Co v.

Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent
Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised
on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions
for certiorari.

Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed. The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose
Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in
the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a
resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the
province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and
shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision
of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath
of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent)
was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs
and practices of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked
for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be
aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to
correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was
not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of
age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only
nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would
be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite
of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his
citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the principle of due
process because he has already been laid to rest

Djumantan vs. Domingo

Facts: Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married
petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979. On
January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, arrived in Manila as the
"guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner
and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. When
petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January
13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.As "guests," petitioner and her two
children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the
Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. On
March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to
that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner
was issued an alien certificate of registration. Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son,
Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter
to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.

The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to petitioner, the
Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Phils. There
was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent residence, since she was an
Indonesian citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid. Thus this petition
for certiorari
Issue: Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings
Held : Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable 2) determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. We need not resolve the validity of
petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an
"undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the right of the
President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is
as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country.

However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an "alien who enters
the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements
or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of
entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and
"shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five
years after the cause for deportation arises". Tolling the prescriptive period from November
19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the
country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation
on September 27, 1990.
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent
Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.
Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto
and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. The
HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE : Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
RULING: The petition is without merit.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization,
(2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
MERCADO VS. MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083, May 26 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then
declared the winning candidate; however its proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position.
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because
he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United
States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did
not lose his Filipino citizenship. From these facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino
and a US citizen.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.
HELD: The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private
respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born
in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause under
Article IV of the Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to posses dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

JACOT VS DAL
FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission
on Elections(COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12
June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying him from running for the position
of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007National and Local Elections, on
the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States(US)
citizenship. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on 13 December1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioners
request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo.

On 27 September2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-
12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six months after, on 26 March
2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local
Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest numberof votes for the position of Vice
Mayor.On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution
disqualifying the petitioner fromrunning for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of hisUS citizenship.

ISSUE: whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007
local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

HELD:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine
citizenship.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the
Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a
situation might arise under Republic Act No.9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship
by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The
afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate
of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in
Philippine elections. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office,
who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have
been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines
, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections

Jacot v. Comelec
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming his disqualification from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship requirement. Petitioner was a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought
to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under R.A No. 9225. Six months after, petitioner filed
his Certificate of Candidacy. Respondent Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the
COMELEC against petitioner arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as
required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws. When the local and national elections were
held petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
Thereafter, COMELEC finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as required by law
for persons seeking public office.
Ruling:
No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. It specifically
provides that public office in the Philippines should meet the Constitutional requirements and
existing laws. At the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 should not only take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
elective posts in the Philippines. A candidate in Philippine elections must only have one
citizenship, that is, Philippine citizenship. This the petitioner fails to do.
A candidate who failed to comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens
and received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or
amount to a waiver of, the citizenship requirement. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the
candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly
applied. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not
a matter of popularity. The appeal was DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED
and petitioner was DISQUALIFIED.

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742
Facts: Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. In 2005, she filed an application to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. It was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous
Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be
an Australian citizen. Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this
time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners
eligibility were filed before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from
holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. Petitioner
argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement.

Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to hold her elective post

Held: No. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights
and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
Before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia, which was not under oath, contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath. When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no
occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance: In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and
single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of
the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit
duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in
clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. Failure to
renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective
public office.

Another ruling:
The Court held that petitioner Sobejana-Condon was disqualified from running for elective
office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship under oath contrary to the exact
mandate of Sec. 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally
rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath, the
Court held.
The Court further held that the petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to
serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the Court has previously
declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidate is already
considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded
by the enactment of RA 9255 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition
of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. It added that the fact that
petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy since garnering the
most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
[Petitioner] is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a
sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any
elective office in the Philippines, held the Court.
The Court also held that it cannot read the Australian Citizen Act of 1978 under which
petitioner claim she deemed to have lost her Australian citizenship into RA 9225 as the Court
would be applying not what the legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so
would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this
Republic.
Petitioner Sobejano-Condon was a natural-born Filipino citizen on August 8, 1944 but became
a naturalized Australian citizen due to her marriage to one Kevin Thomas Condon on
December 13, 1984. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA
9225, which was approved and she took her oath of allegiance to the Republic on December 5,
2005.
On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has
ceased to be an Australian citizen.
She ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in 2007 elections but lost her bid. She
ran again and won in the May 2010 elections, this time for position of Vice-Mayor, and took
her oath on May 13, 2010. However, private respondents Luis M. Bautista, et al., all
registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning her
eligibility before the RTC on the issue of her dual citizenship and that she failed to execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
The RTC on October 22, 2010 ruled that petitioners failure to comply with sec. 5(2) of RA
9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. It also nullified her proclamation as
winning candidate and declared the position of Vice-Mayor in Caba, La Union vacant.
Sobejana-Condon appealed to the COMELEC and the poll bodys Second Division dismissed
the same for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for
reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its September 6, 2011
resolution. However, the COMELEC en banc,in the same resolution, concurred with the
findings and conclusions of the RTC. Thus, it dismissed petitioners instant appeal for lack of
merit and affirmed the October 22, 2010 decision of the RTC, as well as granted the Motion
for Execution filed by private respondents.
The Court held also that the COMELEC en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioners appeal after ruling for
reinstatement. It held that an appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively
resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution and Sec. 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure.
The Court further held that the COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary
execution of judgment which is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Citing Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Court also held that execution pending appeal
may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction.
The Court held that private respondents are not estopped from questioning petitioners
eligibility to hold public office pursuant to Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code which
allows the filing of quo warranto petition within 10 days after the proclamation of the
elections results, which was what private respondents did. (GR No. 198742, Sobejana-
Condon v. COMELEC, August 10, 2012)
When the winning candidate in a local election has been disqualified with finality after
his proclamation, who succeeds him? The vice mayor/vice governor? Or the candidate
for the same position who received the next highest vote? -

A recent (April 13, 2013) SC decision in a disqualification case, penned by the Chief Justice
herself, has established a new/landmark election-law doctrine.

When a winning (ineligible) candidate in a local election (for mayor or vice governor) is
disqualified with finality after his proclamation, the candidate for the same position who
garnered the next highest vote shall be proclaimed the eligible winner.

The old doctrine was that the vice mayor or the vice governor, as the case may be, shall
succeed the disqualified winning candidate, not the candidate for the same position who had
received the next highest vote.

This ruling can benefit Mayor Alfredo Lim, who lost last month to Erap Estrada in the
mayoralty election in Manila.

Erap's disqualification case is now pending before the SC.

It seems that Mayor Lim still has a strong chance to be declared as the real (eligible) winner in
the election - that is, assuming that Erap loses in his disqualification case now pending before
the SC.

Mayor Lim has filed with the SC a motion to intervene to secure his legal interest under the
new doctrine, which is beneficial to him, being the candidate who garnered the next highest
vote in the Manila mayoralty election last May 2013. -


Excerpts:

"x x x.

With Amado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Amado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he
filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already
proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Amado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The affirmation of Amado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches
back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Amado is declared to be not a candidate at all
in the May 201 0 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should
not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.