DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA, petitioner, vs.

REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the

name and style of Pongkay Trading, respondent.
G.R. No. 182356 | 4 December 2013

Facts:
30 March 2000: Juan dela Llana (Juan) was driving a car along North Avenue, QC with
his sister, Dra. Leila dela Llana (Dra. dela Llana) at the front passenger seat and a
certain Calimlim at the backseat.
While stopped across Veterans Hospital, a dump drunk driven by Joel suddenly rammed
the car from the rear, violently pushing it forward.
The cars rear collapsed and its rear windshield shattered. Apart from a few minor
wounds caused by the glass splinters, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered
other visible physical injuries.
May 2000: Dra. dela Llana started to feel pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder,
which eventually became unbearable to the point that she could no longer move her
arm.
Upon consultation with Dr. Milla, she was diagnosed as having suffered from a whiplash
injury. Extensive physical therapy proved to be futile and she had to undergo cervical
spine surgery after consultation with other doctors. As a result of the surgery, Dra. dela
Llana was incapacitated from the practice of her profession.
8 May 2001: Dra. dela Llana sued the owner of the truck, Rebecca Biong (Rebecca), for
damages after the latter refused to compensate her for the injuries she sustained.
At trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile
witness. She testified that she lost the mobility of her arm due to the vehicular accident.
She identified and authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla which stated
that she suffered from a whiplash injury. In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela
Llana was physically fit when they met days after the accident, and that she exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana. It held that the proximate cause of the whiplash
injury was Joels reckless driving. It declared that Joels negligence gave rise to the
presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Joel. Accordingly, it found Rebecca vicariously liable,
and awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of P570,000.00 as actual damages,
P250,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit.
CA: Reversed the ruling of the RTC. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a
reasonable connection between the accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance
of evidence. It ruled that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there
is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact
in issue. (Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. CA) Moreover, it held that courts cannot take judicial
notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It also declared as fatal to her
claim her failure to present an expert witness. No weight was given to the medical
certificate, it having no explanation how and why the accident caused the injury.

Issues: (Note: I only focused on those related to Evidence)
1. WON Dra. dela Llana has established by preponderance of evidence that Joels
negligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury. [NO]
2. WON the medical certificate has probative value. [NO]
3. WON Dra. dela Llanas opinion (as testified by her) has probative value. [NO]
4. WON the SC can take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
[NO]

Ratio:
1. NO, Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.
a. Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three
elements of quasi-delict before the Court can determine Rebeccas liability as
Joels employer. (see Art. 2176, NCC) She should show the chain of causation
between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid
this foundation can the presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel
arise. Only after the negligence, damages and proximate causation are
established can the Court proceed with the application of par. 5, Art. 2180, NCC.
b. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who
alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or
greater weight of credible evidence. Mere allegations are not evidence.
2. NO, it doesnt. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted
in evidence.
a. The RTC did not admit in evidence the medical certificate, hence, the CA erred in
even considering it in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that evidence
which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in
arriving at their judgments.
b. Even if it is considered, it has no probative value for being hearsay. Evidence is
hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence.
c. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The
former depends on its relevance and competence, while the latter pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
3. NO, her opinion has no probative value.
a. Under the RoC, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and
an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in
evidence regarding: (a) identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore,
the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person. On the other hand, the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess.
b. Even if admitted as expert testimony, the Court does not immediately accord it
with probative value. Its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may
afford the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his
opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.
c. Dra. dela Llana was not presented as an expert witness but as an ordinary
witness. As such, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause
and effects of whiplash injury.
4. NO, courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
a. This is not public knowledge, nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration,
nor ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
WHEREFORE, assailed decision and resolution of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED and petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.