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Module Title Method and Practice in the History of Political Thought
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2
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Liberty and individuality in Mill's On Liberty

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5060
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Liberty and individuality in Mill's On Liberty

This essay explores the idea of liberty and individuality in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. It
will defend the following assumptions: (a) Although On Liberty cannot be understood solely
through the study of biographical detail, it is clear that Mill's personal experiences-
particularly his relationship with Harriet Mill- were a great influence in its composition; (b)
On Liberty is not primarily concern with the role of the state in matters of morality. Rather,
the text is, first and foremost, a critique of the coerciveness of public opinion and warning
against a new form of social tyranny emerging in nineteenth-century Europe; (c ) the
self/other- regarding dichotomy derived from Mill's harm principle is the cause of much
disagreement among critics; because Mill's principle lack a coherent account of interests, it
proves itself inapplicable in practice; (d) Mill's vindication of individual liberty carries
controversial assertions that are at odds with his utilitarianism; such an uncompromising
defence of individuality triggered a variety of direct and indirect criticisms, such as those
Matthew Arnold, who argue that an excessive degree of individual liberty may lead to lack of
social cohesion and anarchy.
This essay will be structured in the following manner: In section I, relevant biographical
detail prior to the writing of On Liberty will be provided, followed by a brief discussion on
matters of authorship; in section II, I will, firstly, expose Mill's main argument in On Liberty
and, secondly, clarify some common errors of interpretation; in Section III, a critical
discussion of Mill's harm principle will be developed and issues of applicability will be
addressed; in Section IV, I will explore Mill's defence of individuality and its compatibility
with utilitarian principles; this will be followed by a brief exposition of Matthew Arnold's
alternative account and indirect challenge to Mill's principles of individual freedom.
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Section I- The context of On Liberty
In order to understand the personal motivation behind the writing of On Liberty, it is
necessary to begin with a brief account of Mill's relationship with Harriet Taylor. Mill was
twenty-four and Mrs Taylor twenty-three when they first met. At the time, she was married to
a wealthy merchant and the mother of two young children. Mill was immediately impressed
by Mrs Taylor character and intellect, and it was not long until they started to exchange
intimate correspondence and spend time together (Packe, 1954, p.110). Although Mill and
Mrs Taylor did not see their proximity as improper, this friendship was deemed as
unconventional at best and unacceptable at worst according to moral code of conduct of
nineteenth-century England. As such, their relationship was the target of heavy scrutiny in
their social circle, and it was not long before rumours about their friendship began to
circulate. Such rumours were deeply resented by Mill and Harriet who, for almost twenty
years, had to endure the general disapproval to their association (Himmelfarb, 1974, p.18).
By the mid-forties, such situation led Mill to break off relations with his friends and distance
himself from his family. With the death of Mr. Taylor in 1849- and after two years of
customary mourning- Mill and Harriet, now Mrs Mill, finally married (Packe, 1954, p.350).

Despite the formal legitimization of their relationship, Mrs Mill and Mill grew increasingly
truculent towards their respective circles of family and friends. While Mill accused his
mother and sisters of being tardy in paying their respects to his wife, she resented the insults
perpetrated by old friends (Himmelfarb, 1974, p.19). In the midst of such perceived
hostility,the couple opted for a very private lifestyle after moving to a suburban home in
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Blackheath (Himmelfarb, 1974, p.20). For the seven years that Mill and Mrs Mill were
married- she died in 1858- they were almost entirely removed from literary and political
circles. With the exception of some foreign visitors, they received very few friends or
relatives, their deliberate seclusion increasing alongside Mrs Mill deteriorating health
conditions (Packe, 1974, p.289). She died in 1858 and, few months later, Mill informed his
publisher that On Liberty was ready for publication. The work was published in the following
year.
At the time that On Liberty was published, Mill was fifty-three and, despite his little personal
contact with the external world, he enjoyed eminence within the English academia, to whom
he was considered to be one of the most distinguished philosophers and economists in the
country at the time. His two major works- Systems of Logic (1843) and Principles of Political
Economy (1848)- were already deemed to be authoritative readings for anyone endowed with
any intellectual ambition (Himmelfarb, 1974, p.10). Lord Balfour went so far as to claim that
Mill's importance as an intellectual in nineteenth century England rivalled that wielded by
both Hegel in Germany forty years before and Aristotle in the Middle Ages (Balfour, 1915,
p.138). Despite such public acclaim, Mill remained disenchanted with the 'insipid' Victorian
society in which he lived; so little was his personal contact with the exterior world at the
time, he recounts in his Biography, that it could be almost considered as retiring from it
altogether (Mill, 1924, pp.159-60). To Mill, little could he gain from such contact: most
individuals were obsessed with superficial rules of conduct, were indifferent to serious and
challenging discussion and suspicious of anyone who confronted the ordinary. Such reality,
argued Mill, was inevitably debasing to the intellectual. It is disillusionment with a
mediocrity-hailing society that sets the tone for Mill's most spirited insights on On Liberty.
As Himmelfard nicely puts it, the animus against society expressed in this book, the
exaltation of the individual, the overweening distrust of conformity, convention, and social
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pressures of all kinds, correspond to the existential reality of his own life (Himmelfarb,
1974, p.20).
Both Mill and Mrs. Mill regarded On Liberty as the result of their combined effort. In fact,
Mill never shied away from recognising his wife's contribution to this work. In his
Autobiography, Mill asserts that the book was more directly and literally their joint
production than anything else which bears his name and, furthermore, that the whole mode
of thinking of the book was emphatically hers(Mill, 1949, p.213). Most commentators,
however, regard the frequent and effusive tributes to his wife- the inspirer and in part the
author, of all that is best in my writings, reads Mill's devoted dedicatory on On Liberty- as
the words composed by Mill the utmost adoring husband, rather than Mill the sober and
rational thinker (Himmelfarb, 1974, p.58). In fact, it was typical of Mill to dedicate reverent
remarks to his close associates whilst undermining his own intellectual dexterity. Although it
is broadly agreed that Mill's remarks on his wife's contribution to his work are often
exaggerated, one should not disregard her contribution completely. As Hayek observes, prior
to On Liberty, Mrs. Mill had written an unpublished essay in which she attacked the prevalent
spirit of conformity found in society as a ruinous force that dashes one's potential to
develop a genuine individual character (Hayek, 1951, pp.275-79). Although there is no
evidence proving that Mill consulted this text while writing On Liberty, the themes, opinions
and tone of Mrs. Mill's essay are of remarkable similarity to their latter joined effort.
Section II- Understanding Mill's Principle of Liberty
Mill described On Liberty as a philosophic text-book of a single truth, and the nature of
that truth was categorically asserted in a well-known passage found in the first chapter (Mill,
1974, p.68):
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The objective of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of
society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in
the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection.
Mill builds up on this foundational idea, and develops the rest of this paragraph with the
confident assertion of the following principles: Power can be rightfully exercised over an
individual against his own will only if it intends to prevent harm to others; an individual's
own good- whether physical or moral- is not, in itself, a sufficient warrant; one should not be
be compelled to do or act in any manner because, according to the opinion of others, to do so
is understood as wise, right, or it would bring that person's own happiness. Although these
may be good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him,
or entreating him, these are never enough to justify compelling the individual, or exposing
him to any evil if he does otherwise (Mill, 1974, p.69). In other words, arguments, persuasion
and non-coercive methods influence are permitted, but not physical or moral coercion; the
only part of one's conduct which is amenable to society is that which concerns others; of that
which only concerns oneself, one's independence is absolute. Mill finishes the paragraph with
the sentence that has since become not only one of his hallmarks, but also one of the
epigraphs of modernity: Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
absolute (Mill, 1974, p.69). For its use of remarkable use of language, this extract of On
Liberty is a prime example of the high rhetorical register which the best Victorian prose
could command (Collini, 1989, p.xi).
Although abounding eloquence and assertiveness, the above statements have raised a great
number of objections and difficulties of interpretation. If taken in isolation, it may appear to
the critical reader that Mill takes a rather inflexible position in relation to his doctrine, not
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only because of his choice of words- sole end, only purpose, own body, absolute-
but also for what can be deemed to imply the doctrine's universal applicability to all kind of
states. Mill, however, alerts us that he is mainly concerned with advanced and democratic
societies, above all Britain. Mill views the strive for liberty as contingent upon the stage of
development through which each given society is placed (Gray, 2008, p.xv). When
explaining the scope of his principle of liberty, he asserts that it only applies to human
beings in the maturity of their faculties and not to backward states in which the race itself
may be considered in its nonage and where people are not capable of being improved by
free and equal discussion (Mill, 1974, pp. 68-69). On the very foundations of On Liberty,
therefore, one can find the idea that humanity, under the right conditions, is capable of
progress; or, more fundamentally, that human nature is not static. For Mill, it is only when a
certain level of cultural development has been attained, and backwardness is left behind that
individuality becomes the most valuable component of human well being (Gray, 2008, p.xv).
If Mill's On Liberty is an assault on the despotism of custom marking the character of
European society at the time, it is also a product of this ceaseless concern with progress,
improvement and civilisation that is all too familiar in Western nineteenth century political
thought.
Some commentators, such as Patrick Dvelin, suggest that On Liberty should be primarily
understood as a challenge to the role of the state in matters of morality, as its primary concern
being is to clarify the connection that exists between law and morality (Halliday, 1976, p.115
). A more careful analysis of the text, however, indicates that Devlin's assertion is inaccurate.
This confusion may result from the almost instinctive connection one usually make between
coercion or interference and the government's role as the inflictor of these (Kateb, 2003,
p.30). Mill is indeed concerned with the role of the state as the perpetrator of excessive and
unnecessary power over the lives of individuals; this is not, however, his most pressing
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concern in On Liberty. It is important to refer back to what kind of societies Mill had in mind
whilst writing the text; for him, the old, familiar tyrannical regime was no longer an eminent
threat in civilised society as it once was. The flourishing of representative government in
many countries in Europe meant that the interests of rulers and ruled were, at the time, more
compatible than ever (Himmelfarb, 1974, p.34). Mill's consternation, therefore, lied not as
much in highlighting the manner in which the hard power of the state infringes upon the
individual's freedom; he focused, instead, in a more dispersed and ergo more dangerous kind
of unfreedom. Mill was concerned more fundamentally with what he calls Civil or Social
Liberty, which he deemed to be vital to individuality. Mill foresaw a new tyranny that was
emerging within the civilised world: a social tyranny, one that is exercised by society
through the imposition of norms, values and ideas by popular opinion and example (Mill,
1974, p.168).
Section III- Harm Principle, self-regarding and other-regarding actions
The passages found below are the ones that, arguably, cause the greatest degree of
controversy among critics of On Liberty (Mill, 1974, pp.68-69):
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Many critics assert that Mill's principle of self-protection presupposes the classification of
human action into two categories: first, "self-regarding" actions, which affect only or
primarily the agent himself, and other- regarding acts, which concerns others beside the
agent (Ten, 1980, p.4). For critics, the distinction between these two categories is simply
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impossible to be made. The mere fact that man lives in society necessarily implies that he
cannot be isolated from it; there is no way in which one's action will not affect us in some
way or another. As one of the early critics of Mill puts it: No action, however intimate, is
free from social consequences. No human being can say that what he is, still less what he
does, affects no one but himself (Rees, 1960, p.116). Other critics such as Baker, McIver,
Ritchie depart from the same presupposition: Mill's On Liberty affirms that there are certain
self-regarding actions which bear no social consequences (Ten, 1980,pp.10-11). This
presupposition, however, is not accurate. Mill readily and explicitly asserts that self-regarding
conduct necessarily affects others. He recognises that the mischief which a person does to
himself may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests, those nearly
connected with him and, in a minor degree, society at large. He also asserts that an
individual's self-regarding conduct which affects him directly, may also affect others
through himself (Mill, 1974, p.146; Mill, 1974, p.71).

Although these passages clarify some important matters, they also bring further debate within
Mill's scholarship. The great controversy arises from the perceived inconsistency in Mill's
assertions: How can he defend that there is such a thing as a category of self-regarding acts
and at the same time, claim that such acts which do not have effect on others do, in fact,
affect others? One of the most reputed attempts of answering this question is found in the
1960 paper A Re-Reading of Mill on Liberty written by J.C. Rees. According to Rees, Mill
determines a difference between merely affecting others and affecting the interests of
others (Rees, 1960, p.118). In order to justify this assertion, Rees turns to a number of
passages where Mill utilises the concept of interests rather than that of effects, and concludes
the following: It is an incontestable fact that an individual's action will always affect others;
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but this is not to say that someone else's interests are always going to be affected (Ten, 1980,
p.11). In effect, the degree to which an individual's interest is affected is not dependent upon
his subjective perceptions; rather, it is based on a certain standard of values that is deemed to
be significant. Although purely subjective factors may influence how, or how much, one is
affected by someone else's conduct- if someone is very sensitive, and can be easily offended,
for example- these same factors cannot determine the objective element in the notion of
interests (Rees, 1960, 121; Ten, 1980, pp.11-12).
The crucial problem with this interpretation, however, is how one can determine what man's
actual interests are. Rees's responds to that with the following assertion: interests depend for
their existence on social recognition and are closely connected with prevailing standards
about the sort of behaviour a man can legitimately expect from others (Rees, 1960, p119). If
that is the case, the realm of liberty is largely determined by society's norms and values. It is,
in fact, with the intention of differentiating real human interests from "arbitrary wishes,
fleeting fancies or capricious demands" that Rees emphasises the importance of
understanding interests as dependent and correspondent with society's norms and customs
(Rees, 1960, p.125). It is the values held by the majority that determine whether other
people's interests are violated by a person's conduct, and hence whether his conduct falls
within the area of legitimate intervention by law and public opinion (Ten, 1980, p.12). As
Wollheim points out, Rees's interpretation of Mill's liberty or self-protection principle
becomes relativistic and conservative in character: subsequently, it does little justice to Mill's
ultimate desire to challenge the norms and values of society (Ten, 1980, p.12).
Rees's proposal, therefore, does not appropriately counter the criticism, because there is not
any coherent account of interests in Mill's On Liberty. Furthermore, such obscurity in Mill's
conception of human interests is accompanied by the difficulties of discerning his views on
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harm. What can we consider to be harm? Is offence to feelings an individual's interest that
ought to be protected, and if that is not the case, why not? Can we determine interests that are
value-free in a way that such determination does not alter within the realm of divergent moral
outlooks? In other words, Mill's one very simple principle is infinitely more complex to
come to terms with than what one may be inclined to believe, as it is dependent on a clear
definition of interests that can be utilised by a variety of individuals of contrasting moral
outlooks (Gray, 2008, p.xviii). The reality is, however, that understandings of what
constitutes harm and how severe it is, varies tremendously according to each individual's
moral perceptions. As John Gray observes, this is a serious problem in terms of applicability
of Mill's principle (Gray, 2008, p.xviii).
Section IV- Mill's defence of individuality
As it has been previously pointed out, Mill defended that the creation of sphere of non-
interference allows for individuals to make autonomous choices, and is therefore a vital
component for their happiness and fulfilment as well as society's. The problem with such
assertion is identified by those critics who read On Liberty as an exercise in the philosophy of
utilitarianism. James Fitzjames Stephen, whose Liberty Equality Fraternity arrived as a direct
response to Mill's doctrine, argued that Mill fails to demonstrate that liberty would result in
the greatest possible degree of individual happiness. If happiness is the only thing that has
value in itself, one should promote it with the most possible efficacy; consequently, a
consistent utilitarian social policy would not be particularly sympathetic toward individual
liberty (Stephen, 1967, pp.170-176). Fitzjames Stephen argues that Mill attempts to acquire
liberal conclusions that support individual rights and liberty departing from a utilitarian
perspective. If Mill intents to define liberty through utilitarian lens, therefore, he must
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recognise that it has no intrinsic or inviolable character. The value of liberty is therefore
always entirely dependent on its contingent consequences (Stephen, 1967, p.176):
() if the word 'liberty' has any definite sense attached to it, and if it is consistently used in that sense, it is
almost impossible to make any true general assertion whatever about it, and quite impossible to regard it either
as a good thing or a bad one. If, on the other hand, the word is used merely in a general popular way without
attaching any distinct signification to it, it is easy to make almost any general assertion you please about it; but
these assertions will be incapable of either proof or disproof, as they will have no definite meaning. Thus the
word is either a misleading appeal to passion, or else it embodies or rather hints at an exceedingly complicated
assertion, the truth of which can be proved only by elaborate historical investigations.
It is questionable, however, whether Mill's intended to develop an argument that was fully
congruent with the main tenets of utilitarianism. Indeed, throughout the whole of On Liberty,
Mill insisted happiness was no more a cause for interference with liberty than wisdom or
virtue or mere conformity to the conventions of society (Himmelfarb, 1974, p.31). As C.L.
Ten highlights, there are important non-utilitarian aspects in Mill's vindication of individual
liberty that should not be disregarded (Ten, 1980, p.5). In On Liberty, therefore, Mill's
assertive utilitarianism of past works gives way to a restless defence of values of self-
development and individuality. In fact, what is most radical about on On Liberty is its attempt
to argue not only for the necessity of liberty in the spheres of thought, discussion and action
but for its sufficiency inasmuch it does not cause harm to others. Mill was certainly
concerned with the attainment of truth, wisdom and the improvement of society in general
terms; these principles, however, were conceived as goals that could be only be attained once
principles of liberty and individuality were established firmly and absolutely, and in turn
become the determinant of social policy principles and action.
In his fierce defence of liberty, Mill put himself in a position where a number of counter-
intuitive assumptions had to be defended. Mill's case for freedom of discussion, for example,
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go as far as arguing that truth itself is defined in terms of liberty. What makes the argument
quite remarkable is that Mill does not deny the existence of an objective truth and men's
capacity of achieving it; after all, he is no relativist or nihilist (Himmelfarb, 1974, pp.32). Not
only Mill asserts that it is liberty of debate that allows for the challenging of untruthful
claims, but also that it is the right to assert untruthful claims that allows one to fortify the
truthfulness of one's argument. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due
study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold
them because they do not suffer themselves to think (Mill, 1974, p.94). In other words, truth
consolidates itself through debate, by its weighing against contrasting opinions. If not fully,
frequently, and fearlessly discussed, truth risks being held as dogma (Mill, 1974, p.95). The
very condition that gives us ground for assuming the truth of our opinion is, therefore, the
absolute liberty of contradicting and disproving it; on not other terms, argues Mill, can a
being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right (Mill, 1974, p.78). If
one did not face the constructive contact of a contrasting opinion, if there were no stimulating
challengers to important truths, one should go as far as developing debate artificially (Mill,
1974, p.81):
So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all
important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments
which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up.
The same passionate conviction for liberty is asserted in Chapter III, where Mill addresses
what he deemed to be the greatest possible expression of individuality: liberty of action.
Whilst Mill defended liberty of discussion as the means through which truth can emerge, he
connected the liberty of individuality to development, virtue and genius. Mill felt indignation
towards the social boundaries imposed to those of peculiar taste or eccentricity of conduct;
such barriers of convention force original men to shape themselves according to mediocre
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rules of conduct which, in turn, are determined by an unoriginal multitude; he who lets the
world, or his portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty
than the ape-like one of imitation (Mill,1974, p.123) . Individuality, therefore, must be
opposed to blind submission to societal customs. Individual character can only be attained by
men and women who, through use of critical reasoning and judgement, are capable of
reaching autonomous, deliberate choices (Mill, 1974, pp.121-126).
Mill's fixation with diversity is quite obvious in Chapter III, as he is often hailing the
importance of eccentricity, peculiarity, passion, experimentation, impulse; for Mill, these are
virtues that improve society, and push it beyond the monotonous and predictable paths of
development or, further still, prevent it from stagnating completely (Berlin, 1991, p.39). Mill
highlights the potential danger of societal homogenisation by using the example of China,
where the imposition and perpetuation of uniformity have resulted on an acute condition of
stationariness (Mill, 1974, p.136). To allow for individual self expression, therefore, is not
only good for the individual, but also represents a great benefit for the whole of humanity:
Innovative individuals prevent society to become a stagnant pool (Mill, 1974, p.129).
Indeed, the individuality and energy of character is dying under various influences, especially
that of materialist capitalism: Energetic characters on any on any large scale society are
becoming merely traditional. There is now scarcely any outlet in this country except
business (Mill, 1974, p.135).
Many commentators were critical of Mill's emphatic arguments on the dangers and extent of
this new form of social tyranny and the subsequent decline of individuality. Fitzjames
Stephen, for example, while agreeing with Mill on the importance of individuality for the
flourishing of a better society, he did not have the same opinion on the degree to which this
affected society's principal structures (Mill, 1974, p.35). The pressure applied to society,
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argued Fitzjames Stephen, was limited to spheres that were not of great relevancy such as, for
example, one's dressing code or one's rules of etiquette. In the areas that mattered most, and
where it ought to be exercised, liberty was more widely disseminated than ever before: there
probably never was a time when men who have any sort of originality or independence of
character had in their power at arm's length so cheaply (Mill, 1974, p.36). Another reviewer
writing for the Bentley's Quarterly Review refuted Mill's position as unfounded, pointing to
the fact that a a generation which has produced and which has listened to attentively to Mr
Carlye, Mr Froude and Mr Buckle cannot be charged with shrinking blindly from
independence of thought(Himmelfarb, 1974, p.37).
Whether Mill's assertions on the decline of creativity were correspondent to the reality of
Victorian England at the time, there was another set of criticisms, not explicitly directed to
Mill's essay, that touch on a more contestable issue. In Culture and Anarchy, Matthew
Arnold, one of the most reputed literary critics of nineteenth century England, contested
Mill's principle of individuality as one that could lead to disastrous consequences. Although
Arnold did not directly address Mill's most famous essay, his critique was a visible attack to
the general principles of liberty and individuality advocated by Mill. Arnold believed that, by
granting the Englishman the right to such individual liberty, one is consequently granting him
his right to march where he likes, meet where he likes, enter where he likes, hoot as he likes,
threaten as likes, smash as he likes (Arnold, 1993, p.85). In other words, to permit a greater
degree of liberty to man is to set off in a road that will inevitably lead to excessive behaviour.
By allowing such degree of individual liberty, England is in danger of drifting towards
anarchy(Arnold, 1993, p.85). Arnold was equally reticent to the principle of freedom of
opinion, which he saw as denigrating to a society's culture. Arnold henceforth refutes the
argument that plurality of opinions allows for a happier, more virtuous society.
Page 16 of 20

It is clear that Arnold departs from different presuppositions and holds different opinions on
what man's ultimate ends are. Unlike Mill, he rejected individuality as an end in itself, and
understood this principle as a violation to the vital notions of tradition and authority. While
Mill understood variety and plurality as contributing factors to a more prolific society, Arnold
understood this disparate of competing opinions and the plethora of lifestyles as undesirable
obstructions to a virtuous, cohesive society (Mill, 1974, pp. 43-44). What concerned Arnold
the most in relation to this theory of liberty and individuality, therefore, is its lack of
homogenising means and purposeful ends. The schism between and Mill and Arnold is nicely
represented by their divergent views on the question of education. While Mill argued for an
independent educational system as a way of preventing the state from imposing uniformity
upon the next generation, Arnold understood state-run education as a means through which a
multiplicity of dispersed wills and heterogeneous aims are welded together to form a national
character. For Arnold, to leave education in the hands of private groups would result in
sectarian forms of knowledge that would prevent the nation to attain the necessary
cohesion that leads to the ultimate goals of man: wisdom and virtue (Collini, 1993, p.xiv).
The ideas exposed by Arnold demonstrate that On Liberty should not only be weighted
against the direct criticism it has received since its publication. Mill's essay not only
transformed the concept of individual liberty into a philosophy, but it also- directly and
indirectly- instigated the development of new system of thought, alternative ideals and
sympathetic reformulations. By placing individual liberty as the determinant factor in the
shaping of social policy principles and action, Mill laid the theoretical foundations of
liberalism as a political creed. Today, the precepts defended by Mill are so deeply ingrained
in our society that it may be difficult to appreciate the radicalism of Mill's message in the
context of nineteenth century Britain. Despite its unquestionable importance, one should not
disregard the text's contradictions and inconsistencies. If On Liberty is seen as an essential
Page 17 of 20

part of our intellectual tradition today, it is not only because it still speaks to its contemporary
readers, but also because it has aroused such a degree of debate and controversy.

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