world who load indignities onto someone and then boast about it to others li*e to say( HC gave
him a good scrubbing)+ !hich( of course( is .uite accurate)
23
Cn this conte#t( the practice of the holy fools emerges as a regress in the process)
Cnstead of hearing insults( they are once again dealing them out to anyone who will listen)
They return to the city( and don+t seem to be willing to listen to anyone) 7nce again( it is the
spea*er of insults that is the hero( rather than the hearer)
This resemblance to the cynic philosophers is only s*in deep( however6 the holy fools
were still obviously mar*ed by the ascetic values of defeating vainglory by letting insults fall
upon themselves) The one to whom ?ymeon the holy fool e#clusively spea*s truth( for
e#ample 0Dohn the Deacon in 1eontius+ narrative2( only ever calls him Hfool+( and does not
show him any honour) The people who did show him honour got only abuse in return)
2:
The two distinctive features mar*ing the holy fools out from early "hristian ascetics
that we noted( however( are still valid) 9irstly( the fools leave their solitude and return to the
cityK and secondly( the insulter receives bac* the hero role) There are instances of insulting
behaviour praised amongst the desert fathers and mothers(
24
but in general it is condemned by
early "hristian ascetics(
28
and enduring offence encouraged)
There is reason to pause at this point( however) ?ymeon the holy fool did indeed go
around the city insulting people( and was thrashed for it) >e is also portrayed( however( as
accepting the accusations against him)
2;
The earliest record of a holy fool was Csidora( who
gained the nic*name Hthe human sponge+ because she accepted all the abuse and insults that
were piled upon her)
2
Cf we interpret the holy fools stories as a development of the ascetic
tradition of the insult( what should we focus on as readers$ The insults of the holy fool would
then be e#amples of words 0e should hear as truth) They are tools for our fearless
hermeneutics)
The setting of the stories of holy fools does direct our attention towards those who
recognise the holiness of the fools) The story of Csidora is about the discovery and revelation
23
"limacus( scal.: ?tep ;)
2:
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5:/)
24
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Theodore of Pherme 2;( Macarius the Breat 3 O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: =CC) &pop$. Patr.
87,. syst.9: =CC)53 "limacus( scal.: ?tep 3)
28
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Theodora 3( Nisterus : %asilius( $om. 1 %arsanuphius and Cohannes( resp.: 453) Bould
overstates the case against insulting others6 Bould( 5/6 5/2( 5/3) >owever( the condemnation runs into the
tradition6 cf) ?ymeon the New Theologian 5;06 PP=CC)8)
2;
e)g) when accused of ma*ing a slave pregnant6 1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5:5f <vagrius ?cholasticus( $.e.: C=)/3)
2
&pop$. Patr. 83at9: P=CCC)5 and Palladius( $. 3aus.: PPC=)
5:8
of her holiness6 it is only the first few lines that are devoted to her way of life) The anchorite
Piteroum only *nows of it whilst being chastised for pride by an angel) The clima# of the
story comes when her holiness is recognised) >er behaviour remains constant) The account of
?ymeon the holy fool in the history of <vagrius ?cholasticus is also mar*ed by the
recognition and veiling of ?ymeon+s holiness6 each story 0abusive behaviour in tavernsK the
accusation that he had fathered a slave+s childK visiting a prostituteK dancing among pillars2
includes an element of suspicion that he is not a holy man at all 0he gets angry( isn+t celibate
or sedate2( the author+s e#planation of holiness( and a moment of revelation 0confiding in
friends( a pregnant woman+s confession before childbirth( the prostitute+s poverty revealed(
the dancing revealed as prophetic2) The stories are both about holy fools and about discerning
holiness)
Ct is therefore particularly stri*ing that one of our handful of stories about holy fools
0that use the Bree* designation Hsalos+2 appears in the conte#t of a story about Daniel of
?cetis) !hilst the historical status of the collection is in doubt( it is at least established that
after the introductory story( the Daniel narratives are all discoveries of other people+s piety)
The stories witness to a tendency for early "hristian ascetics to discern holiness outside the
boundaries of their own monastic ways of life) %ut the collection gains status in time 0being
one of the seven great pateri,a ' collections of stories about the fathers2( and thereby
witnesses to the virtue not only of leading a holy life( but of discovering holiness in others)
Daniel of ?cetis has almost no other virtue to spea* of)
/0
1eontius+ wor* on the life of ?ymeon appears in a similar light) Cn his introduction( he
accuses those who do not recognise ?ymeon+s holiness of being sub,ect to passions( and not
*nowing the ?criptures) This accusation is then claimed to be the intention of the holy fool+s
life6
Cndeed( C say that through spending time in the city( hanging around with women( and the rest of
the deception of his life( he truly sought to show to the slothful and pretentious a wea*ness in
the virtuous life and the power granted by Bod to those who truly serve against the spirits of
evil with all their souls)
/5
?o the stories of holy fools are every bit as concerned with the perception of holiness
as they are with its practice) As we noted above 0on page 882( the holiness of the fools is
concealed from all6 it is this non-*nowledge of holiness that constitutes their success( because
/0
". dan. scet.
/5
1eontius( ". 1ym.: intro)522( translation modified)
5:;
awareness of holiness is a part of the principle of vainglory) The function of holy foolishness
' disrupting liturgy( transgressing taboos( babbling( and denying asceticism ' is to disabuse
all of the suspicion they might have that they are being confronted with a good person) The
morality of the witness is therefore at odds with that of the fool6 in order to be good( the
witness must attribute holiness to the foolK whereas the fool must shun that attribution both in
herself and in others) Ct is here that the holy fools become challenging6 whilst <vagrius
?cholasticus and the story of the mad nun contain stories of divine revelation( 1eontius+ 3i.e
o. 1ymeon relates divine veiling)
This parado# generates many of the tensions in these wor*s of hagiography) The fool
is holy because of the attempt to hide that holiness( whereas the unrighteousness of the world
is revealed by not perceiving what has been hidden) The concealment is proof both of the
fool+s holiness and the world+s corruption) !hat is more( the concealment is Bod+s doing 0in
answer to the fool+s prayer26
/2
it seems the dec*s are stac*ed in favour of the fools in this
struggle)
Divine concealment is not simply seen in the fool+s prayer( however6 the narrative
re.uires witnesses to the fool+s holiness in order to include a vindication that identifies the
fool as holy) Miracles must happen( not only for the sa*e of establishing the reader+s holiness
in hearing the insult( but for the fool+s in giving it) %ut this leaves the problem of how the fool
remains recognisably holy but still unrecognised) Cn 1eontius+ narrative( the problem is solved
by the natural and supernatural confounding of the witness+ speech) A merchant stays silent
because he was embarrassed( and accepts everyone else+s ,udgment concerning the foolK
//
the
fool+s former employers didn+t dare to contradict public opinion that ridiculed himK
/3
some
circus fans had become mon*s as a result of one of ?ymeon+s miracles( but they were
supernaturally hindered from saying anything about itK
/:
a local authority investigates
?ymeon( who strips and dances for him( but as soon as he decides ?ymeon is only pretending
to be mad( his tongue is boundK
/4
a Dew catches ?ymeon in the act of spea*ing to angels( but
as soon as he attempts to e#pose him( he is struc* dumb( and then reprimanded in a dreamK
/8
a
group of theologians are also struc* dumb so they could not repeat his criti.ue of 7rigenK
/;
/2
1eontius( ". 1ym.: CCC)533K cf) also HBod hid Abba ?ymeon+s plan+ ' C=)54:)
//
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5:)
/3
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5:3)
/:
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)543)
/4
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5:4)
/8
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5:3)
/;
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5:/)
5:
others simply seem to lose their senses and not understand him until they receive divine
revelation)
/
@nowledge of the fools+ holiness becomes possible only at the time of death6 those
who lose their senses can understand and tell of the holy fool once sShe has died) As soon as
Csidora is discovered( she disappears into the desert) !e non-fools( we witnesses and readers
are not able to win the struggle with the fools over the recognition of their holiness) !e can
only await their death) Cf they strive to conceal( and we to recognise( then they always prove
to be the stronger) <ven the possibility of venerating their memory after their disappearance is
frustrated6 their bodies disappear) !e are denied the cult of the saints) The recognition of true
holiness in the world is impossible) 7nce again the reader is thrown up against the e#treme
negative theology of the hagiography) The holy fools e#ist( but we do not *now who they are(
,ust as Bod and creation are good( but in ways that we do not understand) !e have no
standards by which to recognise the holiness of the fool or the goodness of Bod 0cf) above on
page 5232)
The earliest holy fool literature has therefore an odd message6 there are holy fools( but
they can not be recognised) And the corollary of this statement is that for us( anyone may be a
holy fool) As far as the reader is concerned( holy fools e#ist and are nowhere to be found)
Therefore holy fools are concealed everywhere) No spea*er can be ruled out a priori)
The conclusion that anyone may be a holy fool is also drawn in the closing paragraphs
of the 3i.e o. 1ymeon) After ?ymeon has given an account of his life to 1eontius+ secret
informer( he instructs the latter in matters of holy living6
And he spo*e again( HC beg you( never disregard a single soul( L548M especially when it happens
to be a mon* or a beggar) 9or Qour "harity *nows that >is place is among the beggars(
especially among the blind( people made as pure as sun through their patience and distress)+
30
?ymeon was mas.uerading precisely as a mon* and a beggar) >e hid all his virtues(
but never hid the fact that he was a mon*( in spite of the respect he is reported to have had for
the habit when he first embraced the religious life)
35
?imilarly( he would often accept
charitable gifts from people and associate with beggars(
32
in spite of the fact that he obviously
/
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5:0( 54;)
30
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)544f)
35
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C)5/5f)
32
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)54/)
540
had a great deal of money at his disposal 0he Hemployed+ a large number of prostitutes on a
permanent basis2)
3/
Ct is in this conte#t ' that of producing the e#pectation of holy fools among certain
groups of society ' that we can see ?ymeon+s other impersonations) %y his pretending to fit in
with particular identities and groups( he could challenge the impression we have that we
understand who they are) !e do not understand demon possession( because we might be
mista*ing holy fools for the possessed) Cdentities 1eontius portrays ?ymeon as contesting in
this way included the possessed 0C=)5:4( 5422( the clients of prostitutes 0C=)5::f2(
33
circus
wor*ers( dancers and fans 0C=)538( 5:3f( 54/f2( rapists 0C=)53;( 5:52( the godless 0C=)53;2(
and the mad 0C=)5:: et passim2) 7ur conception of the place of holiness in the world needs to
be re-negotiated) =alues need to be re-thought( and society+s currency needs to be changed)
9or sometimes he pretended to have a limp( sometimes he ,umped around( sometimes he
dragged himself along on his buttoc*s( sometimes he stuc* out his foot for someone running
and tripped him) 7ther times when there was a new moon( he loo*ed at the s*y and fell down
and thrashed about) ?ometimes also he pretended to babble( for he said that of all semblances(
this one is most fitting and most useful to those who simulate folly L5:4M for the sa*e of "hrist)
3:
To recap( the holy fools narratives condemn the non-recognition of holy foolsK
demonstrate that their recognition is impossible 0through the nature of the case and divine
intervention2K and direct the reader+s attention to the typical domain of holy fools in groups
that otherwise would be dismissed as unholy) Cf we apply these theses regarding the
ob,ectives of holy fool literature to our outline of the development of the interpretation of
insults( we can see these wor*s of hagiography generalising the insult) The holy fool might be
anywhere( so the insulting truth may come from anywhere)
The holy fool stories are therefore entirely in line with the early "hristian ascetic
tendency towards cultivating an attitude of listening that is open to insult) They both confirm
this approach( and aim to produce it in their readers) After hearing about the lives of holy
fools( the "hristian of late anti.uity will *now that some insults are the product of someone+s
resentment( but that some might be the prophetic act of a divinely inspired holy man or
woman) +ut 0e don@t ,no0 0$ic$ is 0$ic$) The spea*ers 0the holy foolK Bod2 are directly
attempting to hide the source of their words) The tas* of the good person is to recognise holy
fools for who they are) %ut if the corollary of this parado#ical situation is that fools are
3/
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5::)
33
cf) also <vagrius ?cholasticus( $.e.: C=)/3)
3:
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)5::f)
545
everywhere( the conclusion regarding the insult has to be that no insult can be ruled out as
false a priori6 all are an opportunity to listen humbly) And because insults are founded upon
values that are put into .uestion( no insult is the final word) All humility is also playful)
34
The parado#ical struggle between the holy fool and the listener corresponds to the two
elements of apophatic theology we established above 0on page 53:2( namely criti.ue and play)
Dust as the holiness of the fools is necessarily hidden( and their uninhibited play mere pretence
that moc*s the values of the world( so apophatic theology will always necessarily tend
towards ignorance( and the free play of lies about Bod) Bod and the fool are hiddenK stories
about them are a pretence)
The critical element of the apophaticism of holy fools consists in the prophetic action
from nowhere) The holy fools refuse to accept the configuration of holiness that they meet in
the city 0with its centre in liturgy and its boundaries in acceptable behaviour2 and so deny
them through insult and transgression) ?ymeon puts out the candles in church and then goes
out to steal beans)
38
>e denies the centre and the perimeter of holiness because Bod has no
perimeter( and >er centre is everywhere)
The playful element consists in their pretence) The behaviour of the fools is so wild
that it is unli*ely to be ta*en as a portrayal of Bod) The only way in which it may be ta*en as
such is by recognising it as simulated) They are not really foolish) %ut that still leaves the
.uestion open as to what their holiness consists in) !hilst the hagiographer 0and the modern
interpreter2 attempt to validate the behaviour of the fool through interpretation( the holy fools
themselves will admit no imitators) They cannot condone their own behaviour)
This is of course part of the pro,ect6 an imitator would be an admiring disciple( so that
the holy fool+s virtue would no longer be hidden) %ut even when faced with someone who has
seen the holy fool+s pretence( ?ymeon begs them to follow another way) Dohn the hermit at
the beginning of the story is sent bac* to the desert(
3;
and Dohn the archdeacon towards the
end of the story is presented as an ideal observer( not as a disciple or a new holy fool)
3
Cnstead of being seductive holy figures( they cultivate apophatic observers of godliness)
The holy fools thus embrace the challenge of apophatic theology and social
transformation) Through the techni.ue of the truth-telling insult( they .uestion the placing of
holiness in their society( the values it entails( and the relations of the self) Their behaviour(
34
9or more on this theme( cf) below( on page 253)
38
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)53:f)
3;
1eontius( ". 1ym.: CCC)533)
3
1eontius( ". 1ym.: C=)544f)
542
and the attitude they produce in their readers( transcend assertion and denial) The fools
themselves criti.ue Theology and posit laughter( whilst their readers become sceptical to all
forms of holiness( seeing holy fools in all things ' from demoniacs to dancers( and from
prostitutes to prattlers)
54/
&.: !earing 0$eec#
%rutal truth-telling and biting insults are perhaps not standard characteristics
associated with ascetic saints in the "hristian tradition) !hilst truth is ac*nowledged as a
value in itself( the practices of truth-telling are fraught with moral danger) 9earless speech(
which started off as a way of resisting domination and asserting wisdom( has a tra,ectory that
may be traced ' precisely through the use of insults ' to the brutal forcing of humble self-
*nowledge in disciplines such as early modern psychiatry and criminology)
:0
Ct may be a tool
for the transformation of the self+s relation to society( or for forcing the self to submit to its
place in society) 9le#ibility is ambiguous)
<arly "hristian ascetics themselves were ambivalent to the practice of telling people
the truth about their lives) Not everyone could bear it( and not everyone was meant to follow
the way of the desert( as we saw in the discussion of multiplicity 0above( on page :32) This
made it difficult for disciples6
Again abba Poemen said6 C once came to lower >eracleon( to abba Doseph( and he had a really
beautiful mulberry tree by his hermitageK and in the morning he said to me( HBo and get some
for yourself( and have a nibble)+ Now it was a 9riday) ?o C did not eat because of the fast( and C
as*ed him about it( saying HTell me by Bod the reason for your telling me IBo and have a
nibble)J %ecause C didn+t go because of the fast( but now C+m ashamed of myself( because C
didn+t follow your command( thin*ing that you+d given me an instruction for no reason)+ %ut he
replied( HThe old men did not spea* clearly to the brothers at the beginning( but with great
distortion6 and if they saw anyone doing these distortions( then they would only spea* profitably
to them( realising that they were obedient in everything)
:5
Cn addition to demonstrating once more the centrality of obedience for early "hristian
ascetics( this saying shows us the subtle play of assent between master and disciple that would
lead to the *ind of relation where the master could e#ercise his or her parrhesia towards the
disciple) The practice was only meant for a few people( and they had to signal very clearly
that they were willing to listen) The parrhesiastic contract is negotiated through a play of
transgression( discernment( and obedience) 9or early "hristian ascetics( honest and profitable
truth-telling can only ta*e place within this conte#t) They are consciously hesitant about
telling the truth)
:0
According to 9oucault 2006 )
:5
&pop$. Patr. 83at9: P)/0 0my translation2 O &pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Doseph of Panephysis : O &pop$. Patr. 87,.
syst.9: P)/)
543
?o it is possible to as* the .uestion H!hat value has truth$+ Cn this chapter( we will
e#amine more precisely how truth-telling constructs a relation to the self) Cn particular( focus
will be directed towards the place of and value of truth-telling 0and in particular as regards
uncomfortable home truths2 in a specific community) Truth and listening are necessary
elements of the tas* of ordering and defining any community) C will describe the practices as
relevant to ecclesiology( with its issues of obligation( dogma( and constituted e#perts)
The practices of truth-telling in late anti.uity have come under the scrutiny of certain
recent philosophers as part of a history of the present) Cn spite of his reputation as an
Hhistorian of discontinuity+( 9oucault+s wor* attempts to draw lines of descent from the
?ocratic e#ercises of ?toics through Mediaeval spiritual direction to modern relations of
government and counselling)
:2
Aather than tracing this history here( C propose to identify various respects in which
the different forms of truth-telling and truth-hearing are problematic) >ow and why is it
recommended$ 9rom where does the value of truth derive$ !hat *inds of truth are being
told$ The interface between truth-telling as a resource for self-determination bears specific
relations to its practice as a re.uirement of the community( both logically and historically) C
will be drawing on historical sources throughout the tradition depending on the particular
.uality being studied at each point) %ut instead of using the sources to illustrate an historical
progression( C will be calling on them to demonstrate a logical principle which may apply to a
number of different manifestations of the phenomenon of truth-telling) Cn this way( C hope to
avoid the twin errors of historical criticism( namely the temptations to describe history as on
the one hand a rational progression of thought( and on the other as the betrayal of a pure and
rational origin)
Truth-telling is a problem in its tendency to universalism) 9oucault considered all
anti.uity to have been a Hprofound error+
:/
because it aspired to being a philosophy for
everyone) This aspiration is dissatisfactory) Universal truth telling can either be applied as a
re.uirement or as an ideal) Ae.uiring people to tell and hear the truth about themselves in
order to be part of the universal fellowship ma*es this particular philosophical techni.ue a
way of forcing the populace instead of a tool for transformation) Positing universal
philosophy as an ideal results in the same determination of culture by techni.ues of truth-
:2
A brief summary can be found in McBushin( 20086 ch) 4) "f) also chapters one and two of 9oucault(
200:L2005M)
:/
9oucault( 54L5;3M6 344)
54:
telling( although without including everyone in the same way) <ither way( the attitude to truth
ceases to be definitive of good and desirability( and ac.uires the status of being Ha+ good)
@eeping truth-telling as the reserve of small groups of people does not solve the
problem( however) Truth-telling as a secret good will then allow the mar*eting of
philosophical techni.ues to whoever has the means to nurture the habit of telling the truth
about themselves) This mar*et may integrate its interests with the universal ideal mentioned
above( or it may simply offer its goods on their own terms) <ither way( a mar*etable lac* is
constituted in order to sell truth-telling) <ven if the techni.ue is offered freely by its e#pert
philosophers( as long as it is to avoid the above dangers of the universal ideal or re.uirement(
it will only ever be able to achieve the constitution of an aristocratic group protecting their
own access to the truth) Ct will only be natural to ma*e the transition from seeing the non-
initiated as truthless humans to untrue humans) And if the philosopher attempts to *eep the
techni.ue entirely to himself( then he loses both the telling and the truth)
?o the philosophers of late anti.uity were caught between social stagnation and
aristocracy) They chose the latter) <nlightenment social thought would later choose the former
in their theories of raison d@Ftat)
:3
9or the potential for transformation elicited by truth-telling
and truth-hearing induce fle#ibility in the sub,ect) That fle#ibility may be used to put the
sub,ect into .uestion in its relation to society and produce new forms of life) Ct may cause a
critical voice that refuses to accept its place from the state) 9le#ibility may also be deployed
as an instrument of homogeneity however) Truth-telling may simply re.uire the sub,ect to
adapt its life and truth to society) Ct may re.uire modesty and docility for the sa*e of
suppressing the socially transforming self) Truth-telling facilitates both)
Techni.ues of truth-telling and truth-hearing are not however doomed to either
aristocracy or homogeneity) Truth is not immoral but dangerous) Universalism is not the same
as forced homogeneity) Accounts of truth are not all wrong( but they do all owe us a way of
steering between the dangers of elitism and normalising coercion) This argument concerning
the nature of truth telling and asceticism will be the basis of my evaluation of truth( humour
and humility in the final sections of this thesis)
Cn order to facilitate a critical account of truth-telling in its relation to the
transformation of society and its relation to the self( let us now turn to the various ways in
which the logic of veridiction is configured positively) >ow does truth-telling become an
obligation( and what *inds of truth are included in that obligation$ Are truth-telling
:3
9oucault( 58 9oucault( 2008L2003M)
544
techni.ues committed to certain truth values( and how do those values place and restrict the
self$ !hat role does the truth-telling e#pert have in configuring particular relations between
self and society$ Cn all these issues( we will have an eye to the value of truth-telling and truth-
hearing for the pro,ects of revolution and homogenisation)
3.2.1: .ying
1ying is the opposite of telling the truth) >owever much C may believe that C am
Theology+s answer to 9riedrich Niet&sche( to ma*e such a claim would be a lie) Cn order to be
able to tell the truth about the matter( C will need good friends to disenchant me and e#perts to
give me a proper appreciation of Niet&sche+s genius)
There are a variety of lies( and not all of them re.uire good friends and philosophers)
An atlas will show me that ?weden is not the capital of Norway 0veridiction of political
cartography2( and the presentation of sweet wrappers in my coat poc*et will convince me of
the futility of claiming that it was actually my daughter who had filched the last Wuality ?treet
0veridiction of guilt and innocence2)
There was an array of opinions regarding lying amongst the early "hristian ascetics( a
selection of which are presented above 0on page 2/22) "assian+s ,ustification of lying .uoted
there was based on the duty a spea*er has towards her audience) 7thers embrace a casuistry
of prudence( results( and rules 0cf) fn)28 above( on page 2;2) The motivations given for telling
the truth appeal e#clusively to either care of others or care for the soul) Dohn "limacus
contrasts these two principles6
A man may lie on the grounds of prudence( and indeed regards as an act of righteousness the
actual destruction of his own soul) The inventor of lies declares that he is following the e#ample
of Aahab and maintains that his own destruction is the cause of salvation for others)
::
1ying effects other members of a community in different ways) There are very few
people that are seriously worried about my illusions regarding the genius of Niet&sche and
me) ?ome might be worried about any claim to be the Messiah( although this depends on
whether it appears on the record cover of a popular roc* and roll artist( or on the lips of a
toga-clad tap dancer .uaffing de-icer) 1ying about what one had for brea*fast does not
concern your fellows to the same degree as lies about whether you+d paid for it) The
obligation not to lie is not universal)
::
"limacus( scal.: ?tep 52)
548
?toics and early "hristian thin*ers were acutely aware of the variety of lies) 9ine
distinctions were made between statements of belief( truth( and ,ustification) 7n the bac* of
this tradition( Augustine wrote two fairly typical treatises( attempting to elucidate the relation
between the obligation of truth-telling and the logic of belief)
:4
>e distinguishes ; types of lie(
in a hierarchy of seriousness 0where the first is the worst( and the first five are illicit( whereas
the last three are wrong but allowable in certain circumstances26
5) concerning religious doctrine
2) un,ustly hurtful
/) that profit one at others+ e#pense
3) lying for lying+s sa*e
:) that satifies the desire for pretty speech
4) to prevent theft
8) to prevent death 0even of the guilty2
;) to prevent bodily impurity)
:8
!hilst this list ma*es the issue appear as a treatment of teleological priorities ' a
choice between the lesser of two evils ' Augustine ma*es use of a sophisticated philosophical
framewor* both to ground and apply the list) >e ta*es account of issues of agency and
consent( of intention and the moral benefit of the truth)
After opening the treatise with an assertion of the uncompromising concern for the
truth( he immediately introduces the case of ,o*es to challenge the reader+s assumption that
we *now what a lie is) >e then goes into a variety of cases where the definition of a
proposition as a lie can be challenged( before he attempts an interpretation of the various
%iblical warrants for the admission and prohibition of lying) >e considers .uestions such as
does the spea*er believe the proposition$ Does she e#pect to be believed$ Does he believe he
is telling the truth$ Cs *nowledge of the proposition beneficial$ !e can summarise these
issues most conveniently on a table showing relevant information concerning any person &+s
utterance of any proposition p6
:4
Augustinus( mend Augustinus( c. mend. !e will be concentrating on the former)
:8
Augustinus( mend.: #iv)2:( ##i)32)
54;
Table showing the moral possibilities of & uttering p)
&
believes
p
&
believes
her belief
regarding
p is
correct
p is
true
&
e#pects
to be
believed
that p
@nowing
p is
beneficial
to the
hearer
& is lying Moral assessment
Q Q Q Q Q N ideal
Q Q Q Q N N brutal
Q Q Q N Q $ malevolent
Q Q Q N N $ ironic
Q Q N Q Q N rash
Q Q N Q N N leading astray
Q Q N N Q N rash
Q Q N N N N rash
Q N Q Q Q N ideal
Q N Q Q N N brutal
Q N Q N Q N malevolent
Q N Q N N N -
Q N N Q Q N generous
Q N N Q N N malevolent
Q N N N Q N malevolent
Q N N N N N -
N Q Q Q Q Q rashSgenerous
N Q Q Q N Q rashSmalevolent
N Q Q N Q Q rashSbrutal
N Q Q N N Q rashSmalevolent
N Q N Q Q Q pragmatic
N Q N Q N Q malevolent
N Q N N Q Q cunningSpragmatic
N Q N N N Q cunning
N N Q Q Q $ generous
N N Q Q N $ malevolent
N N Q N Q Q malevolent
N N Q N N $ cunningSpragmatic
N N N Q Q Q pragmatic
N N N Q N Q malevolent
N N N N Q Q brutal
N N N N N $ cunningSpragmatic
?o the morality of truth telling is a good deal more complicated for Augustine than the
simple determination of whether someone is spea*ing true statements or not) >e finally
considers decisive not the social obligation we have to each other to tell the truth( but the
desire to tell the truth to oneself) Telling the truth is useful to ourselves because it is by
54
nurturing the truth in our soul that we produce right actions and right loves) 7nly in this way
can we become good) This consideration far outweighs physical and social benefits or dangers
that might suggest the e#pediency of lying)
Augustine+s categories of lies show us the range of social conse.uences truth-telling
can have) Cf an honest citi&en is attempting to come up with a practical solution to a social
challenge( it does not help the community if that person is entirely ignorant of its details and
bac*ground( or deceiving themselves about its possible solutions) Ct is important that
politicians not be self-deceiving about their tas*s and abilities)
This was ?ocrates+ accusation to the people of Athens) >is truth-telling was one of
uncomfortable truths that were e#pedient for the state to *now) The truth-hearing of the
democratic assembly of Athens had an immediate effect on the citi&ens of that state) They
were obliged to hear the truth and to tell the truth) Ct was not simply a matter of ta*ing care of
their soul6 they needed to legislate for their community)
"ombining these two aspects( however ' the freedom of a truth-teller and the
obligations towards a community ' radically transforms the practice of truth-telling) Cf the
truths an agent is obliged to tell to the group are the same *ind as those offered by a fearless
spea*er( the individual becomes dependent upon and e#posed to truth-tellers 0or absolutely
everyone if the moral hero is the truth-hearer rather than the truth-teller2 in order to fulfil that
obligation) This situation could easily result from a general conviction that people with a lac*
of self-*nowledge are dangerous) Cn order to protect society against them( truth-hearing would
then become obligatory) !hilst fearless spea*ing started off as a contract between a
vulnerable spea*er and a powerful hearer( it can develop into the social contract6 the governor
0representing the community2 tells the truth to the individual( which sShe is then obliged to
confess in order to remain a member of the community) !ithout a ta#onomy of different truth
obligations( it is difficult to see how the general use of truth-telling techni.ues is to refrain
from degenerating into this situation)
Cn the conte#t of a social body( telling lies about the political situation and oneself has
a public effect) Cf the phenomenon of lying is indiscriminately defined as utterances of false
statements( the obligation not to lie becomes an obligation to *now the truth as well as being
honest) Ct becomes an obligation to hear and ac*nowledge uncomfortable truths( an obligation
to hearing fearless speech) The ideal of truth-telling then results in a universal ma#im of
openness and observability)
580
3.2.2: /alues
Cf the truth-telling practice itself is committed to particular relations between self and
society( then it will not promote the transformation of that relation) Ct is therefore crucial to
discern any positive content in fearless speech6 its values( doctrine( and theory) The character
of parrhesia is critical) Ct has a negative force) The truth-teller is remar*able because she says
everything( regardless of convention or danger) There is no doctrine presented as common to
all parrhesiasts( unless it be the command aude sapere ' dare to *now) More often than not(
what the free-spea*er dares to say consists in simple contradiction of their hearers+ assumed
truths) ?o ?ocrates tells people that they are not as wise as they thin*K Diogenes claims that
the *ingship of Ale#ander the Breat is mere shamK ?toics will point out the impracticability of
daily life( and "ynics deny the rationality of the categories of public and private life)
%ecause fearless speech involves an implicit accusation of self-flattery or deception(
early "hristian ascetics were hesitant towards it( and sometimes even hostile) Many
condemned parrhesia along with chattering and gossip as an idle activity that *ept the ascetic
from their proper silence before Bod) Another reason to re,ect it( though( was the confidence
it implied in one+s *nowledge of the neighbour)
Abba Peter( who was the disciple of abba 1ot( told the story6 HC was once in abba Agathon+s cell(
and a certain brother came to him( saying IC want to live with the brothers( but tell me how C
should live with them)J The old man said to him IBuard foreignness 0Bree*6 tvitioK 1atin6
peregrinatio2
:;
you have on the first day you go to them for all the days of your life( and do not
assume boldness 0Bree*6 oppqoiooq,K 1atin6 assumas .iduciam2)J Abba Macarius says to
him( I!hat does boldness do$J The old man says to him ICt is as powerful as the summer that(
during a drought( drives everything before its face( because summer also spoils the fruit of
trees)J Abba Macarius said ICs boldness so bad$J Abba Agathon replied IThere is no passion
worse than boldnessK for it is the mother of all passions) The hard wor*ing mon* should
therefore not embrace boldness( not even if he is alone in his cell)J +
:
Cn this case( parrhesia is not contrasted with silence( but with foreignness6 being a
stranger) The virtue is then not the silence of worship( but that of hesitancy before other
people) Agathon wishes to warn mon*s against rushing in to proclaiming truths about the
brothers without *nowing who they are) And the discovery of who one+s neighbour is is an
:;
C prefer the Bree* reading here( as it retains the sense of arrival on the first day better than the 1atin does)
:
&pop$. Patr. 83at9: P); 0my translation2 O &pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Agathon 5 O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9: P)55)
9oucault completely ignores the positive virtue of strangeness in his commentary on this passage in 9oucault
2006 /0:-/08)
585
endless activity) !e are a mystery to each other that can not even be fathomed by the practice
and doctrine of truth-telling)
9earless speech is not simply about the denial of self-flattery and illusion) Ct does not
,ust ta*e courage to see what everyone is ignoring) Ct ta*es discernment) Qou have to *now
what you are loo*ing for) !hilst the ?ocratic and "ynic forms of fearless speech are the most
unadorned( ?toic and "hristian traditions developed a sophisticated set of practices that would
form the bac*ground against which the truth-teller might spea* courageously and truth-
hearers might be able to spea* the truth about themselves)
This is not the place for an e#haustive overview of these conte#ts for parrhesia) They
vary in detail( from the simple recommendation of ?t Anthony that hermits write down all
their thoughts for the scrutiny of their spiritual director( to the proliferation of handboo*s for
spiritual direction in the wa*e of the "ouncil of Trent 05:3:-5:4/2 which made annual
confession universally obligatory) The techni.ues differ enormously( but all have the same
ob,ective6 to provide a conte#t for the moral agent+s truth-hearing)
The road from the practice of truth-telling to the doctrine of truth about the person is
short) Ct is a mere practical tas* to show people( as ?ocrates did( that they are deceiving
themselves in believing their current way of life to be a rational construction from first
principles) Ct is a natural corollary of this practical tas* to believe that people are self-deceived
concerning themselves) This corollary itself may be elaborated into a ta#onomy of flattering
lies we tell ourselves concerning our greatness( and its recognition or non-recognition by
others)
The transition from shoc*ing home truths to doctrine may be illustrated by the history
of <vagrius+ doctrine of the passions) "ontinuing the philosophical tradition that attempted to
ta*e control of the passions 0particularly through ?toic consolation literature2( <vagrius wrote
his ta#onomy of passions in order to establish practices that would eradicate them) As we saw
above 0on pages 4-5052( this constituted a technology of the self in its relation to truth and
the world( whereby <vagrius aimed to produce ob,ectivity) The ob,ectivity itself served the
twin aims of truth and non-manipulative love)
These aims are less clear in "assian+s account of <vagrius+ ta#onomy( which describes
eight faults( rather than eight passions)
40
Ct is a short step from these to the description of
general sins that may describe all "hristians( monastic or otherwise 0and in this respect
40
"assianus( de institutis: boo*s =-PCC( each of which treats one fault "assianus( *ollationes: boo* =) "limacus
also has eight vices6 "limacus( scal.: ?tep 5/( although strictly spea*ing he adheres to Bregory the Breat+s
ta#onomy of seven deadly sins ' cf) ?tep 22)
582
Pelagius was by no means the loser in his controversy with Augustine6 monastic techni.ues
are .uic*ly applied to and re.uired of the secular church2) !ith Bregory+s moral comments
on Dob( a number of transformations have occurred to "assian+s list6 the faults are generalised(
reduced to seven( and connected to the eternal status of the person) They are no longer ;
practical temptations( but have become the seven deadly sins)
This ta#onomy of sins becomes a doctrine concerning the destiny and status of the
person) Moreover( the list of sins itself yields new techni.ues and interpretations of
techni.ues) They are used by truth-tellers and spiritual directors( and the confession gains the
significance of a diagnosis of the confessing "hristian+s moral substance)
45
!hilst this is simply one contingent and historical tra,ectory for the practice of
parrhesia( the adoption of positive doctrines concerning the person is not a peculiarity
e#clusive to the religious appropriation of the techni.ue) The truth-teller does ac.uire
authority in the course of the parrhesiastic contract) The two forms of courage involved
0courage to spea* despite the danger of reprisals( and the courage to hear despite the danger of
insult2 also imply two forms of trust 0that the hearer will not become violent and that the
spea*er will tell the truth2) Trusting someone to tell the truth is not grounded in first
principles( it is merely necessary to the effectiveness of the techni.ue) The parrhesiastic
techni.ue involves belief in the words of the spea*er) The transition then from choosing to
believe a parrhesiast( towards adhering to commonly held beliefs 0particularly as parrhesiasts
learn their trade from handboo*s and institutional authorities2( and finally to homogeneous
community based on shared perceptions of moral dangers is entirely in *eeping with the ideal
of fearless spea*ing whenever that ideal is held universally)
9earless spea*ers regularly ac.uired a set of disciples( and however resistant they may
have been to established opinion( they became associated with particular doctrines) Ct is not a
necessary result of the practice of parrhesia( but unless the fearless spea*er ta*es steps to
avoid it 0for e#ample through persistent criti.ue of truth-tellers themselves or a theory of the
development of doctrine2( the values and criti.ues that it is courageous to tell soon solidify
into established and fi#ed truths about the person that are no longer dangerous to spea*)
9earless speech may be transformed into uncritical assumption universally applied) These
assumptions still call the sub,ect into .uestion( produce fle#ibility and a critical stance
towards the self( but to the e#tent that they espouse fi#ed standards( their ob,ective is
45
A good e#ample is the opening chapters of Dohn of the "ross( 50)
58/
adaptability towards society rather than the transformation of normality) Cf the doctrine retains
its parrhesiastic authority( anyone denying it will be hailed not as a critic( but a coward)
3.2.3: E0perts
The practice of parrhesia has always been a two-place activity) ?ocrates spo*e the
truth not to himself but to politicians( opponents and disciples) "ynics spo*e out bra&enly to
anyone) The ?toics listened to the bold words of their truth-tellers) The desert fathers listened
to the insults of strangers( and sometimes even of sages) There may not have been a contract
negotiated in each case( and the relation was not always successful either) Nevertheless( the
truth game can only be described as parrhesiastic if there is both a truth-teller and someone to
listen to them) This concrete role can easily be adapted to the mar*et( so that in anti.uity( it
was amenable to the aristocratic tendencies of philosophers) To the e#tent that the role of the
truth-teller becomes defined and restricted by specific criteria( it will also be suited to the
homogenisation of the self+s relation to society)
<arly "hristian ascetics did not radically undermine the role of the authoritative man
in truth-telling( although they were sensitive to the aristocracy of the philosophy of fearless
speech) They did not( for e#ample( restrict the role of the spiritual master to members of the
upper classes or intelligentsia) Abba Arsenius ' who had been an imperial tutor ' was
particularly aware to this problem6
?omeone said to blessed Arsenius( H>ow is it that we( with all our education and our wide
*nowledge got no-where( while these <gyptian peasants ac.uire so many virtues$ Abba
Arsenius said to him( H!e indeed get nothing from our secular education( but these <gyptian
peasants ac.uire the virtues by hard wor*)+
7ne day Abba Arsenius consulted an old <gyptian mon* about his own thoughts) ?omeone
noticed this and said to him( HAbba Arsenius( how is it that you with such a good 1atin and
Bree* education( as* this peasant about your thoughts$+ >e replied( HC have indeed been taught
1atin and Bree*( but C do not *now even the alphabet of this peasant)+
42
As we have seen( the different forms of the techni.ue of parrhesia concentrate on
different elements of the negotiation ' the truth-teller( the truth itself( the truth-hearer( the
ob,ect of the truth( etc) The treatment of anyone and everyone as one+s truth-teller( for
e#ample( is a late development) The transfer of the techni.ue from the political sphere 0where
42
&pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Arsenius : O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: P): 0where the interlocutor is <vagrius2 O &pop$. Patr.
87,. syst.9: P)8 and &pop$. Patr. 8alp$9: Arsenius 4 O &pop$. Patr. 83at9: P=)8 O &pop$. Patr. 87,. syst.9:
P=)8)
583
the truth-teller spea*s to the entire assembly2 to the personal 0where the truth-teller spea*s to
the individual politician2 appears in the wor* of ?ocrates and Plato)
4/
9oucault identifies
Balen as the first to listen to a neutral party who would otherwise be a stranger rather than a
friend who tells you the truth because it is in your interests)
43
"ommon to all these moments of the tradition is the recognition of the spea*er as a
truth-teller) Cn anti.uity( there was not simply a debate concerning how to *now the truth( but
also how to recognise the truth-teller6 this is the force of the warnings against flattery) Ct is not
simply that one ta*es illicit pleasure in hearing lies( but also that the flatterer apes the
parrhesiast6 he is Ha servant of devils( a teacher of pride( the destroyer of contrition( a vandal
of e#cellence( a perverse guide+)
4:
The flatterer does not help one to spea* the truth about
oneself)
>ow does one recognise the truth teller$ There are certain .ualifications and hallmar*s
by which they are *nown( and these are noted and categorised at various points in the
tradition)
44
These .ualifications have to do with the person+s honesty with himself( with his
*nowledge of the passions( his discipline( courage( and ob,ectivity)
Aecognition is a shared thing) Cf C have criteria for identifying someone who can tell
me the truth( then that person can logically claim those criteria to persuade someone to
recognise them as a truth-teller) ?o .ualifications become recommendations( and identifying a
truth-teller is in *eeping with their public recognition as such) 7nce again 0as when we
studied the doctrines of parrhesiasts2( we are faced with the social challenge of authority6 no-
one is obliged to accept someone+s authority( but neither is anyone free from the assumed
choice of some authorities over others)
The tacit or public recognition of certain authorities adds to the obligation to spea* the
truth one hears from the .ualified truth-teller) Ct is one further way in which the universalism
of truth-telling and truth-hearing is reinforced) The recognition may be informal 0as in the
case of truth-telling friends2 or more obviously formal 0as in the case of the truth-telling
priest2) <ither way( the parrhesiastic activity entails that a particular group of people with
specific values and .ualifications e#ert an influence in the determination of the truth about
individuals) As soon as the authority of truth-telling is divorced from its characteristic
elements of resistance to political authority( e#posure to physical danger( distinction from the
opinions of the ma,ority( it may be used to recommend any group of people)
4/
"f) 9oucault 2006 lecture of 5:
th
9ebruary)
43
9oucault( 200:L2005M6 /)
4:
"limacus( scal.: ?tep 22)
44
e)g) in Plutarch( 2004L5;8;M)
58:
C hold the bet that most of you have met at least one of those guys who nowadays regularly visit
a *ind of master who ta*es their money from them in order to teach them how to ta*e care of
themselves) 9ortunately enough( C have forgotten( either in 9rench or in <nglish( or in Berman(
the name of those modern masters) Cn anti.uity( they were called philosophers)
48
The Bree* philosophical tradition( both in its "hristian and its classical manifestations(
has been largely responsible for the continuation of the parrhesiastic tradition 0particularly in
middle- and neo-platonism2) >owever( its idealisation of the philosopher *ing( not least as
realised in the person of Marcus Aurelius( demonstrates the anti.uity of this governorStruth-
teller combination) The fact that the techni.ue was not used in governmental technologies
until early modernism is surely due to its attachment to the role of the advisor to the *ing( and
later to marginal ascetic communities rather than to late anti.uity+s noble resistance to state
power) The power of the parrhesiastic e#pert is difficult to resist( and is a result of reflection
on the practice of truth-telling) %y characterising and limiting the truth-teller( the tradition
defined and grounded the possibilities of truth-hearing in a particular relation to one order of
society) Truth-tellers enabled citi&ens to fulfil the ideal relation( leading philosophically
ordered society onto the horns of the ecclesiological dilemma outlined above 0on page
54/-5442)
Cn its tendencies towards imposing an obligation not to lie( establishing doctrine( and
fi#ing a class of e#perts( the practice of parrhesia is beset with difficulties) None of these are
necessary results of truth-telling( but all are contingent directions to which it may lead)
The effect of these difficulties is to rigidify the self) !hen the authority of a
courageous truth-teller is identified with established ideal .ualities and a particular class of
people( the image of the truth can thereby be confined to that ideal) <stablishing a fi#ed
ta#onomy of virtue and vice( together with techni.ues for avoiding the one( cultivating the
other( and assessing the result( has the force of defining a model to which all must conform)
The obligation for everyone to spea* the truth about themselves to the community
0represented by the truth-teller2 enforces the necessity of the ideal and the model for the sa*e
of the stability of that community)
Cn short( these are specific ways in which the practice of parrhesia can lead to social
homogeneity rather than to criti.ue) Truth-telling is not the unambiguous ethical ideal
48
9oucault( 5;/)
584
embraced by certain na\ve 9oucauldians)
4;
Ct is a practice that lies at the root of disciplinary
techni.ues of normalisation) Ct plays into the hands of aristocratic philosophy( mar*eted
citi&enship( and of homogenising ascetic ideals) 9or this reason( constructive proposals for
practical modes of criti.ue 0e)g) %ernauer+s mysticismK %utler+s giving an account of oneselfK
"ritchley+s >umour2
4
must face the implications and possible appropriations allowed by their
theories) They must find out the cost of telling the truth)
4;
This uncritical appropriation is often associated with theologians( although it can most easily be found
amongst the 9oucauldian ethical writers6 Davidson( 53 McBushin( 2008 7U1eary( 2002)
4
%ernauer( 2002 %utler( 200: "ritchley( 2002)
588
&.&: .umour
C would li*e to ta*e the e#ample here of humour( which is both the most attractive and
most relevant method of truth-telling to be found as regards holy fools) Ct also has the
advantage of having been considered by a wide range of philosophers throughout the
centuries) Ct is a prime e#ample of truth-telling that reconfigures one+s relation to oneself(
with both personal factors 0affecting one+s sense of humour2 and social factors 0through
sharing a ,o*e2) !ith its political satire and individual surprise it is a mode of truth-telling
uni.uely able to transform the relation of the self to society) %y loo*ing at the implications of
humour( and attitudes towards it among early "hristian ascetics( we will be able to assess the
significance of the playful comedy and truth-telling insults of the holy fools)
Cn this section we will loo* at the techni.ue itself( as it is interpreted by some modern
authors(
80
and argue for the interpretation of humour as a form of asceticism and wor* on the
self) 7nce the foundation of this interpretation is given( we can turn to the ways in which
humour ' and particularly the laughter of the holy fools ' falls upon the ecclesiological
dilemma( and what resources it has for solving it)
>umour can be interpreted as a mode of the fearless speech we e#amined above(
namely as an activity with implications for social life( and effects on the self) 1i*e the practice
of learning the truth through listening to a truth-teller( humour is primarily a social activity)
!e laugh at what others tell us) Cf we laugh on our own( it is usually because we have been
provo*ed by someone else+s thoughts( either in writing or memory) At the same time( we say
that people have a good sense of humour( and this is an individual .uality( in the sense that we
would not say that a football team( my relationship with my sister( or all pedestrians have a
good sense of humour)
?o there is an interaction between the relationship and the attitude6 C laugh with others
to the e#tent that C have a sense of humour that fits the interaction) %oth the laughter and the
attitude are dynamic6 they develop and are transformed) C meet new things to laugh at every
dayK C find things funny today that may have been banal or even insulting yesterday) Dust as
we saw the courage of truth-telling and the courage of truth-hearing( the comic situation
allows for the telling of ,o*es and the appreciation of ,o*es) %oth may cause the failure of
comedy)
80
e)g) "ritchley( 2002 %ergson( 200:L505M %erger( 58)
58;
>umour has an identifiable relation to truth-telling in addition to its parallel structure)
There are factors in truth-telling that e.ually rule out being funny) Qou cannot( for e#ample(
use humour to patently communicate dogma) Cn fact( it is a typical butt for comics) ?imilarly(
it is impossible to be a flattering comic) Any ,o*e that appears e#travagant in its praise for the
hearer simply has to be ta*en tongue-in-chee*) A flattering truth-teller has also renounced her
tas*)
A further similarity between fearless speech and humour is the challenge both pose to
the unspo*en assumptions of those who find the ,o*e funny) This may be in terms of simple
punning( which brings into .uestion the meaning of words) More subtle( however( is the
comic tric* of ma*ing everyday life seem absurd)
85
%y ad,usting the perception of reality
somewhat( the logic we enter into when we accept an idiom is revealed and moc*ed) Two
e#amples of moc*ing advertising demonstrate the techni.ue)
!ittgenstein closes a letter to Bilbert Pattisson with the comment H?omehow or
other( one instinctively feels that Two ?teeples No) ;/ Wuality ?oc* is a real man+s
soc*) Ct+s a soc* of taste ' dressy( fashionable( comfortable)+
82
An advertising campaign for a Hno frills+ chain reads H%uy one) Pay for one)+
The comic and truth-telling also have similar relationships to courage) %oth dare to
transgress censorship and taboos in their speech) %oth are in their element when they do so)
"riti.ue and ,o*ing ' e)g) Bree* comedy and Aoman satire ' have both been forbidden by
religious and political authorities( to the detriment of the *nowledge of truth) "omics
throughout history have had to pay dearly for their trade)
Truth-telling can be humorous) %raving taboos can be humorous) >umour is critical)
More specifically( the laugher is often moc*ed by what sShe laughs at) >umour helps us to
find ourselves absurd( which can be a long step towards self-transformation)
As such( humour involves a very specific division of the self) Ct is a division
determined by laughter6 the self finds itself funny) !hilst this is certainly not true of all
humour( or all laughter( it is at least a branch of humour that has been normatively
recommended recently by "ritchley( himself ta*ing up the descriptions of the healthy self in
the later wor* of 9reud)
8/
85
%ergson( 200:L505M6 5;( 8:f)
82
.uoted in Mon*( 506 244f))
8/
"ritchley( 20026 esp) ch)8)
58
!hen the self has been divided in this way( it becomes possible to tell the truth about
the self and ac*nowledge the criti.ue elaborated by the comic without the possibility of insult)
Cf one has found the ,o*e funny( then it simply cannot offend) Cf it does offend( it is no longer
funny) There is no guarantee here( and the comedian+s tas* is to get the audience to remain in
this ab,ective relation to themselves long enough for her to tell the truth)
Cn this respect( the sense of humour is a form of apat$eia) !e noted above 0on page
5:/2 the relation of apat$eia to insults6 to provo*e someone is to test the presence of passion)
!ithout the passion( an insult may become funny) Unless we are disconnected from our
passions on the other hand( we will be unable to find something funny) Cf we immediately feel
concern for a clown slipping on a banana s*in( it will not be funny) Cf we are worried about
our self image( we will not be able to laugh)
>ere C would point out( as a symptom e.ually worthy of notice( the A%?<N"< 79 9<<1CNB
which usually accompanies laughter) Ct seems as though the comic could not produce its
disturbing effect unless it fell( so to say( on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and
unruffled) Cndifference is its natural environment( for laughter has no greater foe than emotion)
83
The candid view of oneself produced by humour 0and truth-telling2 wor*s both
inwards and outwards) !e are confronted with our absurd nature( our world( and our bodies
0which is perhaps why it is so hard not to laugh when someone farts in metaphysical
surroundings2( and forced to recognise the modesty of our lives) At the same time( we are
introduced to the possibility of another way of configuring reality) The silliness of our way of
life is not compatible with its logical necessity) "riti.ue of our modes of being-together and
our representations is made possible) <veryday life may be transformed ' or transfigured ' by
the comic vision) The comedian is a social visionary( forcing the possibility into thought that
things could be otherwise)
%ut because all this is a pleasurable e#perience( our absurdity does not awa*en
revulsion in us( or even regret) Cn our laughter( our faults seem to us li*e so many endearing
foolishnesses) ?atirist Deremy >ardy pointed this out concerning the frustration felt by the
%ritish at the bureaucracy of food regulations in the United @ingdom( that re.uires pac*ets of
walnuts to include a note on the bac* saying Hmay contain nuts+6
That+s the thing that people get most irate about isn+t it$ HCt+s outrageous( pac*ets of nuts which
may contain nuts in itV+ C *now it+s foolish( but it+s .uite .uaint and charming) Ct+s li*e the old
83
%ergson( 200:L505M6 3)
5;0
money( it wasn+t doing any harm( pounds shillings and pence) Qes( it was lunatic( but it was
.uite charming) !hy can+t we have our .uir*s$ !hat+s wrong with it$
8:
Ct is worth tarrying briefly at this understanding of humour as criti.ue) The tendency
of modern philosophy to address its critical eye towards the presuppositions of truth as well as
its content has turned into a mar* of academic rigour that is not always ,ustified) !e are as*ed
to believe a thin*er because he Hchallenges established and presupposed tacit truths+) The term
9oucault used to describe discontinuities in the development of thought ' problematisation
84
'
has become a standard academic term more or less synonymous with Hloo* at+) People e#press
their intention to Hproblematise+ the notion of the family( the treatment of se#uality or the
layout of public buildings in anti.uity or modern times)
The problem with this particular appropriation of modern philosophy is that it yields
almost e#clusively mendacious descriptions) Cf a boo* has genuinely challenged established
tacit presuppositions( then it would be deeply shoc*ing 0or unbelievable and thereby
e#tremely funny2) Cf it is not perceived as such( then we must be sceptical as to the e#tent to
which the truths it has challenged really were deep-seated tacit presuppositions) ?imilarly( if it
were genuinely possible for one researcher to Hproblematise+ a particular concept( group of
people( or practice in which they themselves participate( then that person would be some sort
of messiah figure in that culture) They would also be entirely incomprehensible to their peers)
Cn 9oucault+s terminology( at least( shared e#periences( perceptions( and eventually concepts
become problematic as a result of a variety of factors( and the last ones to *now about it are
often the academics who integrate the new terminology ' the self( ideology( the homeless '
into their thought) Cf professors can sit in their offices and discuss the social significance of
the family( this is because it has already become problematic) Cf it had not become so( it
would not occur to anyone to discuss it) Ct is not a mista*e to use the word to describe the age-
old academic process of isolating and studying an ob,ect of thought or e#perience as
problematisation 0or at least( if it is( it is a trivial e#egetical one2) %ut it is not a very
convincing evidence of truth-telling either)
Cn fact( a number of thin*ers have attempted to transform themselves and culture by
addressing what they consider tacit presuppositions( and the pro,ect is not to be denied by so
much failure) Ct is altogether more dangerous( however( to identify a success story)
Aevolutionary ideas as well as manipulative falsehoods have been offered to the world as
8:
Anderson( 200;)
84
9oucault( 20006 558-55)
5;5
unpopular truths)
88
!e have already noted the social danger inherent in a false proclamation
of liberation) As a result( 9oucault outlines his ideals for such a pro,ect in his agreement with
the school of phenomenology6
Cmpossible( as one turns these pages( not to thin* of Maurice Merleau-Ponty+s teaching and of
what was for him the essential philosophical tas*6 never to consent to being completely
comfortable with one+s own presuppositions) Never to let them fall peacefully asleep( but also
never to believe that a new fact will suffice to overturn themK never to imagine that one can
change them li*e arbitrary a#ioms( remembering that in order to give them the necessary
mobility one must have a distant view( but also loo* at what is nearby and all around oneself)
8;
The practice of criti.ue is not guaranteed to induce a radical change in language and
culture) Although C will be arguing here that humour does have the characteristics of a
particularly penetrating criti.ue that allows us to see the world differently( there is no formula
to produce the *ind of cultural transformation dreamt of by recent theorists) To the e#tent that
humour is met with surprise and resistance( however( it can be shown to be doing more than
re-organising language and culture in the surface)
?urprise is thought by some to be the very essence of humour) The punch-line to a
,o*e( or the sudden recognition of a mime+s ob,ect are not ,ust funny( but une#pected) !e had
not thought this situation in this way before) The surprise is increased the closer it gets to the
bone) ?o half the humour of satirists is based in the audience not e#pecting them to be so
daring) Note that the surprise e#plains both the humour here 0it+s the resolving punch line2
and the criti.ue 0the new way of loo*ing at the world feels li*e a resolutionSrevolution2) A
good e#ample of this is the song HThe Pursuit of >appiness+ by #$e 'i"ine *omedy) The
theme of the song is laid out as a message of love( full of flattery and noble devotion6 IDust as
long as we are together for ever C+ll never be anything other than happyJ) The lover is fulfilled
and completed by the beloved) The beloved is all that matters) Then the final line delivers a
crushing blow to its own genre6
>ey( don+t be surprised if millions die in plague and murder(
True happiness lies beyond your fries and happy burger)
8
88
Dostoevs*y+s 'emons is 0among other things2 an e#cellent portrayal of the abuse of the popularity of
progressive ideas in nineteenth century Aussia6 Dostoevs*y( 2000L5;82M)
8;
9oucault( 2002L58M6 33;
8
>annon( 58)
5;2
The final sentence is a classic punch line) %ut it also leaves us to reflect on the use of
the word Hhappy+ in the song and elsewhere) Cf Hhappy+ can be applied to a hamburger( what
value can be attributed to the happiness the lover derives from being with his beloved$ >ow
serious can love songs ever be from now on$ The punch line( during the singing of which the
instruments fade away( allowing the truth-telling conclusion to appear na*ed in its fran*
intensity( leaves us with an odd feeling of being displaced( li*e we have been fooled into
inauthenticity)
The thesis that surprise is at least one element of humour has not( to my *nowledge(
been contested) That humour regularly meets with resistance is also widely accepted) A
common criticism is that a comic has Hgone too far+( or that she is saying things ,ust for laughs
rather than the more serious business of ma*ing a point) Do*es can be in poor taste) These are
signs that the ,o*e is transgressing limits( which is not to say that the transgression is good or
bad) The fact that the resistance ta*es the form of non-cognitive criticism ' in terms of taste(
of pre-set limits to speech( of whether it+s funny or not( rather than contesting its patent truth
claim ' demonstrates that the ,o*e is not operating in the realm of logical thought) !e don+t
answer one of 9reud+s ,o*es about Dews by pointing out that it is founded in a deception
concerning Dewish hygiene)
;0
Ct is not simply false( but revealing of bad character)
7ne instance of comedy which both meets with resistance and is manifestly meant to
wor* on its hearers+ categories of thought is <ddie C&&ard+s stand-up comedy( and in
particular his se.uence on being a transvestite) Cn ma*ing the distinction between Hweirdo
transvestites+ and He#ecutive transvestites+( he ma*es patent the way in which the category of
transvestite has become defined in relation to a construction of normality and morality rather
than having the positive meaning of cross-dressing) >e attempts to prise away the concepts of
se#uality( gender( and violence) Perhaps more subtly( he moc*s the bourgeois morality that
attributes all things that have to do with the He#ecutive class+ with an acceptable status)
!hen C was in New Qor*( there was a guy in the %ron# who was living in a cave ' li*e you do(
and he was coming out and shooting at geese and ' a lot of weird things going on with this guyK
and the police pic*ed him up and they found a collection of womenUs shoes( and they thought(
HMaybe heUs a transvestite)+ And if he is( he+s a fuc*ing weirdo transvestiteV CUm much more in
the e#ecutive transvestite area) Travel the world( yes( itUs much more e#ecutive) 1i*e D) <dgar
>oover( what a fuc*head he wasV They found out when he died that he was a transvestite( and
;0
These ,o*es are scattered throughout 9reud( 2002L50:M)
5;/
they go( H!ell( that e#plains his weird behaviourV+ Qeah( fuc*ing weirdo transvestiteV 0points to
$imsel.2 <#ecutive transvestite) CtUs a lot wider community( more wide than youUd thin*)
;5
C&&ard does not fall into the mista*e of constructing a new identity for transvestites) >e
does not as* to be ta*en seriously) Ct is not that we should include in our *nowledge of
humanity categories of gender( se#uality( and cross-dressing) Cnstead( he attempts to produce
confusion and frustrate the formation of categories) Cn addition to his self-confession as an
e#ecutive transvestite( for e#ample( he also calls himself a Hlesbian trapped in a man+s body+
or Ha male tomboy+) >is comedy is a bra&en challenge ' categorise me if you canV
This wor* on the conditions of thought is of a piece with his activism) <ddie C&&ard is
also a member of Amnesty Cnternational and has organised a number of events to support
them) 7ne particular form his wor* too* was a protest against the death of =anessa 1orena
1edesma( who died in police custody in %uenos Aries( Argentina6 HC stood on Argentine
territory at the foot of their embassy and said( ICUm a transvestite( CUm on your property( so
arrest me and beat the shit out of me li*e you did with your other transvestitesVJ+
;2
>umour enables criti.ue both through its own truth-telling practices and through its
nurture of an attitude of affectionate self-criti.ue that allows scepticism and change in our
own thought) Ct is a mode of social transformation in both these respects6 we are changed by
its truth and we become open to change by the efficacy of its techni.ue) Cn this respect(
humour can be described well as a speech act) Cts locutionary force 0the patent truth claim of
the ,o*e( e)g) HC+m an e#ecutive transvestite+2 differs from its illocutionary force 0its social
criti.ue( e)g) Hdon+t automatically associate transvestites with dangerous individuals+2( and its
perlocutionary force is then laughter)
;/
Cn contrast with its transformative portrayals( the attitude comedy inculcates in us ' of
modesty and fle#ibility ' is an ongoing point of character) !e are brought down to earth by
our sense of humour) Cf we are in the habit of laughing at the world( then nothing in the world
is safe from the comic perspective) <verything can change)
This techni.ue+s most attractive attribute is perhaps that of delight) !e en,oy
laughing) Unli*e the insult( humour is not a difficult pill to swallow) Ct is a part of the
gracious ordering of creation that leads us to the good and the true through our natural
appreciation of the beautiful)
;3
7ur bodies need food( and hence the e#istence of "ornish
;5
C&&ard( 5;)
;2
Barfield( 2005)
;/
9or the theory of ?peech Acts( see paradigmatically ?earle( 54 and Austin( 58:)
;3
9or the seminal account of this in Augustine+s wor*( cf) >arrison( 52)
5;3
pastiesK we need to drin*( hence hot chocolateK we need to hear the truth( hence Dostoevs*y+s
novels and !ittgenstein+s philosophyK we need to be humble( hence comedy) The practice is
good( true( and beautiful( without the painful effort of repentance and transformation) As
"ritchley has put it( Hyour super-ego is your amigo+V
;:
>umour is not merely an interesting techni.ue of ethics and criti.ue) Ct is theologically
grounded( through its character of delight( its adherence to the truth( and its ob,ective of
goodness) The comic is the flipside of the priest( where the latter adheres to abiding truths(
reinterpreting the tradition for each new day( and the former criticises the priest+s
compromising attitude to contemporary culture( and challenges the obvious truths that
condition thought)
;4
Cn parallel with the practice of fearless speech( however( this techni.ue is beset with
dangers) The public recommendation or ethical endorsement of critical humour may license
its use to force transformation in the entire population) That transformation would be dictated
by and conformed to the sense of humour of that population( and in particular those intelligent
and powerful enough to e#ert an influence on it) >owever( if critical humour becomes the
preserve of an elite few( then all the resources of that techni.ue of the self ' fle#ibility(
adaptability( and self-*nowledge ' are restricted to that aristocratic minority) Alternatively(
the techni.ue may become a mar*etable good li*e spiritual guidance or therapy) That *ind of
mar*eting might then cultivate a sense of lac* in the population6 a sense of humour becomes
the reserve of the rich) This is the economic effect of the assertion of taste in public comedy)
Cn what follows( C shall enumerate problems that parallel those mentioned concerning
truth-telling 0cf) over( on pages 544-5832 in order to discern whether humour( and particularly
that of the holy fools( is able to avoid the slippage from critical truth-telling into the forcing of
the self+s fle#ibility for the sa*e of social homogeneity that ta*es place when truth becomes
obligatory( dogmatic( and the preserve of a few e#perts) !hen applied to humour( these
themes become the obligation to laughK stoc* comic formsK and the power of the comic)
3.3.1: "#e obligation to laug#
>umour both assumes and constitutes a community) Translating ,o*es is a perilous
affair( but a feeling of community results if the ,o*e is appreciated) !e rarely laugh on our
own) ?omething has to be e#tremely funny to provo*e solitary laughter( whereas we can
;:
"ritchley( 20026 /-508)
;4
This portrayal is given in @ola*ows*i( 2003L5:M)
5;:
laugh at banalities in the right company)
;8
Cf we unite this social function of humour with the
self-critical effects( however( humour becomes a tool of homogeneity and the policing of
cultural boundaries) This section will attempt a criti.ue of humour in terms of this reading of
comedy) 1aughter at oneself may be pleasurable( but those who cannot laugh with the ,o*er
are both ostracised thereby( and *ept outside by the truth-force of the ,o*e for those who
laugh)
!e can interpret the perceived dourness of the theologians of the patristic era in this
conte#t) A brief e#amination of what motivated the fathers and mothers of the church to resist
laughter will give the lie to unhelpfully reductionist accounts of these thin*ers as grumpy old
men)
;;
"ertainly the ascetic thin*ers were acutely aware of the social dynamics of humour(
braving ridicule and ostracism by resisting unhelpful humour6
%ut when the demons observe that we stay clear of the sallies of some outstanding wit( as
though we were avoiding the plague( they try to catch us with two seemingly plausible thoughts(
namely that we should not be offensive to the person telling the witty story and we should not
give the appearance of loving Bod more than he does) %e offV Do not dawdleV 7therwise the
,o*es will start coming bac* to you when you are at prayer) %ut do not simply run away) %rea*
up the bad company in a devout way by setting before them the thought of death and ,udgment(
and if a few drops of vainglory fall on you( what harm$ Provided of course( that you become a
source of profit to many)
;
>umour and vainglory are two *ey modes of preserving fi#ed values in a group) They
are inherently social( and hard to resist) The attitude of early "hristian ascetics towards them
is characterised by self-determination) >umour needs to be open to the critical eye( li*e a
passion) The ascetic needs to be able to Hcommand laughter+
0
and reason about the comic)
5
%ecause comedy is an e#tremely reasonable thing)
The effects of comedy are socially useful) %ergson refers to the way laughter produces
social fle#ibility so that people may adapt themselves to the demands of living in community)
1aughter homogenises)
2
"onsider the recent rise of ethnic humour6 it is now possible to laugh
at one+s ethnicity because of the national identity enforced by integration politics( which
;8
%ergson( 200:L505M6 3f et passim Augustinus( con..: CC)i#)58 ?chopenhauer( 2003L50/M6 9urther
Psychological 7bservations)
;;
e)g) in ?creech( 586 38f( et passim)
;
"limacus( scal.: ?tep 52) Dohn "hrysostom is described by Dohn Moschus not as one who never laughed( but as
one who never Hlistened to witty words)+ Moschus( prat.: 55)
0
"limacus( scal.: ?tep 8)
5
%asilius( reg. .us.: Wuestion 58)
2
%ergson( 200:L505M6 8/( ?ymeon the New Theologian 5;06 =CC)52)
5;4
relativises ethnic culture) !hilst this identity was still fragile and negotiable( one+s relation to
one+s ethnic origins was still strong and non-negotiable( hence the play on the rigidity of older
generations prevalent in this brand of humour) The young generation of multicultural %ritish
citi&ens laughs at the older generation that was unable and unwilling to adapt and hybridise its
culture) Cnfle#ible ethnic traditions are criti.ued and laughed at in ways that affirm the
adaptability of cosmopolitan <urope) And here it is important to note that the comedians are
laughing at t$emsel"es6 their own identityK their own family( which they+ve managed to
brac*et in order to fit into secular cosmopolitanism) The discomfort inherent in this analysis
ta*es us immediately into the ecclesiological dilemma6 one is suspicious of the cultural
assumptions that incline one to moc* one+s own culture( whereas forbidding this *ind of
humour implies denying a set of resources for being happy and criticising public life)
Cn what is to my *nowledge the first modern observation of the social technology of
government as the organisation and appropriation of self-control ' the art of arts
/
' %ergson
notes the social utility of an ascetic techni.ue6
1aughter( then( does not belong to the province of esthetics alone( since unconsciously 0and
even immorally in many particular instances2 it pursues a utilitarian aim of general
improvement) And yet there is something esthetic about it( since the comic comes into being
,ust when society and the individual( freed from the worry of self-preservation( begin to regard
themselves as wor*s of art)
3
This particular .uality of humour has been identified by business e#ecutives all over
the world( so that He#ecutive toys+ and He#ecutive games+ have become common practice in
various corporations and office-based institutions) The effectiveness of the wor*force is here
augmented by their rela#ation in each other+s presence and the trivialising of contingent
differences that confirms the shared assumptions of the wor* conte#t) Through humour( they
are able to spea* the truth to each other6 the wor*ing group becomes more cohesive through
the community-building activity of shared ,o*ing( and more effective through the openness
created around gentle moc*ery)
Ct is difficult not to be suspicious of this utilitarian humour) As "ritchley has put it6
/
The term used to denote the conduct of conduct essential to spiritual direction and modern government6 cf)
9oucault( 2002L5;2M 9oucault( 2008L2003M6 53;-5:3 %urchell( 546 5( largely .uoting Bregorius( 3ib. Reg.
Past.: C)5)
3
%ergson( 200:L505M6 50)
5;8
?uch enforced fun is a form of compulsory happiness( and it is tempting to see it as one further
sign of the ways in which employees+ private lives are being increasingly regulated by the
interests of their employers)
:
The .uestion is6 is it possible to resist this form of intrusion$ The game of humour is
difficult to decline without e#periencing immediate ostracism) Aefusing to be amused by
something is both to depart from the shared activity and to invite the community+s derision)
<#pressing offence and solidarity with the butt of the ,o*e is both brave and bad form) The
criti.ue inherent in comedy can cut both ways) 1i*e the obligation not to lie( the obligation to
laugh may soon turn into forced self-humiliation)
This aspect of humour is particularly disturbing because of its combination of
techni.ues of the self with social utility) Ct is not even the ostracism that is pernicious here6 we
can be happily alone when ostracised) >umour that produces humility does not necessarily
homogenise( and social utility can be a commendable virtue) !hen all these aspects are
combined( however( the automatic nature of the techni.ue of humour becomes a form of
government that subsumes the pursuit of happiness under the ob,ectives of the pursuit of an
effective wor*force( a national identity( motivation for citi&en participation( etc) These
community aims are pursued within the conte#t of a form of truth-telling that has enormous
powers of commanding assent) The techni.ue of veridiction is appropriated for the cause of
social utility)
4
Cn this conte#t( the ostracism is unli*ely to happen( because the ,o*ing acts as
an inclusive force) %ut including the useful can be ,ust as sinister as ostracising the
ineffective)
"omedy becomes a force of government for precisely the reasons that it was
considered critical above6 it is surprising( enables criti.ue( places and comforts the self( and
challenges presuppositions) Dust as the value of truth-telling can be deployed in the program
of nation-building( so can the criti.ue of humour be a function of national identity and social
harmony) The techni.ues of change beloved of 9oucault( whereby philosophical activity
consists Hin the endeavour to *now how and to what e#tent it might be possible to thin*
differently( instead of legitimating what is already *nown+
8
are relayed time after time in
homogenising and effectivising corporate wor*shops concerned with Hthin*ing outside the
bo#+) >umour is no e#ception)
:
"ritchley( 20026 5/)
4
?ee 9oucault( 586 2/ for an account of how this *ind of combination 0of the Hcity-citi&en+ game with the
Hshepherd-floc*+ game2 is characteristic of government in early modern <urope)
8
9oucault( 52bL5;3M6 )
5;;
Do the holy fools embrace this governmental force of humour$ Cs their foolery a way
of forcing people into the *ingdom of Bod by ma*ing them laugh$ ?ymeon the >oly 9ool is
certainly portrayed as an aggressive mon*) >e accepts the criticism of the anchoritic life as
unsociable and ultimately self-centred(
;
and responds by ta*ing his asceticism to town) As
such( his aim is to save souls) ?o we can not e#pect his life to pose no demands on the people
he meets) ?ymeon openly espouses the obligation ' indeed the forcing ' of humility)
L?ymeonM said to Dohn( I!hat more benefit do we derive( brother( from passing time in this
desert$ %ut if you hear me( get up( let us departK let us save others) 9or as we are( we do not
benefit anyone e#cept ourselves( and have not brought anyone else to salvation)J And he began
to .uote to him from the >oly ?cripture such things as I1et no one see* his own good( but
rather the good of his neighborJ( and again( IAll things to all men( that C might save allJ( and
from the Bospel( I1et your light so shine before men( that they may see your good wor*s and
give glory to your 9ather who is in heavenJ( and other such things) X ?ymeon said to him(
I%elieve 0me2( C won+t stay( but C will go in the power of "hristK C will moc* the world)J
Cn line with this stated intention( he forces certain people to respond to his teaching of
orthodo#y) 1eontius relates a number of occasions when the holy fool miraculously obliges
the unorthodo# to accept "hristianity) The specific methods vary ' a ,uggler+s hand is
shrivelled until he swears to renounce the theatreK some Hacephalic heretics+ 0monophysitesK
diaphysites in the ?yriac te#t2
500
receive a destructive demon in their shop until they confess
orthodo#yK ?ymeon brea*s all the wares of a Dewish glassblower until he converts ' but the
general form is a threat of violence followed by conversion) The stories are all miraculous(
even when the secrecy narrative does not re.uire them to be 0it is presumably fairly easy to
destroy the produce of a glassblower( but ?ymeon does so by simply ma*ing the sign of the
cross2)
505
Ct would be a mista*e to leave out the aggressive miracle-wor*ing characteristics of
the holy fools) They are warriors for 0diaphysite2 7rthodo#y in a time and place in which
7rthodo#y was confronted with its neighbours 0the monophysite churches( along with many
other movements defined as heretical and forced into the <ast li*e Nestorianism(
Manicheanism( and Messalianism2) This is what constitutes their mar*ers of holiness in the
;
e)g) in %asilius( renunt "limacus( scal.: ?tep 3) This theme also underlies "assian+s treatment of the two forms
of monasticism in "assianus( *ollationes: PCP)