1

ARBITRARY DETENTION ( ART. 124)

ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 154130)
Facts: On September 1, 1997, a team was sent to the isl and of Daram, Western Samar to
conduct intel li gence gatheri ng and forest protection operations i n l i ne with the government s
campai gn agai nst i l l egal l ogging.
Upon investi gati on of the group, Mayor Astorga was found t o be the owner of two boats. A
heated altercati on ensued and Mayor Astorga call ed for reinforcements. Ten armed men
arri ved i n t he scene. The offended parti es were then brought t o Mayor Astorgas house where
they had dinner and drinks and left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian were al lowed t o go down
from the house, but not t o leave the barangay. On the other hand, SPO3 Ci nco and the rest
j ust sat i n the house unti l 2:00 a.m. when t he team was final l y al l owed to leave.1awphi 1.nt
Issue: Whether Mayor Astorga i s gui l t y of arbi trar y detenti on.
Held: Yes. Mayor Astorga i s gui lt y of arbi trary detention. Arbitrar y Detenti on i s committed by
any publ ic officer or employee who, wi thout l egal grounds, detai ns a person.The el ements of
the crime are:
1. That the off ender i s a public officer or empl oyee.
2. That he detai ns a person.
3. That the detention i s without l egal grounds.
In t he case at bar, t he restrai nt resulti ng from fear i s evi dent. Inspi te of their pl eas, t he
wi tnesses and t he compl ainants were not al lowed by petitioner t o go home. This refusal was
quickl y fol lowed by the cal l for and arri val of almost a dozen "reinforcements," al l armed wi th
militar y-issue rifl es, who proceeded t o encircl e t he team, weapons poi nted at the
complai nants and the witnesses. Gi ven such circumstances, we gi ve credence to SPO1
Capoqui ans statement that i t was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga s orders. I t was not j ust
the presence of the armed men, but also the evi dent effect these gunmen had on the actions
of the team which proves that fear was i ndeed insti l led i n t he minds of the team members, to
the extent that they felt compel l ed t o stay i n Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The i ntent t o prevent t he
departure of the compl ai nants and wi tnesses against their wi ll i s thus cl ear.

CAYAO vs. DEL MUNDO ( A.M. No. MTJ-93-813)
Facts: An administrati ve compl ai nt was fi led by Cayao chargi ng Judge del Mundo wi th abuse
of authorit y.
A bus dri ven by the complai nant almost col li ded head-on with an owner-t ype j eepney owned
by Judge del Mundo. Compl ai nant was picked up by pol icemen and immedi atel y brought
before the sal a of the respondent j udge where he was confronted by the latter. Without gi vi ng
complai nant any opportuni t y to expl ain, respondent j udge insisted that compl ai nant be
punished for t he inci dent. Whereupon, complai nant was compel l ed by respondent j udge to
choose from three (3) al ternati ve punishments none of which i s pl easant, t o wit: (a) to face a
charge of multipl e attempted homicide; (b) revocati on of his dri ver' s l i cense; or (c) to be put i n
j ai l for three (3) days. Of the three choices, complai nant chose the third, i . e., conf inement for
three (3) days, as a consequence of which he was forced t o si gn a "wai ver of detention" by
respondent j udge. Thereafter, compl ainant was immedi atel y escorted by pol icemen to the
2

munici pal j ai l . Though not actuall y i ncarcerated compl ainant remai ned i n t he premises of t he
munici pal j ai l for three (3) days W
Issue: Whether or not respondent j udge is gui lt y of the charge of warrantless arrest and
arbitrar y detenti on.
Held: The actuati ons of respondent j udge herei n complai ned of, consti tute abuse of authori ty.
While i t i s true that complai nant was not put behi nd bare as respondent had intended,
however, compl ainant was not al lowed to leave the premises of the j ail house. The idea of
confi nement i s not synonymous only wi th i ncarcerati on inside a j ai l cel l. It i s enough to qual if y
as confi nement that a man be restrained, ei ther moral l y or physical l y, of his personal li bert y.
Under the circumstances, respondent j udge was i n fact gui lt y of arbitrar y detenti on when he,
as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detenti on of complainant wi thout l egal grounds. In
overtaking another vehicl e, compl ainant-dri ver was not committing or had not actual l y
committed a crime i n the presence of respondent j udge. Such bei ng the case, the warrantless
arrest and subsequent detenti on of complai nant were i l legal .
It woul d be wel l to emphasi ze at this poi nt that the gravit y of the misconduct of respondent i s
not al one centered on his order for the detention of compl ai nant. Rather, i t i s i ngrai ned i n t he
fact that complai nant was so detained wi thout affordi ng him his consti tuti onal ri ghts.
















3

MILO vs. SALANGA (G.R. No. L-37007)
Facts: On t he 21st day of April 1973, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captai n, with t he ai d
of some other pri vate persons, namel y Juan Tuvera, Jr., Berti ll o Bataoi l and one Di anong,
maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitti ng wi th butts of their guns and fists bl ows and
immedi atel y thereafter, without l egal grounds, with deli berate intent t o deprive sai d Armando
Val dez of his constitutional l iberty, accused Barri o captai n Juan Tuvera, Sr. , Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of t he pol ice force of Mangsat, Pangasinan
conspiri ng, confederati ng and hel ping one another, di d, then and there, wi l lful ly, unlawful l y
and fel oni ously, lodge and l ock said Armando Valdez i nside the munici pal j ai l of Manaoag,
Pangasi nan for about eleven (11) hours.
Tuvera fi l ed a moti on t o quash the i nformati on on the ground that the facts charged do not
consti tute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investi gation are not sufficient t o
support the fil i ng of the informati on. Peti ti oner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Mi lo fi led
an opposition thereto.
Issue: Whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barri o captai n i s a publ ic officer who can be l i abl e for the
crime of Arbitrar y Detention.
Held: The publ ic officers l iable for Arbi trar y Detenti on must be vested wi th authorit y t o detain
or order t he detenti on of persons accused of a crime. Such publ ic of ficers are the pol icemen
and other agents of the l aw, t he j udges or mayors.
Long before Presi denti al Decree 299 was si gned into l aw, barrio l ieutenants (who were l ater
named barri o captains and now barangay captai ns) were recogni zed as persons i n authorit y.
In various cases, the Court deemed them as persons i n authori t y, and convicted them of
Arbi trar y Detenti on.
One need not be a pol i ce officer to be chargeabl e with Arbitrar y Detenti on. I t i s accepted that
other publ ic officers l ike j udges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functi ons, may be
gui lt y of this crime. A perusal of the powers and functi on vested i n mayors woul d show that
they are simi lar t o those of a barrio captain except that i n the case of the l atter, his territorial
j urisdiction i s smal ler. Having the same dut y of maintaini ng peace and order, both must be
and are gi ven the authorit y to detai n or order detention. Noteworthy i s the fact that even
pri vate respondent Tuvera himself admitted that wi th t he ai d of his rural police, he as a barri o
captain, coul d have l ed the arrest of peti ti oner Val dez.
From the foregoi ng, there i s no doubt that a barri o captain, l ike pri vate respondent Tuvera,
Sr., can be hel d l iable for Arbi trar y Detenti on.







4

DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS ( ART. 125)
PEOPLE vs. GARCI A (G.R. No. 126252)
Facts: On November 28, 1994, Enmodi as and SPO3 Panganiban boarded a passenger
j eepney from their to Bagui o Ci t y. He took the seat behi nd the j eepney dri ver whil e SPO3
Panganiban sat opposite him. Accused Garcia boarded and sat beside the dri ver. The
pol icemen smel l ed mari j uana which seemed to emanate from accused' s bag. To confirm their
suspici on, they deci ded to foll ow accused when he gets off the j eepney.
The pol icemen fol l owed the accused and later on i dentifi ed themsel ves to him and asked the
latter if they can inspect his bag. Upon surrender of the bag, bri cks of marij uana were
discovered. As a consequence, the accused was arrested and the bag sei zed.

The next day, the pol icemen executed their j oint affidavit of arrest and transferred t he
accused t o the Bagui o cit y j ai l . Verif icati on by the arresting officers of the records at the
Narcotics Command revealed that t he accused' s name was i n the l ist of drug dealers.
Issue: Whether the pol ice officers were gui lt y of arbitrar y detenti on and del ay i n the deli very
of detai ned persons.
Held: The pol ice officers cannot be hel d l iabl e for arbitraril y detai ni ng appell ant at the CIS
office. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penal i zes a publ ic officer who
shal l detain another for some legal ground and fai l t o del iver him to the proper authoriti es for
36 hours for crimes punishabl e by afflicti ve or capi tal penalti es. I n the present case, the
record bears that appel l ant was arrested for possessi on of fi ve (5) kilos of marij uana on
November 28, 1994 at 2 p.m., a crime punishable with reclusi on perpetua to death. He was
detai ned for further investigati on and del i vered by t he arresti ng officers to the court i n the
afternoon of t he next day. Cl earl y, t he detenti on of appel lant for purposes of i nvestigati on di d
not exceed the duration al lowed by law, i . e. , 36 hours from the time of his arrest.












5

AGBAY vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (G.R. No. 134503)
Facts: On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwi n Jugal bot, was
arrested and detained at the Li l oan Pol ice Stati on, Metro Cebu for an al leged viol ation of R.A.
7610. The fol l owing day, or on September 8, 1997, a Complai nt for viol ati on of R.A. 7610 was
fil ed agai nst petiti oner and Jugalbot.
Counsel for petitioner wrote the Chi ef of Pol ice of Lil oan demandi ng the immediate release of
peti tioner consi deri ng that t he latter had "fai l ed t o del i ver the detai ned Jasper Agbay t o the
proper j udicial authori ty wi thi n thirt y-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997."

Pri vate
respondents di d not act on this letter and conti nued t o detai n petitioner.
Petitioner fi led a compl ai nt for delay i n t he del i ver y of detained persons agai nst herei n pri vate
respondents SPO4 Nemesio Nati vidad, Jr., SPO2 El eazar M. Sal omon and other unidentifi ed
pol ice officers stationed at the Li loan Police Substati on, before t he Office of the Deput y
Ombudsman for the Visayas.
Issue: Whether the fil ing of the complai nt wi th the Munici pal Tri al Court constitutes to a
"proper j udici al authori ty" as contempl ated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: Art. 125 of the RPC is i ntended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person
wi thout i nforming him of his offense and wi thout permitting him to go on bai l

. More
specifical l y, it punishes publ ic offici als or empl oyees who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shal l fai l to del i ver such person to the proper j udici al authorities wi thi n the
peri ods prescri bed by l aw. The conti nued detenti on of the accused becomes i l legal upon the
expiration of the peri ods provi ded for by Art. 125 without such detainee havi ng been deli vered
to the corresponding j udici al authori ties.
The words "j udici al authori t y" as contempl ated by Art. 125 mean "the courts of j ustices or
j udges of sai d courts vested wi th j udici al power to order the temporar y detenti on or
confi nement of a person charged with havi ng committed a publ ic offense, that is, the Supreme
Court and other such i nferior courts as may be establ ished by l aw.


The power t o order the rel ease or confi nement of an accused i s determinati ve of the issue. I n
contrast with a cit y f iscal, i t i s undisputed that a munici pal court j udge, even i n the
performance of his functi on to conduct prel iminar y investigati ons, retains the power t o issue
an order of release or commitment. Furthermore, upon the fil i ng of the complai nt with the
Munici pal Trial Court, the intent behi nd Art. 125 i s satisfied consi dering that by such act, t he
detai ned person i s i nformed of the crime imputed agai nst him and, upon his appl icati on with
the court, he may be rel eased on bai l. Petitioner himself acknowl edged this power of the
MCTC to order his rel ease when he appl i ed f or and was granted his rel ease upon posti ng bai l.
Thus, the ver y purpose underl yi ng Article 125 has been dul y served with t he fi li ng of the
complai nt with the MCTC. We agree wi th t he postion of the Ombudsman that such fil i ng of the
complai nt wi th t he MCTC interrupted the peri od prescribed i n sai d Articl e.












6

REBELLION ( ART. 134)

PEOPLE vs. SILONGAN ( G.R. No. 137182 )
Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Al exander Sal daa went to Sul tan Kudarat wi th
three other men t o meet a certain Macapagal Si longan al i as Commander Lambada. They
arri ved i n the morni ng and were abl e t o talk t o Macapagal concerni ng t he gold nuggets that
purportedl y being sold by the l atter. The busi ness transacti on was postponed and conti nued
i n t he afternoon due t o the death of Macapagal s relati ve and that he has to pick his brother i n
Cotabato Ci t y.
Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the hi ghway, Macapagal ordered the dri ver t o
stop. Suddenl y, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three compani ons were ordered
to go out of the vehicl e, they were tied up, and bli ndfol ded. Macapagal and Teddy were also
ti ed and bl indfolded, but nothi ng more was done t o them. Al exander i dentifi ed all the
abductors i ncl udi ng the brothers of Macapagal.

The four victims were taken t o the mountain hi deout i n Magui ndanao. The kidnappers
demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexanders wife for his release, but the amount was reduced t o
twel ve mil l ion. The victims were then transf erred from one place to another. They made
Alexander wri te a letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several occasi ons, a person named
Mayangkang himself woul d wri te t o Al exanders wife. The two other victims managed t o
escape but Al exander was rel eased after payment of ransom. The tri al court convicted
Macapagal and his compani ons of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom wit h Serious Ill egal
Detention.
Issue: Whether t he cri me committed was t he crime rebel li on and not kidnappi ng.
Held: Merel y because i t i s all eged that appell ants were members of the Moro Islami c
Li berati on Front or of the Moro Nati onal Li beration Front does not necessari l y mean that t he
crime of kidnappi ng was committed i n furtherance of a rebel li on. Here, the evidence adduced
i s insuffici ent for a findi ng that the crime committed was pol itical l y moti vated. Neither have
the appel l ants sufficientl y proven thei r all egati on that the present case was f il ed against them
because they are rebel surrenderees. This court has invari abl y vi ewed the defense of frame-
up with disfavor. Like the defense of al ibi , i t can be j ust as easi l y concocted.

PEOPLE vs. LOVEDORIO (G.R. No. 112235)
Facts: Off -dut y pol iceman SPO3 Jesus Luci lo was walking al ong a street when a man
suddenl y walked besi de him aimed the gun at the pol iceman' s right ear and fired. The man
who shot Luci l o had three other compani ons with him, one of whom shot the fal len pol iceman
four times as he l ay on the ground.
Luci lo di ed on the same day of massive blood loss from multipl e gunshot wounds on the face,
the chest, and other parts of the body.


Accused-appell ant was found by the tri al court gui lt y beyond reasonabl e doubt for the crime
of murder.

Issue: Whether accused-appel lant is guil t y of murder or of rebel li on.

Held: The crime committed by the appell ant is murder and not rebel l i on. The gravamen of the
crime of rebell i on is an armed publ ic uprising against the government.

By its ver y nature,
rebell i on is essenti al l y a crime of masses or multi tudes i nvol ving crowd acti on, which cannot
be conf ined a priori wi thi n predetermi ned bounds.

One aspect noteworthy i n the commission
7

of rebell i on is that other acts committed i n i ts pursuance are, by l aw, absorbed i n the cri me
itself because they acquire a pol i tical character.

In deci ding if the crime committed is rebel l i on, not murder, it becomes imperati ve for our
courts to ascertai n whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a poli tical end. The
pol itical moti ve of the act shoul d be concl usi vel y demonstrated. In such cases, the burden of
demonstrati ng pol itical motive fal ls on the def ense, moti ve, bei ng a state of mind which the
accused, better than any i ndi vidual , knows.

Cl earl y, pol i tical moti ve shoul d be establ ished before a person charged with a common crime
al leging rebel l ion i n order to l essen the possibl e imposabl e penal ty coul d benef it from
the law' s relati vel y beni gn attitude towards pol i tical crimes.

PEOPLE vs. DASIG (G.R. No. 100231)
Facts: In 1987, two teams of pol ice officers, tasked to conduct survei l lance on a suspected
safehouse of members of the sparrow unit, saw the group of Dasi g tr yi ng to escape. The
pol ice captured them and confiscated the guns and ammuni tions.

Dasig confessed that he and the group ki ll ed Pfc. Manatad. He l ikewise admitted that he and
a certai n Nunes were members of the sparrow uni t and their al iases were Armand and
mabi respecti vel y.

Dasig contended that the procedure by which his extraj udici al confession was taken was
legal l y defecti ve and contrar y to the his constitutional ri ghts. He further contended that
assuming he conspired in the kil l i ng of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of
simple rebel l ion and not murder with direct assault.
Issue: Whether appel lant is gui l t y of simpl e rebel li on or of murder wi th direct assaul t.
Held: What the appel l ant committed was a pol i tical crime of simpl e rebel li on, and hence he
shoul d not be convicted of murder with direct assault.
The crime of rebell i on consists of many acts. It i s a vast movement of men and a compl ex net
of intrigues and plots. Acts committed i n furtherance of rebel l ion though crimes i n themsel ves
are deemed absorbed i n one single crime of rebell i on. 9 The act of kil li ng a pol ice officer,
knowi ng too wel l that the victim i s a person i n authori t y i s a mere component or ingredient of
rebell i on or an act done i n furtherance of the rebell i on. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge.

ENRILE vs. AMIN (G.R. No. 93335)
Facts: Together wi th the fi l ing of an i nformati on charging Enri l e as having committed rebel l ion
complexed wi th murder, government prosecutors fi led another i nformation chargi ng him for
viol ation of PD No. 1829. The second informati on reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmari as Vil l age, Makati, Metro Mani l a
and wi thi n the j urisdi cti on of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, havi ng
reasonabl e ground to bel ieve or suspect that Ex-Col . Gregori o "Gringo" Honasan has
committed a crime, did then and ther e unlawf ul l y, feloniousl y, wi l lful l y and knowi ngl y obstruct,
impede, frustrate or del ay the apprehensi on of sai d Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gri ngo" Honasan by
harbori ng or conceal ing him in his house.
8


Petitioner fil ed a motion for reconsi derati on and to Quash/Dismiss the i nformati on (second
information) on the ground that the pendi ng charge of rebel l ion compl exed wi th murder and
frustrated murder agai nst Enri l e as al l eged co-conspirator of Col . Honosan, on the basis of
their all eged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecuti on of the Senator for
harbouring or conceal i ng the Col onel on the same occasi on under PD 1829. However, thi s
motion was deni ed.
Issue: Whether or not the peti tioner coul d be separatel y charged for viol ati on of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebel l ion case earl ier fi led against him.
Held: No, Enri le could not be separatel y charged for viol ation of PD 1829.
The rej ecti on of both options shapes and determines the primary rul ing of the Court, which
that Hernandez remai ns bi ndi ng doctrine operating to prohibit the complexi ng of rebel l ion wi th
any other offense commi tted on the occasion thereof, ei ther as a means to i ts commissi on or
as an uni ntended effect of an activity that commutes rebel l ion.
This doctrine is appl icabl e in t he case at bar. If a person cannot be charged wi th the compl ex
crime of rebel l ion for the greater penal t y to be appl i ed, neither can he be charged separatel y
for two (2) different offenses where one is a consti tuti ve or component el ement or committed
in furtherance of rebel l i on.
The crime of rebell i on consists of many acts. It is descri bed as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of i ntrigues and plots. Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed i n furtherance
of the rebel li on though crimes in themsel ves ar e deemed absorbed i n the one single crime of
rebell i on. In this case, the act of harboring or conceali ng Col . Honasan is clearl y a mere
component or i ngredi ent of rebel li on or an act done in furtherance of the rebel li on. It cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.

PONCE ENRILE VS. SALAZAR (G.R. NO. 92163)
Facts: I n the afternoon of Februar y 27, 1990, Senate Minorit y Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enri l e
was arrested by l aw enforcement officers l ed by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon Cit y Branch 103 i n
Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information si gned and earl ier that day fi l ed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Seni or State Prosecutor Aurel i o C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdi nand R. Abesamis and Assistant Ci t y Prosecutor Eul ogi o Mananqui l Jr., chargi ng
Senator Enri l e, the spouses Rebecco and Erl inda Panli l i o, and Gregori o Honasan wi th t he
crime of rebel l ion wi th murder and multi pl e frustrated murder al l egedl y committed duri ng the
peri od of t he fai led coup attempt from November 29 t o December 10, 1990.
Senator Enri l e was taken to and hel d overnight at t he NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manil a, wi thout bai l, none havi ng been recommended i n the i nformation and none fixed i n the
arrest warrant. The fol lowi ng morni ng, Februar y 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Kari ngal i n Quezon City where he was gi ven over t o the custody of the Superi ntendent of the
Northern Pol ice District, Bri g. Gen. Edgardo Dul a Torres.
9

On the same date of Februar y 28, 1990, Senator enril e, through counsel , fi l ed a peti ti on for
habeas corpus herein (which was foll owed by a supplemental peti ti on filed on March 2, 1990),
al l egi ng that he was depri ved of his consti tuti onal ri ghts.
Issue: Whether the peti ti oner has committed complex crimes (del i to compel i o) arisi ng from an
offense bei ng a necessar y for committi ng another which i s referred t o i n the second cl ause of
Art. 48 of t he RPC.
Held: There i s one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the RPC
cannot be appl ied i n t he case at bar. If murder were not compl exed wi th rebel l i on, and t he two
crimes were punished separatel y (assuming that this could be done), the fol l owing penalti es
woul d be imposable upon the movant namel y; (1) for the crime of rebel l ion, a fi ne not
exceedi ng P20,000 and prision mayor, i n the correspondi ng peri od, dependi ngupon t he
modif yi ng circumstances present, but never exceedi ng 12 years of pri sion mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusi on temporal i n its maximum peri od t o death, dependi ng upon the
modi f yi ng circumstances present.
In other words, i n the absence of aggravati ng circumstances, the extreme penal t y could not
be imposed upon him. However, Art. 48 said penal ty coul d not have to be meted out to hi m,
even i n the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, sai d provisi on, i f construed
i n conformit y wi th the theor y of the prosecuti on, would be unfavorabl e t o the movant.
The plaint of petiti oners counsel that he i s charged with a crime that does not exist i n the
statute books, whi le technical l y correct so far as the Court has rul ed that rebel l ion may not be
complexed wi th other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhethoric. Read i n the context of Hernandez, t he i nformati on
does indeed charge t he peti ti oner with a cri me defi ned and punished by t he RPC; simple
rebell i on.
Petitioner finall y claims that he was deni ed the ri ght t o bai l . I n the l i ght of the Court s
reaffirmati on of Hernandez as appl icable t o peti ti oners case, and of the l ogical and necessar y
corol lar y that the information agai nst him shoul d be consi dered as charging onl y the crime of
simple rebel l ion, which i s bai l abl e before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
propositi on. But t he questi on remai ns: Gi ven the f acts from which this case arose, was a
peti tion for habeas corpus i n this Court the appropri ate vehicl e for asserti ng a ri ght or
vindicati ng its deni al? The criminal case before t he respondent Judge was the normal venue
for invoking the petitioners right to have provisi onal li ber y pending tri al and j udgment. The
ori ginal j urisdiction to grant or deny bai l rested with sai d respondent. The correct course was
for petitioner t o invoke that j urisdiction by fi l ing peti ti on t o be admitted t o bai l, cl aiming a right
to bai l per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence agai nst him. Onl y after that remedy
was deni ed by the trial court shoul d the revi ew j urisdiction of this Court have been invoked,
and even then, not without first appl yi ng to the Court of Appeals i f appropriate rel ief was also
avai lable there.
The Court rei terates that based on the doctrine enunci ated i n Peopl e vs Hernandez, the
questioned i nformati on filed against petiti oners Juan Ponce Enri l e and the spouses Rebecco
and Erl inda Panli l i o must be read as chargi ng simple rebel l ion onl y, hence sai d petiti oners are
enti tled t o bai l, before final convicti on, as a matter of right. The Courts earl ier grant bail t o
peti tioners bei ng merel y provisi onal i n character, t he proceedi ngs i n both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge t o fix t he amount of bai l t o be posted by the peti tioners.
10

Once bai l i s fixed by sai d respondent for any of the peti ti oners, the correspondi ng bai l bond
fil ed with this Court shal l become functus oficio.

PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ (G.R. NO. L-6025)
Facts: This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the j udgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Mani l a, Hon. Agusti n P. Montesa, presi ding, in its Criminal Case No.
15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al ., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs.
Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for
Rebel l ion with Mul ti pl e Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The appel lants are Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodil l as and Jul ian
Lumanog; Aqui l ino Bunsol, Adri ano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those
sentenced i n the j udgment appealed from, but they have wi thdrawn their appeal . In Criminal
Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebel li on with murders, ar sons and
kidnappi ngs. The accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Val eri o and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they al l
appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. wi thdrew his appeal .
A j oi nt trial of both cases was hel d, after which the court rendered the decision subj ect of the
present appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants-appel ants are l iable for the crime of conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebel l ion or i nsurrecti on under Art. 136 of the RPC?
Held: The court found defendants-appel lants Hernandez, member of the Communist Part y of
the Phil i ppi nes, Presi dent of the Congress of Labor Organi zations (CLO), had cl ose
connecti ons with the Secretariat of the Communist Part y and hel d continuous communications
wi th i ts l eaders and its members, and others, gui lt y as pri ncipal of the crime charged against
him and sentenced hi m to suffer the penalty of recl usion perpetua with the accessori es
provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
In the testimonies shown i n court, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP l eaders used to
send notes to appel lant Hernandez, who in turn issued press rel eases for which he found
space i n the local papers. His acts in this respect bel ong to the categor y of propaganda, to
which he appears to have limited his acti ons as a Communist.
However, i n their appeal , defendants-appel lants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado
Racanday and Genaro de l a Cruz are absol ved from the charges contained in the i nformati on,
wi th their proporti onate share of the costs de oficio.
But other def endants-appel l ants, namel y, Jul i an Lumanog and Fermin Rodil l as, Bayani
Espiritu and Teopista Val erio were found gui lt y of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebel l i on,
as defi ned and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and ever yone of
them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twent y-one
days of prision correcci onal, and to pay a fi ne of P5,000.00, with subsidi ar y imprisonment i n
case of insolvency and to pay their proporti onal share of the costs.
Advocacy of Communism put into Action
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theor y and pri ncipl e is not to be consi dered as
a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted i nto an advocacy of acti on. In
the ver y nature of things, mere advocacy of a theor y or princi pl e i s insuffici ent unless the
communist advocates action, immediate and posi ti ve, the actual agreement to start an
uprising or rebel l ion or an agreement forged to use force and viol ence i n an uprising of the
working class to overthrow constituted authorit y and sei ze the rei ns of Government i tself .
11

Unless acti on is actual l y advocated or i ntended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere
theorist, merel y holdi ng bel i ef in the supremacy of the proletari at a Communist does not yet
advocate the sei zi ng of the rei ns of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet
actual l y consi dered as engagi ng in the criminal fiel d subj ect to punishment. Onl y when the
Communist advocates action and actual uprisi ng, war or otherwise, does he become gui l ty of
conspiracy to commit rebell i on.

PEOPLE VS GERONIMO (G.R. NO. L-8936)
Facts: In an i nformation fi led on June 24, 1954 by the provinci al Fi scal i n the Court of First
Instance of Camari nes Sur, Appell ant Federi co Geronimo, together wi th Mariano P. Bal gos
al i as Bakal al ias Tony, ali as Tony Col l ante al i as Taoic, ali as Mang Paci o, al i as Bonny
Abundi o Romagosa al i as David, Jesus Pol ita al ias Rex, Jesus Lava al ias Jessi e ali as NMT,
al i as Bal bas, al ias Nol i , al i as Nol i Metangere, ali as NKVD, Juan Ocompo ali as Cmdr.
Bundal ian, al ias Tagl e, Rosendo Manuel al ias Cmdr. Sendong, ali as Rui z, Ernesto Herrero
al i as Cmdr. Ed, ali as Rene, al ias Eddy, Santi ago Rotas al ias Cmdr. Jessi e, Fernando Pri nci pe
al i as Cmdr. Mandi ng, Alfredo Saguni al i as Godo, al i as Terry, al i as Terpy, Andres Di apera
al i as Maclang, al ias Berto, al i as Teny, Lorenzo Saniel ali as Wenny, Si l vestre Sisno al i as
Tomo, al i as Al bert, Teodoro Primavera ali as Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas ali as Argos, Vi venci o
Pineda al i as Marquez, Pedro Ani no ali as Fernandez, Mauro Llorera al ias Justo, Richard Doe
al i as Cmdr. Danny and John Doe ali as Cmdr. Beri on, al i as Mayo, al i as Cmdr. Paul i to and
many others, were charged with the complex crime of rebel l ion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappi ng committed.
In Camarines Sur, the above-named accused bei ng then ranking offi cers and/or members of,
or otherwise aff il i ated wi th the Communist Part y of the Phi li ppi nes (CPP) and the Hukbong
Mapagpal aya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the l atter
bei ng the armed force of sai d Communist Party of the Phil i ppi nes (CCP) havi ng come to an
agreement and decide to commit the crime of Rebel l ion, and therefore, conspiri ng together
and confederati ng among themsel ves wi th al l of the thirt y-one accused.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appel l ants committed the crime of rebel li on?
Held: Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not gui lt y to the i nformati on. When
the case was call ed for tri al on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the permissi on of the
court to substitute his origi nal pl ea with one of gui lt y, and was all owed to change his pl ea. On
the basis of the pl ea of gui lt y, the fiscal recommended that the penal ty of life imprisonment be
imposed upon the accused, his voluntar y pl ea of gui lt y being considered as a miti gating
circumstance. Geronimos counsel , on the other hand, argued that the penalt y imposabl e
upon the accused was onl y prision mayor, for the reason that in his opi nion, there is no such
complex crime as rebel li on with murders, robberi es, and kidnappi ng, because the crimes of
murders robberi es, and kidnappi ng bei ng the natural consequences of the crime of rebel l ion,
the crime charged against the accused shoul d be consi dered onl y as simpl e rebel li on. On
October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered j udgment findi ng the accused gui lt y of the compl ex
crime of rebel li on with murders, robberi es, and kidnappi ngs; and gi vi ng him the benefit of the
mitigati ng circumstance of vol untar y plea of gui lt y, sentenced him to suffer the penalt y of
recl usion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnif y the heirs of the various persons
kill ed, as l isted in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proporti onate
costs of the proceedi ngs. From this j udgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raisi ng
the sol e questi on of whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of rebell i on
wi th murders, robberi es, and kidnappi ngs, or si mple rebell i on.

12

However, the decisi on appealed from is modif ied and the accused convicted for the simpl e
(non-compl ex) crime of rebel l ion under articl e 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for
the crime of murder; and considering the miti gati ng effect of his pl ea of gui lt y, the accused-
Appel l ant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prisi on mayor and to
pay a fi ne of P10,000, (wi thout subsi di ar y imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal
Code) for the rebel l ion; and, as above expl ai ned, for the murder, appl yi ng the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to not l ess than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18
years of reclusi on temporal; to i ndemnif y the heirs of Policarpi o Tibay i n the sum of P6,000;
and to pay the costs.






















13

DIRECT ASSAULT (148)
RIVERA vs. PEOPLE ( G.R. No. 138553 )
Facts: On March 20, 1993 Leygo and two others were conducting routinar y patrol on board a
pol ice car when they came upon a truck unloadi ng sacks of chicken dung at t he stall of
accused. Leygo advised the dri ver t o stop unl oading the manure as i t viol ates an ordinance
which prohi bits, among others, the l oadi ng and unl oadi ng of chi cken manure al ong the
sidewalks or road. The dri ver compli ed with the pol ice directi ve. The pol icemen then escorted
the truck back t o Pobl acion, La Tri nidad, Benguet and proceeded t o the police headquarters.
Not l ong after, the two pol icemen were conducti ng patrol when they observed a truck loaded
wi th chicken dung. The two pol icemen fol l owed and stopped the truck and i nformed Leygo
who later on proceeded to the area.
The accused arri ved before the group of Leygo di d and ordered the dri ver not to obey the
pol icemen but i nstead obey him, as he (accused) was the boss. The truck dri ver fol l owed the
accuseds order. A chase ensued and the pol icemen were able to overtake the truck. The
dri ver informed the pol ice that he was j ust fol lowi ng the order of the accused. Accused
al i ghted and was asked why he opted to def y the policemans order. Instead of answeri ng, the
accused pointed a fi nger on the pol iceman and uttered words insulting and unsavor y words
against the pol ice. Leygo cautioned the accused to take it easy and i nformed him that he was
bei ng arrested. The accused, however, answered by assuming a fighti ng stance and later on
punched Leygo on his face.

Issue: Whether the accused is guil t y of direct assault as hel d by the tri al and appell ate
courts.

Held: Yes. Accused is gui lt y of direct assault.
Direct assault, a crime against publ ic order, may be committed i n two ways: first , by any
person or persons who, wi thout a public upri sing, shal l empl oy force or i ntimidati on for t he
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated i n defi ning t he crimes of rebel l i on and sedi tion;
and second, by any person or persons who, wi thout a publ ic uprisi ng, shal l attack, employ
force, or seri ousl y inti midate or resist any person i n authorit y or any of his agents, whi l e
engaged i n the performance of offici al duties, or on occasi on of such performance.
Unquesti onabl y, petiti oners case fal ls under the second mode, whi ch i s the more common
form of assault and i s aggravated when: (a) the assaul t i s committed with a weapon; or (b)
when the offender i s a public officer or employee; or (c) when t he offender l ays hand upon a
person i n authorit y.

PEOPLE vs. ABALOS (G.R. No. 88189)
Facts: The i nci dent transpired duri ng the barangay f iesta near t he house of appel lant at the
sai d barangay. Appel l ant was then havi ng a dri nking session i n front of the shant y of one
Rodulfo Fi gueroa, Jr. which was si tuated j ust a f ew meters from his residence.
Basal, prosecuti on wi tness, sai d that he saw Pol ice Maj or Ceci l i o Abal os, scoldi ng hi s
employees i n his transportati on busi ness. While Maj or Abal os was thus berating his
employees, appel l ant arri ved and asked his father not t o scold them and to j ust l et them take
part i n the barangay festi viti es. This infuri ated the elder Abal os and set off a heated argument
between father and son.
14

While the two were thus quarreli ng, a woman shouted and asked f or help. The victim then
appeared on the scene and asked Maj or Abal os, "What is i t, sir?" The victim sal uted Abal os
when the l atter turned around to face him. As Maj or Abalos l evel ed his carbi ne at the victi m,
appel l ant hurri edl y lef t and procured a pi ece of wood. He then swiftl y returned and
unceremoni ousl y swung with that wooden pi ece at the victim from behind, hitti ng the
pol iceman at the back of the ri ght side of his head. The victim col l apsed unconscious i n a
heap, and he later expi red from the severe skul l fracture he sustained from that blow.

Issue: Whether or not appel l ant was correctl y convicted by the l ower court wi th the complex
crime of direct assault wi th murder.

Held: Yes. The accused is guil t y of direct assaul t with murder. There are two modes of
committi ng atentados contra l a autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebel li on or sedi ti on, except
that there is no publ ic uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way
of committi ng assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or
the offender is a publ ic officer, or the offender l ays hands upon a person i n authorit y.

Appel l ant committed the second form of assault, the el ements of which are that there must be
an attack, use of force, or seri ous i ntimidation or resistance upon a person in authorit y or hi s
agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the
occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person i n authori t y
or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the i ntention to offend, inj ure or assault the
offended part y as a person i n authorit y or an agent of a person in authorit y.

When the assault results in the kil l ing of that agent or of a person in authorit y for that matter,
there arises the compl ex crime of direct assaul t with murder or homici de. The kil l ing i n the
instant case constituted the fel ony of murder qualif ied by al evosi a through treacherous means
del iberatel y adopted Pfc. Labi ne was struck from behi nd whil e he was bei ng confronted at the
same time by appel lant' s father. The evidence shows that appell ant del i beratel y went behi nd
the victim whom he then hi t wi th a piece of wood which he del iberatel y got for that purpose.
Obvi ousl y, appel lant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowi ng full y wel l
that his quarr y was a pol iceman who coul d readi l y mount a defense. The aggravati ng
ci rcumstances of evi dent premeditati on and nocturnit y, however, were not dul y proven, as
correctl y ruled by the court bel ow. On the other hand, appel l ant' s vol untar y surrender even i f
dul y taken into account by the trial court would have been i nconsequential .

PEOPLE vs. DURAL (G.R. No. L-84921)
Facts: On Januar y 31, 1988, whil e t he two prosecution wi tnesses were on their way t o t he
tupadahan, they heard successi ve gunf ires which caused them to run and hide. From the
pl ace they were hi di ng, they saw three armed men firing upon the two Capcom sol di ers. The
three gunmen positioned themselves as to immobil i ze t he two Capcom soldiers. They l eft the
scene after they got t he service pistol and armalite of the Capcom sol diers. Two days after
the incident eyewi tnesses vol untari l y went at the Capcom headquarters at to narrate what
they have witnessed, consequentl y the investi gator brought them at the Capcom headquarters
at Bicutan then at Camp Panopi o Hospi tal . At the sai d hospital , they i dentifi ed one of the
three gunmen (referri ng to accused Dural) who shot t he two Capcom sol diers.
Issue: Whether or not appel l ants are gui l t y of direct assaul t.

Held: Yes. The SC held that there is no doubt that appell ant Dural and the two (2) other
gunmen knew that the victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mangli got, were members
of the Phil i ppi ne Constabular y detai led with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and
ridi ng an offici al CAPCOM car. The victims, who were agents of persons in authorit y, were i n
15

the performance of official duty as peace officers and law enforcers. For having assaulted and
kill ed the said victims, i n conspiracy wi th the other two (2) gunmen, appel l ant Dural also
committed direct assaul t under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The crimes he
committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of murder wi th direct assaul t upon an agent
of a person i n authorit y. Pursuant then to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum
of the penalt y for the more serious crime which is murder, shoul d be i mposed.

PEOPLE VS. TAC- AN (G.R. NOS. 76338-39)
Facts: Renato Tac-an and Francis Escanowere cl ose friends bei ng cl assmates i n hi gh school
and members of the l ocal Bronx gang. Franci s withdrew from the gang on the advice of hi s
mother who saw that Renato carried a handgun on his visi ts to their home. Thi ngs started
turni ng sour between the two, and came to a head on Dec 14, 1984. After an earl ier
al tercati on on that day, Renato went home and got his gun. He entered the Mathematics class
under Mr. Damaso Pasil bas in Rm15 and shouted for Francis. After l ocati ng the victim he
fired at him but missed. He was l ater able to hi t him in the head as he was runni ng to the door
wi th his classmates to escape. After this, Renato paced outside i n the hall way. A teacher
unknowi ng that Renato was the cul prit, asked him for hel p unwittingl y i nforming him that
Francis was sti ll al i ve. Renato immedi atel y re-entered the room and sayi ng "So, he is sti l l
al i ve. Where is his chest?" Standi ng over Francis sprawled face down on the cl assroom floor,
Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bul let entered Francis' back
bel ow the ri ght shoulder, and exi ted on his front chest j ust above the right ni ppl e.
Meantime, as soon as Renato l eft Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue
Francis but could not open the door which Renato had l ocked behind him. One of the students
entered the room by cli mbing up the second fl oor on the outside and through the wi ndow and
opened the door from the i nside. The teachers and students brought Francis down to the
ground fl oor from whence the PC sol diers rushed him to the Cel esti no Gal lares Memori al
Hospi tal. Francis di ed before reaching the hospi tal .
In his defense, Renato cl aimed that he was acti ng i n self -defense. The trial court convicted
Renato gui lt y beyond reasonabl e doubt of the crime of murder with aggravati ng circumstance
of evi dent premedi tati on (treacher y used to qualif y the crime to murder) and the speci al
aggravati ng circumstances of acti ng whi l e under the i nfl uence of dangerous drugs and with
the use of an unlicensed firearm and with i nsul t to a person in authori ty.
Issue: Whether or not the crime was committed i n contempt of or wi th insult to the publ i c
authorities.
Held: The SC held that the tri al court erred i n findi ng the presence of the generic aggravati ng
circumstance of contempt of or with insult to the publ ic authoriti es. A careful reading of the
last paragraph of Articl e 152 of the RPC wi l l show that whil e a teacher or professor of a publi c
or recogni zed pri vate school is deemed to be a "person i n authorit y," such teacher or
professor is so deemed onl y for purposes of appl icati on of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a
person i n authori t y), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person i n authorit y or the
agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of
Article 152 does not i dentif y specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the appl ication of
which any person "directl y vested with j urisdi cti on, etc." is deemed "a person i n authorit y."
Because a penal statute is not to be gi ven a l onger reach and broader scope than is cal led for
by the ordi nary meani ng of the ordi nar y words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an
accused, we do not bel i eve that a teacher or professor of a publ ic or recogni zed pri vate
school may be regarded as a "publ ic authority" wi thi n the meani ng of paragraph 2 of Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code,
31
the provisi on the tri al court appl i ed i n the case at bar.

16

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FALSE TREASURY/BANK NOTES ( ART. 168)

TECSON vs. CA (G.R. No. 113218)

Facts: This case stemmed from a charge of i l legal possession and use of counterfei t US
dol lar notes.

A ci vi li an i nformer personal l y informed the Central bank that a certai n Mang Andy was
invol ved i n a syndicate engaged i n the busi ness of counterfei t US dol lar notes. A test -buy
operation and later on a buy-bust operation were conducted where the petitioner was
apprehended.

Issue: Whether peti ti oner is gui lt y f or viol ation of Art. 168 of the RPC.

Held: The SC affirmed the decisi on of the tri al and appel l ate court in convicting the accused
gui lt y of il l egal possession of false treasur y/bank notes.

The elements of the cri me charged for vi olati on of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, are:
1 ) that any treasur y or bank note or certificate or other obl i gati on and securi ty payabl e to
bearer, or any i nstrument payabl e to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer
is forged or falsif ied by another person; 2) that the offender knows that any of the said
instruments is forged or falsifi ed; and 3) that he either used or possessed wi th i ntent to
use any of such forged or falsif ied instruments. Hence, possession of fake dol l ar notes must
be coupl ed wi th the act of usi ng or at l east with i ntent to use the same as shown by a clear
and del iberate overt act i n order to constitute a crime, as was suffici entl y proven i n the case
at bar.
































17

FALSIFICATION ( ARTS. 171, 172)

ADAZA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN ( G.R. No. 154886)
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution fi ndi ng probable cause agai nst the
spouses Mayor Adaza and wife Aristel a Adaza. Two Informations fil ed before the
Sandi ganbayan: falsifi cation of voucher by counterfeiting the si gnature of PTA President
Mej oranda and falsif ication of DBP check by counterfeiti ng the si gnature of Mej oranda,
rel ati ng to the constructi on of a school bldg consisti ng of 2 cl assrooms. Sandi ganbayan found
Mayor Adaza gui lt y i n the first case, but acquitted him and his wif e in the second case.
Issue: Does the Sandi ganbayan have j urisdicti on if there was no al l egati on showi ng that the
act of falsif icati on of publ ic document attri buted to him was i ntimatel y connected to the duties
of his office as mayor?

Held: No. For an offense to fal l under the excl usi ve ori gi nal j urisdicti on of the
Sandi ganbayan, the fol l owing requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a vi olation
of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the
law on i l l -gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Secti on 2, Titl e VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (the l aw on bri ber y), (d) Executi ve Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued i n 1986
(sequestrati on cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether si mple or compl exed wi th
other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a publ ic
official or empl oyee hol di ng any of the posi ti ons enumerated i n paragraph A of Section 4; and
(3) the offense committed i s i n rel ati on to the office.

Although petiti oner was descri bed i n the i nformati on as a public officer there was no
al l egati on showi ng that the act of falsificati on of publ ic document attri buted to him was
intimatel y connected to the duti es of his office as mayor to bri ng the case wi thi n the
j urisdiction of the Sandi ganbayan. Neither was there any al l egation to show how he made use
of his position as mayor to faci l itate the commission of the cri mes charged. For the purpose of
determini ng j urisdiction, it is this al l egati on that is control l ing, not the evidence presented by
the prosecuti on duri ng the trial .
However, the prosecution is not precl uded from fili ng the appropri ate charge against hi m
before the proper court.

LUMANCAS vs. INTAS (G.R. No. 133472)
Facts: Peti tioners were regul ar empl oyees of the Phi li ppi ne Postal Corporation. They were
charged by their co-employee Virgini a B. Intas for making false entries i n their respecti ve
Personal Data Sheets regardi ng their educati onal attainment, resul ti ng i n their promotion to
hi gher posi tions to the prej udice of other postal empl oyees who had been in the service for a
longer period.
It appears that Consol aci on A. Lumancas' hi ghest educational attai nment was Fourth Year
Pharmacy. Her offici al Transcri pt of Records showed that she took up Bachel or of Sci ence i n
Commerce Maj or in Management. Lumancas' answers however in her three (3) PDS
accompl ished in 1989, 1991 and 1993 were i nconsistent as to the uni versit y and course that
she took. When requested to submit the academic records petiti oner, the IHU submitted
several records but the ori ginal of her Speci al Order was not among them. According Hi gher
Education Di visi on, Lumancas' name coul d not be found in the IHU enrol lment l ist fi led wi th
her office from school years 1974-75 to 1978-79, meani ng that she had not enrol l ed with the
school during those terms.
18

Issue: Whether appel lants are guil t y of falsif icati on through the making of untruthful
statements i n a narrati on of facts.

Held: Yes. All the elements of falsificati on through the making of untruthful statements i n a
narrati on of facts are present: (a) That the offender makes in a document statements i n a
narrati on of facts; (b) That he has a legal obli gation to discl ose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutel y false; and, (d) That the
perversi on of truth i n the narration of facts was made wi th the wrongful intent of i nj uring a
third person. I n Peopl e v. Po Gi ok To the Court held that "i n the falsif icati on of publ ic or
official documents, whether by publ ic official s or by pri vate persons, it is unnecessar y that
there be present the i dea of gai n or the intent to inj ure a third person, for the reason that, i n
contradistincti on to pri vate documents, the princi pal thing punished is the vi olati on of the
public faith and the destructi on of the truth as t herei n solemnl y proclaimed." Hence, the l ast
requisi te need not be present. Also, petiti oners themsel ves have affirmed in their petition that
their Personal Data Sheets were not sworn to before any administeri ng officer thereby taking
their case away from the conf ines of perj ury. Nonethel ess, they argue that they have no legal
obl igati on to discl ose the truth i n their PDS si nce these are not official documents . We
disagree. I n Inti ng v. Tanodbayan the Court hel d that "the accompl ishment of the Personal
Data Sheet bei ng a requirement under the Ci vi l Service Rul es and Regul ations in connection
wi th empl oyment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therei n was,
therefore, i ntimatel y connected with such employment x x x x The fi l ing of a Personal Data
Sheet is required i n connecti on wi th the promot ion to a hi gher positi on and contenders for
promotion have the l egal obl i gati on to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing thei r
qualif icati ons by means of false statements wi l l prej udice other qual ifi ed aspirants to the
same positi on.




RECEBIDO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 141931)
Facts: Pri vate complai nant Caridad Dorol went to the house of petiti oner Aniceto Recebi do to
redeem her propert y, an agricultural land which she mortgaged to the petitioner. Petiti oner
and Caridad Dorol di d not execute a document on the mortgage but Caridad Dorol i nstead
gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 executed i n her favor by her
father, Juan Dorol.
In sai d confrontation, petiti oner refused to al l ow Cari dad Dorol to redeem her propert y on hi s
claim that she had sol d her propert y to him i n 1979. Cari dad Dorol maintai ned and insisted
that the transaction between them i nvol ving her propert y was a mortgage.
Caridad Dorol verified the existence of the Deed of Sal e dated August 13, 1979, al legedl y
executed by Cari dad Dorol i n favor of petitioner and that the property was registered in the
latter' s name. After comparison of the specimen si gnatures of Caridad Dorol i n other
documents wi th that of the si gnature of Cari dad Dorol on the questi oned Deed of Sale, NBI
Document Examiner, found that the l atter signature was falsif ied.

Issue: Whether peti ti oner is gui lt y of falsif icati on.

Held: Yes. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct proof that the peti ti oner
was the author of the f orger y. As keenl y observed by the Solicitor General , "the questi oned
document was submitted by petiti oner himsel f when the same was requested by the NBI for
examinati on. Clearl y i n possessi on of the falsifi ed deed of sal e was peti ti oner and not Caridad
Dorol who merel y verifi ed the questi oned sal e with the Provinci al Assessor' s Office of
Sorsogon." In other words, the peti tioner was in possession of the forged deed of sal e which
purports to sel l the subj ect land from the pri vate compl ainant to him. Gi ven this factual
backdrop, the peti tioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sal e, despite the
absence of any direct evi dence of his authorshi p of the forger y. Si nce the petiti oner is the
19

onl y person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found i n his possessi on,
it is presumed that he i s the materi al author of the falsification.

The prosecution has establ ished that pri vate complai nant Dorol did not sel l the subj ect l and to
the petiti oner-accused at anytime and that sometime i n 1983 the pri vate complai nant
mortgaged the agricul tural land to peti ti oner Recebi do. It was onl y on September 9, 1990,
when she went to peti ti oner to redeem the l and that she came to know of the falsificati on
committed by the petiti oner. On the other hand, peti ti oner contends that the land i n question
was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of pri vate complai nant, and was subsequentl y
sol d to him on August 13, 1983. This Court notes that the pri vate offended party had no actual
knowl edge of the falsifi cation prior to September 9, 1990. Meanwhi le, assuming arguendo that
the version of the peti ti oner is beli evable, the al leged sal e coul d not have been registered
before 1983, the year the al leged deed of sal e was executed by the pri vate complai nant.
Consi deri ng the foregoi ng, i t is logical and i n consonance wi th human experi ence to infer that
the crime committed was not discovered, nor coul d have been discovered, by the offended
part y before 1983. Neither coul d constructi ve notice by registrati on of the forged dee d of sal e,
which is favorabl e to the petiti oner si nce the runni ng of the prescri pti ve period of the cri me
shal l have to be reckoned earl i er, have been done before 1983 as it is impossi bl e for the
peti tioner to have registered the deed of sale pri or thereto. Even granting arguendo that the
deed of sal e was executed by the pri vate complai nant, del i vered to the petitioner -accused in
August 13, 1983 and registered on the same day, the ten- year prescri pti ve period of the crime
had not yet el apsed at the time the information was f il ed in 1991. The inevitabl e concl usi on,
therefore, is that the cri me had not prescribed at the time of the fi li ng of the i nformati on.



ALCANTARA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN ( G.R. No. 101919)

Facts: The instant case arose due to j eal ousy and i ntri gue, resulti ng in vengeance by means
of misrepresentati on, falsificati on of si gnatures and documents and entri es thereon. It is not
understandabl e how the respondent court f el l prey to a vi ndicti ve Orl ando Abad, usi ng
precious time and resources of the j udici al system of the l and.
During the change of administrati on after the EDSA revoluti on, accused Alcantara wi th a
designation as Management and Informati on Anal yst, took over their office. Accused
accordi ng to Abad was already a Quezon Ci t y Hal l empl oyee bei ng then a Technical Assistant
of the Mayor.
Witness Abad, bei ng the nex-i n-rank, fil ed a protest before the CSC agai nst the petiti oner
whom he l earned to be appl yi ng and was bei ng proposed for appoi ntment to the vacant
positi on. Witness Abad averred that peti tioner misrepresented himself when in his el igi bi l it y i n
the CSC, he decl ared to have obtai ned a professional el igi bl e when he is onl y a sub-
professional el i gi ble.
Isl es, record officer of CSC, decl ared that the name of the accused does not appear i n the
Master List for 1979 wi th respect to the Career Service Examinati on. The accused is not
el i gi ble as a career service professional , but the CSC records show that the accused took an
examinati on i n 1980 wi th a passing rati ng as career service s ub-professional .
Issue: Whether peti ti oner is gui lt y of falsif icati on of public document.
Held: No. The prosecution was not abl e to prove the elements of the charge of Falsification of
Publ ic Document as defined and penal i zed under Articl e 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In
the case of Peopl e v. Gui nto, this Court hel d, that:
"The pri nci ple has been dinned i nto the ears of the bench and the barthat in this j urisdicti on,
accusation is not synonymous wi th guil t. Theaccused is protected by the constituti onal
presumpti on of innocencewhich the prosecution must overcome wi th contrar y proof
20

beyondreasonabl e doubt. This Court has repeatedl y decl ared that even if thedefense is weak
the case agai nst the accused must fai l if theprosecution is even weaker, for the convicti on of
the accused must restnot on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of
theprosecuti on. Indeed, if the prosecuti on has not sufficientl y establ ishedthe gui l t of the
accused, he has a ri ght to be acqui tted and rel easedeven if he presents naught a shred of
evi dence. x x x The accused-appell ants have been condemned x x x based on uncertai n
evi dence cl earl y i nsuffi cient to sustain their convicti on. It is their guil t and not their i nnocence
that has been presumed. It is their innocence and not their gui lt that shoul d have been
pronounced. In these circumstances, onl y one thi ng that has to be done if the Constituti on is
to be observed and j ustice is to be served. " (184 SCRA 287)



GONZALUDO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 150910)

Facts: On the 20th day of Januar y, 1993 in the Ci t y of Bacol od accused,
conspiri ng,confederating and acti ng in concert, wi th i ntent to gai n, defrauded the herei n
offended part y, Anita Manlangi t Vda. de Vil l afl or in the fol lowi ng manner, to wi t: that
accusedRosemarie Gel ogo al i as Rosemarie G. commitedacts of falsificati on by
prepari ngand/or causing to be prepared a publ ic document denominated as a Deed of Sal e
datedJanuar y 20, 1993 entered as Doc. No. 402, Page No. 81, Book No. XVII, Series of 1993
of the Notari al Register of Att y. Ramon B. Clapi z, to the effect that she is thel awful owner of
the sai d house and affixing or causi ng to be af fixed thereon her nameand signature.

Issue: Whether the compl ex crime of estafa through falsification of publ ic documentsis the
right offense consi deri ng an el ement is missi ng i n the crime of estafa?

Held: We find no cogent reason to depart from this settl ed pri nci pl e that the deceit,whi ch
must be prior to or si mul taneousl y committed wi th the act of defraudation, must be the
efficient cause or primar y considerati on which induced the offended part y to part wi th hi s
money or propert y and rul e differentl y i n the present case.While i t may be said that there was
fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie i n thi scase, when she used the surname "Vi l lafl or" to
gi ve her semblance of authorit y to sel lthe subj ect 2-storey house, such fraud or decei t was
employed upon the Canlas spouseswho were the ones who parted with their money when they
bought the house.However, the Informati on chargi ng Rosemari e of estafa i n the present case,
al l egeddamage or i nj ur y not upon the Canl as spouses, but upon pri vate compl ainant,
Ani taManlangi t. Si nce the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and di d not i nduceAnita
Manlangi t to part wi th her propert y in this case, Rosemarie cannot be hel d li abl efor estafa.
With al l the more reason must this be for herei n peti tioner.



GARCI A vs. CA (G.R. No. 128213)

Facts: On or about the month of Januar y, 1991 i n Pasay Cit y Abel la Garci a, bei ngthen i n
possessi on of a recei pt for Fi ve Thousand Pesos dated Januar y 21, 1991 issued by one
Alberto Quij ada, Jr. as parti al down payment of the sale of a house and l otsituated at No. 46
P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Mani l a by Albert Quij ada, Jr. toaccused, made al terati ons
and wrote words, figures and phrases to the ori gi nal receiptwhich completel y changed i ts
meani ng by making appear thereon that it was issued onJanuar y 24, 1991 in the amount of
Fift y Fi ve Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when intruth and i n fact, the sai d accused ful l y wel l
knew that the recei pt was onl y for theamount of Fi ve Thousand Pesos.
Issue: Whether or not the charge of falsificati on of a pri vatedocument is proper?
Held: Gi ven the admissions of Avel la that she altered the receipt, and withoutconvi nci ng
evi dence that the alteration was with the consent of pri vate compl ai nant,the Court holds that
al l four (4) elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.As to the requirement of
damage, this is readi l y apparent as i t was made to appear thatAlberto had recei ved P50,000
when i n fact he di d not. Hence, Avel l a' s convicti on
21

PERJURY ( ART. 183)
BURGOS vs. AQUINO (A.M. No. P-94-1081)
Facts: In this administrati ve matter, the compl ai nant Virginia Burgos charged the respondent
of immoral i ty f or mai ntaini ng i l l ici t rel ati ons wi th compl ai nants husband which eventual l y
begotthem a chi ld, named Jocel yn Burgos. The respondent in her comment admitted that she
had ani l l ici t rel ation with compl ai nants husband but the i ll icit rel ation al legedl y happened
pri or to heremployment in the j udici ar y. She cl aimed that that the affair occurred in 1979 and
their lovechi l d was born on March 1980 and that she j oi ned the j udi ciar y onl y on 1981. She
furthercl aimed that she had severed her rel ati on with Att y. Burgos arising from thei r
disagreement oversupport. In the compl ainant s repl y, she claimed that the respondents and
her husbandsrel ati onshi p sti l l continues.

Issue: Whether the respondent shoul d be suspended for immoral i ty; and- Whether the
defense of the respondent is truthful or makes her l i abl e for perj ur y

Held: The office of the Court Administrator found that i ndeed the respondent committed
animmoral act whi le i n the government service regardl ess of whether it was committed
whenemployed i n the j udici ar y. Whether the immoral relati on sti l l subsists is no l onger
materi al . TheSupreme Court agreed with the fi ndi ngs of the OCA, further the evidence proved
that on somepl eadi ngs by Att y, Burgos and t yped by the respondent; bear the i nitials of both
Att y.Burgos andthe respondent. The defense of the respondent that their relati onshi p has
ended was not proveddue to these circumstances. The records also reveled that i n some of
the documents submittedby the respondent; she di d not revealed about her chi ld. Under Art.
183 of the Revised Penal Code, perj ur y is the del i berate making of untruthful statements upon
any materi al matter beforea competent person authori zed to admini ster an oath in cases i n
which the law so requires. Herdel iberate omission to discl ose her chi l d without a val id
j ustif icati on makes her l iable for perj ur y




DI AZ vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 65006)

Facts: Petiti oner Reol andi Di az was charged wi th the crime of Falsificati on of Official
Document beforethe Court of first Instance of Pampanga. He was found gui lt y as charged. On
appeal, the court modi fied its decisi on i ncreasi ng the penal ty of the accused. Henc e thi s
peti tion. The facts of thecase are as fol lows:Reol andi Diaz was a Seni or Cl erk at Jose Abad
Santos High School i n San Fernando Pampanga.He sought appointment as School
Administrati ve Assistant I, and as one of the requirements tosai d appoi ntment, he fil l ed up
Ci vi l Service Form 212 and swore to the truth and veracit y of thedate
and information therein that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B.(Li beral
Arts) al l egedl y pursued at the Cosmopol itan and Harvardi an Coll eges. On that basis , he was
appoi nted to the position. But contrar y to the claim of petitioner, he was never enrol l ed at the
Cosmopol itan Col leges certif ied by i ts Registrar, neither was he a student at the Harvardi an
Col leges, certifi ed by the school s presi dent. The name of the petitioner was not also i ncl uded
inall the enrol lment lists of col lege students submitted to the then Bureau of Pri vate Schools.

Issues: Whether the accused is gui lt y of falsif i cation.

Held: The court held that the crime committed was not falsification but Perj ury, which is the
wi l lful and corrupt asserti on of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authori ty
of law on a material matter. The elements of which are; a) the accused made a statement under
oath or executed an af fidavit upon a material matter; b) that the statement or affidavit was
made before a competent officer, authori zed to recei ve and administer oath; c.) that the
statement or affi davit, the accused made a del i berate asserti on of a falsehood; d.) that the
sworn statement or affidavi t containi ng the falsi t y is required by l aw or made for a
22

legal purpose. Al l the el ements enumerated therein are present in the case at bar, thus the
accused is gui lt y of perj ur y. The decisi on of Court of Appeals was modifi ed, finding the
accused guil t y of perj ury, imposi ng the corresponding penal t y therei n and not of falsificati on.




CHOA vs. CHIONGSON ( A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063)

Facts: This case arose from the al l eged untruthful statements or falsehoods i n the
complai nants Petiti on for Natural i zation.

When i n truth and in fact sai d accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two
chi l dren were not then resi ding at the sai d address at No. 46 Mal aspi na Street, Vil l amonte,
Bacolod Cit y, havi ng l eft the aforesai d resi dence i n 1984, or about fi ve (5) years earli er and
were then resi di ng at Hervias Subdi vision, Bacolod Cit y, that contrar y to his aforesaid
al l egati ons i n his verified Petition for Natural i zati on, accused whil e resi ding at 211, 106
Street, Greenplai ns Subdi visi on, Bacol od Cit y, has been carryi ng on an immoral and i ll ici t
rel ati onship wi th one Stel la Fl ores Saludar, a woman not his wif e si nce 1984, and begotting
two (2) chi ldren with her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the pri vate offended party
herein, have l ong been separated from bed and boards [sic] si nce 1984; which falsehoods
and/ or immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqual ificati ons of becomi ng a citi zen
of the Phil i ppi nes.

Issue: Whether the peti ti oner is gui l t y of perj ury.
Held: With respect to the compl ainants cl ai m that the all egati ons i n the i nformati on do not
consti tute the offense of perj ury, an administrati ve proceedi ng is not the forum to decide
whether the j udge has erred or not, especi al l y as compl ainant has appeal ed his convicti on.
Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error i n the Courts decisi on.
The elements of perj ury as enumerated i n the case of People of the Phi l ippines vs. Bautista
(C.A., 40 O.G. 2491) are as foll ows:
(a) Statement in the affidavi t upon material matter made under oath;
(b) The affiant swears to the truthful ness of the statements in his affi davit before a
competent officer authori zed to administer oath;
(c) There is a wi l lful and del iberate assertion of falsehood; and
(d) Sworn statement containi ng the fal sit y is required by l aw.
It cannot be denied that the petiti on for natural i zation fil ed by Alfonso C. Choa was made
under oath and before a competent officer authori zed to administer oath as shown by the
records. This peti tion for natural i zation is required by l aw as a condi tion precedent for the
grant of Phi l ippine citi zenshi p (Secti on 7 Corn. Act No. 473).
The question now boi ls down to whether there is a wi l lful and del i berate assertion of
falsehood.




23

VILLANUEVA vs. SOJ (G.R. NO. 162187)

Facts: On April 2, 1996, the Refractori es Corporati on of the Phil i ppi nes (RCP) fi led a protest
before the Speci al Committee on Anti -Dumpi ng of the Department of Finance agai nst certain
importations of Hamburg Tradi ng Corporati on (HTC), a corporati on dul y organi zed and
existi ng under the l aws of the Phi l ippines. The matter invol ved 151.070 tons of magnesi te -
based refractor y bricks from Germany. The case was docketed as Anti -Dumpi ng Case No. I -
98.

The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the Department of Trade
and Industr y, to determine if there was a pri ma faci e case for vi olati on of Republ ic Act (R.A.)
No. 7843, the Anti -Dumpi ng Law. Sometime in February 1997, the BIS submitted i ts report to
the Tariff Commission, declari ng that a prima facie case existed and that conti nued
importation of refractory bricks from Germany woul d harm the l ocal industr y. It adopted the
amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the imported goods.

The HTC recei ved a copy of the sai d report on Februar y 14, 1997. However, before i t coul d
respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the parti es to settl e the matter
amicabl y. A conference ensued between RCP Senior Vice Presi dent and Assistant General
Manager Criste Vi l l anueva and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC Presi dent and
General Manager Horst -Kessl er Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on
the other. Duri ng the conference, the parties agreed that the refractor y bricks were imported
by the HTC at a price l ess than i ts normal val ue of DM 1,200, and that such importation was
l ikel y to inj ure the l ocal industr y. The parti es also agreed to settl e the case to avoi d expenses
and protracted l itigati on. HTC was required to reform its price pol icy/structure of its
importation and sal e of refractor y bricks from Germany to conform to the provisi ons of R.A.
No. 7843 and i ts rul es and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and signed a
compromise agreement contai ni ng the terms agreed upon which Vi ll anueva and Borgoni a
signed. Bienvenido Flores, an Office Cl erk of RCP, del ivered the agreement to HTC at the 9th
Fl oor of Ramon Magsaysay Center Bui l di ng, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Mani la by Von
Sprengeisens approval .

However, Von Spr engeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgoni a revised the agreement by
inserti ng the phrase "based on the fi ndi ngs of the BIS" i n paragraph 1 thereof. Vi l lanueva and
Borgoni a si gned the agreement and had the same deli vered to the office of HTC on April 22,
1997 by Li no M. Guti errez, a technical assistant of RCP. Gonzal es recei ved the agreement
and del i vered the same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzal es returned, wi th the
agreement already signed by Von Sprengeisen. Gonzal es, who had al so si gned, t hen gave i t
to Guti errez. On the same day, Notar y Publ ic Zenaida P. De Zui ga notari zed the
agreement. Gonzal es del i vered a copy of the notari zed Agreement to HTC.
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During the May 9, 1997
hearing before the Commission for the approval of the agreement, a representati ve of HTC
appeared. He offered no obj ecti on to the Agreement. The Commission submitted i ts report to
the Speci al Committee which rendered a decision decl ari ng that, based on the fi ndings of the
BIS, the normal val ue of the imported refractor y bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton. HTC
recei ved a copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC appeal ed the
decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not, based on the records, there was probable cause for the pri vate
respondents i ndictment for perj ur y.

Held: Perj ur y is def ined and penal i zed i n Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code.
Any person who, i n case of a sol emn affirmation made in li eu of an oath, shal l commit any of
the falsehoods menti oned in this and the three preceding articl es of this secti on shal l suffer
the respecti ve penalti es provi ded therei n.

Perj ur y is an obstructi on of j ustice; i ts perpetrati on may affect the earnest concerns of the
parti es before a tribunal. The fel ony is consummated when the false statement is made.
24

The seminal modern treatment of the histor y of perj ur y concludes that one consi derati on of
pol icy overshadows all others the measures taken agai nst the offense must not be so
severe as to discourage aggrieved parti es from lodgi ng complai nts or testif yi ng. As quoted by
Dean Wigmore, a l eadi ng 19th Centur y Commentator, noted that Engl is h l aw, "throws every
fence round a person accused of perj ur y, f or the obl igati on of protecting wi tnesses from
oppressi on or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of havi ng made false testimony
is far paramount to that of gi ving even perj ur y i ts deserts."

Perj ur y is the wi llful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmati on
administered by authori ty of l aw on a materi al matter. The elements of the felony are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavi t upon a material
matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authori zed to recei ve
and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affi davit, the accused made a wi llful and del iberate assertion of a
falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containi ng the falsi t y is requi red by law or made for a
legal purpose.

A mere asserti on of a false obj ective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be
del iberate and wi l lful. Perj ur y being a fel ony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the
accused. Willful l y means i ntentional l y; with evi l i ntent and l egal mal ice, wi th the
consciousness that the al leged perj urious statement is false wi th the i ntent that it shoul d be
recei ved as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equi val ent to "knowi ngl y." "Del iberatel y"
impl ies medi tated as disti nguished from i nadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused
knows his statement to be false or as consci ousl y ignorant of its truth.

Perj ur y cannot be wi l lful where the oath is according to bel ief or conviction as to its truth. A
false statement of a bel i ef is not perj ur y. Bona fide bel i ef i n the truth of a statement is an
adequate defense. A false statement which is obviousl y the result of an honest mistake is not
perj ury.

There are two essential el ements of proof for perj ur y: (1) the statement made by the
defendants must be proven false; and (2) i t must be proven that the defendant di d not bel ieve
those statements to be true.

Knowl edge by the accused of the falsi t y of his statement is an i nternal act. It may be proved
by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be
determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a motive to l ie and of the obj ecti ve
falsi t y itsel f, and from other facts tendi ng to show that the accused real l y knew the things he
claimed not to know.

A conviction for perj ur y cannot be sustai ned merel y upon the contradi ctor y sworn statements
of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must
show the statement to be false by other evi dence than the contradicti ng statement.



CABARRUSVS. BERNAS ( A.C. NO. 4634)
Facts: On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrati ve complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for al leged viol ati ons of Articl e 172 of the
Revised Penal Code and Code of Prof essi onal Responsi bi li t y.

Issue: Whether respondent Att y. Bernas transgressed Circul ar No. 28-91, Revised Circul ar
No. 28-91, and Administrati ve Circular No. 04 - 94 on forum shoppi ng.

Held: Expl icitl y, the functi ons of the National Bureau of Investigati ons are merel y
investi gator y and i nformational i n nature. It has no j udicial or quasi -j udici al powers and is
25

incapabl e of granti ng any rel ief to a part y. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an
investi gati ve agency whose findi ngs are merel y recommendator y. It undertakes i nvesti gation
of crimes upon its own initi ati ve and as publ ic welfare may require. It renders assistance
when requested in the investi gati on or detecti on of crimes which precisel y what Att y. Bernas
sought in order to prosecute those persons responsi ble for defraudi ng his cl i ent.

The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circul ar No. 28-91, Revised Circul ar No.
28-91 and Administrati ve Circular No. 04-94 are those vested wi th j udicial powers or quasi -
j udici al powers and those who not onl y hear and determine controversi es between adverse
parti es, but to make bi ndi ng orders or j udgments. As succi nctl y put it by R.A. 157, the NBI i s
not performing j udici al or quasi -j udici al functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those
forums contempl ated by the Circul ar that can enter tai n an action or proceedi ng, or even grant
any rel ief, decl aratory or otherwise.













































26


MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS ( ART. 185)
OUANO vs. CA (G.R. No. L-40203)
Facts: The appell ate proceedi ngs at bar treat of a parcel of l and regi stered under RFC (DBP).
Sai d propert y was offered for bi ddi ng for the second time because the first bidding was
nul lif ied due to Ouanos protest. It appears that prior t o the second bi ddi ng, Ouano and
Echavez oral l y agreed that onl y Echavez woul d make a bid, and that i f i t was accepted, they
woul d di vi de t he property i n proporti on to their adj oi ni ng properti es. To ensure success of
their enterprise, they al so agreed t o i nduce t he onl y other part y known to be i nterested i n t he
propert y-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan t o desist from presenting a bid.

They broached
the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan' s group. The l atter agreed t o wi thdraw, as i t di d i n fact withdraw
from the sal e; and Ouano' s wife pai d i t P2,000 as reimbursement for i ts expenses.
Issue: Whether Ouano committed machinati ons i n public aucti on puni shabl e under the RPC.
Held: These acts constitute a crime, as the Tri al Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had
promised to share i n the propert y in questi on as a consideration for Ouano' s refrai ni ng from
taking part in the publ i c aucti on, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded i n
causing another bi dder to stay away from the auction. i n order to cause reducti on of the price
of the propert y auctioned In so doing, they committed the fel ony of machi nati ons i n publ ic
aucti ons defi ned and penali zed in Articl e 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts i s a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby
onl y one bid that of Echavez was ent ered for the ' l and i n consequence of which Echavez
eventual l y acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal i n character, the parti es not
onl y have no action agai nst each other but are both l iabl e to prosecution and the thi ngs and
price of their agreement subj ect to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code.
This, i n accordance with the so-cal led pari deli cto princi pl e set out i n the Ci vi l Code.












27

IMMORAL DOCTRINES ( ART. 201)
FERNANDO vs. CA (G.R. No. 159751 )
Facts: Acti ng on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materi als, PNP officers
conducted pol ice survei l lance on the store bearing the name of Gaudenci o E. Fernando Music
Fair (Music Fair). A search warrant was issued for vi olati on of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code agai nst peti ti oner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certai n Warren Tingchuy. The
warrant ordered t he search of Gaudenci o E. Fernando Music Fair at 564 Quezon Bl vd., corner
Zi gay Street, Quiapo, Manil a, and t he sei zure of the foll owi ng items:
a. Copies of New Rave Magazi nes with nude obscene pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazi ne with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copi es of Hustler Internati onal Magazi ne with nude obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes contai ning pornographi c shows.
3

On t he same day, pol i ce officers served t he warrant on Rudy Estorni nos, who, accordi ng to
the prosecuti on, i ntroduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched
the premises and confi scated twent y-fi ve (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazi nes,
which they deemed pornographic.
The RTC acqui tted Ti ngchuy for l ack of evi dence to prove his gui lt, but convicted herei n
peti tioners
Issue: Whether peti ti oner i s gui lt y f or viol ation of Art. 201 of t he RPC.
Held: As obscenit y i s an unprotected speech which the State has the ri ght t o regul ate, t he
State i n pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patri ae, t he publ i c from obscene, immoral
and i ndecent materials must j ustif y the regulati on or l imitation.
One such regul ation i s Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be hel d l i abl e, the
prosecuti on must prove that (a) the materi als, publ icati on, picture or l iterature are obscene;
and (b) the offender sol d, exhi bited, publ ished or gave away such materi als.
13
Necessari l y,
that the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
The SC emphasi zed that mere possessi on of obscene materi als, wi thout i ntention t o sel l,
exhibi t, or gi ve them away, i s not punishabl e under Article 201, consi deri ng the purpose of the
law i s to prohibi t the di sseminati on of obscene materials t o the publ i c. The offense i n any of
the f orms under Articl e 201 i s committed onl y when there i s publ i cit y.
32
The l aw does not
require that a person be caught i n the act of sel l ing, gi vi ng away or exhi bi ting obscene
materi als t o be l iable, for as l ong as t he said materials are offered for sal e, displ ayed or
exhibi ted to the public. In the present case, we find that peti ti oners are engaged i n sel l ing and
exhibi ti ng obscene materi als.





28

IGLESI A NI CRISTO vs. CA (G.R. No. 119673)
Facts: Peti ti oner Iglesi a ni Cristo, a dul y organi zed rel i gi ous organi zation, has a tel evisi on
program entitled "Ang Igl esia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 ever y Saturday and on Channel 13
ever y Sunday. The program presents and propagates petiti oner' s rel igi ous bel i efs, doctri nes
and practices often times i n comparati ve studi es wi th other reli gions.
Sometime i n the months of September, October and November 1992 peti ti oner submitted t o
the respondent Board of Revi ew for Movi ng Pictures and Tel evisi on the VTR tapes of its TV
program Seri es Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classifi ed the seri es as "X" or not for
public viewi ng on t he ground that they "offend and constitute an attack agai nst other rel igi ons
which i s expressl y prohibi ted by law."
Issue: Whether peti ti oner may be hel d gui lt y f or vi ol ati on of Art. 201 of the RPC.
Held: It i s opi ned that the respondent board can sti ll uti li ze" attack agai nst any reli gion" as a
ground all egedl y ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohi bi ts the showi ng of motion
pictures, tel evisi on programs and publici ty materials which are contrary to l aw and Articl e 201
(2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibi ts "shows which offend any
race or reli gion." We respectfull y disagree for i t i s pl ai n that the word "attack" i s not
synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of t he Revised Penal
Code shoul d be i nvoked t o j ustif y the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any
rel i gion. It cannot be uti li zed t o j ustif ypri or censorship of speech. It must be emphasi zed that
E.O. 876, the l aw pri or to PD 1986, i ncluded "attack agai nst any rel i gi on" as a ground f or
censorshi p. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. I t s deleti on i s a decree t o
disuse it. There can be no other i ntent. Indeed, even the Executi ve Department espouses thi s
view.
Anent the vali dit y of Sec. 4 of the Board' s Rul es and Regul ation authori zi ng MTRCB to
prohibit the showi ng of materi als "which clearl y constitute an attack against any race, creed
or rel igi on . . .", I agree with Mr. Justice Vitug that the phrase "contrar y to l aw" i n Sec. 3-c
"shoul d be read together wi th other existi ng l aws such as, for i nstance, the provisi ons of the
Revised Penal Code, particularl y Arti cle 201, which prohi bit the exhi bition of shows that
' offend another race or reli gion.' " Indeed, where i t can be shown that there is a clear and
present danger that a rel i gi ous program coul d agitate or spark a rel igi ous strife of such extent
and magnitude as to be i nj uri ous to the general welfare, the Board may "X-rate" it or delete
such porti ons as may reasonabl y be necessary. The debi li tating armed confl icts in Bosni a,
Northern Ireland and in some Middle East countries due to exacerbated rel i gi ous antagonisms
shoul d be enough lesson for al l of us. Rel i gi ous wars can be more ravagi ng and damaging
than ordinar y crimes. If i t is legal and in fact praiseworthy to prevent the commission of, say,
the felony of murder i n the name of publ ic welfare why shoul d the preventi on of a crime
punishabl e by Art. 201 of the Penal Code be any less l egal and l ess praiseworthy.
I note, i n this connecti on, the caveat raised by the ponencia that the MTRCB Rule bans shows
which "attack" a rel i gi on, whereas Art. 201 merel y penal i ze; those who exhi bit programs which
"offend" such rel igi on. Subj ect to changing the word "attack" with the more accurate "offend".
I bel ieve Section 4 of the Rules can stand.











29

PITA VS. C. A. (178 SCRA 362)

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursui ng an Anti -Smut Campai gn initi ated by the Mayor
of the Cit y of Mani la, Ramon D. Bagatsing, el ements of the Speci al Anti -Narcotics Group,
Auxi l li ar y Services Bureau, Western Pol ice Di strict, INP of the Metropoli tan Police Force of
Manil a, sei zed and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
al ong Manil a sidewalks, magazi nes, publ ications and other reading materi als bel i eved to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the sei zed materi als i n publ ic at the
Uni versit y belt al ong C.M. Recto Avenue, Mani l a, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsi ng and
several officers and members of vari ous student organi zati ons.

Among the publ icati ons sei zed, and l ater burned, was "Pi noy Playboy" magazi nes published
and co-edited by pl ai nti ff Leo Pita.

On December 7, 1983, pl aintiff filed a case for inj uncti on with prayer for issuance of the writ
of preliminar y i nj uncti on against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superi ntendent of
Western Pol ice District of the Cit y of Mani la, seeking to enj oi n and/or restrai n sai d defendants
and their agents from confiscati ng plai ntiffs magazi nes or from otherwise preventi ng the sal e
or circul ati on thereof claiming that the magazi ne is a decent, artistic and educati onal
magazi ne which is not per se obscene, and that the publ icati on is protected by the
Constituti onal guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

On Februar y 3, 1984, the trial court promul gated the Order appealed from denyi ng the moti on
for a writ of prel iminar y i nj unction, and dismissing the case for l ack of merit.

Issue:Whether appell ant is gui l t y of a vi ol ati on of the RPC (immoral doctri nes)

Held: The Court states at the outset that i t is not the first time that it is bei ng asked to
pronounce what "obscene" means or what makes for an obscene or pornographic l iterature.
Earl y on, i n People vs. Kotti nger,

the Court l ai d down the test, i n determining the existence of
obscenit y, as fol lows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave
or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral inf luences and into whose hands a
publicati on or other article charged as bei ng obscene may fal l." "Another test,"
so Kotti nger further declares, "is that which shocks the ordi nar y and common sense of men as
an i ndecency." Kotti nger hastened to say, however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or
indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ul timatel y, the questi on
is to be deci ded by the "j udgment of the aggregate sense of the communit y reached b y i t."

Yet Kotti nger, i n its effort to arri ve at a "conclusi ve" def initi on, succeeded merel y in
general i zi ng a probl em that has grown i ncreasingl y compl ex over the years. Precisel y, the
question is: When does a publ ication have a corrupti ng tendency, or when can i t be sai d to be
offensi ve to human sensibi l ities? And obvi ousl y, it is to beg the questi on to say that a piece of
l iterature has a corrupti ng i nfl uence because it is obscene, and vice-versa.

Apparentl y, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertai nt y because i n the same breath, i t woul d
leave the final say to a hypothetical "communi ty standard" whatever that is and that the
question must supposedl y be j udged from case to case.

As the Court declared, the issue is a compl icated one, i n which the fi ne l ines have nei ther
been drawn nor di vided. It is easier sai d than done to say, indeed, that if "the pictures here i n
question were used not exactl y f or art' s sake but rather for commercial purposes,"
12
the
pictures are not enti tl ed to any constitutional protection.

In the case at bar, there is no chal lenge on the ri ght of the State, i n the l egitimate exercise of
pol ice power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvi ous reasons, smut is not smut
simpl y because one insists i t is smut. So is i t equal l y evident that i ndi vidual tastes develop,
adapt to wide-rangi ng i nfluences, and keep i n step wi th the rapid advance of ci vil i zation. What
shocked our forebears, say, fi ve decades ago, is not necessari l y repulsi ve to the present
30

generati on. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored i n the thirties yet their works are
considered important l iterature today.

Goya' s La Maja desnuda was once banned from publ ic
exhibi ti on but now adorns the world' s most presti gi ous museums.

But neither shoul d we say that "obscenit y" is a bare (no pun i ntended) matter of opinion. As
we sai d earl i er, it is the di vergent percepti ons of men and women that have probabl y
compounded the probl em rather than resol ved it.

What the Court is impressi ng, pl ai nl y and si mpl y, is that the question is not, and has not
been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from bei ng a settl ed matter. We share Tribe' s
disappoi ntment over the discouragi ng trend i n American decisional l aw on obsceni t y as wel l
as his pessimism on whether or not an "acceptabl e" sol ution is i n si ght.

In the final anal ysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a
"perfect" defi nition of "obscenit y", if that is possibl e, as evolvi ng standards for proper pol ice
conduct faced with the problem, which, after al l, is the pl ai nt specifical l y raised in the peti ti on.
Undoubtedl y, "immoral " l ore or l iterature comes wi thi n the ambi t of free expression, although
not i ts protection. In free expressi on cases, this Court has consistentl y been on the si de of
the exercise of the ri ght, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State
interference and acti on.

But, so we asserted i n Reyes v. Bagatsi ng,

"the burden to show the
existence of grave and imminent danger that woul d j ustif y adverse acti on ... l i es on the. . .
authorit[i es]."



"There must be obj ecti ve and convi nci ng, not subj ecti ve or conj ectural , proof of the existence
of such cl ear and present danger."

"It is essenti al for the vali dit y of ... previous restraint or
censorshi p that the ... authorit y does not rel y sol el y on his own appraisal of what the publi c
welfare, peace or safety may require."


"To j ustif y such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisf y the
clear and present danger test."
The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arri ve at a sol ution-so
onl y we may arri ve at one-but rather as a serious attempt to put the questi on in i ts proper
perspecti ve, that is, as a genui ne constituti onal issue.
It is also si gnificant that i n his petiti on, the peti tioner asserts consti tuti onal issues, mainl y,
due process and i l legal search and sei zure.

The Court is not convi nced that the pri vate respondents have shown the required proof to
j ustif y a ban and to warrant confiscation of the li terature for which mandator y i nj unction had
been sought bel ow. First of all , they were not possessed of a lawf ul court order: (1) fi ndi ng
the sai d materi als to be pornography, and (2) authori zi ng them to carr y out a search and
sei zure, by way of a search warrant.





PEOPLE VS. PADAN (G.R. No. L-7295)

Facts: That on or about the 13th day of September, 1953, i n the ci ty of Mani la, Phi l ippines,
the sai d accused conspiring and confederating together and mutual l y hel pi ng one another, di d
then and there wi llful l y, unlawf ul l y and feloni ousl y exhibi t or cause to be exhi bited i nside a
bui ldi ng at the corner of Camba Ext. and Morga Ext., Tondo, this Cit y, immoral scenes and
acts, to wit: the sai d accused Jose Faj ador y Garci a, bei ng then the manager and Ernesto
Reyes y Yabut, as ticket coll ector and or exhibi tor, wi l lf ul l y ,unlawf ul l y and feloni ousl y hired
their co-accused Mari na Palan y Al ova and Cosme Espi nosa y Abordo to act as performers or
exhibi ti onists to perform and i n fact performed sexual intercourse i n the presence of many
spectators, thereby exhi biti ng or performing highl y immoral and i ndecent acts or shows
thereat.

31

Issue: Whether al l the accused were guil t y of viol ating Art. 201 of the RPC.

Held: We bel i eve that the penalt y imposed fits the crime, considering its seriousness. As far
as we know, this is the first time that the courts i n this j urisdiction, at least this Tribunal, have
been cal l ed upon to take cogni zance of an of fense agai nst morals and decency of this kind.
We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibiti on of sti ll movi ng pictures of
women in the nude, which we have condemned for obsceni ty and as offensi ve to morals. In
those cases, one might yet cl aim that there was invol ved the el ement of art; that connoisseurs
of the same, and pai nters and scul ptors might f ind i nspiration in the showing of pictures i n the
nude, or the human body exhibi ted i n sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux vi vants. But an
actual exhibi ti on of the sexual act, preceded by acts of l asci viousness, can have no
redeeming feature. In i t, there is no room for art. One can see nothi ng i n it but cl ear and
unmitigated obscenit y, indecency, and an offense to publ ic morals, inspiri ng and causing as it
does, nothi ng but lust and l ewdness, and exerting a corrupti ng i nfluence special l y on the
youth of the l and. We repeat t hat because of al l this, the penalt y imposed by the tri al court on
Mari na, despite her pl ea of gui l ty, is nei ther excessi ve nor unreasonable.
With the modification above-menti oned, the decision appealed from by Mari na Padan and
Jose Faj ardo are hereby aff i rmed, wi th costs agai nst both.


















32

KNOWINGLY RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT (ART. 204)
DIEGO vs. CASTILLO ( A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)
Facts: On Januar y 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage wi th Jorge de Peri o,
Jr., sol emni zed before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan Ci t y. The coupl e were both
Fi li pinos. In the marri age contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescenci a
Escoto, wi th a ci vi l status of si ngl e;

In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a Decree of Di vorce and
purportedl y issued to Jorge de Peri o as petiti oner by the Famil y District Court of Harri s
Count y, Texas (247
t h
Judici al District), it was ordered, adj udged and decreed, that the bonds
of matrimony heretofore existi ng between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby
Dissol ved, Cancel l ed and Annul led and the Peti ti oner is hereby granted a Di vorce.

Subsequentl y, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marri age with herei n
complai nants brother, Manuel P. Di ego, sol emni zed before the Rev. Fr. Cl emente T. Godoy,
parish priest of Dagupan Ci t y. The marri age contract shows that this time, the accused used
and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, agai n, wi th a ci vi l status of singl e.
[ 1]


The COURT orders her ACQUITTAL.

Compl ai nant herein al l eges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestl y
against the law and contrar y to the evi dence.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administrati vel y li abl e for knowi ngl y
renderi ng an unj ust j udgment and/or gross ignorance of the l aw?

Held: Yes. Knowi ngl y rendering an unj ust j udgment is a criminal offense defi ned and
penal i zed under Articl e 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to l ie, i t must be
proved that the j udgment is unj ust and that the j udge knows that it is unj ust.

This Court reiterates that in order to hol d a j udge l iable, it must be shown that the j udgment i s
unj ust and that it was made wi th conscious and del iberate i ntent to do an inj ustice. That good
faith is a defense to the charge of knowingl y rendering an unj ust j udgment remai ns the l aw.
[ ]


There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowi ngl y rendering an unj ust j udgment.
A j udge may not be held administrati vel y accountabl e for ever y erroneous order or decisi on
he renders. The error must be gross or patent, mal ici ous, del iberate or i n evident bad
faith. It is onl y i n thi s l atter i nstance, when the j udge acts fraudul entl y or with gross
ignorance, that administrati ve sancti ons are cal led for as an imperati ve dut y of this Court.

In any event, respondent j udge deserves to be appropriatel y penal i zed for his regrettabl y
erroneous action i n connecti on wi th Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court.

Appl yi ng these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge
bei ng gross and patent, t he same constitutes ignorance of the l aw of a nature suffici ent to
warrant disci pl i nar y acti on.



DE VERA vs. PELAYO (G.R. No. 137354)

Facts: Peti ti oner is not a member of the bar. Possessi ng some awareness of legal pri nci ples
and procedures, he represents himself i n this peti tion.
On August 28, 1996, petiti oner i nsti tuted with the Regi onal Tri al Court, Pasi g Ci t y a speci al
ci vi l action for certiorari , prohibiti on and mandamus to enj oi n the municipal trial court from
proceeding with a complai nt for ej ectment against petitioner.
]
When the Judge ori gi nal l y
33

assi gned to the case i nhi bited himself, the case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Benj amin
V. Pelayo.
]

On Jul y 9, 1998, the trial court deni ed petiti oners appl ication for a temporar y restrai ning
order. Petitioner moved for reconsiderati on. The court deni ed the same on September 1,
1998.
[

On September 23, 1998, petiti oner fi l ed wi th the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit -
complai nt
[
agai nst Judge Pel ayo, accusing him of viol ati ng Articl es 206
[
and 207
[
of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019.
[ 9]

On October 2, 1998, Associ ate Graft Investi gati on Officer, Erl inda S. Roj as submitted an
Eval uati on Report recommending referral of petiti oners complai nt to the Supreme Court.
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Apotadera approved the recommendati on.
On October 13, 1998, t he Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to the Court
Administrator, Supreme Court.
[ 12]

On November 6, 1998, peti tioner moved for the reconsi derati on of the Evaluati on Report.
On Januar y 4, 1999, the Ombudsman deni ed the moti on for reconsi deration.
[ 13]


Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has j urisdicti on to entertai n criminal charges f il ed
against a j udge of the regi onal trial court i n connecti on with his handl i ng of cases before the
court?

Held: No. We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman di d not exercise his power in an arbitrar y or despoti c manner by reason of
passion, prej udice or personal hosti l it y.
[ 16]
There was no evasion of posi ti ve dut y. Neither was
there a virtual refusal to perform the dut y enj oined by l aw.
[ 17]





LOUIS VUITTON vs. VILLANUEVA ( A.M. No. MTJ-92-643)

FACTS: In Crimi nal Case No. XXXVI -62431, entitl ed "Peopl e of the Phi l i ppi nes vs. Jose V.
Rosari o", Louis Vui tton, S.A. accused the latter of unfair competi tion as defi ned by paragraph
1 of Articl e 189, Revised Penal Code.

From the records of the case, the evi dence presented and the arguments advanced by the
parti es, the Court fi nds that the compl aini ng wi tness i n this case i s the representati ve and
attorney-i n-fact, counsel of Louis Vuitton, S.A. French Company with busi ness address at
Paris, France; that pri vat e compl ai nant is suing the accused for the protecti on of the trade
mark Louis Vui tton and the L.V. l ogo which are dul y registered wi th the Phi li ppi ne Patent
Office;

The accused, on the other hand, claimed: that he is not the manufacturer or sel ler of the
sei zed articl es; that the sai d articl es were sol d i n the store by a concessi onaire by the name
of Erl inda Tan who is doi ng business under the name of Hi -Tech Bags and wal l ets.

The Court fi nds that the prosecution fai led to prove that the essential elements of unfai r
competition, to wi t:
a. That the offender gi ves his goods the general appearance of the goods of another
manufacturer or deal er;
b. That the general appearance is shown i n the (1) goods themsel ves, or i n the (2) wrappi ng
of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or i n (4) any other feature of their a
(sic) appearance.
In the compl ai nt, pointed out that the respondent Judge di d not consider the moti on of
February 11, 1990. Thi s omission of respondent j udge al l egedl y consti tuted a clear and gross
viol ation of his ministeri al dut y in order to al l ow the accused to escape criminal l iabil i ty.
Furthermore, compl ainant cl aimed that the respondent j udge' s fai lure to resol ve the moti on
exposed his gross i gnorance of the l aw.
34

Compl ai nant also assai led respondent j udge' s findi ngs that there was no unfair competiti on
because the el ements of the crime were not met, and that he sei zed articl es did not come
close to the appearance of a genui ne Louis Vui tton product, the counterfei t i tems havi ng been
poorl y, done.
Thirdl y, compl ai nant cri tici zed respondent j udge for his fail ure to consider the all eged lack of
credibi l it y of Fel ix Li zardo, the l one witness for the defense, in rendering the assai led
decision.
Lastl y, compl ai nant poi nted out that respondent j udge violated the constitutional mandate that
decisions shoul d be rendered within three (3) months from submission of the case. It
appeared that the deci sion was date June 28, 1991 but it was promul gated onl y on October
25, 1991.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent j udge is gui l ty of knowi ngl y renderi ng a manifestl y unj ust
j udgment.

HELD: No.In this case, We are constrained to hol d that compl ai nant fai led to substanti ate its
claims that respondent j udge rendered an unj ust j udgment knowi ngl y. It merel y rel i ed on the
fai lure of respondent j udge to menti oned the motion i n the decision, on his all eged rel iance on
the testimony of defense witness and on the del ay i n the promul gati on of the case. But they
are not enough to show that the j udgment was unj ust and was mal ici ousl y rendered.
A j udge cannot be subj ected to li abi l it y ci vi l , criminal , or administrati ve for any hi s
official acts, not matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.
22
I n Pabal an
vs. Guevarra,
23
the Supreme Court spoke of the rati onal e for this immunit y.
In this case, The Court finds that the facts and the expl anati on rendered by Judge Vi l l anueva
j ustif y his absol uti on from the charge. However, whil e he is held to be not guil t y, he shoul d
avoid acts which tend to cast doubt on his integrit y. Moreover, his del ay i n the promul gation
of this case deserves a reprimand from this Court as i t is contrar y to the mandate of our
Constituti on which enshri nes the right of the l i ti gants to a speedy dispositi on of their cases.






























35

UNJUST INTERLOCUTORY ORDER ( ART.206)

LAYOLA vs. GABO ( A. M. NO. RTJ-00 1524)

FACTS: Complai nant Luci a F. Layol a fil ed a complai nt with the Office of the Deput y of the
Ombudsman for the Mi li tar y, chargi ng SPO2 Leopoldo M. German and PO2 Tomasito H.
Gagui, members of the Santa Mari a Pol ice Station, Santa Mari a, Bul acan, wi th homici de for
the death of compl ainant' s son.

The complai nant al l eged that the respondent j udge directed that accused SPO2 German be
hel d i n the custody of his immedi ate superior, the Chief of Pol ice of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an
order sans any l egal and factual basis, instead of orderi ng the arrest of the sai d accused
bei ng indicted for murder, a hei nous and non-bail abl e crime. Layol a i nitiated a compl ai nt
chargi ng Presidi ng Judge Basi l io R. Gabo, Jr. of Branch 11 of the Regi onal Trial Court in
Mal ol os, Bulacan, with a vi ol ati on of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issui ng an unj ust
interl ocutor y order, and with gross i gnorance of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent j udge issued an unj ust interl ocutor y order by granting the
peti tion of the Chi ef of Pol ice, Sta. Mari a Stati on to take custody of accused SPO2 German.

Held: No. The Office of the Court Administrator found the charge to be unfounded. Knowi ngl y
renderi ng an unj ust i nterl ocutor y order must have the elements: (1) that the offender is a
j udge and (2) that he performs any of the fol lowi ng acts: (a) he knowingl y renders unj ust
interl ocutor y order or decree, or (b) he renders a manifestl y unj ust interl ocutor y order or
decree through i nexcusabl e negli gence or ignorance.
There was no evidence that the respondent j udge issued the questioned order knowing it to
be unj ust; and nei ther i s there any proof of consci ous and del iberate intent to do an i nj ustice.































36

DIRECT BRIBERY ( ART. 210)

MARIFOSQUE vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 156685)

Facts: This is a petiti on for review on certi orari, which assai ls the September 23, 2002,
decision and the January 3, 2003, Resol uti on of the Sandiganbayan f inding petiti oner Nazari o
Marifosque gui l t y beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bri bery, defi ned and
penal i zed under the 2nd paragraph of Articl e 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Peti tioner
averred that said money was not for him but as reward money for the pol ice asset who
demanded that he be gi ven 350 pesos per cyl i nder tank. Petitioner further averred that he
was onl y col lecting on behalf of the pol ice asset and that he already gave an advance of
1,000 pesos to sai d asset and onl y col l ecting the balance of 4,800.
The Sandi ganbayan rendered a decisi on convicti ng peti ti oner of direct bri bery.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed Direct Bri ber y?

Held: Yes. Petiti oner cannot fei gn i nnocence and profess good fai th since all the indici a poi nt
to his gui lt and malici ous i ntent. Petitioner did not i ntroduce his asset or menti on his name to
Yu So Pong or his daughter at the time of the i ll egal transacti on. His claim that he previousl y
gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedl y represented a partial payment of the reward
money, was not corroborated by his asset. One of the arresti ng CIS officers testifi ed that
peti tioner attempted to gi ve back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest
him, which showed that he was wel l aware of the il l egali t y of his transaction because had he
been engaged i n a legi timate deal , he woul d have faced courageousl y the arresti ng officers
and indignantl y protested the violation of hi s person, which is the normal reaction of an
innocent man. His sol icitous and overl y eager conduct i n pursui ng the robber y inci dent, even
though he was no longer on dut y, betrays an i ntenti on not altogether al truistic and denotes a
corrupt desire on his part to obtai n pecuniar y benefits from an i ll egal transacti on. The
peti tioner' s persistence i n obtai ning the monetar y reward for the asset al though the latter was
no l onger compl ai ni ng about the 1000 pesos that he supposedl y recei ved earl i er.



AGUIRRE vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. L-56013)

Facts: On or about November 24, 1978, i n the Ci ty of Davao, the accused Li wanag Aguirre,
bei ng then an Acting Deput y Sheriff of the NLRC was charged of having wi llful l y, unl awful l y,
and fel oni ousl y demanded and obtai ned from Hermogenes Hanginon, an employee of the
business firm Guardsman Securit y Agency, the sum of 50 pesos, as a consi derati on for the
sai d accused refrai ning, as he di d refrai n, from immediatel y implementing a Writ of Executi on
of a f inal j udgment of the NLRC Regional Branch XI agai nst said securi ty agency.

The Sandiganbayan convicted the peti ti oner as princi pal of the crime charged. Petiti oner
assai led that the j udgment of convicti on upon the ground that the evidence presented fai l ed to
prove his gui l t of the crime charged beyond reasonabl e doubt and that the Sandi ganbayan
erred i n gi vi ng wei ght to the uncorroborated testimony of the l one prosecuti on witness.

Issue: Whether or not the accused Aguirre be hel d guil t y beyond reasonabl e doubt of the
crime of briber y, wherei n the convicti on was anchored upon the uncorroborated testimony of a
single prosecuti on witness?

Held: No. In this case, there are aspects of the testimony of the sol e wi tness that do not
inspire bel i ef. It appears unnatural for the peti ti oner to have demanded a bri be from him, a
mere employee of the securit y agency, wi thout authorit y to accept any wri t or l egal paper and
wi thout money. Furthermore, no entrapment was empl oyed i n this situati on where it coul d
have been qui te easy to catch the petitioner red handed wi th the bri be money. There is a
naggi ng doubt as to whether the testimony of Hangi non, the sol e wi tness for the prosecution,
proves the peti ti oner' s guil t. Thus, i n the absence of evi dence establ ishi ng the gui lt of the
37

peti tioner beyond reasonabl e doubt, this Court finds that the j udgment of conviction under
revi ew must yi eld to the constitutional presumpti on of i nnocence.



MANIPON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN ( G.R. No. L-58889)

Facts: In its decisi on dated September 30, 1981, the Sandi ganbayan found accused
Nathani el S. Mani pon, Jr., 31, gui l t y of direct bri bery, Manipon came to this Court on petition
for review on certi orari seeki ng the reversal of the j udgment of convicti on. The Court
dismissed the peti tion, "the questi on raised bei ng factual and for l ack of merit."
1
However,
upon motion for reconsi derati on, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave due course to
the peti tion.
2


Nathani el S. Mani pon, Jr., a deput y sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Bagui o Cit y and
Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Mi nister of Labor .

Pursuant to that assi gnment, Manipon sent a notice to the COMTRUST garnishi ng the bank
accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hol d the accounts. For one reason or another,
Manipon di d not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor di d he exert efforts to
immedi atel y satisf y the j udgment under executi on.

Dominguez sought Mani pon' s help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon tol d
Dominguez that the money coul d not be wi thdrawn.

However, when the two met again, Manipon tol d Dominguez that he "can remedy the
wi thdrawal so they wi l l have something f or the New Year." Dominguez i nterpreted this to
mean that Manipon woul d withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez
agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon l eft,
Dominguez confi ded the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisi to Sanchez. They t hen
hatched up a pl an to entrap Mani pon by paying him with marked money the next day. Col .
Sanchez and a Col . Aguana were abl e to put up P700.00 in fift y-peso bil ls which were then
authenticated, xeroxed and dusted wi th fl uorescent powder.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused committed direct bri ber y?

Held: Yes. Mani pon mai ntains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He
sai d that in 1978 he and Flora had levi ed execution against several vehicles owned by
Dominguez, an act which the latter had openl y resented.
The defense theor y is so i ncredi bl e that i t leaves no doubt whatsoever i n the Court' s mind
that Mani pon is gui lt y of the crime charged.

It is ver y strange i ndeed that for such an i mportant agreement that woul d modif y a f inal
j udgment, no one took the bother of putti ng it down on paper. Of course Manipon woul d have
us bel ieve that there was no need for it because he trusted Domi nguez and Tabek. And yet
di d he not also cl aim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there
was reall y an agreement to alter the j udgment, why di d he not i nform the l abor arbiter about i t
considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of executi on? Manipon
could not gi ve satisfactor y explanations because there was no such agreement in the first
pl ace.

The temporar y recei pt
20
adduced by Manipon, as correctl y poi nted out by the Sol icitor
General , is a l ast -minute fabricati on to provi de proof of the al leged agreement for the tri al
payment of the j udgment debt. Contrar y to Mani pon' s cl aim, it i s hard to bel i eve that
Dominguez was not i nterested in getti ng said temporary recei pt because precisel y that was
the proof he needed to show that he had partial l y compl i ed with his legal obl i gati on.
Indeed, Manipon' s behavi or at the ver y outset, had been marked wi th irregul ari ties. As earl y
as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at
38

Comtrust, but he did not notif y the labor arbi ter so that the correspondi ng order for the
payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn
immedi atel y to satisf y the j udgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was ver y
busy i n the sheriff' s office, attendi ng to vol uminous exhi bi ts and court proceedi ngs. That was
also the same excuse he gave for not i nforming the l abor arbi ter of the novati on. In fact he
candi dl y admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC concerning the garnishment. He
returned the writ unsati sfied onl y on Februar y 20, 1980 al though by its express t erms, it was
returnabl e wi thi n thi rt y days from October 29, 1979.
22
Cl earl y, Mani pon had pl anned to get
Dominguez to acqui esce to a consi derati on for l ifting the garnishment order.
Dwel l ing on one l ast poi nt, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was i l legal l y sei zed
because there was no val i d March warrant and therefore i nadmissibl e.
The argument is untenabl e. The rule that searches and sei zures must be supported by a vali d
warrant is not an absol ute rule. There are at l east three exceptions to the r ule recogni zed i n
this j urisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicl e,
and 3) sei zure of evidence i n plai n view. This f al ls on the first excepti on.



ARANETA vs. CA (G.R. No. L-46638)

Facts: Att y. Aqui li na Araneta was charged wi th vi olation of Secti on 3, Subsecti on B of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the Ci t y of Cabanatuan, Phi l ippines, and
wi thi n the j urisdicti on of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
employed as Hearing Officer in the Department of Labor, wi th stati on at Cabanatuan Ci t y, and
therefore, a publ ic officer, di d then and there wi lful l y, unlawf ul l y, and fel oniousl y demand and
recei ve for herself the amount of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Phi l ippine Currency, from
one Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco, as a condi ti on and/or consi derati on for her to act on the
claim for compensati on benefits fi led by the sai d Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco pertai ni ng to
the death of her husband, which cl aim was then pendi ng i n the office wherei n the
abovenamed accused was empl oyed and i n which, under the l aw, she has the offici al capacit y
to i ntervene.

After trial , the lower court convicted the petitioner as charged.
The respondent appel l ate court modified the decisi on of the lower court and convicted the
peti tioner i nstead of the crime of bri ber y under the second paragraph of Articl e 210 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether peti ti oner is gui lt y of bri bery.

Held: No. The peti ti oner submits that the criminal intent originated in the mind of the
entrappi ng person and for which reason, no convicti on can be had agai nst her. This argument
has no meri t.

The petiti oner confuses entrapment with insti gati on. There is entrapment when law officers
employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehensi on of the cri minal whi le in the actual
commission of the crime. There is i nstigati on when the accused was i nduced to commit the
crime (Peopl e vs. Gal icia, [CA], 40 OG 4476). The difference in the nature of the two li es i n
the ori gin of the criminal i ntent. In entrapment, the mens rea ori gi nates from the mind of the
criminal. The Idea and the resol ve to commit the crime comes from hi m. In insti gation, the law
officer concei ves the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
Idea and carri es it i nto execution.

The legal effects of entrapment and insti gation are also different. As already stated,
entrapment does not exempt the criminal from l iabil i t y. Insti gation does.
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.- While i t has been said that the practice of entrappi ng
persons into crime for the purpose of instituti ng criminal prosecutions is to be depl ored, and
whi le i nstigati on, as disti nguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
39

sometimes been hel d to prevent the act from bei ng criminal or punishable, the general rule is
that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that faci l ities f or its commission were
purposel y placed in hi s way, or that the cri minal act was done at the ' decoy solici tati on of
persons seeking to expose the crimi nal, or that detecti ves fei gni ng complici t y i n the act were
present and apparentl y assisting i n its commission. Especial l y is this true i n that class of
cases where the offense is one of a kind habi tual l y committed, and the sol ici tation merel y
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere decepti on by the detecti ve wi ll not shi eld
defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from t he i nfluence of the i nsti gati on of
the detecti ve.

The contenti on of the petiti oner was squarel y answered i n Uni ted States vs. Panl i l io (28 Phi l .
608) where this Court hel d that the fact that the i nformati on in i ts preamble charged a
viol ation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us f rom finding the accused gui lt y of a vi ol ati on of
an articl e of the Penal Code. To the same effect is our ruli ng i n United States vs. Guzman (25
Phi l. 22) where the appel lant was convicted of the crime of estafa i n the l ower court, but on
appeal, he was i nstead convicted of the crime of embezzl ement of publ ic funds as defi ned and
penal i zed by Act No. 1740.

As long as the information clearl y recites al l the el ements of the crime of briber y and the facts
proved duri ng the trial show i ts havi ng been committed beyond reasonable doubt, an error i n
the designation of the crime' s name is not a deni al of due process.



SORI ANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN ( G.R. No. L-65952)

Facts: Thomas N. Tan was accused of qual i fied theft i n a compl ai nt l odged wi th the Cit y
Fiscal of Quezon Ci t y. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assi gned for
investi gati on to the peti ti oner who was then an Assistant Cit y Fiscal . In the course of the
investi gati on the petiti oner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the pric e for dismissi ng the
case. Tan reported the demand to the Nati onal Bureau of Investi gati on which set up an
entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to rai se the required amount onl y P2,000.00 in bil l s
were marked by the NBI which had to suppl y one-half thereof . The entrapment succeeded and
an i nformati on was fi led with the Sandi ganbayan i n Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as
fol lows:

The undersigned Tanodbayan Speci al Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for Viol ati on
of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti -Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

After trial the Sandi ganbayan rendered a decisi on finding accused Lauro G. Sori ano, Jr.,
GUILTY beyond reasonabl e doubt, as Princi pal i n the Informati on, for Vi olati on of Secti on 3,
paragraph (b), of Republ ic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti -Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
A motion to reconsider the decision was deni ed by the Sandi ganbayan; hence the instant
peti tion.

Issue: Whether or not accused is guil t y of Bri ber y?

Held: Yes. The princi pal issue is whether or not the i nvestigati on conducted by the petiti oner
can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" wi thi n the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No.
3019. On this issue the petiti on is hi ghl y impressed wi th meri t.
The peti ti oner states:

Assuming in grati a argumenti, petitioner' s gui lt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bri bery
defi ned and penal i zed under the provisi on of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a
viol ation of Secti on 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
40

The evi dence for the prosecuti on clearl y and undoubtedl y support, if at al l the offense of
Direct Bri ber y, which is not the offense charged and is not l ikewise incl uded in or i s
necessari l y included i n the offense charged, which is for viol ation of Section 3, subparagraph
(b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecuti on showed that: the accused is a publ i c
officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was al legedl y sol ici ted, P2,000.00 of which was
al l egedl y recei ved, the peti ti oner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complai nt
pendi ng prel iminar y investigati on before him, which may or may not consti tute a crime; that
the act of dismissing the criminal complai nt pendi ng before peti ti oner was related to the
exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarit y that the offense
proved, if at al l is Direct Bri ber y. (Petiti on, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
A readi ng of the above-quoted provision woul d show that the term ' transacti on' as used
thereof is not l imited i n i ts scope or meani ng to a commercial or business transacti on but
incl udes al l kinds of transacti on, whether commercial, ci vi l or administrati ve i n nature,
pendi ng with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act woul d have so stated i n the
"Defi ni tion of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it di d not, perforce l eaving no other i nterpretati on
than that the expressed purpose and obj ect is to embrace al l kinds of transaction between the
government and other part y wherei n the publ ic officer would i ntervene under the l aw.
(Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvi ous that the investigati on conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Nei ther was
it a transaction because this term must be construed as anal ogous to the term which pr ecedes
it. A transaction, l ike a contract, is one whi ch i nvol ves some consideration as i n credit
transacti ons and this el ement (consi derati on) i s absent i n the i nvesti gati on conducted by the
peti tioner.
In the l ight of the f oregoi ng, We agree wi th the peti ti oner that i t was error for the
Sandi ganbayan to have convicted him of viol ati ng Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The peti tioner also cl aims that he cannot be convicted of briber y under the Revised Penal
Code because to do so woul d be vi olati ve of as constitutional ri ght to be i nformed of the
nature and cause of the accusati on agai nst him. Wrong. A reading of the information which
has been reproduced herei n cl earl y makes out a case of bri bery so that the peti ti oner cannot
claim depri vati on of the ri ght to be i nformed.



























41

INDIRECT BRIBERY ( ART. 211)
FORMILLEZA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 75160)
Facts: Peti ti oner Leonor Formil l eza has been with the government service for around 20
years. On the other hand, a certai n Mrs. Estrel la Muti a was an employee of the NIA. Her
appoi ntment was coterminous wi th a proj ect but nonetheless she conti nued t o work despi te
completi on of the said proj ect.
Mrs. Muti a reported to the Phi l ippine Constabul ar y (PC) authoriti es that petitioner refused to
attend to her appointment papers unless the l atter were gi ven some money. The PC offici al s
told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the petiti oner. Two entrapment operati ons were
pl anned against petitioner. The first of which fail ed and on the second where the peti ti oner
was arrested despite her obj ections.

Issue: Whether the facts and circumstances of the case substanti al to convict t he accused
gui lt y of indirect bri bery defined under Articl e 211 of t he Revised Penal Code.

Held: The essenti al i ngredient of i ndirect bri ber y as defi ned i n Arti cle 211 of the Revised
Penal Code
10
is that the publ ic officer concerned must have accepted the gift or materi al
consideration. There must be a clear intenti on on the part of the publ ic officer to take the gif t
so offered and consi der the same as his own propert y from then on, such as putti ng away the
gift for safekeepi ng or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other
sign, ci rcumstance or act to show such acceptance is not suffici ent to lead the court to
conclude that the cri me of indirect bri ber y has been committed. To hold otherwise wi ll
encourage unscrupulous indi vi duals to frame up public officers by si mpl y putting within thei r
physical custody some gift, money or other propert y.

As the peti ti oner was admittedl y handed the money, this explai ns why she was positi ve for
ul tra-vi ol et powder. It i s possibl e that she i ntended to keep the supposed bribe money or may
have had no intenti on to accept the same. These possibi l ities exist but We are not certain.
Moral certai nt y, not absol ute certaint y, is needed to support a j udgment of conviction, Moral
certai nt y is a certai nt y that convi nces and sati sfies the reason and conscience of those who
are to act upon a given matter.
14
Without thi s standard of certai nt y, it may not be said that
the gui lt of the accused i n a criminal proceedi ng has been proved beyond reasonabl e doubt.























42

CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICI ALS ( ART. 212)
CHUA vs. NUESTRO (A.M. No. P-88-256)
Facts: Compl ai nant Ri na V. Chua fi led an administrati ve charge agai nst the respondent for
al l egedl y del ayi ng the enforcement of the writ of executi on i n her favor after demandi ng and
getting from her the sum of 1500 pesos.On September 12, 1988, when the court issued a wri t
of executi on, Chua and counsel asked respondent Deput y-Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro to
immedi atel y enforce the writ of execution agai nst the defendant, and for the purpose, they
agreed to gi ve 1000 pesos to the r espondent. Respondent recei ved the amount of 1000 pesos
on September 12, 1988; however, the next day, they saw the respondent talking wi th counsel
of defendant and that the respondent was hesitantin proceeding to carr y out the wri t of
execution. Respondent even asked for a addi ti onalamount of P500.00; consequentl y, i n the
afternoon of the same day, respondent went to the premises i n question and when he arri ved
there, but he was tol d by the j udge not to proceed because a supersede as bond was f il ed.
Neverthel ess, he found the premises locked, and at the i nsistence of the compl ai nant, they
broke the padl ock and entered porti on B of the premises. Later, counsel for defendant arri ved
and showed them the offici al receipt of payment of the supersede as bond and s o he
discontinued the execution proceedi ngs.

Issue: Whether Chua and counsel be charged of corrupti on of publ ic official when they gave
to therespondent the amount of 1500 pesos in consideration of enforcing the writ of
execution.

Held: While we cannot f ault the sheriff for his hesi tance to immedi atel y carr y out the writ of
execution because the defendant sti l l had time to fi l e supersedeas bond to stay execution, we
find dul y proved by preponderance of evidence that the respondent Deput y Sheriff Edgardo D.
Nuestro recei ved the amount of P1,500.00 from the compl ainant and her l awyer as a
consideration for the performance of his work. This amount is distinct from the sheriffs fee
and expenses of execution and was not intended for that purpose. It was indeed a bri be gi ven
and recei ved by respondent deput y sheriff from the complai nant.



























43

MALVERSATION ( ART. 217)

TABUENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (268 SCRA 332)

Facts: Through their separate petiti ons for revi ew,

Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta
appeal the Sandiganbayan decisi on dated October 12, 1990,

as wel l as the Resol ution dated
December 20. 1991

denyi ng reconsideration, convicti ng them of mal versation under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code.

There were three (3) criminal cases fil ed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total
amount of P55 Mi l l ion was taken on three (3) separate dates of Januar y, 1986. Tabuena
appears as the princi pal accused he bei ng charged i n all three (3) cases.

Gathered from the documentar y and testi monial evi dence are the fol lowi ng essential
antecedents:

Then President Marcos i nstructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directl y to the president' s
office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phi li ppi ne Nati onal Constr ucti on Corporati on
(PNCC), to which Tabuena repl i ed, " Yes, si r, I wi ll do i t ." About a week later, Tabuena
recei ved from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then pri vate secretar y of Marcos, a Presi denti al
Memorandum dated Januar y 8, 1986 (herei nafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum)
rei terati ng in black and white such verbal i nstructi on.

In obedi ence to Presi dent Marcos' verbal instructi on and memorandum, Tabuena, with the
hel p of Dabao and Peral ta, caused the rel ease of P55 Mi l l ion of MIAA funds by means of
three (3) withdrawals (Januar y 10, 16 and 31, 1986).

The disbursement of the P55 Mi l l ion was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themsel ves,
"out of the ordi nar y" and "not based on the normal procedure".

With the rej ection by the Sandiganbayan of their cl aim of good faith which ultimatel y l ed to
their conviction, Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors

committed by the
Sandi ganbayan for this Court' s consi derati on.

Issue: Whether or not the j ustif yi ng circumstance of obedi ence to a l awful order be
appreci ated i n absol ving the appel l ants in the crime charged?

Held: The Court reversed the rul ing of the Sandi ganbayan. Accused Tabuena and Peral ta are
ACQUITTED. It is settl ed that good faith is a val i d defense i n a prosecuti on for mal versati on
for i t woul d negate criminal i ntent on the part of the accused.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the wi thdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faul ted if he had to obey and strictl y compl y
wi th the presidential di recti ve, and to argue otherwise is somethi ng easi er said than done.
Marcos was undeni abl y Tabuena' s superi or the former being then the President of the
Republic who unquesti onabl y exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA
and PNCC.


Tabuena therefore is enti tled to the j ustif yi ng circumstance of "Any person who acts i n
obedi ence to an order i ssued by a superi or for some l awful purpose."


Tabuena had reasonabl e ground to bel i eve that the Presi dent was entitl ed to recei ve the P55
Mi l l ion since he was certai nl y aware that Marcos, as Chi ef Executi ve, exercised supervision
and control over government agenci es. And the good fai th of Tabuena in havi ng deli vered the
money to the Presi dent' s office (thru Mrs. Gi menez), in strict compl iance with the MARCOS
Memorandum, was not at all affected even if i t l ater turned out that PNCC never recei ved the
money. Thus, i t has been sai d that: Good faith i n the payment of publ i c funds rel i eves a publ i c
officer from the crime of malversati on. The pri nci ples underl yi ng all that has been sai d above
44

in exculpation of Tabuena equall y appl y to Peral ta i n relation to the P5 Mi l l ion for which he i s
bei ng hel d accountabl e, i . e., he acted in good faith when he, upon the directi ve of Tabuena,
hel ped faci li tate the withdrawal of P5 Mil l i on of the P55 Mi l l ion of the MIAA funds.
In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the Presi dent and bears the
signature of the Presi dent himself, the highest offici al of the l and. It carri es wi th i t the
presumpti on that i t was regularl y issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patentl y lawf ul
for no l aw makes the payment of an obl i gati on il l egal. This fact, coupl ed wi th the urgent tenor
for i ts execution constrai ns one to act swiftl y wi thout questi on. Obedi enti a est l egis essentia.



DAVALOS vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 145229)

Facts: On Januar y 14, 1988, petiti oner Daval os, as suppl y officer of the Office of the
Provi nci al Engineer of Mari nduque, recei ved from the provinci al cashi er a cash advance of
18000 pesos forthe procurement of working tools for a certai n NALGO proj ect. Petitioner' s
receipt of theamount is evi denced by his signature appeari ng i n Disbursement Voucher No.
103-880-08.Two demand letters were recei ved by the petiti oner from the Provi nci al Treasurer
to submit al i quidati on of the 18000 pesos cash advance. The peti ti oner fai l ed to do so.

Issue: Whether the petiti oner be hel d gui lt y of malversati on of public funds; and- Whether the
return of the misappropriated amount exti nguish the criminal l i abi l it y of theoffender .

Held: The fai lure of a publ ic officer to have dul y forthcoming any publ i c funds or propert y wi th
whichhe is chargeabl e, upon demand by any dul y authori zed officer, shal l be prima faci e
evi dence thathe has put such missing fund or propert y to personal uses. There can be no
dispute about thepresence of the first three el ements. Petitioner is a public officer occupyi ng
the posi tion of asuppl y officer at the Office of the Provincial Engi neer of Mari nduque. In that
capaci t y, herecei ves money or property bel ongi ng to the provi nci al government for which he is
bound toaccount.In mal versati on of public funds, payment, indemnif ication, or reimbursement
of fundsmisappropri ated, after the commission of the crime, does not exti nguish the criminal
l iabi l it y of the offender which, at most, can merel y affect the accused' s ci vi l li abi l it y and be
considered amitigati ng circumstance bei ng analogous to vol unt ar y surrender.



CHAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN ( G. R. No. 149613)

Facts: Peti tioner Pamela Chan seeks a reversal of the Sandi ganbayan decisi on of August 28,
2001 fi ndi ng her gui lt y of Mal versation of Publ i c Funds under Articl e 217.
A routi ne audit examination of the accountabi l it y of the peti ti oner was conducted. The audit
was conducted during the l eave of the peti ti oner. A second audi t was conducted, where the
auditor found a shortage i n petitioners cash accountabi l it y. A demand l etter was issued to the
peti t ioner to restitute the missi ng funds and expl ain the shortage.

Petitioner was thus i ndi cted before the Regional Trial Court for Mal versation of Public Funds.

Issue: Whether peti ti oner is gui lt y of mal versation of publ ic funds.

Held: The burden of proof that the subj ect audit reports contai n errors sufficient to meri t a re-
audit l ies wi th petiti oner. What degree of error suffices, there is no hard and fast rule. While
COA Memorandum 87-511 dated October 20, 1987
[ 13]
(which, as ref lected i n the above-quoted
Deput y Ombudsmans Order of Jul y 28, 1997,
[ 14]
was ci ted by COA Director Al qui zal as when
he opposed peti tioners Moti on for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigati on before the
Ombudsman) recogni zes that a re-audit may be conducted i n certain instances, i t does not
specif y or ci te what those instances are.
45

The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitioners account the shortage in
the col l ections actual l y done by Bas.
Petitioner, nonethel ess, could have shown that she was not remiss i n her supervisi on of Bas,
by way of rebutting the disputable presumpti on i n Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
which states:
The fai l ure of a publ ic officer to have dul y forthcoming any publ ic funds or propert y wi th whi ch
he is chargeabl e, upon demand by any dul y authori zed officer, shal l beprima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
Petitioner, however, fai led to do so. Not onl y di d she omit to report the shortages of Bas to
the proper authorit y upon her discover y thereof; she even practical l y admitted to havi ng
assisted Bas in coveri ng up such shortages.

PEOPLE vs. TING LAN UY (G.R. NO. 157399)

Facts: Sometime i n Jul y 1990, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a publ ic accountabl e officer,
bei ng theTreasurer of National Power Corporati on (NAPOCOR), and Ernesto Gamus and
Jaime Ochoa, bothpubl ic officers bei ng the Manager of the Loan Management and Forei gn
Exchange Di vision andForei gn Trader Anal yst, respecti vel y, of NAPOCOR; and accused Raul
Gutierrez, a pri vatei ndi vidual being a foreign exchange trader, falsif y or cause t o be falsifi ed
the NAPOCOR' sappl icati on for managers checks wi th the Phi l ippine National Bank in the total
amount of 183 805 291.25 pesos, i ntended for the purchase of US dol lars from the Uni ted
Coconut Pl antersBank, by i nserting the account number of Raul Guti errez SA-111-121204-4,
when in truth and i nfact that the Payment Instructions when si gned by the NAPOCOR
authorities di d not i ndicate theaccount number of Raul Guti errez, thereby making alteration or
intercalati on in a genui nedocument which changes it s meaning, and wi th the use of the sai d
falsif ied commercialdocuments, accused succeeded in di verting, col lecti ng and recei ving the
sai d amount fromNAPOCOR, which they thereafter mal verse, embezzle, misappropri ate, and
convert to their ownpersonal use and benefi t to the damage and prej udice of the
NAPOCOR.Gamus, Uy, and Ochoa pleaded not gui lt y. Guti errez remained at l arge. Duri ng
pretri al, i t wasfound that Gamus does not have any custody to public funds. However,
because of preponderance of evi dence, he is ci vi l l y l iable for the damages.

Issue: Whether Ochoa be hel d gui lt y of malversati on thru falsification of commercial
document wi thoutviol ating his constitutional ri ght to due process and to be i nformed of the
accusation agai nsthim, when the information al leged wi llful and intenti onal commission of the
acts complai ned of,whereas the j udgment found him gui lt y of i nexcusable negl i gence
amounti ng to mal ice.

Held: The Sandi ganbayan rendered its deci sion, finding Ochoa gui l ty beyond reasonabl e
doubt of thecrime of mal versation thru falsification of commercial document and that, on the
ground of reasonable doubt, accused Ti ng Lan Uy, Jr., was acquitted of Mal versati on of publ i c
funds thrufalsification of commercial document.Mal versation may be committed either t hrough
a positi ve act of misappropriati on of publ ic fundsor propert y or passi vel y through negl i gence
by al l owi ng another to commit suchmisappropri ati on. The fel ony invol ves breach of publ i c
trust, and whether it is committedthrough deceit or negl i gence,
the l aw makes it puni shabl e and prescribes a uniform penalt y.Even when the information
charges wi l lful mal versation, conviction for mal versati on throughnegli gence may sti l l be
adj udged if the evi dence ul timatel y proves that mode of commission of the offense.





46

ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS ( ART. 220)


TETANGCO vs. OMBUDSMAN (G.R. NO. 156427)

Facts: This peti tion for certi orari seeks to annul and set asi de the Order of publ i c
respondentOmbudsman which dismissed the Compl ai nt of petitioner Amando Tetangco
against pri vaterespondent Mayor Jose L. Ati enza, Jr ., for vi ol ati on of Articl e 220 of the
Revised Penal Code(RPC).On March 8, 2002, petiti oner fi led hi s Compl ai nt before the
Ombudsman al l egi ng that on Januar y 26, 2001, pri vate respondent Mayor Atienza gave
P3,000 cash f inanci al assistanceto the chairman and P1,000 to each tano of Barangay
105, Zone 8, District I. Al legedl y, onMarch 5, 2001, Mayor Ati enza refunded P20,000 or the
total amount of the fi nancial assistance from the Cit y of Mani la when such disbursement was
not j ustified as a lawf ul expense.In his Counter -Affidavi t, Mayor Ati enza denied the al legations
and sought the dismissal of the Compl ai nt for lack of j urisdicti on and for forum-shopping. He
asserted that i t was theCommission on El ecti ons (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has
j urisdiction over the caseand the same case had previ ousl y been fi led before the COMELEC.
Furthermore, theCompl ai nt had no verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The
mayor maintainedthat the expenses were l egal and j ustifi ed, the same being supported by
disbursementvouchers, and these had passed prior audi t and accounti ng. The Investi gati ng
Officer recommended the dismissal of the Compl ai nt for lack of evi denceand meri t. The
Ombudsman adopted hi s recommendati on. The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over -al l
Deput y Ombudsman, l ikewise deni edpetiti oner s motion for reconsi deration.

Issue: Whether accused committed a viol ation of the anti -graft l aw.

Held: In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characteri zed asarbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evi dence to proveprobabl e
cause. Probabl e cause signifies a reasonabl e ground of suspicion supported bycircumstances
sufficientl y strong i n themselves to warrant a caut i ous mans bel i ef that theperson accused is
gui lt y of the offense wi th which he is charged.

Here, the Compl ai ntmerel y al leged that the di sbursement for fi nancial assistance was nei ther
authori zed by l awnor j ustified as a lawf ul expense. Compl ai nant di d not cite any l aw or
ordi nance thatprovi ded for an origi nal appropri ati on of the amount used for the f inanci al
assistance ci tedand that it was di verted from the appropri ati on i t was i ntended for. The
Compl ai nt charges Mayor Atienza wi th i l l egal use of publ ic funds. On this matter, Art.220 of
the Revised Penal Code provides:Art. 220. l legal use of publ ic funds or property. Any publi c
officer who shal l appl y anypublic fund or propert y under his administration to any publi c use
other than that for whi ch such fund or property were appropri ated by l aw or ordinance shal l
suffer the penal ty of pri sion correccional i n its minimum peri od or a fi ne rangi ng from one-half
to the total of thesum misappl i ed, if by reason of such misappl ication, any damages or
embarrassment shall have resulted to the publ i c service. In either case, the offender shal l also
suffer the penal tyof temporary speci al disqual ificati on.If no damage or embarrassment to the
public service has resul ted, the penalt y shal l be afi ne from 5 to 50 percent of the sum
misappl ied. The el ements of the offense, also known as technical malversati on, are: (1) the
offender isan accountabl e publ ic officer; (2) he appl ies public f unds or propert y under
hisadmi nistrati on to some publ ic use; and (3) the publ ic use for whi ch the public funds
orpropert y were appl i ed is different from the purpose for which they were
ori ginall yappropri ated by l aw or ordi nance. It i s clear that for technical mal versati on to exist,
it isnecessar y that publ ic funds or properties had been di verted to any publ ic use other
thanthat provided for by l aw or ordinance.

To constitute the crime, there must be a diversi on of the funds from the purpose for which
they had been ori ginall y appropri ated by l aw orordi nance.

Patentl y, the third el ement is not present i n thi s case.

47

DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ( ART. 247)

PEOPLE V. PUEDAN (G.R. No. 139576)

Facts: Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his grandson, Reymark, went to the house of appellant Luceno Tulo to
buy a piglet. Luceno was fashioning out a mortar for pounding palay near his house when Florencio and
Reymark arrived. Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to buy a piglet from him.

Appellant suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five times using a sharp pointed knife locally known as
plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed, Luceno fled towards the house of his neighbor. Young Reymark
ran back to his parents house and told his mother, Erlinda, what transpired.

Erlinda ran swiftly to Lucenos place but Florencio was already dead, bathed in his own blood and lying by the
side of the rice paddy. The body remained where it had fallen until the arrival of the police later that day.

Leah, wife of appellant, admitted having an illicit relationship with Florencio. Their relationship had been going
on for two years and was known in their Barangay. In the morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio came to
their house, while she was breastfeeding her child, and was looking for her husband.


Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to invoke the defense of death under exceptional circumstances under
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that by raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as his defense,
appellant admitted that he killed the victim.

By invoking this defense, appellant waives his right to the constitutional presumption of innocence and bears
the burden of proving the following: (1) that a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his
daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; (2) that he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical
injury in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his
wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised his wife and the victim in flagrante
delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter.

However, all that appellant established was the victim's promiscuity, which was inconsequential to the killing.
What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically opposed to the convincing
accounts of the prosecution witnesses.



PEOPLE VS. ABARCA (G.R. NO. L-74433)

Facts: Accused Francisco Abarca has a wife who had an il l icit relati onship with Khi ngsl ey
Paul Koh which started when he was revi ewi ng for the 1983 Bar exam in Mani la and his wife
was l eft in Tacl oban.
Upon reaching home, he found his wife Jenny and Khi ngsl ey Koh in the act of sexual
intercourse. When the wife noticed the accused, she pushed her paramour who got hi s
revol ver. The accused who was peeping above the bui ld-i n cabi net ran away.
He went to l ook for a firearm and got a rifle. He went back to his house but was not abl e to
find his wife and her paramour so he went to the mahj ong sessi on where Khi ngsl ey hangouts.
He found him pl ayi ng and then he fired at him 3 times with rifl e. Koh was hit.
Arnold and Li na Amparado who were occupyi ng the adj acent room of t he mahj ong room were
hi t as well . Koh died instantaneousl y but the spouses were abl e to survi ve due to time
medical assistance. Arnol d was hi t in the kidney. He was not able to work for 1 and months
because of his wounds and he was recei vi ng P1000 as sal ar y. He spent 15K for hospital whil e
his wife spent 1K for the same purpose.
48

The l ower court found the accused gui lt y of the complex crime of murder wi th double
frustrated murder and sentenced him to suffer death penalt y. However, consi deri ng the
circumstances of the crime, the RTC beli eves that accused is deservi ng of executi ve
clemency, not of ful l pardon but of substanti al if not radical reduction or commutati on of hi s
death sentence.

Issue: Whether the tri al court is correctl y convicted the accused of complex crime of murder
wi th double frustrated murder instead of entering a j udgment of convi cti on under Art. 247

Held: The accused is enti tled to the defense of death under excepti onal circumstance under
Art. 247 of RPC. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour i n
the act of il l icit copulati on.
The foregoi ng el ements of Art. 247 of RPC are present i n this case:
legal l y marri ed surprises spouse in the act of sex wi th another person; and
that he kil ls any or both of them i n the act or i mmediatel y after.

Although an hour has passed between the sexual act and the shooting of Koh, the shooting must be
understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. Articvle 247 only requires that
the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his
spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind
impulse and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of
the accused's rage.

Regarding the physical inj uries sustai ned by the Amparado spouses, the Supreme Court hel d
that the accused is onl y l iable for the crime of l ess seri ous physical inj uries thru s impl e
negli gence or imprudence under 2
nd
paragraph of Article 365, and not frustrated murder. The
accused did not have the i ntent to kil l the spouses. Although as a rul e, one committing an
offense is l i abl e for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. In this case, the accused was not committi ng murder when he
discharged rifl e upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder.



PEOPLE V. OYANIB (G.R. Nos. 130634-35)

Facts: Accused Manolito Oyanib and Tita Oyanib were married on February 3, 1979 and had two children,
Desilor and Julius.

In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two
children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas, not far from the place where
her family lived.

At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the
sala located at the ground floor of their house, they heard a commotion coming from the second floor rented
by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs
to check.

Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing
Jesus Esquierdo while sitting on the latter's stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When
Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.

Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the
hospital. She died on the way to the hospital.

Accused admitted the killings. However, he argued that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

49

Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to invoke the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code

Held: The Supreme Court acquitted the accused of the crime charged, finding that the accused is entitled to
the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is present 'where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.'"

Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person;
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse

The accused was able to prove all the foregoing elements.

There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must
convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter.

Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse. The accused
chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual
intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused.
He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he
stabbed his wife as well several times.

The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the opportunity to avail
himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v. Wagas:
"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife
creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be
justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to
only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter."




PEOPLE V. SABILUL ( G.R. No. L-3765)

Facts: In the afternoon of September 14, 1949, while appellant Moro Sabilul was plowing in the vicinity of his
house and, he asked his wife, Mora Mislayan, for some water.
The latter proceeded towards the creek, but no sooner had she arri ved at the pl ace than the
appel l ant heard a noise.

This caused the appellant to rush to the scene where he found Moro Lario wrestling with and on top of Mora
Mislayan who was shouting "don't, don't".

Whereupon, picking up a pira (a Yakan bladed weapon) which he noticed nearby, the appellant slashed Moro
Lario on the right side of the face.

Appellants wife ran away upon appellant's arrival.

Moro Lario also attempted to flee, but he was overtaken and slashed a few more times by the appellant, after
which Moro Lario fell and died.

50

Issue: Whether the defendant is guilty of murder for killing his wifes paramour

Held: The Supreme Court found appellant had killed Moro Lario in actual adultery with appellant's wife, and
thus was sentenced to destierro under article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

The murder was committed while the deceased Lario was in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
appellant's wife, Mora Mislayan.

In the main it is argued that, if appellant's wife was really forced by Moro Lario, she would not have run away
upon appellant's arrival.




PEOPLE V. GELAVER (G.R. NO. 95357)

Facts: Appellant was married to Victoria Pacinabao, with whom he begot four children. They lived together at
their conjugal home until July 3, 1987 when she abandoned her family to live with her paramour. He did not
know the name of his wife's paramour nor the name of the owner of the house where his wife and her
paramour had lived together.

On March 24, 1988, after appellant was informed by his daughter that his wife and paramour were living at a
house in front of the Sto. Nio Catholic Church, appellant immediately repaired to that place. Upon entering
the house, he saw his wife lying on her back and her paramour on top of her, having sexual intercourse. The
paramour took a knife placed on top of the bedside table and attacked appellant. The appellant was able to
wrest possession of the knife and then used it against the paramour, who evaded the thrusts of the appellant
by hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received the stab intended for the paramour.

Appellant also stabbed his wife because his mind had been "dimmed" or overpowered by passion and
obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act with her paramour.

Issue: Whether the appellant can invoke the exceptional circumstance under Art. 247

Held: Before Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code can be operative, the following requisites must be
present:
1) That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his daughter, the
latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person.
2) That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any
serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
3) That he has not promoted or facilitated that prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that
he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse."

Implicit in this exceptional circumstance is that the death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity.

In this case, the appellant failed to prove that he caught his wife and the latters paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse. There are several contradictions in appellant's testimony. It is contrary to human nature
appellant's claims that he went to confront the paramour of his wife unarmed and that he never learned the
name of the paramour inspite of the fact that his wife, allegedly, had been living with the paramour in the
same town for almost a year before the incident. Furthermore, as noted by the Solicitor General, the natural
thing for a person to do under the circumstances was to report to the police the reason for killing his wife.
However, in this case, appellant failed to inform the police that he killed his wife. Therefore, appellant is guilty
of parricide for killing his wife.




51


MURDER/HOMICIDE (ARTS. 248, 249)

PEOPLE V. ENGUITO (G.R. NO. 128812)

Facts: Appellant Thadeos Enguito bumped and hit the motoreala which Wilfredo Achumbre was riding. As a
consequence, his driver Felipe Requirme and his wife Rosita Requirme sustained bodily injuries while
Achumbre was able to run towards the railings at Marcos Bridge.

However, appellant with intent to kill Achumbre, immediately rammed and hit the latter with his driven vehicle
cutting the latters right leg. Unsatisfied, appellant further ran over Achumbre thereby causing mortal harm
which was the direct and immediate cause of instantaneous death of the latter.

Appellant was charged with murder with multiple less serious physical injuries.

Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of murder by use of a motor vehicle

Held: The Supreme Court held that appellant is guilty of complex crime of murder. The killing of Wilfredo
Achumbre was attended with the aggravating circumstance of by use of motor vehicle.

The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof.

Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is
belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the
crossing. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he
still continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased. Accused-appellant further
used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than 1 kilometer away from the place of the
incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.

Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still
continued his pursuit. Accused-appellant was allegedly "still very angry" while he was following, bumping and
pushing the motorela which was in front of him. Clearly, accused-appellant's state of mind after he was
mauled and before he crushed Achumbre to death was such that he was still able to act reasonably. In fact,
he admitted having seen a police mobile patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort to the dastardly act
which resulted in the death of Achumbre and in the injuries of the spouses Requerme.




PEOPLE V. WHISENHUNT (G.R. NO. 123391)

Facts: Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants condominium unit. The following day,
accused-appellants housemaid Demetrio Ravelo was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant
gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom. The accused-appellant and Ravelo collected the
dismembered body parts of Elsa and disposed of Elsas cadaver and personal belongings in Bataan.

Ravelo, after being convinced by his wife, reported the incident to the authorities. The police and the NBI
agents found the mutilated body parts a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, where Demetrio
pointed. The hair specimens found inside accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities
with hair taken from Elsas head, and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers
and in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type.

Accused appellant was charged with the crime of murder. The lower court convicted him as charged and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant is guilty of murder

52

Held: The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by outraging
and scoffing at the victims person or corpse. This circumstance was both alleged in the information and
proved during the trial.

The mere decapitation of the victim's head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus
qualifying the killing to murder

In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then,
he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on
the ground. Therefore, accused-appellant is guilty of murder.



PEOPLE VS. MALLARI (G.R. NO. 145993)

Facts: Joseph Galang was watching a basketball game at the barangay basketball court when appellant
Rufino Mallari and his brothers attempted to stab him. Galang ran away but appellant pursued him with the
truck. Appellant continued chasing Galang until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous
death.

Appellant was charged with the crime of murder, qualified by use of motor vehicle.

The lower court convicted appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death.

Hence this automatic review.

Issue: WON appellant is guilty of murder qualified by means of motor vehicle

Held:
Yes.The Supreme Court held that appellant is guilty of murder qualified by means of motor vehicle.
Appellant deliberately bumped Galang with the truck he was driving. The evidence shows that Rufino
deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a
result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to
perpetrate the killing of Joseph.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another by means of motor vehicle is guilty
of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, which were
alleged in the information, were not proved. What was proved was the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender through the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the prosecution. In view
of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion
perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.


PEOPLE VS. TEEHANKEE (G.R. Nos. 111206-08)

Facts: Jussi Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hutlman and and other friends for a party at his house.
They later proceeded to a pub and returned to Leino's house to eat.

After a while, Hultman requested Leino to take her home. Chapman tagged along. When they entered the
village, Hultman asked Leino to stop the car because she wanted to walk the rest of the way to her house.
Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.

Leino and Haultman started walking on the sidewalk when appellant Claudio Teehankee, Jr., alighted from his
car, approached them and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino took out his plastic wallet, and
handed to accused his I.D. Chapman saw the incident and inquired what was going on. Accused pushed
53

Chapman, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered
him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Appellant then pointed his gun at Leino. Haultman became
hysterical and started screaming for help. Appellant ordered them to sit on the sidewalk. Leino was later hit on
the upper jaw. Leino heard another shot and saw Haultman fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what
was happening and saw appellant return to his car and drive away.

Appellant was charged with murder.

Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of murder qualified by treachery

Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman, but
found it present in the wounding of Leino and Hultman.

Absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and
killing of Chapman. The shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend
himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately
adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It
appeared that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers
to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting
of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a
deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery.

However, as to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, the Supreme Court held that treachery
clearly attended the commission of the crimes. After shooting Chapman, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the
pavement. Haultman became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went
after her, Haultman moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or
two, appellant got to Haultman and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed
and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two
victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time
between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which appellant used to
prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was
thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the
wounding of Leino are concerned.



PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO (G.R. NO. 128900)

Facts: An amiable game of cards that started the night before turned into tragic event that resulted in the fatal
shooting of Arnulfo Tuadles by Alberto Antonio. The victim, Arnulfo Tuadles, a former professional basketball
player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly
precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol.

Antonio was charged with murder.

Issue: WON appellant is guilty of murder qualified by treachery

Held: No. The Supreme Court held that appellant Alberto Antonio is liable for the crime of homicide, not
murder. There was no treachery in this case. There is no basis for the trial court's conclusion "that accused
Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal
design without risk to himself." It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must
be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. Since the sudden
shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio,
then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with treachery. The evidence clearly shows that
the incident was an impulse killing. Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.


54

PEOPLE VS. MANERO ( G.R. NOS. 86883-85)
Facts: On 11 Apri l 1985, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edi l berto and El pi di o, al ong wi th Rodri go
Espi a, Severi no Li nes, Rudy Li nes, Efren Pl eago and Roger Bedao, were i nsi de the eatery of one
Reynal do Di ocades. They were conferri ng wi th three others of a pl an to l i qui date a number of
suspected communi st sympathi zers. Among thei r targets are: Fr. Peter, Domi ngo Gomez, Banti l , Fred
Gapate, Rene al i as Tabagac and Vi l l ani ng." "Fr. Peter" i s Fr. Peter Geremi as, an Ital i an pri est
suspected of havi ng l i nks wi th the communi st movement; "Banti l " i s Rufi no Robl es, a Cathol i c l ay
l eader who i s the compl ai ni ng wi tness i n the Attempted Murder; Domi ngo Gomez i s another l ay l eader,
whi l e the others are si mpl y "messengers". On the same occasi on, the conspi rators agreed to Edi l berto
Manero' s proposal that shoul d they fai l to ki l l Fr. Peter Geremi as, another It al i an pri est woul d be ki l l ed
i n hi s stead. They l ater on nai l ed a pl acard near the cari nderi a beari ng the names of thei r i ntended
vi cti ms.

Later, at 4:00 pm, the Manero brothers, together wi th Espi a and the four (4) appel l ants, al l wi th
assorted fi rearms, proceeded to the house of "Banti l ", thei r fi rst i ntended vi cti m, whi ch was al so i n the
vi ci ni ty of Deocades' cari nderi a. After a heated confrontati on, Edi l berto drew hi s revol ver and fi red at
the forehead of Banti l who was abl e to parry and was hi t at the l ower porti on of hi s ear. Banti l tri ed to
run but he was agai n fi red upon by Edi l berto. Though Banti l was abl e to seek refuge i n the house of a
certai n Domi ngo Gomez, Norberto Jr. ordered hi s men to surround the house so that Banti l woul d di e
of hemorrhage. Moments l ater, whi l e Deocades was feedi ng hi s swi ne, Edi l berto strewed hi m wi th a
burst of gunfi re from hi s M-14 Armal i te. Deocades cowered i n fear as he knel t wi th both hands
cl enched at the back of hi s head. Thi s agai n drew boi st erous l aughter and ri di cul e from the dreaded
desperados. At 5:00 o' cl ock, Fr. Tul i o Faval i arri ved at Km. 125 on board hi s motorcycl e. He entered
the house of Gomez. Whi l e i nsi de, Norberto, Jr., and hi s co-accused Pl eago towed the motorcycl e
outsi de to the center of t he hi ghway. Norberto, Jr. , opened the gasol i ne tank, spi l l ed some fuel , l i t a
fi re and burned the motorcycl e. As the vehi cl e was abl aze, the fel ons raved and rej oi ced. Upon seei ng
hi s motorcycl e on fi re, Fr. Faval i accosted Norbert o, Jr. But t he l atter si mpl y stepped backwards and
executed a thumbs-down si gnal . At thi s poi nt, Edi l berto asked the pri est: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre
(What i s i t you want, Fat her)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ul o mo (Do you want me, Father, to
break your head)?" Thereafter, i n a fl ash, Edi l berto fi red at the head of the pri est. As Fr. Faval i
dropped to the ground, hi s hands cl asped agai nst hi s chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edi l berto i f that was
the onl y way he knew to ki l l a pri est. Sl i ghted over the remark, Edi l ber to j umped over the prostrate
body three (3) ti mes, ki cked i t twi ce, and fi red anew. The burst of gunfi re vi rtual l y shattered the head
of Fr. Faval i , causi ng hi s brai n to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., fl aunted the brai n to the
terri fi ed onl ookers, hi s brothers danced and sang "Mut ya Ka Bal el eng" to the del i ght of thei r comrades -
i n-arms who now took guarded posi ti ons to i sol ate the vi cti m from possi bl e assi stance.

From thi s j udgment of convi cti on onl y accused Severi no Li nes, Rudy Li nes, Efren Pl eag o and Roger
Bedao appeal ed wi th respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as
wel l as Rodri go Espi a di d not appeal ; nei ther di d Norberto Manero, Jr., i n the Arson case.
Consequentl y, the deci si on as agai nst them al ready became fi nal .

Issue: Whether or not the appel l ants can be excul pated from cri mi nal l i abi l i ty on the basi s of defense
of al i bi whi ch woul d establ i sh that there i s no conspi racy to ki l l .

Held: The court di d not appreci ate the defense of al i bi of the Li nes brother, who accordi ng to them,
were i n a farm some one ki l ometre away from the cri me scene. The court hel d that It i s axi omati c that
the accused i nterposi ng the defense of al i bi must not onl y be at some other pl ace but that i t must al so
be physi cal l y i mpossi bl e f or hi m to be at the scene of the cri me at the ti me of i ts commi ssi on. There i s
no physi cal i mpossi bi l i ty where the accused can be at the cri me scene i n a matter of 15 -20 mi nutes by
j eep or tri cycl e. More i mportant, i t i s wel l -settl ed that the defense of al i bi cannot prevai l over the
posi ti ve i denti fi cati on of t he authors of the cri me by the prosecuti on wi tnesses. In thi s case, there were
t wo eyewi tnesses who posi ti vel y i denti fi ed the accused.

Contrary to the cl ai m of the Li nes brothers, there i s a communi ty of desi gn to commi t the cri me. Based
on the fi ndi ngs of the l ower court, they are not merel y i nnocent bystanders but i n fact were vi tal cogs
i n the murder of Fr. Fuval i . They performed overt acts to ensure the success of the commi ssi on of the
cri mes and the furtherance of the ai ms of the conspi racy. Whi l e accused-appel l ant s may not have
del i vered the fatal shots themsel ves, thei r col l ecti ve acti on showed a common i ntent to commi t the
cri mi nal acts.
There i s conspi racy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commi t a cri me and deci de to
commi t i t. It i s not essenti al that al l the accused commi t together each and every act consti tuti ve of the
55

offense. It i s enough that an accused parti ci pates i n an act or deed where there i s si ngul ari ty of
purpose, and uni ty i n i ts executi on i s present
Whi l e i t may be true that Fr. Faval i was not ori gi nal l y the i ntended vi cti m, as i t was Fr. Peter Geremi as
whom the group targetted for the ki l l , neverthel ess, Fr. Faval i was deemed a good substi tute i n the
murder as he was an Ital i an pri est. The accused agreed that i n case they fai l to ki l l the i ntended
vi cti ms, i t wi l l be suffi ce to ki l l another pri est as l ong as the person i s al so Ital i an pri est.




















































56

DEATH CAUSED IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY (ART. 251)


PEOPLE vs. UNLAGADA (G.R. NO. 141080)

Facts: ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE al ias Lapad " was charged and subsequentl y
convicted by thecourt a quo and sentenced to recl usion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs
of thevictim P100,000.00 as moral damages,P50,000.00 as temperate damages, andanother
P50,000.00 as exempl ar y damages.In the eveni ng Dani l o Laurel l eft his house togetherwi th
Edwi n Selda, a visi tor f rom Bacol od Cit y, to attend a public dance at Ri zal St., Mag-asawang
Taytay, Hini garan, Negros Occi dental. Two (2) hours l ater, or around 11:00 o' cl ockthat
eveni ng, Dani lo asked Edwi n to take a short break from dancing to attend to thei r
personalnecessiti es outsi de the dance hal l. Once outsi de, they deci ded to have a dri nk and
bought two(2) bottles of Gol d Eagle beer at a nearby store.Not l ong after, Dani lo, half way on
his first bottl e, left to l ook for a pl ace to rel ievehim. Accordi ng to Edwi n, he was onl y about
three (3) meters from Dani lo who was rel i evinghimself when a short, dark bearded man
walked past him, approached Dani lo and stabbed himat the si de. Dani l o retal i ated by striki ng
his assai l ant wi th a half -fil l ed bottl e of beer. Almost simul i taneousl y, a group of men
numbering about seven, ganged up on Dani lo and hit him wi th assorted weapons, i.e.,
bamboo poles, stones and pi eces of wood. Edwi n, who waspetri fied, could onl y watch
hel pl essl y as Dani lo was bei ng mauled and overpowered by hisassai lants. Danil o fel l to the
ground and di ed before he could be gi ven any medical assistance.

Issue: Whether the testimony of prosecuti on witness was credible; andWhether the l ower
court is ri ght in convicti ng the accused of murder qual ified by treacher y andnot death i n a
tumultuous affray.

Held: Art. 251. Death caused in a tumul tuous affray. - When, whi le several persons, not
composi nggroups organi zed for the common purpose of assaul ting and attacking each other
reci procal l y,quarrel and assault each other i n a confused and tumultuous manner, and i n the
course of theaffray someone is kil led, and i t cannot be ascertai ned who actual l y ki ll ed the
deceased, but theperson or persons who i nfl i cted seri ous physical i nj uries can be identified,
such person orpersons shal l be punished by prisi on mayor . Veri l y, the attack was qual ifi ed by
treacher y. Thedeceased was reli eving himsel f, full y unaware of any danger to his person
when suddenl y theaccused walked past wi tness Edwi n Sel da, approached the victim and
stabbed him at theside. There was hardl y any risk at al l to accused-appell ant; t he attack was
completel y wi thoutwarning, the victim was caught by surprise, and gi ven no chance to put up
any defense. Thepenal ty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code i s recl usi on
temporal in itsmaximum peri od to death. Absent any aggravati ng or miti gating circumstance,
the penalt yshould be i mposed in i ts medi um peri od which, as correctl y imposed by the court a
quo, is recl usi on perpetua.

















57

PEOPLE vs. MARAMARA (G.R. NO. 110994)

Facts: The case is an appeal from the decisi on of the Regi onal Trial Court of Masbate
convicting theaccused CresencianoMaramara of murder and sentenci ng him to suffer the
penal ty of recl usi onperpetua and to pay the vi ctims heirs the amount of P10,000 as medical
and funeral expensesand P50,000 as moral damages. The accused chal lenged the fi ndi ngs of
the tri al court i n order tosecure an acqui ttal or, at the l east, being hel d l iable onl y for the
death of Miguel i toDonato i n atumultuous affray as defi ned i n Articl e 251 of the Revised Penal
Code.The i nformati on agai nst the accused al leged that in the evening of November 18, 1991,
inBarangay Calpi , Claveria, Masbate, the accused, wi th intent to kil l, evident
premeditati on,treacher y and taking advantage of ni ghttime, assaulted and shot with a hand
gun Miguel itoDonato and hit the l atter on the chest, thereby i nfl icted the wound which caused
hisd eath.

Issue: Whether accused is gui lt y of death caused in tumultuous affray i nstead of murder.

Held: There was no meri t in accuseds posi ti on that he shoul d be hel d l iable onl y for death
caused intumul tuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such
situati on thataccused came at the scene and j oi ned the fray purportedl y to pacif y the
protagonists whenMi guel i to attacked him causing four stab wounds in different parts of his
body. Assuming that arumble or a free-for-al l fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251
of the Revised Codecannot appl y because prosecution wi tnesses Ricardo and
RegarderDonato posi ti vel y identif iedthe accused as Mi gueli tos kil l er. While the accused
himself suffered mul ti pl e stab wounds, whichat first, may lend veri t y to his claim that a rumbl e
has ensued and that Miguel i to i nfl icted uponhi m these wounds, the evidence was i nadequate
to consider them as miti gati ng circumstancebecause defenses versi on stood discredi ted in
l ight of the more credibl e versi on of theprosecuti on as to the circumstances surrounding
Mi guel itos death. However, the Supreme Courtdid not subscri be to trial courts appreci ation
of treacher y, which was discussed onl y i n thedispositi ve porti on of the decision and which
was based solel y on the fact that the accused useda f irearm in ki ll i ng the victim Mi guel ito. In
the absence of any convi ncing proof that the accusedconsci ousl y and deli beratel y adopted
means by which he committed the crime i n order to ensureits executi on, the Supreme Court
resol ved the doubt in favor of the accused. And si nce treacher ywas not adequatel y proved,
the accused was convicted of homici de onl y. The Supreme Courtmodifi ed the j udgment
appealed from and found the accused gui lt y beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, defi ned
and penal i zed under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the ki ll i ng of Miguel itoDonato
wi thout the attendance of any modif yi ng circumstance. Accordi ngl y, the Courtsentenced the
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalt y of ten years of prisi on mayor, asminimum, to
seventeen years, and four months of recl usion temporal, as maximum, with al l i tsaccessor y
penal ti es, and to pay the heirs of Miguel tio in the amount of P10,000 as actualdamages and
P50,000 as death indemnity.









58

SISON VS. PEOPLE (G.R. NOS. 108280-83)
Facts: On Jul y 27, 1986, i n support to the Marcos government, Marcos loyal ists had a ral l y at
Luneta. At about 4:00 p.m., a smal l group of loyal ists converged at the Chi nese Garden.
There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popul ar movie starl et and supporter of Presi dent Marcos,
j oggi ng around the fountai n. They approached her and i nformed her of their dispersal and
Annie Ferrer angri l y ordered them "Gul pihi n ni nyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she
conti nued j ogging around the fountain chanti ng. A f ew minutes l ater, Anni e Ferrer was
arrested by the pol ice. However, a commotion ensued and Renato Bancul o, a cigarette
vendor, saw the l oyal ists attacki ng persons i n yel l ow, t he col or of the "Cor yi stas." Renato took
off his yel low shirt.

He then saw a man weari ng a yel l ow t-shirt bei ng chased by a group of
persons shouti ng. The man i n the yel l ow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared t o be
Marcos l oyal ists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and maul ed him. Salcedo tri ed
to extricate himself from the group but they agai n pounced on him and pummelled him with
fist blows and kicks hitti ng him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumi lang,
an el ectrician at t he Luneta, rush t o Salcedo' s ai d. Sumilang tried t o pacif y the maul ers so he
could extricate Salcedo f rom them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrel enti ngl y, boxing
him wi th stones i n their fists. Somebody gave Sumi lang a l oyal ist tag which Sumil ang showed
to Salcedo' s attackers. They backed off for a whi le and Sumil ang was able to tow Salcedo
away from them. But accused Raul Bi l losos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man
boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de l os Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the
head and kicked him even as he was already fal len.

Salcedo tried t o stand but accused Joel
Tan boxed him on the l eft side of his head and ear.

Accused Nil o Pacadar punched Salcedo
on his nape. Sumil ang tri ed t o pacif y Pacadar but the l atter lunged at t he victim again.
Accused Josel ito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the l eft j aw and kicked hi m as he once more fell .
Bancul o saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on t he head, and when he tri ed
to stand, Sison repeatedl y boxed him.
6
Sumilang saw accused Gerr y Neri approach the victi m
but di d not notice what he di d.


The maul i ng resumed at the Ri zal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard unti l
Salcedo coll apsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang fl agged down a van and with t he hel p of
a traffic officer, brought Salcedo t o the Medical Center Mani la but he was refused admissi on.
So they took hi m to the Phil i ppi ne General Hospi tal where he di ed upon arri val.
For their defense, t he pri ncipal accused deni ed their participati on i n the mauli ng of the victim
and offered their respecti ve al ibis.The trial court rendered a decisi on finding Romeo Sison,
Ni l o Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de l os Santos and Josel ito Tamayo gui l ty as princi pals i n the
crime of murder qual ifi ed by treacher y. On appeal , t he CA modifi ed the decision of the tri al
court by acquitti ng Annie Ferrer but increasi ng the penalt y of t he rest of t he accused, except
for Josel ito Tamayo, t o reclusi on perpetua. The appel l ate court found them guil t y of murder
qualif ied by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Josel ito Tamayo of homicide
Issue: Whether accused are guil t y of vi olati on of Art. 251 of t he RPC.
Held: Appel lants claim that the l ower courts erred i n fi ndi ng t he existence of conspiracy
among t he princi pal accused and i n convicti ng them of murder qual if ied by abuse of superi or
strength, not death i n tumul tuous affray. A tumultuous aff ray takes place when a quarrel
occurs between several persons and they engage i n a confused and tumultuous affray, i n t he
course of which some person i s ki ll ed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.

59

Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the
course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified,
such person or persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the
penalty ofprision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all
those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical
injuries or who used violence can be identified.
62

A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a
confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author
thereof cannot be ascertained.
63

The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion
subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal
that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.


























60

DISCHARGE OF FIREARM ( ART. 254)

DADO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 131421)

Facts: The present case is a peti tion for review under Rul e 45 of the Rules of Court assai l ing
thedecisi on of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decisi on of the Regi onal Trial Court of
Kudarat finding the Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso gui lt y of the crime of homici de.
Thei nformati on charged both Dado and Eraso with murder al l egedl y committed by sai d the
accused,armed wi th firearms, with i ntent to ki l l, with evi dent premeditation and treacher y, and
shotSi l vestre Bal i nas thereby inf licting gunshot wounds upon the l atter which caused hi s
instantdeath.The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecuti on witnesses Alfredo Bali nas and
Rufo Al ga wereas fol l ows: On the ni ght of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat
Pol ice Stati on formedt hree teams to i ntercept some cattle rustl ers. The Team composed of
the petiti oner SPO4Geronimo Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Af lredoBali nas
and Rufo Alga waitedbehind a l arge dike. Alfredo Bal i nas and Ruf o Al ga, who were both
armed with M14 armal iterif les, were posi tioned between the peti tioner, who was armed wi th a
cal i ber .45 pistol, andaccused Francisco Eraso, who was carr yi ng an M16 armal ite rif le. At
around 11:00 of that sameeveni ng, the team saw somebody approachi ng at a distance of 50
meters. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo Bal i nas noticed that
Francisco Eraso was making somemovements. Bal inas told Eraso to wait, but before Bali nas
could beam his flashl ight, Eraso firedhis M16 armal ite rifle at the approachi ng man.
Immediatel y thereafter, petitioner fired a si ngleshot from his .45 cal iber pistol. The victim
turned out to be Sil vestre Butsoy Bal i nas, thenephew of Alfredo Bal i nas. Eraso embraced
Alfredo Bal i nas to show his repentance for his deed.

Issue: Whether accused is gui lt y of homici de i nstead of i l legal discharge of firearm onl y.

Held: In convicti ng the petitioner, both the tri al court and the Court of Appeals found that
conspiracyattended the commission of the cri me. The Court of Appeals rul ed that petiti oner
Dado andaccused Eraso conspired i n kill i ng the deceased, thus, i t i s no l onger necessar y to
establ ish whocaused the fatal wound i n as much as conspiracy makes the act of one
conspirator the act of al l .Al though the agreement need not be directl y proven, circ umstanti al
evi dence of such agreementmust nonethel ess be convi nci ngl y shown. In the case at bar,
peti tioner and accused Erasosseemingl y concerted and almost simul taneous acts were more
of a spontaneous reacti on ratherthan the result of a common pl an to ki ll the victim. Evi dentl y,
the prosecution fai led to provethat the metal l ic fragments found in the fatal wound of the
victim were particl es of a .45 cal iberbul let that emanated from the .45 cal iber pistol fired by
peti tioner. Hence, the Supreme Courtset asi de the decisi on of the Court of Appeals affirming
the convicti on of peti ti oner for the crimeof homicide and acquitted the petitioner of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonabl edoubt. A new decisi on was entered fi ndi ng petitioner
Geronimo Dado gui lt y of the crime of i ll egaldi scharge of firearm and sentenced him to suffer
the indeterminate penalt y of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years
and eleven (11) months of prision correcci onal, asmaximum.















61

UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION ( ART. 257)

PEOPLE vs. GENOVES (G.R. NO. 42819)

Facts: Crispin Genoves and deceased Soledad Rivera were laborers in adjoining cane fields.
Riveracl aimed that the yoke of the pl ow which the accused was repairing bel onged to her and
tri ed totake it by force. The accused struck her with his fist causi ng her to fal l to the ground.
She got upand returned to the quarrel where she received another fist blow on the left cheek causing her
tof al l agai n t o t he gr ound. I mmedi at el y af t er t he i nci dent , t he deceased pr oceeded t o
t hemunicipal building, she complained to the chief of police of pain in the abdomen as she
waspregnant at the time. For a few days, the deceased suffered from hemorrhage and pai n
whichresulted in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she
waycarr yi ng, but the other baby could be del ivered. Both babi es were dead.Genoves was
convictedi n t he Cour t of Fi r st I nst ance of Occi dent al Negr os of t he compl ex cr i me of
homi ci de wi t habortion. An appeal was made by the accused.

Issue: Shoul d the accused be hel d gui lt y f or the death of the victim and her unborn chi l d?

Held: It is general l y known that a fal l is li abl e to cause premature del iver y, and the evi dence
shows acompl ete sequel of events from the assault to her death. The accused must be hel d
responsi bl efor the natural consequences of hi s act.However, the miti gati ng circumstances of
lack of i ntentto commit so grave a wrong as that inf licted and provocati on are present, as the
offended part yby force induced the accused to use force on his part.The aborti on in this case
is uni ntenti onal aborti on denounced by Articl e 257 of the Revised Penal Code.



PEOPLE vs. SALUFRANI A (G.R. NO. L-508804)

Facts: Before the court is i nformation, dated 7 May 1976, Fi lomeno Sal ufrani a y Al eman was
chargedbefore the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime
of parricide with i ntenti onal aborti on, committed that on or about the 3rd day of December,
1974, in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, Phil ippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
HonorableCourt the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfull y,
unlawfull y, andfeloniousl y attack, assault and use personal violence on MARCIANA ABUYO-
SALUFRANIA, thel awful l y wedded wif e of the accused, by then and there boxing and
stranging her, causing uponher i nj uri es whi ch resulted in her i nstantaneous death; the
accused likewise did then and therewi llful l y, unl awful l y, and fel oni ousl y cause the death of the
chi l d whi l e sti ll i n i ts maternal womb,thereby committi ng both cri mes of PARRICIDE and
INTENTIONAL ABORTION as to the damageand prej udice of the heirs of said woman and
chi l d in the amount as the Honorable Court shal l assess.

Issue:Should Fil omeno Salufrania be hel d l iabl e for for the compl ex crime of parricide wi thuni
ntentional abortion?


Held: The evi dence on record, therefore, establ ishes beyond reasonabl e doubt that accused
Fi lomenoSa l u f r a n i a c o mmi t t e d a n d s h o u l d b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r t h e c o mp l e x c r i me
o f p a r r i c i d e wi t h unintenti onal aborti on. The aborti on, i n this case, was caused by the
same viol ence that causedthe death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily
exerted by the herein accusedupon his victi m.It has also been cl earl y establ ished (a) that
Marci ana Abuyo was seven (7) to ei ght (8) monthspr egnant when she was
k i l l ed; ( b) t hat vi ol ence was vol unt ar i l y exer t ed upon her by her husband accused; and
(c) that, as a result of sai d vi ol ence, Marci ana Abuyo di ed together wi ththe foetus in her womb.




62

MUTILATION ( ART. 262)


AGUIRRE vs. SECRETARY (G.R. NO. 170723)

FACTS: On June 11,2002 peti ti oner Gl ori a Aguirre i nstituted a criminal complai nt for the
viol ation of Revised Penal Codeparticul arl y Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republi c
Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondri z,Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Doe all egi ng that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent i nstructions of respondents
Michel i na Aguirre-Ol ondri z and Pedro Aguirre actual l y scouted, prospected, faci l itated
sol icited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on
the intended mutil ati on via bi lateral vasectomy of Laureano Agui rre.Olondri z deni ed that
the prospected, scouted, faci l itated, sol ici ted and/or procured any fal se statement muti l atedor
abused his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common l aw
brother went through avasectomy procedure but that does not amount to muti l ati on.Dr. Agatep
contends that the compl ainant has no legal personali t y to fi l e a case si nce she is onl y a
common lawsister of Larr y who has a legal guardi an in the person of Pedro Aguirre.
He further contends that Vasectomy does not i nany way equate to castrati on and what
i s touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ i n the context of law andmedici ne.The
Assistant Cit y Prosecutor held that the facts al leged did not amount to muti lation, the
vasectomy operationdi d not depri ved Larr y of his reproducti ve organ.Gl oria Aguirre then
appealed to the Secretar y of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petiti on
stati ngthat the Secretary of Justice may motu propi o dismiss outright the petiti on if there is no
showi ng of any reversible error i nthe questioned resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are l i abl e for the crime of muti lati on

HELD: No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Art. 262.
Muti l ati on. The penal t y of recl usi on temporal to reclusi on perpetua shall be imposed upon
anyperson who shal l intentional l y mutil ate another by depri vi ng him, ei ther total l y or partial l y,
of some essenti al organ for reproducti on. Any other intenti onal muti l ation shal l be punished
by prisi on mayor i n its medium and maximum peri ods. A straightforward scrut i ny of the above
provision shows that the el ements of muti l ati on under the first paragraph of Art.262 of the
Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castrati on, that is, mutil ati on of organs necessar y
for generati on;and 2) that the mutil ati on is caused purposel y and del i beratel y, that is, to
deprive the offended part y of some essential organ for reproducti on. Accordi ng to the publi c
prosecutor, the facts al l eged did not amount to the crime of mutil ation as def ined
andpenal i zed above, i .e., [t]he vasectomy operati on did not in any way depri ved (si c)
Larr y of his reproducti ve organ,which is stil l very much part of his physical self.



















63

SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES ( ART. 266)

LI vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 127962)

Facts: One morning in Apri l 1993, street brawl ensued between Christopher Arugay and his
nei ghbor, Ki ngstone Li . Arugay sustai ned multi pl e stab wounds causing his death whil e Li
sustai nedhack wounds on the head and contusi ons. Two different versi ons of the inci dent
were presented. Accordi ng to the f irst versi on, Arugay was watchi ng the tel evisi on wi th hi s
sisters Crist y and Baby Jane and Tan, boyfriend of Baby Jane, when they heard a noise
caused by Li and Sangal ang who were then bathing naked outside their house. Enraged,
Arugay went outsi de and confronted the two which eventual l y ended up with Li striking Arugay
wi th a basebal l bat on the head and later stabbi ng him wi th a knife. Sangal ang was also seen
stabbing the victim at least once wi th a knife. The second versi on, offered by Li however
presented that Li was watching the tel evisi on wi th a friend when Arugay and his girlfriend
hurl ed obj ects and kicked the gate of his house. Upon seeing that Arugay has gotten himsel f
two kitchen kni ves, Li armed himself wi th a baseball bat. Li managed to evade Arugays
thrusts and successful l y hi t him wi th the bat on the shoul der wi th which Arugay ran back to
his house and emerged carr yi ng a bolo. Arugay tri ed to hi t Li with the bolo but Li raised his
right hand to protect hi mself but Arugay was abl e to hi t him on his right temple, ri ght wrist,
and ri ght shoul der. Li passed out. Sangalang was also present when the i nci dent started.
Arugay di ed of multipl e stab wounds whi le Li was brought to the hospital .

RTC charged Li with homicide and rul ed the existence of conspiracy although concl uded that
it was Sangal ang, and not Li, who stabbed Arugay. Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs decisi on
but opi ned that si nce it has not been established which wound was i nfl icted by either one of
them, they shoul d both be held li abl e and each one is gui lt y of homicide, whether or not a
conspiracy exists.

Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy between Li and Sangal ang. If there is not, what
acts are imputable to Li .

Held: No, RTC erred i n concluding an impl ied conspiracy. The facts that Li and Sangal ang
were i n the same house at the same time; and that they both armed themselves before going
out to meet Arugay are not in themsel ves sufficient to establ ish conspi racy.

Sangal ang stabbed Arugay onl y after petiti oner had become unconsci ous. Before that poi nt,
even as Li struck Arugay with a basebal l bat, i t was not proven that Li had asked for, or
recei ved, any assistance from Sangal ang. Based on these circumstances, Sangal ang and Li
had not acted in concert to commit the offense. After Arugay had struck hack wounds on Li
and as Li l ay i ncapaci tated, possibl y unconsci ous, i t remained hi ghl y doubtful whether he had
any further partici pati on in the brawl . At that poi nt, Sangalang, emerged and stabbed Arugay
to death. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay coul d ver y wel l be construed as a spur -of -the-
moment reacti on by Sangalang upon seei ng that his fri end Li was struck by Arugay. It cannot
be assumed that Sangalang di d what he di d wi th the knowl edge or assent of Li, much mor e in
coordi nation wi th each other. It was also proved that Li, already weak and inj ured, could
possibl y i nfl ict fatal stab wounds on Arugay.

Absent any clear showi ng of conspiracy, Ki ngstone Li cannot answerfor the crime of Eduardo
Sangal ang. Petiti oner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the charge of Homici de for l ack of
evi dence beyond reasonabl e doubt. However, he is found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES.







64

RAPE ( ART. 266- A)

PEOPLE VS. SALALIMA (G.R. NOS. 137969-71)

Facts: 15 year ol d Mi ladel Q. Escudero was l eft alone by her mother one day when the l atter
went to work as a mani curist. She was l eft wi th her younger sister, Lovel ymae, whom she took
care of constantl y whi l e her mother was away at times. That same morning, the accused
arri ved and ate breakfast at their house, and afterwards went to attend to some work up i n the
mountai ns. Mil adel then went to her sisters room to get some sleep. She was awakened by
the presence of the appel lant, who managed to have sexual i ntercourse with the victim after
threatening to ki ll her and hol di ng a bolo to her throat. After satisfyi ng his l ust, appel lant
walked away, warni ng again complai nant not to reveal what had happened, otherwi se he wi l l
kill her and her mother. Complainant recal l ed that she was also sexual l y abused by appel l ant
the foll owi ng month that year. It took pl ace i n the kitchen of their house whi l e her mother was
in the poblaci on. Another assaul t was repeated that same year. The victim was not abl e to
report the three i nci dents to the authoriti es and to her rel ati ves si nce the accused threatened
to ki l l her and her fami l y.

The victim also testifi ed that the sexual assaults were al l committed by appel lant duri ng
daytime. When asked if the penis of appel l ant was abl e to penetrate her vagi na, she frankl y
declared that in the first encounter onl y half of the penis penetrated her vagi na but in the
second and third i ncidents, appel lants entire penis penetrated her vagina.

One time, the victims mother had an altercati on wi th appel l ant. The quarrel became qui te
seri ous that appel lant sai d something about his relation wi th compl ai nant by tel l ing Erenita,
Ang imong anak dugay na nakong nakuha, si guro buntis na (I have had sexual intercourse
wi th your daughter a l ong time ago, maybe she is already pregnant). When confronted by
her mother, Mi ladel reveal ed the sexual abuses done to her by appel l ant. Asked why she di d
not reveal these abuses, compl ainant tol d her mother that appel lant had threatened her.
Erenita immediatel y brought compl ainant to the doctor for medical examinati on. Assisted by
her mother, l odged complai nts for rape against appell ant. Afterwards, appell ant was arrested
and detai ned. After trial , the accused was convicted of the crime of rape.

Issue: Whether or not the i nformati ons are defecti ve because the date and time of
commission of the crimes are not stated wi th particul ari t y.

Held: The Supreme Court overruled this argument and affirmed the gui lt of the accused,
sentenci ng him to recl usion perpet ua.

Fail ure to specif y the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not i pso facto make
the information defecti ve on i ts face. The reason is obvi ous. The precise date or time when
the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact
of carnal knowl edge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. As long as i t is al leged that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was committed an i nformation is sufficient.

In this case, al though the indictments did not state wi th particul arit y the dates when the
sexual assaul ts took pl ace, we bel ieve that the all egati ons therei n that the acts were
committed sometime duri ng the month of March 1996 or thereabout, sometime duri ng the
month of Apri l 1996 or thereabout, sometime duri ng the month of May 1996 or thereabout
substantial l y apprised appel l ant of the crimes he was charged with since all the el ements of
rape were stated i n the i nformati ons. As such, appel lant cannot compl ain that he was
deprived of the ri ght to be i nformed of the nature of the cases f il ed agai nst him. Accordingl y,
appel l ants assertion that he was depri ved of the opportunit y to prepare for his defense has
no l eg to stand on.



65

PEOPLE VS. LOYOLA (G.R. NO. 126026)

Facts: 16 year ol d Stecy Gatil ogo took a tri p from Cebu Ci t y to visit her grandmother i n Lanao
del Sur. It was duri ng this trip that she saw and became acquainted with accused Maurici o
Loyol a, a bus conductor, who seemed to take speci al i nterest in her. He saw to i t that he
could sit by her si de after issui ng bus tickets to the other passengers, and striking a
conversati on with her. The bus was not able to reach its desti nationthat day because the ro ad
became too sl ippery for the bus to conti nue. As she was about to get down from the bus,
Loyol a bl ocked her way and advised her not to go anymore as i t was getting dark. Stecy was
prevai l ed upon to stay i n the bus. The bus turned around and travel ed back to the nearest
town known as Kal i langan, Buki dnon. At about seven-thirt y, the bus parked at the terminal ,
where she was invited by the accused to have di nner at a local cari nderi a. Afterwards, the two
went back to the bus to get some rest.

At about midni ght, Stecy was startled when she fel t that someone had touched her breast.
When the person told her not to shout, Stecy recogni zed accused by his voice. Stecy begun to
cry and became frightened when accused threatened to kil l her if she would cr y f or help. She
found herself unabl e to rise because her arm had stuck into a small gap between the seat and
seat armrest during her sleep. With her feet touchi ng the floor, accused rode on top of her
and begun to open the button and zi pper of her pants. Stecy' s pleas were unheaded. With one
arm trapped by the seat armrest, Stecy' s resistance was futi le. Accused drew down her pants
and pant y, spread her l egs and succeeded in having sexual i ntercourse wi th her. Afterwards,
the accused stood up and sai d "keep qui et, anyway i t was already f i nished". Then he sat by
Stecy and tri ed to comfort and reassure her even as she continued to sob. Because her own
shirt had been badl y soi led, she agreed to the offer of the accused to put on his shirt.

The next morni ng, the bus wi th onl y Stecy as its passenger, The dri ver decided to return to
Cagayan de Oro Cit y i nstead. When the bus passed by Pangantucan, Stecy got off at her
mother' s house. Stecy di d not have the heart to report the i ncident to her mother. However, a
close fri end noticed that the victim was distraught and managed to get the whol e stor y of the
inci dent; the fri end reported the i ncident to her brother, who was a pol iceman. Maribel and her
grandmother with other relatives brought Stecy to the pol ice station.

After tri al on the merits of the case, the accused was found gui lt y of rape. The accused now
argues that the i ncident between him and the victim was consensual and free from duress,
since he actuall y courted the victim and the latter agreed to be his girlf riend.


Issue: Whether or not the sweetheart defense may rel i ed upon as a ground for acqui ttal in the
crime of rape

Held: The Supreme Court said that this was not a val i d defense, and that the accused was
gui lt y nonethel ess.

The "sweetheart defense" has often been raised in rape cases. It has been rarel y upheld as a
defense wi thout convincing proof. Here, the accused bears the burden of provi ng that he and
complai nant had an affair that natural l y l ed to a sexual relati onship. Jurisprudence tel ls us
that no young Fi l i pi na of decent repute woul d publ icl y admit she had been raped unless that
was the truth. Even i n these modern times, thi s princi pl e sti l l hol ds true.

The accused was not abl e to present any proof to show that he and the compl ai nant were
indeed lovers, that he had courted her and that she had accepted hi m. Other than his self -
servi ng statement, "no documentar y evidence of any sort, l ike a letter or a photograph or any
pi ece of memento, was presented to confi rm a li aison between accused and the compl ai nant.
The Court f ound that the same is but a mere concoction by appel lant in order to excul pate
himself from any criminal li abi l it y.

66

The SC also sai d that even if indeed accused and compl ai nant were sweethearts, this fact
does not necessari l y negate rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex agai nst her wi ll .
Defi nitel y, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, empl oy
viol ence upon her on the pretext of l ove. Love i s not a l icense for l ust.




PEOPLE vs. PARAISO (G.R. No. 131823)

Facts: One day from mid morni ng to noon, the victims father was having a drinking spree
wi th the defendant and some other people at the pl ace of a copra deal er. The defendant then
told his buddies that he had to proceed to the place of the ' pamanhikan' which concerned hi s
son. Defendant l ikewise asked the victims father who were the persons i n their house, and
the l atter tol d the defendant that his chi ldren Arlene(the victim) and two year -ol d Dona Janice
wi l l be left i n their house, as the other two chi l dren wi l l buy rice.

On the same day l ate that afternoon, one of the nei ghbors of the victim heard the voice of a
young chil d shouting ' Di yos ko po, Di yos ko po, tama, na po, tama na po.' He was thus
impel l ed to proceed to the pl ace where the shout came from. When he was already near, he
saw defendant Isagani Paraiso carr yi ng a chi l d face down, with his two hands. He hid himself
in a shrubby pl ace where there were several anahaw trees. The he saw appell ant put down
the chi ld wi th her face up on .the ground. The chi l d was Arl ene Reci l la. He saw appel lant
remove the shorts of Arlene then raise her upper cl othes and pul l down his pants. Parai so
then placed himself on top of Arl ene and raped her for about fi ve minutes. Thereafter, the
accused hacked Arlene on the neck wi th a bol o. Because of fear, the wi tness. He reported the
inci dent to Barangay Captai n who i n turn summoned his barangay kagawad and they went to
the pl ace where they found the victim already dead.
After tri al on the merits, the trial court found the defense of al i bi of the defendant unavai li ng,
and convicted him.

Issue: Whether or not there is merit i n the defense of the accused - that the commission of
the crime was improbable because it was committed during daytime

Held: The SC affirmed the decisi on of the tri al court convicti ng the defendant, based mai nl y
on the testimony of the primar y wi tness.

The SC rul ed that the asserti on that the commission of such crime duri ng broad dayl i ght was
hi ghl y improbabl e is i l logical. It said that l ust is no respecter of time and place. Rape can be
committed i n places where people congregate, i n parks, al ongsi de the road, wi thi n school
premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even i n the same room where
there are other members of the famil y who are sl eepi ng. How much more i n a remote hi ll y
pl ace where houses are distantl y situated, such as i n the i nstant case. While the defense tri ed
to establ ish through prosecution eyewi tness Reoveros that there were other houses near the
victim' s, it has not shown that there were occupants present during the perpetration of the
crime who coul d have wi tnessed or percei ved it, but fai l ed to. Nothi ng on record contradicts
the eyewi tness' testimony as to the commission of the crime by appel lant duri ng that fateful
hour and day at the place where the victim was found.

The defense of al ibi, as a rule, is considered with suspici on and is al ways recei ved wi th
cauti on, not onl y because it is i nherentl y weak and unrel i abl e but also because it can be
easi l y fabricated. It cannot prevai l over the positi ve identification of the appel lant by a
credibl e eyewi tness who has no i l l moti ve to testif y f alsel y. For such defense to prosper, i t
must be convi ncing enough to preclude any doubt on the physi cal impossi bi l it y of the
presence of the accused at the l ocus criminis at the time of the i ncident.

But, according to Parai so, his house was merel y about two thousand meters from that of the
Recil l a' s. Even by foot, such distance is not i mpossible to trek in l ess than an hour.26 By the
67

eyewi tness' account, the victim' s unlawf ul defi lement took no more than fi ve minutes and,
immedi atel y thereafter, appel l ant savagel y hacked her neck. Al l these could, therefore, have
happened when defense wi tness Bui zon was out gathering bamboo trees. She simpl y
presumed that appel l ant was asleep al l throughout. Gi ven the posi ti ve identif icati on of
appel l ant by a credi bl e eyewi tness -- his own nephew -- as the rapi st-kil ler, his defense of
al i bi must necessari l y fai l .



PEOPLE vs. BALACANO ( G.R. No. 127156)

Facts: The 14 year ol d victim, Esmeral da Bal acano, al leged that she was raped fi ve times by
her stepfather, the accused. She coul d not anymore remember the dates she was ravished
except that which happened on August 9, 1995. She also narrated that on t he said date, at
around 7:00 o' cl ock in the evening, she and her sister Peafranci a were i n their residence
when the appel lant entered the room, asked her sister to go out, and ordered her (victim) to
undress. Sensi ng that appel l ant was drunk and afrai d of his anger, she compl ied. Appel l ant
then i nserted his penis into her vagi na. After satisf yi ng his l ust, he sl ept. She then went out of
the house to look for her sister and they wai ted for their mother. Upon the arri val of the latter,
they went to the pol ice stati on where the i nvesti gation of the i ncident took place.

Bal acano deni ed the whol e thi ng. Accordi ng to him, on the all eged date of commission of the
crime, he was alone, sl eeping insi de their rented room. He deni ed having raped the victim. No
other wi tness was presented to corroborate hi s testimony. The tri al court found the evi dence
for the prosecution enough to convict appel lant Jaime Balacano for rapi ng his step-daughter
Esmeral da Bal acano.


Issue: Whether or not the l one testimony of the victim of the crime of rape is suffici ent to
convict the accused

Held: The SC said yes. An accusati on for rape can be made wi th faci li ty; it is difficult to prove
but even more difficul t to disprove by the person charged, though i nnocent; (2) i n vi ew of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where onl y two persons are usual l y i nvol ved, the
testimony of the compl ai nant must be scruti ni zed wi th extreme cauti on; and (3) the evi dence
of the prosecution must stand or fal l on i ts own meri ts, and cannot be al lowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evi dence for the defense.

The Court has repeatedl y ruled that the l one testimony of the victim may suffice to convict the
rapist. When a victim says she has been raped, she says i n effect al l that is necessar y to
show that rape has been committed and if her testimony meets the test of credi bil i t y, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.

In this case, the SC agrees wi th the lower court that the credibi l it y of the victim has not been
impaired by her all eged i nconsistencies al luded to by the defendant. Although there may be
some inconsistenci es i n her testimony, but these are minor ones that do not destroy her
credibi l it y neither weakens the case of the prosecution. It even impressed of the mind of the
Court that the same is not fabricated. It is expected also consi deri ng the nightmare she has
gone through which some people woul d l ike to forget.
The relationshi p between a stepfather and stepdaughter is akin to the rel ati onship of a natural
father and a natural daughter especi al l y if the stepdaughter grew up recogni zi ng him as her
own. Such rel ationshi p necessari l y engendered moral ascendancy of the stepfather over the
step-daughter.





68


PEOPLE vs. WATIMAR (G.R. Nos. 121651-52)

Facts: 20 year ol d Myra Watimar testified that one eveni ng, she slept together wi th her
brothers and sisters, namel y Bernardo, Mari l ou, Leonardo, Ariel and Lea, wi thout her mother
who went to the hospital as her aunt was about to gi ve birth; that her father sl ept with them in
the same room. At earl y dawn, she fel t that somebody was on top of her and kissing her neck.
The defendant proceeded to threaten the victi m and succeeded i n havi ng sexual intercourse
against her wi l l. Another i nci dent happened shortl y thereafter; when the victim was agai n
assaul ted in their communal kitchen whi le she was preparing her meals. Afterwards, she was
threatened by her father not to tel l anyone about the i nci dent. The accused deni ed the
inci dent and al l eged the defense of al ibi , and that he was not at home when the sai d crime
happened.

Issues: Whether or not the possibi l it y of rape is negated by the presence of famil y members
in the pl ace where the crime happened

Held: The possibi l it y of rape is not negated by the presence of even the whol e famil y of the
accused insi de the same room with the l ikel i hood of bei ng discovered. For rape to be
committed, it is not necessar y for the place to be i deal, or the weather to be fi ne, for rapists
bear no respect for l ocale and time when they carr y out their evil deed. Rape may be
committed even when the rapist and the victim are not al one, or whil e the rapist' s spouse was
asl eep, or i n a smal l room where other famil y members also slept , as in the i nstant case. The
presence of people nearby does not deter rapi sts from committi ng their odi ous act.
Rape does not necessari l y have to be committed i n an isolated pl ace and can i n fact be
committed i n pl aces which to many woul d appear to be unlikel y and high-risk venues for
sexual advances.
Whether or not the rape victim has to prove that she resisted the assault
The l aw does not impose upon a rape victi m the burden of provi ng resistance, especial l y
where there is intimidation. Physical resistance need not be establ ished in rape when
intimidati on is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her wi ll to the
rapist' s l ust because of fear for her l ife or personal safet y. In rape cases, it is not necessary
that the victim shoul d have resisted unto death or sustained i nj uries i n the hands of the rapist.
It suffices that intercourse takes pl ace against her wi l l or that she yi el ds because of a genui ne
apprehension of great harm. In i ncestuous rape, actual force and intimidati on is not even
necessar y. The reason for this is that i n a rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the moral ascendancy of the former over the l atter substitutes for viol ence and
intimidati on.
Whether or not there must be medical fi ndi ngs presented as evidence of the al l eged
crime
A medical examination is not i ndispensable to the prosecuti on of rape as l ong as the evi dence
on hand convi nces the court that conviction for rape is proper. Al though the results of a
medical examinati on may be consi dered strong evi dence to prove that the victim was raped,
such evidence is not i ndispensabl e in establishi ng accused-appel l ant' s gui lt or innocence.
A medical examinati on is not i ndispensable i n a prosecuti on for rape. Medical fi ndi ngs or
proof of i nj uri es, virgi ni ty, or an all egati on of the exact time and date of the commission of the
crime are not essential in a prosecuti on for rape.




ORDINARIO vs. PEOPLE

Facts: The case before the Supreme Court rel ates to an affirmance by the Court of Appeals
of the j ointdecision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City convicting Geronimo
Ordinario ontwelve (12) counts, of having committed punishable acts under Article 266-A of the
RevisedPenal Code. The char ges, under t he t wel ve ( 12) separ at e i nf or mat i ons f i l ed i n
vol ved t hecommission of acts of sexual assault by Ordinario against Jayson Ramos, a ten (10)
69

year oldmale, by i nserti ng his penis into the complai nants mouth. The accused plead not
gui lt y to al l thecharges. Compl ainant Jayson Ramos and the accused were student and
teacher, respecti vel y, atNicanor Garcia Elementary School during the time the alleged crime was perpetrated.The
accused vehementl y deni ed the accusations agai nst him and cl aimed that his
class scheduleat the school starts in the morni ng and ends at 1:00 P.M. so it woul d have been
impossi ble forhim to have molested the chil d at 6:00 in the evening. However, he occasional l y
went back tothe school late in the afternoon to feed the chicken as part of his duty
as overseer of the school spoultr y proj ect. In addi ti on, wi tnesses were presented by
the defense who cl aimed that they di dnot notice any change in the attitude or appearance of
the complainant, that nothing unusual was noted during the moments of the alleged molestations, etc.

Issue: Whether accused is gui lt y of rape.

Held: Al ibi cannot be sustai ned where i t is not onl y wi thout credi ble corroboration, but it al so
does noton its face demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accuseds presence at the
place andtime of the commission of the offense. Appell ant himself has admitted that whi le hi s
class wouldend at one oclock in the afternoon, he occasionall y would still go back to school
late in theafternoon to oversee the schools poultr y proj ect. The appel l ate court was correct
i n holdi ng thatthe exact date of the commission of the offense of rape is not an element of the
crime. Thedefi ni tion of the crime of rape has been expanded wi th the enactment of Republ i c
Act No. 8353, ot her wi se al so k nown as t he Ant i - Rape Law
of 1997, t o i ncl ude not onl y " r ape by sexual i ntercourse" but now l ikewise "rape by sexual
assaul t." The Supreme Court observed that boththe trial court and the appellate court failed to
provide civil liability ex del icto, an indemnit yauthori zed by prevail i ng j udicial pol icy to be an
equivalent of actual or compensator y damages inci vil l aw. The award of P50,000.00 ci vi l
indemnit y and P100,000.00 moral damages adj udged bythe tri al court for each count of sexual
assaul t were excessi ve and were reduced to
P25,000.00c i v i l i n d e mn i t y a n d P2 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 mo r a l d a ma g e s f o r e a c h c o u n t . T h e
a wa r d o f e x e mp l a r y damages was del eted for lack of l egal basi s. The Supreme Court
affirmed the j udgment appeal edtherefrom and convicted Geronimo Ordinario of rape by
sexual assaul t on twel ve (12) counts.



PEOPLE vs. DELA TORRE

Facts: On or about the 2
nd
week of September at Barangay Tumarbong, in the Municipality of
Roxas,Palawan, the accused Butchoy Dela Torre in conspiracy and confederating with his wife, Fe DelaTorre,
by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously have carnal
knowledge with one Baby Jane Dagot, a girl of 16 years of age against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice. Nine criminal cases were consolidated and joint trial conducted before the Regional Trial Court
of Palawan and Puerto Prinsesa City. OnMarch 1995, the appellants were found guilty and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua for eachcount. They were also ordered to indemnify the complainant the sum of Php
5000.00 as actualdamages and Php 90000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

Issue: Is the accused guilty in conspiracy and confederating with his wife to have caused Baby JaneDagot
damage and prejudice?

Held: The credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis of the substance of their testimonyand
the surrounding circumstances. The greatest weight is accorded to the findings andconclusions reached by
the lower court, owing to the courts unique position to see, hear andobserve the witnesses testify. The
judgment of the RTC is hereby MODIFIED. The appellants arefound guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify theoffended party the sum of Php 50000.00 as civil indemnity,
50000.00 as moral damages and25000.00 as exemplary damages. With the respect to cases 11313 11320,
the appellants areacquitted for failure of prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.



70

KIDNAPPING & SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION ( ART. 267)

PEOPLE vs. SURI AGA (G.R. no. 123779)

Facts: Edwin Ramos was cl eani ng the car of his ol der brother, Johnny who was taking care of
his 2- year ol d daughter, Nicol e, pl ayi ng inside the car. Suri aga, a cousi n of the Ramos
brothers, arri ved. He was accompanied by his l ive-i n-partner Rosita. Suri aga requested Edwin
if he coul d dri ve the car, butte l atter decl ined, sayi ng he did not have the keys. Meanwhi le,
Johnny returned to his house because a visitor arri ved. At this i nstance, Rosita hel d Nicole
and caj ol ed her. Rosi ta asked Edwi n if she could take Nicole wi th her to buy barbeque.
Having been acquainted wi th Rosita for a l ong time and because he trusted her, Edwi n
acceded. When Rosita and the chil d left, Suriaga j oined them. More than an one hour has
passed but the two fail ed to return wi th Nicol e. Edwi n, Johnny and his wife, Mercedita, then
began searching but they could not fi nd their daughter and Rosita. Nicol es grandfather then
recei ve a cal l from Suri aga asking for ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny
immedi atel y reported the cal l to the PACC Task Force.

The next day, Suri aga call ed Mercedita, introduced himself and asked her if she and her
husband woul d give the amount to which the l atter responded i n the positi ve. Suri aga
instructed Merci di ta as to the how the money should be deli vered to hi m with a warni ng that if
she wi l l not del i ver the money ,her daughter woul d be placed i n a plastic bag or thrown in a
garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and whi le being tai l ed by PACC agents,
Merci da proceeded to del i ver the money to Suri aga. The PACC agents arrested Suriaga and
his companion Isidera after Merci da gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was
rescued i n a shanty where Rosi tas sister l i ved.

Issue: Whether or not there was a depri vation of the victims li bert y i n this case

Held: The Supreme Court sai d that there was, and affirmed the gui l t of the accused. The
essence of the crime of kidnappi ng is the actual deprivati on of the victims li bert y, coupl ed
wi thi n dubitabl e proof of the accuseds i ntent to effect the same. And if the person detai ned i s
a chi ld, the questi on that needs to be addressed is whether there is evi dence to show that i n
taking the chi ld, there was depri vation of the chi l ds li bert y and that i t was the i ntention of the
accused to depri ve the mother of the chi lds custody. Undoubtedl y, the el ements of
kidnappi ng for ransom have been suffici entl y establ ished by the prosecuti on consi deri ng the
fol lowi ng circumstances:

appel l ant, a private i ndi vidual , took the young Nicol e without personal l y seeking
permissi on from her father
Here, appel lant took the girl and brought her to a shant y where Rositas sister li ved,
wi thout i nforming her parents of their whereabouts
He detai ned the chi ld and depri ved her of her l ibert y by fai l ing to return her to her
parents overnight and the fol l owi ng day; and
He demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through tel ephone cal ls and gave instructi ons
where and how it shoul d be deli vered.




PEOPLE vs. UBONGEN G.R. No. 126024

Facts: The victim Rose Ann Posadas was three years and ten months old at the time of the
al l eged kidnapping. She li ved wi th her mother Rosal i na at their beaut y parl or / house at La
Trindidad, Benguet. Her mother testifi ed that one afternoon, Rose Ann went to the parl or and
told her that an old man i nvi ted her to go wi th him to buy a banana and an orange. Si nce
Rosal i na was then attendi ng to a customer, Rosal ina di dn t bother to check on the ol d man
and j ust told her daughter to sit behi nd her. A few minutes later, she noticed her daughter
71

was nowhere i n si ght. She inquired around and sought the hel p of her nei ghbors. They
reported Rose Anns di sappearance to the pol i ce.

Two search teams in two cars were organi zed. A certain Rosal ine Fontani l la, a chil d who
l ived i n the neighborhood, i nformed the searchers that she saw Rose Ann with an old man
walking towards Buyagan Road. Rosali ne thought the ol d man was Rose Anns grandfather.
The searchers drove towards Buyagan road. After 45 minutes, the fi rst car reached Taltal a s
Store l ocated one ki lometer from the beaut y parlor. Garcia, one of the searchers , entered the
store and found Rose Ann with the old man who was l ater i dentifi ed as the defendant. When
asked why he had the chi ld wi th him, he j ust kept si l ent. While on the way to the pol ice
stati on at La Trini dad, Phi l ip Leygo, Jr., one of the searcher s, al l egedl y slapped
At the pol ice station, Rosal ina executed a sworn statement. The defendant was charged with
kidnappi ng.

The defendant al l eged that en route to the pol ice stati on, he merel y chanced upon the chi ld
and wanted to help the chi ld reach her home, but the three men on board the pol ice car
started to sl ap him. While he was detai ned i n the pol ice stati on, a certai n Sgt. Sal vador
cal l ed for the brother of appel lant. When the brother arrived he noticed that appel lants face
and eyes were swoll en and his nose was bl eedi ng. Appel l ant told his brother that he had
been mauled. The fol l owing day, appel lant was brought to the provi nci al j ai l . A lawyer met
wi th him four days l ater.

After trial on the meri ts, the accused was convicted of the crime al leged.


Issue: Whether or not intent to depri ve the victim of li berty is essenti al i n the crime of
kidnappi ng & serious i ll egal detenti on


Held: The Supreme Court ruled that it was, and that the absence of the same in this case
warrants the acqui ttal of the accused. Kidnappi ng or serious i ll egal detenti on is committed
when the fol l owi ng el ements of the crime are present: (1) that the offender is a pri vate
indi vi dual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or i n any manner deprives the l atter of his
l ibert y; (3) that the act of detenti on or kidnappi ng must be i l legal ; and (4) in the commission of
the offense, any of the fol l owing circumstances is present: (a) that the kidnapping or
detenti on lasts for more than 5 days; or (b) that it is commit ted simul ating publ ic authori t y; or
(c) that any seri ous physi cal i nj uri es are infl icted upon the person kidnapped or detai ned or
threats to ki l l him are made; or (d) that the person kidnapped or detai ned is a minor, femal e,
or a public officer.

The primary el ement of the crime of kidnapping is actual confi nement, detenti on and restrai nt
of the victim. A revi ew of the prosecutions own narration of events shows that the
prosecuti on di d not establ ish actual confinement, detenti on or restrain of the chi ld, which i s
the primary el ement of kidnappi ng. Since the evidence does not adequatel y prove that the
victim was forceful l y transported, locked up or restrained, the accused cannot be held li abl e
for kidnappi ng. Here, there is no i ndubitabl e proof of a purposeful or knowi ng acti on by the
accused to forcibl y restrain the victim, hence there was no taking coupl ed with intent to
complete the commissi on of the offense.

In a prosecuti on for kidnappi ng, the i ntent of the accused to depri ve the victim of the l atter s
l ibert y, in any manner, needs to be establ ished by indubitabl e proof. But i n this case, we are
constrained to rul e against the prosecuti ons attempt to establ ish that appel l ant had intended
to depri ve the chi l d of her l ibert y.





72



PEOPLE vs. ACBANGIN (G.R. No. 117216)

Facts: One eveni ng, Dani lo Acbangi n was worried when his daughter, four - year ol d Sweet
Grace Acbangi n did not come home. He last saw Sweet on the same day, at six o' cl ock in the
eveni ng, playi ng in Jocel yn' s house.Jocel yn was the commonl aw wif e of his second cousi n,
Remy Acbangi n. Dani l o went to Jocel yn' s house and l ooked for Sweet. There was no one
there. Thereafter, Dani l o reported to the Barangay and the Bacoor Pol ice Stati on that Sweet
was missi ng. Later that eveni ng, Jocel yn arri ved at Dani lo' s house wi thout Sweet. When
asked where the chi ld was, Jocel yn deni ed knowing of the chi ld' s whereabouts.

The next day, Dani l o made a second report to the Bacoor Pol ice Station, stati ng that Jocel yn
returned without the chi ld.m Jocel yn i nformed Dani l o' s mother-i n-l aw that Sweet was in Niu' s
house i n Tondo, Mani l a. Jocel yn then accompanied Dani lo, Sweet' s grandfather and police
officers to Ni u' s house. Jocel yn personall y knew Ni u and was first to enter the house. Jocel yn
went up to the second floor of the house. She went down with Ni u and Sweet. Sweet was
wel l -dressed and smil i ng. She ran to her father and embraced hi m. Niu then vol untari l y
turned Sweet over to her father and the pol icemen.

A compl aint for kidnappi ng a minor was fi led against Acbangi n Ni u and two others who were
uni dentifi ed.

For her part, Jocel yn testifi ed that for six years, she was empl oyed as Ni u' s housemai d.
While working for Niu, she took care of several chi ldren of different ages. The number of
chi l dren i n Ni u' s househol d woul d var y from seven to fourteen. Accordi ng to Jocel yn, Ni u was
in the business of sel l i ng chi ldren. On Apri l 23, 1993, Sweet was brought to Ni u' s house by a
certai n Cel ia and Hel en. Jocel yn r ecogni zed Sweet as her niece. Upon seei ng Sweet, she
decided to go to Sweet' s parents i n Bacoor, Cavite. She then accompani ed Sweet' s father,
al ong with some pol icemen to Niu' s house.

After trial on the meri ts, the court convicted the accused of the cri me of kidnappi ng and
seri ous il l egal detenti on.


Issue: Whether or not there was i ntention on the part of the defendant to depri ve the parents
of the custody of the chi ld

Held: The Supreme Court rul ed in the affirmati ve and upheld the deci sion of the l ower court.
In cases of kidnappi ng, if the person detained is a chi ld, the questi on is whether there was
actual depri vation of the chi ld' s li bert y, and whether i t was the i ntenti on of the accused to
deprive the parents of the custody of the chi ld. The i ntent i on to depri ve Sweet' s parents of her
custody is indicated by Jocel yn' s hesi tation for two days to discl ose Sweet' s whereabouts and
more so by her actual taking of the chi ld. Jocel yn' s moti ve at this point is not rel evant. It i s
not an el ement of the cri me.

In this case, Jocel yn knew for two days where Sweet was. In fact, it was she who brought
Sweet to Niu' s house. The fact that she l ater on fel t remorse for taking Sweet to Tondo,
Manil a and showed Sweet' s father where the chi l d was, cannot absol ve her. At that point, the
crime was consummated. Jocel yn' s repentance and desistance came too l ate. Sweet was
deprived of her l ibert y. True, she was treated wel l . However, there is sti ll kidnappi ng. For
there to be kidnappi ng, it is not necessar y that the victim be pl aced in an enclosure. It is
enough that the victim is restrai ned from going home. Gi ven Sweet' s tender age, when
Jocel yn left her in Ni u' s house, at a distant pl ace i n Tondo, Manil a, unknown to her, she
deprived Sweet of the freedom to leave the house at wi l l. It is not necessar y that the
detenti on be prol onged.


73


PEOPLE vs. PAVILLARE ( G. R. No. 129970)

Facts: The victim, an Indi an national named Sukhj i nder Singh testifi ed i n court that at about
noon of one day, whi l e he was on his way back to his motorcycle parked at the corner of
Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, three men bl ocked his way. The one directl y i n front of hi m,
whom he later identified as herei n Pavi l lare, accused him of havi ng raped the woman inside
the red Ki a taxi cab parked nearby. Si ngh denied the accusati on, the three men nevertheless
forced him insi de the taxi cab and brought him somewhere near St Joseph' s Coll ege in
Quezon Ci t y. One of the abductors took the key to his motorcycle and drove i t alongsi de the
cab. Singh testif ied that the accused-appel lant and his companions beat him up and
demanded one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for his r elease but Singh tol d him he
onl y had f i ve thousand pesos (P5,000.00) with him.

Pavi l lare then forced hi m to gi ve the phone numbers of his rel ati ves so they can make thei r
demand from them. Si ngh gave the phone number of his cousin Lakhvir Si ngh and the
appel l ant made the cal l. The pri vate complai nant also stated i n court that it was accused-
appel l ant who haggl ed with his cousi n for the amount of the ransom. When the amount of
twent y fi ve thousand was agreed upon the complai nant stated that the kidnappers took him to
the corner of Aurora Boul evard and Boston streets and parked the cab there. The accused-
appel l ant and two of the male abductors al i ghted whil e the dri ver and their lady compani on
stayed wi th the compl ai nant i n the car. When the compl ai nant tur ned to see where the
accused-appel l ant and his, compani ons went he saw his uncle and his cousi n in a motorcycle
and together wi th the kidnappers they entered a mini -grocer y. Later the kidnappers brought
the compl ainant to the mini -grocer y where he met his rel ati ves. The ransom money was
handed to the appel lant by the compl ainant' s cousi n, after which the accused-appel lant
counted the money and then, together with his cohorts, immedi atel y l eft the scene.

Pavi l lare al leged i n his defense that on the whol e day of the i ncident, he was at the j ob si te
in Noval iches where he had contracted to bui ld the house of a cl ient and that he coul d not
have been anywhere near Roces Avenue at the time the complai nant was al legedl y
kidnapped. One of his employees, an electri cian, testifi ed that the accused-appel l ant was
indeed at the j ob site in Novaliches the whol e day of February 12, 1996.

After tri al on the meri ts, the l ower court found the accused gui lt y and convicted him of the
crime of kidnappi ng for ransom.

Issue: Whether or not the accused should instead be li abl e for simpl e robber y i nstead of the
crime all eged, si nce they were onl y moti vated wi th the i ntent to gain

Held: The Supreme Court sai d no; and affirmed his convicti on. The Court di d not consi der
Pavi l laras argument that he shoul d have been convicted of si mple robber y and not
kidnappi ng with ransom because the evi dence proves that the prime moti ve of the accused-
appel l ant and his compani ons is to obtain money and that the compl ai nant was detai ned onl y
for two hours

The crime is sai d to have been committed when: any pri vate indi vi dual who shal l kidnap or
detai n another, or i n any other manner depri ve him of li bert y, shal l suffer the penalt y of
recl usion perpetua to death;
1......If the ki dnapping or detenti on shal l have lasted more than three days.
2......If it shall have been committed simul ati ng public authori t y.
3......If any serious physi cal inj uries shal l have been i nfl icted upon the person ki dnapped or
detai ned; or if threats to kil l him shal l have been made.
4......If the person kidnapped or detained shal l be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalt y shal l be death where the kidnapping or detenti on was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
74

above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is kil led or
di es as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is the subj ected to torture or
dehumani zi ng acts, the maximum penalt y shal l be imposed.

The testimoni es of both the pri vate compl ai nant and his cousi n are replete wi th posi ti ve
declarati ons that the accused-appell ant and his compani ons demanded money f or the
complai nant' s rel ease. The pretense t hat the money was supposedl y in exchange for the
droppi ng of the charges for rape is not supported by the evi dence. The compl ainant' s cousi n
testifi ed that at the agreed drop-off poi nt Pavi l lare demanded the ransom money and stated,
"Andi yan na ang tao ni nyo i bigay mo sa akin ang pera". Pavi ll are rel eased the compl ainant
when the money was handed over to him and after counting the money Pavi ll are and his
companions immedi atel y l eft the scene. This cl earl y i ndicated that the payment of the ransom
money is in exchange for the l ibert y of the pri vate complai nant.

The durati on of the detention even if onl y for a few hours does not alter the nature of the
crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depri vi ng the victim of libert y
whether he is placed i n an encl osure or simpl y restrai ned from going home. As squarel y
expressed i n Article 267, above-quoted the penalt y of death is imposabl e where the detenti on
is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the durati on of the detention is not
materi al .



PEOPLE vs. CORTEZ ( G.R. Nos. 131619-20)

Facts: The ki dnap victim Lol i ta Mendoza was in her house, i n Si ti o Catmon, San Rafael ,
Rodri guez, Ri zal , when Cortez and two others, all armed with bolos, arri ved. They were
looking for Lol ita' s cousin, and were threateni ng to kil l him on sight. Unable to find Santos,
they decided to abduct Lol ita to prevent her from reporti ng the i ncident to the pol ice.
Accompanied by the other two, accused Cal l os poi nted his bolo at Lol i ta' s back and dragged
her to the mountain. They brought her to the house of Pablo Torral, an uncle of accused
Cortez, and thereafter conti nued their search for Santos. Hours later, the pol icemen and the
barangay captain rescued Loli ta in the house of the Torrals.

A witness rushed to the Montal ban munici pal hal l and reported Lol i ta' s abducti on. Police went
back to the crime scene to gather more information, and thereafter they proceeded to the
resi dence of accused Cortez. The police officers then saw Loli ta outsi de the ni pa hut of the
Torral s, conversing wi th Pabl o Torral . Loli ta told them that the Torrals did not prevent her
from leaving their house. However, she di d not attempt to escape for fear that the accused
woul d make good their threat to kil l her. One officer brought her back to the house of accused
Cortez where she identifi ed the three accused as her abductors. The police then took the
accused i nto custody.

The accused argues that at the time of the rescue, Lol ita was not physical l y confi ned i nsi de
the house as they found her standi ng outsi de, conversi ng wi th Pablo Torral . They stress that
Lol ita herself declared that she was not prevented by the Torrals from leavi ng the house; that
she was not under duress at that time. This was not appreciated by the lower court, and the
accused were tried and convicted of the crime al l eged.


Issue: Whether or not the victim was depri ved of her l ibert y i n this case


Held: The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC on the gui lt of the accused. In a prosecution
for kidnappi ng, the State has the burden of provi ng all the essenti al el ements of an offense.
For the crime of kidnappi ng to prosper, the i ntent of the accused to depr i ve the victim of his
l ibert y, i n any manner, has to be established by indubitabl e proof. However, i t is not
75

necessar y that the offended part y be kept wi thi n an encl osure to restrict her freedom of
locomoti on.

In the case at bar, the deprivati on of Lol ita' s l i bert y was ampl y establi shed by evi dence. When
the appel l ants fail ed to find Lol ita' s cousi n, they forcibl y dragged her to the mountai ns and
kept her i n the house of the Torrals. Appel l ant Cortez even bound her hands wi th a belt.
Although at the time of the rescue, she was f ound outside the house talki ng to Pabl o Torral ,
she expl ained that she di d not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the appel l ants woul d
make good their threats to kil l her shoul d she do so. Her fear i s not basel ess as the
appel l ants knew where she resi ded and they had earl ier announced that their intenti on i n
looking for Lol ita' s cousin was to kil l him on sight: Certainl y, fear has been known to render
peopl e immobi le. Indeed, appeals to the fears of an i ndi vidual , such as by threats to kil l or
similar threats, are equi valent to the use of actual force or vi olence which is one of the
el ements of the crime of kidnappi ng under Arti cle 267 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.




PEOPLE vs. SINOC (G.R. Nos. 113511-12)

Facts: In the morni ng of September 21, 1991, Isidoro Vi acrusis, manager of Taganito Mi ni ng
Corporati on, was on hi s way from the company compound to Suri gao Ci ty, on a company
vehicle, a Mitsubishi Paj ero. As Vi acrusis and his dri ver were approachi ng the publi c
cemeter y of Cl arer they were stopped by several armed men who i dentifi ed themsel ves as
member of the New Peopl e' s Army. Upon reachi ng Barobo, Suri gao del Norte, Vi acrusis and
his dri ver were ordered to al i ght and proceed to a coconut grove wi th their hands bound
behind their back. After the two were made to l i e face down on the ground, they were shot
several times. Viacrusi s miraculousl y survi ved, whil e the dri ver di ed.

In an affidavit executed by Vi acrusis, he was abl e to identif y by name onl y one Dani l o
Sinoc. In the morni ng of September 21, 1991, a secret i nformant reported to the Pol ice
Stati on at Montkayo, Davao del Norte that the stol en (carnapped) Paj ero was parked behind
the apartment of a certai n Paul ino Overa at Pobl aci on, Monkayo. A pol ice team went to the
pl ace and posted themselves i n such a manner as to keep it i n view. They saw a man
approach the Paj ero who, on seeing them, tri ed to run away. They stopped him and found out
that the man, i dentifi ed as Dani lo Si noc, had the key of the Paj ero, and was acti ng under
instructi ons of some compani ons who were wai ti ng for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao
del Norte. The pol ice turned over Si noc to the 459th Mobi le Force, together with the Paj ero.
Sinoc was brought to the Publ ic Attorneys' Office in Butuan Cit y where he asked one of the
attorneys there, Att y. Alfredo Jal ad, to assist him in making an Affidavi t of Confessi on. Atty.
Jal ad told Sinoc that he had the ri ght to choose his own counsel, and to remai n si lent. Si noc
sai d he wanted to make the affidavi t nonethel ess, and be assisted by Jalad i n doi ng so. Atty.
Jal ad then had Si noc narrate the occurrence. Jal ad asked Si noc if the CIS had promised hi m
anything for the affi davit he woul d execute. Sinoc sai d no. Onl y then di d the CIS officers
commence to take Si noc' s statement. Jalad read to Si noc the contents of his statement. The
statement was thereafter si gned by Si noc and by Jalad, the l atter bei ng described as "witness
to si gnature."
Since was next brought to Prosecutor Brocoy so that he might take oath on his statement.
Ci t y Fiscal Brocoy tol d Si noc that the statement was ver y damaging. Si noc stood by hi s
answers, sayi ng that they had been vol untari l y gi ven. Evi dentl y satisfi ed of the vol untari ness
of the statement, Brocoy admi nistered the oath to Si noc.
Sinoc' s assault agai nst the propri et y of his interrogation after his warrantl ess arrest because
it was conducted without advice to him of his consti tuti onal ri ghts, is poi ntless. It is true that
the initi al interrogati on of Si noc was made without his first being told of his corresponding
rights. This is i nconsequenti al , for the prosecuti on never attempt to prove what he might have
sai d on that occasion. The confessi on made by him afterwards at the Publ ic Attorneys' Office
at Butuan Cit y shows it to have been executed vol untari l y.

76

Issue: Whether or not kidnappi ng was the principal obj ecti ve of the defendant in this case


Held: The Supreme Court sai d that i t was not. The "kidnappi ng" was not the princi pal
obj ecti ve; i t was merel y i ncidental to the forcibl e taking of the vehicl e. Unfortunatel y, by
reason or on the occasi on of the sei zure of the "Paj ero" and (as far as the proofs
demonstrate) wi thout fore-knowl edge on Si noc' s part i ts dri ver was kil led, and the lone
passenger seri ousl y inj ured. There was t hus no kidnapping as the term is understood i n
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code the essenti al obj ect of which is to "kidnap or detain
another, or i n any other manner deprive him of his l ibert y." The i dea of "ki dnapping" i n thi s
case appears to have been the result of the continuous but uni nformed use of that term by the
peace officers i nvol ved i n the i nvestigati on, carel essl y carried over i nto the i ndictments and
the record of the trial , and even accepted by the RTC.

The offense actual l y committed is Robber y with vi olence agai nst or i ntimidati on of persons
Penal ties. Any person guil t y of robber y with the use of vi ol ence agai nst any person shal l
suffer: 1. The penalt y of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasi on of the
robber y, t he crime of homici de shall have been committed, or when the robber y shal l have
been accompanied by rape or i ntenti onal muti lati on or arson. . . ." It is germane to observe
that even if the i ntent to depri ve of l ibert y were as important or primordi al an obj ecti ve as the
asportati on of the "Paj ero," the ki dnappi ng woul d be absorbed in the robber y wi th homici de;
and that the term, "homicide," is used i n the quoted articl e i n the generic sense i.e., as
also i ncluding murder, the nature of the offense not bei ng al tered by the treacherous
character, or the number, of the kil l ings i n connecti on wi th the robbery.

In this case, there is no avoi ding the fact that a homicide al though not agreed to or
expected by him was committed on the occasi on of the robber y, of the "Paj ero," and he
could not but have real i zed or antici pated the possibi l it y of seri ous harm, even death, bei ng
inf licted on the person or persons i n the "Paj ero" targeted for robber y, since two of his
companions were armed with guns, even if in his mind, to repeat, his agreement with them di d
not i ncl ude kil l ing. The most that can be conceded is to credit him with the miti gating
circumstance of having no intenti on to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Si noc
may not be held l i able i n Case No. 3565 for the separate offense of frustrated murder as
regards Vi acrusis. In this particular case, the evi dence shows that he agreed onl y to the pl an
to "carnap" the "Paj ero," but not to any assault or kill i ng. Nor is it logi cal to convict him twice
of robber y of the same propert y under the same circumstances. Hence, he may not be
pronounced responsi bl e for the separate offense of robber y of the same "Paj ero," in additi on
to bei ng declared gui lt y of robber y, (of that same "Paj ero") wi th homicide under Artic le 294.




















77


SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION ( ART. 268)

People vs. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262)
Facts: On Februar y 5, 1987 the appell ant Judy Reyes, chief securi t y and rattan controll er of
an export company i nformed Tomas Banzon, the company dut y guard, that he caught a thi ef
on Februar y 4, 1987. Appel lant then took Banzon to his room where a person named
Bienvenido Mercado was found ti ed to a wooden post i n the room. Appell ant told Banzon that
Mercado was the thief he caught.
In the afternoon of Februar y 6, 1987, the company manager, cal l ed up Banzon by phone
inquiri ng if there was any unusual i ncident. Banzon repl ied that he woul d give a report after 2
hours. However, appel lant warned Banzon to keep quiet about Mercados detenti on or be
kill ed. Appell ant at the time was armed wi th a .45 cal i ber pistol. When the company manager
went to the office she was tol d by the appell ant that i t was all finished and that he is going to
Sto. Nino to confess that he had ki ll ed someone.
The foll owi ng day, Banzon asked appell ant about Mercado and appel lant sai d that he had
disposed of him. Banzon, at that time, noticed that appel lants arm had teeth marks, which
accordi ng to the appell ant, was hi t by a pi ece of wood.
On the same day, the body of Bi enveni do Mercado was found by the police with gunshot
wound on the forehead and mul ti ple abrasi ons in the arms and body.
In the pl ace where they found the body, the pol ice also found an empt y shel l of a .45 cal i ber
bul let.
Issue: Whether or not appel l ant is gui lt y of kidnappi ng wi th murder as charged i n the
information or of murder as convicted by the lower court or of sl i ght i l l egal detenti on onl y.
Held: The SC found that the appel lant is li abl e onl y f or sli ght i l legal detention and not of
murder nor of kidnappi ng with murder.
The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustai ned by the trial court, cl earl y
establ ished that appel l ant had i n fact detained the victim without authori t y to do so. Banzon
testifi ed that he witnessed the victim hangi ng by the arms in appel lant' s room. Banzon' s
testimony si gnificantl y j ibes wi th the physical evi dence showi ng that the victim sus tai ned
multi ple abrasi ons i n both arms. Furthermore, Dr. Ceni za narrated that several employees
cal l ed her up i n the morni ng of Februar y 5, 1987 asking for permission to go home because
there was a "man hangi ng at the back in one of the bui ldi ngs of GF Internati onal." Dr.
Ceni za' s testimony was unrebutted. All these ineludibl y prove beyond reasonabl e doubt that
the victim was depri ved of his l i bert y by appel l ant.
Sc hel d that the tri al court merel y made a fi ndi ng that appell ant coul d not be convicted of
seri ous i l legal detenti on for the sole reason that the victim' s detenti on did not exceed f ive
days. The lower court, however, found that appell ant i l legal l y detai ned the victim for at least
one day, which act by i tself constitutes sl i ght i ll egal detenti on. Besi des, the tri al court
appreci ated the act consti tuti ng sl i ght i l legal detention as a qual i f yi ng circumstance, i . e.,
employi ng means to weaken the defense. Whil e we find no proof beyond reasonable doubt to
sustai n a conviction for murder, the records indisputabl y prove cul pabil i ty for sl i ght i l legal
detenti on.




78

PEOPLE vs. DADLES (G.R. No. 118620-21)
Facts: This case i nvol ves the all eged kidnappi ng of two farmers, Al ipi o Tehidor and Sal vador
Ali pan and their respecti ve sons, Di onisio and Antoni o from their homes i n Barangay
Amontay, Bi nal bagan, Negros Occi dental on May 24, 1989. Among the accused, onl y the
appel l ant was arrai gned where he pleaded not gui l ty.
On May 24, 1989, the appel l ant together with 5 others arri ved at the resi dence of one of the
victims, Al ipi o Tehi dor, his wife and their two sons were awakened from their sl eep when t he
appel l ant and his companions cal l ed Al ipi o from downstairs. The group which was known to
the Tehi dor fami l y was al l owed t o enter by Ali pio' s wife. They told Francisca that they wanted
to talk to Al ipi o downstairs. Al ipi o' s wife requested the group t o talk to her husband i nside
their house but her request was unheeded. When Francisca protested, the appell ant' s group
told her that they woul d free Al i pi o and Di oni sio i f they surrender the firearms of their two
other sons. Unable to surrender the said firearms, the appel l ant' s group forced Al ipi o and
Di onisio t o walk wi th them to an unknown pl ace. Since then Franci sca has not heard from
ei ther her husband or her son.
On the same day, a f ew minutes after the Al i pi o Tehidor and his sons were forci bl y taken by
the appel l ant' s group, whi le sal vador and his famil y were i n their house, they heard somebody
cal l ing them from outside which they have i dentifi ed as the appell ant and 9 others, al l of
whom are armed. Sal vador and his son l eft with the group t o an unknown desti nati on. And l i ke
Francisca, Luzviminda never saw her husband and son again after that night.
Issue: Whether or not appel l ant i s gui lt y of ki dnapping as charged.
Held: The court ruled that the appell ant i s gui lt y beyond reasonabl e doubt of kidnappi ng.
However, "si nce none of the circumstances menti oned i n Article 267 of the RPC (kidnappi ng
wi th seri ous i l l egal detenti on) was proved and onl y the fact of kidnappi ng . . . was
establ ished, SC rul ed that the crime committed i s sl ight i ll egal detention under Arti cle
268.

Moreover, i n the execution of the crime agai nst the first two (2) victims, Sal vador and
Antonio Al ipan, more than three (3) armed malefactors acted together i n i ts
commission.

Thus, si nce the generic aggravati ng circumstance of band

attended the
commission of the cri me and there being no mitigati ng circumstance present, the penal ty
i s recl usion temporal i n its maximum peri od. For the sli ght i l l egal detenti on of the l atter two
(2) victims, Al i pi o and Dionisi o Tehidor, t he aggravating circumstance that the crime was
committed by a band as all eged i n t he information f inds no suffici ent factual basis si nce t he
testimonies of the prosecution wi tnesses do not disclose that at l east four (4) of the
malefactors were armed.

Hence there being no aggravating nor miti gati ng circumstance
attendant i n the commission of the crime, the penalt y of reclusion temporal should be
imposed i n its medi um peri od.







79

PEOPLE vs. ROLUNA (G.R. No. 101797)
Facts: I n an Informati on dated June 26, 1990, ei ght (8) persons were charged with the crime
of Ki dnapping wi th Murder. Onl y the appel lant was arrested, tri ed and convicted.
On May 27, 1984, Sombi l on was on his way t o attend t o the pasture of his carabao. He saw
his neighbor, Anatal io Moroni a, stopped i n hi s tracks and taken capti ve by accused Abundi o
Roluna. Rol una was then accompanied by seven (7) other persons. Accused Rol una was
armed wi th an armal ite whil e his compani ons were carr yi ng short fi rearms. Usi ng an abaca
stri p, he saw Carl os Daguing tie up the hands of Moroni a at the back. Frightened, he di d not
shout for help and proceeded on his way. With the excepti on of his wife, he did not i nform
anyone about what he saw that fateful day.
From that time on, both witnesses testifi ed that Moronia was never seen or heard from.
Issue: Whether or not the appel lant i s guil t y of the crime of kidnapping wi th murder.
Held: However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough t o hol d
accused-appel l ant responsibl e for the death of Moronia.
There bei ng no evidence t o the contrary, t he disputable presumption under Secti on 5 (x) (3),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would appl y, but only i nsofar as to establ ish the presumptive
death of Moronia. Whether accused-appel lant i s responsibl e for t he death of Moronia i s a
different matter. The Rul es di d not authori ze that from this disputable presumpti on of death, i t
shoul d be further presumed that the person wi th whom the absentee was l ast seen shal l be
responsi bl e for the subsequent unexpl ained absence/disappearance of the latter. The
conviction of accused-appel l ant for the seri ous crime of kidnapping wi th murder cannot be
al l owed to rest on t he vague and nebulous facts establ ished by the prosecution. As discussed
earl ier, the evidence presented by t he prosecution surrounding t he events of that fateful day
are grossl y i nsuffici ent to establ ish the al leged l iabi li t y of accused-appell ant for the death of
Moroni a.
Since none of t he circumstances menti oned i n Article 267 of t he Revised Penal Code
(kidnappi ng wi th seri ous i ll egal detenti on) was proved and onl y t he fact of kidnapping of
Anatal io Moronia was establ ished, we fi nd that the crime committed i s sl ight il l egal detenti on
under Articl e 268 of the Revised Penal Code. In the executi on of t he crime, more than three
(3) armed malefactors acted together i n its commission. Thus, since the generic aggravati ng
circumstance of band attended the commissi on of the crime and there bei ng no miti gati ng
circumstance present, the penalt y of recl usion temporal i n its maxi mum peri od as maximum
and prisi on mayor as minimum shoul d be imposed on accused-appel l ant.







80

FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR ( ART. 270)
PEOPLE vs. PASTRANA (G.R. No. 143644)
Facts: Sometime i n Januar y 1997, whi le i n Canada, Erma was i ntroduced by her sister t o
spouses Leopol do and Rebecca Frias who i nformed her that their daughter, accused-
appel l ant Rubirosa Pastrana, can hel p process Will y s travel documents to Canada. Erma
agreed to hand the processing of her sons papers t o accused-appel l ant and consequentl y
sent her, on various occasi on
Accused went to the house of Erma and introduced herself t o the chi l dren of Erma as the one
who wil l work out the processing of their travel documents to Canada. On several occasions,
accused sol ici ted money from Erma on account of the i ll ness and such other needs of the
latter' s chil dren.
Erma l ater on found out from Aresola that accused did not return Will y to Cal oocan. Few days
after such knowl edge, accused went to Cal oocan t o inform Doroteo that Will y i s missi ng. They
searched for Will y but their efforts were frui tl ess. The same propmted Erma to return t o the
Phi l ippines.
Accused-appell ant vehementl y denied the charges agai nst her.
Issue: Whether or not accused i s guil t y of kidnappi ng and fai lure to return the minor.
Held: Yes. Kidnapping and fail ure to return a minor under Articl e 270 of the Revised Penal
Code has two essential el ements, namel y: (1) the offender i s entrusted with the custody of a
minor person; and (2) the offender del iberatel y fai ls to restore the sai d minor t o his parents or
guardi ans. What i s actual l y being punished i s not the kidnapping of the minor but rather t he
del iberate fai lure of the custodi an of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or
guardi ans. The word del i berate as used i n Articl e 270 must impl y somethi ng more than mere
negli gence - i t must be premedi tated, headstrong, foolishl y dari ng or intenti onall y and
malici ousl y wrong.
In the case at bar, there i s no question that accused was entrusted wi th the custody of 9- year
ol d Will y. Erma and her chi l dren trusted accused-appel l ant that they sent her money for t he
processi ng of Will y s travel documents, and more importantl y, they al l owed Will y t o stay i n her
apartment. Regardl ess of whether Will y stayed i n accused-appel lant s apartment permanentl y
or temporari l y, the first el ement of t he offense charged i s satisfi ed because duri ng said period
Will y was entrusted to accused-appel l ant who undertook the responsi bi l it y of seeing t o i t that
he was wel l -taken care of.
Evidence of the case showed that the accused del i beratel y fai led to return Will y to their
house.






81

PEOPLE vs. BERNARDO (G.R. No. 144316)
Facts: On May 13, 1999, 12- year old Mari a Rosel le and her 15-day ol d sister, Rosal yn, were
wi th their mother at t he Fabel la Memori al Hospital.
While Rosi ta was undergoi ng medical check up i nside t he hospi tal, her two daughters waited
at the lobby. Rosell e was seati ng on a bench wi th her 15-day old sister on her lap when t he
appel l ant sat besi de her and befri ended her.
The appel lant decei ved Rosell e by asking her to buy i ce water. She saw the accused runni ng
away with her baby sister. She chased the appel lant and when she caught up with her, t he
appel l ant told her that she was runni ng after her mother. The chase ensued as Rosel le tried
to prevent appell ant from running away.
A kagawad came to hel p Rosel le. He took the baby from the appel l ant and l ooked for the
mother of the two chi ldren i nside the hospital where he confirmed Rosi ta' s i denti t y.
Appel l ant was convicted by t he lower court of kidnappi ng and fai lure t o return a minor.
Issue: whether or not accused-appell ant i s guil ty of kidnapping and fai lure to return a minor.
Held: The crime committed by appell ant i n t he case at bar fal ls under Article 267 of the RPC.
It has two essenti al el ements, namel y: (1) t he offender i s entrusted wi th the custody of a
minor person; and (2) the offender del iberatel y fai ls to restore the sai d minor t o his parents or
guardi ans. I n Peopl e vs. Ty (263 SCRA 745 [1996]), The Court stated that the essenti al
el ement of the crime of kidnapping and fai l ure t o return a minor i s that the offender i s
entrusted wi th the custody of the minor, but what i s actual l y being punished i s not the
kidnappi ng of t he minor but rather the del i berate fai lure of the custodi an of the mi nor t o
restore the l atter to his parents or guardi ans. Indeed, t he word deli berate as used i n Articl e
270 of the Revised Penal Code must impl y somethi ng more than mere negl igence i t must be
premeditated, headstrong, fool ishl y daring or i ntenti onal l y and mal iciousl y wrong.
When Rosel l e entrusted Rosel yn to appel lant before setti ng out on an errand for appel l ant t o
look for ice water, the first el ement was accomplished and when appel lant refused to return
the baby t o Rosel l e despi te her conti nuous pl eas, the crime was effecti vel y accompl ished. In
fine, we agree with the trial courts fi ndi ng that appell ant i s guil t y of the crime of kidnappi ng
and fai lure to return a minor.








82

PEOPLE vs. TY (G.R. No. 121519)
Facts: Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged wi th t he crime of kidnappi ng and fai l ure to
return a minor. On November 18, 1987, complai nant Johanna Sombong brought her si ck
daughter Arabel la, then onl y 7 months old, for treatment to t he Sir John Medical and Maternit y
which was owned and operated by the accused-appel l ants. Arabell a was di agnosed to be
suffering bronchi tis and di arrhea, thus compl ai nant was advised t o confi ne t he chi l d at t he
cli nic for speedy recover y. Few days later, Arabell a was wel l and was ready to be discharged
but compl ai nant was not around to take her home. Arabel la stayed i n the cl i nic and later on i n
the nurser y as complai nant has no money t o pay t he bi l ls.
From then on, nothi ng was heard of the complai nant. She neither visited her chi ld nor cal l ed
to i nquire about her whereabouts. Efforts to get i n touch with the compl ainant were
unsuccessful as she l eft no address or telephone number where she can be reached.
Two years after Arabel la was abandoned by complai nant, Dr. Fe Mal l onga, a dentist at t he
cli nic, suggested duri ng a hospi tal staff conference that Arabell a be entrusted t o a guardi an
who coul d gi ve the chi ld the l ove and affection, personal attenti on and caring she badl y
needed as she was thin and sickl y.
In 1992, compl ainant came back t o claim the daughter she abandoned some five (5) years
back. When her pl eas all egedl y went unanswered, she fi l ed a peti tion for habeas
corpus against accused.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appel l ant i s gui lt y of kidnappi ng and fai l ure t o return a minor.
Held: Under t he facts and rul i ng i n Sombong, as wel l as the evi dence adduced i n this case
accused-appel l ants must perforce be acqui tted of the crime charged, there bei ng no reason to
hol d them li abl e for fai l ing t o return one Cristina Grace Neri, a chi ld not concl usivel y shown
and establ ished t o be complai nant' s daughter, Arabel l a.
The foregoi ng notwithstanding, even i f we were t o consi der Cristi na Grace Neri and Arabel l a
Sombong as one and the same person, sti l l, the i nstant criminal case against the accused-
appel l ants must fall .
Before a convicti on f or kidnappi ng and fai lure to return a minor under Articl e 270 of the
Revised Penal Code can be had, two el ements must concur, namel y: (a) t he offender has
been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) t he offender del iberatel y fails to restore
sai d minor t o his parents or guardians. The essential el ement herei n i s that t he offender i s
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what i s actual l y punishabl e i s not the kidnappi ng
of the minor, as the titl e of the articl e seems to indicate, but rather the deli berate fail ure or
refusal of the custodian of the minor t o restore the l atter to his parents or guardi ans.

Sai d
fai lure or refusal, however, must not onl y be del i berate but must also be persistent as to
obl ige the parents or t he guardi ans of the chil d to seek the aid of the courts i n order to obtai n
custody.

The key word therefore of this el ement i s del i berate
In the case at bar, i t i s evi dent that there was no del i berate refusal or fai lure on the part of
the accused-appel lants to restore the custody of t he compl ainant' s chi l d t o her. When the
accused-appel l ants l earned that complai nant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long
years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herei n compl ai nant fi nd t he
chi l d as t he latter was no l onger under t he cli nic' s care.
It i s worthy to note that accused-appell ants' conduct from the moment the chi l d was left i n t he
cli nic' s care up to t he time the chi l d was given up for guardi anship was moti vated by nothi ng
more than an earnest desire t o hel p the chi l d and a high regard f or her welfare and wel l-
bei ng.
83

PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA (G.R. No. L-67610)
Facts: On September 28, 1982 spouses Ernesto and Eugeni a Pol icarpi o along with their two
chi l dren were at the Luneta Park. A woman who turned out t o be accused Angel ina Mendoza,
but who had introduced herself as ' Rosal i nda Quintos' accosted them. She struck a
conversati on with the spouses and even offered them food particularl y t o Edward.
Subsequentl y, accused pl ayed with Edward and l ured him away from his mother. Shortl y, the
accused carried Edward and took him away wi th her.
It devel oped that from the Luneta the accused brought the chi ld to Tramo Street, Pasay Cit y
where she claimed before some resi dents that the chi ld was that of a hostess friend of hers
who being gravel y i ll of leprosy was i n dire need of money, and that she was asked t o sel l t he
chi l d for P 250.00.
The accused offered Mrs. Navarette t o buy the chi l d. She, she however decl ined t he offer
because of i ts i l legal i ty. Accused insisted on momentari l y l eavi ng the chi l d with Mrs.
Navarette. Intendi ng t o have the chi l d returned t o his mother, Mrs. Navarette asked her sister
to go wi th the accused to l ook for the chi l d' s mother
Sometime later, t he accused reappeared at the Luneta Pol ice Stati on obstensi bl y t o visit a
detai nee thereat. I t was then that the pol i ce officer on dut y recogni zed her. She was
questi oned regardi ng the whereabouts of the boy. Threatened with arrest, she reveal ed t hat
she had left the boy with Mrs. Navarette i n Pasay Cit y. That l ed t o the recover y of Edward
Pol icarpio and his eventual return to his parents twent y days after the accused took him
away.
Issue: Whether or not accused i s guil t y of kidnappi ng and fai lure to return a minor.
Held: The court hel d that accused-appel l ant i s gui lt y of Kidnappi ng and Serious Ill egal
Detention beyond reasonabl e doubt. I t has been establ ished by the clear, strong and posi ti ve
evi dence of the prosecution that the taking of the minor chi l d Edward was wi thout the
knowl edge and consent of his parents.
While the Informati on against accused-appel lant i s capti oned "Ki dnappi ng and Fai lure t o
Return a Mi nor", t he all egati ons i n the body thereof properl y consti tute the crime of
kidnappi ng and Serious Ill egal Detenti on. Thus, instead of al leging the el ements of kidnappi ng
and Fai lure t o Return a Minor that the offender had been entrusted with the custody of a
minor person and that sai d offender had deli beratel y fail ed t o restore the l atter to his parents
or guardians, the text of the Information al l eged the el ements of the crime of kidnappi ng and
Seri ous Il legal Detenti on.
It i s wel l -settl ed that the real nature of the cri minal charge i s determined not from the caption
or preamble of the Inf ormati on nor from the specification of the provisi on of law al leged t o
have been vi olated, they being concl usi ons of law, but by the actual recital of facts i n t he
complai nt or i nformati on.





84

GRAVE COERCION ( ART. 286)
PEOPLE vs. SANTOS (G.R. No. 140074)
Facts: It i s not unknown that a debtor occasi onall y would suffer from the malady of sel ecti ve
amnesi a.The case i s a tal e of one unfortunate credi tor who might have sought to rouse her
absent-minded debtor f rom the haze of forgetful ness.
On 10 December 1996, at six o' cl ock i n t he morning, Leonida de l a Pea was at home
inBarangay Resurrecci on, Umingan, Pangasi nan, wi th her ei ght- year old niece, Christine
Lovel yMae Del anos, when a passenger j eepney arri ved. Fi ve decentl y dressed men
stepped down from the vehicl e and entered the house. The first, who was attired i n a
business suit, i ntroducedhimself as Rocky Alberto and his compani ons as agents of the
Criminal Investi gation Service("CIS").[1] Alberto asked Leoni da about her unpaid obli gation
to Josephi ne Sant os. Leonidaanswered that she had already pai d t he debt before the
barangay captain of Umingan. Momentslater, another vehi cl e, a brown col ored car, stopped i n
front of the house. Henr y Sal imbay (thebarangay captain of Umingan), Josephi ne Santos,
Manny Baltazar and two uni dentifi ed mal esand one unidentified female, al ighted. Leoni da
rushed to confront Sal i mbay, tel l ing him thatJosephi ne had sent t he CIS agents t o demand
payment of her debt and that i t was Josephi newho shoul d i nstead be accosted. Sensi ng an
escalating tensi on between the two women, thebarangay captai n decided t o leave, tel li ng
the parti es that i t was best for both of them to j ust amicabl y settl e their differences.
Issue: Whether or not accused -appel lant i s gui l ty of grave coerci on.
Held: The circumstances that have surfaced i nstead warrant a convicti on for grave
coercion. Grave coerci on i s committed when a person prevents another from doing somethi ng
not prohi bited by l aw or compel l ing him to do something agai nst his wi l l, whether i t be ri ght or
wrong, and without any authorit y of l aw, by means of vi olence, threats or i ntimidation. Its
el ements are - First, that the offender has prevented another from doi ng somethi ng not
prohibited by law, or that he has compel l ed hi m to do somethi ng agai nst his wi l l, be i t ri ght or
wrong; second, that t he preventi on or compul sion i s effected by viol ence, either by materi al
force or such display of force as would produce i ntimidation and control over the wi l l of the
offended part y; and, thi rd, that the offender who has restrained the wi l l and l ibert y of another
di d so wi thout any right or authori t y of l aw. Where there i s a variance between the offense
charged i n the compl ai nt or i nf ormati on and that proved and the offense charged necessari l y
incl udes the l esser offense establ ished i n evidence, t he accused can be convicted of t he
offense proved.








85

PEOPLE vs. VILLAMAR (G.R. No. 121175)
Facts: Maril yn Vi l lamar was charged with the crime of il legal detention and frustrated murder
i n an i nformati on.
On Februar y 11, 1993, Vil l amar went t o t he house of the pri vate offended party Cortez and
inquired i f the latter was interested i n adopti ng her daughter, expl aini ng that her offer was
due her husband' s hast y departure. Unabl e t o refuse, Cortez accepted the offer and
immedi atel y prepared a "Si numpaang Salaysay" to formal i ze the adopti on. Unfortunatel y, on
June 5, 1993, Vil l amar, apparentl y regretti ng her decisi on, went t o the house of Cortez and
decided t o take her daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of course, not taken l ightl y by
Cortez, who vehementl y refused to rel i nquish custody of the girl to Vi l lamar.
Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the t wo, duri ng which Vi l lamar managed to hi t Cortez
wi th a chisel on the head renderi ng the latter weak and immobi l i zed, after which she
threatened her with a pair of scissors. Vi l lamar was demanding that Cortez reveal where the
"Si numpaang Sal aysay" was l ocat ed. Meanwhi l e, attracted by the commotion, a curious crowd
was already gathering outside the Cortez resi dence. Sensi ng imminent danger, Vil l amar
demanded money and a get-away vehicle t o extricate herself from her predicament. However,
on her way t o the car, a melee ensued resul ti ng i n her immedi ate arrest by t he respondi ng
pol icemen.
Issue: Whether or not accused i s guil t y of seri ous i l legal detention.
Held: No. The court i s of the opini on that the accused had no i ntention t o kidnapor deprive
Cortez of her personal l ibert y.
What actual l y transpired was the rage of a woman scorned. The undeniable fact that t he
purpose of Vi ll amar was to seek the return of her chil d was never assai l ed by the prosecuti on.
Unti l t he defendant' s purpose to detai n t he of fended part y i s shown, a prosecuti on for i l legal
detenti on wi ll not prosper.
Under the l aw, as presentl y worded, i t i s essenti al that the ki dnappi ng or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorti ng ransom.

In the instant case, there i s no showi ng
whatsoever that Vi l lamar wanted t o extort money from Cortez prior t o their confrontation.
When accused-appel l ant coerced Cortez t o reveal the whereabouts of the "Si nampaang
Sal aysay" for the purpose of destroyi ng the same, the act merel y constituted grave coercion,
as provi ded i n Article 286 of the RPC. The crime of grave coerci on has three el ements: (a)
that any person i s prevented by another from doing somethi ng not prohi bited by law, or
compel l ed t o do somethi ng against his or her wi l l, be i t ri ght or wrong; (b) that the preventi on
or compulsi on i s effected by vi olence, either by material force or such a displ ay of i t as would
produce intimi dati on and, consequentl y, control over the wi l l of the offended part y; and (c)
that t he person who restrains the wi ll and l ibert y of another has no right to do so; i n other
words, that t he restrai nt i s not made under authorit y of l aw or i n t he exercise of any lawf ul
right.
While Vi ll amar di d compel Cortez t o do somethi ng against the l atter' s wil l , i t must be stressed
that the same cannot be categori zed as an act of i ll egal detenti on. Sti l l, when Vi l l amar was
erroneousl y charged f or i ll egal detenti on, such oversight wi l l not preclude a gui lt y verdict for
the crime of grave coercion. I n the earl y case of U.S. v. Quevengco, and, recentl y, i n Peopl e
v. Astorga, we ruled that the offense of grave coerci on i s necessari l y incl uded i n il l egal
detenti on; as such, an information for i ll egal detenti on wi l l not bar the accused from bei ng
convicted of grave coercion, i nstead of t he ori ginal charge.

86

PEOPLE vs. ASTORGA (G.R. No. 110097)
Facts: Appel lant Astorga tricked Yvonne t o go with him by tel li ng her that they were goi ng t o
buy candy. When Yvonne recogni zed the deception, she demanded that she be brought home,
but appel l ant refused and i nstead dragged her toward the opposi te di rection against her wi ll .
While i t i s uncl ear whether Appell ant Astorga i ntended t o detai n or "lock up" Yvonne, there i s
no questi on that he forced her to go wi th him agai nst her wi l l.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appel l ant i s gui lt y of kidnappi ng.
Held: No. The accused-appel l ant shoul d be convicted onl y of grave coercion.
Grave coerci on or coaccion grave has three el ements: (a) that any person i s prevented by
another from doing somethi ng not prohi bited by law, or compel l ed t o do somethi ng agai nst his
or her wi l l, be i t ri ght or wrong; (b) that t he prevention or compulsion i s effected by vi ol ence,
ei ther by materi al force or such a displ ay of i t as woul d produce i ntimidation and,
consequentl y, control over the wi l l of the offended part y; and (c) that the person who restrai ns
the wi ll and l i bert y of another has no ri ght t o do so or, i n other words, that the restrai nt i s not
made under authorit y of a law or i n the exerci se of any l awful ri ght.

When appel l ant forci bl y
dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right t o go home to Bi nuangan. Appel l ant
presented no j ustif icati on for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.
















87

UNJUST VEXATION ( ART. 287)
BALEROS vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 138033)
Facts: On December 13, 1991, Malou was awakened by the smel l of chemical on a piece of
cloth pressed on her f ace. She struggl ed but coul d not move. Somebody was pi nning her
down on the bed, hol di ng her ti ghtl y. She wanted t o scream for hel p but the hands coveri ng
her mouth wi th cloth wet with chemicals were ver y tight. Sti l l, she conti nued fighting off her
attacker by kicking hi m until at l ast her ri ght hand got free. With this the opportuni ty
presented i tself when she was abl e t o grab hol d of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
Chito was i n t he Bui ldi ng when t he attack on MALOU took pl ace. He had access t o the room
of MALOU as Room 307 where he sl ept the night over had a wi ndow which al lowed i ngress
and egress t o Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not onl y t he Bui l di ng securit y guard, S/G
Ferol in, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was weari ng a black
"Adi das" shorts and fraterni t y T-shirt when he arri ved at the Bui ldi ng/Uni t 307 at 1:30 i n the
morning of December 13, 1991. Though i t was dark during their struggl e, MALOU had made
out the f eel of her i ntruders apparel to be something made of cotton materi al on t op and
shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITOs bag whi ch was found i nsi de Room 310 at the ver y spot where wi tness Renato
Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evi dence: the
handkerchi ef stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a bl ack "Adidas" sati n
short pants; and a whi te fraternit y T-shirt, al so stained wi th bl ue. A diff erent wi tness, thi s
time, Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belongi ng to CHITO. As i t turned out,
laborator y examination on these items and on the beddi ngs and clothes worn by MALOU
duri ng t he i ncident reveal ed that t he handkerchi ef and MALOU s ni ght dress both contained
chl oroform, a vol ati l e poison which causes first degree burn exactl y l ike what MALOU
sustai ned on that part of her face where t he chemical -soaked cloth had been pressed.
Issue: Whether the offender' s act causes annoyance, irri tati on, torment, distress, or
disturbance to themi nd of t he per son t o whom i t i s di r ect ed, whi ch i s a par amount quest i on
i n a pr osecut i on f or unj ust vexation?
Held: I n the present case, the posi tive i dentification of the petiti oner forms part of
circumstanti al evi dence, which, when taken together wi th t he other pi eces of evi dence
consti tuti ng an unbroken chai n, l eads t o onl y f air and reasonabl e conclusi on, which i s that
peti tioner was the intruder i n questi on.
There i s absol utel y no dispute about the absence of sexual i ntercourse or carnal knowl edge i n
the present case. Overt or external act has been defi ned as some physical acti vit y or deed,
indicati ng the i ntention t o commit a particul ar crime, more than a mere planni ng or
preparati on, which i f carri ed out t o its compl ete termination foll owi ng i ts natural course,
wi thout being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntar y desistance of the
perpetrator, wi l l l ogical l y and necessari l y ri pen i nto a concrete offense.
Veri l y, whi le the seri es of acts commi tted by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape,
as earl i er discussed, they consti tute unj ust vexati on punishabl e as l ight coercion under t he
2nd paragraph of Article 287 of the RPC. There i s no need t o al l ege mal ice, restrai nt or
compulsion i n an i nformation for unj ust vexati on. As i t were, unj ust vexati on exists even
wi thout the el ement of restrai nt or compulsi on for the reason that this term i s broad enough to
incl ude any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or materi al harm,
woul d unj ustl y annoy or irritate an innocent person.
ONG CHIU KWAN vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006)
88

Facts: On Januar y 31, 1991, Bayona fi led an i nformation charging petitioner wi th unj ust
vexati on for cutting the el ectric wires, water pi pes and tel ephone l ines of Crazy Feet, a
business establ ishment owned and operated by Mi l dred Ong.
On Apri l 24, 1990, at around 10:00am, Ong Chi u Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to relocate
the tel ephone, electric and water li nes of Crazy Feet, because sai d li nes posed as a
disturbance. However, Ong Chi u Kwan fail ed to present a permit from appropriate authoriti es
al l owi ng him to cut the el ectric wires, water pipe and telephone l ines of the busi ness
establ ishment.
After due tri al , on September 1, 1992, the l ower court found Ong Chi u Kwan gui lt y of unj ust
vexati on, and sentenced him to imprisonment for twent y days." The court also ordered him to
pay moral damages,exemplar y damages and to pay attorney' s fees.
Issue: Whether or not the peti tioner i s gui lt y of unj ust vexati on.
Held: Petiti oner admitted having ordered t he cutti ng of the el ectric, water and telephone l ines
of complai nants busi ness establishment because these l ines crossed his propert y li ne. He
fai led, however, t o show evi dence that he had the necessar y permit or authori zati on t o
rel ocate t he l ines. Also, he timed the interruption of el ectric, water and telephone services
duri ng peak hours of the operation of business of the compl ai nant. Thus, petitioners act
unj ustl y annoyed or vexed the complai nant. Consequentl y, peti ti oner Ong Chi u Kwan i s l i abl e
for unj ust vexati on.




89




















90

ROBBERY ( ART. 293)


PEOPLE VS. BASAO

Facts: On the testimony of Gi l bert Basao, in the afternoon of Apri l 14, 1994, the accused-
appel l antPepe Il igan shot Lt. Joerl ick Faburada and wife, Dra. Arl yn Faburada who was four
monthspregnant, with an armalite rifle as the spouses were riding a motorcycle. When Dra.
Faburadaa t t e mp t e d t o r e a c h h e r h u s b a n d s f i r e a r m, s h e w a s a g a i n s h o t b y t
h e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t . Afterwards, Iligan took away Lt. Joerlick Faburadas PNPA gold ring, one
.45 caliber pistol andthe latters radio handset.On April 19, 1994, Basao and accused-appellant went to the
apartment of one Reynaldo Angelesin Butuan City. Iligan asked Angeles to pawn a ring. He acceded to the
request.

Issue: Whether the accused-appel lant has committed robber y wi th murder.
Held: No. The accused-appel l ant di d not commit robber y wi th murder. The rul ing i n People vs.
Sal azar is doctri nal . If the ori ginal criminal desi gn does not clearl y comprehend robber y but
robber yfollows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the homicide, the criminal
actshould be vi ewed as constituti ve of two offenses and not of a singl e compl ex crime.
Robber ywith homicide arises only when there is a direct relation, an intimate connection, between
therobber y and the kil li ng, even if the kil l ing is prior to, concurrent wi th, or subsequent to
therobbery.In the instant case, it is apparent that the taking of the personal properties from the victim
wasa n a f t e r t h o u g h t . T h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t i e s w e r e t a k e n a f t e r a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t h a s a l r e a d y successfully carried out his primary criminal intent of killing Lt Faburada and
the taking did notnecessi tate the use of vi ol ence or force upon the person of the victim. Thus the
crime is theftunder Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code which provides, viz.: Wherefore, the decision of
theRegional Trial Court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
People vs. Danilo Reyes (G.R. No. 135682)
FACTS: PO1 Eduardo C. Molato saw the victim bei ng held up by two persons. The one i n
front of the victim forcibl y took his wristwatch whil e the other one stabbed him at the
back. He fired one warni ng shot which caused the three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu
Avenue. He chased them but when he saw the victim, he hai led a tricycle and asked the
dri ver to bri ng the victi m to the nearest hospi tal. He conti nued chasing the suspects up to
Phase II unti l he reached Agora, but the suspects were gone. The i nci dent happened swiftl y
but PO1 Mol ato had a good l ook at the face of the one who stabbed the victim as he was
about 8 to 10 meters away from them.
After trial , the lower court rendered a j udgment of convicti on
According to accused - appel l ant, the vi tal element of ani mus lucrandi was not suffici entl y
establ ished as the taki ng of the watch could have been a mere afterthought and the real
intent of the malefactors was to i nfl ict inj uries upon the victim. Moreover, there was no
evi dence of ownershi p of the wristwatch, as it may have bel onged to the two persons who
attacked the victim. Lastl y, there was no evidence of conspiracy.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of robber y wi th homicide is warranted.

HELD: A conviction for robber y wi th homici de requires proof of the fol l owing el ements: (a) the
taking of personal propert y wi th vi olence or i ntimidation agai nst persons or with force upon
things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taki ng be done wi th ani mus
lucrandi (i ntent to gai n); and (d) on the occasi on of the robbery or by reason thereof,
homici de in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a speci al complex crime
of robber y with homici de under Articl e 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is kil l ed on
the occasion or by reason of the robber y

91

Ani mus l ucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be establ ished through the overt
acts of the offender. Al though proof of moti ve for the crime is essenti al when the evi dence of
the robber y is circumstantial , intent to gai n or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the
furti ve taking of useful propert y pertaini ng to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The i ntent to gai n may be presumed from the
proven unl awful taking.
[ 6]
In the case at bar, the act of taking the victi ms wristwatch by one of
the accused Cergontes whil e accused-appel lant Reyes poked a knife behi nd him sufficientl y
gave rise to the presumption.
In conspiracy, proof of an actual pl anning of the perpetrati on of the crime is not a conditi on
precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed
or i nferred from the acts of the accused evi nci ng a j oi nt or common purpose and design,
concerted acti on and communit y of interest.
People vs. Suela et.al (GR No. 133570-71)

FACTS: Brothers Edgar and Neri o Suel a, and Edgardo Batocan sporti ng ski masks, bonnests
and gloves, brandishi ng handguns and knife barged i nto the room of Director Rosas who was
watching tel evision together wi th his adopted son, Norman and his friend Gabil o. They
threatened Rosas, Norman and Gabi lo to gi ve the l ocati on of their money and valuabl es,
which they eventual l y took. They dragged Gabi lo downstairs with them. Upon Nerios
instructi ons, Batocan stabbed Gabi l o 5 times which caused the l atters death. The tri al court
sentenced Edgar, Nerio and Batocan to suffer the penalt y of death appreci ating the
aggravati ng circumstance of disguise whi ch was not al leged in the Informati on agai nst the
three.

The Informati on agai nst Edgar Suel a reads as f ol l ows:
"xxx the sai d accused, wi th intent to gai n, and by means of i ntimidati on against person, di d
then and there wilful l y, unl awful l y and fel oni ousl y rob/extort one John Doe ( not his real name)
in the manner as fol l ows: on the date and pl ace aforementi oned, the said accused cal l ed up
by phone the Executi ve Secretar y of sai d compl ainant and demanded the amount
of P200,000.00, Phi l ippine Currency, in exchange for the i nformati on regarding the robber y
case and sl ayi ng of Geronimo Gabi lo on Jul y 26, 1995, as i n fact sai d accused, took, robbed
and carried away the aforesai d amount of P200,000.00, Phi l ippine Currency, to the damage
and prej udice of the sai d offended part y."
When arrai gned on September 24, 1996, appel l ants, wi th the assistance of counsel, pleaded
"not gui lt y." In due course, they were tri ed and found gui lt y by the court a quo.

ISSUE: Whether or not Suela is gui lt y of robbery.

HELD: "Simple robbery is committed by means of vi ol ence agai nst or intimidati on of persons
as distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the viol ence or
intimidati on does not fal l under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised Penal Code)
"Unfortunatel y, i n the case at bar, the prosecuti on fail ed to prove that appell ant Edgar Suel a
employed force or i nti midation on pri vate complai nant John Doe ( not his real name) by
insti l l ing fear i n his mind so as to compel the l atter to cough out the amount of P200,000.00.
Instead, what was establ ished was that he had agreed to gi ve the P200,000.00 in exchange
for informati on regarding the i denti t y and whereabouts of those who robbed him and kil l ed hi s
friend.

There was no showi ng that appel lant Edgar Suela had exerted inti midation on him so as to
leave him no choice but to gi ve the money. Instead, what is cl ear was that the gi ving of the
money was done not out of fear but because it was a choice pri vate complai nant opted
because he wanted to get the i nformati on bei ng offered to hi m for the considerati on
of P200,000.00 In fact, the money was del i vered not due to fear but for the purpose of
possibl y havi ng a lead i n sol vi ng the case and to possi bl y bri ng the culpri t to j ustice (ibid.).
As such, the el ements of simple robber y have not been establ ished i n the i nstant case,
hence, appel l ant Edgar Suel a should be acquitted of that charge."
92


People v. Donato Del Rosario (G. R. No. 13106)

FACTS: An i nformati on was fi l ed agai nst Donato del Rosari o chargi ng him of robber y with
homici de committed as fol lows:
That accused steal and carr y away j ewelri es, bel onging to Emel ita Paragua, and on the
occasion of sai d robbery and for the purpose of enabl ing him to take, steal and carr y away the
items and taking advantage of superi or strength and wi th intent to kill treacherousl y attack,
assaul t, hi t her with a hard obj ect on the head and then strangl e and tie the neck of Raquel
Lopez (niece of Emel i ta Paragua) to prevent her from breathi ng and making an outcr y,
inf licti ng upon sai d Raquel Lopez asphyxi a i nj uries which directl y caused her death.
Emel ita Paraguas house was set on fire, some of her j ewelri es were missing and ni ece
Raquel Lopez was found dead at the kitchen. The pol ice recei ved i nformati on that Donato Del
Rosari o was seen outside the house of Paragua before the inci dent happened and
disappeared since then.

A few days later, Del Rosario surrendered himself to a pol ice officer and vol unteered that he
wi l l accompany them in recovering the stolen j ewelri es from where he sol d them. After the
j ewelri es were recovered, with the assistance of his l awyer, the suspect si gned a wai ver and
confession for kil l ing Raquel Lopez, robber y and setting the house of Paragua on fire.

Del Rosario was charged for Robbery wi th Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo Ci t y. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guil ty f or the crime charged.
The tri al court found the accused guil t y beyond reasonabl e doubt hence, an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the essential requisites of the crime of Robber y wi th Homici de are
present?

HELD: Yes, the essenti al requisites of the crime of robber y wi th homicide are present.

Case law has i t that when a stol en propert y is found in the possession of a person who is not
the owner thereof, wi ll be presumed the thief if he cannot satisfactori l y expl ain his
possessi on. The accused knew exactl y where he can recover the stol en j ewelri es and was
positi vel y i dentif ied by wi tnesses.

Intent to gai n is assumed in an information where i t is al l eged that there was unl awful taking
and appropri ati on by the offender of the properti es stol en. The j ewelries recovered were
pawned and sold by the accused and was positi vel y identified by the owner of the
establ ishments.

Homici de may occur before or after robbery, what i s important i s there i s an intimate
connecti on between the kil li ng and the robber y.

People v. Zinampan (G.R. No. 126781)

FACTS: Appel lant El vi s Doca and his co-accused, Cal ixto Zinampan al i as Gorio, Artemio
Apostol al i as Temy, Ignacio Cusi pag, Robert Cusipag, Roger Al l an and Miguel Cusi pag were
charged with the crime of robber y with homicide def ined and penal i zed under Articl e 294(1) of
the Revised Penal Code

93

El vis Doca, Artemio Apostol , Cal ixto Zi nampan and Roger All an entered the sari -sari store of
Henr y and Gaspara Narag of Li nao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan and forced their way i nto the house
adj acent to the store. The housekeeper, Marl yn Cal aycay was pul l ed back to the store by
El vis Doca as Henr y was taken to the sal a. Henr y was repeatedl y ordered to produce his gun
and money and when he refused Artemio hi t him in the head wi th his gun. Henr y gave them
money but insisted that he di d not have a gun for whi ch Cal ixto hit hi m wi th the butt of a gun
at the back of his head whi l e Gaspara pleaded for their l i ves. The intruders then carri ed away
propert y and money that they had obtai ned from the coupl e. Henr y died fi ve days l ater due to
the i nj uries suffered from the robber y. Gaspara Narag passed away whi l e the criminal case
was pending with the trial court l eavi ng Marl yn as the l one witness left. The trial court found
El vis Doca guil t y of robber y wi th homici de and sentenced him to recl usion perpetua.

It appears that the spouses Henr y and Gaspara Narag, together with their housemai d Marl yn
Calaycay, were the onl y persons present when four (4) men robbed their house i n Li nao,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in the earl y evening of December 8, 1988. Henr y Narag di ed fi ve (5)
days after sl i ppi ng into coma due to the severe head inj uries whi ch he suffered from the
hands of the robbers. Incidental l y, Gaspara Narag passed away whi l e the i nstant criminal
case was pendi ng wi th the tri al court, before she could testi f y as wi tness for the
prosecuti on. Marl yn Cal aycay was the prosecutions lone eyewi tness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the gui lt of the accused for the crime of robber y wi th homici de was
proven by the testimony of the si ngl e wi tness?

HELD: Yes, the guil t of the accused was suff i cientl y proven by the sol e prosecution wi tness
for the crime of robber y.
ART. 294. Any person gui lt y of robber y wi th the use of viol ence agai nst or i ntimidati on of any
person shall suffer:
1. The penalt y of from reclusi on perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasi on of the
robber y, the crime of homici de shall have been committed; or when the robber y shal l have
been accompani ed by rape or i ntenti onal muti l ation or arson.
The el ements of the cri me of robber y with homici de are: (1) the taking of personal propert y is
committed with vi olence or i ntimidati on agai nst persons; (2) the propert y taken bel ongs to
another; (3) the taki ng i s done wi th animo l ucrandi ; and (4) by reason of the robber y or on the
occasion thereof, homicide (used i n its generi c sense) i s committed.
[ 29]

Contrar y to appel lants contention i n the second assi gnment of error, his gui l t for the crime of
robber y wi th homici de was adequatel y proven primari l y by the testimony of the sole
prosecuti on eyewi tness which we found to be honest and credi bl e. Unl ess expressl y required
by law, the testimony of a singl e wi tness, if found credi bl e and positi ve such as i n the case at
bench, is sufficient to convict for the truth is establ ished not by the number of witnesses but
by the quali t y of their testimoni es.
The court found the testimony of the sol e prosecuti on eyewi tness as honest and credi ble and
further hol ds that a credi bl e and positi ve testimony of a si ngl e eyewi tness is suffici ent. A
conviction for the truth is determined by the qual i ty of the testimony and not by the number of
wi tnesses.


94



People vs. Apolinario (G.R. No. 97426)

FACTS: Romeo Apoli nario and Antoni o Ri vera appeal from a decisi on of the RTC fi ndi ng them
gui lt y of robber y wi th homicide.

Appel l ants were charged in an i nformati on whi ch reads as fol lows:

Xxx the above-named accused, armed wi th bol os and with intent of ( sic) gain, conspiring,
confederati ng and mutual l y helpi ng one another, by means of force upon thi ngs entered the
house of the Spouses SIMON HIBALER and RESTITUTA HIBALER through the wi ndow
j ealousy (sic) and once i nside, by means of viol ence and intimidati on did then and there
wi lful l y, unl awful l y and fel oni ousl y take, st eal and carr y away personal properties i ncluding
Cash money, si l ver coings. Assorted j ewelri es et.al and that on the occasion and in the
furtherance of the robber y, Simon Hi bal er was bol oed several times causing death thereafter.

Appel l ants contend that they coul d not be convicted of robber y with homicide because the
robber y had not been proven as there was no conclusi ve evi dence that they had carri ed the
money and other personal properti es away from the Hi bal er house

ISSUE: Whether appel l ants are guil t y of speci al compl ex crime of robber y wi th homici de.

HELD: The element of taking or asportation in the crime of robber y, i n the i nstant case, was
completed when appell ants and Mario Si on took the personal property, even if (and this is not
true i n the case at bar) they had no subsequent opportuni t y to dispose of the same. Restituta
had testifi ed that after the robber y, she made an i nventor y and found many of their personal
bel ongings missing. The l ater dispositi on of the propert y taken, or the fai lure to dispose of
such propert y, is without moment so far as the characteri zati on of the crime as robber y i s
concerned. In Peopl e v. Puloc, it was held that:
. . .. As earl y as Peopl e v. Patrici o, the settl ed rul e i s that when the fact of asportati on has
been establ ished beyond reasonabl e doubt, the conviction of the accused i s j ustifi ed even i f ,
as i n this case, the thing subj ect of the robbery was abandoned by the accused and recovered
by t he owner.
In People v. Salvi l la, the Court held that i n robber y, t he el ement of asportati on which
requires the taki ng of personal propert y out of the possessi on of its owner, wi thout his pri vi ty
and consent and wi thout ani mus revertendi i s present once the propert y i s i n fact taken
from the owner:
Severance of goods from the possessi on of t he owner and absol ute control of the propert y by
the taker, even for an i nstant, constitutes asportation.
In the case at bar, al l the el ements of robber y, i .e., (a) personal propert y bel onging to
another; (b) was unl awful l y taken; (c) wi th intent to gai n; and (d) with the use of force upon
things were present. Because the homici de was committed by reason or on the occasion
of the robber y, appel lants are gui l t y of the special compl ex crime of robber y wi th homicide
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.



95

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE ( ART. 294 [1])
People vs. Legaspi (GR 117802)
FACTS: For t he robber y-sl ay of Pol ice Offi cer Carl os Deveza and the physical i nj uries
inf licted on Wilfredo Dazo, the RTC convicted accused-appel l ants Dennis Legaspi and Emil i o
Franco, for the speci al complex crime of Robber y wi th Homicide.
Legaspi and Franco were charged and convicted of t he special compl ex crime of robber y wi th
homici de. They were identifi ed as perpetrators of t he crime by someone from a group of
el even residents who were i nvited for questioni ng by the pol ice. The accused now claims that
their rights duri ng custodi al i nvesti gati on were viol ated.
ISSUE: Was the speci al complex crime of robber y wi th homici de dul y establ ished by t he
evi dence presented by the prosecuti on?
HELD: The evi dence adduced establ ished al l the el ements of the special compl ex crime of
robber y wi th homici de. For i n the crime of robber y with homici de, the homici de may precede
the robber y or may occur after t he robber y, as what i s essential i s that there i s a direct
rel ati on, an intimate connection between the robber y and t he kil l i ng.
This special complex crime i s primaril y a cri me agai nst propert y and not agai nst persons,
homici de being a mere inci dent of the robbery wi th the latter being the main purpose and
obj ect of the criminal . I n the instant case, the records show that the fatal shooti ng of Carl os
Deveza, whi le i t preceded the robber y, was for the purpose of removing an opposition t o the
robber y or suppressing evi dence thereof. New miso
The phrase "by reason" covers homici de committed before or after the taking of personal
propert y of another, as long as the moti ve of the offender (in ki l li ng a person before t he
robber y) i s t o depri ve the victim of his personal propert y which i s sought to be accompl ished
by el iminating an obstacl e or opposi tion, or to do away wi th a witness or t o defend t he
possessi on of stol en propert y.
Obvi ousl y, the kil l ing of Carl os Deveza and t he shooting of Wilfredo Dazo were perpetrated by
reason of or on the occasi on of the robber y. Thus, t he physical i nj uri es sustai ned by Dazo are
deemed absorbed i n the crime of robber y wi th homici de. Taken i n i ts entiret y, the overt acts
of accused-appell ant Legaspi prove that the lone moti ve for the kil l ing of Deveza and t he
shooting of Dazo was for the purpose of consummating and ensuri ng the success of the
robber y.
The shooti ng of Dazo was done i n order to defend t he possessi on of the stolen propert y. It
was therefore an act which tended to insure the successful termination of the robber y and
secure t o t he robber the possessi on and enj oyment of the goods taken. Accused-appell ant s
argument that t he el ement of "taki ng" was not proved i s thus unavai li ng.






96

People vs. Robles (GR No. 101335)

FACTS: Patrolmen were on board a pol ice vehicl e patrol l ing. The pol i ce car came al ongsi de a
taxicab wi th two male passengers. When the pol icemen noticed that the passengers were
acting suspiciousl y and could not l ook directl y at them, they signal led the taxicab driver to
stop for routi ne i nspection. The one seated beside the dri ver was i dentifi ed as Manas, whi l e
the one at the back seat was appel lant Robl es. The pol icemen saw two bags on the fl oor of
the back of the taxicab. When asked whether the bags bel onged to them, the two men i ni tial l y
refused to answer. However, Robl es broke down and admitted that they had robbed the house
of one Jose Macal ino i n Makati . Detecti ve then went to the house of Macali no and there they
discovered two dead persons inside the house, later identified as household helpers of
Macali no.

Appel l ant was convicted of robber y with homi cide. He was apprehended after admitti ng the
crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not complex crime of Robber y wi th Homicide was committed.

HELD: Robl es is gui lt y of Robber y wi th Homicide.
The unexpl ained possession of stol en articles gi ves rise to a presumpti on of theft, unless it i s
proved that the owner of the articl es was depri ved of possessi on by viol ence, i ntimidati on, i n
which case the presumption becomes one of robber y.
In robber y with homici de cases, the prosecuti on need onl y to prove these elements: the
taking of personal propert y is perpetrated by means of vi olence or intimidati on against a
person; propert y taken bel ongs to another; the taking is characteri zed by i ntent to gain or
animus l ucrandi , and on the occasi on of the robber y or by reason thereof the crime of
homici de, here used i n a generic sense is committed.
The homicide may precede the robber y or may occur after the robber y. What is essenti al i s
that there is an intimate connecti on between robber y and the kil l ing whether the l atter be prior
or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time. The rul e
is that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on occasi on of the
robber y, al l those who took part as principals i n the robber y wi ll also be hel d guil t y as
pri ncipals of the crime of robber y with homicide although they di d not take part i n the
homici de, unl ess it cl earl y appears they endeavored to pr event the homicide.


PEOPLE vs. DANIELLA (G.R. No. 139230)


FACTS: An Information for Robber y wi th Homi cide was fi led agai nst Manuel and Jose i n the
Regi onal Tri al Court of Cebu Cit y, which reads:
That the said accused, connivi ng and confederating together and mutual l y hel pi ng each
other, armed wi th bl aded weapons and handguns, with del i berate i ntent and with i ntent to kill ,
di d then and there attack, assault and use personal viol ence upon one Roni to Enero by
stabbing him on the vi tal parts of his body wi th sai d bl aded weapons, thereby i nfl icting upon
him physical i nj uries thus causi ng his i nstantaneous death, and wi th intent of gain, did then
and there take and carr y away there from j ewelri es consi sti ng of earri ngs, necklaces,
wristwatch and rings.
The defense argues that appel l ant never had the ori gi nal design to rob when he went to the
Co compound.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecuti on proved the crime of robber y wi th homici de

97

HELD:
HELD: The el ements of Robber y wi th Homici de are as foll ows:
(1) the taking of personal propert y is committed wi th vi olence or intimi dati on against persons;
(2) the propert y taken bel ongs to another;
(3) the taking is done with animo l ucrandi ; and
(4) by reason of t he robber y or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
A conviction for robber y wi th homicide requires certi tude that the robber y is the mai n
purpose and obj ecti ve of the mal efactor and the kil l ing is merel y i ncidental to the
robber y. The ani mo l ucrandi must proceed the kill i ng.
If the ori ginal design does not comprehend robber y, but robbery f ol l ows the homici de either
as an afterthought or merel y as an i nci dent of the homici de, then the malefactor is gui lt y of
two separate crimes, that of homici de or murder and robber y, and not of the speci al complex
crime of robber y wi th homicide, a si ngl e and i ndi visi ble offense. It is the i ntent of the actor to
rob which suppl i es the connecti on between the homici de and the robber y necessar y to
consti tute the compl ex crime of robber y wi th homicide.
However, the l aw does not require that the sole moti ve of the mal efactor is robber y and
commits homici de by reason or on the occasi on thereof. Even if the malefactor i ntends to ki l l
and rob another, i t does not precl ude his conviction for the speci al complex crime of robber y
wi th homicide. I n People v. Damaso, this Court hel d that the fact that the intent of the fel ons
was tempered wi th a desire also to avenge grievances agai nst the victim kil led, does not
negate the conviction of the accused and puni shment for robber y wi th homicide.
A convicti on for robbery wi th homicide is proper even if the homici de is committed before,
duri ng or after the commission of the robber y. The homici de may be committed by the actor at
the spur of the moment or by mere acci dent. Even if two or more persons are kil led and a
woman is raped and physi cal i nj uri es are i nfl icted on another, on the occasion or by reason of
robber y, there is onl y one special compl ex cri me of robber y with homici de. What is primordi al
is the result obtained wi thout reference or di sti nction as to the circumstances, cause, modes
or persons i nterveni ng i n the commission of the crime.
Robber y wi th homicide is committed even if the victim of the robber y is different from t he
victim of homicide, as l ong as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasi on of the
robber y. It is not even necessar y that the victim of the robber y is the ver y person the
malefactor intended to rob.

People vs. Ricardo Napalit (G.R. Nos. 142919)
FACTS: The Informati on charges accused-appell ant wi th robber y in band wi th homicide
defi ned and penali zed under Article 294 (as amended by R. A. 7659) and Articl e 296 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Accused-appell ant argues nevertheless that assuming that he had i ndeed partici pated i n the
inci dent, he shoul d onl y be held l iable for robber y and not for the special complex crime of
robber y wi th homici de. For, so he cl aims, the shooti ng of Gomez by his compani ons was
beyond his contempl ati on and he never intended to perpetrate any kill i ng, hence, onl y the
actual perpetrators of the kil l i ng shoul d be hel d l i abl e therefore and the kil l i ng shoul d not be
98

appreci at ed to increase his l iabil i ty. He further adds that his carr yi ng of a firearm was onl y for
the purpose of threatening the victims so that they woul d not offer any resistance to him and
his compani ons.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused shal l be held l iable for robber y and not for the speci al
complex crime of robbery wi th homici de.

HELD: Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, provi des:
Article 294. Robbery wi th viol ence agai nst or i nti mi dation of persons. Penal ti es. Any
person gui lt y of robbery wi th the use of vi olence agai nst or intimidati on of any person shal l
suffer:
1. The penal t y of recl usi on perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shal l have
been accompani ed by rape or i ntenti onal muti l ation or arson.
That accused-appel lant di d not shoot Gomez is immaterial . Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code is clear and l eaves no room for any other interpretation. For, for robber y with
homici de to exist, it is suffici ent that a homicide results by reason or on the occasion of
robber y.
[ 35]
The l aw of course exculpates a person who takes part i n the robber y from the
special complex crime of robber y with homicide and punishes him onl y for simpl e robbery
when there is proof that he tri ed to prevent the homicide. No such proof, however, was
offered.
Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robber y, al l
those who took part as pri nci pals in the robber y wi l l also be held gui l ty as principals i n the
special complex crime of robbery wi th homicide al though they di d not take part i n the
homici de, unl ess it is cl ear l y shown that they endeavored to prevent the homici de.
As conspiracy has been establ ished, al l the conspirators are li abl e as co-princi pals regardless
of the manner and extent of their partici pation since, i n conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
al l .


People vs. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57)

FACTS: Two criminal cases were fi l ed agai nst Monti nol a and he was later on sentenced to
recl usion perpetua for robber y wi th homicide and death for i l legal possessi on of firearm.

Monti nol a boarded a passenger j eepney dri ven by Hi bini oda. Among the passengers was
Reteraci on. Al l of a sudden, appel lant drew his gun, an unl icensed firearm, .380 cal pistol and
directed Reteraci on to hand over his money or else he would be ki ll ed. Mont i nol a aimed the
firearm at the neck of Reteraci on and fired successi ve shots at the latter. As a result
Reteraci on sl umped dead. Montinol a was charged wi th robber y with homici de and il l egal
possessi on of firearm. He entered a pl ea of not gui lt y but withdrew the same after the
prosecuti on presented 3 wi tnesses. When rearrai gned, he pleaded "gui l ty" to the 2 charges.

ISSUE: Whether the use of an unl icensed firearm on the ki ll i ng perpetrated by reason or on
occasion of the robber y may be treated as a separat e offense or as an aggravati ng
circumstance i n the cri me of robber y wi th homici de?

HELD: Where either homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unl icensed firearm,
such use shal l constitute an aggravati ng circumstances. but the same cannot be gi ven
retroacti ve effect to herei n accused.
99


Sec. 1 of P.D.1866 provi des that if homicide or murder is committed wi th the use of an
unl icensed f irearm, the penal ty of death shal l be imposed. Said Presi denti al Decree was
however, amended by R.A. 8294, whi l e Monti nol as case was stil l pendi ng.

R.A. 8294 provi des that if homicide or murder is committed wi th the use of an unl icensed
firearm, such use of an unl icensed firearm shall be consi dered as an aggravati ng
circumstance.

No separate convicti on for i l legal possessi on of firearm if homicide or murder is committed
wi th the use of an unl i censed firearm; i nstead, such use shal l be considered merel y as an
aggravati ng circumstance i n the homicide or murder committed. Hence, insofar as the new
law will be advantageous to WILLI AM as it will spare him from a separate conviction for
illegal possession of firearm, it shall be given retroactive effect.

Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294,
use of an unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in the homicide or
murder committed. At any rate, even assuming that the aggravati ng circumstances present
in the commission of homicide or murder may be counted i n the determination of the penal t y
for robber y with homicide, we cannot appreci ate i n this case the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm menti oned in the third paragraph of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Such l aw was not yet enacted when the crime
was committed by WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be gi ven retroacti ve effect for bei ng
unfavorable to him.

The Court further held Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, robber y wi th homicide is punishabl e by recl usi on perpetua to death, which are both
indi visi bl e penal ti es. Article 63 of the same Code provides that in al l cases in which the l aw
prescribes a penalt y composed of two i ndi visi ble penalties, the greater penalt y shal l be
appli ed when the commissi on of the deed is attended by one aggravati ng circumstance. If we
woul d appl y retroacti vel y the speci al aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the i mposable penal ty woul d
be death. Conformabl y with our ruli ng i n Peopl e v. Val dez, i nsofar as the new l aw woul d
aggravate the crime of robber y wi th homicide and i ncrease the penalt y from reclusi on
perpetua to death, i t woul d not be gi ven retroacti ve applicati on, l est i t woul d acquire the
character of an ex post facto l aw. Hence, we shal l not appreci ate that speci al aggravati ng
circumstance. There bei ng no modif yi ng circumstances, the l esser penal t y of recl usi on
perpetua shal l be imposed upon accused-appel lant WILLIAM.


In this case, the accused had been charged with two offenses: robber y wi th homici de and
i ll egal possessi on of firearms. Duri ng the pendency of the case, the amended l aw came into
force. The court then hel d that i nsofar as R.A. 8294 was favorabl e to the accused i n that i t
spared him from separate prosecution for il l egal possession, the charge for i l legal possessi on
was dropped. Insofar, however, as it i ncreased the penal ty for robber y with homicide, the
aggravati ng circumstances of the use of unl icensed weapon could not be appreciated.












100



PEOPLE vs. HIPONA

Facts: On or about June 12, 2000 at 1: 00 am in Cagayan de Oro, appell ant Michael Hi pona
togetherwith Romul o Seva, Jr. and one John Doe conspired and fel oni ousl y had a carnal
knowl edge withthe offended part y AAA who is the aunt of accused Michael Hipona. On
occasion of the sai d rape,accused, with evident premeditation, treacher y and abuse of
superi or strength and dwel l i ng,choked and strangul ated the victim. The victims brown bag
worth P3,800; cash money i n theamount of no less than P5,000; and gold neckl ace were
stolen by al l the accused but the goldnecklace were later on recovered and confiscated in the
person of accused Michael Hipona.For fai lure to prove the gui lt of accused Romulo Seva, Jr.
beyond reasonable doubt, he is dul yacquitted.

Issue: Whether appell ant is l i abl e of the crime of robber y wi th homici de.

Held: Yes. Robber y was the mai n intent of appel lant. AAAs death resul ted by reason of or on
occasionthereof. Fol lowi ng Article 294 (1) and Articl e 62 (1)1 of RPC, rape should have been
appreci ateda s a n a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u ms t a n c e i n s t e a d . Wh e r e f o r e , t h e d e c i s i o
n o f C A i s a f f i r me d w i t h modif icati on. Mi chael Hi pona is gui lt y of robber y wi th homici de.






































101


ROBBERY WITH RAPE ( ART. 294 [2])

PEOPLE cs. VERCELES

Facts: On October 19, 1996, i n the morning, in barangay Mal ibong i n Pangasinan, the
accused, Mari oVercel es, Fel ix Corpus, Mamerto Soriano, Pabl o Ramos and Jerr y Soriano,
entered the house of Mrs. Rosi ta Qui lates by forci bl y destroyi ng the gri lls of the wi ndow which
they used as an i ngressand once inside, did, then and there, willfull y and unlawfull y cart away
the following personalproperties: 1 colored TV, 1 VHS, assorted j ewelries, 1 alarm clock and 1
radio cassette, all valued at P60,000.00, and that on the same occassion, the said accused
feloniousl y have sexual intercourse wi th Mari beth Bol ito agai nst her wi l l to the damage of the
sai d victims.

Issue: Whether accused-appel lants are gui lt y of the crime of Robber y with Rape.

Held: On the matter of whether rape was committed, the SC agree with the trial court' s rul ing
that theheal ed l acerati ons on the vagina of the victim nor the absence of spermatozoa
negates rape.Thevictim' s del aration of her sexual ordeal gi ven i n a convi ncing manner, shows
no other i ntentiont han t o obt ai n j ust i ce f or t he wr ong done t o her . Wher ef or e, t he cour t
f i nds t he accused- appel lants gui lt y of the crime of Robber y with Rape and punished to
suffer penal ty of
Reclusi onPe r p e t u a , a n d t o a wa r d d a ma g e s i n t h e a mo u n t o f P5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s mo
r a l d a ma g e s a n d P50,000.00 as ci vi l i ndemni t y to the rape victim.



PEOPLE vs. TAMAYO

Facts: On March 29, 1998, Mar y Ann Guazon, a 24- year ol d sewer, was alone in her home in
Tatalon,Quezon Ci t y, her husband at work in Bal i wag, Bul acan, whil e her chi l dren are with her
aunt i nFairview Quezon Ci t y,. At 1 i n the morni ng, she was suddenl y roused from her sl eep by
a man,who simulteneousl y covered her mouth and poked a knife to at the side of her neck.
She wastold not to move or she woul d b ki l led. The l i ght on her house has been turned off,
but sherecogni zed the man as accused-appel l ant Nelson Tamayo, because of the l ight coming
from themarket outside.Despi te the fi erce resistance Mar y Ann showed, the accused
succeeded in rapi ngher. After he had finished, she sensed that the accused was going to kil l
her. She thus pretendedthat she enj oyed the encounter and pleaded with him to spare her.
Accused rel ented and warnedher not to report the i nci dent or else she wi l l be kil l ed. He tol d
her to get dressed and handedover her clothes. It was then that she discovered that the
P500.00 she earned from doinglaundr y that day, which she kept in her shorts' pocket, was
gone.

Issue: Whether the the trial court erred i n f inding accused-appel l ant gui lt y of the speci al
complex crimeof robber y wi th rape, despi te his gui lt not having been proven beyond
reasonabl e ground.

Held: Yes. That the accused is the person who raped complainant and stole the P500.00 is
beyonddoubt. The court f inds his i dentification as the pepetrator of the crime to be posi tive
and certai n.It was suffici entl y explai nes that the l i ght coming from the market was bri ght
enough to enablecompl ai nant to i dentif y him as the one who raped her.She also took note of
specific details thatwoul d ascertain the i dentit y of the rapist. The contention of fabrication
must be rej ected as thecompl ainant has no i l l moti ve to falsel y impl icate him in the
commission of the offense. Also, herconducts after the crime, strenghtened her account and
fortifi ed her credibi l it y. No decent andsensibl e woman wi ll publ icl y admit bei ng a rape victi m
and thus run the risk of publ ic contemptunless she is, in fact, a rape vi ctim.


102


THEFT ( ART. 308)


LAUREL vs. ABROGAR

Facts: On or about September 10-19, 1999, or pri or thereto in Makati Cit y, the accused,
conspiri ng andconfederating together and al l of them mutual l y hel ping and aidi ng one
another, wi th intent togai n and wi thout the knowl edge and consent of the Phi l ippi ne Long
Distance Tel ephone (PLDT),di d then and there wi l lful l y, unlawf ul l y and fel oni ousl y take, steal
and use the i nternati onal l ongdistance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International
Simple Resale (ISR), which is amethod of routing and completing i nternati onal l ong distance
cal ls using l i nes, cabl es, antenae,and/or air wave frequency which connect directl y to the
local or domestic exchange facil i ti es of the countr y where the cal l is destined, effecti vel y
steal i ng this business from PLDT whi le using i tsfaci l iti es in the estimat ed amount of
P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prej udice of PLDT, i nthe sai d amount.

Issue: Whether internati onal l ong distance calls and the business of provi ding
telecommunication ortelephone services are considered as personal properties subjected to theft.

Held:I n t he i nst ant case, t he act of conduct i ng I SR oper at i ons by i l l egal l y connect i ng
var i ousequi pment or apparatus to pri vate respondent PLDTs tel ephone system, through
which petitioneris able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent
PLDTs facilitiesconstitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.



LUCAS vs. CA

Facts: Hermini gi ldo Lucas was charged wi th theft before the Regi onal Trial Court of
Binangonan, Ri zal ,together wi th Wilfredo Navarro and Enri que Lovena. The Informati on
al l eged that on or about 8June 1990 the three (3) accused, conspiring, confederati ng and
mutuall y hel pi ng one another,wi th intent to gain, wil lful l y, unlawf ul l y and fel oni ousl y stol e and
carri ed away one stereocomponent, a 14-inch col ored TV, an electri c fan, twent y-three (23)
pi eces of cassette tapes,one (1) box of car toys, four (4) pi eces of Pyrex cr ystal bowls, cash
of P20,000.00 and j ewelr yworth P10,000.00, val ued at P100,000.00 al l bel onging to Luisi to
Tuazon.Peti tioner Hermini gi l doLucas and his co-accused Wilfredo Navarro pl eaded not gui l ty.
Their co-accused Enrique Lovenaremai ns at l arge.

Issues: Whether the tri al court erred to prove the conspiracy between the accused; - Whether
the trial court erred in proving the credi bi l it y of the wi tnesses; and- Whether the tri al court
erred i n imposi ng the penalties therein of the accused-appell ant

Held: The court ruled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a pri or
agreement tocommit the crime. It may be deduced from t he concerted acts of the accused,
indubitabl ydemonstrati ng their unit y of purpose, i ntent and sentiment in committing the crime.
Thus, i t isnot required that the accused were acquai nted wi th one another or that there was
an agreementfor an appreciable peri od prior to the occurrence.










103


QUALIFIED THEFT ( ART. 310)

QUINAO vs. PEOPLE

Facts: A petition was fil ed for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decisi on of the
CA fi ndi ngConchi ta Qui nao and Sal vador Cases guil t y of the cri me Usurpati on of Real
Propert y. Bothaccused and compl ainant are cl aiming ownership over the l and i n questi on. The
land was alreadyl i tigated and awarded to the parents of the compl ainant i n a decided Ci vi l
Case. Compl ainant' swi tness Bienvenido Del monte decl ared that on Februar y 2, 1993 at
around 9 o' clock in themorning whi l e he was busy working i n the agricultural l and which he
owns i n common withcomplai nant Francisco Delmonte, accused together with their other cl ose
rel ati ves suddenl yappeared and whil e there, wi th the use of force, viol ence and intimidati on,
usurped and tookpossession of their l andholdi ng, claiming that the same is their inheri tance
from their ascendantsand whi l e there, accused immediatel y gathered coconuts and made
them into copra.Compl ai nant was forcibl y dri ven out by the accused from their landholdi ng
and was threatenedthat if he wi l l try to return to the l and i n questi on, something wi l l happen to
him.
Issue: Whether accused-petiti oner who claims to be the owner of the l and i n questi on coul d
be heldl iable of usurpation of her own propert y.
Held: As rul ed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, the issue of ownership over the l and
inquesti on having been deci ded i n Ci vil Case No. 3516 i n favor of the compl ainant i n 1949,
thesame wi l l not be disturbed. The accused has to respect the fi ndi ngs of the court.
The Court ful l yagreed wi th the fi ndi ngs on the issue of the ownershi p of the l ot i nvol ved in this
case. Theevidence on record suffici entl y refuted peti tioner' s claim of ownershi p. In ord er to
sustai n aconviction for "usurpacion de derecho real es
," the proof must show that the real propert yoccupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant
or usurper, but to some third person, and thatthe possession of the usurper was obtai ned by
means of intimidati on or vi olence done to theperson ousted of possession of the propert y. The
tri al court and the CA rul ed in the affirmati vebased on the testimony of prosecuti on witness
Bienvenido Delmonte. The peti ti on was denied forlack of merit, and the decisi on of the CA
was affirmed.


ROQUE vs. PEOPLE ( G.R. No. 138954)
FACTS:Peti tioner Asuncion Roque was charged of qual ifi ed theft i n the Regi onal Tri al Court
of Guagua Pampanga.
On November 16, 1989, accused Asuncion Roque, a tell er of the Basa Air Base Savings and
Loan Associ ation Inc. (BABSLA) wi th office address at Basa Air Base, Fl oridabl anca,
Pampanga. As a tell er he was authori zed and reposed with the responsibi l it y to recei ve and
col l ect capital contributi ons from its member/contributors of sai d corporation, and having
col l ected and recei ved in her capaci t y as tel l er of the BABSLA the sum of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), Roque, with i ntent to gain, and wi th grave abuse of confidence and without the
knowl edge and consent of the corporation, take away the amount of P10,000.00, by making it
appear that a certai n depositor by the name of Antoni o Sal azar wi thdrew from his Savi ngs
Account No. 1359, when in truth and i n fact sai d Antoni o Sal azar did not withdraw the sai d
amount of P10,000.00.
104

The RTC found the pet iti oner gui l ty beyond reasonabl e doubt of the crime charged. On
appeal, the appel late court affirmed the decisi on of the RTC i n toto.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the accused is gui lt y of qual i fied theft.
2. Whether or not qual ified theft may be committed when the personal propert y is i n the lawf ul
possessi on of the accused prior to the commission of the al leged fel ony?
HELD: The Supreme Court acqui tted the accused for the crime of qual ifi ed theft. The
prosecuti on fail ed to prove by direct or sufficient circumstanti al evi dence that there was a
taking of personal propert y by petitioner.
Theft as defi ned in Article 308 of the Revi sed Penal Code requi res physical taking of
anothers propert y wi thout viol ence or i ntimidati on agai nst persons or force upon thin gs.
The crime of theft is akin to the crime of robber y. The onl y difference is i n robber y there is
force upon thi ngs or vi olence or i ntimidati on against persons in taking of personal
properties. In the cri me of theft the taking of the personal property wi th i ntent to gain is
wi thout vi olence against or i ntimidati on of persons nor force upon thi ngs and the taki ng shal l
be without the consent of the owner. In robbery, the taking is against the wi l l of the owner.
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the fol lowi ng are the el ements of the crime of
theft:
1. Intent to gai n;
2. Unl awful taki ng;
3. Personal property belongi ng to another;
4. Absence of vi ol ence or intimidati on against persons or force upon thi ngs.
The foregoi ng requirements presume that the personal propert y is in the possessi on of
another, unl ike estafa, [where] the possession of the thing is already in the hands of the
offender.
The j uridical possessi on of the thi ng appropri ated di d not pass to the perpetrators of the
crime, but remai ned i n the owners; they were agents or servants of the owners and not
bai lees of the propert y. But i t has been suggested that one of the essenti al el ements of the
crime of theft is that the i ntent to misappropri ate the propert y taken must exist at the time of
the asportati on and that whi le this el ement clearl y existed i n the De Vera case, it is not as
apparent i n the case at bar.
In the present case, what is involved is the possessi on of money i n the capaci t y of a bank
tel ler. I n Peopl e v. Locson,
[ 15]
cited above, thi s Court consi dered deposi ts recei ved by a tel ler
in behalf of a bank as bei ng onl y i n the material possession of the tel ler. This i nterpretati on
appli es wi th equal force to money recei ved by a bank tel l er at the beginning of a business day
for the purpose of servici ng wi thdrawals. Such is onl y materi al possessi on. Juri di cal
possessi on remai ns wi th the bank. In l i ne with the reasoning of the Court i n the above-cited
cases, beginning with Peopl e v. De Vera, if the tel ler appropriates the money for personal
gai n then the fel ony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, si nce the tel ler occupies a
positi on of conf idence, and the bank places money i n the tel l ers possession due to the
confi dence reposed on the tel ler, the felony of qualif ied theft woul d be committed.
105


PEOPLE vs. BUSTINERA (G. R. No. 148233)
FACTS: Sometime i n 1996, Edwi n Cipri ano, who manages ESC Transport hired appel lant,
Luisito Bustinera as a taxi dri ver and assigned him to dri ve a Daewoo Racer. I t was agreed
that appel l ant woul d dri ve the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he woul d return i t
to ESC Transports garage and remit the boundar y f ee i n the amount of P780.00 per day.
On December 25, 1996, appel lant admittedl y reported for work and drove the taxi , but he di d
not return i t on the same day as he was supposed to.
The foll owi ng day, Ci pri ano went to appel lants house to ascertai n why the taxi was not
returned. Arri vi ng at appel lants house, he did not fi nd the taxi there, appel l ants wife tell i ng
him that her husband had not yet arri ved. Thereafter, Cipri ano went to the Commonweal th
Avenue police stati on and reported that his taxi was missing.
On January 9, 1997, appell ants wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and reveal ed that
the taxi had been abandoned i n Regal ado Street, Lagro, Quezon Ci t y. Cipri ano recovered the
sai d taxi.

Busti nera was charged for the crime of qual ifi ed theft.

The RTC convicted t he accused for t he crime of qual ifi ed theft.
ISSUE: Whether or not appel l ant i s gui lt y of t he crime of qual ifi ed thef t.
HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted Luisi to D. Bustinera for the cri me of qual ifi ed theft but,
convicted him for the crime of carnapping under Republ ic Act No. 6539.
Appel l ant was convicted of qualif ied theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicl e. However, Articl e 310 has been modifi ed,
wi th respect t o certai n vehicles, by Republ ic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as
"AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING."
When statutes are i n pari materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to t he
same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particul ar subj ect matter, or
have the same purpose or obj ect, the rul e dictates that they should be construed together.
In construing them the ol d statutes rel ating t o the same subj ect matter should be compared
wi th the new provisi ons and i f possibl e by reasonable constructi on, both shoul d be so
construed that effect may be given t o every provisi on of each. However, when t he new
provision and the old rel ati ng to the same subj ect cannot be reconci l ed t he former shal l
prevai l as i t i s the l atter expression of the legislative wi l l
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for i n Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) that there be taking of personal propert y; (2) that said propert y belongs to another;
(3) that the taking be done with intent t o gai n; (4) that the taking be done wi thout t he consent
of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished wi thout the use of viol ence agai nst or
intimidati on of persons or force upon things.
Theft i s qual ified when any of the fol lowi ng circumstances i s present: (1) the thef t i s
committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft i s committed wi th grave abuse of confidence;
(3) the property stolen i s either a motor vehicle, mai l matter or large cattl e; (4) the
propert y stol en consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a pl antati on; (5) the property
stolen i s fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the propert y was taken on the occasi on
of fire, earthquake, t yphoon, volcanic erupti on, or any other calamity, vehicular acci dent or
ci vi l disturbance.
106

On t he other hand, Secti on 2 of Republ ic Act No. 6539, as amended defi nes "carnapping" as
"the taking, with i ntent to gai n, of a motor vehicle belongi ng to another without the l atter' s
consent, or by means of viol ence against or i ntimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things." The el ements of carnappi ng are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which bel ongs
to another; (2) t he taki ng i s wi thout the consent of the owner or by means of vi olence against
or i nti mi dation of persons or by usi ng force upon things; and (3) t he taki ng i s done wi th intent
to gai n.
Carnappi ng i s essenti al l y t he robber y or theft of a motori zed vehicl e, the concept of unl awful
taking i n theft, robber y and carnapping bei ng the same.
Since appell ant i s bei ng accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, i t i s the anti -
carnapping l aw and not the provisi ons of qual if ied theft which woul d appl y.
The desi gnati on i n the information of the of fense committed by appell ant as one for qual ifi ed
theft notwithstanding, appell ant may sti l l be convicted of the crime of carnapping. Amistake i n
the capti on of an i ndi ctment i n designating the correct name of t he offense i s not a fatal
defect as i t i s not the designation that i s control li ng but the facts al leged i n the i nformati on
which determines t he real nature of t he crime.
In the case at bar, the information all eges that appel lant, wi th i ntent to gain, took the taxi
owned by Ci priano without the latters consent. Thus, t he i ndictment al l eges ever y el ement of
the crime of carnappi ng, and t he prosecuti on proved the same.















107


PEOPLE vs. SALONGA ( G.R. No. 131131)
FACTS: Accused-appel lant Abelardo Sal onga was employed by Metrobank as an acti ng
assistant cashier. In such capaci t y, he was in charge of managing money market pl acements
and payments of maturing money placement i nvestments. Accused-appel l ant was the
custodian of the blank Metrobank cashi ers check which was processed and encashed. When
a spot audit was conducted by Arthur Christy Mari ano it was discovered that there was a
discrepancy i n the proof sheet brought about by the issuance of a cashiers check numbered
013702 made payable to Firebrake Sales and Services i n the amount P36,480.30. In order to
facil i tate the i l legal transaction, accused-appell ant falsifi ed the signature of the bank
manager.
Hence, he was charged of the crime of qual ifi ed theft through falsification of commercial
document.
On Jul y 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its deci sion finding Sal onga gui l ty beyond reasonabl e
doubt of Qualif ied Theft through Falsif icati on of Commercial Document.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abel ardo Sal onga is gui lt y of the crime of qualif ied theft through
falsif icati on of commercial document wi th the penalt y of recl usi on perpetua.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. wi th the
modification that the penal ty is reduced to fourteen (14) years and ei ght (8) months
of reclusi on temporal as minimum to twent y (20) years of recl usi on temporal as maximum.
The crime charged is Qual ifi ed Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. The
information al l eged that the accused took P36,480.30 wi th grave abuse of confidence by
forgi ng the si gnature of officers authori zed to si gn the subj ect check and had the check
deposited i n the account of Firebrake Sal es and Services, a fictitious payee wi thout any
legitimate transaction wi th Metrobank.
Theft is qualifi ed if it i s committed with grave abuse of confi dence. The fact that accused-
appel l ant as assistant cashier of Metrobank had custody of the af oresai d checks and had
access not onl y i n the preparation but also in the rel ease of Metrobank cashi ers checks
suffices to designate the crime as qual ifi ed theft as he gravel y abused t he confi dence reposed
in him by the bank as assistant cashi er. Si nce the val ue of the check is P38,480.30, the
imposable penal t y for the fel ony of theft i s prisi on mayor in i ts minimum and medi um peri ods
and one year of each additi onal ten thousand pesos i n accordance wi th Articl e 309, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, under Articl e 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the cri me of qual ified theft i s
punished by the penal ti es next hi gher by two (2) degrees than that specifi ed i n Articl e 309 of
the Revised Penal Code. Two (2) degrees hi gher than prisi on mayor in i ts minimum and
medium peri ods is recl usi on temporal i n its medi um and maximum periods.
In additi on, forgi ng the signatures of the bank officers authori zed to si gn the subj ect cashi er s
check was resorted to in order to obtai n the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the
accused.
Since falsificati on of the subj ect cashi ers check was a necessar y means to commit the crime
of qual ifi ed theft resulti ng in a compl ex crime. Hence, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
appli es, which provi des that, x x x where an offense is a necessary means for committi ng
the other, the penalty for the more seri ous crime i n its maximum peri od shal l be
imposed. Consi deri ng that qualifi ed Theft is more serious than falsi fication of bank notes or
108

certificates which is punished under Articl e 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prisi on
mayor i n i ts minimum peri od, the correct penalt y is fourteen (14) years and ei ght (8) months
of reclusi on temporal as minimum to twent y (20) years of recl usi on temporal as maximum.


CARIAGA vs. CA (G.R. No. 143561)
FACTS: Luis Mi guel Aboiti z, employed as Systems Anal yst of the Davao Light & Power
Company, Inc. (DLPC), recei ved reports that some pri vate electrici ans were engaged i n t he
clandesti ne sal e of DLPC materials and suppl ies. He i nitiated a covert operati on and sought
the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Vil l asis, Chi ef, Theft & Robber y Secti on, San Pedro Patrol
Stati on, DavaoHe also hired one Florenci o Siton, a wel der as undercover agent under the
pseudonym ' Canuto Duran' , an ' el ectrician from Kabakan, Cotabato.
Canuto Duran struck an acquai ntance with one Ricardo Cari aga, who offered t o suppl y
' Canuto Duran' wi th el ectrical materials, sayi ng that he has a cousin from whom he can
procure the same. His cousin i s peti ti oner Jonathan Cari aga.
Petitioner Jonathan Cariaga was an employee of DLPC; he was permanentl y assi gned as
dri ver of Truck "S-143" had charge of al l t he DLPC equipment and suppl i es kept i n his
vehicle, i ncluding l i ghtni ng arresters, cut-out and wires, which were general l y used for the
instal lation of transformers and power l ines; and specifical l y stored therei n for emergency
operations at ni ght when the stockroom i s closed that he had access t o the electrical suppl i es
of sai d company; and that with grave abuse of confi dence, he stole el ectrical materi al s
bel onging to DLPC.
The RTC found Jonathan Cari aga gui lt y of theft, qual ifi ed by grave abuse of conf idence,
under Articl e 310, i n rel ati on t o Article 309, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged,
aggravated by the use of motor vehicl e which i s not offset by any miti gati ng circumstance. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the deci sion of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jonathan Cari aga i s gui lt y of t he crime of qual ified theft.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
The SC states that whi l e t he mere circumstance that the petiti oner i s an empl oyee or l aborer
of DLPC does not suf fice t o create the relati on of confi dence and i ntimacy that the l aw
requires t o desi gnate the crime as qualif ied theft, i t has been hel d that access to t he pl ace
where t he taking took pl ace or access t o the stol en items changes the complexion of the
crime committed t o that of qual ifi ed theft. Thus, theft by a truck dri ver who takes the l oad of
his truck bel ongi ng t o his employer i s gui lt y of qualif ied theft

as was proven i n this case.





109

PEOPLE vs. SISON (G.R. No. 123183)
FACTS: Appell ant Ruben Sison i s the Assistant Manager of the Phi l i ppi ne Commercial
Internati onal Bank (PCIB). He concurrentl y hel d the position of Branch Operation Officer of
PCIB Luneta Branch. As such, appel l ant was abl e to changed the account name from Soli d
Electronics, Inc. to Sol id Real t y Development Corporation and that appel l ant made the back
office wi thdrawals i n behalf of Sol id Real t y Development Corporation. He also faci l itated the
crediti ng of two (2) ficti ti ous remittances i n the amounts of P3,250,000.00 and P4,755,000 i n
favor of Sol id Realt y Development Corporati on, an equall y ficti ti ous account, and then later
the wi thdrawal of P6,000,000.00 from the PCIB Luneta Branch.
The tri al court convicted appel l ant of qual ified theft.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ruben Sison i s gui l t y of qual ifi ed theft?
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC decision convicti ng the accused for qual ifi ed
theft.
Art.' s 308 and 310, respecti vel y of the Revised Penal Code provi des:
Who are l iable for theft. Theft i s committed by any person who, wi th i ntent t o gain but
wi thout viol ence against or i ntimidati on of persons nor force upon thi ngs, shal l take personal
propert y of another wi thout the l atter' s consent.
Qual ifi ed Theft. The crime of theft shal l be punished by t he penal ti es next hi gher by two
degrees than those respecti vel y specifi ed i n the next precedi ng article, i f committed by a
domestic servant, or wi th grave abuse of confi dence, or i f the property stol en i s motor vehicl e,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a pl antati on,
fish taken from a fishpond or fisher y or i f propert y i s taken on the occasi on of fire,
earthquake, t yphoon, vol vanic erupti on, or any other cal amit y, vehicular accident or ci vi l
disturbance.
Under Articl e 308 of t he sai d Code, the elements of the crime of theft are:
1. that t here be taking of personal propert y;
2. that sai d propert y belongs t o another;
3. that the taking be done with i ntent t o gai n;
4. that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. that the taki ng be accomplished without t he use of vi olence against intimi dati on of persons
or force upon things.
Theft becomes qual ified when any of the fol l owi ng circumstances i s present:
1. the theft i s committed by a domestic servant;
2. the theft i s committed wi th grave abuse of confi dence;
3. the propert y stol en i s a (a) motor vehicle, (b) mail matter or (c) large cattle;
4. the propert y stol en consists of coconuts taken from the premises pl antati on;
110

5. the propert y stol en i s fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and
6. the propert y was taken on t he occasion of fire, earthquake, t yphoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other cal amit y, vehicul ar acci dent or civi l disturbance.
The crime perpetuated by appell ant against his empl oyer, the Phi l ippine Commercial and
Industri al Bank (PCIB), i s qual ifi ed theft. Appel l ant coul d not have committed the crime had
he not been hol ding the positi on of Luneta Operati on Officer which gave him not onl y sol e
access t o the bank vault but also control of t he access of al l bank employees i n that branch,
except the Branch Manager, t o confi denti al and highl y del icate computeri zed securi t y systems
designed t o safeguard, among others, the integrit y of telegraphic fund transfers and account
names of bank cli ents. The management of the PCIB reposed its trust and conf idence i n the
appel l ant as i ts Luneta Branch Operati on Offi cer, and i t was this trust and confi dence which
he expl oi ted t o enrich himself to the damage and prej udice of PCIB i n the amount of
P6,000,000.00.



















111

USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY ( ART. 312)
QUIANAO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 139603)
FACTS: On February 2, 1993, at about 9:00 o' cl ock i n the morni ng, at Siti o Bagacay, Bgy.
Petong, Lapi nig, Northern Samar, accused Sal vador Cases and Conchita Qui nao, together
wi th their other cl ose rel ati ves suddenl y appeared and with the use of force, vi ol ence and
intimidati on, usurped and took possessi on of a real property owned by Francisco F. del
Monte, cl aiming that the same i s their i nheritance from their ascendants and whi le there,
accused immedi atel y gathered coconuts and made them into copra. Compl ai nant was forci bl y
dri ven out by the accused from their l andhol di ng and was threatened that i f he wi l l try t o
return to the land i n question, something wi l l happen t o him. Compl ainant was thus forced t o
seek assistance from the Lapini g Phi l ippine Nati onal Pol ice.
The tri al court rendered j udgment fi ndi ng both accused gui l ty of the crime of Usurpation of
Real Ri ghts i n Property. On 25 September 1997, i t was l earned that accused Cases di ed on
Apri l 9,1995.
The tri al court convicted the accused for the crime charged. Petiti oner appeal ed her
conviction t o t he CA. The appel late court, however, affirmed the decision of the tri al court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused i s guil t y f or the crime of the usurpation of real propert y.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals findi ng peti tioner
Conchita Quinao and Sal vador Cases gui l ty of the crime of Usurpati on of Real Propert y.
Article 312 of Revised Penal Code defines and penali zes the cri me of usurpation of real
propert y as fol lows:
Art. 312. Occupati on of real property or usurpati on of real ri ghts i n property. - Any person
who, by means of vi ol ence against or i ntimidation of persons, shal l take possessi on of any
real propert y or shal l usurp any real ri ghts i n propert y bel onging to another, i n additi on t o the
penal ty i ncurred for the acts of viol ence executed by him shal l be puni shed by a fi ne from P50
to P100 per centum of the gain which he shal l have obtai ned, but not l ess than P75 pesos.
If the val ue of the gai n cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to P500 pesos shall be
imposed.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possessi on of another' s real property
or usurped real rights i n another' s propert y; that the possessi on or usurpati on was committed
wi th vi ol ence or i ntimidation and that t he accused had ani mo l ucrandi . I n order t o sustai n a
conviction for "usurpacion de derecho real es, " the proof must show that the real propert y
occupi ed or usurped bel ongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and
that the possessi on of the usurper was obtai ned by means of i ntimidation or viol ence done to
the person ousted of possessi on of t he property.
More expl ici tl y, i n Castrodes vs. Cubel o, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are
(1) occupation of another' s real propert y or usurpati on of a real ri ght bel onging to another
person; (2) viol ence or i ntimidation should be empl oyed i n possessing t he real propert y or i n
usurpi ng the real ri ght, and (3) the accused shoul d be animated by t he intent t o gai n.
Thus, i n order t o absol ve herself of any li abi l it y for the crime, petiti oner insists that the
el ements of the crime are not present i n this case. Peti ti oner maintai ns that she owns t he
propert y i nvol ved herei n.
112

However, t he issue of ownership over the land i n questi on have been decided i n Ci vil Case
No. 3561 i n favor of the compl ai nant i n 1949.Further, as establ ished by the commissioner
appoi nted by t he trial court t o l ook into peti ti oner' s defense, i t was found out that the area
claimed by the accused encroached the area of the pl aintiffs.





















































113

ESTAFA ( ART. 315)


ONG VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 165275

FACTS: Peti ti oner Goretti Ong, had for years been buyi ng j ewelr y from Gold Asia which i s
owned and operated by the famil y of Rosa Cabuso (the pri vate complai nant). While she
normal l y bought j ewelry on cash basis, she was al l owed to issue postdated checks to cover
the j ewelr y she bought i n December 1994 up to Februar y 1995, upon her assurance that t he
checks woul d be funded on their due dates. When, on maturit y, the checks were deposi ted,
they were returned wi th the stamp "Account Closed."

Hence, petitioner was i ndicted for Estafa. She was l ikewise indicted for 10 counts of viol ation
of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manil a, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 213645-CR to 213654-
CR.

However, the Informati on dated August 10, 1995, peti tioner was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mani l a for Estafa, wi thout specification under what mode i n Articl e 315 of
the Revised Penal Code the offense was al l egedl y committed.

The RTC convicted petiti oner of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on appeal but modified the penal ty
and the amount of i ndemnity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appell ant can be convicted of the crime of estafa
despi te the fail ure of the prosecuti on to prove her guil t beyond reasonabl e doubt.

HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted Goretti Ong, of the crime charged for fai l ure of the
prosecuti on to establ ish all the elements of Estafa under Articl e 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
RPC.

Section 14(2) of Articl e III of the Constitution grants the accused the ri ght to be i nformed of
the nature and cause of the accusati on. This i s to enabl e the accused to adequatel y prepare
for his defense. An accused cannot thus be convicted of an offense unless it is cl earl y
charged i n the complaint or information.

From the al l egati ons i n an i nformati on, the real nature of the crime charged is determined.


In the case at bar, the Informati on al leged that peti ti oner issued the questi oned checks
knowi ng that she had no funds i n the bank and fai l ing to fund them despite notice that they
were dishonored. These al legations cl earl y const itute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as
the lower courts found but, under paragraph 2(d) of Articl e 315 of the Revised Penal Code
which is committed as fol l ows:
x x x x

(a) 2(d) By postdating a check, or issui ng a check in payment of an obli gation when the
offender had no funds i n the bank, or his funds deposited therei n were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check. The fai lure of the drawer of the check to deposi t the amount
necessar y to cover thi s check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that sai d check has been dishonored for lack or i nsufficiency of
funds shal l be pri ma faci e evidence of decei t constituti ng false pretense or fraudulent act.

x x x x

Although the earli er quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediatel y quoted paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 have a common el ement - false pretenses or fraudulent acts - the l aw treats
Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bouncing check di fferentl y.
Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates
114

a prima facie presumption of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which
is not an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a).

Under paragraph 2(d), i f there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insuffici ency of
funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori i ntent, no Estafa can be deemed to
exist. In the case of Peopl e v. Ojeda.

x x x [N]otice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the R[evised] P[enal ]
C[ode] and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of the check must
deposit the amount needed to cover his check wi thi n three days from recei pt of notice of
dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to pay the amount of the
check within five days from recei pt of noti ce of dishonor. Under both laws, notice of
dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and vi ol ati on of BP 22). Without proof of
notice of dishonor, knowl edge of i nsufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no
crime (whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist. Notice of dishonor
bei ng then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearl y
charged, fai lur e to prove it is a ground for acqui ttal thereunder.

In the case at bar, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that
peti tioner recei ved noti ce of dishonor of al l, except one (All i ed Bank Check No. 7600042 for
P76,654), of the questi oned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks,
the pri ma faci e presumption of knowl edge of insuffici ency of funds did not arise.

Petitioner' s defenses of good faith and lack of criminal i ntent, defenses to a mal um in se l ike
Estafa. On notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Al li ed Bank
check, petiti oner offered to pay in i nstal lment, to which the pri vate complai nant agreed, the
amount covered by the sai d check, as wel l as the others. As reflected above, the prosecuti on
sti pul ated that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250, which amount is almost one -
third of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount covered by the P76,654
All i ed Bank check.




























115

VELOSO vs. PEOPLE ( G.R. No. 149354)

FACTS: Shangri -la Fi nest Chinese Cuisi ne, at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangl e, Quezon
Ci t y, is a restaurant owned and operated by the Developers Group of Compani es, Inc. Ramon
Sy Hunl i ong (Ramon) was its presi dent and general manager. Peti ti oner Rol and Vel oso,
claiming to be a consultant of then Congressman Antoni o V. Cuenco, was an occasi onal guest
at the restaurant.

Before the May 1995 electi ons, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, whi l e at the sai d
restaurant, had a conversati on wi th Ramon. This led to a fri endl y bet between petitioner and
Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. woul d wi n as a Senator. Ramon assured that
Marcos, Jr. is a sure wi nner, but petiti oner cl ai med otherwi se. They both agreed that t he loser
wi l l host a di nner for ten (10) persons. After the el ections, offici al resul ts showed that Marcos,
Jr. lost in his senatori al bi d. Hence, petiti oner won i n the bet.

On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuencos secretar y cal l ed Eva Anne Nanette Sto.
Domingo, the restaurants assistant dini ng manager, to reserve a dinner for one tabl e
correspondi ng to ten persons on behalf of petiti oner. Ramon, the l oser, informed Eva that he
woul d pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner.

However, when peti ti oner arri ved at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4)
additional tables be set, promising he woul d pay for the same. Hence, Eva had four addi ti onal
tabl es prepared i n additi on to the one under Ramons account. The Sales Invoice for the
additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00.

When the Sal es Invoice was presented to petiti oner, he refused to pay, expl aini ng he was a
guest of Ramon. Due to petitioners stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where she should
send the bi l l. Petiti oner i nstructed her to send it to Congressman Cuencos office as he was
al ways present there. It turned out, however, that he was no l onger reporti ng at that office.
Hence, the bil l was sent to his address at 63 Benefi t Street, GSIS Vil l age, Quezon Cit y, but
sti l l, he refused to pay.The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand l etter to peti ti oner, but to
no avai l.

Consequentl y, peti ti oner was charged with estafa before the Metropol itan Tri al Court (MeTC),
Branch 31, Quezon Cit y.

After tri al on the merits, the MeTC rendered a decision fi ndi ng peti ti oner guil t y of the cri me
charged. The said decisi on was affirmed by the Regional Tri al Court and the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred i n affirming the RTC Decisi on fi ndi ng peti ti oner
gui lt y of estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals findi ng peti tioner
Roland V. Veloso gui l ty beyond reasonabl e doubt of the crime of estafa.
The Court found that peti ti oner and his guests, occupyi ng four tabl es, ate the food he
ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and i nsisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears
emphasis that the understanding between peti tioner and Ramon was that the l atter woul d pay
for onl y one tabl e. Further, i t agreed wi th the Sol icitor Generals brief that petiti oner empl oyed
fraud in orderi ng four addi ti onal tabl es, partaking of the food ordered and then i l l egall y
refusi ng to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Articl e 315 (2)(e) of the Revised
Penal Code.






116

BONIFACIO VS. PEOPLE ( G.R. No. 153198)

FACTS: On March 21, 1996, petitioner Crisanta Bonifaci o recei ved several pi eces of j ewelry
from private compl ai nant Ofel ia Santos, who i s a busi nesswoman and a buy-and-sel l agent of
j ewelr y. Bonifaci o signed a document acknowledgi ng receipt of the j ewelr y and agreeing to
sel l these items on commission basis. She al so promised to remit the proceeds of the sal e or
return the unsol d items to Santos within 15 days.
Petitioner fai led to turn over the proceeds of the sal e withi n the gi ven period. She,
however, returned some of the unsol d items at a l ater date. The val ue of the pieces
unaccounted for amounted toP154,000.
On March 28 and Apri l 3, 1996, petiti oner asked Santos for new sets of j ewelr y to sel l
under the same terms and conditi ons. In both transaction, peti ti oner fai led to account.
Santos sent a l etter to the petiti oner demandi ng from the latter the payment of the total
amount of P244,500. Petiti oner gave her two checks amounti ng to P30,000 as partial
payment. However, the checks, bounced for bei ng drawn agai nst i nsufficient funds and bei ng
drawn agai nst a cl osed account, respecti vel y.
Petitioner was thereafter charged wi th the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The tri al court rendered a decisi on, fi nding accused Crisanta Bonifaci o gui lt y beyond
reasonabl e doubt of the crime of estafa under Par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
On appeal, the appel late court affirmed the RTC decisi on but modified the penalt y:

ISSUE: Whether or not the el ement of misappropri ation or conversi on was proved to convict
peti tioner for the crime of estafa under articl e 315 (1)(b), RPC.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisi on of the Court of Appeals.

The essence of estafa under Articl e 315 (1)(b), RPC is the appropriation or conversion of
money or propert y recei ved, to the prej udi ce of the owner. The words convert and
misappropri ate connote an act of usi ng or di sposing of anothers propert y as if i t were ones
own, or of devoting i t to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.

In an agency for the sale of j ewelr y, i t is the agents dut y to return the j ewelr y on demand of
the owner. The demand for the return of the thing del i vered i n trust and the fai l ure of the
accused-agent to account for it are circumstantial evidence of misappropri ation.

Here, peti ti oner admitted that she recei ved the pi eces of j ewelr y on commission. She l ikewise
admitted that she fail ed to return t he items or their val ue on Santos demand. On the other
hand, the testimony of her l one witness, Li l ia Pascual, fai led to rebut the prosecuti on s
evi dence that she misappropriated the i tems or their corresponding val ue. She also never
appeared in the tri al court to refute the charge against her. Hence, the tri al and appel late
courts conclusion of gui l t by misappropri ati on was a l ogical consequence of the establ ished
facts.















117


RECUERDO VS. PEOPLE G.R. No. 168217

FACTS: Pri vate respondent Yol anda Floro is engaged i n the busi ness of buyi ng and sell i ng of
j ewelr y. She regul arl y conducts business at her resi dence located in Pobl acion, Meycauayan,
Bul acan. Petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, is a dentist by profession, who was introduced to Floro
by the latters cousi n Aimee Aoro. Recuerdo became her customer. Sometime i n the second
week of December 1993, at around 7:30 i n the evening, Recuerdo went to the house of Fl oro
and purchased from her two pieces of j ewelry, to wit: a 2.19 carat di amond round st one i n
white gold setti ng worth P220,000.00 pesos, and one pi ece of loose 1.55 karat marquez
di amond with a value of P130,000.00 pesos.

For the 2.19 carat di amond stone, accused i ssued and del i vered to the compl ai nant then and
there ten post-dated checks each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn agai nst Unitrust
Devel opment Bank, Makati Commercial Center Branch. Onl y six (6) postdated checks, are
subj ect of Criminal Case. For the 1.55 carat marquez loose di amond, accused issued and
del i vered to compl ainant then and there ten (10) postdated checks, each in the amount of
P13,000.00 drawn against PCI Bank, Makati, Del a Rosa Branch. Six of those checks are
subj ect of Criminal Case.

In another transaction that transpired on Februar y 7, 1994, Recuerdo once again bought
another set of j ewelr y, this time a pair of di amond earri ngs worth P768,000.00 pesos. She
was gi ven seven (7) postdated checks one for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six
(6) postdated checks drawn against Prudential Bank, Legaspi Vi l lage, Makati Branch, each
for P100,000.00 representi ng the balance in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos
(Checks Nos. 100783, 01184, 01185, 011786, 011787 and 011788, Record, Criminal Case
No. 2750-M-94, pp. 138-150) subj ect matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94.

Fl oro deposi ted the aforementi oned checks at Li bert y Savi ngs & Loan Associ ati on,
Meyc[a]uayan, Bul acan. Upon presentment for encashment by sai d deposi tar y bank with the
different drawee banks on their respective maturit y dates, the six (6) Prudenti al Bank checks
were al l dishonored f or having been drawn against closed accounts. With her pi eces of
j ewelr y sti l l unpai d, Floro, through counsel , made formal demands requiring Requerdo to pay
the amounts represented by the dishonored checks (Record, supra, pp. 123, 138, and 151).
Fl oros efforts to obtai n payment, though, onl y proved futi l e as Requerdo conti nuousl y refused
to pay the val ue of the purchased pi eces of j ewelr y.

The tri al court found the peti tioner Recuerdo gui lt y of two (2) counts of estafa, def ined and
penal i zed under Articl e 315, par. 2[b] (sic) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, , the CA
rendered j udgment affirming with modification the decisi on of the RTC as to the penal t y meted
on the appel lant

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisi on of the Court of Appeals.
Estafa through false pretense or fraudul ent act under Paragraph 2(d) of Articl e 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, is committed as fol lows:
By postdati ng a check, or issuing a check i n payment of an obl igati on when the offender had
no funds i n the bank, or his funds deposited therei n were not suffici ent to cover the amount of
the check. The fail ure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessar y to cover his
check wi thi n three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shal l be prima faci e
evi dence of deceit consti tuti ng false pretense or fraudul ent act.

The essenti al elements of the fel ony are: (1) a check is postdated or i ssued i n payment of an
obl igati on contracted at the time i t is issued; (2) l ack or i nsufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof. It is criminal fraud or decei t i n the issuance of a
check which is made punishabl e under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of a
debt. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by
false or misl eading al l egati ons or by conceal ment of that which shoul d have been discl osed
118

which deceives or is i ntended to decei ve another so that he shall act upon it to his l egal
inj ur y. Concealment which the l aw denotes as fraudulent impl i es a purpose or design to hide
facts which the other part y ought to have. The postdati ng or issuing of a check i n payment of
an obl i gati on when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therei n are
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check is a false pretense or a fraudul ent act.

There is no false pretense or fraudul ent act if a postdated check is issued in payment of a
pre-existing obl i gati on.

Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (wi th mal ice). For one to be criminal l y li abl e for estafa
under paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, mal i ce and specific i ntent to
defraud are required.

There can be no estafa if the accused acted i n good faith because good fai th negates malice
and deceit.

In the present case, peti tioners defense of good faith is bel i ed by the evi dence of the
prosecuti on and her own evi dence. Petitioner never offered to pay the amounts of the checks
after she was informed by the pri vate complai nant that they had been dishonored by the
drawee banks, the pri vate complai nant thus charged her wi th estafa before the RTC.

Moreover, estafa is a publ ic offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State on
its own moti on even though complete reparation had been made for the l oss or damage
suffered by the offended part y. The consent of the private complai nant to peti tioners payment
of her ci vi l l iabil i ty pendente l ite does not enti tle the l atter to an acquittal . Subsequent
payments does not obl i terate the criminal l iabil it y already i ncurred. Cri minal l i abi l it y for estafa
is not affected by a compromise between peti tioner and the pri vate compl ainant on the
formers ci vi l li abi l it y.






























119

RAMOS-ANDAN vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 136388

FACTS: On Februar y 4, 1991,peti tioner, Anicia Ramos-Andan, and Potenciana Ni eto
approached El i zabeth E. Cal deron and offered to buy the latters 18-carat heart-shaped
di amond ri ng. El i zabeth agreed to sel l her ri ng. In turn, Potenciana tendered her three (3)
postdated checks

Since the three checks were all payable to cash, El i zabeth required petiti oner to endorse
them, the l atter compl ied. When El i zabeth deposited the checks upon maturit y wi th the
drawee bank, they bounced for the reason "Account Closed." She then sent Potenci ana a
demand letter to pay, but she refused.

The Provinci al Prosecutor fi led the correspondi ng Information for Estafa wi th the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Mal ol os, Bul acan. Subsequentl y, peti ti oner was arrested but
Potenciana has remai ned at large.

During the hearing, petiti oner deni ed buyi ng a diamond ring from El i zabeth, mai ntaini ng that
she signed the recei pt and the checks merel y as a wi tness to the transacti on between
Eli zabeth and Potenci ana. Thus, she could not be hel d l i abl e for the bounced checks she di d
not issue.

After heari ng, the tri al court rendered a decisi on finding petiti oner gui lt y as charged. The tri al
court held that whi le i t was Potenci ana who issued the checks, nonethel ess, it was peti ti oner
who induced El i zabeth to accept them and who endorsed the same.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decisi on affirming with modificati on as to the
penal ty.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has proved petiti oners gui lt beyond reasonabl e doubt; and

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisi on of the Court of Appeals.
In the present case, whi l e Potenciana, who remains at large, was the drawer of the checks,
however, i t was petitioner who directl y and personal l y negotiated the same. It was she who
signed the recei pt evidencing the sale. It was she who handed the checks to El i zabeth and
endorsed them as payment for the ri ng. It is thus cl ear that peti ti oner and Potenciana acted in
concert for the purpose of induci ng and defraudi ng Eli zabeth to part with her j ewel r y.
The el ements of the offense as defi ned and penali zed by Articl e 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are:
(1) postdati ng or issuance of a check in payment of an obl igati on contracted at the time the
check was issued;
(2) lack of or insuffici ency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) the payee was not i nformed by the offender and the payee did not know that the offender
had no funds or i nsufficient funds.

All these elements are present i n this case. The prosecuti on proved that the c hecks were
issued i n payment of a simultaneous obl i gati on. The checks bounced when Eli zabeth
deposited them for the reason "Account Cl osed." There is no showi ng whatsoever that before
peti tioner handed and endorsed the checks to El i zabeth, she took steps t o ascertain that
Potenciana has suffici ent funds in her account. Upon being informed that the checks bounced,
she fai l ed to gi ve an adequate expl anati on why Potencianas account was closed. Citing the
case of Echaus v. Court of Appeals, the Court rul ed that "the fact that the postdated
checkswere not covered by suffici ent funds, when they fel l due, in the absence of any
explanation or j ustification by peti tioner, satisfi ed the element of decei t i n the crime of estafa,
as defi ned i n paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code."




120


OTHER DECEITS ( ART. 318)

CHUA vs. PEOPLE

Facts: On November 25, 1982, peti ti oner Anita Chua issued to Aracel i Estigoy, compl ai nant,
fivepostdated checks drawn agai nst Pacific Bank i n payment of imported i tems. Petiti oner
wentagain to Esti goy s house to purchase some imported items and issued ei ght postdated
checksdrawn agai nst the same bank. On thei r due dates, compl ainant deposited the checks
but thesame were dishonored. She then notif ied the peti ti oner and demanded payment, to
which thepetiti oner fail ed to redeem or pay the amounts of the checks.Appel l ant admitted
usi ng the checks but i nterposed the defense that she issued the checks ascol lateral and by
way of accommodati on of the compl ai nant who requested for the checks.

Issue: Whether issuance of unfunded checks as col lateral or security for the goods does not
consti tuteestafa under Art 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Held: Al l the elements of estafa are present i n the case. Petiti oners defense is not worthy of
credence.Tri al court correctl y found and affirmed by CA cl earl y showed that they were
intended aspayments for the items she obtai ned from complai nant. Compl ai nant woul d not
have parted wi thhis goods i n exchange of bum checks. It is likewi se contrar y to ordi nar y
human experience andto sound business practice for petitioner to i ssue so many unfunded
checks as coll ateral or byway of accommodati on. As an experi enced busi nesswoman,
peti tioner coul d not have been sonave as not to know that she coul d be hel d criminal l y li abl e
for issui ng unfunded checks. TheSupreme Court deni ed the peti tion for l ack of merit.




GUINHAWA V PEOPLE (GR 162822)

FACTS: Jaime Gui nhawa was engaged i n the busi ness of sell i ng brand new motor vehicles,
incl udi ng Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. On March 17,
1995, Gui nhawa purchased a brand new Mi tsubishi L-300 Versa Van with Motor No. 4D56A-
C8929 and Serial No. L069WQZJL-07970 from the Uni on Motors Corporati on (UMC) i n Paco,
Manil a. The van bore Plate No. DLK 406. Gui nhawas dri ver, Leopol do Olayan, drove the van
from Mani l a to Naga Ci ty. However, whi l e the van was traveli ng al ong the highway in Labo,
Daet, Camarines Norte, Ol ayan suffered a heart attack. The van went out of control ,
traversed the hi ghway onto the opposi te l ane, and was di tched i nto the canal paral lel to the
hi ghway.

Sometime in October 1995, the spouses Ral ph and Josephi ne Si lo wanted to buy a new van
for their garment business. They went to Guinhawas office, and were shown the L-300 Versa
Van which was on display. The coupl e inspected its i nterior porti on and found it
beautiful . They no longer inspected the under chassis since they presumed that the vehicl e
was brand new. Unaware that the van had been damaged and repaired on account of the
acci dent in Daet, the coupl e decided to purchase the van for P591, 000.00. Azotea suggested
that the coupl e make a down payment of P118, 200.00, and pay the bal ance of the purchase
price by i nstalments via a l oan from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Naga Branch,
wi th the L-300 Versa Van as col l ateral. Azotea offered to make the necessar y arrangements
wi th the UCPB for the consummation of the loan transacti on. The coupl e agreed. On
November 10, 1995, the spouses executed a Promissor y Note

for the amount of P692, 676.00
as payment of the bal ance on the purchase price, and as evi dence of the chattel mortgage
over the van in favor of UCPB.




121

ISSUE: Whether or not Gui nhawa viol ated paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the RPC, or the crime of
other decei ts?


HELD: Yes. The false or fraudulent representation by a sel ler that what he offers for sal e i s
brand new is one of those decei tful acts envi saged in paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the RPC. This
provision incl udes any kind of concei vable decei t other than those enumerated i n Arts. 315 to
317 of the RPC. It is intended as the catchal l provision for that purpose with i ts broad scope
and intendment. It is evi dent that such false statement or fraudul ent representation
consti tuted the ver y cause or the onl y moti ve f or the spouses to part wi th their propert y.
















































122


ARSON ( ART. 320/ P.D. 1613)

PEOPLE V. MALNGAN (GR. NO. 170470)

FACTS:On Januar y 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a housemai d by Roberto Separa Sr. was
accused of setting fire the house of his employer resulted i n the destruction of his employer s
house and the death of six persons including his employer Roberto Separa Sr., some seven
adj oi ning residential houses, were also razed by fire.
She was apprehended by the Barangay Chairman and was brought t o the Barangay Hal l. She
was then i dentif ied by a nei ghbor, whose house was also burned, as the housemai d of the
Separas and upon inspection, a disposable l ighter was found inside accused-appell ants bag.
Thereafter, accused-appel lant confessed to t he Barangay Chairman.
On Januar y 9, 2001, an i nformati on was f il ed before the RTC of Mani l a, chargi ng the accused-
appel l ant with the crime of Arson wi th multi pl e homicide. The RTC as wel l as t he Court of
Appeals finds the accused gui lt y beyond reasonabl e doubt of the cri me of Arson with multiple
homici de.
ISSUE: Whether or not Edna Mal ngan was gui lt y of the crime of destructi ve arson or simpl e
arson?

HELD: The crime committed by the accused-appel l ant is Simple Arson and not Arson wi th
Multi ple Homicide. The Supreme Court rul ed that there is no compl ex crime of Arson with
Multi ple Homicide. There are two laws that govern the crime of arson where death results
therefrom Articl e 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Secti on 5 of Presi denti al Decree 1613,
quoted hereunder, to wi t:

Revised Penal Code
Art. 320. Destructi ve Arson xxxx If as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penal i zed under this Article, death results, the mandator y
penal ty of death shal l be imposed.
Presi denti al Decree No. 1613
Sec. 5. Where Death Resul ts from Arson if by reason of or on the
occasion of the arson death results, the penalt y of reclusi on perpetua to death shall be
imposed.

Both l aws provi de onl y one penal t y for the commission of arson, whether consi dered
destructi ve or otherwise, where death resul ts therefrom. The reason i s that arson is i tself the
end and death is simpl y the consequence.

The case fal ls under si mple arson si nce f rom a readi ng of the body of the information it
can be seen that it states that the accused, with intent to cause damage, xxx del i berately set
fire upon the two-storey resi denti al house, xxx that by reason and on the occasion of the sai d
fire, xxx which were the direct cause of their death xxx. It is clear that her i ntent was merel y
to destroy her empl oyers house through the use of fire.

When fire is used wi th the i ntent to kil l a parti cul ar person who may be in a house and
that obj ecti ve is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder onl y. When the Penal
Code declares that kil l i ng committed by means of fire is murder, it i ntends that fire shoul d be
purposel y adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder wi thout a design to take
l ife. In other words, if the mai n obj ect of the offender is to ki ll by means of fire, the offense i s
murder. But if the main obj ecti ve is the burni ng of the bui l di ng, the resul ti ng homici de may be
absorbed by the crime of arson. The l atter bei ng the appl icable one i n this case.



123


PEOPLE V. OLIVI A (GR. NO. 170470)


FACTS: On Augus t 23, 1993, at ar ound el ev en o' c l oc k i n t he ev eni ng, Av el i no and
hi s f ami l y wer e sleepi ng i n their house. Avel ino went out to urinate. He saw the accused-
appel l ant set roof of their house on fire wi th a li ghted match. One of the neighbors, Benj ami n,
went to the nearbyri ver and fetched water wi th a pail . As Benj amin was hel ping put out the
fire, he was shot by theaccused. The gunshot wound caused Benj ami n' s death. Informati on for
arson and for murderwas fil ed separatel y against the accused and the other three co-accused.


ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guil t y of arson.

HELD: Whether the victim was shot whi le he was on the street or when he was pouri ng water
on theburning roof i s irrel evant t o the crime. The two witnesses on that aspect are not
necessari l yi nconsistent. The Court agrees with the sol ici tor general that Benj amin coul d have
been on thestreet while pouring water on the burning roof. There is no need to prove that the accused hadactual
knowl edge that the was burned i s inhabited. There was treacher y where the victim, whil ehe
was merel y acti ng as good nei ghbor, i nnocentl y hel ping out the fire, when shot, unaware
of the fatal attack on hi m.





PEOPLE V. ACOSTA (GR. NO. 126351)

FACTS: Appel lant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38- year ol d mason, marri ed, and a resi dent of
Barri o Makati po, Kalookan Cit y, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good
friend of Almanzor "El mer" Montescl aros, the grandson of pri vate complai nant, Fi lomena M.
Mari gomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montescl aros, i n the bel ief
that appell ant and his wife were the ones hi di ng his l i ve-in partner from him, stormed the
house of appel lant and burned their cl othes, furniture, and appli ances. Montescl aros l i ved i n
the house owned by said compl ai nant and located at Banahaw St., Mountai n Hei ghts
Subdi vision, Barri o Makati po, Kal ookan Ci ty. It was this house al l egedl y set on fire by
appel l ant.
At about 4:00 t o 5:00 oclock i n t he afternoon of Februar y 27, 1996, the nephew of
prosecuti on wi tness Mona Aqui no cal led the l atter, simultaneousl y shouti ng that appell ant
Raul Acosta, their nei ghbor, was carr yi ng a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her
house and approached appel l ant who, when asked why he was carr ying a stove and a knife,
repl ied that he would burn the house of compl ai nant Fi lomena M. Marigomen.
Owi ng t o the fearsome answer of appel l ant t o wi tness Aquinos quer y, she returned
immedi atel y t o her house. A f ew minutes after closi ng the door, she heard the sound of
broken bottles and the throwi ng of chair inside the house of compl ai nant. When she peeped
through her kitchen door, she saw appell ant insi de compl ainants house, which was
unoccupied at that ti me. Thereafter, appell ant poured kerosene on t he bed (papag) and
l ighted i t wi th ci garette l ighter. The fire was easi l y put off by appel lants wife who arri ved at
the pl ace.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused i s guil t y of arson.
HELD: In this case, we fi nd the tri al court correctl y held that the fol lowi ng circumstances
taken together consti tute an unbroken chai n of events poi nting to one fair and logical
conclusi on, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of pri vate complai nant.
124

Although there is no direct evi dence l inking appel l ant to the arson, we agree wi th the tri al
court i n hol ding him gui lt y thereof i n the li ght of the fol lowi ng circumstances dul y proved and
on record:
First, appel lant had t he moti ve t o commit the arson. It i s not absol utel y necessar y, and i t i s
frequentl y impossi ble for the prosecution t o prove the moti ve of the accused for the
commission of the cri me charged, neverthel ess i n a case of arson l ike the present, t he
existence or non-existence of a suffici ent moti ve i s a fact affecting the credi bi li t y of the
wi tnesses. Appel l ant had every reason to f eel aggrieved about the i ncident and t o retali ate i n
kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.
Second, appell ants intent t o commit the arson was establ ished by hi s previous attempt t o set
on fire a bed ("papag") insi de the same house (pri vate compl ainants) which was burned later
i n t he night. Prosecuti on wi tness Mona Aquino testifi ed that at around 5:00 i n the afternoon of
the same day, she saw appel l ant carr yi ng a gas stove and knife. When she asked him what he
was going t o do with the stove, he answered that he was goi ng to burn the house of pri vate
complai nant.
Third, appell ant was not onl y present at the l ocus crimi nis before the i nci dent, he was seen
insi de t he yard of the burni ng house during the hei ght of the fire. At around 1:00 i n the
morning of Februar y 28, 1996, prosecution witness Li na Vi dea was awakened by the barki ng
of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to i nvestigate.
Fourth, appel lant s actions subsequent to t he i ncident further point to his cul pabi li t y. At
around 12:00 noon of the same day, pri vate complai nant went with prosecution wi tness Lina
Videa to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to l eave when appell ant arri ved.
Pri vate compl ainant asked him why he burned her house and appel lant answered, "So what i f
I burned your house?" Then appell ant stared meanl y at private complai nant, who got nervous
and had t o take medi cations. The fol lowi ng day, appel l ant threatened prosecuti on witness
Mona Aquino, sayi ng that i f she woul d testif y agai nst him, he woul d al so burn her house.

























125



ADULTERY/ CONCUBINAGE ( ART. 333. 334)

BELTRAN V PEOPLE (GR. NO. 137567)

FACTS: Pet ioner and wife Charmai ne Fel ix were married on June 16, 1973. On Februar y 7,
1997, after twent y- four years of marriage
p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d f o r n u l l i f y o f m a r r i a g e o n t h e g r o u n d o f psychol ogical
incapacit y. I n the answer of Charmaine, he al leged that petitioner abandoned theconj ugal
home and l i ved with a certain woman. She fil ed a criminal complai nt for
concubi nage. Peti tioner argued that the pendency of the civi l case for declarati on of null i t y of
his marri agepos ed a pr ej udi c i al ques t i on t o t he det er mi nat i on of t he c r i mi nal c as e.
The RTC deni ed hi s motion as well as his motion for reconsideration. Thus, the petiti oner
fil ed an i nstant peti ti on forrevi ew.

ISSUE:
Whet her t he pendenc y of t he pet i t i on f or t he dec l ar at i on of nul l i t y of mar r i age bas
ed onpsychol ogical i ncapaci t y under Articl e 36 of the Ci vi l Code is a prej udici al questi on that
shoul d merit the suspension of criminal case for concubinage.


HELD:

The pendency of the case for decl arati on of null if y of petitioner s marriage is not a
prej udicial question to the concubi nage case. For a ci vi l case to be considered prej udici al to a
criminal action, i t must appear not onl y that the sai d ci vil case invol ves the same facts upon
which thecriminal prosecuti on woul d be based, but also that in the resol uti on of the issue
raised in theaforesaid ci vi l acti on, the gui lt or i nnocence of the accused woul d necessari l y
be determined.The subsequent pronouncement that his marri age is voi d does not acquit hi m
from the crime of concubi nage. He who cohabits wi th a woman other than his wife before the
j udici al decl arati onof nul l it y of marri age assumes the risk of bei ng prosecuted for concubi nage



VERA-NERI VS PEOPLE (GR. NO. 96602)

FACTS:
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri i n the company of Mrs. Li nda Sare and
wi t nes s J abunan, t ook t he mor ni ng pl ane t o Bagui o. Ar r i v i ng at ar ound 11: 00 a. m. ,
t heydropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Cr ystal Cave, Bagui o
Ci t y thenproceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri spouses. At around 7:00
o cl ock evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arri ved at the Neris condominium. Witness
opened thedoor for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master s
bedroom whereaccused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused
Ruby Vera Neri srequest, Li nda Sare l eft the master s bedroom and went upstairs to the sala
leaving the twoaccused. About fort y-fi ve minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and tol d Li nda
Sare that she coul dalready come down. Three of them, ther eafter, went up to the sala then
left the condominium.(Court of Appeals Decisi on.)

ISSUE: Whether Dr. Neri s al l eged extra-mari tal affair precl udes him from fili ng t he criminal
complai nton the ground of pari del icto

HELD:
Del i ber at i ng on t he Mot i on f or Rec ons i der at i on i n G. R. No. 96602, t he Cour t bel i e
v es t hat peti ti oner Arroyo has fail ed t o show any ground that woul d warrant t he Court
reversing itsResol uti on dated 24 April 1991; and on t he Petiti on for Review docketed as G.R.
No. 96715, the Court considers that peti ti oner Ruby Vera Neri has fai l ed to show reversi bl e
126

error on the part of the Court of Appeals i n issui ng i ts Decisi on dated 21 May 1990 and its
Resol uti on, dated 18December 1990. Peti ti oner Arroyo did not convi nce this Court i n G.R. No.
96602 to dismiss the criminal case on the basis of Dr. Neri s pardon.ACCORDINGLY, the
Moti on for Reconsideration i n G.R. No. 96602 i s hereby DENIED for lack of merit and this
denial i s FINAL. The Petiti on for Review i n G.R. No. 96715 i s hereby simil arl yDENIED for l ack
of merit. Costs agai nst peti tioners.


ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS ( ART. 336)


PEOPLE V MONTERON (GR. NO. 130709)


FACTS:

On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-ol d Mar y Ann Martenez was walking home
fromWangan Nati onal Agricul tural School, Davao Cit y. While she was walking on a secl uded
porti onof the road, Mary Ann was hi t on t he head by a sli ngshot. She turned t o see where the
stonecame from; she was hit agai n on the mouth. She fel l down unconscious. When Mar y Ann
cameto, she found herself l yi ng on the grass naked. Accused-appel lant was l yi ng on top of
her, alsonaked. She struggled but accused-appell ant, who was stronger, restrai ned her. He
pl aced hispenis on top of her vagi na, which caused her t o feel pain. She franticall y grabbed
his erect penis and pushed i t away from her.


ISSUE:

Whether accused is gui lt y of consummated rape.

HELD:

Time-tested is the rul e that between the posi ti ve assertions of prosecution wi tnesses and the
negat i v e aver ment s of t he acc us ed, t he f or mer undi s put edl y des er v es mor e c r eden
c e andentitled to greater evidentiar y wei ght. In the case at bar, Mary Ann Martenez positi vel y
identifi edaccused-appel lant as her mol ester. Mar y Anns testimony pointing to accused-
appel l ant as theauthor of th crime is corroborated by her cousin Arnel Arat. Accused-appel lant
has commencedthe commission of the rape directl y by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing
himself and the victimand l yi ng on top of her, but he di d not perfor m al l the acts of execution
which shoul d producethe fel ony by reason of some cause or acci dent other than his own
spontaneous desistance. case at bar, it was Mar y Anns viol ent resistance which prevented
the inserti on of accused-appel l ants penis in her vagi na. The foregoi ng conclusion i s
supported by the medical fi ndi ngs of Dr. Dani lo P. Ledesma that Mar y Anns hymen was intact
and had no laceration.














127



PEOPLE vs. GI ANAN (135288-93)

FACTS:

The first inci dent of rape happened sometime in December 1992, at around 9 oclock i n the
eveni ng, Myra (then el even years ol d) asked permissi on forom his father if she could go to
hebut told Myra to stay and gi ve him a massage. Myra obeyed her father. Afterwards, she
again asked permissi on to go to their nei ghbors house and was al ready at the door when
accused-appel l ant pul l ed her and started kissing her. Startled, she resisted by pushi ng and
hi tti ng her father, but she was warned to keep qui et or else she woul d be ki ll ed. She was
made to l ie down by accused-appel lant who then took off her cl othes. He also undressed and
proceeded to have sexual intercourse wi th her. After accused-appel l ant was through, he got
up, dressed and then l eft. For fear that her father would make good his threats, Myra kept t o
herself what happened.
A few days later, whi l e Myra was taking a bath in their house i n Tondo, accused-appel l ant
entered the bathroom and started kissi ng her on the l ips, neck and genitali a. Because she
resisted and pushed hi m away, accused-appel lant lef t.
Sti l l, i n the same month of December 1992, Myra was agai n molested by accused-
appel l ant. She was cleani ng the room of their house and her father was the onl y other person
in the house. Accused-appel l ant suddenl y sei zed her and started kissing her. As before, her
father succeeded i n undressing her despi te her resistance and eventual l y consummated the
sexual act. Like the first inci dent, she di d not menti on this i nci dent to her mother for fear that
accused-appel l ant woul d carry out his earli er threats.
Shortl y afterwards, the Gianans house was destroyed by fire, as a result of which the famil y
moved to Barangay Pag-asa i n Dasmarias, Cavite. Myras mother was able to l and a j ob as
bookkeeper at the Santos Pension House where she was required to work from 7:30 in the
morning to 9 oclock in the evening. Accused-appell ant, who was unemployed, was l eft i n their
house with the chil dren.
[ 7]

Under this setup, the abuses agai nst Myra conti nued. One morni ng in March 1993, whi le Myra
was taking a bath, accused-appel lant entered the bathroom, removed his shorts, then started
embraci ng and kissi ng her. Myra, who was onl y i n her undergarments, tried to push him away,
but was unsuccessful. Accused-appell ant, whi l e seated on the toi l et bowl, made Myra straddl e
him as he di d the sexual act.
[ 8]

The fourth rape inci dent took place i n the evening of Apri l 1993, after Myra and her two
younger si bl i ngs had gone to bed. Their mother had not yet arri ved from work. Myra was
awakened as accused-appel l ant was undressi ng her. She insti ncti vel y kicked him, but she
was warned not to make any noise. Accused-appel l ant then started kissing her and pi nned
down her l eft l eg with his feet whi l e undressi ng. He then proceeded wi th the sexual
intercourse wi th Myra who was cr yi ng whi le her father vi ol ated her.
[ 9]

The fifth rape took pl ace i n November 1995. Duri ng the wake for her grandfather, whi le Myra
was servi ng coffee to those who came to condol e with the famil y, she was tol d by accused-
appel l ant to go home. A short whi le after compl ainant arri ved, her father fol lowed. They were
the onl y ones i n the house. She was then tol d to prepare the beddi ngs and, whi l e she was
doi ng so, accused-appel l ant embraced and started kissi ng her. She resisted but was tol d to
keep qui et. Although accused-appel lant was onl y abl e to l ower her pants and underwear down
to her knees, he succeeded in abusi ng her.

128

ISSUE: Whether accused-appel l ant is gui l t y of multipl e rape and that the informati on against
him is void.

HELD: The evidence shows that accused-appell ant was abl e to consummate each of the
rapes through force and intimidati on. Myra testifi ed that her father threatened to kil l her and
the other members of their fami l y if she reveal ed the sexual attacks to anyone. The threats
cannot be minimi zed considering the moral influence of accused-appel l ant over her. Indeed,
we have consistentl y rul ed that i n cases of incestuous rapes, the fathers moral ascendancy
over the victim substitutes for vi olence and inti midation. This especi al l y holds true i n the case
of Fi l ipi no chi ldren who are tradi tional l y raised to obey and to respect their el ders.
With regard to the i nci dent i n December 1992 duri ng which accused-appel lant kissed
complai nant i n vari ous parts of her body i n t he bathroom where she was taking a bath, the
crime committed was acts of l asci vi ousness. The elements of the crime are: (1) that the
offender commits any act of l asci vi ousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by usi ng force
or i ntimidation or (b) when the offended part y is depri ved of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or (c) when the offended part y is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended part y i s
another person of ei ther sex. Al though the i nformation fil ed was for multipl e rape, accused-
appel l ant can be convicted of acts of l asci vi ousness because the crime of acts of
lasci viousness is i ncl uded i n rape.



PEOPLE V COLLADO (GR. NO. 135667-70)

FACTS: The first of four (4) unfortunate occasions was on 27 Apri l 1993 when Jul ie and her
ol dest son Reggi e went to Cubao. Messeah was resti ng i n her bedroom upstairs when Jessi e
suddenl y barged into her room. Jessie then parted her l egs and tied them apart, pul li ng
down her garteri zed shorts and panti es unti l her ankles. He tri ed forcing his penis i nto her
vagina, but when he fai led in his attempt, he inserted it i nto her anus i nstead. Messeah fel t
pai n in her anus and something sticky l ike paste f lowed out from his penis. Her vagi na
ached from Jessies earl ier attempt to defi le her. She saw Jessi e close his eyes as though he
was enj oyi ng himself.
On 5 June 1993 Jul i e and Reggi e went to the Marikina publ ic market, agai n leaving
Messeah and Metheor al one wi th Jessi e. Messeah was resti ng on the sofa whil e Metheor was
in the garage when Jessie grabbed Messeah and dragged her upstairs. She screamed and
Jessi e tried to cover her mouth. She was crying as Jessie told her to take off her shorts and
panti es, took off his shorts, pressed her l egs apart wi th his two (2) legs, and rubbed his peni s
against her thi ghs, unti l it touched her vagi na. She told him to stop because she was hurti ng
but he di d not heed her pl ea. The intimate encounter went on for some ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes.
The third molestati on happened on 7 Jul y 1993. Again, onl y Metheor, Jessi e and
Messeah were at home. Metheor was upstai rs sleeping whil e Messeah was resting on the
sofa when Jessi e suddenl y entered the l i vi ng room armed wi th a knife. Messeah cal led for
her ol der brother twi ce, but Reggi e had already gone out . She onl y stopped when Jessie
poi nted the knife at her and threatened to stab her if she shouted agai n. He then forced her
to walk backwards to the kitchen where he tol d her agai n to remove her shorts and
panti es. She resisted but Jessi e insisted and even tri ed twice to stab her if she di d not
compl y. He used one of his hands to remove his shorts and briefs. He forced Messeah to sit
on a steel chair and tol d her to spread her l egs. She sat wi th her l egs closed together but he
got mad and threatened t o stab her if she did not open her legs. She reluctantl y opened her
legs sl ightl y and Jessi e spread them wi der with his free hand as the other hand was hol ding
the knife. Jessi e then tol d Messeah to sit at the edge of the steel chai r, l ike before. He st ood
wi th one hand hol ding on to her shoul der, the other holdi ng the knife, and stood straddl ing her
legs. He then i nserted his penis between her thi ghs and used his legs to press her thi ghs
together (apart?). Then he rubbed his penis against her thi ghs for some three (3) to fi ve (5)
minutes unti l i t touched her vagi na.
129

Jessi e again took advantage of the situation on 17 October 1993 when ever ybody i n the
Dumaoal household, except for the two (2) youngest chil dren, were away from home. As
Messeah was changing her cl othes after coming from the party, Jessi e again entered her
room, told her to remove her pant y, and inserted his small est fi nger ( kal ingkingan) into her
vagina whi l e tel l ing her to keep si lent. He then removed his pants and briefs and went on top
of her. This time, he was not abl e to touch her vagi na wi th his penis because Messeah cri ed
and screamed and call ed for Metheor who agai n went up and tol d Jessi e, Get away from my
sister. Jessi e stopped but threatened to throw the chi ldren to the sharks if they tol d thei r
parents what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of mul tiple rape

HELD: The tri al court was correct i n fi ndi ng accused-appel l ant gui lty of three (3) counts of
acts of lasci viousness. The SC took however to i ts fi ndi ng that statutor y rape was committed
by him on 5 June 1993. A thorough evaluati on of the records wi l l show that accused-appel l ant
shoul d onl y be convicted for acts of lasci viousness and not for consummated rape.

The SC hel d that absent any showi ng of the sli ghtest penetration of the female organ, i.e.
touching of either the labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape; at most, i t can onl y be attempted rape, if not acts of l asci vi ousness.
The SC found accused gui l t y of 4 counts of acts of lasci vi ousness, aggravated by obvi ous
ungrateful ness. Appl yi ng the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appell ant was sentenced
to an indetermi nate pri son term of four (4) months and twent y (20) days of arresto mayor
maximum as minimum, to four (4) years si x (6) months and ten (10) days of prisi on
correccional maximum as maximum, i n each count of Acts of Lasci vi ousness. Accused-
appel l ant was further directed to pay the pri vate complai nant P30,000.00 as ci vil indemnity,
P40,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 f or exemplar y damages, i n each of the four (4)
counts of Acts of Lasci viousness, and t o pay the costs.



DULLA V. COURT OF APPEALS (GR. NO. 123164)

FACTS: On Februar y 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years ol d, came home cr yi ng, with
bruises on her right thigh. She tol d her guardi an, Il uminada Beltran, that her uncle, herei n
peti tioner, touched her pri vate part. In her own words, she said, Inaano ako
ng uncl e ko, whi l e doi ng a pumpi ng motion wi th the l ower part of her body to demonstrate
what had been done to her. She also sai d that peti tioner showed his penis to her.
The matter was reported t o Barangay Counci lor Carlos Lumaban who, wi th t he chi l d, the
latters guardian, and three barangay tanods, went to the house of petiti oner t o confront hi m.
As peti ti oners father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and hi s part y, Lumaban sought
assistance from the nearby Western Pol ice Di strict (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears, however,
that petiti oner took advantage of the situation and ran away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused i s guil t y of crime of acts of l asci vi ousness
HELD: Peti tioner questi ons the competence of Andrea as a wi tness. He argues that Andrea i s
not capabl e of understandi ng t he questi ons propounded t o her. Moreover, she di d not take an
oath and the fact that she was asked purel y l eading questions shows that she was onl y
coached by her guardian. The contenti on has no merit. As a general rule, al l persons who can
percei ve, and percei ving, can make known their percepti on to others, may be
wi tnesses. Under Rul e 130, 21 of the Rul es of Court, onl y chi ldren who, on account of
immaturi t y, are incapabl e of percei ving the facts respecting which they are examined and of
130

rel ati ng them truthful l y are disqual ified from being witnesses. In Peopl e v. Mendoza, the Court
hel d:
It i s thus cl ear that any chil d, regardl ess of age, can be a competent witness i f he can
percei ve, and percei ving, can make known his percepti on to ot hers and of rel ating truthfull y
facts respecti ng which he i s examined. In the 1913 decisi on i n Uni ted States vs. Buncad, thi s
Court stated:
Professor Wigmore, after referring t o the common-law precedents upon this poi nt, says: But
this much may be taken as settled, that no rul e def ines any particular ageas concl usi ve of
incapacit y; i n each instance the capacit y of the particular chi ld i s to be i nvesti gated.
(Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638)
. . .
The requirements then of a chi l ds competency as a wi tness are the: (a) capaci t y of
observati on, (b) capacit y of recol l ection, and (c) capaci t y of communication. And i n
ascertaini ng whether a chil d i s of sufficient intel li gence according to the foregoi ng, i t i s
settl ed that the tri al court i s cal led upon t o make such determinati on.
In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months ol d at the time she testified.
Despi te her young age, however, she was able to respond to the questi ons put t o her. She
answered yes and no to questi ons and, when unabl e t o articulate what was done to her by
peti tioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. Duri ng her i nterrogati on, she showed an
understandi ng of what was being asked. She was consistent i n her answers to t he questi ons
asked by t he prosecutor, the defense counsel, and even by the j udge.

PEOPLE vs. PEREZ (G.R. No. 141647-51)
Facts: Jobelyn Ramos, then eleven (11) years old, was with her four younger siblings sleeping in the sala of
their house. The accused, said to be an uncle of Jobelyn, entered the house, approached Jobelyn and
unceremoniously pulled down her shorts and underwear. Followingly, the accused removed his shorts, pinned
the girl down and "pressed" his penis against her vagina. Her struggles failed to dissuade the accused. He
sucked her breast and attempted to penetrate Jobelyn. With his penis still touching Jobelyn's private part, he
threatened to kill her family if she were to report the incident to anyone.
In the early morning of 23 January 1998, Jobelyn was roused from slumber when she felt the accused
caressing her hair. He covered her with a blanket upon seeing her awake. He pulled down her shorts and
underwear and placed himself on top of her. He tried to force his penis into her but she struggled to forestall
the assault. Amidst sobs, Jobelyn told the accused that she would report his abuses to her mother. He
repeated his prior threat and, again, she was forced into silence.
The incident was repeated once more when Jobelyn was pretending to be asleep while accused forced her to
lie face-up and he inserted his penis into her anus after removing her shorts and underwear.
The incident of rape was repeated twice.
Issue: Whether the accused was correctl y convicted by the lower court for the crime of acts
of l asci vi ousness.
Held: In Criminal Case No. 19120, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty of acts of lasciviousness.
Appellant was shrouded with lust in trying, although unsuccessfully, to get the young girl to suck his penis.
131

The elements of this crime are that: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) by
using force or intimidation, or when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or the
offended party is under 12 years of age. In acts of lasciviousness, the acts complained of are prompted by
lust or lewd design where the victim has not encouraged such acts. In cases of acts of lasciviousness, the
offender is deemed to have accomplished all the elements necessary for the existence of the felony once he
has been able, by his overt acts, to actually achieve or attain his purpose.























132

QUALIFIED SEDUCTION( ART. 337)
PEOPLE vs. JAVIER, (G.R. No. 126096)
FACTS: Under revi ew are three separate compl aints fil ed agai nst accused-appel lant chargi ng
him wi th rape committed agai nst his daughter, Jul i a Ratuni l Javier, on October 20, 1994 and
sometime i n November, 1994 and December, 1994.
The compl ainant is a minor of 16 years of age. She testif ied that on October 20, 1994, at
more or less 1 oclock in the afternoon, by means of force, vi olence, and intimidati on, whi l e
insi de their dwel l i ng house, accused-appell ant and her daughter, herein compl ai nant were
al one i n their house. complai nants mother during that time was out doi ng l aundr y work as a
laundr y woman. The accused-appell ant pul led compl ainant to his bedroom in and as she
refused, wrestled and shouted for hel p, accused-appel lant boxed and hit her stomach to
unconsci ousness and there, agai nst compl ainants wi l l and consent, had carnal knowl edge
wi th her. The complainant noticed upon regai ni ng consciousness that she was already raped,
and the accused threatened her of death if she woul d reveal the i nci dent to her mot her or t o
anybody else. This i ncident happened again sometime in November and December 1994,
which resulted to the complai nants pregnancy.
Accused-appell ant deni ed the charges against him al leging that the same were engineered by
his mother-i n-l aw, who despises him for bei ng a drunkard. He further declared that Juli a is an
errant daughter, who after reachi ng the age of 14, started attendi ng dances and acquired
several sweethearts but onl y one of them pai d visi ts at their house. Thus, he beat her,
especi al l y when he discovered her to be pregnant.
The accused-appel lant also posed the defense of al ibi contendi ng that he was working at the
time the rape inci dents happened.
After trial, the RTC rendered j udgment fi ndi ng accused-appell ant Amado Sandrias Javier ,
gui lt y of rape i n Criminal Case No. 95-136 and of Qual ifi ed Seducti on in Criminal Cases Nos.
95-147 and 95-148.
Hence this appeal .
ISSUE
Whether the tri al court correctl y f ound the accused-appel lant guil t y of the crimes charged.
HELD
The tri al court correctl y convicted accused-appel l ant of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No.
95-136. However, this court cannot agree wi th RTC j udgment insofar as Criminal Cases No.
95-147 and 95-148 are concerned.
RATIO
The Trial court erred when it proceeded to convict accused-appel l ant merel y of qualif ied
seduction under Articl e 337 of the Revised Penal Code i n the aforementioned cases.
This court fi nds that the accused-appell ant empl oyed practical l y the same force and
intimidati on i n committi ng the crime on October 20, 1994, November 18, 1994 and December
19, 1994. The commission of rape wi th force and intimidati on under Article 335 (par. 2) of the
Revised Penal Code i s clearl y established by the testimony of complai nant herself. Said
133

testimony plai nl y shows how accused-appel l ant took advantage of hi s moral ascendancy over
complai nant despite her struggl e and resistance.
Moreover, assumi ng that the prosecution fai l ed to prove the use of force by accused-
appel l ant, the l atter cannot be convicted of qual ifi ed seducti on. It is onl y when the compl ai nt
for rape contai ns al l egations for qual ifi ed seduction that the accused may be convicted of the
latter i n case the prosecution fai ls to prove the use of force by the accused. To do otherwi se
woul d be vi ol ati ng the consti tuti onal ri ghts of the accused to due process and to be i nformed
of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of
qualif ied seducti on under the same information. Then, too, rape and qual ifi ed seduction are
not i dentical offenses. While the two fel oni es have one common element which is carnal
knowl edge of a woman, they si gnificantl y var y i n al l other respects.
What the tri al court shoul d have done was to dismiss the charges for rape in Criminal Cases
No. 95-147 and 95-148, if indeed, i n i ts opini on, the prosecuti on fail ed to suffici entl y establ ish
the existence of force and i ntimidati on, and order i nstead the fil i ng of the appropri ate
information. Be that as it may, this Court bel i eves otherwise and is ful l y convinced that
accused-appel l ant is gui lt y as wel l of these two other counts of rape.


PEOPLE vs. MANANSALA (G.R. Nos. 110974-81)
FACTS: Eight (8) criminal cases for rape were commenced against accused-appel l ant, upon
complai nt of his daughter Jennif er, i n the RTC of Mani la.
Accused-appell ant was a taho vendor. He li ved in the taho factory located at 1223
Asuncion Street, Tondo, Mani la, after separati ng from Jennifers mother wi th whom he had
l ived in common l aw rel ation.
The prosecuti ons version of the facts of the case is quite vague. Its pri ncipal witness,
Jennifer Manansala, declared duri ng her direct examinati on that, on November 1, 1991, she
was taken by her father to the taho factor y i n Tondo and she was ordered to proceed to a
room on the upper fl oor of the factor y where the Accused-appell ant proceeded to do the
sexual act or rape. She further testifi ed that this sexual torture was repeatedl y happened
ei ght times on 2
nd
, 3
r d
,4
t h
,6th and 8
t h
of November. These al l happened in the taho factor y
i n Tondo. .
However, on cross examinati on, Jennifer changed her statement that the rapes were
committed i n the taho factor y. She tol d the court that onl y the f irst one was committed there
and that was on November 1, but the rest were committed i n Tarlac, from November 2, 1991
to November 8, 1991. When agai n queried by the defense counsel where she had been raped
- whether in Tarl ac or at the taho factor y i n Mani la - she sai d at the taho factory.
On March 20, 1992, the next hearing, she was agai n asked, this time by the court, where she
had been raped on November 3, 1991 and she sai d, wi thout l imiti ng herself to November 3,
that what actual l y happened is that she was raped in Tarlac. She expl ained that the reason
why she cl aimed she had been raped at the taho factor y i n Mani la was because she was
afrai d her complai nts might be dismissed for i mproper venue.
Accused-appell ant deni ed the accusati ons agai nst him. He testifi ed, among others, that he
was i n Tarl ac from October 31, 1991 up to November 14, 1991; that Jennifer was wi th him i n
Tarlac on those dates; that he di d not do any of the acts al l eged in the compl aints;
[
and that
the reason the complai nts were f il ed agai nst him was because his wif e Teresita was angr y at
134

him for his refusal to gi ve her money.

Accused-appel l ant sai d that Teresi ta was a ver y vi olent
person and that she beat Jennifer whenever she was angr y. On several occasi ons, Jennifer
showed him the scratches and marks caused by her mother. He sai d at one time even he had
been chased by his wif e wi th a knife.
He insisted that Jennifer had been i nstigated by her mother to fi le the cases against him.
Dantes testimony that he di d not rape Jennifer and that he and Jennifer were both i n Tarlac
from October 31, 1991 up to November 14, 1991 was corroborated by the testimoni es of the
accused-appel l ants mother, Adriana Manansal a and his aunt Rebecca M. Bautista.
The tri al court found accused-appel l ant gui lty of havi ng raped his daughter i n the taho
factor y in Tondo, Mani l a on November 1, 1991. However although sai d court found that the
accused-appel l ant had also raped his daughter from November 2, 1991 to November 8, 1991,
but si nce he committed these rest of the cri mes in Tarl ac, it is beyond the court a quo s
j urisdiction. Accordingl y, it hel d accused-appel lant Dante Manansal a gui lt y of rape committed
in Mani l a on November 1, 1991, as charged i n Criminal Case No. 91-100766, but dismissed
the compl ai nts i n Criminal Case Nos. 100767 to 100773, with respect to rapes committed from
November 2, 1991 to November 8, 1991.
ISSUES: Whether the appel lant is gui lt y of the crime of rape as charged? Whether the
appel l ant could be convicted of the crime of qual ifi ed seduction?
HELD:
This Court is constrai ned to reverse the convi cti on of the accused-appel lant on the ground of
reasonabl e doubt.
Since the charge does not i ncl ude qualif ied seduction, the appel lant could not be convicted
thereof
RATIO
The tri al court fi ndi ng was based sol el y on the testimony of the compl ainant. In so doi ng, the
tri al court disregarded the contradictor y testi mony of Jennifers own mother, Teresi ta, who
stated on cross examination that Jennifer was wi th accused-appell ant in Tarl ac from
November 1, 1991 up to November 13, 1991 and that Jennifer told her the sexual assaul ts
took place i n Tarl ac. Accused-appel lant could not therefore have raped his daughter i n Mani l a
on November 1, 1991.
This court i n many i nstances sustai ned the convicti on of an accused on the basis of the lone
testimony of the victim, especi all y because the cr ime is general l y committed wi th onl y the
accused and the victi m present. But in order to j ustif y the convicti on of the accused, the
testimony must be credibl e, natural , convinci ng and consistent wi th human nature.
In the case at bar, the tri al court erred i n rel yi ng on the cl aim of compl ainant as basis for its
findi ng that al though seven rapes had been committed by accused-appel l ant against her i n
Tarlac on successi ve days from November 2 to 8, 1991, one was committed on November 1,
1991 in Mani la, i n vi ew of inconsistencies in her statements as to the pl ace of commission of
the crime. If, as the complai nant impl ied one rape the one al l egedl y committed on
November 1, 1991 was committed i n Mani la, there woul d be no basis for her fear of total
fai lure of prosecuti on i n Mani la.
The truth is that compl ainant ran i nto a series of contradicti ons because her mother, on
February 11, 1992, had told the court that complai nant was i n Tarlac wi th accused-appel l ant
from November 1-13, 1991. Compl ai nant coul d not therefore have been raped in Mani la as
she had cl aimed before.
135

Inconsistenci es in the testimonies of the prosecuti on wi tnesses, especial l y the compl ainant
herself, cannot be dismissed as tri vial . They cal l i nto questi on the credibi l ity
of compl ai nant. It was error for the tri al court to rel y on compl ainant s testimony for evi dence
that accused-appel lant had raped her on November 1, 1991 i n Mani l a. Tri al courts must keep
in mind that the prosecuti on must be able to overcome the constituti onal presumpti on of
innocence beyond a reasonabl e doubt to j ustif y the convicti on of the accused. The
prosecuti on must stand or fal l on i ts own evi dence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense.
The prosecuti ons evi dence is not onl y shot through with inconsistencies and contradicti ons, it
is also improbabl e. If complai nant had been raped on November 1, 1991, the Court cannot
understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there wi th him
unti l November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone through a harrowi ng experience at
the hands of her father but the fol lowi ng day and for thirteen more days after that she stayed
wi th him. It is true the medico-l egal exami nation conducted on November 17, 1991 showed
that she was no l onger a virgi n and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact
that she had vol untari l y gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not rape
but, qui te possi bl y qual ifi ed seducti on, consideri ng the age of compl ai nant (14 at the time of
the crime). This is especi all y true because she said she had been gi ven money by her father
ever ytime they had an i ntercourse.
The fact that she coul d descri be the l urid detai ls of the sexual act shows that it was not an
ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subj ected to sexual torture can
hardl y be expected to see what was bei ng done to her. What is clear from complai nants
testimony is that although accused-appell ant had had sexual intercourse with her, i t was not
done by force or i nti midation. Nor was the rape made possi bl e because of accused-
appel l ants moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accused-appel l ant was not l i ving
wi th them, having separated from complainant s mother i n 1986.
Thus, consi deri ng the al l egati ons in the compl aint that the rape i n this case was committed
by means of force, vi olence and i ntimidation, accused-appel l ant cannot possi bl y be
convicted of qual ifi ed seduction wi thout offense to the constituti onal rights of the accus ed to
due process and to be informed of the accusati on agai nst him. That charge does not i ncl ude
qualif ied seducti on. Neither can qual ified seducti on i nclude rape.
This court reversed the decision of the RTC acquitti ng accused-appel lant Dante Manansala Y
Manal ansang on the ground of reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.


















136

PEOPLE vs. SUBINGSUBING (G.R. Nos. 104942-43)
FACTS
Accused-appell ant Napol eon Subi ngsubing was charged with the crime of rape i n three (3)
separate informations i n CRIMINAL CASES NO. 772. 773 and 774.
The complainant, Mary Jane Espi lan testified that she i s sixteen years ol d, unmarri ed and
l ived with her grandmother for the past three years at the l atter' s house at Bo. Fi angti n,
Barl i g, Mountain Provi nce. The accused Napol eon Subi ngsubing i s the complai nant' s uncl e,
who was then l i ving wi th his mother and his ni ece i n the same house as menti oned. On Nov.
25, 1989, at 1:00 P.M., Mar y Jane and Napol eon were alone i n the house, the grandmother
having gone t o the fields. When Mar y Jane was about t o go out t o attend her afternoon
classes i n school, Napol eon forcibl y pull ed her to the bedroom of the grandmother, poi nted
his Garand rifle at her, then punched her i n the stomach, as a result of which, the former lost
consciousness. When the compl ai nant regai ned her senses, she noticed that she was en
dishabi ll e and her vagi na was bl oody. She fel t pain i n her pri vate parts and i s quite certai n
she was raped or abused. The accused who was then standing outside the room warned the
complai nant not t o tel l anybody what happened or else he wi ll kil l her. I n the morni ng of
November 28, 1989, at 10:30 o' clock A.M., Mary Jane arri ved from school and Napoleon was
al one i n t he house. The l atter agai n sexual l y abused or took advantage of t he compl ainant
second time around. Al l the whi l e, Napol eon was hol ding unto his ri fle and Mar y Jane was
afrai d to scream for he might squeeze the trigger. Immedi atel y thereafter, the compl ai nant
gathered up al l her clothes and went t o their own fami l y house at Bo. Pat-tog, Barl i g, which i s
less than a ki lometer away from her grandmother' s residence. She wanted t o get away from
her uncle, hence she stayed alone i n the house until November 30, 1989 i n the morni ng when
the accused fol lowed her. She was cl eani ng the cei li ng of their house when Napoleon
sneaked up behi nd her, and when the former tri ed t o scream, the accused pl aced a pi ece of
cloth with some sort of chemical over the nose of the complai nant and the l atter fainted. When
she awoke, Mary Jane found herself l yi ng on the fl oor stark naked. She fel t that she had
again been sexuall y mol ested. The accused who was outside the house menaci ngl y ordered
the complai nant t o pack her clothes and go back home with him. The afternoon of the same
day, Mar y Jane and Napol eon went back to the house of the former' s grandmother. The
complai nant di d not reveal to anybody t he things that happened to her for fear that the
accused might real l y ki ll her as the accused had threatened to do. Months l ater, when she
was wi th her parents i n Bagui o, Mar y Jane fi nal l y di vul ged ever ythi ng to her mother Rosita
Espi lan. They went back to Barli g and reported t he i nci dents to the pol ice stati on where the
statement of the compl ai nant was taken. Thereafter, she had herself physicall y examined at
the Barl ig hospital by a government physici an and was found pregnant. On August 29, 1990 i n
Bagui o, the complai nant del i vered a baby boy. The l atter before all these thi ngs happened t o
her was a vi rgin with no pri or sexual experience. She di d not even have a boyfriend. In open
court, Mar y Jane Espi l an singled out t he accused Napoleon Subi ngsubi ng as the culpri t i n al l
of the i nci dents she earl ier testified to.
The accused Napol eon Subi ngsubi ng denied the charge of rape as narrated above and
proferred a different stor y. He interposed consent on the part of the complai nant as a
defense.
To bolster the cl aim of the accused, his mother, Rufi na Subi ngsubing, who i s also the
grandmother of the complai nant, testifi ed among others, that t he three (3) of them were li vi ng
i n one house and that their relati onship was happy, even after the month of November 1989;
that the complainant l eft her house i n March 1990 for a vacati on and was fetched by her
mother; that the onl y thi ng she observed about the compl ainant was that her breasts were
becoming bigger; that the compl ainant and t he accused got food for the pi gs on Saturdays
and that when t he l atter woul d recei ve his monthl y sal ar y, the compl ai nant would ask him to
take her t o t he movi es.
137

Three (3) other witnesses f or the defense were presented who corroborated the stor y of t he
accused and testif ied that i ndeed, the compl ai nant and the accused were seen goi ng out
together and sharing happy moments months after November 1989 (when t he all eged rapes
were committed).
The tri al court found t he case meritorious for the prosecuti on i n Crimi nal Case Nos. 772 and
774 i n vi ew mai nl y of the testimony of the complai nant which was f ound credi ble. Accused-
appel l ant was, therefore, convicted for rape i n said cases. However, he was acqui tted i n
Criminal Case No. 773.
Hence this appeal .
ISSUE
Whether or not the correctl y found the accused guil t y of the crime of rape i n Criminal Cases
No. 772 and 774.
HELD
The accused i s guil t y of the crime of Qual ifi ed Seduction i nstead of rape under Criminal Case
No. 774, whi l e acquitted i n Criminal Case No. 772 based on reasonable doubt.
RATIO
Records of this case reveals, even i f were t o assume arguendo that t he defense of consent on
the part of the compl ai nant was not suffici entl y establ ished, that the evi dence for the
prosecuti on cannot, on its own, stand and suffice to establ ish t he gui l t of the accused for the
crime of rape beyond reasonabl e doubt.
The records and the testimony of the compl ai nant disclose contradicti ons and inconsistenci es
on vi tal detai ls which l ead one to seriousl y doubt the veraci t y of her stor y. The compl ai nant
on 05 March 1991 testi fied that on 25 November 1989 and 28 November 1989, the accused
employed force and threats which rendered her unconsci ous and unabl e t o feel anything when
ravished by the accused.
However, her testimony on 05 March 1991, and which rendered her "unconscious," i s bel i ed
by her own testimony on 02 April 1991, when she gave a detai led descri pti on of what
transpired duri ng those i nci dents.
The Court also cannot help but questi on the conduct of the compl ai nant after the al leged
inci dents of rape. The complai nant did not reveal the inci dents t o her grandmother al legedl y
because the accused tol d her not t o and that he would kil l the compl ainant and her
grandmother i f she tol d anyone. Nei ther di d she tel l her mother upon the l atter' s arri val at
barl ig on 28 April 1990 or soon after the complai nant was brought by her mother to Phi l ex
Mi nes i n Baguio Ci t y. The mother was tol d of the al l eged i nci dents onl y on 15 May 1990. It i s
quite unnatural for a gi rl not to reveal such assaults on her virtue (i f indeed they occurred)
immedi atel y after they happened or when the al l eged threat on her l ife and her grandmother' s
had ceased, as i n this case, when complai nant had gone t o Bagui o. The compl ainant l ikewi se
admitted that after the al l eged i ncidents i n November 1989, she sti l l went out wi th the
accused t o watch betamax movies or get food for the pi gs i n the ri cefiel ds. Such behavi our
directl y contradicts t he normal or expected behavi our of a rape victim. There i s no way she
could possi bl y forgi ve, to say the least; and yet, compl ai nant i nteracted immedi atel y wi th her
assai lant. Vi ewed i n its entiret y, such behavi our of the compl ainant appears to be inconsistent
wi th her charge of rape.
138

The accused, on t he other hand, whi le admitti ng that i ndeed he had sexual intercourse with
the compl ainant on 25 November 1989, set up the defense that the l atter consented to such
act. The Two (2) succeeding incidents were however deni ed by t he accused. While we fi nd
such defenses weak, we nevertheless stress once more the time-honored pri nci ple that the
prosecuti on must rel y on the strength of i ts evi dence rather than on the weakness of the
defense.
Appel l ant' s exculpati on from the offense of rape does not mean, however, that his
responsi bi l it y i s merel y moral and not penal i n character.
For fai lure to prove gui l t beyond reasonabl e doubt, the court set asi de the tri al court' s
j udgments of conviction for rape. However, t he Court finds concl usive evidence (no less t han
the accused-appel l ant' s admissi on) that on 25 November 1989, the accused Napoleon
Subingsubing had sexual i ntercourse wi th Mary Jane Espil an when she was onl y 16 years of
age. The complai nant and the accused were l i ving i n t he same house. The accused i s the
uncle of the complai nant, brother of her own mother.
Qual ifi ed seducti on i s the act of havi ng carnal knowl edge of a virgi n over 12 years t o 18 years
of age and committed by any of the persons enumerated i n Art. 337 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wi t: any person i n public authori ty, pri est, home-servant, domestic, guardi an,
teacher, or any person who, i n any capaci ty, shal l be entrusted wi th the educati on and
custody of the woman seduced. Abuse of confidence i s t he qual if yi ng circumstance i n the
offense. Notabl y, among the persons who can commit qual ifi ed seduction i s a "domestic". And
a "domestic," for purposes of said l egal provisi on, has been i nterpreted j udici al l y as
. . . Upon the word domestic bei ng empl oyed i n said legal provisi on segregating i t from that of
a servant, t he term i s appl ied to persons usual l y l i vi ng under t he same roof, pertaini ng t o the
same house, and consti tuti ng, i n the sense, a part thereof, distinguishing i t from the term
servant whereby a person servi ng another on a sal ar y i s desi gnated; i n this manner, i t has
been properl y used.
Under the circumstances of the case at bench, the court holds that a conviction for qualif i ed
seduction i s proper i n Criminal Case No. 774. The verif ied complai nt for rape contains
al l egati ons, sans averment on the use of force, which impute the crime of qual ifi ed seduction.
Any defici ency i n t he complai nt i s suppl i ed by the supporting affidavi t,

where compl ainant
averred that t he accused Napol eon Subi ngsubi ng, her uncl e,

who was l i vi ng i n the same
house as the complai nant, had sexual intercourse wi th her. The accused took advantage of
his moral ascendancy i f not dominance over the compl ai nant. She was presumabl y a virgi n.
As already stated, the accused was a domestic i n rel ati on to the complai nant wi thi n the
meani ng of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the court modified the j udgement of the tri al court and convicted the accused of the
crime of Qual ifi ed Seduction instead of rape under Criminal Case No. 774 and was acquitted
i n Criminal Case No. 772 based on reasonabl e doubt.






139

PEOPLE vs.ALVAREZ (G.R. No. L-34644)
FACTS
A compl ai nt for rape by the offended part y was filed agai nst appel lant Nicanor Al varez. It was
al l eged i n said compl ai nt that on or about June 6, 1969, the accused rape and have sexual
intercourse Loreta T. del a Concepcion, a virgi n, 13 years of age and sister-i n-l aw of the
accused whi le she was asleep.
The complainant i n her testimony identifi ed the appel lant and stated that the latter was a
brother-i n-l aw, his wife being an elder sister of the compl ai nant. She was i n his house
because the appel l ant asked permission from her father t o take care of the appel l ant s
son. She admitted that the son, then almost one year old, and her sister were i n t he house
duri ng the inci dent.

When she arri ved i n the afternoon at fi ve o' cl ock the day before, t he
accused was not present, returni ng onl y at around 9:00 o' clock that eveni ng. She and the
appel l ants wif e were sleepi ng i n the sal a when the appel l ant arri ved and afterwards raped
her. She mai ntai ned that she was asl eep at the outset, but after waking up she resisted but
she could not overcome the accused strength. She added that duri ng that time, he threatened
to ki l l her i f she ever revealed to anybody what was done. She also sai d that she reported t o
her sister the fol lowi ng morning but the sister di d not say any word. She did not, however,
report t o her mother or father al l egedl y because she was afrai d and that she might be
punished, because she knew that what had happened t o her was bad. The compl ai nant
informed her parents about the i ncident onl y i n Januar y of 1970.
The trial court then sentenced Nicanor Al varez to reclusi on perpetua for committi ng a crime of
rape.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appel lant i s guil t y of the crime of rape.
Whether or not the accused-appel lant could be convicted of the crime of qual ifi ed seducti on.
HELD
No. The hol di ng that appel l ant was gui lt y of rape through the use of force or intimidati on
cannot stand.
Yes. For havi ng taken advantage of a young teenager over whom appel lant did exercise moral
ascendancy, i t i s fitti ng and appropri ate that such act fal ls within the concept of qual ifi ed
seduction to which the appel l ant shoul d be hel d responsi bl e.
RATIO
The stor y of the inci dent as el ici ted i n the complai ning wi tness' s testimony, that is, that, she
was raped before the very eyes of her sister, wife of herein accused-appel lant, wi thout the
latter raisi ng a fi nger, chal l enges human creduli t y. Vi ewed from human observati on and
experi ence not even a confirmed sex mani ac woul d dare do his thi ng before the eyes of
strangers, how much more for a healthy husband before the eyes of his ver y wife? Then,
again, testimony that her sister before whose very eyes t he al leged rapi ng i nci dent took pl ace
di d not lift a fi nger to her, mocks at human sensibi l it y. I n the natural course of thi ngs, thi s
pi ece of evi dence i s repugnant to common experi ence and observation i n that the natural
reacti on wife woul d be that of righteous i ndi gnati on rather than passi ve [acqui escence]and the
natural response of a sister woul d be t o protect the virtue of a younger sister from abuse of
her husband.
140

Appel l ant i s therefore entitl ed to a reversal of the decisi on i nsofar as i t would hol d him li abl e
for rape.
It does not fol l ow, however, that appel l ant' s excul pation from the offense of rape means that
his responsi bi l it y i s merel y moral and not penal i n character. It i s cl ear from the information
that t he el ements of t he crime of qual ifi ed seducti on were i ncluded i n the facts al leged. He
cannot be heard t o compl ain thereafter that he i s enti tl ed t o complete acqui ttal. As a matter of
fact, i n his defense, ri ghtful l y gi ven credence by us, he did admit his havi ng taken advantage
of an inexperienced adol escent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have
been bound by the cl osest ties of affinit y, consi deri ng also, as testified t o by him, how cl ose
she fel t towards him.














































141

SIMPLE SEDUCTION (ART. 338)


PEOPLE vs. PASCUA (G.R. Nos. 128159-62)

FACTS
Pri vate compl ai nants Li za and Anna, both surnamed Paragas, are twi ns born on Jul y 12,
1983. The appel l ant was their neighbor. Li za and Anna consi dered appel lant as their
grandfather although he was not related to them.
On August 6, 1995, pri vate complai nants were playi ng near the house of the appell ant when
the l atter call ed Li za and instructed her to buy j uice at the store. Li za obeyed. After she
returned from the store, the appel l ant ordered Li za to go i nside his house and l ie down on the
floor. Appel lant then removed Li zas pants and underwear, went on top of her, i nserted hi s
penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. Li za tri ed to scream but appel lant
threatened to ki ll her. After the sexual i ntercour se, the appel lant gave Li za P10 and warned
her not to reveal the incident to her mother. Li za then went home but did not tell her mother
what happened for fear that her mother woul d punish her.
The same thi ng happened on Januar y 27, 1996 when Li za was cal led by the appel l ant as she
was passing by his house. After her ordeal , this time, the appel l ant gave Li za P5 and
reminded her not to tel l her mother what happened. So Li za went home without tel l ing her
mother that she was sexual l y abused by the appel lant .
Li za s twi n sister, Anna, suffered the same fate at the hands of the appell ant sometime i n
August 1995 and on Januar y 20, 1996. Anna was not able to shout because she was afraid
that the appel l ant would ki ll her and, j ust l i ke Li za, she did not tel l her mother that the
appel l ant mol ested her out of fear.
Pri vate compl ai nants mother, Leticia Paragas, l earned of her daughters ordeal through her
ol der daughter, Rosal i na, who, i n turn, came to know of the rape i ncidents from the
appel l ants granddaughter. Apparentl y the granddaughter wi tnessed the appel l ant as he was
rapi ng Li za and told Rosal i na about it.
At the trial , the appel l ant admitted having sexual i ntercourse with pri vate compl ainants but
insisted that Li za and Anna freel y consented to the repeated sexual acts i n exchange for
money rangi ng from P5 to P10. On several occasi ons, Li za and Anna al l egedl y visited him at
home asking for money and sexual satisf action. In fact, it was pri vate compl ainants
supposed persistence which drove him to accede t o their demands to have sex, even if he
was havi ng difficult y achi eving erecti on as he was sufferi ng from hernia. Thus, there was
never an i nstance when the appel lant forced or threatened pri vate complai nants i nto havi ng
sexual intercourse wi th him.
On November 14, 1996, the tri al court rendered its assai led decision fi ndi ng the accused
gui lt y beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.

ISSUE
Whether or not the pri vate complai nants vol untari l y consented to the sexual desires of the
accused-appel l ant, thus, shoul d be acqui tted wi th the crime of rape.
Whether or not the accused-appel lant is li abl e for simple seducti on.

HELD
The appel lants defense that the victims consented to his l asci vi ous desires is simpl y too
preposterous to deserve seri ous consider ati on. The appel lant actual l y employed force or
intimidati on on the two victims to satisf y his l ust, hence li abl e for two counts of rape.
The argument of the appell ant that, if he is at al l l i abl e for anything, i t shoul d onl y be for
simple seduction is untenabl e.

RATIO
Indeed, after admitti ng that he had carnal knowl edge of pri vate complai nants on several
occasions, the appell ant assumed the burden of proving his defense by substanti al evi dence.
The record shows that, other than his self -servi ng assertions, the appel l ant had nothing to
support his cl aim that pri vate complai nants were teenagers of loose morals and that the
repeated acts of sexual i ntercourse were consensual.
142

This court entertains no doubt that Li za and Anna told the truth. It is clear from their
testimony that pri vate complai nants tried to scream but the appel lant prevented them by
threatening to kil l them. Also, after each rape incident, pri vate compl ai nants were warned by
the appel lant not to tel l their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is
not required to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an el ement of rape, need not be
irresisti ble; it need onl y be present and so l ong as i t brings about the desired resul t, al l
considerations of whether i t was more or l ess irresisti ble is beside the point. Indeed, physical
resistance need not be establ ished in rape when, as i n this case, i ntimidati on was used on the
victim and she submitted to the rapists l ust for fear of her l ife or her personal safet y.
Jurisprudence hol ds that even though a man l ays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of
physical forces, he so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance
through fear of greater harm, the consummation of unlawf ul i ntercourse by the man is
rape. Without questi on, the prosecution was able to prove that force or i ntimidation was
actual l y empl oyed by the appell ant on the two victims to satisf y his l ust. Hence the crime
committed is not merel y simpl e seduction.




















143

PEOPLE vs.TEODOSIO (G.R. No. 97496)
FACTS
Fernando Teodosio y Carreon was charged of the crime of rape fi led by El aine R. Cesar i n t he
Regi onal Trial Court. I n the case at bar, i t was establ ished that at time of the incident on
December 19, 1985, the offended part y, El aine Cesar, was onl y 12 years and 6 months ol d
and a mere 6th grader whi l e the accused was already 20 years ol d and a 4th year coll ege
student; and that the accused i s a sexual l y hot i ndi vi dual as borne by the fact that he
admittedl y masturbates at l east once a week. The offended part y, El ai ne Cesar, testified i n a
simple, honest and strai ght-forward manner whereas the accused testified i n an evasive and
sometimes i ncredi ble and i nconsistent manner. El ai ne, at the time of the i ncident, bei ng onl y
12 years and 6 months old and a mere Grade 6 student, was quite gull i ble and easi l y
decei ved by the accused. This court also noted that the accused admitted, on cross-
examinati on, that he and El aine agreed that they woul d stay i n t he Champion Lodgi ng House
for onl y ' a short time which would be for 3 t o 4 hours' onl y.
The accused claimed that when they f irst arri ved at that motel i n t he afternoon of December
19, 1985, he phoned hi s house and talked to her sister, Imelda, to tel l his famil y that he woul d
arri ve home l ate that day. In order to satisf y his lustful desires, the accused who i s a sexual l y
hot person, drugged t he softdrink or pineappl e j uice which El ai ne later drank insi de the room
i n that motel so that she became di zzy and eventual l y l ost consciousness. Once El aine was
unconsci ous, the accused raped her.
When she woke up at 5:00 A.M. on t he fol l owing morni ng, December 20, 1985, El aine found
bl ood on her private part or vagina and she fel t pai n i n her body; when she asked t he accused
what happened, the accused l i ed by sayi ng that nothi ng happened. On the fol lowi ng day,
December 21, 1985, when El aine told her mother what happened at the motel , her mother got
angr y and l ost no time i n bri ngi ng her to the PC Crime Laborator y before 5:00 o' clock i n the
afternoon to have Elai ne physical l y examined by the expert Medico-Legal Exami ner, Col ./Dr.
Gregorio Bl anco. Dr. Bl anco testifi ed posi ti vel y that i n the course of his physical examinati on
of El aine, he found her hymen t o have a fresh l acerati on at 5:00 o' clock and that said fresh
laceration meant that there was a ver y recent sexual i ntercourse, and he also concluded that
the chi l d, El aine Cesar, was therefore i n a non-virgin state because of that fact. Considering
that the accused first met Elai ne Cesar onl y on September 11, 1985, i t i s difficul t t o bel i eve
that t he said young gi rl, bei ng onl y 12 years and 6 months ol d at that time, would have
consented t o go with the accused to a motel on December 19, 1985 for the purpose of
submitti ng her virgini ty to him. The accused al so admitted on cross-examinati on that whi l e he
and El ai ne were i nsi de the room i n that motel that he kissed and embraced Elai ne and that he
asked El aine to gi ve her virgini t y t o him "three times". The accused, bei ng much ol der than
Elai ne, took advantage of, decei ved and abused the l atter sexual l y by raping her when she
was unconsci ous on account of her havi ng drunk the drugged softdrink or pineappl e j uice.
After trial, a decision was rendered by the trial court convicting t he accused of the offense
charged as penal i zed under Articl e 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES
Whether or not the appel l ant i s gui lt y of the cri me of rape.
Whether the appel l ant could be hel d l i abl e of the crime of simpl e seduction.
HELD
No. appel lant cannot be hel d l iabl e for rape as i t was a consensual affair.
144

No. appel l ant cannot be hel d l i abl e for simpl e seduction either because such was not al l eged
i n the information.
RATIO
Elai ne admitted that she knew appel lant some three months before the al l eged i nci dent took
pl ace because they were neighbors. Apparentl y, they fell i n l ove wi th each other for Elai ne
gave appel l ant her photograph wi th her handwritten dedicati on.
The contradicti ons i n the testimony of Elai ne where she attempted t o prove that their coi ti on
was i nvol untar y rather than fortif y the case of the prosecuti on, served to demolish the same.
What i s obvious and cl ear i s that these two young l overs, carried by their mutual desire for
each other, i n a moment of recklessness, slept together and thus consummated the fruiti on of
their bri ef l ove affair. Appell ant cannot be hel d l i able for rape as there was none committed. I t
was a consensual affair.
Based on the evidence the crime committed by appel lant i s simple seduction. Articl e 338 of
the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 338. Si mple seducti on. The seduction of a woman who i s singl e or a wi dow of good
reputati on, over twel ve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shal l
be punished byarresto mayor.
All the el ements of the offense are present. That;
Elai ne was over 12 and under 18 years of age.
She i s si ngl e and of good reputation.
The offender had sexual i ntercourse with her.
It was committed by decei t.
Appel l ant sai d he planned t o marry El aine and for this reason he successful l y persuaded her
to gi ve up her virginit y. This i s the decei t contemplated by l aw that attended the commission
of the offense.
Unfortunatel y, the essenti al ingredients of si mple seduction are not al l eged nor necessari l y
incl uded i n the offense charged i n the i nf ormati on. The onl y el ements of the offense al l eged i n
the sworn complaint of the offended part y i s that she i s over 12 years of age when appel lant
had carnal knowl edge of her. Thus, appel lant cannot be convicted even for simple seduction
ei ther.
This court rendered its j udgment acquitti ng t he appell ant of the offense charged.









145

FORCIBLE ABDUCTION ( ART. 342)

PEOPLE vs. LINING (G.R. No. 138401)

FACTS Gerr y Li ning and Lian Sal vacion were both charged wi th the crime of Abduction with
Rape.
On October 4, 1997, at around 12:30 i n the af ternoon, Emel ina Ornos, then fifteen (15) years
ol d, requested permissi on from her parents to visi t her aunt Josephi ne at Ori ental Mindoro
where she was supposed to spend the night. She arri ved at her aunts house at around one
ocl ock in the afternoon. While in her aunts house, Emel i na was i nvited by one Saj er to a
dance part y to be hel d at the barangay basketbal l court. Emeli na accepted the i nvitation and
at around seven ocl ock in the evening of the same day, she went to the part y, accompani ed
by her aunt. Josephine then l eft Emeli na at the part y, tell i ng her that she had to go home but
she woul d return l ater to fetch her.

At around 12:30 i n the morning, the part y ended but Josephine stil l had not returned. Emel ina
decided to go home al one. On her way to her aunts house, Emel ina was accosted by Gerry
Li ning and Li an Sal vacion, both of whom were known to her since they were her former
nei ghbors. Lini ng poked a kitchen knife at Emel i nas breast and the two hel d her
hands. Emel i na was dragged towards the rice field and was forci bl y carri ed to an unoccupi ed
house owned by Mi l a Sal vacion.
[


Inside the house, Lini ng removed Emel inas t-shirt, pants and undergarments. She was
pushed to the fl oor and whi le Sal vaci on was holdi ng her hands and kissi ng her, Lini ng
inserted his penis insi de her vagina. Emel i na shouted and tri ed to ward off her attackers, but
to no avai l . After Li ning had satisfi ed his l ust, he held Emel inas hands and kissed her whi le
Sal vaci on i n turn inserted his penis i nsi de her vagina. Thereafter, the two directed Emel i na to
put on her cl othes. The accused then l ooked for a vehicle to transport Emel ina to Barangay
Maningcol . Emel i na saw an opportuni ty to escape. Accompani ed by the friend of her father,
the compl ainant went to the barangay captain then to the police stati on where she was
subj ected to a medical examinati on. The Chi ef of Police immedi atel y ordered the arrest of
Li ning but Salvacion was abl e to escape.

Accused Li ni ng deni ed the accusations agai nst him and disputed the fi ndi ngs of the tri al
court. He i nterposed an al ibi that he was not abl e to attend the dance part y because hi s
brother-i n-l aw, Artemio, requested him to l ook after the pal ay i n his house.
After trial , the court found Gerr y Li ni ng gui l ty beyond reasonabl e doubt for the crime of
forcibl e abduction wi th rape, and for another count of rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appel l ant is gui lt y of the complex crime of forci bl e
abducti on wi th rape.

HELD: No. Forci ble abduction is absorbed i n the crime of rape in this case.

RATIO
The accused-appel l ant could onl y be convicted for the crime of rape, instead of the compl ex
crime of forcibl e abducti on wi th rape. Indeed, it would appear from the records that the mai n
obj ecti ve of the accused when the victim was taken to the house of Mi la Sal vaci on was to
rape her. Hence, forcibl e abduction is absorbed i n the crime of rape.
The Court sustai ns the trial court in not appreci ati ng the aggravating circumstances of
nocturni t y, abuse of superi or strength and the use of a knife i n the commission of the crime of
rape.
Accused-appell ant is deemed a co-conspirator for the act of rape committed by his co-
accused Li an Sal vaci on. Thus, he is found gui l ty beyond reasonabl e doubt of two (2) counts
of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalt y of reclusi on perpetua in each case.



146

PEOPLE vs. EGAN (G.R. No. 139338)

FACTS

Li to Egan al i as Akiao, thirt y-six (36) years ol d, was an avi d admirer of a twel ve (12) - year
ol d girl named Leni e T. Camad. Both the accused and Lenie were members of
the Manobo indigenous cultural communit y i n Mindanao and resi dents of Si ti o Salaysay,
Mari log, Davao Cit y.

On 6 Januar y 1997 Leni e and her cousi n Jessica Si lona were fetchi ng water at a deep wel l
several meters from Leni es house i n Siti o Sal aysay. At around 2:00 o' cl ock i n the afternoon,
the accused appeared from nowhere and forcibl y dragged and pushed Leni e towards Siti o
Dalag, Arakan, Cotabato. He threatened to kil l her if she resisted. Before leaving the si te of
the deep well , he likewi se terrori zed Jessica by brandishing his hunti ng knife which forced the
girl to scamper for safety. About 5:00 o' cl ock that same afternoon, Jessica was abl e to report
to Leni es father, Palmones Camad, the abduction of hi s
daughter. Palmones with a fri end proceeded t o Si tio Dal ag to look for Lenie. They sought
the hel p of the barangay captai n of Si tio Dal ag whi l e the accused and Leni e stayed that same
ni ght i n a house in Si ti o Dal ag.

On 7 Januar y 1997 accused Li to Egan forced Lenie to escort him to Siti o Sayawan, Miokan,
Arakan, Cotabato, sti ll threatening to kil l her i f she shouted or resisted, and there stayed i n
the house of a sist er of Li to. It was i n this pl ace where under the cover of darkness and
desol ati on he al legedl y raped Leni e. (She woul d however change her recol lecti on of the
al l eged rape when she l ater testifi ed that the crime had happened on 6 Januar y 1997 at the
house where they l odged i n Si ti o Dal ag and that no other i ncidents of rape subsequentl y took
pl ace).

For four (4) months the datus of Siti o Sal aysay, who interceded for Lenies safe
rel ease, attempted a customary settl ement of the abduction i n accordance
wi th Manobo traditi ons. It appears that the accused agreed to gi ve two (2) horses to the
famil y of Leni e i n exchange for her hand i n marriage. The accused however reneged on his
promise to gi ve two (2) horses. So si nce the amicabl e settl ement was not real i zed, the
accused forci bl y rel ocated Leni e to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where she was
eventual l y rescued on 15 May 1997.

Lenie lost no time in denouncing the accused and exposing to her vi l lage el ders the disgrace
that had befal len her. She and her father al so reported the crime at the pol ice stati on in
Lamundao, Mari log, Davao Ci ty. She was turned over to the Bal ay Dangupan, a shelter house
of the DSWD, which hel ped her in obtaini ng a medico-l egal exami nati on and executi ng the
necessar y affidavit -compl ai nt against accused Li to Egan.
Informati on for forcibl e abduction wi th rape was fi l ed agai nst the accused and was f inal l y
arrested.

The tri al court rej ected the defenses of accused Li to Egan and convicted him of a complex
crime of forci ble abduction wi th rape; hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guil t y of forcibl e abduction wi th rape.

HELD: No. Accused-appel lant is instead decl ared guil t y of Forci ble Abduction onl y under Art.
342 of The Revised Penal Code.

RATIO
All the el ements of forcibl e abducti on were proved i n this case. Accused-appel l ant Lito Egan
was charged wi th forci ble abducti on wi th rape of twel ve (12) - year ol d Lenie T.
Camad. Although from the records it appears that Lenie was l ess than twel ve (12) years ol d
as shown by her birth certificate when the abduction took place and the al l eged rape was
147

perpetrated a day after, the criminal l i abi l it y of accused-appel l ant woul d nevertheless be
confi ned onl y to the cri me al leged i n the Informati on.

Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penal i zes the crime of forci bl e
abducti on. The el ements of forci ble abducti on are; that the person abducted is a woman,
regardl ess of her age, ci vi l status, or reputati on; that the abduction is agai nst her wi l l; and,
That the abducti on is wi th l ewd desi gns. On the other hand, Art. 335 of the same Code
defi nes the crime of rape and provi des for i ts penal ty. The elements of rape perti nent to thi s
case are: that the offender had carnal knowl edge of a woman; and,
That such act is accompl ished by usi ng force or intimidati on.

Nonetheless even assuming that the accused and the compl ainant were engaged by virtue of
the dowr y he had offered, this fact alone woul d not negate the commission of forci bl e
abducti on. An indigenous ritual of betrothal , l ike any other l ove affair, does not j ustif y
forcibl y banishing the bel oved agai nst her wi l l with the i ntention of molesting her. It is
l ikewise wel l -settled that the givi ng of money does not beget an unbridl ed l icense to subj ect
the assumed f i ance to carnal desires. By asserting the existence of such relati onshi p, the
accused seeks to prove that the victim wi l l ingl y partici pated i n the act. But, as shown by the
evi dence, she certai nl y did not. The evi dence clearl y does not speak of consensual l ove but
of criminal lust which could not be disguised by the so-cal led sweetheart defense or i ts
vari ant as i n the i nstant case. Fi nal l y, as held in Peopl e v. Crisostomo, the intenti on to marr y
may constitute unchaste desi gns not by itself but by the concurring circumstances which may
vitiate such an i ntention, as i n the case of abducti on of a minor wi th the l atter' s consent, in
which the male knows that she cannot l egal l y consent to the marri age and yet he el opes wi th
her. In the case at bar, there is no denyi ng the fact that Leni e was i ncapaci tated to marry
accused-appel l ant under Manobo or Christi an rites since she was sti l l a minor thereby
demonstrati ng the existence of l ewd desi gns.

As to the charge of rape, although the prosecuti on has proved that Lenie was sexual l y
abused, the evi dence proffered is i nadequate to establ ish carnal knowl edge. Sexual abuse
cannot be equated wi th rape. In the case at bar, there is no evidence of entrance or
introduction of the male organ into the l abi a of the pudendum. Leni e' s testimony did not
establ ish that there was penetrati on by the sex organ of the accused or that he tri ed to
penetrate her. The doctor who examined Leni e' s vagina woul d i n fact admi t upon questioning
of the trial j udge that "there was no i nterl abi a contact."

Under the circumstances, the criminal l i abi l it y of accused-appel l ant is onl y for forci bl e
abducti on under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. The sexual abuse which accused-
appel l ant forced upon Lenie consti tutes the lewd design i nherent i n forci ble abducti on and i s
thus absorbed therei n. The i ndecent molestati on cannot form the other half of a complex
crime si nce the record does not show that the pri ncipal purpose of the accused was to
commit any of the crimes against chasti t y and that her abducti on woul d onl y be a necessary
means to commit the same. Surel y i t woul d not have been the case that accused-appel lant
woul d touch Lenie onl y once duri ng her four (4) -month capti vit y, as she herself admitted, if
his chi ef or primordi al i ntenti on had been to l ay wi th her. Instead, what we discern from the
evi dence is that the i ntent to seduce the girl f orms part and parcel of her forci ble abduction
and shares equal importance wi th the other element of the crime which was to remove the
victim from her home or from whatever fami l iar place she may be and to take her to some
other. Stated otherwise, the i ntenti on of accused-appel l ant as the evidence shows was not
onl y to seduce the victi m but also to separate her from her famil y, especial l y from her father
Palmones, cl earl y tel l -tal e si gns of forcibl e abducti on.

Veri l y the si ngl e sexual abuse of Leni e al though accused-appel l ant had other opportuni ties to
do so was i tself the external manifestation of his l ewd design, and hence he coul d not be
punished for it either separatel y or as part of a complex crime.



148

PEOPLE vs. GARCI A (G.R. No. 141125)

FACTS
The victim, Cl eopatra Changlapon, was 19 years ol d and a sophomore student of B.S.
Physical Therapy at the Bagui o Central Uni versit y. On Jul y 14, 1998, she left school at 6:30
p.m. to go home. As she was crossing Bonifaci o Street, Bagui o Cit y, she saw a white van
approachi ng so she stopped to let it pass. Suddenl y, the van stopped in front of her. The rear
door sli d open and Cl eopatra was pul led by the arms into the van. She struggl ed as the door
closed and the van sped away. Somethi ng was sprayed on her face which made her eyes
sti ng and feels di zzy. She shouted, then she fel t a fist bl ow on her stomach and she fel l
unconsci ous.

When Cleopatra woke, she was i nsi de a room. She was totall y undressed and was l yi ng fl at
on her back on a bed. In the room wi th her were four men. One of them, who
had Bombay f eatures, was also total l y naked whi le the other three were clad in bri efs and
smoking ci garettes. The Bombay-l ooki ng man lay on top of her. She tried to push him away
but he held her l eft arm. Another man wi th l ong hair, whom she later i dentifi ed as accused-
appel l ant Jeffrey Garci a, burned her ri ght chi n with a li ghted ci garette. Cleopatra fought back
but accused-appell ant hel d her right arm. Whi le accused-appel lant was seated on her ri ght
side and hol ding her, the Bombay-looking man proceeded to have sexual i ntercourse with her.
She tried t o kick him and cl ose her legs, but two men were hol di ng her feet. The two men
boxed her thi ghs and burned her l egs with ci garettes.

After the Bombay-looki ng man fi nished having sexual intercourse with Cl eopatra, accused-
appel l ant and then the other two men took their turn, successi vel y. After the fourth man
finished raping her, he got up. She felt di zzy and her pri vate parts were aching. She opened
her eyes and tri ed to move, but accused-appel lant hi t her on the abdomen.

One of the men agai n sprayed somethi ng on Cl eopatras face which made her visi on bl urred.
She heard somebody say that it was 1:30. After that, she bl acked out. When she regai ned
consciousness, she was l yi ng by the roadsi de somewhere between Tam-awan and Longl ong.
It was sti l l dark. She al ready had her cl othes on. She felt pain all over her body and was
unabl e to move. A taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afrai d to ride the taxi,
she boarded i t j ust to get home. The taxi brought her to her house. At home, after when she
was able to regai n her composure, she tol d her aunt and si bl i ngs that she had been raped by
four men.

The fol lowi ng day, Jul y 15, 1998, Cl eopatra was brought to the Bagui o Cit y Pol ice Stati on and
gave her testimony. She was also brought to the Crime Laborat or y of the Bagui o Ci t y Pol ice
for examinati on. Two days after, she came back to the sai d pol ice station and gave a
description of the four rapists to the cartographer.

Meanwhi l e, accused-appel lant was arrested at 4:30 p.m. of Jul y 17, 1998 in connection wi th
another rape charge agai nst him fil ed by a certai n Gi l da Mangyo.

The cartographic sketches were publ ished in the Sun-Star newspaper. Pol ice Officers
Gi lbert Bulal it and Archi bal d Di az saw the sketches and noticed that one of the suspects
depicted in the cartographic sketch bore a striking resembl ance to accused-appel l ant, who
was in their custody. On Jul y 26, 1998, Cl eopatra was summoned to identif y accused-
appel l ant. she recogni zed accused-appell ant and then gave a suppl emental statement to the
pol ice, confirming her i dentification of accused-appel l ant as one of her rapists.

Formal charges for forcibl e abducti on wi th rape were brought against accused-appel lant and
three John Does. In the tri al , accused-appell ant denied the charges of rape and int erposed a
defense of ali bi.


149

ISSUE: Whether or not the is accused-appell ant guil t y of one count of forcibl e abduction with
rape aNd three counts of rape as charged.

HELD: Yes. The tri al court did not err in convicti ng accused-appel lant of the compl ex crime of
forcibl e abduction wi th rape.

RATIO
The two el ements of forcibl e abduction, as defined in Articl e 342 of the Revised Penal Code,
are: the taki ng of a woman against her wi l l and wi th lewd designs.

The crime of forcibl e abduction wi th rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal
knowl edge with the abducted woman under the fol lowi ng circumstances: by usi ng force or
intimidati on; when the woman is depri ved of reason or otherwise unconscious; and when the
woman is under twel ve years of age or is demented.

In the case at bar, the information sufficientl y al leged the el ements of forci bl e
abducti on, i .e., the taki ng of complai nant agai nst her against her wi ll and with lewd desi gn. It
was l ikewise al l eged that accused-appell ant and his three co-accused conspired,
confederated and mutual l y aided one another i n having carnal knowledge of compl ainant by
means of force and i nti midation and agai nst her wi l l.

Aside from al l egi ng the necessar y elements of the crimes, the prosecution convi nci ngl y
establ ished that the carnal knowl edge was committed through force and i ntimidati on.
Moreover, the prosecution suffici entl y proved beyond reasonabl e doubt that accused-
appel l ant succeeded in forcibl y abducting the complai nant with l ewd designs, establ ished by
the actual rape.

Hence, accused-appel l ant is gui lt y of the complex crime of forci bl e abduction wi th rape. He
shoul d also be held l i abl e for the other three counts of rape committed by his three co -
accused, consi deri ng the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvi ous concerted
efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four
accused hel ped one another in consummating the rape of compl ai nant. While one of them
mounted her, the other three hel d her arms and legs. They al so burned her face and
extremiti es with li ghted cigarettes to stop her from wardi ng off her aggressor. Each of them,
therefore, is responsi bl e not onl y for the rape committed personall y by him but for the rape
committed by the ot hers as wel l.

However, as correctl y hel d by the trial court, there can onl y be one complex crime of forcible
abducti on with rape. The crime of forci ble abducti on was onl y necessary f or the f irst rape.
Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no l onger be considered as separate complex crimes
of forcible abducti on wi th rape. They should be detached from and considered independentl y
of the forcibl e abduction. Therefore, accused-appel l ant should be convicted of one compl ex
crime of forci ble abduction wi th rape and three separate acts of rape.















150


PEOPLE vs. ABLANEDA (G.R. No. 131914)

FACTS

On Februar y 18, 1993, at around 7:00 ocl ock i n the morning, six- year old Magdalena Sal as, a
Grade I pupi l was walki ng to school. Along the way, accused-appell ant Jaime Abl aneda, also
known as Joey Capistrano, approached her and asked if he coul d share her umbrell a, si nce it
was raini ng. Suddenl y, accused-appel lant boarded a trimobi le wi th Magdalena and brought
her to a smal l hut. Whi l e i nsi de, accused-appel lant removed his underwear and the chi ld s
panti es. He appli ed cooking oil , which he had bought earl ier, on his organ and on
Magdalenas. Then, he proceeded to have sexual i ntercourse with the li ttl e girl. Magdalena
felt pai n but was too terrifi ed to speak or cr y out. After satisf yi ng hi s lust, accused-appell ant
ordered Magdal ena to go home.

When Magdal ena arri ved at their house, Ai l ene Vil l afl ores, her uncl es sister -i n-l aw, noticed
that she looked pale and weak, and found traces of bl ood on her dress. Ai lene asked her
what happened, but Magdal ena merel y sai d that her cl assmate had pushed her. Ai l ene di d
not bel ieve this, so she brought her to a quack doctor. The l atter tol d her that Magdalena had
been raped. Ai l ene then brought Magdalena to the Daet Police Stati on and, later, to the
Camari nes Norte Provinci al Hospital to have her medical l y exami ned. When Ail ene saw
Magdalenas bl oodi ed panti es, she agai n asked her what happened. This time, Magdal ena
confessed that she was raped by a man who had a scar on the stomach.

Dr. Nil da Bayl on, the Medico-Legal Officer who examined Magdalena, found that the latter s
hymen was completel y l acerated, thus confirmi ng that she had indeed been raped.
Sometime thereafter, Magdalena and Ai l ene were summoned by the pol ice because a man
had been apprehended. At the precinct, Magdal ena positi vel y i dentifi ed accused-appel lant as
her rapist.

Consequentl y, accused-appel lant was charged before the Regi onal Trial Court of Daet,
Camari nes Norte, wi th the compl ex crime of Forcibl e Abduction wi th Rape.

At his arrai gnment, accused-appel lant pl eaded not gui l t y. After trial, the l ower court rendered
j udgment finding the accused gui l ty of the complex crime of forcibl e abducti on with rape as
defi ned and penal i zed by Art. 342 of the Revised Penal Code i n conj unction wi th Art. 335
(S.3) of the Revised Penal Code and Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence this appeal

ISSUE; Whether there is sufficient evi dence to sustai n the accused-appel l ant conviction for
the complex crime of forcibl e abduction wi th rape.

HELD: Yes. Al l the el ements of both the crimes of forci bl e abduction and rape were proven in
this case.

RATIO
The el ements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defi ned i n Arti cle 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardl ess of her age, ci vil
status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken agai nst her wi ll ; and (3) that the abduction is with
lewd desi gns. On the other hand, rape is committed by havi ng carnal knowl edge of a woman
by force or intimidati on, or when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconsci ous, or when
she is under twel ve years of age.

All these el ements were proven i n this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken agai nst
her wi l l , as shown by the fact that she was i ntenti onal l y directed by accused-appell ant to a
vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdal ena coul d not be expected to physical l y resist
considering that the lewd desi gns of accused-appel l ant could not have been apparent to her
at that t ime. Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was
151

against her wil l . The employment of decepti on suffices to constitute the forcibl e taking,
especi al l y since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl . Fi nal l y, the evi dence shows that the
taking of the young victim agai nst her wi l l was effected in furtherance of l ewd and unchaste
designs. Such l ewd designs i n forci ble abducti on is establ ished by the actual rape of the
victim.

In the case at bar, Magdal ena testified in open cour t that accused-appel l ant i nserted his peni s
into her pri vate parts. The fact of sexual i ntercourse is corroborated by the medical findings
wherei n it was found that the victim suffered from complete hymenal laceration. Whether or
not she consented to the sexual contact is immateri al considering that at the time thereof, she
was below twel ve years of age. Sex wi th a girl below twel ve years, regardless of whether she
consented thereto or not, constitutes statutor y rape.

The impositi on of the penal ty of recl usion perpetua, for the crime of forcible abduction wi th
rape was correct. No qualif yi ng or aggravati ng circumstance was proven i n this case and
there was none al l eged i n the i nformati on.










































152

PEOPLE vs. NAPUD (G.R. No. 123058)

FACTS: At around 1:00 A.M. on September 21, 1994, appel lant wi th his co-accused, Tomas
Amburgo and Romel Bril l o, went to the house of the spouses Esmayl i ta and Ernesto
Benedicto at Barangay Jibolo, Jani uay, Iloi lo. Amburgo cal led al oud for the occupants of the
house to come down. The Benedictos were awakened by the cal l, but j ust kept quiet si nce
they sensed that i t woul d be dangerous to respond. Unable to el icit any response from the
Benedictos, the tri o then approached the house of Esmayl i tas parents, the spouses Evel yn
and Manuel Canti ll er, j ust a few meters away. Agai n, they cal l ed f or the resi dents of the
house to come down. The Cantil l ers were awakened by the cal l but chose to remai n
sil ent. Their grandson Greg Canti l l er, who was st ayi ng with them, also remained quiet.
Mi nutes later, Amburgo forcibl y pushed the door of the Canti l lers house open. He found
Evel yn and Manuel l yi ng on the fl oor. Amburgo at once pinned down Manuel s
head. Meanwhi l e, appel lant broke into the chicken coop beneath the Benedictos house,
caught ten (10) chickens, and handed them to Bril l o who was wai ti ng outsi de. Appel lant then
barged i nto the Canti l l ers house. He asked Manuel if he had a daughter i n the house. The
latter sai d he didnt. Appell ant then told the 59 year-old Evel yn Canti ll er to step out of the
house. He l ed her to the back of the house and told her to undress. When she refused,
appel l ant threatened her wi th a knife. Out of fear, Evel yn removed her skirt, appel l ant then
raped her. After a few minutes of coi tus, appel l ant asked Evel yn to assume the woman-on-
top posi ti on. Warning her that she and her husband woul d be kill ed shoul d she attempt to
flee, appel l ant then had Evel yn mount him. The rape was ended when Amburgo saw them
and asked appel lant to stop, remindi ng the l atter that Evel yn was an old woman. ( Cri minal
Case No. 44262)

Amburgo then grabbed Greg Cantil l er and ordered him to summon the Benedictos. Greg di d
as he was tol d, but the Benedictos woul d not respond. Angered, Amburgo threatened to burn
down their house. Left wi th no choice, the Benedictos stepped out. Amburgo then ordered
Greg to return to the Canti l l ers residence.

Once outsi de, Esmayl i ta expl ained that her husband, Ernesto, had a stomach
ai lment. Ernesto then asked permission to answer a cal l of nature. Amburgo acceded to hi s
request but warned Ernesto not to fl ee or report to the authoriti es. When Ernesto fai l ed to
return, Amburgo then grabbed Esmayl i ta and brought her to a banana pl antation l ocated i n
Barangay Cal ansonan, some 1-1/2 kil ometers away from her house. Sti l l wiel di ng his knife,
Amburgo commanded her to l ie down. He removed her l ower garments, lay on top of her, and
had sexual intercourse wi th her. Esmayl i ta pl eaded wi th him to stop as she had a small chi l d,
but Amburgo threatened to knife her. After Amburgos l ust was spent, he tol d Esmayl i ta to
put on her clothes and brought her over to appel l ant, who had been watchi ng the whole affair
from a short distance. ( Cri minal Case No. 44264)

Appel l ant dragged Esmayl ita some distance away from Amburgo. He forci bl y stripped her
naked. He then told her to l ie down. When Esmayl ita refused, appel l ant poked a knife at her
and made signs that he woul d kil l her. Faced with imminent death, Esmayl i ta
obeyed. Appell ant had i ntercourse wi th her. After some minutes, appell ant made Esmayl i ta
stand up. Esmayl i ta begged to be al lowed to go home, but appel lant ignored her and ordered
her to si t on top of him. Esmayl i ta remai ned moti onl ess as he put his organ i nto her
vagina. Angered, appel l ant ordered her to do what she usual l y does with her
husband. Esmayl i ta then made up-and-down moti ons with her buttocks. After some five
minutes of sexual i ntercourse, appel l ant made her stand up, forced her l egs apart, and agai n
inserted his penis i nside her vagi na. Appel lant then had sexual intercourse with her unti l hi s
lust was satisfi ed. At around four oclock i n the morning, Esmayl i ta was fi nal l y rel eased and
al l owed to go home. ( Crimi nal Case No. 44263)

Meanwhi l e, Esmayl i tas husband, Ernesto, had fled to the house of their barangay counci l or
located a ki lometer away from the Benedicto house and reported the i nci dent. The barangay
official then accompani ed Ernesto to the nearest pol ice detachment. When Ernesto and the
153

law enforcers arri ved at the Benedicto house, Esmayl i ta was already there. She tol d them
that she had been raped.

On November 3, 1994, the Provi nci al Prosecutor of Iloi lo fi led an i nformation for Robber y wi th
Rape agai nst appell ant and his co-accused wi th the Regi onal Tri al Court of Il oi l o Ci t y.
On the same day, Esmayl ita also fi l ed two separate compl aints, one f or rape and another
for forci bl e abducti on with rape

When arrai gned i n each of the three cases, both Napud and Amburgo pl eaded not gui lt y to the
charges. The third accused, Romel Bril l o, has remained at large. Both Amburgo and Napud
raised the defense of deni al and al i bi .

The tri al court declared Napud and his co-accused, Amburgo, gui lt y beyond reasonable doubt
of the charges against them.

Onl y Napud seasonabl y f i l ed his notice of appeal . His co-accused, Amburgo, opted not to
appeal his conviction.

ISSUES: Whether the appell ant is correct i n al l egi ng that the tri al court erred i n convicti ng the
appel l ant of rape by means of force and i nti midation absent physical i nj uries found on the
bodies of ei ther complainants.
Whether the penal ti es i mposed for the offenses committed by the appel l ant is proper.

HELD
No. The absence of external inj uri es does not negate rape.
Yes. The tri al court correctl y hel d that the cri me of rape charged and proved in Criminal Case
No. 44263 already absorbed the forci ble abducti on wi th rape compl ai ned of i n Criminal Case
No. 44264 and also found the accused-appel l ant gui l ty of the speci al complex crime of
robber y wi th rape under Criminal Case No. 44262

RATIO
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal
knowl edge of a woman by force or intimidati on and against her wi l l or without her consent.
What consummates the felony is peni le contact, however sli ght, wi th the l abi a of the victims
vagina wi thout her consent. Consequentl y, it is not required that lacerati ons be found on the
pri vate complai nants hymen. Nor is i t necessar y to show that the vi ctim had a reddeni ng of
the external genital i a or sustai ned a hematoma on other parts of her body to sustain the
possibi l it y of a rape charge. For i t i s wel l -settl ed that the absence of external i nj uries does
not negate rape. This i s because in rape, the important consideration is not the presence of
inj uries on the victims body, but peni l e contact with the female geni tal ia without the womans
consent. Hence, appel lants reli ance upon the fi ndings of Dr. Renato Armada, who testif ied
that he examined Evel yn and found no l acerati ons or hematoma in any part of her body coul d
not prevail over the positi ve testimony of the offended part y and her witnesses that she was
sexual l y abused.

As to the propri et y of the penal ties imposed on appel lant, the trial court found that the forci bl e
abducti on with rape all eged i n Criminal Case No. 44264 was absorbed by the rape charged i n
Criminal Case No. 44263. The evi dence for the prosecution shows that Esmayl i ta was
brought by Amburgo and appell ant to a banana pl antati on some 1-1/2 ki lometers away from
her house for the purpose of rapi ng her. Both men then successivel y had carnal knowl edge of
her at said place. Where complai nant was forci bl y taken away f or the purpose of sexual l y
assaul ting her, then the rape so committed may absorb the forcibl e abducti on. The tri al court,
thus, correctl y hel d that the rape charged and proved in Criminal Case No. 44263 already
absorbed t he forcibl e abduction wi th rape compl ained of i n Criminal Case No. 44264.
Coming now to Criminal Case No. 44262, the information charged appel l ant and his co-
accused wi th robber y with rape. When appel lant forcibl y entered the Canti ll ers chicken coop
and took their chickens, whi le his confederate Amburgo was threatening the Canti l ler
spouses, he committed the crime of robber y. The elements of the of fense -vi z: (a) personal
154

propert y belongi ng to another; (b) unlawf ul taking; (c) intent to gain; and (d) vi olence or
intimidati on - were al l present. Though robber y appears to have preceded the rape of Evel yn,
it is enough that robber y shal l have been accompanied by rape to be punished under the
Revised Penal Code (as amended) for the Code does not differenti at e whether the rape was
committed before, during, or after the robber y. Thus, Accused- appel lant is found gui lt y of the
special compl ex crime of robber y with rape and sentenced by this court to recl usion perpetua
wi th damages.
155
































156

PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMES OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION,
ABDUCTION, RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS ( ART. 344)
Beltran v. People

Facts: The petiti oner Meynardo Bel tran and his wife Charmai ne Fel ix got married. After 24
years and havi ng four chi l dren, Bel tran fil ed a peti tion for declarati on of null it y of marriage on
the ground of psychol ogical i ncapacit y. Charmaine Fel ix, in her Answer, al leged that it was
Bel tran who abandoned the conj ugal home and cohabi ted wi th another woman named
Mi l agros. Thereafter, she fi l ed a criminal compl aint for concubinage against Beltran and his
paramour.

Bel tran argued that the pendency of the ci vi l case for decl aration of nul l it y of marriage posed
a prej udicial questi on to the determinati on of the criminal case of concubinage agai nst him.

Issue: Whether or not the declarati on of nul l it y of marriage is a prej udici al questi on to the
criminal case of concubinage.

Held: It is not a prej udi cial questi on. Under Article 40 of the Civi l Code, i t is provi ded that the
absol ute nul li t y of a previ ous marri age may be i nvoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis sol el y of a final j udgment declari ng such previous marri age voi d.

In view of such provisi on, it fol l ows that for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptabl e. Therefore i n a case for concubi nage, the accused, l ike the herei n peti ti oner, need
not present a f inal j udgment decl aring his marri age voi d f or he can adduce evi dence in the
criminal case of the nul li t y of his marriage other than proof of a final j udgment declari ng hi s
marriage void.

A subsequent pronouncement that marriage i s voi d from the beginni ng is not a defense i n a
concubi nage case. He who cohabits wi th a woman not his wif e before the j udici al decl aration
of nul l it y of the marri age assumes the risk of bei ng prosecuted for concubinage.



People v. Tipay

Facts: This is a criminal case of rape fi led by Susan Pel aez, 15, suffering from mi ld mental
retardati on and transi ent psychotic i ll ness, assisted by her grandmother Fl ora Degui no
against her stepfather named Romeo Tipay.

The prosecuti ons evi dence showed that the accused raped his stepdaughter several times
whenever the l atters mother and sibl ings were out of the house. The victim was threatened
by the accused that he would ki l l Susans famil y member if she woul d tel l anyone about i t.
One day, Susan compl ai ned to her grandmother that her head was aching. Flora had Susan
checked up by a midwi fe. The midwife found out that Susan is 4-months pregnant and it was
at this moment that Susan conf ided to her grandmother that she was bei ng raped by her
stepfather.

Sometime i n 1996, the lower court convicted the accused of the crime of rape under Art. 344
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and sentenced the accused to Death
Penal t y which caused the automatic review by the Supreme Court.

Issues: Is the criminal complai nt fatal l y defecti ve due to the fact that it was the grandmother
of the victim and not her mother who assisted her i n f il i ng the compl ai nt?

157

Held: No. Under the Rules of Court, in Sec. 5, par. 3 of Rul e 110, it is provi ded that where
the offended part y is a minor, her parents, grandparents, or guardi an may fi l e the compl ai nt.
The ri ght to fi le the action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shal l be excl usive of
al l other persons and shal l be exercised successi vel y i n the order herei n provided. However,
wi th the advent of RA 8353, which recl assified rape as a crime agai nst person and no l onger
a pri vate crime, the complai nt can now be instituted by any person.

It is also worthy to note that i n the case of Peopl e vs. Estrebel l a, i t was hel d that any
technical defect i n a complai nt for rape woul d be remedied by testimony showi ng the consent
and wi l l ingness of the famil y of the compl ainant who cannot gi ve her consent (due to minori ty
or mental retardati on, for i nstance) to have the pri vate offense publ i cl y tried. In the case at
bar, Mari l yn Degui no (complai nants mot her) herself requested Susans grandmother to take
care of the case.


Alonte v. Savellano

Facts: This is a case prayi ng for the reversal of the decisi on convicti ng Bayani M. Alonte and
Buenaventura Concepci on of rape.

An i nformati on for rape was fi l ed on December 5, 1996 agai nst petiti oners Al onte and his
accompl ice Concepcion based on a compl aint fil ed by Juvie-l yn Punongbayan. It was all eged
that the accused Concepcion brought Juvi e-l yn to Alontes resthouse and left her to Al onte
after recei vi ng P1,000.00. Al onte gave Juvie-l yn water to drink whi ch made her di zzy and
weak. Afterwards, agai nst her wi l l, Al onte raped her.

Sometime in 1996, duri ng the pendency of a petiti on for change of venue, Juvi e-l yn, assisted
by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavi t of desistance.

Upon arraignment, peti tioners both pleaded not gui lt y to the charge.

Trial ensued and they were both found gui lt y.

Issue: Whether or not the affidavi t of desistance fi led by the offended part y exti nguished the
criminal l i abi l it y of the accused?

Held: An affidavit of desistance by i tself, even when construed as a pardon i n the so-cal led
"pri vate crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has
been i nsti tuted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earl i er i ntimated, possibl y constitute
evi dence whose weight or probati ve value, l ike any other pi ece of evidence, woul d be up to
the court for proper evaluati on.

Paragraph 3 of Articl e 344 of the Revised Penal Code prohibi ts a prosecution for seduction,
abducti on, rape, or acts of lasci viousness, except upon a complai nt made by the offended
part y or her parents, grandparents, or guardi an, nor, i n any case, i f the offender has been
expressl y pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibi t the
conti nuance of a prosecution if the offended part y pardons the offender after the case has not
been insti tuted, nor does it order the dismissal of said case.

Note: Rape is now a publ ic crime.






158

Arroyo v. CA

Facts: Dr. Jorge B. Neri fi led a crimi nal complai nt for adul ter y agai nst his wife, Ruby Vera
Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982. Both defendants pl eaded not
gui lt y but were subsequentl y f ound gui lt y by the tri al court.

When the case was pendi ng wi th the CA on certi orari , Ruby Neri fil ed a motion for
reconsi derati on or a new tri al al l egi ng that her husband already pardoned her and had
contracted marriage to another with whom he is presentl y cohabiti ng. Dr. Neri also fi led a
manifestation prayi ng that the case agai nst petiti oners be dismissed as he had "taci tl y
consented" to his wife' s i nfidel it y. The co-accused peti tioners then fil ed a moti on prayi ng for
the dismissal of the case citing as basis the manifestati on of Dr. Neri.

CA di d not grant the motions.

Issue: Whether or not Dr. Neri' s affidavi t of desistance and the compromise agreement
operate as a pardon meriti ng a new trial .

Held: No. The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:

ART. 344. ... The cri me of adul ter y and concubinage shal l not be prosecuted except upon a
complai nt f il ed by the offended spouse.
The offended part y cannot insti tute criminal prosecution wi thout i ncludi ng both parti es, if they
are both ali ve, nor i n any case, if he shal l have consented or pardoned the offenders.
xxx xxx xxx

While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon i n the sense that consent
is granted pri or to the adulterous act whil e pardon is gi ven after the i l l ici t affair, nevertheless,
for ei ther consent or pardon to benefi t the accused, it must be gi ven pri or to the f il i ng of a
criminal compl aint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed onl y after the
tri al court had already rendered its decisi on dated.

It should also be noted that whi l e Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the
crime of adulter y cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse' s compl aint, once the
complai nt has been fil ed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement
of our l aw on adulter y is not exclusi vel y, nor even pri nci pal l y, a matter of vindicati on of the
pri vate honor of the offended spouse; much l ess is it a matter merel y of personal or social
hypocrisy. Such enforcement rel ates, more importantl y, to protecti on of the basic social
insti tutions of marriage and the famil y i n the preservation of which the State has the strongest
interest; the public pol i cy here i nvol ved is of the most fundamental ki nd.

In U.S. v. Topio, the Court hel d that:

... The husband bei ng the head of the fami l y and the onl y person who coul d i nstitute the
prosecuti on and control i ts effects, it is quite clear that the pri ncipal obj ect i n penal i zi ng the
offense by the state was to protect the purit y of the famil y and the honor of the husband, but
now the conduct of the prosecution, after it is once commenced by the husband, and the
enforcement of the penalties imposed is also a matter of publ i c pol icy i n which the
Government is vital l y i nterested to the extent of preserving the publ ic peace and providi ng for
the general welfare of the communi t y. ...







159


Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

Facts: Imel da Pil api l , a Fi l ipi no citi zen, was married to pri vate respondent Erich Ekkehard
Gei l i ng, a German nati onal. Due to conj ugal disharmony, the pri vate respondent i ni tiated a
di vorce proceedi ng agai nst petitioner i n Germany and the peti ti oner then fi led an action for
legal separati on, support and separation of propert y. A di vorce decree was granted.

The pri vate respondent then fi led two compl ai nts for adulter y al l egi ng that whi le stil l marri ed
to Imelda, she had an affair wi th Will iam Chi a and another man named Jesus Chua.

Issue: Whether pri vate respondent can prosecute petiti oner for adultery even though they are
no l onger husband and wife as a decree of di vorce was already issued.

Held: The l aw specifical l y provi ded that i n prosecution for adulter y and concubi nage, the
person who can l egal l y fil e the compl aint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In
this case, pri vate respondent is the offended spouse who obtai ned a val id di vorce i n his
countr y. The sai d di vorce decree and i ts l egal effects may be recogni zed i n the Phi l ippines i n
so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consi derati on and rational e, pri vate
respondent is no l onger the husband of peti ti oner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he f il ed sui t.





































160

ART. 349: BIGAMY

Manuel v. People

Facts: Eduardo Manuel was prosecuted for bi gamy. The prosecution were abl e to adduce
evi dence that Eduardo was married to Rubyl us Gaa i n Makati . Eduardo met compl ai nant
Tina B. Gandalera and proposed to her on several occasions, assuri ng her that he was si ngl e.
He even made his parents meet her and assure her that he was singl e.

The coupl e was happy duri ng the first three years of their marri ed l ife. However, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house onl y twice or thrice a year. Ti na was
j obless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would sl ap her.

After a whil e, Eduardo took al l his cl othes, left, and di d not return. Worse, he stopped gi vi ng
financial support. Tina became curious and made i nquiri es from the Nati onal Statistics Office
(NSO) i n Mani la where she l earned that Eduardo had been previ ousl y marri ed. She secured
an NSO-certif ied copy of the marri age contract. She was so embarrassed and humili ated
when she l earned that Eduardo was i n fact al ready married when they exchanged their own
vows.

For his defense, Eduardo cl aimed Tina knew he was already marri ed. He also cl aimed that he
stated that he was sti l l single in his marriage contract wi th Tina because he beli eved i n good
faith that his first marri age was voi d. He also claimed he was forced to marry Ti na because
she threatened him that she woul d commit suicide.

Upon convicti on in the tri al court, Eduardo, on appeal , cl aimed that his first wife Gaa had
been "absent" for 21 years si nce 1975 and under Articl e 390 of the Ci vi l Code, she was
presumed dead as a matter of law. He poi nts out that, under the first paragraph of Articl e 390
of the Civi l Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is sti ll
al i ve, shal l be presumed dead for al l purposes except for succession, whi l e the second
paragraph refers to the rul e on legal presumpti on of death wi th respect to succession.

Issue: Whether or not Manuel shoul d be acqui tted on the bigamy charge on the ground of
presumpti on of death of his first wife due to absence.

Held: No, he is li abl e for bigamy.

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa and such
marriage was not j udici al l y decl ared a null i t y; hence, the marri age is presumed to subsist. The
prosecuti on also proved that the petitioner married the pri vate complai nant l ong after the
effecti vit y of the Famil y Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evi l intent when he married the
pri vate compl ainant. As a general rul e, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a val i d
defense i n a prosecution for a fel ony by dol o; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
However, ignorance of the l aw is not an excuse because everyone i s presumed to know the
law. Ignoranti a l egis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he marri ed the pri vate
complai nant, he was of the wel l -grounded bel i ef
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years. He
shoul d have adduced i n evidence a decisi on of a competent court decl aring the presumptive
death of his f irst wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relati on to
Article 41 of the Fami l y Code. Such j udicial declarati on also constitutes proof that the
peti tioner acted i n good fai th, and woul d negate criminal intent on his part when he marri ed
the pri vate compl ainant and, as a consequence, he coul d not be held gui lt y of bigamy i n such
case. The petiti oner, however, fai l ed to discharge his burden.
161


The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumpti vel y dead by means of
a j udgment rendered on the proceedings" i n Articl e 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empt y or usel ess words. The requirement for a j udgment of the presumpti ve
death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the
pai ns and the consequences of a second marriage, precisel y because he/she could be
charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony i s
found i ncredi ble.



Diego v. Castillo

Facts: An administrati ve compl ai nt was fi led agai nst RTC Judge Si l veri o Q. Casti l lo f or
al l egedl y knowi ngl y renderi ng an unj ust j udgment i n a criminal case and/or renderi ng
j udgment i n gross i gnorance of the l aw.

The Administrati ve compl aint stemmed from the Judgment of the Judge i n a Bi gamy case fil ed
against Lucena Escoto by Jorge de Per io, Jr.

Prior that fi l ing of the case, the Famil y District Court of Texas granted a decree of Di vorce on
Lucena Escoto and Jorge de Peri o, Jr.s marriage. Later on, Lucena Escoto contracted
marriage with the brother of the complai nant, Manuel P. Di ego. After the tri al of the bigamy
case, respondent Judge acquitted the accused and stated that his main basis was the good
faith on the part of the accused.

Issue: Whether or not the acquittal i n the bigamy case was proper.

Held: No. The Supreme Court, in Peopl e v. Bitdu, carefull y distingui shed between a mistake
of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bi gamy case, from a mistake
of law, which does not excuse a person, even a l ay person, from li abi l it y. Bi tdu held that even
if the accused, who had obtai ned a di vorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestl y bel i eved
that in contracting her second marri age she was not committi ng any viol ation of the l aw, and
that she had no criminal intent, the same does not j ustif y her act. The Supreme Court further
stated therei n that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith i n
contracti ng the second marriage, bel ieving that she had been val idl y di vorced from her first
husband, it is suffici ent to say that ever yone i s presumed to know the law, and the fact that
one does not know that his act constitutes a vi ol ati on of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.
Moreover, squarel y appl icabl e to the criminal case for bigamy, is Peopl e v. Schneckenburger,
where it was hel d that the accused who secured a foreign di vorce, and later remarried i n the
Phi l ippines, i n the bel i ef that the foreign di vorce was vali d, is li abl e for bigamy.


People v. Abunado

Facts: Sal vador Abunado married Narcisa Arceno sometime in 1967. Sal vador later
contracted a second marri age wi th Zenaida Binas. A case for bi gamy was fi l ed by Narcisa
against Sal vador and Zenaida. Sal vador was convicted of the crime of bigamy.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the rul ing appreci ati ng the miti gating circumstance that the
accused was sevent y si x years of age then.

Sal vador avers that the information fi l ed agai nst him was defective as it stated that the
al l eged bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when i n fact it shoul d have been 1989.
162

He claims that he should be acqui tted on the ground that he was not sufficientl y i nformed of
the nature and the cause of the accusati on against him.

Issue: Whether or not the peti tioner should be acqui tted of bi gamy on the ground that he was
not sufficientl y i nformed of the nature and cause of the accusati on agai nst him.

Held: No, the convicti on is upheld. The statement i n the information that the crime was
committed i n Januar y 1995 was merel y a typographical error, for the same informati on
clearl y states that petiti oner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenai da Abunado on
Januar y 10, 1989. The petitioner fai led to obj ect to the al leged defect i n the Informati on
duri ng the tri al and onl y raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of
Appeals.


Morigo v People

Facts: Lucio Mori go and Luci a Barrete got married sometime i n 1990. A year after, a decree
of di vorce was granted to them by a court in Ontari o. In 1992, Luci o Mori go marri ed Mari a
Jececha Lumbago. A bi gamy case was then fil ed against him. In 1993, the accused fil ed a
complai nt for j udicial declarati on of null i t y of marriage on the ground that no marri age
ceremony actual l y took pl ace.

The tri al court convicted Mori go of bi gamy.

Issue: Whether or not peti tioner committed bi gamy.

Held: No, the first element of bi gamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legal l y marri ed.

The existence and the val i di t y of the first marriage bei ng an essential el ement of the crime of
bi gamy, it is but l ogical that a convicti on for sai d offense cannot be sustai ned where there i s
no first marriage to speak of.

No marri age ceremony at all was performed by a dul y authori zed solemni zi ng officer.
Petitioner and Luci a Barrete merel y signed a marri age contract on thei r own.

Te vs. CA

Facts: Arthur Te and Li li ana Choa got married i n ci vi l rites on 1988. They di d not l i ve
together after marriage although they woul d meet each other regularl y. In 1989, Li l iana gave
birth to a girl . Thereafter, Arthur stopped visi ti ng her.

Arthur contracted a second marri age whi l e his marri age with Li li ana was stil l subsisting.
Li l iana then fi l ed a bigamy case agai nst Arthur and subsequentl y an administrati ve case for
revocation of his engi neeri ng l icense for grossl y immoral act.

For his defense, Arthur al l eged that his first marriage was nul l and voi d.

Issue: Whether or not the null i t y of the first marri age of t he accused is a defense in a bi gamy
case.

Held: The formed decisions of the Supreme Court hol ding that no j udicial decree is necessar y
to establish the i nval idi ty of a marriage which i s ab i niti o is overturned. The prevail i ng rule is
Art. 40 of the Famil y Code which states that the absol ute null i t y of a previous marriage may
not be i nvoked for purposes of remarriage unl ess there is a fi nal j udgment declari ng such
previous marri age voi d.

163

Under the law, a marri age, even one which i s voi d or voidabl e, shal l be deemed vali d unti l
declared otherwise i n a j udicial proceedi ng.

Mercado vs. Tan
FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage
with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and
after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993
declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.

HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as
void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed
bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage
without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge.
















164

LIBEL ( ARTS. 353, 354)
FERMIN vs. PEOPLE
Facts: On complai nt of spouses Annabell e Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddi e) Guti errez,
two (2) criminal informations for li bel were fil ed agai nst Cristi nel l i S. Fermin and Bogs C.
Tugas.
The June 14, 1995 headli ne and lead story of the tabl oi d says thatit i s improbabl e for
Annabell e Rama t o go to the US shoul d i t betrue that she i s evadi ng her conviction i n an
estafa case here i n thePhi li ppi nes for she and husband Eddi e have more probl ems/casesto
confront there. This was said t o be due to thei r, especi all yAnnabel le' s, usi ng fell ow Fi li pinos
money, fai lure t o remit proceedsto the manuf acturi ng company of the cookware t hey were
sel l ingand not bei ng on good terms wi th the latter.
Annabell e Rama and Eddi e Guti errez fi l ed li bel cases againstFermin and Tugas before RTC of
QC, Br. 218.
RTC: Fermin and Tugas found guil t y of l i bel.
CA: Tugas was acqui tted on account of non-participati on butFermin' s conviction was affirmed.
Fermin' s moti on for reconsideration was deni ed. She argues thatshe had no knowl edge and
partici pati on i n the publ icati on of thearticl e, that the article i s not l ibel ous and i s covered by
the freedomof the press.
Issue: Whether peti ti oner i s gui lt y of l ibel .
Held: A Libel i s defi ned as a publ ic and mal ici ous imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginar y, or any act, omissi on, condi ti on, status, or circumstance tendi ng t o cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or j uri dical person, or to bl acken the memory
of one who i s dead. In determini ng whether a statement i s defamatory, the words used are t o
be construed i n their entiret y and shoul d be taken i n their pl ain and ordi nar y meani ng as they
woul d natural l y be understood by persons reading them, unless i t appears that they were
used and understood i n another sense.
To say that the articl e, i n its entirety, i s not li bel ous disturbs one' s sensi bi li ties; i t woul d
certai nl y prick one' s consci ence. There i s evident imputati on of the crime of malversati on, or
vices or defects for bei ng fugi tives from the l aw. and of bei ng a wastrel . The attributi on was
made publ icl y, consi dering that Gossip Tabloi d had a nationwi de circulation. The victims were
identifi ed and i dentifi abl e. More importantl y, the articl e reeks of mali ce, as i t tends t o cause
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the compl ai nants.
Petitioner cl aims that there was no mal ice on her part because all egedl y, the article was
merel y a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabel l e Rama Guti errez was issued a
warrant of arrest for her convicti on for estafa before Judge Palattao' s court.
It can be gleaned form her testimony that peti tioner had the moti ve to make defamatory
imputations against complai nants. Thus, petiti oner cannot, by simpl y making a general deni al,
convince us that there was no malice on her part. Veri l y, not onl y was there malice i n law, t he
articl e bei ng mal icious i n itself, but there was also mal ice i n fact, as there was moti ve to talk
i ll agai nst compl ainants duri ng t he el ectoral campaign.
Neither can petitioner take refuge i n the consti tuti onal guarantee of freedom of speech and of
the press. Al though a wi de l atitude i s gi ven t o cri tical utterances made against publ ic offici als
i n the performance of their official duti es, or agai nst publ i c figures on matters of publ ic
165

interest, such criticism does not automati cal l y fal l wi thi n t he ambit of constituti onal l y
protected speech. If the utterances are false, mal ici ous, or unrel ated t o a public officer' s
performance of his duties or irrelevant t o matters of publ ic interest i nvol ving publ ic fi gures,
the same may gi ve rise to criminal and ci vi l l iabi l it y. While complai nants are consi dered publ i c
figures for being personal iti es i n the entertai nment busi ness, medi a peopl e, incl udi ng gossi p
and i ntri gue wri ters such as petitioner, do not have the unbri dl ed l icense t o mali gn their honor
and dignit y by i ndiscriminatel y airing fabri cated and mal ici ous comments, whether i n
broadcast medi a or i n print, about their personal li ves.
In vi ew of t he foregoing disquisi tions, the convi cti on of peti tioner for l i bel should be upheld.
With respect t o the penal t y t o be imposed for this convicti on, we note that t he Court issued on
25 Januar y 2008, Admi nistrati ve Circular No. 08-2008 enti tl ed Gui del ines i n the Observance
of a Rul e of Preference i n the Impositi on of Penalti es i n Li bel Cases. The circul ar expresses a
preference for the imposi ti on of a FINE rather than imprisonment, gi ven the circumstances
attendant i n the cases cited therei n i n which onl y a fi ne was imposed by the Court on those
convicted of l ibel. It also states that, i f the penal t y imposed i s merel y a fi ne but the convict i s
unabl e to pay the same, the RPC provisions on subsi diar y imprisonment should appl y.
However, the Ci rcular li kewise al lows t he court, i n the exercise of sound discretion, the option
to impose imprisonment as penal t y, whenever the impositi on of a fine alone would depreciate
the seri ousness of the offense, work viol ence on the social order, or otherwise be contrar y t o
the imperati ves of j usti ce.


BUATIS vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 142509)
Facts: On August 18, 1995, t he wife of pri vate-complai nant Att y. Jose J. Pieraz (Att y. Pieraz),
retrieved a letter from their mai l box addressed t o her husband. The l etter was open, not
contained i n an envel ope, and Att y. Pi eraz wife put i t on her husbands desk. On that same
day, Atty. Pi eraz came upon the letter and made out i ts content.
Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a
communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr. who dispatched a second letter later on.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao,"
Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the
knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka
lang gago dito."
Issue: Whether accused i s gui lt y of l ibel .
Held: Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defi nes li bel as a publ ic and mal ici ous
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginar y, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
j uri dical person, or to blacken the memory of one who i s dead.
For an imputati on t o be l i bel ous, t he fol l owing requisites must concur: (a) i t must be
defamator y; (b) i t must be malici ous; (c) i t must be gi ven publ ici t y; and (d) t he victim must be
identifi able.
8

166

The last two el ements have been dul y establ i shed by t he prosecution. There i s publ icati on i n
this case. I n l i bel, publi cation means making the defamator y matter, after i t i s wri tten, known
to someone other than the person agai nst whom i t has been written.
9
Peti tioners subj ect
letter-repl y itself states that the same was copy furnished to al l concerned. Also, peti tioner
had dictated t he letter t o his secretar y. I t i s enough that the author of the li bel compl ained of
has communicated i t to a third person.
10
Furthermore, t he l etter, when found i n the mail box,
was open, not contai ned i n an envelope thus, open t o publ ic.
The victim of the l i bel ous l etter was i dentifi abl e as the subj ect letter-repl y was addressed t o
respondent himself.
We shal l then resol ve the issues raised by peti tioner as t o whether the imputati on i s
defamator y and mal icious.
In determini ng whether a statement i s defamatory, the words used are to be construed i n thei r
entiret y and should be taken i n their pl ai n, natural and ordi nar y meani ng as they woul d
naturall y be understood by persons reading them, unless i t appears that they were used and
understood i n another sense.
11

For the purpose of determini ng the meaning of any publ ication al leged to be li bel ous, we l ai d
down the rul e i nJi menez v. Reyes,
12
to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Mi nn., 341), the court had the fol lowi ng
to say on this poi nt: "In determini ng whether the specifi ed matter i s l i bel ous per se, two rul es
of construction are conspicuousl y appl icabl e: (1) That construction must be adopted which wi l l
gi ve to the matter such a meani ng as i s natural and obvi ous i n the plai n and ordi nar y sense i n
which the publ ic woul d natural l y understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter
al l eged t o be li bel ous must be construed as a whole."
In appl yi ng these rul es to the l anguage of an al leged l ibel, the court wi ll disregard any subtle
or ingeni ous expl anati on offered by the publ isher on being call ed to account. The whol e
question being the effect the publ ication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not
having been assisted by the offered explanati on i n reading the arti cle, i t comes too l ate t o
have t he effect of removi ng the sting, i f any there be, from the words used i n the
publicati on.
13

Gauging from the abovementi oned tests, the words used i n the l etter dated August 18, 1995
sent by peti ti oner to respondent i s defamatory. In usi ng words such as "l ousy", "i nutil e",
"carabao English", "stupi dit y", and "satan", the letter, as i t was written, casts aspersion on t he
character, integrit y and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicul e.
No evidence ali unde need be adduced to prove it. As t he CA sai d, these ver y words of
peti tioner have caused respondent t o publ ic ridicul e as even his own famil y have tol d him:
"Ginagawa ka l ang gago di to. "
14

Any of t he imputations covered by Articl e 353 i s defamator y; and, under the general rule l ai d
down i n Articl e 354, ever y defamator y imputation i s presumed t o be malici ous, even i f i t be
true, i f no good i ntenti on and j ustifi abl e moti ve for making i t i s shown. Thus, when the
imputation i s defamatory, the prosecuti on need not prove malice on t he part of petitioner
(malice i n fact), for the l aw already presumes that petitioners imputati on i s malici ous (malice
i n law).
15
A readi ng of peti tioner s subj ect letter-repl y showed that he malevol entl y casti gated
respondent for writi ng such a demand l etter t o Mrs. Qui ngco. There was nothi ng i n t he sai d
letter which showed peti ti oners good i ntenti on and j ustifi abl e motive for writi ng the same i n
order to overcome t he l egal inference of mal ice.


167

PROBATION LAW

VICOY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On August 24, 1995, MTCC of Tagbi l aran promul gated a j udgment of conviction
against Vicoy f or viol ation of Ci ty Ordi nance No. 365-B for peddli ng fish outsi de the Agora
Publ ic Market and of the crime of Resistance and Serious Disobedi ence To Agents Of A
Person In Authori t y.

Petitioner then fi led an appl icati on for probati on on the same day. On September 18, 1995,
however, peti ti oner fi led a moti on to withdraw her appl icati on for probati on and
simultaneousl y fi l ed a notice of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the peti ti on for certi orari was val i dl y dismissed by the RTC on the
ground of peti ti oners f ai l ure to compl y wi th i ts Order dated August 2, 1996.

HELD: Yes

RATIO: The trial court categorical l y directed petiti oner, i n its August 2, 1996 Order, to furnish
the Cit y Prosecutors Office with a copy of her memorandum and of the assai l ed j udgment.
Petitioners counsel di d not compl y, prompti ng the court to dismiss the pet iti on for certiorari.

Even assuming that the Regi onal Trial Court did not order the sai d dismissal, petitioner s
special civi l acti on, questioning the deni al of her notice of appeal, woul d sti l l fai l . Petiti oner
fil ed an applicati on for probation. Section 7, Rul e 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure i s
expl ici t that a j udgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has appl ied for
probation. This is total l y i n accord with Section 4 of Presi denti al Decree No. 968 (Probati on
Law of 1976, as amended), which in part provides that the fi l i ng of an appl ication for
probation is deemed a wai ver of the right to appeal . Thus, there was no more opportunit y f or
peti tioner to exercise her ri ght to appeal, the j udgment havi ng become final by the fi li ng of an
applicati on for probation.




PABLO vs. CASTILLO


FACT: Petiti oner Pabl o was charged with a vi ol ati on of Batas Pambansa Bi lang 22, otherwise
known as the Bounci ng Checks Law, i n three separate Informati ons, for issuing three bad
checks to compl ainant Mandap. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D, 94-00198-D
and 94-00199-D, respecti vel y, the three cases were not consol i dated. The first two were
raffled and assi gned to Branch 43 whi l e the third case to Branch 41 of the RTC in Dagupan
Ci t y.

ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of peti ti oner s appl icati on for probati on val id.

RULING: Yes

RATIO: Secti on 9 paragraph (c) of the Probati on Law, P.D. 968 provi des that those who have
previousl y been convicted by fi nal j udgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or fi ne of not l ess than two hundred pesos cannot avai l
of the benefi ts of probati on. It is a basic rule of statutor y construction that if a statute is clear,
pl ain and free from ambiguit y, it must be gi ven its l iteral meaning and appli ed without any
interpretation. Not onl y that; i n the matter of i nterpretati on of l aws on probati on, the Court has
pronounced that the pol icy of l i beral it y of probation statutes cannot prevai l against the
categorical provisions of the law.

168

In the present case of peti tioner, when she appl ied for probation i n Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
00197-D and 94-00198-D, she had a previous conviction in Criminal Case No. 94-00199-D,
which thereby disqualif i ed her from the benefits of probati on.





SANTOS VS. CA (G.R. No. 127899)

FACTS: Peti ti oner issued fifty-four (54) checks in the total amount of Three Mi l li on Ni ne
Hundred Ei ght y Nine Thousand One Hundred Sevent y-Fi ve and 10/100 (P3,989,175.10)
Pesos, al l of which checks were dishonored upon presentment to the drawee bank.

On October 12, 1993, the petiti oner was charged with fift y-four (54) counts of vi olati on of
Batas Pambansa Bi l ang 22 ("BP 22") in fift y-four (54) separate Informati ons, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 102009 to 102062, respecti vel y, before Branch 160 of the Regi onal Tri al
Court of Pasi g Ci t y. To the sai d accusations, peti tioner pleaded not gui lt y upon arraignment.
After tri al, she was found gui lt y in a Decision promul gated on December 20, 1994, sentenci ng
her to a total prison term of fifty-four (54) years and to pay P3,989,175.10 to the pri vate
respondent.

Petitioner therefore, fi l ed an appl icati on for probati on, which was ref erred by Presi ding Judge
Umali to the Probation Officer of Marikina, for investi gati on, report, and recommendati on.
Pri vate respondent opposed subj ect appl icati on for probation on the grounds that: the
peti tioner is not el i gi bl e for probation because she has been sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of fifty-four (54) years, and she fail ed to pay her j udgment debt to the pri vate
respondent.

The tri al court j udge approved the probati on but the Court of Appeals reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petiti oner is entitled to probati on.
RULING: No

RATIO: Probation is a j ust privi l ege the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. Before
granti ng probati on, the court must consi der the potenti ali t y of the offender to reform, together
wi th the demands of j ustice and public interest, al ong with other relevant
circumstances.
10
The courts are not to l imit the basis of their decisi on to the report or
recommendati on of the probation officer, which is at best onl y persuasi ve.

It can be gleaned unerringl y that petitioner has shown no remorse for the criminal acts she
committed agai nst the pri vate respondent. Her issui ng subj ect fift y-four (54) bounci ng checks
is a serious offense. To al low peti ti oner to be pl aced on probation woul d be to depreciate the
seri ousness of her mal efactions. Worse, instead of compl yi ng wi th the orders of the trial court
requiri ng her to pay her ci vil l iabil i t y, she even resorted to devious schemes to evade the
execution of the j udgment agai nst her. Veril y, petitioner is not the penitent offender who is
el i gi ble for probati on wi thi n legal contempl ation. Her demeanor manifested that she i s
incapabl e to be reformed and wi l l onl y be a menace to soci et y shoul d she be permitted to co-
mingl e wi th the public.









169

Peopl e v. Que Mi ng Kha

Facts:
On May 16, 1997, members Central Pol ice District recei ved a phone cal l from an i nformant
that a bl ue Ki a Pregi o van with pl ate number UPN 595 which was being used i n the transport
of shabu has been seen withi n the vici nit y of Barangay Hol y Spirit, Quezon Ci t y. A tem was
immedi atel y dispatched to the reported pl ace.

Around 5:00 o' clock in the afternoon, the team spotted the blue Ki a van on the opposite si de
of the street goi ng toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching
Commonwealth Avenue, i n front of Andok' s Li tson Manok, the van hi t. A concerned motorist
picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital .

When the pol ice final l y intercepted the van, they i ntroduced themselves as pol ice officers to
the dri ver and passenger of the van and i nformed them that they committed the crime of
reckless imprudence and asked for his dri ver' s l icense. The police noted that Go was on the
dri ver' s seat whi le Que sat on the passenger' s seat.

The pol ice peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the
floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and noticed that it contai ned
several pl astic bags contai ning whi te crystal l ine substance.

The arresting officers thereafter forwarded the sei zed substance to the PNP Crime Laborator y
for examinati on. Each of the ni ne sacks contai ned 253 plastic bags which contai ned around
one kilo of the whi te crystall i ne substance.

Upon examination, the substance was found
positi ve for methamphetamine hydrochl ori de or shabu.
5


Both Go and Que cl aim i gnorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the van.

Issue: Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act

Held:

The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but acquitted appellant
Que.

It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the time of its
discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated drug without authority which is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated
drug."
To exonerate himself, Go cl aimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband at
the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under consi derati on i s malum
prohibitum. I n such case, the lack of criminal i ntent and good faith do not exempt the accused
from criminal l i abi l it y. Thus, Go' s contenti on that he di d not know that there were il l egal drugs
insi de the van cannot constitute a val id defense. Mere possession and/or deli ver y of a
regulated drug wi thout l egal authorit y i s punishabl e under the Dangerous Drugs Act
Regarding the criminal liability of appellant Que, the Supreme Court acquitted Que. Que had nothing
to do with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness pointed to him as having been
with Go inside the van when it hit Elmar Cawiling. No less than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt
on the guilt of Que and recommends his acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's
guilt, the Court should listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.

In People v. Pagaura, the Supreme Court made a cautionary warning that "the court must be extra
vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually heavy penalties for drug
170

offenses. In our criminal justice system the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
























































171

ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES

Serena v. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
Petitioner Hannah Euni ce D. Serana was a seni or student of the UP-Cebu. She was appoi nted
by then Presi dent Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve
a one- year term starting Januar y 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
On September 4, 2000, peti ti oner, with her si bl ings and relati ves, regi stered wi th the SEC t he
Office of t he Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the proj ects of t he OSRFI was
the renovation of the Vi nzons Hal l Annex.

Presi dent Estrada gave P15,000,000 to the OSRFI as fi nanci al assistance for the proposed
renovati on. The source of the funds was the Office of t he Presi dent. However, the renovati on
of Vi nzons Hal l Annex fai l ed t o materi ali ze.

The succeedi ng student regent, Kristine Cl are Bugayong, and Christine Jil l De Guzman,
Secretar y General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide all i ance of student counci ls withi n
the state uni versit y, consequentl y f il ed a complai nt for Mal versati on of Publ ic Funds and
Propert y wi th t he Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found probable cause t o indi ct petitioner and her brother Jade I an D. Serana
for estafa and fil ed the case to the Sandi ganbayan.

Petitioner moved to quash the i nformati on. She cl aimed that the Sandi ganbayan does not
have any j urisdicti on over the offense charged or over her person, i n her capacit y as UP
student regent. The Sandiganbayan denied peti tioners moti on for l ack of merit. Peti tioner
fil ed a moti on for reconsideration but was deni ed with fi nal i ty.
Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the estafa case filed against petitioner, a student regent
of UP

Held:
The rul e i s wel l -establ ished i n this j urisdi cti on that statutes shoul d recei ve a sensi ble
constructi on so as t o avoid an unj ust or an absurd concl usi on.

Every secti on, provisi on or
clause of t he statute must be expounded by reference t o each other i n order t o arrive at t he
effect contempl ated by the legisl ature.


Evidentl y, from the provisi ons of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has
j urisdiction over other f eloni es committed by publ ic offici als i n rel ati on t o their office.
Plai nl y, estafa i s one of those other fel oni es. The j urisdiction i s si mpl y subj ect t o the twin
requirements that (a) the offense i s committed by public officials and employees mentioned i n
Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense i s committed i n relati on
to their office.
Petitioner falls under the j urisdicti on of the Sandi ganbayan, even i f she does not have a
sal ar y grade 27, as she is placed there by express provisi on of l aw.


Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 expl ictl y vested the Sandiganbayan wi th j urisdicti on over
Presi dents, directors or trustees, or managers of government -owned or control led
172

corporati ons, state uni versi ti es or educati onal i nstituti ons or foundati ons. Petitioner fall s
under this categor y.

As the Sandi ganbayan poi nted out, the BOR performs functi ons simil ar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporati on. By express mandate of l aw, petiti oner is, i ndeed, a publ ic
officer as contempl ated by P.D. No. 1606.






Chang v. Peopl e

Facts:
Petitioner Roberto Estanislao Chang (Chang) was the Municipal Treasurer of Makati who was tasked
to, among other things, examine or investigate tax returns of private corporations or companies operating
within Makati, and determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of Income Tax assessed on them and collect
payments therefor. Petitioner Pacifico San Mateo was the Chief of Operations, Business Revenue
Examination, Audit Division, Makati Treasurer's Office.

Makati Treasurer's Office examiners Vivian Susan Yu and Leonila Azevedo conducted an
examination of the books of accounts and other pertinent records of GDI, and found that GDI incurred a tax
deficiency inclusive of penalty in the total amount of P494,601.

The Office of the Treasurer thus issued an Initial Assessment Notice dated January 25, 1991 to GDI
for it to pay the tax deficiency within four days from receipt.

No word having been received by the Office of the Treasurer from GDI, it issued a Second
Assessment Notice 6 dated February 14, 1991, reminding GDI to settle the amount due within three days
from receipt.

The assessment notices were personally received by Mario Magat, Chief Operating Officer of GDI, in
April 1991.

Magat was later able to talk via telephone to San Mateo who had been calling GDI's Accounting
Department and requesting for someone with whom he could talk to regarding the assessment.

On May 15, 1991, Magat and San Mateo met for lunch at the Makati Sports Club. 8 Chang later
joined the two, and the three agreed that if GDI could pay P125,000 by the end of May 1991, the assessment
would be "resolved."

During their second meeting, on May 29, 1991, petitioners offered GDI that if they could pay
P125,000, the tax would be settled. Thinking that it was the right tax assessment, GDI prepared P125,000 in
check. Petitioners made it clear that it was not the tax due and gave two options: either to pay the petitioners
P125,000 or pay the Municipality P494,000.

GDI then alerted the NBI and the petitioners were caught in an entrapment operation.

Issue: Whether the petitioners were guilty of corrupt practices under Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019

Held:
Section 3(b) of the Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provi des:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of publ ic officers. In addi tion to acts or omissi ons of public
officers already penal i zed by existing law, the foll owi ng shall consti tute corrupt practices of
any publ ic officer and are hereby declared to be unl awful:
xxx xxx xxx
173

(b) Directl y or indirectl y requesti ng or recei ving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benef it, for himself or for any other person, i n connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other part y, wherei n the publ ic officer i n his offici al capacit y
has to intervene under the law.

The el ements of vi olati on of Section 3(b) of the Anti -Graft and Corrupt Practices Act are:
the offender is a publ ic officer
who requested or recei ved a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit
on behalf of the offender or any other person
in connecti on with a contract or transaction wi th the government
in which the public of ficer, i n an offici al capacit y under the law, has the ri ght to
intervene.

In this case, all the above-stated elements were satisfactori l y establ ished by the prosecution.

Petitioners were undisputedl y publ ic officers at the time of the commission of the offense.
Mere denial by the petiti oners refusal to request anything from GDI to settle i ts assess ed
defici ency is contrar y to evidence since San Mateo met Magat on vari ous meeti ngs to
negotiate the settl ement of the assessed def ici ency tax. Petitioners tol d to Magat that GDI
onl y had two opti ons to prevent the cl osure of the company, ei ther to pay the assessed
amount of P494,601 to the Munici pal it y, or pay the amount of P125,000 to them.

Furthermore, the prosecution was able to establ ish beyond reasonabl e doubt the presence of
conspiracy between San Mateo and Chang. The burden of the evi dence havi ng shifted to him,
it was i ncumbent for Chang to present evi dence to controvert the prosecution evidence. He
opted not to, however. He is thus deemed to have wai ved his right to present evidence i n his
defense.































174


ILLEGAL POSSESSION

Sayco vs People

Facts: Peti tioner is a pl anter

who was recruited to assist i n the counter -i nsurgency campaign
of the AFP.

He offered no evi dence that he is in the regul ar pl antil l a of the AFP or that he i s
recei ving regul ar compensation from said agency. He presented the fol lowi ng evidence: 1.
Memorandum Recei pt for Equi pment; 2. Missi on Orders. He was convicted of i ll egal
possessi on of firearms.

Sayco i nsists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Phi l ippines (AFP), and
it was i n that capacit y that he recei ved the subj ect firearm and ammuniti ons from the AFP. As
sai d firearm and ammuniti ons are government propert y dul y l icensed to the Intel l igence
Securit y Group (ISG) of the AFP, the same coul d not be l icensed under his name, instead,
what he obtai ned were a Memorandum Recei pt and a Mission Order whereby ISG entrusted to
him the subj ect firearm and ammuniti ons and authori zed him to carry the same around
Bacolod Ci t y. Petitioner further argues that he merel y acted i n good faith when he rel ied on
the Memorandum Recei pt and Mission Order for authorit y to carr y sai d firearm and
ammuniti ons; thus, it woul d be a grave i nj ustice if he were to be punished for the def ici e ncy of
sai d documents.

Issue: WON the peti ti oner, who is not in the regular planti l la of the AFP nor recei ve regul ar
compensation from AFP is l icensd to carr y the subj ect firearm and ammunition.

Held: Sayco cannot be consi dered a regular ci vi l i an agent but a mere confi denti al ci vi l ian
agent. As such, he was not authori zed to recei ve the subj ect government -owned f irearm and
ammuniti ons. The memorandum recei pt he signed to account for sai d government properti es
di d not l egi timi ze his possessi on thereof. The rul es governi ng memorandum receipts and
mission orders covering the issuance to and the possession and/or carryi ng of government -
owned firearms by speci al or confi denti al ci vil i an agents may be synthesi zed as fol lows:

First, speci al or confi dential ci vi l ian agents who are not incl uded in the regular pl antil l a of any
government agency i nvol ved i n l aw enforcement or recei vi ng regul ar compensati on for
services rendered are not exempt from the requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a permit to carr y the same
outsi de of resi dence;

Second, sai d special or conf identi al ci vi l i an agents are not qual ifi ed to recei ve, obtai n and
possess government -owned firearms. Their inel i gi bi li t y wi l l not be cur ed by the issuance of a
memorandum recei pt for equipment coveri ng said government -owned firearms. Neither wi ll
they qual if y for exempti on from the requirements of a regular firearms l icense and a permit to
carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-owned firearms covered by a
memorandum receipt; and

Third, sai d speci al or confi denti al ci vi l i an agents do not qual if y f or mission orders to carry
firearms (whether pri vate- owned or government -owned) outsi de of their resi dence.

The foregoing rules do not appl y to speci al or confi denti al ci vil i an agents i n possession of or
bearing pri vate-owned firearms that are dul y l icensed and covered by permits to carry the
same outsi de of resi dence. Set against the foregoing rul es, it is cl ear that petiti oner is not
authori zed to possess and carr y the subj ect firearm and ammuni ti on, notwi thstandi ng the
memorandum recei pt and mission order which were i ll egal l y issued to him.





175

People v. Comadre (G. R. No. 153559)

Facts: At around 7:00 oclock in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanl og, Jimmy
Wabe, Gerry Bul landay, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugeni o were havi ng a drinki ng spree on the
terrace of the house of Roberts father, Jaime Agbanl og. Jaime was seated on the banister of
the terrace l isteni ng to the conversati on of the companions of his son.

As the drinki ng session went on, Robert and the others noticed appel lants Antoni o Comadre,
George Comadre and Dani l o Lozano walking. The three stopped i n front of the house. While
his compani ons l ooked on, Antonio suddenl y lobbed an obj ect which fel l on the roof of the
terrace. Appel l ants immedi atel y f led by scali ng the fence of a nearby school .

The obj ect, which turned out to be a hand grenade, expl oded ripping a hol e i n the roof of the
house. Robber Agbanl og and his compani ons were hi t by shrapnel and sl umped unconsci ous
on the floor. They were al l rushed to the hospi tal for medical treatment. However, Robert
Agbanl og died before reachi ng the hospital for wounds sustained which the grenade explosion
inf licted. Roberts compani ons sustained shrapnel i nj uries.

The appel l ants were arrested t he fol l owing day but denied any parti cipati on i n the incident,
claimed they were elsewhere when t he i ncident occurred and that they had no animosi t y
towards t he victims whatsoever.

After tri al, the court a quo convicted appel lants of the complex crime of Murder with Mul tiple
Attempted Murder for havi ng conspiri ng, confederati ng and mutual l y hel ping one another, with
intent t o ki ll and by means of treacher y and wi th the use of an explosi ve.


Issue: Whether or not the use of expl osi ve qual ifies the crime to murder?

Whether or not appel l ants conspired to kil l the victims?

Held: Yes, the kill i ng by means of explosi ves qualif ies the crime to murder. The information
al l eges that both treacher y and the use of expl osi ve attended the crime.

Since both circumstances can qualif y the kil l i ng to murder under Articl e 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, the Supreme Court held that when the ki ll i ng is perpetrated with treacher y and
by means of expl osi ves, the l atter shal l be considered as a qual if yi ng circumstance. Not onl y
does j urisprudencesupport this vi ew but also, since the use of explosi ves is the pri nci pal
mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qual if y the offense
instead of treacher y which wi l l then be rel egated merel y as a generic aggravati ng
circumstance.

No, there was no conspiracy. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was i n
the act of throwi ng the hand grenade, George Comadre and Dani l o Lozano merel y l ooked on
wi thout utteri ng a si ngl e word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him.

A conspiracy must be establ ished by positi ve and conclusi ve evi dence. It must be shown to
exist as clearl y and convi ncingl y as the commission of t he crime i tself. Mere presence of a
person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends
companionshi p.

The evi dence shows that George Comadre and Dani l o Lozano di d not have any participati on
in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the
scene of the crime as wel l as their cl ose relationshi p with Antoni o are i nsufficient to establ i sh
conspiracy consi deri ng that they performed no positi ve act i n furtherance of the crime. There
bei ng no conspiracy, onl y Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.
176

People vs Tadeo

Facts: RA 8294 took effect onl y on 6 Jul y 1994 whil e the crimes i nvol ved herei n were
committed on 4 November 1993. Sai d RA decriminali zed vi olations of PD 1866 where the
unl icensed f irearm is used i n carr yi ng out the commission of other cri mes -

Sec. 1. Unlawf ul Manufacture, Sal e, Acquisi ti on, Disposi tion or Possessi on of Firearms or
Ammuni ti on or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammuni ti on. - The penal t y of prisi on correccional i n its maximum peri od and a fine of not l ess
than Fifteen Thousand pesos ( P15,000) shal l be imposed upon any person who shal l
unl awful l y manufacture, deal i n, acquire, dispose, or possess any l ow powered firearm, such
as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammuniti on, or machiner y, tool or i nstrument used or intended to be used i n the manufacture
of any f irearm or ammunition. Provi ded, that no other crime was committed x x x x If
homici de or murder is committed wi th the use of an unl icensed f i rearm, such use of an
unl icensed f irearm shal l be considered as an aggravati ng circumstance.

Issue: WON the use of unlicensed firearm can be appreciated as a speaci al aggravati ng
circumstance i n the instant case

Held: The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be consi dered however as a special
aggravati ng circumstance i n Crim. Case No. 23-498 and Crim. Case No. 23-494. For one, i t
was not al l eged as an aggravati ng circumstance i n the Informati ons for murder and frustrated
murder which is necessar y under our present Revised Rules of Cri mi nal Procedure. Moreover,
even if al leged, the circumstance cannot be retroacti vel y appl i ed to prej udice accused-
appel l ant; it must be stressed that. In any event, as correctl y observed by the Sol ici tor
General , there is no evidence provi ng the i l li cit character of the .38 cal . revol ver used by
appel l ant i n kil li ng Mayol i to Cabatu and i n tr yi ng to kil l Florenci a Cabatu, as to which req uisi te
of the crime the record is eeri l y si lent.

The foregoi ng amendments obviousl y bl ur the distincti ons between murder and homici de on
one hand, and qual ifi ed i ll egal possession of firearms used in murder or homici de on the
other. We have decl ared that the formul ation in RA 8294, i .e., "[i ]f homici de or murder i s
committed with the use of an unl icensed firearm, such use of an unl i censed firearm shal l be
considered as an aggravati ng circumstance," signifies a l egislati ve i ntent to treat as a si ngle
offense the i l legal possessi on of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the
use of an unl icensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an unl icensed firearm in
committi ng homicide or murder, he may no l onger be charged with what used to be the t wo (2)
separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal Code and qualif ied il l egal
possessi on of firearms used in homicide or murder under PD 1866; i n other words, where
murder or homici de was committed, the penalty f or il l egal possessi on of firearms is no longer
imposable si nce it becomes merel y a speci al aggravati ng circumstance.








177

ANTI-PIRACY (PD 532)
PEOPLE vs. AGOMO-O (G.R. No. 131829)
Facts: On the eveni ng of September 22, 1993, a passenger j eepney dri ven was stopped by
three men, among them was the accused i n this case, Ronnie Agomo-o, who, armed wi th a
gun, announced a hold-up and ordered the dri ver to turn off the engine.
As a consequence of gunshots fired during t he hol d-up, the dri ver of the j eep di ed whi le f ew
of i ts passengers were wounded.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appel l ants are gui l ty of highway robber y?
Held: Hi ghway robber y i s now governed by P.D. No. 532, otherwise known as t he Anti -Piracy
and Anti -Hi ghway Robber y Law of 1974. This l aw provi des:
Sec. 2. (e). Highway Robbery/Bri gandage. The sei zure of any person for ransom, extorti on
or other unl awful purposes, or the taki ng away of the propert y of another by means of
viol ence agai nst or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unl awful means,
committed by any person on any Phi l ippine highway.
In the case of Peopl e v. Puno, i t was held that P.D. No. 532 amended Art. 306 of the Revised
Penal Code and that i t i s no l onger required that there be at least four armed persons forming
a band of robbers. The number of offenders i s no longer an essential el ement of the crime of
hi ghway robber y. Hence, t he fact that there were onl y three identifi ed perpetrators i s of no
moment. P.D. No. 532 onl y requires proof that persons were organi zed for the purpose of
committi ng hi ghway robber y i ndiscriminatel y. "The robber y must be di rected not onl y agai nst
specific, intended or preconcei ved victims, but agai nst any and al l prospecti ve victims." In
this case, the accused, intendi ng to commit robber y, waited at t he Barangay Mapi l i crossing
for any vehicl e that woul d happen t o travel al ong that road. The dri ver Rodi to Lasap and hi s
passengers were not predetermined targets. Rather, t hey became the accused' s victims
because they happened t o be travel i ng at t he time when the accused were there. There was,
thus, randomness i n the sel ection of the victims, or the act of committi ng robber y
indiscriminatel y, which differenti ates this case from that of a simple robber y wi th homici de.










178

PEOPLE vs. CERBITO (G. R. No. 126397)
Facts: On the 3rd day of September 1992 at around 2:20 p.m. the passengers of a Phil i ppi ne
Rabbit Bus travel l i ng on the North Expressway on i ts way t o Mani l a were victimi zed i n a hol d-
up committed by four men who boarded the bus as i t was approachi ng the Tabang tol l gate. A
pol iceman who was a passenger i n t he bus shot one of the hol duppers. The pol iceman was
shot i n turn by another hol dupper; the pol iceman di ed.
After these accused di vested her co-passengers of their cash and belongi ngs, Jimboy poi nted
the gun to the dri ver and Vicente Acedera was also near him was seated at the ri ght side of
the dri ver, whil e Cerbito was di vesti ng al l passengers.
The accused raised the defense of denial and al i bi . The lower court convicted the accused
gui lt y beyond reasonabl e doubt of t he crime of robber y wi th homicide penali zed under PD
532.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appell ants were correctl y convicted by the l ower court of
the crime of robber y wi th homici de under PD532.
Held: After a careful examinati on of the entire evi dence, the SC resol ved to affirm the
j udgment of convicti on. SC agreed wi th the tri al courts rej ecti on of t he defense of al i bi for t he
reason that said defense cannot prevai l over the posi ti ve identifi cation made by t he two
eyewi tnesses presented by t he prosecuti on. Confronted with contradictor y decl arati ons and
statements, the trial court cannot be faulted for gi ving greater wei ght t o the positi ve
testimonies of t he wi tnesses who have not been shown to have any motive to falsel y impl icate
the accused-appell ants, and whose credi bil it y has not been pl aced i n doubt. Al i bi has
general l y been regarded with disfavor by the court because i t i s easi l y f abricated and we have
no reason to deviate from this rul e.
Hi ghway robbery/bri gandage i s defined i n Secti on 2(e) of P. D. 532 enti tl ed "Anti -Piracy and
Anti -Highway Robbery Law" as "(t)he sei zure of any person for ransom, extorti on or other
unl awful purposes, or the taking away of the propert y of another by means of viol ence against
or intimidati on of person or force upon thi ngs or other unl awful means, committed by any
person on any Phil i ppi ne Hi ghway." The robber y must be directed not onl y agai nst specific,
intended or preconcei ved victims, but against any and al l prospecti ve victims. Al l t he above
el ements were established.



















179


BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22


GARCIA VS. CA G.R. No. 138197


FACTS:
Sometime in 1994, peti ti oner Ma. El i za C. Garci a introduced herself as a stockbroker to
pri vate compl ai nant Carl Valenti n and convi nced him to invest in the stock market.
Consequentl y, Garci a purchased and sol d shares of stocks for the account of Val entin as
evi denced by the purchase and sal e confirmati on sl i ps issued to him by petitioner.

In the course of their busi ness deal i ngs, petiti oner Garcia issued to pri vate complai nant
Val entin, two checks drawn agai nst Ci t y Trust Banking Corporati on . Both checks were
payabl e to pri vate complai nant. Upon presentment of the checks for payment, the drawee
bank dishonored them for the reason "account cl osed..". Val entin notifi ed petiti oner of the
dishonor and the latter promised to pay the val ue thereof wi thi n a peri od of three (3) months.
Thereafter, peti ti oner gave Carl Valenti n a check in the amount of P100,000. However, the
sai d check bounced.

Despi te repeated demands, peti ti oner fai led to pay her obli gation.Thus, pri vate compl ainant
fil e an action agai nst her i n the Metropol itan Trial Court of Pasi g Cit y, Branch 69 for vi olati on
of B.P. 22.

After trial , the Metropol i tan Tri al Court of Pasi g Ci t y rendered a verdict of conviction.On
appeal, the Regi onal Trial Court in Pasig Cit y affirmed the lower court s decision.

Petitioner el evated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of peti ti on for review which the
respondent court deni ed in the first assai l ed decisi on, affirming the tri al courts decisi on.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Ma. El i za C. Garci a has been erroneousl y convicted and
sentenced for vi olati on of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Bil ang 22).

HELD: Yes.
The elements of the vi ol ati on of B.P. 22 are: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any
check to appl y on account or for val ue; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he
does not have suffici ent funds i n or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in ful l upon i ts presentment; and (3) the check is subsequentl y dishonored by the drawee
bank for insuffici ency of funds or credit or woul d have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, wi thout any val i d reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
14

We find the foregoing el ements present i n thi s case. Petitioner issued Ci t y Trust Check No.
057066, dated Januar y 8, 1996, i n the amount of P323,113.50 and payabl e to Carl Val enti n,
representi ng proceeds of his stock market investments which she brokered. She also issued
for the same purpose Ci t y Trust Check No. 057067, dated Januar y 24, 1996, i n the amount
of P146,886.50 also payable to Carl Valenti n. It is undisputed that she di d not have suffici ent
funds to cover the checks at the time she issued it. The checks, which were deposited on the
date indicated on each, were subsequentl y di shonored because the account from which the
money should have been drawn against was closed by peti ti oner. Despite demands made on
her by pri vate compl ai nant to pay the val ue of the check, peti ti oner fai l ed to pay. Neither di d
she make arrangements for payment in ful l of the checks by the bank wi thin f ive banking days
after notice of dishonor so as to absol ve her of any li abi l it y f or issui ng a bounci ng check.



180

LIM vs. PEOPLE
GR. 149276. September 27, 2002

FACTS: In December 1991, peti ti oner spouses issued to pri vate respondent two postdated
checks, namel y, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated Januar y 15, 1992 i n the amount of
P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated Januar y 22, 1992 in the amount of
P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for havi ng been drawn
against i nsufficient funds whi le check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon
request of petiti oners who promised to repl ace the dishonored check.
An Informati on for the crime of estafa was fi led wi th the RTC agai nst peti tioners. Thereafter,
the tri al court issued a warrant for the arrest of herei n peti tioners,
Petitioner Jovenci o Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the tri al court
and was detained at the Quezon Cit y Jai l . However, peti tioner Teresi ta Lim remained at
large.
Petitioners contend that, (by virtue of BP22) i nasmuch as the amount of the subj ect check i s
P365,750, they can be penali zed wi th reclusi on perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. Thi s
penal ty, accordi ng to peti ti oners, is too severe and disproporti onate to the crime they
committed and i nfri nges on the express mandate of Articl e III, Secti on 19 of the Constituti on
which prohi bits the i nfl i cti on of cruel, degrading and i nhuman punishment.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 818 viol ates the constitutional provisi ons on due process, bai l and
imposi ti on of cruel , degradi ng or i nhuman puni shment.
HELD: The Court uphol ds the consti tuti onal it y of PD 818RATIO
RATIO
PD 818 secti on 1 provi des;
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts as defined i n paragraph 2(d) of Articl e 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shal l be punished by:
1
st
. The penalt y of reclusi on temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum, t he penalt y
provided i n this paragraph shall be imposed i n i ts maximum peri od, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos but the total penal t y which may be imposed shall i n no case exceed
thirt y years. In such cases, and i n connection wi th the accessory penal ti es which may be
imposed under the Revi sed Penal Code, the penalt y shall be termedreclusi on perpetua;
2
nd
. The penalt y of pri sion mayor in its maxi mum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3
r d
. The penal t y of prision mayor i n its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4
t h
. By prision mayor i n its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.
181

Settl ed is the rule that a punishment author i zed by statute is not cruel, degradi ng or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unl ess it is flagrantl y and pl ai nl y oppressive and
whol l y disproporti onate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
communit y. It takes more than merel y being harsh, excessi ve, out of proportion or severe for
a penal t y to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this pri nci ple, the Court has
consistentl y overrul ed contentions of the def ense that the penalt y of fine or imprisonment
authori zed by the statute invol ved i s cruel and degrading.
Petitioners also argue that whi l e PD 818 i ncreased the imposable penalti es for estafa
committed under Articl e 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it di d not increase the
amounts correspondi ng to the sai d new penalties. Thus, the ori ginal amounts provided for i n
the Revised Penal Code have remained the same notwi thstanding that they have become
negli gibl e and i nsi gnificant compared to the present value of the peso.
Cl earl y, the i ncrease i n the penal ty, far from bei ng cruel and degradi ng, was moti vated by a
laudable purpose, namel y, to effectuate the repressi on of an evil that undermines the
countr y s commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precauti on to deter
peopl e from issui ng bounci ng checks. The fact that PD 818 di d not increase the amounts
correspondi ng to the new penalti es onl y proves that the amount is immateri al and
inconsequential. What the l aw sought to avert was the prol iferation of estafa cases
committed by means of bounci ng checks. Taking into account the sal utar y purpose for which
sai d law was decreed, we concl ude that PD 818 does not viol ate Secti on 19 of Article III of
the Constituti on.
Moreover, when a l aw is questi oned before the Court, the presumption is i n favor of its
consti tuti onal it y. To j ustif y i ts nul l ification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of
the Constituti on, not a doubtful and argumentati ve one. The burden of provi ng the invali dit y of
a l aw rests on those who chal l enge i t. In this case, peti tioners fai l ed to present cl ear and
convinci ng proof to defeat the presumpti on of consti tuti onal it y of PD 818.
With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 i nfringes on Section 1 of Articl e III of the
Constituti on, petiti oners claim that PD 818 i s viol ati ve of the due process cl ause of the
Constituti on as it was not publ ished in the Official Gazette. This cl aim is i ncorrect and must
be rej ected. Publicati on, being an indispensabl e part of due process, is imperati ve to the
val i di t y of l aws, presidenti al decr ees and executi ve orders. PD 818 was published i n the
Official Gazette on December 1, 1975.




















182

Domagsang v. CA

Facts: The petiti oner was convicted of 18 counts of vi olati on of BP22. It woul d appear that
the peti tioner approached complai nant Ignaci o Garcia, an Assi stantVice President of
METROBANK, to ask for financi al assistance. Garci a accommodated peti ti oner and gave him
a loan i n the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange, the petitioner issued and del i vered to the
complai nant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the l oan. When the checks were, i n
time, deposi ted, the instruments were al l dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason:
Account closed. The complai nant demanded payment all egedl y by cal l ing up peti tioner at
her office. Fai l ing to recei ve any payment for the val ue of the dishonored checks, the
complai nant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedl y wrote peti tioner a letter of
demand but that the l atter i gnored the demand.

During trial, the notice of dishonor was not offered i n evi dence.

Issue: Whether or not conviction of a viol ation of BP 22 is proper.

Held: The convicti on is not proper. Penal statutes are strictl y construed against the State. In
this case, a demand l etter was sent by a counsel of the compl ainant because of the fai lure
of the prosecuti on to formall y offer it i n evidence. Courts are bound to consi der as part of the
evi dence onl y those which are formal l y offered for j udges must base their fi ndi ngs strictl y on
the evidence submitted by the parti es at the tri al . Without the wri tten notice of dishonor, there
can be no basis for establ ishi ng the presence of "actual knowledge of i nsufficiency of funds."

The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be the foll owi ng: (1) the making, drawi ng
and issuance of any check to appl y for account or for val ue; (2) the knowl edge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have suffici ent funds i nor credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon i ts presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for i nsuffici ency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any val id cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment. There is deemed to be a pri ma facie evidence of knowl edge on the part of
the maker, drawer or issuer of i nsuffici ency of funds i n or credi t wi th the drawee bank of the
check issued if the dishonored check is presented wi thi n 90 days from the date of the check
and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement wi th the drawee bank
for that purpose. The statute has created the prima faci e presumpti on evidentl y because
"knowl edge" which invol ves a state of mind woul d be difficul t to establ ish. The presumpti on
does not hol d, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon or make sarrangement for payment in ful l by the drawee bank
of such check withi n 5 banking days after recei vi ng notice that such check has not been pai d
by the drawee bank


















183

Anti-Wire Tapping
Navarro v. CA

Facts: Two local medi a men, Stanl ey Jalbuena, Enrique Li ngan went to the pol ice station to
report an all edged i ndecent show in one of the ni ght establishment i n the Cit y. At the stati on,
a heated confrontati on foll owed between Li ngan and Navarro who was then having dri nks
outsi de the headquarters. Lingan was hit by the handl e of the accused' s gun below the l eft
eyebrow, foll owed by a fist bl ow which resul ted i n his death. The exchange of words was
recorded on tape, specifical l y the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation
that i t was the victim who provoked the fi ght. Duri ng the tri al, Jal buena testifi ed and
presented i n evi dence the voice recordi ng he had made of the heated discussi on at the pol ice
stati on between the pol ice officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken wi thout
the knowl edge of the two.

Issue: Whether or not the voice recording is admissibl e i n evidence i n vi ew of RA 4200, whi ch
prohibits wire tapping.

Held: Yes. The law prohi bits the overhearing, i ntercepti ng, or recording of pri vate
communications (Rami rez v Court of Appeal s, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Li ngan was not pri vate, i ts tape recordi ng is not prohibited.


















184

DANGEROUS DRUG ACT

People v. Burton

Facts:

In the evening of December 26, 1992, appellant William Burton y Robert, a British national, checked
in at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), Pasay City, for his trip to Sydney, Australia.

The appellant had two pieces of luggage with him which he passed through the x-ray machine at the
departure area of the airport. However, the machine showed certain portions of the sidings of one bag and the
bottom of the other to be dark in color, making its operator to suspect that something illegal was inside them.
Upon the request of the Customs examiner in the NAIA to whom the x-ray finding was referred, appellant
removed all his belongings from the travelling bags. The two bags of the accused were then subjected to
another x-ray examination. The same finding was revealed.

The appellant, together with his two pieces of baggage, was brought to the Customs Office at the
NAIA, where, with his consent, the sidings of one bag and the bottom of the other were slashed open. Found
inside, sandwiched between thin plastic slabs attached to the upper and lower sides of one bag, and forming
the false bottom of the other, were 12 rectangular bricks and 1 square brick of dark brown materials, each
with a thickness of about 1/3 of an inch. Their total weight was 5.6 kilos.

During his investigation, the accused was observed to be walking in an uneasy manner. Suspecting
that there was something hidden in his shoes, the investigator requested Burton to remove his shoes to which
the accused consented. Retrieved from inside the shoes, hidden between their soles and the upper covers,
were four (4) blocks, each about one-fourth (1/4) of an inch thick, of the same dark brown substance shaped
according to the contour of the soles of the shoes. The articles taken from the two bags and from the pair of
shoes of the accused were suspected to be marijuana or 'hashish' by the Customs and the police
investigators. Representative samples of the substance were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for examination.

The NBI Forensic Chemistry Division and the PNP-Crime Laboratory Service found the materials to
be 'hashish', a derivative of marijuana. This substance is a prohibited drug. (Sec. 2(e)(1 )(i), Republic Act No.
6425)"

Appellant William Robert Burton, a British national, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, for attempting to transport 5.6 kilograms of hashish, a prohibited drug, through the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport.

Issue: Whether there is animus possidendi of prohibited drugs to convict appellant under PD 1675

Held:

Section 4 of Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1675 penalizes the acts of selling, administering, delivering, giving away to another, distributing, dispatching
in transit or transporting any prohibited drug. While sale and delivery are given technical meanings under said
Act, transportation, distribution and dispensation are not defined. However, in indictments for violation of said
provision, the prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the accused committed any of
said unlawful acts at a particular time, date and place.

Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of
an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus
possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the
prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may
and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that appellant has animus possidendi of prohibited drugs at the
time of the arrest. Appellants excuse is undeserving of credence as it is contrary to common experience. The
185

Court also finds incredible appellant's allegation that he had no idea that the luggage and rubber shoes he
"purchased" from a certain John Parry contained prohibited drugs. A mere uncorroborated claim of the
accused that he did not know that he had a prohibited drug in his possession is insufficient. Any evasion, false
statement, or attempt at concealment on his part, in explaining how the drug came into his possession, may
be considered in determining his guilt.

The 5.6 kilos of hashish cleverly and painstakingly concealed inside appellant's luggage and rubber
shoes can be said to be in the possession and control of appellant with his knowledge. Not only were the
blocks and bars of the prohibited drug of a considerable amount, but they were placed inside three different
objects in order to escape detection by the authorities.

In several cases, the Court has held that possession of a considerable quantity of marijuana cannot
indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said prohibited drug.

Similarly, in the case People vs. Alfonso, the Court disregarded a similar excuse, saying that if it were
true that the accused was not really the owner and that he simply accepted the errand from one who was not
even a friend, the explanation, standing by itself, is too trite and hackneyed to be accepted at its face value,
since it is obviously contrary to human experience.