1. On this issue appellant argue that Republic Act No.

601, which imposed the 17% foreign

exchange tax, was erroneously interpreted by the Monetary Board; that said act is indeed so
difficult of interpretation that its application could not be definitely understood until the decision of
the Court in the case of Philippine National Bank vs. Zulueta


G.R. No. L-15225 April 29, 1961
C. G. NAZARIO & SONS, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendants-appellees.
Martin B. Laurea and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Balbao and Evangelista and Ramon de los Reyes for defendants-appellees.
LABRADOR, J .:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Froilan Bayona, presiding, dismissing
the complaint.
The complaint was filed by C. G. Nazario & Sons, Inc., on December 8, 1958, and seeks to recover from
the Central Bank the sum of P17,287.53, representing the 17% special tax on foreign exchange sold to
plaintiff by the Philippine National Bank between May 10, 1951 and May 29, 1951. Said tax was collected
by virtue of the provisions of Republic Act No. 601, which took effect on March 28, 1951.
Upon being summoned the Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain the case and that the right of action was already barred by the Statute of
Limitations. It is shown in the motion that upon expiration of Republic Act No. 601, as amended, on
December 31, 1955, the said special excise tax of 17% collected by the Central Bank which had not yet
been turned over or paid to the National Treasurer, were turned over or paid to the Treasurer of the
Philippines on June 26, 1956. This claim is supported by official receipts (Annex 6 and Annex 7, Central
Bank). Under these facts defendant argues that pursuant to the case of Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 726,
the action to recover the tax in question should be against the National Treasurer and not against the
Central Bank.
In support of the defense of prescription, the Central Bank alleged that as the taxes were collected by
reason of a mistake of the Monetary Board in the construction of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 601, the
action for the return of the amount (as improperly collected) is six years from the accrual of the cause of
action as provided in Article 1145 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In reply to the claim that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action, for the reason that the money
sought to be collected has already been turned over to the National Treasurer, defendant argues that at
most the defect is not lack of jurisdiction but merely non-joinder of the National Treasurer, which non-
joinder may be cured by amendment. As to the defense of prescription, defendant argued that as the
payment was made by virtue of a mistake in the construction of a doubtful or difficult question of law as
defined in Article 2155 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the cause of action accrued only when on
August 30, 1957, this Court decided the case of Philippine National Ban vs. Jose Zulueta, G.R. No. L-
7271, wherein it was held that an obligation, which was incurred before the creation of the 17% excise tax
under Republic Act No. 601, is not subject to tax for the reason that its imposition on an existing
obligation would have the effect of impairing the obligation of contracts.
The court below sustained the objections of the defendant Central Bank and dismissed the complaint. It is
against this order of dismissal that the present appeal was taken.
The court below sustained the objection that the court lacks jurisdiction over the action because the funds
sought to be refunded have already been turned over to the Philippine Government; it held that the action
should have been brought not against the Central Bank and the Philippine National Bank. The defense of
prescription was also sustained, the court holding that the action had elapsed because the law applicable
is Article 1149 of the Civil Code which fixes the period in cases where the laws or the Code have not fixed
a period. Both resolutions of the court below are subject of this appeal.
The defense of prescription is the more important issue to be resolved, as the other issue could be
avoided by in including the National Treasurer as a principal party-defendant in the action. On this issue
appellant argue that Republic Act No. 601, which imposed the 17% foreign exchange tax, was
erroneously interpreted by the Monetary Board; that said act is indeed so difficult of interpretation that its
application could not be definitely understood until the decision of the Court in the case of Philippine
National Bank vs. Zulueta; that plaintiff's cause of action accrued only upon the promulgation of said
decision around August 1957, so that the presentation was actually filed within one year and four months
from date of its accrual. We cannot subscribe to the above theory. If the tax is unlawfully collected, the
action to recover the same should accrue from the date of collection. (Article 1150, Civil Code). The error
of the Monetary Board in the enterpretation of the law may not change or extend the time of the accrual of
the action. Mistakes of officers in the collection of taxes cannot prejudice the Government.
The period within which the action for refund should have been brought is that fixed in Article 1145 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (Belman Compaia Incorporada vs. Central Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. L-15044, July 14, 1960).
As the tax was paid in the year 1951 and the action brought in 1958, the action is clearly barred.
In view of our resolution on the question of prescription, it is unnecessary to consider the other issue.
The order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon,
JJ., concur
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 601
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 601 - AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL EXCISE TAX ON FOREIGN
EXCHANGE SOLD BY THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ITS AGENTS


(REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1394)

Section 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall be assessed, collected and
paid a special excise tax of seventeen per centum (17%) on the value in Philippine peso of
foreign exchange sold and/or authorized to be sold by the Central Bank of the Philippines or
any of its agents during the period of two years counted from the date of the approval of
this Act.

Sec. 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the
Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat,
chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultry
feed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board on
Textbooks and/or established public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported
by or for publishers for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and
newspapers; book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary
readers (approved by the Board on Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under
contracts perfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by
the Director of Printing; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, X-Ray films,
laboratory reagents, biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for
compounding medicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in
quantities to be certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals
applying therefor; drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs
and medicines as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote
and protect the health of the people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer
making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules
and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven hereof.

Sec. 3. The tax collected on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of articles or
containers used by the importer himself in the manufacture or preparation of local products
for consignment or export abroad shall likewise be refunded upon satisfactory proof under
said rules and regulations that said imported articles or containers were actually used in the
manufacture or preparation of such local products, forming part thereof, and that said local
products have been actually exported.

Sec. 4. The tax imposed in this Act shall not apply to foreign exchange sold and/or
authorized to be sold by the Central Bank of the Philippines for any of the following
purposes:

1. Payment in respect of reinsurance.

2. Payment in respect of marine and aviation insurance.

3. Payment of expenses for the drydocking and repair abroad of vessels of Philippine
register, and for the repair abroad ofrplanes of Philippine register, and payment of purchase
price or charter fees ofrplanes and vessels of Philippine register: Provided, That, before
vessels are sent to be drydocked abroad, an estimate of the cost of drydocking should be
certified by the Hulls and Boilers Division of the Bureau of Customs, and in case ofrplanes
andrplane parts, the cost of such repairs and such parts should be certified by the Civil
Aeronautics Administration.

4. Remittances for payment of living expenses of students studying abroad not exceeding
the equivalent of three hundred dollars per month, and for payment of tuition and other
school fees.

5. Payment of premiums by Veterans on Life Insurance Policies under the Government of
the United States.

6. Payment of premiums and other amounts due by policyholders on Life Insurance
Policies issued before December 9, 1949.

7. Payment of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary
industries as determined in accordance with Republic Act Numbered Thirty-five.

Sec. 5. The Tax imposed under section one hereof shall be paid to the Central Bank of the
Philippines by the purchaser of the foreign exchange, and the Central Bank of the
Philippines and/or its agents shall not sell any foreign exchange without the payment of the
said tax. The refund of taxes pursuant to sections two and three of this Act shall be made
by the Central Bank of the Philippines. The monies collected shall accrue to the General
Fund in the National Treasury.

Sec. 6. Any person violating any provision of this Act or any of the regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto shall, upon conviction, be fined in an amount not exceeding
twenty thousand pesos and imprisoned for a period not exceeding two years: Provided,
however, That if the offender is a corporation, association or partnership, the penalty shall
be imposed upon the president, directors managers, managing partners, as the case may
be, and/or the person charged with the administration thereof.

Sec. 7. The Monetary Board of Central Bank of the Philippines shall prescribe and
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 8. The tax provided herein shall not be levied assessed and collected upon exchange
used for the importation of industrial and agricultural machinery covered by an import
license which had already been granted and the letter of credit for which had already been
opened prior to January first, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

Sec. 9. Except as expressly provided in section five hereof, the provisions of this Act shall
in no case be construed to abrogate, diminish or limit in any manner any of the powers now
exercised or hereafter to be exercised by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to
existing laws and regulations.

Section 10. Separability clause. If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this Act
is adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not
affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of said Act, but shall be confined in its operation
to the clause, sentence, paragraph or part thereof directly involved in the controversy.

Section 11. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.




G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 April 30, 1965
ANTONINO DIZON, ADELAIDA D. REYES, CONSOLACION DEGOLLACION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources,
HERACLITO MONTALBAN, as Acting Director of Fisheries,
MIGUEL TOLENTINO, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. Nos. L-20355-56 April 30, 1965
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES,
DIRECTOR OF FISHERIES, MIGUEL TOLENTINO, and CLEMENCIA TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONINO DIZON, ADELAIDA D. REYES, CONSOLACION DE
DEGOLLACION, ARTEMIO DIZON, AMORANDO DIZON, REMEDIOS MANAPAT SY-JUCO, and
LEONILA SIOCHI GOCO,respondents.
Jalandoni and Jamir for petitioners Antonino Dizon, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents Republic, et al.
Miguel Tolentino for and in his own behalf.
BARRERA, J .:
These are separate appeals instituted by Antonino Dizon, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-20300-01) and the Republic
of the Philippines, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-20355-56), from a single decision of the Court of Appeals, as
modified by its resolution of August 20, 1962, holding that Lots Nos. 49 and 1 of subdivision plan Psd.-
27941 are parts of the navigable boundary of the Hacienda Calatagan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-722, and declaring the occupants Dizon, et al. possessors in good faith, entitled to remain
therein until reimbursed, by the intervenor Republic of the Philippines, of the necessary expenses made
on the lots in the sum of P40,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
The facts of these cases, briefly stated, are as follows:
Hacienda Calatagan owned by Alfonso and Jacobo Zobel was originally covered by TCT No. T-722. In
1938, the Hacienda constructed a pier, called "Santiago Landing," about 600 meters long from the shore
into the navigable waters of the Pagaspas Bay, to be used by vessels loading sugar produced by the
Hacienda sugar mill. When the sugar mill ceased its operation in 1948, the owners of the Hacienda
converted the pier into a fishpond dike and built additional strong dikes enclosing an area of about 30
hectares (of the Bay) and converted the same into a fishpond. The Hacienda owners also enclosed a
similar area of about 37 hectares of the Bay on the other side of the pier which was also converted into a
fishpond.
In 1949, the Zobels ordered the subdivision of the Hacienda by ordering the preparation of the subdivision
plan Psd-27941 wherein fishpond No. 1 (with 30 hectares) was referred to as Lot No. 1 and fishpond No.
2 (with 37 hectares) was referred to as Lot No. 49. The plan was approved by the Director of Lands, and
the Register of Deeds issued, from TCT No. T-722, TCT No. 2739 for lots 49 and 1 in the name of Jacobo
Zobel.
In 1950, Jacobo Zobel sold to Antonino Dizon, et al. Lot 49 for which said purchasers obtained at first
TCT No. T-2740 and later T-4718, Lot 1, on the other hand, was purchased by Carlos Goco, et al., who,
in turn, sold one-half thereof to Manuel Sy-Juco, et al. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4159 was issued in
the names of the Gocos and Sy-Jucos.
On May 24, 1952, Miguel Tolentino filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application for ordinary fishpond
permit or lease for Lot 49, and an application for a similar permit, for Lot 1, was filed by his daughter
Clemencia Tolentino.
The Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed a protest with the Bureau of Fisheries, claiming the properties to
be private land covered by a certificate of title. This protest was dismissed by the Director of Fisheries, on
the ground that the areas applied for are outside the boundaries of TCT No. T-722 of Hacienda
Calatagan. This ruling was based upon the findings of the committee created by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to look into the matter, that Lots 1 and 49 are not originally included
within the boundaries of the hacienda.
On October 1, 1954, the protestants Dizons, Sy-Jucos, and Gocos filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Civ. Case No. 24237) to restrain the Director of Fisheries from issuing the fishpond
permits applied for by the Tolentinos. The court dismissed this petition for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedy, it appearing that petitioners had not appealed from the decision of the Director of
Fisheries to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On appeal to this Court, the decision of
the lower court was sustained (G.R. No. L-8654, promulgated April 28, 1956). The protestants then filed
an appeal with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. This time, the same was dismissed
for being filed out of time.1wph1.t
On August 16, 1956, the Dizons filed Civil Case 135 and the Sy-Jucos and Gocos, Civil Case 136, in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, to quiet their titles over Lots 49 and 1. Named defendants were the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and applicants Tolentinos. The Republic of the
Philippines was allowed to intervene in view of the finding by the investigating committee created by the
respondent Secretary, that the lots were part of the foreshore area before their conversion into fishponds
by the hacienda-owners.
On January 30, 1958, after due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Batangas promulgated a joint
decision making the finding, among others, that the subdivision plan Psd-27941 was prepared in
disregard of the technical description stated in TCT No. T-722, because the surveyor merely followed the
existing shoreline and placed his monuments on the southwest lateral of Lot 49, which was the pier
abutting into the sea; and made the conclusion that Lots 1 and 49 of Psd-27941 were part of the
foreshore lands. As the certificate of title obtained by petitioners covered lands not subject to registration,
the same were declared null and void, and Lots 1 and 49 were declared properties of the public domain.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision of October 31, 1961, as well as the resolution of August 20, 1962, the appellate court
adopted the findings of the lower court, that the lots in question are part of the foreshore area and
affirmed the ruling cancelling the titles to plaintiffs. Although in the decision of October 31, 1961, the Court
of Appeals awarded to applicants Tolentinos damages in the amount of P200.00 per hectare from
October 1, 1954, when plaintiffs were notified of the denial of their protest by the Director of Fisheries,
such award was eliminated in the resolution of August 20, 1962, for the reason that plaintiffs, who relied
on the efficacy of their certificates of title, cannot be considered possessors in bad faith until after the
legality of their said titles has been finally determined. Appellants were thus declared entitled to retention
of the properties until they are reimbursed by the landowner, the Republic of the Philippines, of the
necessary expenses made on the lands, in the sums of P40,000.00 (for Lot 49) and P25,000.00 (for Lot
1). It is from this portion of the decision as thus modified that defendants Tolentinos and the intervenor
Republic of the Philippines appealed (in G.R. Nos. L-20355-56), claiming that plaintiffs' possession
became in bad faith when their protest against the application for lease was denied by the Director of
Fisheries. In addition, the intervenor contends that being such possessors in bad faith, plaintiffs are not
entitled to reimbursement of the expenses made on the properties.
In G.R. Nos. L-20300-01, plaintiffs Dizon, et al., claim that the finding that the Lots in question are part of
the seashore or foreshore area was erroneous, because from defendants' own evidence, the same
appear to be marshland before their conversion into fishponds.
It is noteworthy in connection with the appeal of plaintiffs, that they do not contest the existence of the
pier that was used by the hacienda owners in the loading of their manufactured sugar to vessels. The fact
that said pier jutted out 600 meters to the sea indicates that the area over which such cemented structure
spanned was part of the sea or at least foreshore land. And, plaintiffs were not able to disprove the
testimonial evidence that the fishponds in question were constructed by enclosing the areas with dikes,
using the pier as one of the ends of the fishponds. It is clear that the areas thus enclosed and converted
into fishponds were really part of the foreshore. This, and the fact that the subdivision plan Psd-27941
was found to have been prepared not in accordance with the technical descriptions in TCT No. T-722 but
in disregard of it, support the conclusion reached by both the lower court and the Court of Appeals that
Lots 49 and 1 are actually part of the territorial waters and belong to the State. And, it is an elementary
principle that the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate
when the land thus covered is not capable of registration.
On the matter of possession of plaintiffs-appellants, the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be upheld.
There is no showing that plaintiffs are not purchasers in good faith and for value. As such title-holders,
they have reason to rely on the indefeasible character of their certificates.
On the issue of good faith of the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reasoned out:
The concept of possessors in good faith given in Art. 526 of the Civil Code and when said
possession loses this character under Art. 528, needs to be reconciled with the doctrine of
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. Such reconciliation can only be achieved by holding that the
possessor with a Torrens Title is not aware of any flaw in his Title which invalidates it until his
Torrens Title is declared null and void by final judgment of the Courts.
Even if the doctrine of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title were not thus reconciled, the result would
be the same, considering the third paragraph of Art. 526 which provides that:
ART. 526. ...
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
The legal question whether plaintiffs-appellants' possession in good faith, under their Torrens
Titles acquired in good faith, does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment
their Titles are declared null and void by the Courts, a difficult one. Even the members of this
Court were for a long time divided, two to one, on the answer. It was only after several sessions,
where the results of exhaustive researches on both sides were thoroughly discussed, that an
undivided Court finally found the answer given in the next preceding paragraph. Hence, even if it
be assumed for the sake of argument that the Supreme Court would find that the law is not as we
have stated it in the next preceding paragraph and that the plaintiffs-appellants made a mistake in
relying thereon, such mistake on a difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. Hence,
their possession in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment their Torrens Titles are declared null and void by the Courts.
Under the circumstances of the case, especially where the subdivision plan was originally approved by
the Director of Lands, we are not ready to conclude that the above reasoning of the Court of Appeals on
this point is a reversible error. Needless to state, as such occupants in good faith, plaintiffs have the right
to the retention of the property until they are reimbursed the necessary expenses made on the lands.
With respect to the contention of the Republic of the Philippines that the order for the reimbursement by it
of such necessary expenses constitutes a judgment against the government in a suit not consented to by
it, suffice it to say that the Republic, on its own initiative, asked and was permitted to intervene in the case
and thereby submitted itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all
respects, without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday the Twenty-fifth day of July two thousand eleven.
[ Republic Act No. 10175 ]
AN ACT DEFINING CYBERCRIME, PROVIDING FOR THE PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION,
SUPPRESSION AND THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the vital role of information and communications
industries such as content production, telecommunications, broadcasting electronic commerce, and data
processing, in the nations overall social and economic development. The State also recognizes the
importance of providing an environment conducive to the development, acceleration, and rational
application and exploitation of information and communications technology (ICT) to attain free, easy, and
intelligible access to exchange and/or delivery of information; and the need to protect and safeguard the
integrity of computer, computer and communications systems, networks, and databases, and the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and data stored therein, from all forms of misuse,
abuse, and illegal access by making punishable under the law such conduct or conducts. In this light, the
State shall adopt sufficient powers to effectively prevent and combat such offenses by facilitating their
detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing
arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms are hereby defined as
follows:
(a) Access refers to the instruction, communication with, storing data in, retrieving data from, or otherwise
making use of any resources of a computer system or communication network.
(b) Alteration refers to the modification or change, in form or substance, of an existing computer data or
program.
(c) Communication refers to the transmission of information through ICT media, including voice, video and
other forms of data.
(d) Computer refers to an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other data processing or
communications device, or grouping of such devices, capable of performing logical, arithmetic, routing, or
storage functions and which includes any storage facility or equipment or communications facility or
equipment directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device. It covers any type of computer
device including devices with data processing capabilities like mobile phones, smart phones, computer
networks and other devices connected to the internet.
(e) Computer data refers to any representation of facts, information, or concepts in a form suitable for
processing in a computer system including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a
function and includes electronic documents and/or electronic data messages whether stored in local
computer systems or online.
(f) Computer program refers to a set of instructions executed by the computer to achieve intended results.
(g) Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of
which, pursuant to a program, performs automated processing of data. It covers any type of device with
data processing capabilities including, but not limited to, computers and mobile phones. The device
consisting of hardware and software may include input, output and storage components which may stand
alone or be connected in a network or other similar devices. It also includes computer data storage
devices or media.
(h) Without right refers to either: (i) conduct undertaken without or in excess of authority; or (ii) conduct
not covered by established legal defenses, excuses, court orders, justifications, or relevant principles
under the law.
(i) Cyber refers to a computer or a computer network, the electronic medium in which online
communication takes place.
(j) Critical infrastructure refers to the computer systems, and/or networks, whether physical or virtual,
and/or the computer programs, computer data and/or traffic data so vital to this country that the incapacity
or destruction of or interference with such system and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national or economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters.
(k) Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training,
best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and
organization and users assets.
(l) Database refers to a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions which
are being prepared, processed or stored or have been prepared, processed or stored in a formalized
manner and which are intended for use in a computer system.
(m) Interception refers to listening to, recording, monitoring or surveillance of the content of
communications, including procuring of the content of data, either directly, through access and use of a
computer system or indirectly, through the use of electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices, at the
same time that the communication is occurring.
(n) Service provider refers to:
(1) Any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by means of
a computer system; and
(2) Any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communication service or
users of such service.
(o) Subscribers information refers to any information contained in the form of computer data or any other
form that is held by a service provider, relating to subscribers of its services other than traffic or content
data and by which identity can be established:
(1) The type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and the period of
service;
(2) The subscribers identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access numbers, any
assigned network address, billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service
agreement or arrangement; and
(3) Any other available information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, available
on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement.
(p) Traffic data or non-content data refers to any computer data other than the content of the
communication including, but not limited to, the communications origin, destination, route, time, date,
size, duration, or type of underlying service.
CHAPTER II
PUNISHABLE ACTS
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable
under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
(2) Illegal Interception. The interception made by technical means without right of any non-public
transmission of computer data to, from, or within a computer system including electromagnetic emissions
from a computer system carrying such computer data.
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction
or transmission of viruses.
(4) System Interference. The intentional alteration or reckless hindering or interference with the
functioning of a computer or computer network by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting,
deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data or program, electronic document, or electronic data
message, without right or authority, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
(5) Misuse of Devices.
(i) The use, production, sale, procurement, importation, distribution, or otherwise making available,
without right, of:
(aa) A device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing
any of the offenses under this Act; or
(bb) A computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer
system is capable of being accessed with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the
offenses under this Act.
(ii) The possession of an item referred to in paragraphs 5(i)(aa) or (bb) above with intent to use said
devices for the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this section.
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead,
destroy reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name registration:
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a
personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
(b) Computer-related Offenses:
(1) Computer-related Forgery.
(i) The input, alteration, or deletion of any computer data without right resulting in inauthentic data with the
intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or
not the data is directly readable and intelligible; or
(ii) The act of knowingly using computer data which is the product of computer-related forgery as defined
herein, for the purpose of perpetuating a fraudulent or dishonest design.
(2) Computer-related Fraud. The unauthorized input, alteration, or deletion of computer data or
program or interference in the functioning of a computer system, causing damage thereby with fraudulent
intent: Provided, That if no
damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession,
alteration or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without
right: Provided, That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree
lower.
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No.
9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That
the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic
communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products
and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the
sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient
to reject. receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic
message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any
part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in
the future.
SEC. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
SEC. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if
committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered
by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree
higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may
be.
SEC. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
CHAPTER III
PENALTIES
SEC. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a)
and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two
hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage
incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment
of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion
temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount
commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be
punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act
of 2009: Provided,That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished
with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not
exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with
imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least
One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) or both.
SEC. 9. Corporate Liability. When any of the punishable acts herein defined are knowingly committed
on behalf of or for the benefit of a juridical person, by a natural person acting either individually or as part
of an organ of the juridical person, who has a leading position within, based on: (a) a power of
representation of the juridical person provided the act committed falls within the scope of such authority;
(b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the juridical person: Provided, That the act committed falls
within the scope of such authority; or (c) an authority to exercise control within the juridical person, the
juridical person shall be held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7
up to a maximum of Ten million pesos (PhP10,000,000.00).
If the commission of any of the punishable acts herein defined was made possible due to the lack of
supervision or control by a natural person referred to and described in the preceding paragraph, for the
benefit of that juridical person by a natural person acting under its authority, the juridical person shall be
held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7 up to a maximum of
Five million pesos (PhP5,000,000.00).
The liability imposed on the juridical person shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural
person who has committed the offense.
CHAPTER IV
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
SEC. 10. Law Enforcement Authorities. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of the provisions
of this Act. The NBI and the PNP shall organize a cybercrime unit or center manned by special
investigators to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.
SEC. 11. Duties of Law Enforcement Authorities. To ensure that the technical nature of cybercrime
and its prevention is given focus and considering the procedures involved for international cooperation,
law enforcement authorities specifically the computer or technology crime divisions or units responsible
for the investigation of cybercrimes are required to submit timely and regular reports including pre-
operation, post-operation and investigation results and such other documents as may be required to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for review and monitoring.
SEC. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be
authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with
specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type
of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or
recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and
the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove
has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed: (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to
the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
SEC. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information
relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum
period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six
(6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That
once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case,
the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor
shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its
compliance.
SEC. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant,
shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscribers
information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and
the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.
SEC. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure warrant is
properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the
functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein
to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure
and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the
computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty
(30) days from date of approval by the court.
SEC. 16. Custody of Computer Data. All computer data, including content and traffic data, examined
under a proper warrant shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed therein,
be deposited with the court in a sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the law
enforcement authority executing it stating the dates and times covered by the examination, and the law
enforcement authority who may access the deposit, among other relevant data. The law enforcement
authority shall also certify that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made,
or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the package deposited with the court. The
package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or then
contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with
due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications
have been recorded.
SEC. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and
15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and
completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination.
SEC. 18. Exclusionary Rule. Any evidence procured without a valid warrant or beyond the authority of
the same shall be inadmissible for any proceeding before any court or tribunal.
SEC. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie found
to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to
such computer data.
SEC. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the
orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829
with imprisonment ofprision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement
authorities.
CHAPTER V
JURISDICTION
SEC. 21. Jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the
provisions of this Act. including any violation committed by a Filipino national regardless of the place of
commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was committed within the Philippines or
committed with the use of any computer system wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such
commission any damage is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was
committed, was in the Philippines.
There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges to handle
cybercrime cases.
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Sec. 22. General Principles Relating to International Cooperation All relevant international instruments
on international cooperation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or
reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations
or proceedings concerning criminal offenses related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of
evidence in electronic form of a criminal, offense shall be given full force and effect.
CHAPTER VII
COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
SEC 23. Department of Justice (DOJ). There is hereby created an Office of Cybercrime within the DOJ
designated as the central authority in all matters related to international mutual assistance and
extradition.
SEC. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within thirty (30)
days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for
policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.
SEC. 25. Composition. The CICC shall be headed by the Executive Director of the Information and
Communications Technology Office under the Department of Science and Technology (ICTO-DOST) as
Chairperson with the Director of the NBI as Vice Chairperson; the Chief of the PNP; Head of the DOJ
Office of Cybercrime; and one (1) representative from the private sector and academe, as members. The
CICC shall be manned by a secretariat of selected existing personnel and representatives from the
different participating agencies.
SEC. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance for the suppression of
real-time commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT);
(b) To coordinate the preparation of appropriate and effective measures to prevent and suppress
cybercrime activities as provided for in this Act;
(c) To monitor cybercrime cases being bandied by participating law enforcement and prosecution
agencies;
(d) To facilitate international cooperation on intelligence, investigations, training and capacity building
related to cybercrime prevention, suppression and prosecution;
(e) To coordinate the support and participation of the business sector, local government units and
nongovernment organizations in cybercrime prevention programs and other
related projects;
(f) To recommend the enactment of appropriate laws, issuances, measures and policies;
(g) To call upon any government agency to render assistance in the accomplishment of the CICCs
mandated tasks and functions; and
(h) To perform all other matters related to cybercrime prevention and suppression, including capacity
building and such other functions and duties as may be necessary for the proper implementation of this
Act.
CHAPTER VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 27. Appropriations. The amount of Fifty million pesos (PhP50,000,000.00) shall be appropriated
annually for the implementation of this Act.
SEC. 28. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The ICTO-DOST, the DOJ and the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall jointly formulate the necessary rules and regulations within
ninety (90) days from approval of this Act, for its effective implementation.
SEC. 29. Separability Clause If any provision of this Act is held invalid, the other provisions not
affected shall remain in full force and effect.
SEC. 30. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees or rules inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. Section 33(a) of Republic Act No. 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act is hereby
modified accordingly.
SEC. 31. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of its publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by
law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
New York-based watchdog Human Rights Watch on Friday urged the Philippine government to "repeal or
replace" the Cybercrime Prevention Act, saying it violates the Constitution as well as international
conventions.

Brad Adams, Asia director for HRW, said the law "violates Filipinos rights to free expression and it is
wholly incompatible with the Philippine governments obligations under international law."

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Philippines has been a partner
since 1986, ensures "the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."

But Adams said the provisions in the Cybercrime Act that raise the penalty for libel and give the
government the power to shut down websites and collect computer data without warrants endanger free
speech. "Anybody using popular social networks or who publishes online is now at risk of a long prison
term should a reader--including government officials--bring a libel charge," Adams said.

"So long as it stands, the new cybercrime law will have a chilling effect over the entire Philippine online
community," he also said. Even before the Cybercrime law was passed this month, the UN Human Rights
Committee had already called on the Philippines to decriminalize libel.

"Allegedly libelous speech, online or offline, should be handled as a private civil matter, not a crime,"
Adams said.

Senator Edgardo Angara, author of the law at the Senate, said on September 21 that it will keep the
Internet from being "a wild frontier where no due process is afforded to victims of legitimate Internet-
related crimes."

"We have to give the law a chance and see how it will be implemented. Only then will the loopholes and
the gaps be identified and properly addressed. But as it is, I believe this law is a milestone for ICT in the
country," he said.

Despite this, two of Angara's colleagues have already taken steps to amend the bill. Senator Francis
Escudero, who has been pushing to decriminalize libel, said he wants the provision on libel changed.

"Ill take out the criminal liability but the civil liability provision will be intact, meaning no jail penalty," he
said.

Senator Teofisto Guingona III, who voted against passage of the bill, has petitioned the Supreme Court to
void the provisions of the Cybercrime Act that he said exposed individuals to double jeopardy, are vague,
and would stifle freedom of speech.

"The last time I checked, we were still a democracy. We want empowered citizens, not scared and passive
ones," he said.

Five petitionsincluding one filed by journalists and bloggershave been filed at the SC asking it to
review and void portions of the Cybercrime Act.
Today we remember the 40th year anniversary of the declaration of Martial Law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Among the first victims of Martial Law was the freedom of expression.
Twenty-six years after the end of this malignant era, we should be celebrating a priceless gift of liberty.
However, last Sept. 12, the present occupant of Malacaang signed into law something that brings to life the ghost
of Martial Law the draconian Cybercrime Prevention Law or Republic Act 10175.
The authors and supporters of this law claim that the law is needed to regulate how people behave in cyberspace.
Rapid technology advancement has revolutionized how people share ideas on line, especially through social media.
The power of the Internet helped topple dictators in the Middle East and North Africa last year.
In the Philippines, with Internet penetration at 30 million or about 30 percent of the population, on line and social
media has become a potent force.
Including online libel for defamatory utterances and publications sets back the campaign to strike out the 80-year-
old criminal penalties for libel under the Revised Penal Code.
Punishing online libel a degree higher than ordinary libel is grievous aggravation.
Libel has been used as a harassment tool by public officials against journalists and citizens who criticize the
excesses and misconduct of those in power.
Worse, the new law has a take down provision which would give the executive department through the
Department of Justice powers to issue an order to restrict or block access to computer data considered as prima
facie evidence in violation of the laws provisions.
The inclusion of libel and the take down provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Law strikes at the heart of the
constitutionally protected freedom of expression.
This right of a free press prohibits the State from using its powers to make good threats of subsequent punishment or
censorship of published or uttered ideas from any citizen.
Article 3, sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution clearly states that No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
On this day of remembrance, the call for vigilance against enemies of freedom and democracy gains more relevance.
If some quarters in high government want to police cyberspace because it views it as the new wild wild west, then it
falls on all freedom-loving Filipinos, especially journalists, bloggers, and millions of online social media users to
band together as cyber cowboys, ready to lasso the wayward sheriff.
just read media reports that the Supreme Court had just denied all pending motions for reconsideration
on its earlier ruling declaring the Cybercrime Prevention Acts provision on libel as being constitutional.
As counsel for journalists Alexander Adonis, Ellen Tordesillas et al., I am of course deeply disappointed
with this latest turn of events. In my opinion, the Supreme Court just lost a great opportunity to rectify the
inconsistencies in our jurisprudence on freedom of expression. Simply put, while we have adopted the
normative value of freedom of expression as the means to ascertain the truth and as the means to form
informed public opinion which is indispensible in a democracy, the fact that the Court continues to
sanction the imposition of imprisonment for libel contradicts our so-called constitutional commitment to
freedom of expression.
Moreover, I believe that this latest decision is a blatant disregard of the view expressed by the UN Human
Rights Committee declaring criminal libel in the Philippines as being contrary to freedom of expression. It
is thus a breach of pacta sundt servanda, or that treaty obligations must be complied with in good faith.
The view expressed by the UN Human Rights Committee in the case of Adonis vs. Philippines that
criminal libel in the Philippines violates freedom of expression is as clear as the light of day. Whether or
not the Committee actually expressed the view that the Philippines should repeal its criminal libel law is
not the issue. What is clear is that with the declaration, we are in breach of our international obligation to
protect and promote the right to freedom of expression, the Supreme Court should have ensured: one,
that we cease and desist from the breach by declaring criminal libel as being contrary to international law;
and two, it should have provided compensation to all those wrongfully sentenced for criminal libel.
Certainly, to uphold a law that provides for an even more draconian libel law since it provides for a longer
penalty of imprisonment doing away with the possibility of parole is a continuing breach of our
international obligation.
So, what will we do now? This latest Supreme Court decision is tantamount to exhaustion of domestic
remedies. When we filed our challenge versus cyber libel with Alexander Adonis as petitioner, we were
aiming to implement the UN Human Rights Committee view through jurisprudence. Since the highest
court of the land has instead put its stamp of approval on the draconian law, the decision is evidence that
we have again exhausted all domestic remedies. This will qualify Adonis et al to return to the UN to
complaint that instead of implementing its earlier view, the Republic of the Philippines has openly defied
it. We will pray for a second declaration that not only does libel under the Revised Penal Code violate Art.
19, but additionally, the Cybercrime Prevention Act equally violates freedom of expression.
The difference is while the earlier view issued by the UN was against a decision of a Regional Trial Court
Judge, this time around, we will ask the Committee to declare a collegial decision of our highest judicial
organ as violating international law.
If we succeed -- and chances are that we will -- the Court will be put in an embarrassing situation where
proven experts in the field of human rights will find a decision of our 15-man court as being erroneous and
violates human rights law. This would be downright embarrassing for the Court. When this happens, we
can say that when we filed our motion for reconsideration, we gave our Courts the opportunity to avoid
the spectacle of an experts view that its decision is wrong. In the end, the Court will only have itself to
blame for the ignominy of a decision, which could be condemned by the international human rights
community as a violation of human rights law.
In Adonis vs. Republic of the Philippines, the UN Human Rights Committee declared that criminal libel
under the Revised Penal law is contrary to Freedom of Expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR
because it is not necessary, the existing alterative being civil libel. The Committee also ruled that
imprisonment is not proportionate to the means sought to be enforced by the law, which is the protection
of the right to privacy of private individuals.
The Philippines has also not complied with the view that journalist Alexander Adonis should be paid
compensation for the one-year imprisonment he served for his conviction for libel.
While the views of the Committee are non-binding, no less than the International Court of Justice has said
that since these views are the opinions of the most authoritative experts in the field of human rights
tasked with monitoring states compliance with their obligations under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the views should be given much weight.
The Philippines also undertook to comply with the views expressed by the Committee because it ratified
the optional Protocol to the ICCPR.
Simply put, the denial of our Motion for Reconsideration now triggers the availability of international
remedies against the draconian law. Thank goodness for international law!