06 Succession With Charts

06 Week. Succession. ALS 3C. 2013. Justice Hofilena.
1

CONTENTS
FOR RECIT AFTER MIDTERMS ................................................................................................................ 1
25. Arts. 955 1002 (See Tolentino comment on Art. 999).................................................. 1
1. Pascual v Pascual Bautista 207 SCRA 561 MOMMY ..................................................... 5
2. Landayan v Bacani 117 SCRA 117 GASTON .................................................................... 6
3. Manuel v Ferrer 247 SCRA 476 CARLO SANCHEZ ........................................................ 8
4. Rosales v Rosales 128 SCRA 69 NORBY ............................................................................ 8
5. Berciles v GSIS 138 SCRA 53 MAITI ................................................................................. 10
26. Arts. 1003 1014 .......................................................................................................................... 11
1. City of Manila v Archbishop of Manila 36 Phil 815 LEX AQUINO .......................... 12
2. Adlawan v Adlawan 479 SCRA 275 (jan 2006) DONDON ......................................... 13
27. Arts. 1015 1023 MEMORIZE Art. 1015 ............................................................................ 14
1. Torres v Lopez 49 Phil 504 PENDIX ................................................................................. 15
28. Arts. 1024 1028 .......................................................................................................................... 16
29. Arts. 1029 1040 .......................................................................................................................... 17
1. Nepomuceno v CA 139 SCRA 217 HADDY ..................................................................... 18
2. Villavicencio v Qinio GR 45248 April 18, 1939 KEITH .............................................. 20
3. Cayetano v Leonidas 129 SCRA 522 RIO ........................................................................ 21
30. Arts. 1041 1048 .......................................................................................................................... 23
31. Arts. 1049 1057 .......................................................................................................................... 24
1. Avelino v CA 329 SCRA 368 JECH ...................................................................................... 25
32. Arts. 1058 1077 .......................................................................................................................... 26
1. Zaragoza v CA 341 SCRA 309 DEBBIE LIM .................................................................... 27
2. Adan v Casili 76 Phil 279 JELI............................................................................................. 29
3. Dizon Rivera v Dizon 9 SCRA 555 REGGIE ..................................................................... 30
33. Arts. 1078 1090 .......................................................................................................................... 32
1. Garcia v Calaliman 172 SCRA 201 BELLE....................................................................... 33
2. Balanay Jr v Martinez 64 SCRA 454 MUTI...................................................................... 34
3. Alejandrino v CA 295 SCRA 538 JAMON ........................................................................ 36
4. Cua v Vargas 506 SCRA 374 ANGEL ................................................................................. 37
5. J.L.T. Agro Inc. v Balansag 453 SCRA 211 TRISTAN ................................................... 39
6. Chavez v IAC 191 SCRA 211 MARIANA .......................................................................... 42
7. Santiago v Santiago v 627 SCRA 351 ELLIE .................................................................. 43
8. Barcelona v Barcelona 58 Official Gazette 373 JAPS case not found ................. 45
9. Bautista v Grino-Aquino 168 SCRA 790 MEME ........................................................... 45
34. Arts. 1091 1105 .......................................................................................................................... 47
1. Bautista v Bautista 529 SCRA 187 CJ NARVASA .......................................................... 51
2. Reyes v RTC of Makati Br. 142 561 SCRA 593 JP ORTIZ........................................... 52

FOR RECIT AFTER MIDTERMS
25. ARTS. 955 1002 (SEE TOLENTINO COMMENT ON ART. 999)
Art. 955. The legatee or devisee of two legacies or devises, one of which is onerous,
cannot renounce the onerous one and accept the other. If both are onerous or
gratuitous, he shall be free to accept or renounce both, or to renounce either. But if the
testator intended that the two legacies or devises should be inseparable from each
other, the legatee or devisee must either accept or renounce both.
Any compulsory heir who is at the same time a legatee or devisee may waive the
inheritance and accept the legacy or devise, or renounce the latter and accept the
former, or waive or accept both. (890a)
Art. 956. If the legatee or devisee cannot or is unwilling to accept the legacy or devise, or
if the legacy or devise for any reason should become ineffective, it shall be merged into
the mass of the estate, except in cases of substitution and of the right of accretion.
(888a)
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a manner that it
does not retain either the form or the denomination it had;
2

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed
or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or
devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If
after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be
by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be
valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise
of the right of repurchase;
(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime of the testator, or
after his death without the heir's fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay
the legacy or devise shall be liable for eviction if the thing bequeathed should
not have been determinate as to its kind, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 928. (869a)
Art. 958. A mistake as to the name of the thing bequeathed or devised, is of no
consequence, if it is possible to identify the thing which the testator intended to
bequeath or devise. (n)
Art. 959. A disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be
understood to be in favor of those nearest in degree. (751)
CHAPTER 3
LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION
SECTION 1. - General Provisions

Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only
with respect to the property of which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates
the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases
provided in this Code. (912a)
Art. 961. In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, in accordance
with the rules hereinafter set forth, in the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the
deceased, in the surviving spouse, and in the State. (913a)
Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of
article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987,
paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines. (912a)

SUBSECTION 1. - Relationship

Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each
generation forms a degree. (915)
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and
descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not
ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (916a)
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917)
Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons,
excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree
removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-
grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made
to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees
removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four
from his first cousin, and so forth. (918a)
3

Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same
father and the same mother.
Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but
not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same father. (920a)
Art. 968. If there are several relatives of the same degree, and one or some of them are
unwilling or incapacitated to succeed, his portion shall accrue to the others of the same
degree, save the right of representation when it should take place. (922)
Art. 969. If the inheritance should be repudiated by the nearest relative, should there be
one only, or by all the nearest relatives called by law to succeed, should there be several,
those of the following degree shall inherit in their own right and cannot represent the
person or persons repudiating the inheritance. (923)
SUBSECTION 2. - Right of Representation

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited. (942a)
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have succeeded. (n)
Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never
in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the full or half blood. (925)
Art. 973. In order that representation may take place, it is necessary that the
representative himself be capable of succeeding the decedent. (n)
Art. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall
be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not
inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or
could inherit. (926a)
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they
shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts.
But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions. (927)
Art. 976. A person may represent him whose inheritance he has renounced. (928a)
Art. 977. Heirs who repudiate their share may not be represented. (929a)

SECTION 2. - Order of Intestate Succession
SUBSECTION 1. - Descending Direct Line

Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line. (930)
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner
as a legitimate child. (931a)
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares. (932)
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation. (934a)
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)
Art. 983. If illegitimate children survive with legitimate children, the shares of the
former shall be in the proportions prescribed by Article 895. (n)
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his
parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs. (n)

SUBSECTION 2. - Ascending Direct Line
4

Art. 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents
and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives. (935a)
Art. 986. The father and mother, if living, shall inherit in equal shares.
Should one only of them survive, he or she shall succeed to the entire estate of the child.
(936)
Art. 987. In default of the father and mother, the ascendants nearest in degree shall
inherit.
Should there be more than one of equal degree belonging to the same line they shall
divide the inheritance per capita; should they be of different lines but of equal degree,
one-half shall go to the paternal and the other half to the maternal ascendants. In each
line the division shall be made per capita. (937)
SUBSECTION 3. - Illegitimate Children

Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate
children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (939a)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of
another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and
the latter by right of representation. (940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate
children shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by
right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a)
Art. 991. If legitimate ascendants are left, the illegitimate children shall divide the
inheritance with them, taking one-half of the estate, whatever be the number of the
ascendants or of the illegitimate children. (942-841a)
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Art. 993. If an illegitimate child should die without issue, either legitimate or illegitimate,
his father or mother shall succeed to his entire estate; and if the child's filiation is duly
proved as to both parents, who are both living, they shall inherit from him share and
share alike. (944)
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his
or her surviving spouse who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,
she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (945a)

SUBSECTION 4. - Surviving Spouse

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate
children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse
shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001. (946a)
Art. 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.
(834a)
Art. 997. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants,
the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the estate, and the legitimate parents
or ascendants to the other half. (836a)
Art. 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half. (n)
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child. (n)
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse, and illegitimate children are
left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the other half
shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such
widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, and the illegitimate children the
other fourth. (841a)
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half. (953, 837a)
5

Art. 1002. In case of a legal separation, if the surviving spouse gave cause for the
separation, he or she shall not have any of the rights granted in the preceding articles.
(n)
1. PASCUAL V PASCUAL BAUTISTA 207 SCRA 561 MOMMY

EMERGENCY RECIT:
FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late
Eligio Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual,
who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or
spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes
Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for
administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are
illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term illegitimate
children as described in art 992 should be construed as spurious children).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding
that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of
the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of
their father.

COMPLETE
FACTS
Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio
Pascual, who is a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual

Don Andres Pascual died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural,
adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the
deceased
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood
of the deceased
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased
and represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Dad m. Mom
Don Andres Pascual m.
Adela Soldevilla Pascual
Eligio Pascual
Olivia (Acknowledged
Natural Child)
Hermes (Acknowledged
Natural Child)
6

Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual

Adela, the wife of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the RTC a special proceeding
for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Adela then filed a
Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly
stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres
Pascual.

Again Adela executed a affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual
is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the
statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual . All the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the Olivia and Hermes,
although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual.

The Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia and Hermes, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate
of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle.

Olivia and Hermes filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights. The RTC denied the
motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes. CA affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE
W/N Article 992 of the Civil Code can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD
Petition dismissed. CA decision Affirmed.
RATIO
Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
The issue in this case had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court
ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that
it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie
of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
IAC did not err in holding that Olivia and Hermes cannot represent their father Eligio
Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres
Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
2. LANDAYAN V BACANI 117 SCRA 117 GASTON
Landayan Version

1st m. 2nd m. 3rd m.
Florencia Bautista Antera Mandap
Maxima Andrada
(respondent)
I
Guillerma
Abenojar
I I
Severino Abenojar
(illegitimate)
Maria, Segundo,
Marcial, Lucio
(legitimate)
Teodoro
7

Andrada and Abenojar Version

Facts
1. Teodoro Abenojar (Teodoro) died intestate and left several properties (land, house
and improvements in Pangasinan and Manila)
2. Private respondents Maxima Andrada, Teodoros surviving spouse, and Severino
Abenojar partitioned the estate of Teodoro among themselves.
3. Petitioners (Landayan) filed a case with the CFI seeking a judicial declaration that
they are Teodoros legal heirs and to annul the extra-judicial partition (fact 2)
4. LANDAYAN contends, inter alia, that Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate child and
therefore that the partition is therefore void as to him.
5. Private respondents (Andrada and Severino) aver that the petitioners (Landayan)
right to bring an action to annul an extrajudicial on the basis of fraud has already
prescribed. Such right, according to them, expires in 4 years and here, 18 years
have already passed.
6. Lower courts rule in favor of the petitioners and dismiss the case.

Issue: W/N the action has prescribed.
Held: WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondent Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits and render the corresponding
judgment thereon. The private respondents shall pay the costs.
Ratio:
Petitioners contend that Severino Abenojar is not a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar,
he being only an acknowledged natural child of Guillerma Abenojar, the mother of
petitioners, whom they claim to be the sole legitimate daughter in first marriage of
Teodoro Abenojar. If this claim is correct, Severino Abenojar has no rights of legal
succession from
Teodoro Abenojar in view of the express provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code,
which
reads as follows:
o ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.
The right of Severino Abenojar to be considered a legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar
depends
on the truth of his allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of Guillerma
Abenojar, but an
acknowledged natural child of Teodoro Abenojar. On this assumption, his right
to inherit from
Teodoro Abenojar is recognized by law (Art. 998, Civil Code).
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that Severino
Abenojar is an
illegitimate son of Guillerma Abenojar, he is not a legal heir of Teodoro
Abenojar. The right of
representation is denied by law to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to
inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of Ms father. (Art. 992, Civil
Code). On this
supposition, the subject deed of extrajudicial partition is one that included a
person who is
not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned. Such a deed is
governed by
Article 1105 of the Civil Code, reading as follows:
o Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but
who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
It could be gathered from the pleadings filed by the petitioners that they do not
seek the
nullification of the entire deed of extra-judicial partition but only insofar as the
same deprived
them of their shares in the inheritance from the estate of Teodoro Abenojar;
Should it be proved, therefore, that Severino Abenojar is, indeed, not a legal
heir of Teodoro Abenojar, the portion of the deed of extra-judicial partition
adjudicating certain properties of Teodoro Abenojar in his favor shall be
deemed inexistent and void from the beginning in accordance with Articles
1409, par. (7) and 1105 of the Civil Code. By the express provision of Article
1410 of the Civil Code, the action to seek a declaration of the nullity of the
same does not
prescribe.
m. m. m.
Florencia Bautista
Antera
Mandap
m. HUSBAND
Maxima
Andrada
I I
Severino
Abenojar
(Acknowledged
Natural Child)
Guillerma
Abenojar
(spurious
child)
I
Maria,
Segundo,
Marcial,
Lucio
Teodoro
8

3. MANUEL V FERRER 247 SCRA 476 CARLO SANCHEZ
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL,
MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL,
EMILIA MANUEL AND NUMERIANA MANUEL, PETITIONERS v. Hon. NICODEMO FERRER,
MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL.
August 21, 1995, J. Vitug

FACTS:
1. The MANUELS (Manuels) are the legitimate children of Antonio and Beatriz.
2. Antonio had an extra-marital affair with Ursula Bautista, and he sired JUAN
MANUEL (illegitimate child).
3. JUAN MANUEL married ESPERANZA GAMBA. A certain Laurenciana donated a
parcel of land covering 2,700 m
2
. They also had 2 other parcels of land registered in
Juans name.
4. Juan and Esperanza cant have a child, so they informally adopted private
respondent MODESTA.
5. JUAN made a pacto de retro sale to ESTANISLAOA MANUEL of his land.
6. JUAN died intestate, two years after, ESPERANZA also died.
7. MODESTA executed an affidavit of self-adjudication to issue the title to her name
over the three properties.
8. MODESTA also made a quitclaim as to the pacto de retro sale to ESTANISLAOA.
9. These acts by Modesta did not bode well with the MANUELS.
a. MANUELS filed a case to nullify. The complaint was dismissed holding that
petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan
Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
b. An MR was filed, but was denied.
10. The MANUELS go to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the legitimate descendants are entitled to the estate of an
illegitimate brother who died without descendants. (NO)
HELD:
1. MANUELS argue that Article 992 applies.
2. Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the
rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the
direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has
no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
3. The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other
cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's
inheritance;
a. that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from
her illegitimate child;

b. that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession
to the estate of the legitimate grandparent;
c. that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased
uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father;

and
d. that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father.

4. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no
part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation
to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.
Thus, because of the existence of this iron curtain, the petition of the MANUELS are
denied.
4. ROSALES V ROSALES 128 SCRA 69 NORBY
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner, v.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and
ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents. (1987) GERALDEZ

ER: IRENEA seeks to inherit from her mother-in-law. Her husband, a son of the
deceased, predeceased his mother. As such, the court ruled that deceaseds properties
be given to husband, children, and grandchildren (by the predeceasing son). They got
each. IRENEA wants a share too. SC says she cannot get a share, as there are only two
ways to be come compulsory heirs by your own right or by right of representation.
HUSBAND m. Ursula Bautista affair with Antonio m. Beatriz
I I
Esperanza
Gamba
m.
Juan Manuel
(illegitimate
Manuels
(Petitioners)
Informally
adopted
Modesta
Fortunate m. Petra (decedent)
I
Magna Antonio Carterio m.
Irenea (daughter-in-
law)
I
Mackiequerox
9

According to provisions in the code referring to either and both, nowhere can a
daughter-in-law become a compulsory heir, either on her own right or by
representation.
Facts:
1. This is a case filed by a widow of an heir who predeceased his mother. In other
words, the daughter-in-law seeks to be declared a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law, now that her husband is dead.
2. PETRA was survived by her husband FORTUNATE, her children MAGNA and
ANTONIO, and her grandchild MACIKEQUEROX (son of Carterio)
3. She had another son named CARTERIO, but he died before her.
a. His wife , IRENEA is petitioner here.
4. In the course of Intestate Proceedings, the course ruled as follows:
a. Fortunata (husband), 1/4; Magna (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox
(grandson), 1/4; and Antonio, son, 1/4.
5. IRENEA wants a share, saying she is a compulsory heir too.
Issue: W/N she is a compulsory heir. No!
Ratio:
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by
their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation.
1
Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate
succession provided for in the Civil Code,
2
or by the right of representation provided
for in Article 981 of the same law.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is
an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The provisions of the Code which relate to the
order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
1
enumerate with meticulous

1
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance
in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former
shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them
should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions.
exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: XXX
(3) The widow or widower; XXX
The aforesaid provision of law
3
refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case
the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law.
It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter
whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate
children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the
same share as that of a legitimate child.
10

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his
death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.
5. BERCILES V GSIS 138 SCRA 53 MAITI

ER:
Judge Berciles died leaving survivors benefits amounting to P311,000 from the
GSIS.
Such benefits are now being claimed by two families, both of whom claim to be the
deceaseds lawful heirs.
GSIS decided that, besides Judge Berciles widow and 4 legitimate children, the
acknowledged natural child and the 3 other illegitimate children shall have a share
in the distribution of the survivors benefits.
Both families opposed this distribution.
WON the distribution by GSIS was in accordance with the law?
No. The disposition made by respondent GSIS of the retirement benefits due the
heirs of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles is consequently erroneous and not in
accordance with law. Illuminada and her children are the lawful heirs entitled to
the distribution of the benefits which shall accrue to the estate of the deceased
Judge Berciles and will be distributed among the petitioners as his legal heirs in
accordance with the law on intestate succession.
Under the law, Article 287, New Civil Code, illegitimate children other than natural
in accordance with Art. 269 are entitled to support and such successional rights as
are granted in the Code, but for this Article to be applicable, there must be
admission or recognition of the paternity of the illegitimate child.
Article 887, N.C.C., defining who are compulsory heirs, is clear and specific that (i)n
all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

FACTS
Judge Pascual G. Berciles of the Court of First Instance of Cebu died in office on
August 21, 1979 at the age of sixty-six years, death caused by cardiac arrest due to
cerebral vascular accident. Having served the government for more than 34 years,
26 years in the judiciary, the late Judge Berciles was eligible for retirement so that
his heirs were entitled to survivors benefits amounting to P311,460.00
Other benefits accruing to the heirs of the deceased consist of the unpaid salary, the
money value of his terminal leave and representation and transportation
allowances, computed at P60,817.52, and the return of retirement premiums paid
by the retiree in the amount of P9,700.00 to be paid by the GSIS.
Such benefits are now being claimed by two families, both of whom claim to be the
deceaseds lawful heirs.
The Illuminada (wife) and the legitimate children filed for survivors benefits which
was duly supported by the required documents
o i.e. marriage certificate
Flor Fuentebella, who also claims to be married to Berciles, the natural child and
the illegitimate children also filed the same claim. As proof of her marriage to
Berciles, the ff were presented:
o Flor claimed that their marriage certificate was destroyed due to the war.
Instead, she presented sworn statements of other people attesting to her
marriage to Berciles
o For the children, a baptismal certificate and certifications that the birth
certificates of the other children were destroyed due to the war.
o Family pictures, letters from Berciles
The retirement benefits were then decided by GSIS to be distributed among the
heirs in the ff manner:
o 77/134 for his widow
o 10/134 for his 4 legitimate children
o 5/134 for his acknowledged natural child
o 4/134 for his 3 illegitimate children
Both families appealed the GSIS decision. Hence this petition

Issue: WON the distribution made by the GSIS was correct?
Held: Accordingly, the disposition made by respondent GSIS of the retirement benefits
due the heirs of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles is consequently erroneous and not in
accordance with law. Illuminada and her children are the lawful heirs entitled to the
distribution of the benefits which shall accrue to the estate of the deceased
Judge Berciles and will be distributed among the petitioners as his legal heirs in
accordance with the law on intestate succession.

Flor Fuentebella
claims to
be married
to
Judge Pascual
Berciles
m.
Iluminada
Ponce
I
1 ANC + 3
Illegitimate
children
11

Ratio:
The Court, after examination of the evidence presented by both parties, therefore
concludes that Judge Pascual Berciles was legally married to Iluminada Ponce.
His alleged marriage to Flor Fuentebella was not sufficiently proved and therefore
the children begotten with her are either natural or illegitimate children depending
on whether they have been born before or after the marriage of Iluminada Ponce.
o We have examined carefully this birth certificate and We find that the
same is not signed by either the father or the mother; We find no
participation or intervention whatsoever therein by the alleged father,
Judge Pascual Berciles. Under our jurisprudence, if the alleged father did
not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the
mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Such registration would not
be evidence of paternity. The mere certificate by the registrar without the
signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on his
part. A birth certificate does not constitute recognition in a public
instrument.
o As to the baptismal certificate, the rule is that although the baptismal
record of a natural child describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if in
the preparation of the record the decedent had no intervention, the
baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of
parentage
The SC held the GSISs distribution to be erroneous in view of their ruling the
Chanliongco and Vda. De Consuegra case [Remember Insurance?] that retirement
benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his legal heirs in
accordance with the law on intestate succession, as in the case of a life insurance if
no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy, and that the money value of the
unused vacation and sick leave, and unpaid salary form part of the conjugal estate
of the married employee.
The SC also held GSIS as having grave abuse of discretion in approving the
recommendation with regard to the acknowledged natural child and the
illegitimate children, there being no substantial evidence through competent and
admissible proof of acknowledgment by and filiation with said deceased parent as
required under the law.
Under the law, Article 287, New Civil Code, illegitimate children other than natural
in accordance with Art. 269 are entitled to support and such successional rights as
are granted in the Code, but for this Article to be applicable, there must be
admission or recognition of the paternity of the illegitimate child.
Article 887, N.C.C., defining who are compulsory heirs, is clear and specific that (i)n
all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
In the Noble case, the Supreme Court laid down this ruling:
o The filiation of illegitimate children, other than natural, must not only be
proven, but it must be shown that such filiation was acknowledged by the
presumed parent. If the mere fact of paternity is all that needs to be
proven, that interpretation would pave the way to unscrupulous
individuals to take advantage of the death of the presumed parent, who
would no longer be in a position to deny the allegation, to present even
fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased to inquiries affecting
his character.
26. ARTS. 1003 1014
SUBSECTION 5. - Collateral Relatives

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (946a)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall
inherit in equal shares. (947)
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who
are the children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former
shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes. (948)
Art. 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers
and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the
latter. (949)
Art. 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half blood, some on the father's and some
on the mother's side, are the only survivors, all shall inherit in equal shares without
distinction as to the origin of the property. (950)
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or
per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for the brothers and sisters of the full
blood. (915)
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason
of relationship by the whole blood. (954a)
Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of
relationship in the collateral line. (955a)
SUBSECTION 6. - The State
12

Art. 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in accordance with the provisions of
the preceding Sections, the State shall inherit the whole estate. (956a)
Art. 1012. In order that the State may take possession of the property mentioned in the
preceding article, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court must be observed.
(958a)
Art. 1013. After the payment of debts and charges, the personal property shall be
assigned to the municipality or city where the deceased last resided in the Philippines,
and the real estate to the municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is
situated.
If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the whole estate shall be assigned to the
respective municipalities or cities where the same is located.
Such estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and public charitable institutions
and centers, in such municipalities or cities. The court shall distribute the estate as the
respective needs of each beneficiary may warrant.
The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion, may order the
establishment of a permanent trust, so that only the income from the property shall be
used. (956a)
Art. 1014. If a person legally entitled to the estate of the deceased appears and files a
claim thereto with the court within five years from the date the property was delivered
to the State, such person shall be entitled to the possession of the same, or if sold the
municipality or city shall be accountable to him for such part of the proceeds as may not
have been lawfully spent. (n)
1. CITY OF MANILA V ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA 36 PHIL 815 LEX AQUINO
THE CITY OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant, v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP
OF MANILA and THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF MARIA CONCEPCION
SARMIENTO, interveners-appellees. G.R. No. L-10033; August 30, 1917
ER: Ana Sarmiento died in 1672. She left a will providing for the establishment of a
"Capellania de Misas;" and that the first chaplain of said capellania should be her nephew
Pedro del Castillo. The succeeding administration should continue perpetually. For more
than two hundred years, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, through his various
agencies, has administered the property. An action was commenced in CFI Manila
seeking to escheat the property. SC held that the property cannot be escheated. Section
750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It provides,
"when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or
person by law entitled to the same". Ana Sarmientos will clearly, definitely and
unequivocally defines and designates what disposition shall be made of the property in
question.
Facts:
Ana Sarmiento resided, with her husband, in the city of Manila.
17th day of November, 1668: she made a will.
23d day of November, 1668: she added a codicil.
19th day of May, 1669: she made another will and made the November 23 codicil a
part thereof.
The will contained provisions for the establishment of a "Capellania de Misas;" that
the first chaplain of said capellania should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo;
o There was a provision for the administration of said property in relation
with the said "Capellania de Misas" that the succeeding administration
should continue perpetually.
Ana Sarmiento died about the year 1672.
For more than two hundred years the intervener, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, through his various agencies, has administered the property;
o They claim that the institution has rightfully and legally succeeded in
accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.
This action was commenced CFI Manila on February 15, 1913. Its purpose was to
have declared escheated to the city of Manila the property which consists of five
parcels of land located on of Malate and Paco.
The theory of the City of Manila is that Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said
property and died in the year 1668 without leaving "her or person entitled to the
same."
The Honorable A. S. Crossfield, reached the conclusion that the prayer of the City of
Manila should be denied. Manila appealed.
Issue: Whether or not Ana Sarmientos property could be escheated to the City of
Manila.
Held: The property cannot be escheated.
Ratio:
Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated.
It provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . .
leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same,"
In that case, such property under the procedure provided for, may de declared
escheated.
13

The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will
provides for the administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the
subsequent administration of the same.
It further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled to
inherit her property. In view of the facts, therefore, the property in question
cannot be declared escheated.
If by any chance the property may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the
fact that persons subsequent to Ana Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir
or person by law entitled to the same.
The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what
disposition shall be made of the property in question. The heir mentioned in said
will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to be administered in
accordance therewith.
So far as the record shows, it is still being administered in accordance with the
terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary, as was intended by the
original owner.
2. ADLAWAN V ADLAWAN 479 SCRA 275 (JAN 2006) DONDON
Arnelito Adlawan v. Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan

Emergency Recitation:
DOMINADOR Adlawan died leaving behind his wife GRACIANA and acknowledged
illegitimate son ARNELITO
Part of the estate of DOMINADOR was his ancestral house and lot which were
transferred to him by his parents though a simulated deed of sale while the latter
were still alive in order for DOMINADOR to obtain a loan with the property as
collateral and use to renovate the house
DOMINADOR, despite being the title owner, did not question the ownership of his
parents over the property, and in fact his entire family (including his 9 siblings, 2 of
which are EMTERIO and NARCISA) continued to live there
When DOMINADOR died, ARNELITO claimed to be the sole heir and executed an
affidavit adjudicating to himself the property. He then asked his dads siblings,
EMETERIO and NARCISA to vacate the property, claiming that he merely tolerated
their stay there on the condition that they will leave when he decides to use the
property
EMETERIO and NARCISA refused to leave and instead filed an action to quiet title
Hence, ARNELITO filed the present ejectment case against them
ISSUE: W/N the ejectment case can prosper NO it cannot. SC dismisses ejectment
case!
ARNELITO is wrong in claiming to be the sole heir because when DOMINADOR died,
he was also survived by his wife, GRACIANA. Hence, by intestate succession,
GRACIANA became a co-owner of the property left behind by DOMINADOR
True the Civil Code provides that any co-owner may bring an action for ejectment,
but this cannot apply when the person bringing the suit does not recognize the co-
ownership.
ARNELITO clearly claims to bring the ejectment suit as the sole heir and not for the
benefit of the other co-owners (namely, GRACIANAs nephews and nieces who also
have a claim)
Thus, in order for the court to have jurisdiction, these other parties-in-interest must
be impleaded
For failing to do so, the case should be properly dismissed.

FACTS:
History: RAMON and OLIGIA ADLAWAN owned Lot 7226 and the house built
thereon, located at Barrio Lipata, Cebu
1961 RAMON and OLIGIA needed money to renovate their house but they were
not qualified to obtain a loan. Hence, they transferred the property to their only
child (among their 9 children) who earned a college education, DOMINADOR,
through a simulated deed of sale
DOMINADOR took out a loan with the property as collateral and got the house
renovated
Throughout the subsequent years, although the title was under his name,
DOMINADOR did not question the ownership of his parents and in fact, his parents
still lived in the house along with his other siblings (including respondents here
EMETERIO Adlawan and NARCISA Adlawan)
May 28, 1987 DOMINADOR died leaving his wife GRACIANA and acknowledged
illegitimate son, ARNELITO
ARNELITO claimed that he is the sole heir of DOMINADOR and executed an affidavit
adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon
He claims now that he merely allowed DOMINADORs brothers and sisters
(EMETERIO and NARCISA) to live in the property on the condition that they will
vacate when he decides to use it
He now demanded them to leave but they refused to do so.
Hence, he now files an ejectment case against them
EMETERIO and NARCISA claim: ARNELITO cannot bring the ejectment case because
the property is not solely his. That when DOMINADOR died, he also left his wife
GRACIANA who was entitled to her own share of the property. Also, they
questioned ARNELITOs status claiming that DOMINADORs signature in
ARNELITOs birth certificate was forged
MTC dismissed the ejectment case stating that ARNELITOs status and the
settlement of DOMINADORs estate were conditions precedent to the ejectment
case
RTC reversed MTC ruling on the ground that DOMINADORs title over the land
cannot be collaterally attacked
RTC also granted ARNELITOs motion for execution pending appeal but now
nephews and nieces of GRACIANA seek to intervene to protect their interest. RTC
dismissed this motion to intervene
14

RTC however also eventually recalled the order granting the execution pending
appeal because the case was already elevated to the CA
CA reversed RTC and reinstated MTC decision dismissing the ejectment case
Hence, this petition

ISSUE: W/N the ejectment case can prosper NO it cannot

HELD: Petition denied. Ejectment case dismissed.

RATIO:
The ejectment case cannot prosper because the same theory of succession which
ARNELITO bases his claim for ownership over the property in fact reveals that he is not
the sole owner.
This is so because DOMINADOR was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal
wife, GRACIANA, who died 10 years after the demise of DOMINADOR.

By intestate succession, GRACIANA and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. The
death of GRACIANA on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot
7226 because the share of GRACIANA passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not
to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations.

ARNELITO now claims that he can institute the ejectment case based on Article 487 of
the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

However, this will only apply if the co-heir does not bring the suit solely for his own
benefit. It cannot apply when the person bringing the suit does not recognize the co-
ownership.

The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he
claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not
prosper.

If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and
entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the
other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the
subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no
proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or
conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the
trial court.

Also, under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to
implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed
to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought
the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019.
Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be
binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable party in a case
renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint
including the judgment. The absence of the respondents siblings, as parties, rendered all
proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court,
ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present

Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioners action operates as a
complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or
recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper.

27. ARTS. 1015 1023 MEMORIZE ART. 1015
CHAPTER 4
PROVISIONS COMMON TO TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSIONS
SECTION 1. - Right of Accretion

MEMORIZE Art. 1015. Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more
persons are called to the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned to
the one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died before the
testator, is added or incorporated to that of his co-heirs, co-devisees, or co-
legatees. (n)
Art. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a testamentary
succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance, or to the same
portion thereof, pro indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator, or renounce the
inheritance, or be incapacitated to receive it. (928a)
Art. 1017. The words "one-half for each" or "in equal shares" or any others which, though
designating an aliquot part, do not identify it by such description as shall make each heir
the exclusive owner of determinate property, shall not exclude the right of accretion.
15

In case of money or fungible goods, if the share of each heir is not earmarked, there shall
be a right of accretion. (983a)
Art. 1018. In legal succession the share of the person who repudiates the inheritance
shall always accrue to his co-heirs. (981)
Art. 1019. The heirs to whom the portion goes by the right of accretion take it in the
same proportion that they inherit. (n)
Art. 1020. The heirs to whom the inheritance accrues shall succeed to all the rights and
obligations which the heir who renounced or could not receive it would have had. (984)
Art. 1021. Among the compulsory heirs the right of accretion shall take place only when
the free portion is left to two or more of them, or to any one of them and to a stranger.
Should the part repudiated be the legitime, the other co-heirs shall succeed to it in their
own right, and not by the right of accretion. (985)
Art. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not take place,
the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall pass
to the legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the same charges and
obligations. (986)
Art. 1023. Accretion shall also take place among devisees, legatees and usufructuaries
under the same conditions established for heirs. (987a)

1. TORRES V LOPEZ 49 PHIL 504 PENDIX
In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased.
MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee,
vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. L-25966; November 1, 1926

Emergency Recit:
Tomas Rodriguez was in the custody of his cousin Vicente Lopez, since he was senile and
infirm. Tomas excuted a last will and testament, declaring Lopez and de Bueno as
universal heirs. However, Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and
no account was presented to him at the time of his death making the disposition of
Tomas to Lopez invalid under Art. 753(Old Civil Code).

The will was already probated in a previous case, but Margarita Lopez (Margarita)
wanted a piece of the pie, so she wanted to get Vicente's portion. The matter that the SC
decided in this case was who had the right to Lopez' disqualified share, de Bueno or
Margarita? De Bueno! Why? The Court applied Art. 982 (now 1015) defining accretion.
Accretion occurs when
Two or more persons are called to the same inheritance without special
designation of shares.
One of the persons so called dies before the testator, or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualified to receive it.
Lopez and de Bueno were called to the same inheritance without special designation of
shares. Furthermore, Lopez had predeceased the testator and was disqualified to
receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. The legal
effect would be to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided
half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been
alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him.

Margarita attempted to assert her claim by invoking two articles. First Art. 764, which
stated that a will can be valid even if the instituted heir was disqualified. AND Art. 912,
which stated that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also
when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. The SC denied her claim stating that if
there are conflicting provisions, the more general is to be considered as being limited by
the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983 (1015), 912 is the more general
of the two since it is about the general topic of intestate succession while
983(1015) is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which
accretion takes place.
Indeed, in Art. 912(3) the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly
subordinated to Art. 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion."
2

Facts:
Rodriguez was both physically weak and senile, so he was placed in the custody of his
cousin, Vicente Lopez. Rodriguez executed his last will and testament on Jan 3, 1924,
declaring as universal heir the aforementioned Lopez and the latter's daughter, Luz
Lopez de Bueno. However, on Jan 7, 1924 Lopez died, and Rodriguez died as well on
February 25, 1924. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not
presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been
presented by him at the time of his death. The will was contested by Margarita Lopez,
Vicente's nearest relative. The will was admitted probate in a previous case.

Issue: Who, between de Bueno and Margarita, has the better right to Vicente's share?

2
May other defense pa yung abogado ni Margarita, distinguishing the right incapcity to succeed v. incapacity to
take (912 v. 982). Argument nila incapcity to succeed daw yung case, so 912 applies. Court rejected the
contention again. Discussed siya sa main digest.
16

Held: De Bueno has the better right! The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and
it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Ratio:
There are two intermingling issues in the case. First was Art. 753 of the Old Civil Code
declared that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary
provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the
final accounts of the latter have been approved. This was applied by the SC in this
case. Thus, the disposition of Rodriguez to Lopez was not an exception under the law.

The court then applied Art. 982 (now 1015) to the case, which defined the right of
accretion. In effect, accretion take place in a testamentary succession when:
First: the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the
same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and
second: one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces
the inheritance or is disqualified to receive it.

Lopez and de Bueno were called to the same inheritance without special designation of
shares. Furthermore, Lopez had predeceased the testator and was disqualified to
receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. The legal
effect would be to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided
half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been
alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no
error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno
entitled to the whole estate. It correctly applied Art. 982(1015).

To assert her better right to the Vicente's portion, Margarita invoked two articles:
Art. 764 of the Old Civil Code which declared, among other things, that a will
may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit.
Art. 912 which stated that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before
the testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed.

The SC denied her contention. If there are conflicting provisions, the more general is to
be considered as being limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983
(1015), 912 is the more general of the two since it is about the general topic of
intestate succession while 983(1015) is more specific, defining the particular
conditions under which accretion takes place. Indeed, in Art. 912(3) the provision
with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to Art. 983 by the
expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion."

Indeed, in Art. 912(3) the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly
subordinated to Art. 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It
is true that the same express qualification is not found in Art. 912(4), yet it must be so
understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the more
specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only
possible means of harmonizing the two provisions.

Margarita's attorneys direct attention to the fact that, under Art. 912(4), intestate
succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de
suceder), while, under 982(2) accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit
under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de recibirla).

A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take,
and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the
case under article 912 rather than 982. The SC denied such technical interpretation
of the code. At any rate, the disability of Vicente Lopez was not a general disability
to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration
which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.
28. ARTS. 1024 1028
SECTION 2. - Capacity to Succeed by Will of by Intestacy

Art. 1024. Persons not incapacitated by law may succeed by will or ab intestato.
The provisions relating to incapacity by will are equally applicable to intestate
succession. (744, 914)
Art. 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living
at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper.
A child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent is capable of
succeeding provided it be born later under the conditions prescribed in article 41. (n)
Art. 1026. A testamentary disposition may be made to the State, provinces, municipal
corporations, private corporations, organizations, or associations for religious, scientific,
cultural, educational, or charitable purposes.
All other corporations or entities may succeed under a will, unless there is a provision to
the contrary in their charter or the laws of their creation, and always subject to the
same. (746a)
Art. 1027. The following are incapable of succeeding:
17

(1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness,
or the minister of the gospel who extended spiritual aid to him during the same
period;
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth
degree, the church, order, chapter, community, organization, or institution to
which such priest or minister may belong;
(3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given by a ward in his
favor before the final accounts of the guardianship have been approved, even if
the testator should die after the approval thereof; nevertheless, any provision
made by the ward in favor of the guardian when the latter is his ascendant,
descendant, brother, sister, or spouse, shall be valid;
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or
children, or any one claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or children;
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who took care of
the testator during his last illness;
(6) Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by law to inherit.
(745, 752, 753, 754a)
Art. 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article 739, concerning donations inter vivos
shall apply to testamentary provisions. (n)
29. ARTS. 1029 1040
Art. 1029. Should the testator dispose of the whole or part of his property for prayers
and pious works for the benefit of his soul, in general terms and without specifying its
application, the executor, with the court's approval shall deliver one-half thereof or its
proceeds to the church or denomination to which the testator may belong, to be used for
such prayers and pious works, and the other half to the State, for the purposes
mentioned in Article 1013. (747a)
Art. 1030. Testamentary provisions in favor of the poor in general, without designation
of particular persons or of any community, shall be deemed limited to the poor living in
the domicile of the testator at the time of his death, unless it should clearly appear that
his intention was otherwise.
The designation of the persons who are to be considered as poor and the distribution of
the property shall be made by the person appointed by the testator for the purpose; in
default of such person, by the executor, and should there be no executor, by the justice
of the peace, the mayor, and the municipal treasurer, who shall decide by a majority of
votes all questions that may arise. In all these cases, the approval of the Court of First
Instance shall be necessary.
The preceding paragraph shall apply when the testator has disposed of his property in
favor of the poor of a definite locality. (749a)
Art. 1031. A testamentary provision in favor of a disqualified person, even though made
under the guise of an onerous contract, or made through an intermediary, shall be void.
(755)
Art. 1032. The following are incapable of succeeding by reason of unworthiness:
(1) Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to
lead a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(3) Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been
found groundless;
(4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent death of the
testator, should fail to report it to an officer of the law within a month, unless
the authorities have already taken action; this prohibition shall not apply to
cases wherein, according to law, there is no obligation to make an accusation;
(5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the
testator;
(6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence should
cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(7) Any person who by the same means prevents another from making a will,
or from revoking one already made, or who supplants, conceals, or alters the
latter's will;
(8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the decedent. (756,
673, 674a)
18

Art. 1033. The cause of unworthiness shall be without effect if the testator had
knowledge thereof at the time he made the will, or if, having known of them
subsequently, he should condone them in writing. (757a)
Art. 1034. In order to judge the capacity of the heir, devisee or legatee, his qualification
at the time of the death of the decedent shall be the criterion.
In cases falling under Nos. 2, 3, or 5 of Article 1032, it shall be necessary to wait until
final judgment is rendered, and in the case falling under No. 4, the expiration of the
month allowed for the report.
If the institution, devise or legacy should be conditional, the time of the compliance with
the condition shall also be considered. (758a)
Art. 1035. If the person excluded from the inheritance by reason of incapacity should be
a child or descendant of the decedent and should have children or descendants, the
latter shall acquire his right to the legitime.
The person so excluded shall not enjoy the usufruct and administration of the property
thus inherited by his children. (761a)
Art. 1036. Alienations of hereditary property, and acts of administration performed by
the excluded heir, before the judicial order of exclusion, are valid as to the third persons
who acted in good faith; but the co-heirs shall have a right to recover damages from the
disqualified heir. (n)
Art. 1037. The unworthy heir who is excluded from the succession has a right to demand
indemnity or any expenses incurred in the preservation of the hereditary property, and
to enforce such credits as he may have against the estate. (n)
Art. 1038. Any person incapable of succession, who, disregarding the prohibition stated
in the preceding articles, entered into the possession of the hereditary property, shall be
obliged to return it together it its accessions.
He shall be liable for all the fruits and rents he may have received, or could have
received through the exercise of due diligence. (760a)
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (n)
Art. 1040. The action for a declaration of incapacity and for the recovery of the
inheritance, devise or legacy shall be brought within five years from the time the
disqualified person took possession thereof. It may be brought by any one who may
have an interest in the succession. (762a)
1. NEPOMUCENO V CA 139 SCRA 217 HADDY
ER:
Martin Jugo was married to Rufina Gomez. They had two children. Jugo was then
estranged from his family. Jugo subsequently lived as husband and wife with Sofia
Nepomuceno. Before Hugos death, he executed a will with all its formalities properly
executed. In the will, Jugo explicitly mentioned that he was living as husband and wife
with Nepomuceno. For Nepomucenos love and affection, Jugo, in his will, wanted to
bequeath a portion of his estate to Nepomunceno. After Jugos death, Nepomuceno had
the will probated. Her share was declared void by the probate court since there is a
prohibition in the Civil Code that one cannot donate to another who is guilty of
concubinage (FYI: this can be proven by preponderance of evidence). Nepomuceno
contended that the probate court should only focus on the EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL or the formalities and not on its intrinsic validity. ISSUE: W/on the probate court
could decide on the intrinsic validity of the will. HELD: As a general rule, nope. The
probate courts jurisdiction is merely on the extrinsic validity. The EXCEPTION is that
when on the wills face, it is clear that it violates the intrinsic validity. The will of the
testator in this case falls under the EXCEPTION since the said will expressly mentioned
that the testator was living as husband and wife with Nepomuceno even though the
testator was already married.
FACTS:
-Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal.
-The will was properly executed.
-n the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno
as his sole and only executor of his estate.
-It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina
Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he
had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner
as husband and wife. I
-In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The
testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children
Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The Will reads in part:
19

Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my
aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and
daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit
to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I
have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I
cannot deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been
separated up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully
well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one
Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my
love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now
and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full
knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as her
own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I
could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of
my aforementioned previous marriage; (Emphasis supplied by MHT)
-After the death of the testator, the will was probated by Nepomuceno
-CFI denied the probate of the will.
-CA set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of
the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in
favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article
1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
-NEpomucenos contention: the court could not decide on the intrinsic validity of the
will
ISSUE: w/on the probate court could decide on the intrinsic validity of a will
HELD: As a general rule, no, unless it is evident of the face of the will that there is a
violation of its intrinsic validity
RATIO:
-The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will
-The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the
petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will
of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void.
Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.
-We sustain the CA's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of
the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in
the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of
the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the
issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section
2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522).
After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to
the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a
will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal
offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity
may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of
the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in
the same action.
20

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations
inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
-In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years
before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina
Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He
also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate
children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the
petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love
and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in
truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo
lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was
then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in
good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
-the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation
between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which
becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The
very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was
disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
2. VILLAVICENCIO V QINIO GR 45248 APRIL 18, 1939 KEITH
Emergency Recit:
Eugenio del Rosario died with a will. She made specific dispositions and provided that
the remainder be given to the masses through alms and masses. Villavicencio and group
(mostly relatives within the fifth degree) claimed that they are entitled to some of the
remainder because the testatrix did not intend that everything of the remainder be
given to the masses and that only a part of it should be given.
No.
It was clear that the testatrix intended to give all of the remainder of her estate to the
masses, not only a portion of it. Since they are not forced heirs, they are not entitled to
the inheritance or to the remainder of it. To be clear, there was no remaining portion
since whatever was not specifically disposed of was intended to be given to the masses.
Facts
Eugenio Zuiga del Rosario died in Batangas, Batangas, on December 19, 1934,
leaving a will executed with all the legal formalities, which was probated on
February 1, 1935, over the opposition of some relatives.
Said deceased Eugenia Zuiga del Rosario had disposed in her will of her
properties by way of masses and alms, etc. in a church in Lipa. All the fruits of
the lands and all the income be spent for masses.
Subsequently, Santiago Quinio and twenty-eight relatives of the testatrix
within the fifth degree in the collateral line (THEY), with the conformity of the
Bishop of Lipa, filed a motion that they be declared heirs of said testatrix
charged with the duty to comply with its provisions. (Motion that they be the
ones in charge of complying with the provisions)
They stated that they had already reached an understanding with the Bishop of
Lipa whereby they, within ninety days from the adjudication to them of the
properties constituting the inheritance,
o Would deposit with said Bishop the necessary amount to defray the
masses for three years, and
o Would likewise deposit in any bank designated for the purpose an
amount the interest of which would be sufficient to cover the other
expenses for the annual masses and alms ordained in the will.
They were also claiming that a remainder of the estate should be passed on to
them
The executor Vicente Reyes Villavicencio opposed the foregoing motion.
Motion that they be declared the ones in charge was denied by the Court.
On their appeal, they (Villavicencio and group) contend:
o Even after full compliance with the will of the testatrix, a substantial
balance would still remain after deducting the necessary expenses for
masses and alms and the amount of the allowance for support of
Eulalia del Rosario, and excluding the legacy left to Ubaldo Magbuhat
and Engracio Alegria.
o As to that balance, they contend that the deceased Eugenia Zuiga del
Rosario died partly intestate and that they are entitled to succeed her
with respect to that part.

Issue: Whether they are entitled to the balance? No.
Ratio:
Such contention is based on something entirely inconsistent with that the testatrix
ordered in the third clause of her will.

21

As will be seen, the appellants proceed on the false assumption that for every mass
celebrated for the soul of the testatrix and those of her parents, brothers and sisters,
something or a determinate amount from the fruits of her properties had to be given.
Proceeding on this assumption, it is possible that the fruits of said properties would
leave an excess which the testatrix has not disposed of.

However, as we have stated, such an assumption is untenable because the testatrix has
not provided that a certain amount be taken from the fruits of her properties for the
celebration of the masses ordered by her, but has said: "I have provided that my said
properties be devoted only for the peace and happiness of my soul and those of my
parents, brothers and sisters, and also for the benefit of the church, etc."; and,
continuing, she ordered "that the fruits of the lands and the income of the house and
warehouse, be spent for masses . . ."
Hence, the testatrix has provided, not that something out of the fruits and income of her
properties be paid for the masses which she has ordered to be celebrated for her soul
and those of her parents, brothers and sisters, but that all the fruits of the lands and all
the income be spent for masses.
For this purpose, and doubtless foreseeing that the income of her properties would be
insufficient to cover the amount of the masses and of its other provisions, the testatrix
has ordered in the sixth and ninth paragraphs of her will that, if necessary, her
properties be sold with leave of court. Considering the provisions of the will of the
deceased Eugenia Zuiga del Rosario in their entirety, her collateral relatives, not
being forced heirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the remainder of her
properties, which does not exist, or as to the naked ownership thereof.

Said testamentary provisions, whose validity is not here questioned, should be complied
with because the testatrix, not having forced heirs as in the present case, may dispose of
her properties for masses and pious works for the benefit of her soul, as provided in
article 747 of the OLD Civil Code.
The Bishop's intervention in this case cannot validate any arrangement calculated to
defeat the testamentary provisions inasmuch as the testatrix did not leave anything to
the Roman Catholic Church which might be under the administration or supervision of
the Bishop.
3. CAYETANO V LEONIDAS 129 SCRA 522 RIO
POLLY CAYETANO, vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA,
ER:
1. Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father and sisters as surviving heirs.
2. Hermogenes, the father, was the only compulsory heir, he executed an affidavit of
adjudication whereby he adjudicated himself the ownership of the entire estate of
Adoracion.
3. Nenita Paguia, one of her sisters, filed a petition of reprobate of the will of
Adoracion, which was allegedly executed in the US and for her appointment as
administratrix of Adoracions estate.
4. Nenita alleged that the testratrix was an American citizen at the time of her death
and was a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and that her last will and
testament was made under the Pennsylvania law and was probated and allowed in
the said state.
5. Hermogenes opposed the reprobate.
6. The respondent JUDGE LEONIDAS issued an order, allowing the will for probate
and declaring NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA AS ADMINISTRATRIX.
7. Hermogenes says this is an error. He died. He was substituted by POLLY CAYETANO
the executor of his will.
8. CAYETANO maintains that since JUDGE LEONIDAS allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was
reserved by the law for him.
9. SC - This contention is without merit.
10. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited HERMOGENES and thus,
the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil
Code which respectively provide: However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, and Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent.
11. the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
12. Based it on case of Bellis v. Bellis - It is therefore evident that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
FACTS: (mej magulo facts sorry, ER good na for facts)
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of JUDGE
LEONIDAS of the CFI of Manila, which admitted to and allowed the probate of
22

the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte
presentation of evidence by NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA.
1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner HERMOGENES
Campos and her sisters, private respondent NENITA C. Paguia, Remedios C.
Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.
As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby
he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
11 months after, NENITA C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of
the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United
States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
testatrix.
In her petition, NENITA alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at
the time of her death and was a permanent resident of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.;
o that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while
temporarily residing with her sister at Malate, Manila;
o that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament
on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
o nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor;
o that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was
presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of
Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
o that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed
after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as
executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A.,
o and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an
administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties
of the estate located in the Philippines.
1978, an OPPOSITION to the reprobate of the will was filed by HERMOGENES
(father of testator ADORACION) alleging among other things, that he has every
reason to believe that the will in question is a FORGERY;
o that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that
even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked,
the same could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and
injury to him.
December 1978 - HERMOGENES through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed
a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating
that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion."
Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the
questioned will was made.
January 10, 1979 , the respondent judge issued an order, allowing the will for
probate and declaring NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA AS ADMINISTRATRIX
Another manifestation was filed by HERMOGENES, confirming the withdrawal
of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
THEREAFTER, HERMOGENES Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that
the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of
his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means.
o According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted
among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of
Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged
that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not
his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but HERMOGENES failed to appear.
He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May
29, 1980.
1980, HERMOGENES filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or
Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29,
1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and
resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I
also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the
Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When
the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for HERMOGENES
tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of
the petition for relief.
Thus, judge LEONIDAS issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for
failure to present evidence in support thereof.
HERMOGENES filed a MR DENIED. Judge LEONIDAS also denied the motion
to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
On June 6,1982, petitioner HERMOGENES Campos died and left a will, which,
incidentally has been questioned by the NENITA, his children and forced heirs
as, on its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly
CAYETANO as the executrix of his last will and testament.
CAYETANO, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the
instant case which was granted by the court.
MOTION to dismiss filed by NENITA, her sisters, and only remaining children
on the ground of merger of rights with them was denied.
CAYETANO maintains that JUDGE LEONIDAS acted with GADALEJ when:
23

o (ONLY ONE IMPORTANT FOR OUR PURPOSE) 3) He ruled that the
right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the
forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
ISSUE: WON JUDGE LEONIDAS erred in allowing the reprobate of Adoracion's will,
because Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the
law for him NO IT DID NOT ERR, capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
HELD: The petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
RATIO:
3.) The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As
a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
In the case at bar, the CAYETANO maintains that since JUDGE LEONIDAS
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited HERMOGENES and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2)
and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit
that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate
may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, CAYETANO ARGUES
that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of
Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis
v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
30. ARTS. 1041 1048
SECTION 3. - Acceptance and Repudiation of the Inheritance

Art. 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of the inheritance is an act which is purely
voluntary and free. (988)
24

Art. 1042. The effects of the acceptance or repudiation shall always retroact to the
moment of the death of the decedent. (989)
Art. 1043. No person may accept or repudiate an inheritance unless he is certain of the
death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. (991)
Art. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate
an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated
by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their
default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (992a)
Art. 1045. The lawful representatives of corporations, associations, institutions and
entities qualified to acquire property may accept any inheritance left to the latter, but in
order to repudiate it, the approval of the court shall be necessary. (993a)
Art. 1046. Public official establishments can neither accept nor repudiate an inheritance
without the approval of the government. (994)
Art. 1047. A married woman of age may repudiate an inheritance without the consent of
her husband. (995a)
Art. 1048. Deaf-mutes who can read and write may accept or repudiate the inheritance
personally or through an agent. Should they not be able to read and write, the
inheritance shall be accepted by their guardians. These guardians may repudiate the
same with judicial approval. (996a)
31. ARTS. 1049 1057
Art. 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.
An express acceptance must be made in a public or private document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which the intention to accept is
necessarily implied, or which one would have no right to do except in the capacity of an
heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration do not imply an acceptance of
the inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity of an heir has not been
assumed. (999a)
Art. 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted:
(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to a stranger, or to his co-
heirs, or to any of them;
(2) If the heir renounces the same, even though gratuitously, for the benefit of
one or more of his co-heirs;
(3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his co-heirs indiscriminately; but
if this renunciation should be gratuitous, and the co-heirs in whose favor it is
made are those upon whom the portion renounced should devolve by virtue of
accretion, the inheritance shall not be deemed as accepted. (1000)
Art. 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic
instrument, or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the
testamentary or intestate proceedings. (1008)
Art. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the
latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the
amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the
renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the
rules established in this Code, it may belong. (1001)
Art. 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance
his right shall be transmitted to his heirs. (1006)
Art. 1054. Should there be several heirs called to the inheritance, some of them may
accept and the others may repudiate it. (1007a)
Art. 1055. If a person, who is called to the same inheritance as an heir by will and ab
intestato, repudiates the inheritance in his capacity as a testamentary heir, he is
understood to have repudiated it in both capacities.
Should he repudiate it as an intestate heir, without knowledge of his being a
testamentary heir, he may still accept it in the latter capacity. (1009)
25

Art. 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made, is irrevocable,
and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate
consent, or when an unknown will appears. (997)
Art. 1057. Within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution of
the estate in accordance with the Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall
signify to the court having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to have accepted the inheritance.
(n)
1. AVELINO V CA 329 SCRA 368 JECH
ER: Antonio Avelino died intestate. Maria, as Antonios daughter and one of his
compulsory heirs, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
Antonios estate. Angelina et al. opposed the petition and, instead, motioned that the
proceedings be converted into an action for judicial partition. Both the RTC and the CA
granted and affirmed the motion, respectively, forcing Maria to bring the case before the
SC. Was partition proper? The SC held that as a rule, when a person dies intestate, or if,
testate, failed to name an executor or the one so name is incompetent, refuses the trust,
or fails to furnish the required bond, then the decedents estate shall be judicially
administered and the courts shall appoint a qualified administrator. However, the
foregoing rule, which provides for judicial administration and appointment of
administrator, need not be complied with when (1) the heirs, who are all of age, opt for
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate between themselves, where the decedent died
intestate and left no debts and (2) the court proceeds to a summary settlement of the
estate, where the gross value thereof does not exceed 10K, regardless of whether the
decedent died testate or intestate. Here, the first exception should apply, as the CA found
that Antonio left no debts and all his heirs are of lawful age. Also, a complete inventory
of the estate is possible during the partition proceedings, which dispels the need for an
administrator even if the nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined.
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino (Maria) is a daughter and compulsory heir of the
late Antonio Avelino, Sr. (Antonio), and his first wife Respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other Respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony (all
surnamed Avelino) are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an
American, is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other Respondents are siblings of
Maria (Angelina et al.)
On 24 October 1991, Maria filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration of the estate of Antonio, who died intestate on 10 April 1989.
o She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina et al. filed their opposition by filing a motion to
convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition, which Maria
duly opposed.
The RTC granted the motion filed by Angelina et al. and directed all the parties to
submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the
deceased.
Marias motion for reconsideration having been denied, she brought the case before
the CA, which dismissed the same. Hence, this petition.
Maria submits that (a) partition is not yet possible, as no determination has yet
been made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate, (b) the estate is in
danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it,
and (c) the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the
issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed an error of law and gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper? Nope.
Held: When a person dies (a) intestate, or, if testate, (b) failed to name an executor in his
will or the executor so named is (c) incompetent, or (d) refuses the trust, or (e) fails to
furnish the bond required by the Rules, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the
order established in Section 6 of Rule 78.
- The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74, which provide:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition.
SECTION 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. - Whenever the gross
value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does
not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and
upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may
direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor
or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any
there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts
of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own
right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees
26

legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive
and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of
the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course
thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or
award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.
- Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among
themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated.
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not
required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.
In cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no
extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may
be resorted to, as in this case.
Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then
the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings.
o Here, the CA found that the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age and, thus, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules should
apply.
o Moreover, as regards the need for an administrator, as the nature and
character of the estate have yet to be determined, a complete
inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings,
especially since the estate has no debts.
32. ARTS. 1058 1077
SECTION 4. - Executors and Administrators

Art. 1058. All matters relating to the appointment, powers and duties of executors and
administrators and concerning the administration of estates of deceased persons shall
be governed by the Rules of Court. (n)
Art. 1059. If the assets of the estate of a decedent which can be applied to the payment of
debts are not sufficient for that purpose, the provisions of Articles 2239 to 2251 on
Preference of Credits shall be observed, provided that the expenses referred to in Article
2244, No. 8, shall be those involved in the administration of the decedent's estate. (n)
Art. 1060. A corporation or association authorized to conduct the business of a trust
company in the Philippines may be appointed as an executor, administrator, guardian of
an estate, or trustee, in like manner as an individual; but it shall not be appointed
guardian of the person of a ward. (n)
SECTION 5. - Collation

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from
the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should
have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the
donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036)
Art. 1063. Property left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired. (1037)
Art. 1064. When the grandchildren, who survive with their uncles, aunts, or cousins,
inherit from their grandparents in representation of their father or mother, they shall
bring to collation all that their parents, if alive, would have been obliged to bring, even
though such grandchildren have not inherited the property.
They shall also bring to collation all that they may have received from the decedent
during his lifetime, unless the testator has provided otherwise, in which case his wishes
must be respected, if the legitime of the co-heirs is not prejudiced. (1038)
Art. 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to collation in the inheritance of their
ascendants any property which may have been donated by the latter to their children.
(1039)
Art. 1066. Neither shall donations to the spouse of the child be brought to collation; but
if they have been given by the parent to the spouses jointly, the child shall be obliged to
bring to collation one-half of the thing donated. (1040)
Art. 1067. Expenses for support, education, medical attendance, even in extraordinary
illness, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are not subject to
collation. (1041)
Art. 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional,
vocational or other career shall not be brought to collation unless the parents so
provide, or unless they impair the legitime; but when their collation is required, the sum
which the child would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his
parents shall be deducted therefrom. (1042a)
27

Art. 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the debts of his children, election
expenses, fines, and similar expenses shall be brought to collation. (1043a)
Art. 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing, and
outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious except insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of
the sum which is disposable by will. (1044)
Art. 1071. The same things donated are not to be brought to collation and partition, but
only their value at the time of the donation, even though their just value may not then
have been assessed.
Their subsequent increase or deterioration and even their total loss or destruction, be it
accidental or culpable, shall be for the benefit or account and risk of the donee. (1045a)
Art. 1072. In the collation of a donation made by both parents, one-half shall be brought
to the inheritance of the father, and the other half, to that of the mother. That given by
one alone shall be brought to collation in his or her inheritance. (1046a)
Art. 1073. The donee's share of the estate shall be reduced by an amount equal to that
already received by him; and his co-heirs shall receive an equivalent, as much as
possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality. (1047)
Art. 1074. Should the provisions of the preceding article be impracticable, if the
property donated was immovable, the co-heirs shall be entitled to receive its equivalent
in cash or securities, at the rate of quotation; and should there be neither cash or
marketable securities in the estate, so much of the other property as may be necessary
shall be sold at public auction.
If the property donated was movable, the co-heirs shall only have a right to select an
equivalent of other personal property of the inheritance at its just price. (1048)
Art. 1075. The fruits and interest of the property subject to collation shall not pertain to
the estate except from the day on which the succession is opened.
For the purpose of ascertaining their amount, the fruits and interest of the property of
the estate of the same kind and quality as that subject to collation shall be made the
standard of assessment. (1049)
Art. 1076. The co-heirs are bound to reimburse to the donee the necessary expenses
which he has incurred for the preservation of the property donated to him, though they
may not have augmented its value.
The donee who collates in kind an immovable which has been given to him must be
reimbursed by his co-heirs for the improvements which have increased the value of the
property, and which exist at the time the partition if effected.
As to works made on the estate for the mere pleasure of the donee, no reimbursement is
due him for them; he has, however, the right to remove them, if he can do so without
injuring the estate. (n)
Art. 1077. Should any question arise among the co-heirs upon the obligation to bring to
collation or as to the things which are subject to collation, the distribution of the estate
shall not be interrupted for this reason, provided adequate security is given. (1050)
1. ZARAGOZA V CA 341 SCRA 309 DEBBIE LIM
Zaragoza vs. CA
(September 29, 2000)
Flavio was the owner of certain parcels of land. He has 4 children: Gloria, Zacariaz,
Florentino and Alberta. He died without a will and was survived by his children.
Alberta (private respondent) filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino and
Erlina for delivery of her inheritance share (Lots 943 and 871)
Alberta contended that her father in his lifetime, partitioned the property among
his 4 children. The shares of her siblings were given to them by deed of sale without
a valuable consideration except for her because she became an American citizen
through her marriage and thus, was prohibited to own lands in the Philippines
except through hereditary succession.
The RTC adjudicated the lot 871 to Alberta. CA ruled that both Lots 871 and 943
were the inheritance share of Alberta.
Issues:
WON the partition inter vivos by Flavio of his properties, including lots 871
and 943, is valid. - YES
WON the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently, the TCT over lot 943
registered in the name of the spouses, can be a valid subject matter of the
entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share. NO
Held:
First Issue
The partition inter vivos was valid since it may be done for as long as legitimes are
not prejudiced. Article 1080 of the CC is clear on this.
The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in
Article 1061:
28

o Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
However, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for the
delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs.
The petition must be therefore dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a
new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful
determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by
the partitioning inter vivos.
Second Issue
Alberta in requesting for the delivery of her inheritance share, was in effect
questioning the validity of the deed of sale covering lot 943 in favor of Florentino
and consequently, the TCT issued in his name.
This could not be done because the petition is a collateral attack. It is not allowed by
the Property Registration Decree.
o Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the
real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law
Facts:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated
situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province
of Iloilo.
He had 4 children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza.
On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his 4 children.
Private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Moran filed a complaint against Spouses
Florentino and Erlinda (petitioners) for delivery of her inheritance share consisting
of Lots 943 and 871 and for payment of damages.
Alberta claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and that her father, in his
lifetime, partitioned the properties among his 4 children. The shares of her brothers
and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid
consideration. While her share which consists of lots 871 and 943 was not
conveyed by way of deed of sale then because she became an American citizen
because of her marriage. So, she was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines
except by hereditary succession.
The spouses filed a motion to dismiss. They admitted their affinity with Alberta but
they denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by
their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their fathers name, while lot
943 was sold to them for a valuable consideration. They denied that there was
partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.
The RTC ruled in favor of Alberta and adjudicated the lot 871 to her. It also found
that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among his 3 children by
deeds of sales and intended lot 871 to be the share of Alberta. Both parties
appealed.
The CA ruled that the alleged sale of lot 943 in favor of the spouses was fictitious
and void. The signature of Flavio in the documented was different from his other
signatures appearing in other documents he signed. It gave weight to the evidence
presented by Alberta to support its finding that Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance
share of Alberta.
Issues:
1. WON the partition inter vivos by Flavio of his properties, including lots 871 and
943, is valid. - YES
2. WON the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently, the TCT over lot 943
registered in the name of the spouses, can be a valid subject matter of the entire
proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share. NO
Ratio:
On the first issue:
The spouses even admitted that Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of
Alberta. These are factual determinations of the CA, based on documentary and
testimonial evidence. As a rule, the SC is bound by the findings of facts of the CA.
The partition inter vivos was valid since it may be done for as long as legitimes are
not prejudiced. Article 1080 of the CC is clear on this.
The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in
Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of
the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
However, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for the
delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs.
The petition must be therefore dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a
new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful
determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by
the partitioning inter vivos.
29

On the second issue:
Alberta in requesting for the delivery of her inheritance share, was in effect
questioning the validity of the deed of sale covering lot 943 in favor of Florentino
and consequently, the TCT issued in his name.
The CA declared the sale in favor of Florentino to be fictitious because of finding of
marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the deed of sale compared to his
other signatures. However, this could not be done because the petition is a
collateral attack.
It is not allowed by the Property Registration Decree.
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified, or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In Halili, we held that a certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise
and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except
in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered
titles would be lost.
And in Co, we stated that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue
on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.

2. ADAN V CASILI 76 PHIL 279 JELI

Felix commenced an action against his sister, Victoria Adan-Casili, to secure the
judicial partiion of the estate left by their mother
Estate consists of 4 parcels of land with a value of P 2,783.55
Casili refused on the ground that Felix has already received more that his share
consisting of money livetock, palay and real property (Expenses as a student, 12
carabaos, 300 cavans of palay, 2 parcels of land).
RTC ruled in favor of Casili.
Issue: W/N Felix is entitled to a share in the 4 parcels of landNO
Ratio:
Under the article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for support, education,
attendance in illnesses, even though unusually expensive, apprenticeship,
ordinary equipment, or customary presents are not subject to collation.
Article 1042 of the same Code provides that expenses which may have been
incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional or artistic
career shall not be brought to collation unless the parent so orders or they
encroach upon the legitimate. It also provides that in cases in which it is
proper to collate them, the money which the child would have spent if it had
lived in the house and company of its parents shall be deducted therefrom.
Since the career of surveyor is a professional one, and since the expenses incurred
by Felix's mother in giving him that career encroached upon the legitimate, it is
proper to collate one-half of the amount spent by her for him during the two years
he studied surveying, the other half being considered as the amount which the Felix
would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his mother.
Summarizing the evidence, we find that the Felix has received from the estate of his
mother the following:
Cash P1,110
Twelve carabaos, at P30 a head 9;360
Three hundred cavans of palay, at
P2.20 a cavan 660
Amount spent by the Felix's mother
to give him a professional career, to
wit, P1,000, of which one-half is
collationable 500
Total P2,630

Victoria, on the other hand, received from her deceased mother the four parcels of
land in question, the agreed value of which is P2,783.55. It was proven during the
trial that she spent P300 for the funeral of the deceased, and deducting that sum
from the value of the property she received would leave only P2,483.55 as her net
share, which is less than that received by the Felix.

FACTS:
Felix Adan commenced this action against his sister Victoria Adan and the latter's
husband, Agapito Casili, to secure the judicial partition of the estate left by their
deceased mother, Simplicia Nepomuceno, alleged to consist of six parcels of land
which are specifically described in the complaint.
Parcels 1 and 3, however, were subsequently discarded, the first having been sold
by the parties to the municipality of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the second
being admittedly the property of Maria Adan, a half sister of the parties litigant.
The remaining four parcels, referred to in the record as lots Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6, are
valued by both parties at P2,783.55.
Casilis defense: That the four lots in question were ceded by the deceased Simplicia
to her daughter Victoria as her share of the inheritance; and that Felix has received
30

more than his share consisting of money, livestock, palay, and real property,
namely:
Expenses of the Felix as a student
from 1918 to 1925 P8,000
Twelve carabaos received by the
Felix from his mother, at P30 each 9;360.
P4.20 a cavan 1,260
Cash taken by the Felix from his
mother in 1927 1,110
Two parcels of land bought by
Felix with money he received from
his mother 1,220.00

RTC- in favor of Casili. Felix cannot get his share in the parcels of land.

ISSUES: WON Felix is entitled to a share in the parcels of land-- NO

HELD: Felix is NOT entitled to any share in the parcels of land.

RATIO:
Felix took and received from his mother during the latter's lifetime P1,110 in cash
and 300 cavans of palay. The 300 cavans of palay was taken by the Felix from the
granary of his mother in 1927. The cash consisting of twenty-peso and five-peso
bills and amounting in all to P1,110 was taken by the Felix from his mother's trunk
on an occasion when she suffered a collapse and when the Felix took some money
from the same trunk with which to pay for injections.
It is admitted in the brief for Felix that he took 300 cavans of palay from his
mother's granary, but it is claimed that said palay belonged to him. In the absence
of Felix's testimony to support such claim, there is no basis upon which to sustain it.
It was also proved during the trial that the Felix took possession of twelve carabaos
belonging to his mother and that the value of said animals was P30 a head.
Felix studied surveying in Manila and that during his studies his mother and sister
sent him money for his support and expenses, amounting to approximately P500 a
year. Although the Casilis claim that his studies lasted from 1918 to 1925, we
sustain the contention of the Felix in his brief that it took him only two years to
finish the course of surveying, because it is a matter of common knowledge that
surveying is a two-year course, and it is probable that the rest of the time was spent
by him in acquiring a high-school education.
Under the article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for support, education,
attendance in illnesses, even though unusually expensive, apprenticeship,
ordinary equipment, or customary presents are not subject to collation.
Article 1042 of the same Code provides that expenses which may have been
incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional or artistic
career shall not be brought to collation unless the parent so orders or they
encroach upon the legitimate. It also provides that in cases in which it is
proper to collate them, the money which the child would have spent if it had
lived in the house and company of its parents shall be deducted therefrom.
Since the career of surveyor is a professional one, and since the expenses incurred
by Felix's mother in giving him that career encroached upon the legitimate, it is
proper to collate one-half of the amount spent by her for him during the two years
he studied surveying, the other half being considered as the amount which the Felix
would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his mother.
Summarizing the evidence, we find that the Felix has received from the estate of his
mother the following:
Cash P1,110
Twelve carabaos, at P30 a head 9;360
P2.20 a cavan 660
Amount spent by the Felix's mother
to give him a professional career, to
wit, P1,000, of which one-half is
collationable 500
Total P2,630

Victoria, on the other hand, received from her deceased mother the four parcels of
land in question, the agreed value of which is P2,783.55. It was proven during the
trial that she spent P300 for the funeral of the deceased, and deducting that sum
from the value of the property she received would leave only P2,483.55 as her net
share, which is less than that received by the Felix.

3. DIZON RIVERA V DIZON 9 SCRA 555 REGGIE
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON,
BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON,
oppositors-appellants. (30 June 1970)
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Agripina J. Valdez was survived by 7 compulsory heirs. 6 of these 7 compulsory
heirs (except Marina) are the oppositors.
Named beneficiaries in Agripinas will were the compulsory heirs and 7
grandchildren. The will was probated, and Marina was appointed executrix.
The properties had a total value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the
compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.
31

In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance
with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific
real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her
children and grandchildren.
Marina Dizon and Tomas Dizon received properties in excess of their legitime while
the other compulsory heirs received less than their legitime.
Marina filed her project of partition, adjudicating to the other compulsory heirs
their properties plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes.
Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received less the cash
and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime.
The oppositors proposed the reduction of all testamentary dispositions
proportionately to the value of of the entire estate corresponding to the free
portion, and the other half to be divided among the 7 compulsory heirs as
constituting their legitimes.
CFI approved Marinas project of partition.
ISSUE: WON Art. 1063 of the Civil Code can be applied. (NO)
RATIO:
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is
not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the
legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction
thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this
article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it
may have some plausibility in an appropriate case, has no application in the present
case.
Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the
testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime
which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left
merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles
1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of
the Civil Code and this has been complied with.

FACTS:
Agripina J. Valdez died in Pampanga, and was survived by 7 compulsory heirs
(Estela, Tomas, Bernardita, Marina (executrix), Angelina, Josefina, and a
legitimate granddaughter named Lilia). 6 of these 7 compulsory heirs (except
Marina) are the oppositors.
Named beneficiaries in Agripinas will were the compulsory heirs, and 7
grandchildren. The will was probated, and Marina was appointed executrix.
The properties of the testatrix at the time of her death had a total value of
P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the 7 compulsory heirs amounted to
P129,362.11.
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in
accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and
bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of
her estate among her 6 children and 8 grandchildren.
The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the
testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ......................P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon ...................106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon ...................51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ......................52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon .......................131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ....................1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ................... 69,280.00
9. Grandchildren ........................72,540.00
Total Value .....................P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as follows:
o Marina and Tomas received in the will more than their respective
legitime, while the rest of the compulsory heirs received less than their
respective legitime.
o Thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively
given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their
respective legitimes to P129,254.96.
o Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the
will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced
legitime.
The oppositors submitted their counter-project of partition where they
proposed the reduction of all testamentary dispositions proportionately to the
value of of the entire estate corresponding to the free portion, and the other
half to be divided among the 7 compulsory heirs as constituting their legitimes.
The CFI approved Marinas project of partition.

ISSUE: Whether the oppositors are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under
Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the
Civil Code.
HELD: Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906
of the Civil Code.
RATIO:
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the
testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." Decisive of the issues at bar is the
fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition
of her estate by will. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated
32

and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code. This
right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of
compulsory heirs to their legitime under Art. 906 and Art. 907.
This was properly complied with in Marinas project of partition, wherein the
five oppositors were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and
assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete
their respective legitimes of P129,362.11. Oppositors' proposal would amount
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix'
will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to
the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him."
The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in
their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix'
repeated use of the words "I bequeath". Oppositors err in their premises, for
the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the
whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole
estate that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her
will.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left
by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain
unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some
authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really
means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may
have some plausibility in an appropriate case, has no application in the
present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire
estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during
her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each
heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the
application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount
of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article
906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project
of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining
portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally
to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of
partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon,
as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as
solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee.
33. ARTS. 1078 1090
SECTION 6. - Partition and Distribution of the Estate

SUBSECTION 1. - Partition

Art. 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the
deceased. (n)
Art. 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held
in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its
value. (n)
Art. 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will,
such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep any agricultural,
industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him
in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property
is not assigned, be paid in cash. (1056a)
Art. 1081. A person may, by an act inter vivos or mortis causa, intrust the mere power to
make the partition after his death to any person who is not one of the co-heirs.
The provisions of this and of the preceding article shall be observed even should there
be among the co-heirs a minor or a person subject to guardianship; but the mandatary,
in such case, shall make an inventory of the property of the estate, after notifying the co-
heirs, the creditors, and the legatees or devisees. (1057a)
Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale,
and exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. (n)
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the
testator should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of
indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in article 494. This power of the
testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime.
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the
causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for
33

compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs.
(1051a)
Art. 1084. Voluntary heirs upon whom some condition has been imposed cannot
demand a partition until the condition has been fulfilled; but the other co-heirs may
demand it by giving sufficient security for the rights which the former may have in case
the condition should be complied with, and until it is known that the condition has not
been fulfilled or can never be complied with, the partition shall be understood to be
provisional. (1054a)
Art. 1085. In the partition of the estate, equality shall be observed as far as possible,
dividing the property into lots, or assigning to each of the co-heirs things of the same
nature, quality and kind. (1061)
Art. 1086. Should a thing be indivisible, or would be much impaired by its being divided,
it may be adjudicated to one of the heirs, provided he shall pay the others the excess in
cash.
Nevertheless, if any of the heirs should demand that the thing be sold at public auction
and that strangers be allowed to bid, this must be done. (1062)
Art. 1087. In the partition the co-heirs shall reimburse one another for the income and
fruits which each one of them may have received from any property of the estate, for any
useful and necessary expenses made upon such property, and for any damage thereto
through malice or neglect. (1063)
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (1067a)
Art. 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership of each property shall be delivered to
the co-heir to whom said property has been adjudicated. (1065a)
Art. 1090. When the title comprises two or more pieces of land which have been
assigned to two or more co-heirs, or when it covers one piece of land which has been
divided between two or more co-heirs, the title shall be delivered to the one having the
largest interest, and authentic copies of the title shall be furnished to the other co-heirs
at the expense of the estate. If the interest of each co-heir should be the same, the oldest
shall have the title. (1066a)
1. GARCIA V CALALIMAN 172 SCRA 201 BELLE
Garcia v. Calaliman (1989)
HEIRS:
Heirs 1 - Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia,
Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia
Heirs 2 - Rosario Garcia, Margarita Garcia, Dolores Rufino, Resurreccion Tagarao,
Serafin Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, Fortunata Garcia and Simeon Garcia
Petitioner-Heirs - Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia
Emergency Recit:
Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land, inherited by his
nephews and nieces.
Heirs 1 and Heirs 2 sold their unpartitioned share of the land to Calaliman in
December 1954. It failed to notify Petitioner-Heirs of the said sale.
In March 1955, one of the Petitioner-Heirs went to the Register of Deeds to obtain a
copy of the Deed of Sale.
In May 1955, Petitioner-Heirs filed a complaint against Calaliman seeking to
redeem the property, based on their right of legal redemption, as co-owners of the
unpartitioned land.
Calaliman alleged that Petitioner-Heirs failed to exercise its right to redeem within
the period of one month allowed by the Art. 1088 of Civil Code. He insists that
notice was given to Petitioner-Heirs, and that since there was notice when one of
them went to the Register of Deeds, it was sufficient notice.
The Court rejected the theory of Calaliman because the 30 day period reckons from
the day of notice, and that notice must be a written notice given to the co-owners,
any other manner of notice is not sufficient notice. Thus, the complaint was timely
filed.

FACTS:
Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land about 372 sq.
meters, situated in the Municipality of Tubungan, Province of Iloilo. The parcel of
land was inherited by his nephews and nieces (HEIRS).
On December 3, 1954, Heirs 1 executed an extrajudicial partition with deed of
absolute sale, conveying their respective shares in the parcel of land to Calaliman.
Subsequently, on December 17, 1954, Heirs 2 also sold their undivided portion in
the land to Calaliman.
Thereafter, Petitioner-Heirs filed a case against Calaliman for legal redemption of
the portions sold to the latter. Petitioner-Heirs alleged that their co-owners, Heirs 1
and Heirs 2, never offered their shares over the land to them, prior to the sale to
Calaliman, neither were they given notice of the intention to sell the same, nor a
notice in writing of the sale was afforded the Petitioner-Heirs.
34

Petitioner-Heirs would have purchased the shares, had they been informed or
offered such.
Petitioner-Heirs alleged that they offered to redeem the property within 30 days
from knowledge of the sale. Petitioner-Heirs prayed that the Court order that
Petitioner-Heirs are entitled to redeem the property and for damages.
Calaliman alleged that there was no cause of action against them and that notices
were given to Petitioner-Heirs sometime in June 1953 but they did not exercise
their right to redeem. Thus, they cannot now belatedly file their claim.
Petitioner-Heir Garcia went to Register of Deeds to obtain a copy of the deed of sale,
which Calaliman refused to furnish the former, on March 24, 1995.
Trial Court ruled in favour of Petitioner-Heirs. CA reversed and dismissed
complaint of Petitioner-Heirs. Thus, petition for review to SC

ISSUE: WON the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088
3
of the New Civil Code for a
co-heir to exercise his right of legal redemption, had already elapsed when they filed
complaint on May 7, 1955?
HELD: NO. The 30-day period has not elapsed.
RATIO:
It is undisputed that no notification in writing was ever received by Petitioner-
Heirs about the sale of the hereditary interest of some of their co-heirs in the parcel
of land they inherited from the late Gelacio Garcia, although in a letter dated June
23, 1953 one of the Petitioner-Heirs, Francisco Garcia wrote one of his co- heirs,
Joaquin Garcia, who is an uncle of Petitioner-Heirs, proposing to buy the hereditary
interests of his co-heirs in their unpartitioned inheritance. Although Francisco
asked that his letter be answered "in order that I will know the results of what I
have requested you," there is no proof that he was favored with one.
Petitioner-Heirs came to know that their co-heirs were selling the property on
December 3, 1954 when one of the Heirs 1, Juanito Bertomo, asked Petitioner-Heir
Paz Garcia to sign a document because the land they inherited was going to be sold
Jose Calaliman. The document mentioned could be no other than the one entitled
"Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale" dated December 3, 1954 as it is in this
document that the name of Paz Garcia, Maria Garcia and Amado Garcia appear
unsigned by them.
The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale as sufficient
notice of a sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496 applies only to

3
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may
be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
registered lands and has no application whatsoever to a case where the property
involved is, admittedly, unregistered land.
Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in
some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still
entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as
to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation
is not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the method
of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any
particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written
notification of redemption.
2. BALANAY JR V MARTINEZ 64 SCRA 454 MUTI
Leodagaria died and was survived by her husband Felix Sr. and their 6 legitimate
children. Felix Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mothers
notarial will. In the will, Leodagaria declared (a) that she was the owner of half of the
conjugal lots; (b) that she was the owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from
his father; and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among
her heirs during her husbands lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of
the fruits of her properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not provision (c) is valid under Art. 1080. NO!!
Leodagaria made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her 6 children. She did
not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in Art. 1080. Hence,
she had no right that the legitimes be paid in cash.
On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of 20 years. Thus,
the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husbands lifetime would
at most be effective only for 20 years from the date of her death unless there are
compelling reasons for terminating the coownership.

FACTS:
o Leodegaria Julian (Leodegaria) died and was survived by her husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr. (Felix Sr.), and by their six legitimate children.
o Felix Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial
will.
o In that will Leodegaria declared the following:
o that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots
o that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she
inherited from her father
o that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her
35

heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be
satisfied out of the fruits of her properties
o that after her husband's death, her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal
lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that
part of her will.
o She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She
disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.
o Felix Sr. and Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged
improper partition of the conjugal estate.
o Felix Sr. withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was
interested in its probate. He confirmed that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
o Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Sr. were void. The lower court denied the opposition.
o Another lawyer for the children of Leodegaria, Atty. Montaa, appeared in the case.
Montaa in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the
conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed
that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into
an intestate proceeding.
o The lower court then dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to
creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing.

ISSUE: WoN the provision in the will that properties should not be divided among her
heirs during her husbands lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the
fruits of her properties is valid under Art. 1080. NO!!

RATIO:
o The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even
before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become
an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
o But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its
order, it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share
of the conjugal estate.
o The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code).
o The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal
lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share
was inchoate and proindiviso. But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire
will.
IMPORTANT PART:
o The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that
the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code
which reads:
o ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail
himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the
legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned
be paid in cash.
o The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half
conjugal share).
o She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article
1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash.
o On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty
years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's
lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death
unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership.

o Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is
intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition
would become effective upon the death of Felix Sr. In the meantime, the net income
should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
o In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in her will. It is true that she
could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate but since the husband,
after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary
partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the
will may be probated.
o The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, where the testatrix instituted as
heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it
36

preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Since the preterition of the
parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no
legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted.
o In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will. Save
in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's
duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will.
3. ALEJANDRINO V CA 295 SCRA 538 JAMON
ER
- Spouses Alejandrino left their 6 children (Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia,
Laurencia, and Abundio) a 219sqm lot in Cebu. Upon the death of the spouses,
property should have been divided among the children but the estate was not
settled in accordance with the procedure. Mauricia (petitioner) bought Gregorios
and Ciriacos shares. It turned out that Nique (respondent) also bought certain
portions of land from Laurencia and the other siblings, allegedly through Laurencia.
Laurencia questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title against Nique. Court
rendered decision in favor of Nique. Laurencia appealed but withdrew the same
which led to the finality of said case. Therefore, Mauricia filed a complaint for
redemption of properties because she claims that Nique didnt give her preemptive
right and that she wasnt notified of the purchase of the undivided lot. Nique filed a
motion for segregation of his portion of the lot and the court granted the motion
saying that Mauricia and Laurencia also entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
estate whereby they agreed to divide the land between them. Although not
notarized, it is valid as between the parties. The court also said that theres a deed
of sale in favor of Nique. ISSUE: W/N Laurencia may validly sell specific portions to
a 3
rd
party
RATIO
- When Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the property that
were adjudged in his favor, Nique was in effect calling for the partition of the
property. However, under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may only be
effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an
ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by
the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
- In this case, Mauricia admitted that there was an extrajudicial settlement. They
tried contending that since it was not notarized, it had no effect. However, the
notarization requirement is superseded by Art.1082 of the Civil Code, which states
that
Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-
ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs."
Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of
renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. In effect,
Laurencia expressed her intention to terminate the co-owner by selling her share to
private respondent.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
reflected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically
divide the property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and
therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that
the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the
two of them.
FACTS
- Spouses Alejandrino left their 6 children (Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia,
Laurencia, and Abundio) a 219sqm lot in Cebu. Upon the death of the spouses, the
property should have been divided among their children with each child having a
share of 36.50sqm. HOWEVER, the estate was not settled in accordance with the
procedure outlined in the ROC
- Petitioner Mauricia allegedly bought 12.17sqp of Gregorios share and 36.5sqm of
Ciriacos. It turned out, however, that a 3
rd
party named Nique (respondent) also
purchased 36.5sqm from Laurencia, 36.5sqm from Gregorio through Laurencia,
12.17sqm from Abundio through Laurencia and 36.5sqm from Marcelino.
- Laurencia questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and damages against
Nique. Court rendered judgment in favor of Nique and ordered plaintiff to vacate
the premises to the extent of the 4 shares aforementioned
- Laurencia appealed but withdrew the same
- Mauricia Alejandrino filed a complaint for redemption and recovery of properties
with damages against Nique in the RTC. The counsel of Mauricia was the same as
Laurencias in the previous case
o An amended complaint was submitted and alleged that Nique never
notified Mauricia of the purchase of 121.67sqm of the undivided lot. He
also didnt give Mauricia preemptive right
- In the case of the quieting of title, Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the
146sqm portion declared as his own. The court mentioned that:
o In this case of Laurencia, the decision of the court has long become final as
regards Niques ownership.
37

o Mauricia and Laurencia also entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
estate whereby they agreed to divide the land between them. Although
not notarized, it is valid as between the parties
o There was a deed of sale in favor of Nique
o The court, in the end, granted the motion of Nique
- Mauricia questioned said order but CA dismissed the petition. CA said that the court
was merely performing its job of seeing to it that execution of a judgment must
conform to that decreed in the decision. Mauricia filed an MR but CA denied.
ISSUE W/N as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific
portions thereof to a 3
rd
party
RATIO
- The legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino
spouses was settled in the case for the quieting of title.
o The decision in that case had become final and executory with Laurencia's
withdrawal of her appeal. When Nique filed a motion for the segregation
of the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, Nique was
in effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law,
partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs
themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for
partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the
testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
- The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for
quieting of title. As there is no pending administration proceedings, the property of
the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an
extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on the extrajudicial
settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it became the basis for
the order for segregation of the property sold to private respondent. Petitioner
Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the absence of
notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.
- Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of making it a
public document that can bind third parties. However, this formal requirement
appears to be superseded by the substantive provision of the Civil Code that states:
Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-
ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs."
Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of
renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. In effect,
Laurencia expressed her intention to terminate the co-owner by selling her share to
private respondent.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate
reflected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically
divide the property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and
therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that
the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the
two of them.
4. CUA V VARGAS 506 SCRA 374 ANGEL
October 31, 2006

A parcel of residential land located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind
by the late Paulina Vargas.
A notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by Paulina Vargas'
9 heirs, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question. Only 5
out of the 9 heirs signed the said document
An Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and
among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings.
Once more, only 5 heirs signed the document and their respective shares totaling
55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua.
Gloria Vargas, one of the four heirs who did not sign the aforementioned
documents, came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale
only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in
May 1995. She also claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property had
been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner Cua, Gloria Vargas
tried to redeem the property from Joseph Cua but the offer was refused. Gloria
Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption
of the lot against Joseph Cua.

1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their
failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when
the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published
NO. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding.
The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no
notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates
a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or
partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to
38

participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not
after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the
instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
2. Whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in
connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under Article
1088 of the Civil Code

can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual knowledge
of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can exercise the right to
be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the date of actual
knowledge of the sale.
NO. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the
sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It
cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or
contemplated sale.
The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual
sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or
effect the redemption.
The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified
in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs.
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time
that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
Considering, therefore, that Gloria Vargas' co-heirs failed to comply with this
requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing her to redeem the
shares sold to Cua given the Gloria Vargas et al's obvious willingness and
capacity to do so.

Facts:
A parcel of residential land located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left
behind by the late Paulina Vargas.
On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was
executed by and among Paulina Vargas' 9 heirs partitioning and adjudicating
unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11
square meters
o Four of the heirs (Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria) however,
did not sign the document.
o Only five (Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario) of the 9 heirs
signed it.
The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes
Tribune for three consecutive weeks.
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale
was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and
also with the same sharings.
o Once more, only the same five heirs (Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida
and Rosario) signed the document and their respective shares
totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua
According to Gloria Vargas, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale, only when the original house built on the lot was being
demolished sometime in May 1995
o She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs involving the same property had been
published in the Catanduanes Tribune
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas
tried to redeem the property by sending a letter to buyer Joseph Cua which
indicated the formers intent to exercise her right of legal redemption of said
five (5) shares
When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to reach an
amicable settlement at the barangay level, Gloria Vargas filed a case for
annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot.
Gloria Vargas et al claimed that claimed that the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were
null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them
o They claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the
price of the sale.
o They likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a written
notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the
right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written
notice was sent to them.
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of Cua
RTC Affirmed MTCs ruling.
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts declaring that the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale were void and without any legal effect. The CA held that,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial
settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents
considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their
consent to the same.
Held: In favor of Gloria Vargas et al. CA decision affirmed
Issues:
39

1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure
to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the
extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published. NO.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The
rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no
notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.

o It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what happened in the
instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was
notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for
the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their
lawful participation in the decedent's estate.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their
hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The
heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial
settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in
the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are
given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil
Code.

2. Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind persons who
did not participate therein, whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to
his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition
under Article 1088 of the Civil Code

can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual
knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can exercise the
right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the date of actual
knowledge of the sale. NO.

The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified
in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs.
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time
that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale
acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It
cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or
contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written
notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to
repurchase or effect the redemption.
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor
any distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the method of
notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law. This
proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep strangers to
the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of
outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and in a position
to repurchase the share sold.
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves
upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know
the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. This will
remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and
validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. As a result,
the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the
alienation.
Considering, therefore, that Gloria Vargas' co-heirs failed to comply with this
requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing Gloria Vargas et al to
redeem the shares sold to Cua given Gloria Vargas obvious willingness and
capacity to do so.
Likewise untenable is Cua's contention that he is a builder in good faith. Cua derived his
title from the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs With Sale dated November 15,
1994. He was very much aware that not all of the heirs participated therein as it was
evident on the face of the document itself. Because the property had not yet been
partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property
could have been identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. This is because
the alienation made by Gloria Vargas' co-heirs was limited to the portion which may be
allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Despite this
glaring fact, and over the protests of Gloria Vargas et al, Cua still constructed
improvements on the property.

5. J.L.T. AGRO INC. V BALANSAG 453 SCRA 211 TRISTAN
ER:
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted 2 marriages:
1
st
Marriage with Antonia (1
st
wife)
2
nd
Marriage (after the Death of Antonia) with Milagros Donio (2
nd
wife).

Don Julian had 2 children with Antonia, namely: (1) Josefa, and (2) Emilio.
40

He also had 4 children with Milagros Donio, namely: (1) Maria, (2) Jose, (3) Milagros and
(4) Pedro.

The present controversy involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais
Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don
Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, Don Julian and his children from his 1
st
marriage
(Josefa and Emilio) entered into a Compromise Agreement with regard the properties of
Don Julian and Antonia. Certain properties, including Lot No. 63, were to be retained by
Don Julian while the other properties were reserved for Josefa and Emilio. Furthermore,
the Compromise Agreement lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian:
that in the event of his (Don Julians) death, the properties now selected and adjudicated
to him (Don Julian) shall exclusively be adjudicated to his 2
nd
wife (Milagros Donio) and
his four minor children (Maria, Joes, Milagros and Pedro). However, on 16 November
1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with
Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (TRT: to provide additional context,
Don Julian was the president of this corp. and Josefa was the treasurer; family
corporation) Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the
Supplemental Deed. This instrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63 in favor of
J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Then, Don Julian died intestate. Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her
children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of the
Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with
spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. At the Register of Deeds while trying to
register the deed of absolute sale, Spouses Balansag and Cadayday discovered that the
lot was already titled in the name of J.L.T. Agro Inc.
ISSUE: WON the transfer of the lot between Don Julian and J.L.T. Agro, Inc. was valid
despite the presence of the reservation of the said lot in favor of his heirs in the 2
nd

marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement. HELD: YES. The partition inter
vivos of the properties of Don Julian is valid pursuant to Article 1347, which provides the
GENERAL RULE that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of
man may be the object of a contract. The EXCEPTION is that no contract may be entered
into with respect to future inheritance, and the EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION (i.e.,
follow GENERAL RULE) is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
Nevertheless, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of
Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated
to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope
of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition,
the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest
to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist. Evidently, at the
time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of
petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over
the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time
of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute
right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by
Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been
adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement. Furthermore, Don
Julian did NOT execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his
properties.

FACTS:
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena
(Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian
had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escao (Josefa) and Emilio Teves
(Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio
Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves
(Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).
The present controversy involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais
Cadastre (Lot No. 63), which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal
partnership of Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the said parcel of land was
among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages involving Don
Julian and his 2 children from the 1
st
marriage (Josefa and Emilio). Thereafter, the
parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement, which embodied the partition
of all the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the Compromise Agreement, the CFI of Negros Oriental declared certain
properties in favor of Don Julian, including Lot No. 63. Paragraph 13 of the Compromise
Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death
of Don Julian vis--vis his heirs:
x x x
In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four
minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children
Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria
Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of
Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a
year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument
entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of
Liabilities (Supplemental Deed)

dated 31 July 1973. This instrument which constitutes a
supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63,
among other properties, in favor of petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.. On 14 April 1974, Don
Julian died intestate.
41

Petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc. was able to register the subject lot in its name, and since then,
has been paying the taxes assessed to said lot.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the
subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a
yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday,
(respondents). On Lot No. 63, the Spouses temporarily established their home and
constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of
partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria
Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the
name of petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc in 1979, respondent Spouses bought Lot No. 63 from
Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate dated 9
November 1983.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale, respondent
Spouses discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner J.L.T. Agro,
Inc. Thus, they failed to register the deed.
Spouses filed a complaint before the trial court (TC) of Bais City, seeking the declaration
of nullity and cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc and
the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 to their names.
Trial Court
TC dismissed the complaint, among other things, on the ground that the adjudication in
favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final and operative, as the lot
was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during his lifetime. With Lot No. 63
being the conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the TC also declared that
Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the
conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the latter.
The TC ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no
longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July
1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition by
Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it

Court of Appeals
The CA reversed the TC.
ISSUE
WON the transfer of the lot between Don Julian and J.L.T. Agro, Inc. was valid despite the
presence of the reservation of the said lot in favor of his heirs in the 2
nd
marriage
pursuant to the Compromise Agreement.
HELD
YES. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things,
may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may
also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may
be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is
the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened
at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future
inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following
requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance;
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right
which is purely hereditary in nature.
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and
therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will,
such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second
marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement
was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of
their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature
was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related
was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.
42

Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No.
63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since
ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian
retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be
challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already
been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court
approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of
preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir
of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second
marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in
the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire along this line. Hence,
the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage, a
requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
6. CHAVEZ V IAC 191 SCRA 211 MARIANA
Manuela was a very indecisive woman. She distributed her land to her six children.
However, she reserved for herself the possession of the land and enjoyment of the
fruits.
3 of the 6 kids sold their land to a sibling (Concepcion). In effect, Concepcion had
4/6 of the land.
Manuela again sold the land to 1 kid only (Raquel) and then sold it again to a certain
Mr. Ferrer. Obviously, the other children complained and said that the initial
distribution was already a valid partition inter vivos made by Manuela.
ISSUE: W/N the IAC erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale as a partition by an act
inter vivos considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a
testament amounting to a will of Manuela? No!
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate
either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs.
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition
of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL.
o When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such
partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law
on wills
o when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such
partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a
will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs.
FACTS
Manuela Buenavista was the paraphernal owner of the land in question.
Manuela had 6 children (Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and
Floserpina)
o First 3 plaintiffs, last three plus mother were defendants (in the lower
court)
Presentacion, Florespina and Raquel with the conformity of their mother sold her
1/6 share to Concepcion.
o Therefore, Concepcion owned 4/6. Antonio and Rosario owned 2/6.
All the documents evinced that Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to
her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at
Sitio Langas, Barrio Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of
4.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No. 9303 and assessed at
P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself the possession of the land and
the enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime.
Despite all the sales and transfers, Manuela signed a Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa
of the entire land in favor of Raquel and her husband.
o The others filed a case against Raquel and the mom.
Manuela again sold the land to Pepito Ferrer.
TC: Dismissed. Raquel, Manuela and Ferrer win.
CA: reversed TC. Sales to Raquel and Ferrer were null and void. Documents
evidence a valid partition of the land between Manuela Buenavista and her
children, subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime.
o Filed MR. MR denied.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the IAC erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale as a partition by an act
inter vivos considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not
a testament amounting to a will of Manuela? No!
HELD: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals
in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708, the same is affirmed in toto. The petition for review is
dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioners.
RATIO:
43

Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate
either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs.
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition
of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL.
o When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such
partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law
on wills
o when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such
partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a
will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs.
The Deeds of Sale (By Presentacion, Florestina and Raquel) are not contracts
entered into with respect to feature inheritance but a contract perfected and
consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and
gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner
herself, is valid.
it would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to
revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in
favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel
who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received
in the partition inter vivos. Unjust enrichment!
7. SANTIAGO V SANTIAGO V 627 SCRA 351 ELLIE
Santiago v. Santiago G.R. No. 179859 (August 9, 2010)
Facts:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages:
o 1
st
: to Bibiana Lopez with 2 kids- Irene and Marta
Marta is the mother of the oppositors- Felimon, Leonila,
Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, ALL surnamed
Soco.
o 2
nd
: to Irene Santiago with 6 kids- Tomas, Cipriano; Respondents Zoilo and
Felicidad; Petitioner Ma. Pilar. ALL surnamed Santiago
o 3
rd
: to Cecilia Lomotan. With 3 kids- Eugenia; Petitioner Clemente; and
Cleotilde. ALL surnamed Santiago
After Basilio died testate on Sep. 16, 1973, petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the RTC
of Bulacan a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP No. 1549-M.
The will was admitted to probate and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa
itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang
pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman
sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa
habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-
aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop
ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga
anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia,
Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng
dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan,
hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at
ang maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang
magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon
matapos na ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang
reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko
ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring
ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding
kapakinabangan at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng
Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia
Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo,
Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-
pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at
gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob
ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at
pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte
lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari matapos
bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga gugol na
kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o salaping
manggagaling dito.
After Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in
Accordance with the Will," the probate court approved the will by Order of
August 14, 1978 and directed the RD of Bulacan and Manila to register the
certificates of title indicated therein. Accordingly, the titles to 5 lots in Malolos,
Bulacan and 1 lot in Manila were transferred in the names of Ma. Pilar and
Clemente.
The children of Marta filed a Complaint-in-Intervention alleging that
Basilios second wife was not Irene but a certain Maria Arellano with whom he
had no child; and that Basilios will violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code.
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its
previous approval of the "Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in
Accordance with the Will."
The children of Marta filed a complaint for completion of legitime before
the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-90, against the heirs of the
44

second and third marriages. Their contention was that they were partially
preterited by Basilios will because their legitime was reduced.
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime)
in favor of the children of Marta. (a.k.a. CA-G.R. NO. 45801 & CA-G.R. NO.
45801)
On appeal, the CA annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17, holding that the
dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its August 14,
1978 Order approving the probate of the will constitute res judicata with
respect to Civil Case No. 562-M-90.
Children of Marta challenged the appellate courts decision but the Court
denied it. The denial became final and executory on April 9, 2003.
On October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second marriage filed before
the probate court Motion for Termination of Administration, for
Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees.
o They were alleging that the twenty (20) year period within which
subject properties should be under administration of Ma. Pilar
Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on September 16, 1993.
o they should have transferred the titles to the named legatees in the
Last Will and Testament of the testator by then.
Ma. Pilar and Clemente argued that with subsequent issuance of certificates of
title covering the properties involved, the case had long since been closed and
terminated.
The probate court granted the motion for termination of administration, for
accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees.
The trial court held:
o clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties cannot
actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the death of the
testator Basilio Santiago. The testator Basilio Santiago died on
September 16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be filed after
September 16, 1993. No prescription of action has set in.
o The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate
proceeding which is continuing in character, and terminates only
after and until the final distribution or settlement of the whole estate
of the deceased in accordance with the provision of the will of the
testator.
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for reconsideration
with the probate court. DENIED. Court of Appeals affirmed the probate courts
decision.

Issue:
1
st
Issue: W/N decision of the appellate court in the earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld
by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No.
83094 (the subject of the present petition for review). NO!
2
nd
Issue: W/N CA erred in including the house and lot in Manila, covered by TCT No.
131044, among those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as it would contravene the
testators intent that no one is to own the same. NOPE.

Ratio:
1
st
Issue:
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and 47 (c)
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
o 1
st
: Bar by Prior Judgment. proscribes the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action already
settled in a prior action.
o 2
nd
: Conclusiveness of Judgment. ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
32

Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present
case. The final judgment regarding oppositors complaint on the reduction of
their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition, which
solely tackles the propriety of the termination of administration, accounting
and transfer of titles in the names of the legatees-heirs of the second and third
marriages.
o There is clearly no similarity of claim, demand or cause of action
between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of
judgment" cannot likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606
would only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors supposed
preterition and reduction of legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at
the very least even invoked, in the present petition.

2
nd
Issue:
It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be
transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes only, and that
the property be owned by the heirs in common but the condition set by the
decedent on the propertys indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation.
For this Court to sustain without qualification Ma. Pilar and Clementes
contention is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870,
and 1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a
property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property
for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction
co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code
45

8. BARCELONA V BARCELONA 58 OFFICIAL GAZETTE 373 JAPS CASE NOT FOUND
9. BAUTISTA V GRINO-AQUINO 168 SCRA 790 MEME
BAUTISTA vs. GRIO-AQUINO
October 28, 1988
Petitioners: MANUEL BAUTISTA and EVANGELINE BAUTISTA
Respondents: MANOLITO BAUTISTA, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN, BETTY N. BAUTISTA
alias BEATRIZ BAUTISTA, NELIA N. BAUTISTA, GLORIA N. BAUTISTA, CLARITA N.
BAUTISTA and ROSALINA BAUTISTA
Emergency Recitation
Facts:
Petitioners instituted an action in the CFI Rizal to declare the deed of extrajudicial
partition, deed of absolute sale, TCT nos. 14182, 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and void.
Agreed Stipulation of Facts:
1. The land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel Bautista
under TCT No. 2210, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano
Bautista;
2. On Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed.
3. Upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, T.C.T. No. 2210 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182 was issued;
4. The private respondents, with the exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property;
5. On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the
other private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T. C.T.
Nos. T-1 5665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T-15671, were
issued to private respondents;
6. Petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo;
7. Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child,
Evangeline Bautista
8. That the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition
of property on December 22,1966, among the heirs of the late Juliana
Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista;
9. Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property;
10. The parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel
Bautista;
11. That the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.
The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs.
On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, petitioner now seeks a review of said decision

Issue: Can the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial
partition of the estate of the deceased wife?
Held: No
Ratio:
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the
Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and
with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the
decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an
extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased
would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process
of law. Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by
succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this
case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as
exclusive owner of the property.
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of
Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter
by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would
wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the
said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said document.
Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to
be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad
faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.
The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition and
issuance of the title in their names, private respondents except Manolito Bautista in
turn executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of the latter in whose
name the title was also issued. And yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was
executed this time by Manolito Bautista selling back the same property to private
respondents in whose names the respective titles were thus subsequently issued.
This series of transactions between and among private respondents is an indication
of a clever scheme to place the property beyond the reach of those lawfully entitled
thereto.
Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the property
during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is
prohibited by law.
46

As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging
exclusively to petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all
subsequent transactions involving the same property between and among the
private respondents are also null and void.
Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to sue their co-
owners for partition of the property is imprescriptible.
o And even assuming that the present action may prescribe as ruled by the
respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline Bautista
who are not parties to the said instrument asserted that they discovered
the same only soon before they filed the complaint in court. Certainly the
action has not prescribed.

Original Digest
Case:
Can the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial
partition of the estate of the deceased wife?
This is the singular issue in this petition.

Facts:
Petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to declare the
deed of extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates Title Nos.
14182, 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and Tax Declaration
No. 5147, null and void.
The parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts:
1. That both parties admit that the land in question was registered in the
name of petitioner Manuel Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter
inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista;
2. Both petitioners and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22, 1966, a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed.
a. Private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the
signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear
in that document,
b. although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that
Extrajudicial Partition;
3. Both parties admit that upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, T.C.T. No. 2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182
was issued;
4. The parties admit that the private respondents, with the exception of
Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito
Bautista of that property;
5. Upon registration of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista;
6. On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
the other private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale,
T. C.T. Nos. T-1 5665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T-
15671, were issued to private respondents;
7. Parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife
Emiliana Tamayo;
8. Parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo,
had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949;
9. That the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial
partition of property on December 22,1966, among the heirs of the late
Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista;
10. Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of
Property;
11. On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the
questioned signature of Manuel Bautista;
12. That the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.
In a decision of January 14, 1983, the trial court dismissed the complaint with costs
against plaintiffs.
On appeal, a decision was rendered in due course by the Court of Appeals on August
3, 1987, affirming the decision of the trial court.
Hence, petitioner now seeks a review of said decision

Issue: Whether or not the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an
extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife
Held: No. The petition is impressed with merit.
Ratio:
The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that
the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is
authentic, as examined by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding.
Nevertheless, even granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned
Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on
admitted and proven facts renders the document fatally defective.
The extrajudicial partition was supposed to be a partition without court
intervention of the estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista,
constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista appears
to have waived his right or share in the property in favor of private respondents.
However, the property subject matter of said extrajudicial partition does not belong
to the estate of Juliana Nojadera. It is the exclusive property of Manuel Bautista who
inherited the same from his father Mariano Bautista, which was registered in his
name under T.C.T. No. 2210.
47

Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the
Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and
with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the
decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an
extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased
would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process
of law. Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by
succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this
case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as
exclusive owner of the property.
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of
Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter
by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would
wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the
said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said document.
Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to
be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad
faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.
The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition and
issuance of the title in their names, private respondents except Manolito Bautista in
turn executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of the latter in whose
name the title was also issued. And yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was
executed this time by Manolito Bautista selling back the same property to private
respondents in whose names the respective titles were thus subsequently issued.
This series of transactions between and among private respondents is an indication
of a clever scheme to place the property beyond the reach of those lawfully entitled
thereto.
Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the property
during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is
prohibited by law.
As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging
exclusively to petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all
subsequent transactions involving the same property between and among the
private respondents are also null and void.
Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to sue their co-
owners for partition of the property is imprescriptible.
o And even assuming that the present action may prescribe as ruled by the
respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline Bautista
who are not parties to the said instrument asserted that they discovered
the same only soon before they filed the complaint in court. Certainly the
action has not prescribed.

Judgment: WHEREFORE, AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision
dated August 3, 1987, of respondent Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 03631 and the
Resolution of September 11, 1987, in the same case, are hereby reversed and set aside;
and a new one is rendered declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated December
22, 1966, as null and void ab initio, nullifying and cancelling T.C.T. Nos. T-14182, T-
14186, T-15665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T-15670, T-15671, and Tax
Declaration No. 5147, restoring and reviving T.C.T. No. 2210, in the name of Manuel
Bautista, with costs against private respondents. Let a copy of this decision be furnished
to the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City for implementation.
34. ARTS. 1091 1105
SUBSECTION 2. - Effects of Partition

Art. 1091. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of
the property adjudicated to him. (1068)
Art. 1092. After the partition has been made, the co-heirs shall be reciprocally bound to
warrant the title to, and the quality of, each property adjudicated. (1069a)
Art. 1093. The reciprocal obligation of warranty referred to in the preceding article shall
be proportionate to the respective hereditary shares of the co-heirs, but if any one of
them should be insolvent, the other co-heirs shall be liable for his part in the same
proportion, deducting the part corresponding to the one who should be indemnified.
Those who pay for the insolvent heir shall have a right of action against him for
reimbursement, should his financial condition improve. (1071)
Art. 1094. An action to enforce the warranty among heirs must be brought within ten
years from the date the right of action accrues. (n)
Art. 1095. If a credit should be assigned as collectible, the co-heirs shall not be liable for
the subsequent insolvency of the debtor of the estate, but only for his insolvency at the
time the partition is made.
The warranty of the solvency of the debtor can only be enforced during the five years
following the partition.
Co-heirs do not warrant bad debts, if so known to, and accepted by, the distributee. But
if such debts are not assigned to a co-heir, and should be collected, in whole or in part,
the amount collected shall be distributed proportionately among the heirs. (1072a)
48

Art. 1096. The obligation of warranty among co-heirs shall cease in the following cases:
(1) When the testator himself has made the partition, unless it appears, or it
may be reasonably presumed, that his intention was otherwise, but the
legitime shall always remain unimpaired;
(2) When it has been so expressly stipulated in the agreement of partition,
unless there has been bad faith;
(3) When the eviction is due to a cause subsequent to the partition, or has been
caused by the fault of the distributee of the property. (1070a)
SUBSECTION 3. - Rescission and Nullity of Partition

Art. 1097. A partition may be rescinded or annulled for the same causes as contracts.
(1073a)
Art. 1098. A partition, judicial or extra-judicial, may also be rescinded on account of
lesion, when any one of the co-heirs received things whose value is less, by at least one-
fourth, than the share to which he is entitled, considering the value of the things at the
time they were adjudicated. (1074a)
Art. 1099. The partition made by the testator cannot be impugned on the ground of
lesion, except when the legitime of the compulsory heirs is thereby prejudiced, or when
it appears or may reasonably be presumed, that the intention of the testator was
otherwise. (1075)
Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years
from the time the partition was made. (1076)
Art. 1101. The heir who is sued shall have the option of indemnifying the plaintiff for the
loss, or consenting to a new partition.
Indemnity may be made by payment in cash or by the delivery of a thing of the same
kind and quality as that awarded to the plaintiff.
If a new partition is made, it shall affect neither those who have not been prejudiced nor
those have not received more than their just share. (1077a)
Art. 1102. An heir who has alienated the whole or a considerable part of the real
property adjudicated to him cannot maintain an action for rescission on the ground of
lesion, but he shall have a right to be indemnified in cash. (1078a)
Art. 1103. The omission of one or more objects or securities of the inheritance shall not
cause the rescission of the partition on the ground of lesion, but the partition shall be
completed by the distribution of the objects or securities which have been omitted.
(1079a)
Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be
rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other
persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person
omitted the share which belongs to him. (1080)
Art. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person. (1081a)
Title V. - PRESCRIPTION
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 1106. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the
lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by prescription. (1930a)
Art. 1107. Persons who are capable of acquiring property or rights by the other legal
modes may acquire the same by means of prescription.
Minors and other incapacitated persons may acquire property or rights by prescription,
either personally or through their parents, guardians or legal representatives. (1931a)
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:
(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or
other legal representatives;
(2) Absentees who have administrators, either appointed by them before their
disappearance, or appointed by the courts;
(3) Persons living abroad, who have managers or administrators;
(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.
49

Persons who are disqualified from administering their property have a right to
claim damages from their legal representatives whose negligence has been the
cause of prescription. (1932a)
Art. 1109. Prescription does not run between husband and wife, even though there be a
separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements or by judicial decree.
Neither does prescription run between parents and children, during the minority or
insanity of the latter, and between guardian and ward during the continuance of the
guardianship. (n)
Art. 1110. Prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, runs in favor of, or against a married
woman. (n)
Art. 1111. Prescription obtained by a co-proprietor or a co-owner shall benefit the
others. (1933)
Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already
obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future.
Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results
from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired. (1935)
Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. (1936a)
Art. 1114. Creditors and all other persons interested in making the prescription effective
may avail themselves thereof notwithstanding the express or tacit renunciation by the
debtor or proprietor. (1937)
Art. 1115. The provisions of the present Title are understood to be without prejudice to
what in this Code or in special laws is established with respect to specific cases of
prescription. (1938)
Art. 1116. Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the
entire period herein required for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be
applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required. (1939)

CHAPTER 2
PRESCRIPTION OF OWNERSHIP AND OTHER REAL RIGHTS

Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with
just title for the time fixed by law. (1940a)
Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. (1941)
Art. 1119. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere
tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession. (1942)
Art. 1120. Possession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly.
(1943)
Art. 1121. Possession is naturally interrupted when through any cause it should cease
for more than one year.
The old possession is not revived if a new possession should be exercised by the same
adverse claimant. (1944a)
Art. 1122. If the natural interruption is for only one year or less, the time elapsed shall
be counted in favor of the prescription. (n)
Art. 1123. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. (1945a)
Art. 1124. Judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been issued and shall not give
rise to interruption:
(1) If it should be void for lack of legal solemnities;
(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the
proceedings to lapse;
(3) If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
In all these cases, the period of the interruption shall be counted for the
prescription. (1946a)
50

Art. 1125. Any express or tacit recognition which the possessor may make of the
owner's right also interrupts possession. (1948)
Art. 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary prescription of
ownership or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice of a third person, except in
virtue of another title also recorded; and the time shall begin to run from the recording
of the latter.
As to lands registered under the Land Registration Act, the provisions of that special law
shall govern. (1949a)
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. (1950a)
Art. 1128. The conditions of good faith required for possession in Articles 526, 527, 528,
and 529 of this Code are likewise necessary for the determination of good faith in the
prescription of ownership and other real rights. (1951)
Art. 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right. (n)
Art. 1130. The title for prescription must be true and valid. (1953)
Art. 1131. For the purposes of prescription, just title must be proved; it is never
presumed. (1954a)
Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for
four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted possession
for eight years, without need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of which he
has been illegally deprived, as well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale,
fair, or market, or from a merchant's store the provisions of Articles 559 and 1505 of
this Code shall be observed. (1955a)
Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired through
prescription by the offender. (1956a)
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years. (1957a)
Art. 1135. In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less
than that expressed in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession. (n)
Art. 1136. Possession in wartime, when the civil courts are not open, shall not be
counted in favor of the adverse claimant.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith. (1959a)
Art. 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules shall
be observed:
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription
by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest;
(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a
previous time, has continued to be in possession during the intervening time,
unless there is proof to the contrary;
(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (1960a)
CHAPTER 3
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS

Art. 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. (1961)
Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the
possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by
prescription for a less period, according to Articles 1132, and without prejudice to the
provisions of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133. (1962a)
Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights by prescription. (1963)
Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years. (1964a)
51

Art. 1143. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this Code, are not
extinguished by prescription:
(1) To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;
(2) To bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance. (n)
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)
Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (n)
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one
(1) year. (As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)
Art. 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
(1) For forcible entry and detainer;
(2) For defamation. (n)
Art. 1148. The limitations of action mentioned in Articles 1140 to 1142, and 1144 to
1147 are without prejudice to those specified in other parts of this Code, in the Code of
Commerce, and in special laws. (n)
Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws
must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n)
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.
(1969)
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the
enforcement of obligations to pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last
payment of the annuity or of the interest. (1970a)
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation
declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final. (1971)
Art. 1153. The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs from the
day the persons who should render the same cease in their functions.
The period for the action arising from the result of the accounting runs from the date
when said result was recognized by agreement of the interested parties. (1972)
Art. 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event
from enforcing his right is not reckoned against him. (n)
Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court,
when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. (1973a)
1. BAUTISTA V BAUTISTA 529 SCRA 187 CJ NARVASA
Mom dies intestate. Leaving land to husband and 5 children.
Dad and 4 of the kids execute a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, with dad waiving
his share.
o Leaving out 1 brother. (petitioner)
Turns out, one sister is conning them all. She had her 2 sisters sign a deed of
absolute sale, naming her as owner-buyer.
Then subsequently sells the property to 3
rd
person.
52

RTC hears case and declared void the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition Both Deeds of
Absolute Sale and the subsequent TCTs.
CA: Reverses due to prescription.
SC: CA wrong. No extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition
was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for
the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years.
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to
have it annulled does not prescribe.
Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to
Teofilos co-heirs.

FACTS:
Teodora Rosario was the owner parcel of land (the property) in Poblacion,
Pangasinan.
She died intestate on January 19, 1970, leaving behind:
o Her spouse Isidro Bautista (Isidro) and five children.
Isidro and four of his five children executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the
property, which Isidro waived his share in favor of his said four children.
o Teofilo (a son of the couple) was excluded from the partition.
Alegria and Angelica, who, under the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, acquired of
the property, allegedly sold the same, to their sibling Pacita.
o Pacita obtained TCT
Pacita then sold the property to Cesar Tamondong.
Petitioner Teofilo, filed a Complaint against his siblings and their heirs (some sibs
died) for annulment of documents, partition, recovery of ownership, possession
and damages.
o Claimed that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of the
property
o That the deed of sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar Tamondong was
fictitious as it was impossible for her to have executed the same in Manila,
she being already seriously ill at the time.
Alegria and Angelica claimed that it was Pacita who caused the execution of the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
o Because they trusted Pacita, they signed the document without
scrutinizing it;
o That they learned about the contents of the partition only upon Teofilos
filing of the Complaint.
o Pacita approached Angelica and Alegria to borrow their share in the
property on her representation that it would be used as security for a
business loan; and that agreeing to accommodate Pacita, Angelica and
Alegria signed a document which Pacita prepared which turned out to be
the deed of absolute sale in Pacitas favor.
RTC: Declared void the
o Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
o Both Deeds of Absolute Sale
o TCT of Tamondong
Ordering the partition of the land in question among the compulsory heirs.
CA: Reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and dismissed Teofilos
complaint on the ground of prescription. (4 yrs. Fraud, or 10 yrs. Reconveyance; but
it has been 12 yrs.)
ISSUES:
W/N the action has prescribed? NO!
RATIO:

The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilos co-heirs was invalid, however. So
Segura v. Segura instructs:
o x x x The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six
of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule, no extra-judicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect
the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that
their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years.
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to
have it annulled does not prescribe.
Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to
Teofilos co-heirs.
Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of of the property to
Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of of the property to Cesar
Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet.
2. REYES V RTC OF MAKATI BR. 142 561 SCRA 593 JP ORTIZ
ER: Pedro(father) Anastacia (mother), Oscar (son), and Pedro (son) owned shares of
stock of Zenith Insurance. Pedro died and his estate was judicially partitioned among his
heirs. Anastacia subsequently died. Anastacias estate (included shareholdings in Zenith)
had not been partitioned. Rodrigo learned that the shareholdings of Anastacia were
fraudulently transferred to Oscar. Rodrigo and Zenith filed a derivative suit to obtain an
accounting of the assets of Zenith and to determine shares of stocks appropriated by
Oscar for himself. Oscar denied the allegations and challenged the jurisdiction of RTC
(initially the SEC, prior to transfer of jurisdiction made by RA 8799) as a special
commercial court since the action pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia.
ISSUE: whether the RTC as a special commercial court has jurisdiction. (NO)
Held:
53

The court mentioned that to be cognizable, the action must involve an intra-corporate
controversy. The Court found that Rodrigos action is based on successional rights and
not of those of a stockholder. Therefore, the action is not an intra-corporate controversy.
In summary, the RTC, as special commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear
Rodrigos complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution
of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigos proper
remedy is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Anastacia Reyes.
COMPLETE
Facts: Oscar and Rodrigo are two of four children of spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes.
Each of foregoing mentioned owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation
(Zenith). Pedro died in 1963 and his estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs.
However, there appears to be no partition of Anastacias estate that included Zenith
stocks in dispute herein when she died in 1993.
Rodrigo discovered that by some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their
deceased mother (Anastacia) valued in the corporate books at P7,699,934.28,
more or less, had been transferred solely in the name of Oscar.
Zenith and Rodrigo filed with the SEC against Oscar a complaint denominated as
derivative suit to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith and to
determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated by Oscar for himself. Oscar then filed his Answer with Counterclaim
denying the charges and asserted that he purchased said stocks. He further averred that
is not a bona fide derivative suit as it lacks requites thereof and also questioned the
SECs jurisdiction since the action pertains to the settlement of Anastacias estate
settlement.
Meanwhile, R.A.8799 took effect and the SECs exclusive and original jurisdiction was
transferred to the RTC that would now act as a special commercial court. Hence, the
records of Rodrigos SEC case were turned over to the RTC. Oscar then filed a motion to
declare complaint as nuisance or harassment suit as well as citing his previous
arguments in his Answer at the SEC that it is not a derivate suit nor does the RTC as a
special commercial court have jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion in part. It held
that a reading of the Complaint disclosed the presence of two (2) causes of action, a) a
derivative suit in to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith and b)to
determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses. The latter action is denied and
should threshed out in a petition for settlement of estate while the first one is under the
cognizance of the RTC.
Oscar then went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
.
The
appellate court affirmed the RTCs decision. It likewise denied his motion for
reconsideration. He now comes before the SC on appeal through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: W/N the RTC sitting as a special commercial court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint (NO)
Held: Paragraph A: Fraudulent devices and schemes
The standard used to determine if jurisdiction is conferred in the RTC as a special
commercial court is enunciated in Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court. It
provides that all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake must be stated with particularity. Tested against this, the court held that the
charges of fraud in Rodrigos complaint were not properly supported by the required
factual allegations. The allegations therein are not particular enough to bring the
controversy within the special commercial court's jurisdiction; they are not statements
of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged
appropriation of shares can be characterized as illegal and fraudulent were not
explained nor elaborated on.
Paragraph B: Intra-Corporate Controversy
The court cited previous jurisprudence that established a two-tier test to determine
whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy. In such a test, two elements
must concur: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy. The first element requires that the
controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or
all of the parties and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates,
respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State
insofar as it concerns their individual franchise. The second element requires that the
dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the
corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in
character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.
The first element involves the relationship test. In this case, Rodrigo holds stocks in
two capacities: in his own name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia. What is
material in resolving this case is Rodrigos interest as an heir. Being only an heir
the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between the
parties involved does not bind the corporation and third parties. Settlement of the
estate must first occur before succession can bind the corporation. Furthermore,
the transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation to make the
transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to recognition. Without proving these
Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, his
complaint fails the intra-corporate relationship test.
As for the second element that involves nature of controversy test, it is to be determined
54

by the body of the complaint and not merely its title. The courts examination of the
complaint yields the conclusion that the complaint is about the protection and
enforcement of successional rights. The controversy it presents is purely civil
rather than corporate, although it is entitled complaint for accounting of all
corporate funds and assets. Moreover, contrary to the findings of both the trial and
appellate courts, the SC only finds one cause of action. The main action is for
determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses allegedly taken by Oscar,
its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these shares to the parties
brothers and sisters. The derivative suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the
corporation is then only incidental to this. Hence, Rodrigo, in filing the complaint, is
enforcing his rights as a co-heir and not as a stockholder of Zenith. The injury he
also seeks to remedy is one suffered by an heir and not by the corporation nor by
Rodrigo as a shareholder on record. Thus, the RTC acting as a special commercial
court has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a
deceased.
As for the matter of the derivative suit, Rodrigos complaint has not complied with its
requisites. First, he is not a shareholder, he only stands as a transferee-heir whose right
to the shares are inchoate and unrecorded. Second, Paragraph 8 of his complaint does
not satisfy the requirement of exhaustion of remedies within the corporate setting.
Finally, the damage pointed out is not to the corporation but to his co-heirs nor is there
any wrongdoing against the corporation.
In summary, the RTC, as special commercial court has no jurisdiction to hear
Rodrigos complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution
of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigos proper
remedy is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Anastacia Reyes.

06 Succession With Charts

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06 Succession With Charts

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06 Week. Succession. ALS 3C. 2013. Justice Hofilena.

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