ALFONSO FIRAZA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.

154721 March 22, 2007

FACTS:
Firaza was charged and convicted of the crime of Estafa by the Trial Court on
November 25, 1998when he failed to pay private Respondent Henry Samar, Jr. pay the
amount for the sale of the land of Henry. Despite verbal demands by Henry, Firaza still
failed to pay the amount via post-dated check, for his account was closed due to
insufficient funds. In his Defense, Firaza alleges that in Henrys affidavit dated October
12, 2003, or after the proceedings of the criminal case, stated that He has in fact paid
and settled all his accounts with private complainant arising from the sale of a parcel of
land, and it was only through sheer inadvertence of Henry Samar, Jr. that the payments
were overlooked.
ISSUE:
Is Henrys affidavit dated October 12, 2003, stating that he has in-avertedly overlooked
that the payments already have been made, be considered?
HELD:
Applying the Legal Maxim of Falsa demonstration non nocert, cum de corpore constat,
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and
disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under
which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for
the change, discriminatingly analyzed. in situations, like the instant case, where
testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting witness,
This Court is properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless
the affiant is presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are
generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. In the case at bar, the
affidavit was executed almost eight years after the filing of the Information on 16
January 1996 and almost five years after petitioners conviction by the trial court. It is
nothing but a last-minute attempt to save petitioner from punishment. The
reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner
does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the
civil liability. Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and
punished by the State on its own motion even though complete reparation had been
made for the loss or damage suffered by the offended party. The consent of the private
complainant to petitioners payment of her civil liability pendente lite does not entitle the
latter to an acquittal.


SHELL COMPANY, ltd. v. NATIONAL LABOR UNION
(G.R. No. L-1309 July 26, 1948)
FACTS:

The Court of Industrial Relations rendered its decision, ordering Shell Company of
Philippine Islands, Limited" to pay their workers who work at night an additional
compensation of 50% of their regular wages if they worked by day. On appeal, Shell
Company contends and argues that not only there is no legal provision empowering the
Industrial Relations Court to order the payment of additional workers who work at night,
but also the compensation, however, in Commonwealth Act No. 444 relieves the
employer of such obligation since in the law where it is compulsory to pay "overtime"
(additional compensation) are provided, and among such cases do not include the work
at night. Further, Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, where, as in the case at bar,
the statute specifies expressly cases where payment of compensation may be
demanded extra, such extra compensation may be allowed in those cases only, and in
no others. The price provider of the Commonwealth Act No. 444 cannot be enlarged by
implication or otherwise, Expressum facit cessare tacitum.

ISSUE:

Is the legal maxims of Expressio Unius Est Exclusion and Expressum Facit Cessare
Tacitum applicable to the case at bar?

HELD:

The legal maxim of expressio unius est exclusion alterius and expressum facit
cessare tacitum cannot be applied, since Commonwealth Act No. 444 is not
applicable to this case, it is evident that it has a specific purpose, namely: (a) fix the
maximum 8-hour workday; (b) point out certain exceptional cases that can authorize
work outside that day; (c) providing a bonus, which should not be less than 25% of
regular pay for "overtime" or work in excess of 8 hours cannot be applied to this case.
Shells night work requiring its workers tally is not an 'overtime "in the sense which that
word is used in Commonwealth Act No. 444, but a full day's work, also 8 hours: only
that instead of done by day, it is done by night. In other words, night work is not only
excess, prolongation or "overtime" regular work day, but other work, absolutely
independent of the day shift. So there are two shifts: the shift workers who work day;
and the shift of working at night. So it is not strange that the legislature did not include
this type of work between cases of "overtime" mentioned in the said Act No. 444. If this
court has, in cases of dispute, the power to set wages as it deems fair and reasonable
for the work day, there's no reason it should not have the same power with respect to
the wages of night; work is as the one and the other. And regarding appreciation wing
that night work is heavier and cumbersome than the day and therefore deserves greater
remuneration, there is no motive to revoke or alter.

BASILIA BOUGH and GUSTAVUS BOUGH v. MATILDE CANTIVEROS and
PRESBITERA HANOPOL, G.R. No. 13300 September 29, 1919
FACTS:

Matilde Cantiveros was the owner of various parcels of realty of the value of thirty
thousand pesos or more. On December 24, 1912, Matilde and her husband Jose
Vasquez signed a marital contract of separation. Through the influence of Gustavus
Bough, spouse of the cousin of Matilde, He induced Matilde Cantiveros to sign a
fictitious contract of sale of all her property to Basilia Bough, the amount of the
consideration, ten thousand pesos. By this deed, Matilde Cantiveros purported to
convey sixty-three parcels of land, the real value of which was over thirty thousand
pesos, for ten thousand pesos, In order to reassure Matilde Cantiveros that they would
not take advantage of the fictitious sale, Gustavus Bough and Basilia Bough prepared
and signed a contract of donation by them to Matilde Cantiveros of all the property to be
effective in case of the death of themselves and their children before the death of
Matilde Cantiveros Matilde Cantiveros has remained in possession of the property.
ISSUE:

Is the Contract of Sale executed between Matilde and Bough illegal?

HELD:

No. It is rudimentary that contracting parties may not establish pacts, clauses, and
conditions, which conflict with the laws, morals, public policy, or public order. It is further
well settled, that a party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to
have his illegal objects carried out. The rule is expressed in the maxims: "Ex dolo malo
non oritur actio," and "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis." The law will not
aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Where,
however, the parties to an illegal contract are not equally guilty, and where public policy
is considered as advanced by allowing the more excusable of the two to sue for relief
against the transaction, relief is given to him. Cases of this character are, where they
conveyance was wrongfully induced by the grantee through imposition or overreaching,
or by false representations, especially by one in a confidential relation.









JOSE ANTONIO MAPA v. HON. JOKER ARROYO, in his Capacity as Executive
Secretary, and LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 78585 July
5, 1989
FACTS:
Mapa bought lots no. 12, 13, 15, and 16 from Labrador Development Corporation,
located in Barangay Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, which are payable in ten years.
Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and despite constant reminders
by Labrador, mapa still refuses to pay. This prompted Labrador to cancel the contracts
to sell of the, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Under such clause,
Labrador is obligated to complete the development of the lots, except those requiring
the services of a public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date
of the contract. Petitioner, invoking the so-called doctrine of last antecedent, contends
that Section 20 of P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements,
and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development if offered and indicated
in the approved subdivision plans and Section 21 of the same Decree that Failure of the
owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding
provisions shall constitute a violation under such.
.

ISSUE:
W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the
doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect.

HELD:
No. This Court further rejects Mapas strained and tenuous application of the so-called
doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of
Section 21. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause
7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from
Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the
contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written
commitment was made by the developer. Applying the Legal Maxim of ad proximum
antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia The words which are offered and
indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans refer not only to other forms of
development but also to facilities, improvements, and infrastructures. The word and
is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy,"
and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry", G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
Fact:
On January 13, 1988, Isabela and Enrique, both surnamed Puno was charged of
conspiring together, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one
Maria Del Socorro M. Sarmiento for Ransom. The trial court convicted Isabela and
Enrique, both surnamed Puno, of robbery with extortion committed on a highway,
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532. On appeal, The Punos contended that
they should not be expressly convicted under said Decree, saying that their motive is
only to just extort the victim.
Issue:
Is the offense in Presidential Decree No. 532 applicable to the Respondents at bar?
Held:
Yes. It is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of
the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts
partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the
modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in
perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon. In the case at bar, there is no showing
whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money
from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. With respect to the specific
intent of appellants --- the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the
proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended
party of her liberty, and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an
incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. The
Legal Maxim of Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege is also
applicable to this case. According to the Preamble of PD No. 532, highway
robbery/brigandage which is among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by
the penal statutes of all countries. Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce
amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed
on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. If the
mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be
farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive
criminal law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELO PALERMO Y CARIAS, G.R. No. 120630 June 28,
2001
Facts:
Marcelo C. Palermo was convicted and was meted out the penalty of death for having
raped his very own 14-year old daughter. In his defense, Marcelo contends that his
judicial confession should be considered as analogous to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty and pleads for compassionate justice that his penalty be
reduced to reclusion temporal. During trial, when Marcelo was asked the first direct
examination question as to what he can say about the charge against him, he boldly
and categorically admitted having raped his daughter, saying, "Nagawa ko po sa anak
ko and panggagahasa ko kaya ako nakademanda. The court a quo, bearing in mind
the imposable penalty of death for such crime under Republic Act No. 7659, asked him
some questions to determine if he understood the consequences of his confession.
Thus, in reply to the query by the trial court, Marcelo further declared that he knew he
will be penalized with death by reason of his confession, but despite such penalty he is
not changing his avowal because, in his own words, "Ako po'y nagkasala kaya
aaminin,"
Issue:
Is Marcelos his confession of guilt, made in the course of his testimony and after the
prosecution has rested its case, is a mitigating circumstance? If yes, would the penalty
of death be reduced to reclusion perpetua?
Held:
No. In the first place, such incident is not even a mitigating circumstance within the
contemplation of Article 13 (paragraph 7) of the Revised Penal Code. To be considered
a mitigating circumstance, paragraph 7 of said Article 13 requires that the offender "had
voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution." In the instant case, appellant did not only plead "not guilty" upon
arraignment, but waited for the prosecution to rest its case. It was only during his turn to
present evidence that he confessed having committed the crime charged. Certainly, his
confession of guilt was not spontaneous, which is what the law requires.
Compassionate justice is accorded only to one deserving of compassion within the
bounds of the law. It may now be trite, but nonetheless apt, to restate the legal maxim
"Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est." (The law may be
exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.), He knows he is facing the death penalty for
his crime, but he is ready for it because, as he, said, "Ako po'y nagkasala....




SULTAN YAHYA "JERRY" M. TOMAWIS v. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA
A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA, and RAMLA A. MUSOR, G.R. No.
182434 March 5, 2010
Facts:
Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and Ramla A. Musor filed with the Sharia
District Court (SDC), Fourth Judicial District in Marawi City an action for claim of
ownership of title of a parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi City, against Sultan
Jerry Tomawis and one Mangoda Radia. In his answer, Tomawis raised SDCs lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that the regular civil court, not SDC,
had such jurisdiction pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Respondent judge Hon. Rasad G. Balindog asserted the
SDCs original jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), by force of Article 143, paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No.1083 or the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
Is the Sharia District Court vested jurisdiction over the case at bar?
Held:
Yes. Art. 143 of PD 1083 vests SDCs, in certain cases, with exclusive original
jurisdiction and with concurrent original jurisdiction over certain causes of action: All
actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have
not specified which law shall govern their relations -subpar. (d), par. (1); All other
personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved
are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court-subpar. (b), par. (2). On
the other hand, BP 129, as amended, vests the RTC or the municipal trial court with
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title to or possession of
real property, or any interest in it, and the value of the property subject of the case or
the jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case comes within the jurisdictional
competence of the RTC or the MTC. A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129
and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of general application to civil courts, has no
application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083, a special law,
which only refers to Sharia courts. BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil
courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a
special law that only applies to Sharia courts. Applying the Legal Maxim of generalia
specialibus non derogant, We must read and construe BP 129 and PD 1083
together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two
laws. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of
the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
37
In the instant case, private
respondents petition

in Civil Case No. 102-97 sufficiently alleged the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the SDC.
JUANITO R. RIMANDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NORMA O. MAGNO,
G.R. No. 176364 September 18, 2009
Facts:
Juanito R. Rimando was charged and convicted by the Commission on Elections for
violation of carrying of firearms and wearing of Uniform during the 2001 Elections. In
defense, the Petitioner, invoking the legal maxim of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege, contended that COMELEC has no authority in making criminal an act of bearing
arms within the immediate vicinity of the place of work without COMELEC authority,
even when it is clearly not made so under Section 261(s) of the Omnibus Election Code.
And assuming arguendo that the act was constituted as an Election Offense, Juanito
cannot be made criminally liable for the acts of other persons--- The Security Guards
who personally carried the firearms just because he was the head of the Security
Agency, when it was not clearly made so in Section 261(s) of the same Code.
Issue:
Is the legal maxim of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege prevailing in the case at
bar?
Held:
Yes. In the case at bar, the cause of the confusion appears to be the fact that the
security guards who were being charged with violation of the election gun ban were
bearing firearms within the immediate vicinity of their place of work, but their place of
work happened to be a residential subdivision where they were guarding the residences
of private persons. Indeed, this seeming conflict between the general rule (which allows
the bearing of arms within the immediate vicinity of the security personnels place of
work) and the exception (which states that prior written approval from the COMELEC is
necessary when security personnel are guarding private residences or offices) can be
harmonized if we interpret the exceptions as pertaining to instances where the security
personnel are outside the immediate vicinity of their place of work or where the
boundaries of their place of work cannot be easily determined. Applying this
interpretation to the case at bar, prior written approval from the COMELEC is only
required when a member of a security agency is guarding private residences outside
the immediate vicinity of his place of work, or where the exact area of his assignment is
not readily determinable. Petitioner should not be made responsible for the acts of
another, more so, when the law does not make him expressly so responsible In the
case of U.S. v. Abad-Santos, this Court held that Courts will not hold one person
criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed without his knowledge or
consent, unless there is a statute requiring it so plain in its terms that there is no doubt
of the intention of the Legislature. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No
person should be brought within their terms that are not clearly within them, nor should
any act be pronounced criminal who is not clearly made so by the statute. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that Section 261(s) required petitioners security
agency to secure prior written approval from the COMELEC for its security guards to
bear arms in their place of work (which was a residential subdivision), the failure of the
President or General Manager of the security agency to secure such approval is not
itself defined as an election offense; therefore, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege
must prevail.
LIM CO CHUI v. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-23487
February 11, 1925
Facts:
Lim Co Chui is the owner of three dry goods stores located in Manila. On account of the conditions---
On October 18- 20, 1924, there existed in the City of Manila a riot against the Chinese, the petitioner
was prevented from making a return on October 20, 1924, the last day for paying the taxes due. .
Instead, on that day a representative of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce acting for on behalf of
all Chinese citizens, requested the respondent to extend the time prescribed for the payment of the
taxes. This request was denied by the respondent on the ground that he had no authority to grant it.
On October 21, 1924, the Lim Co Chui tendered payment to the Collector of Internal Revenue of the
tax due on his business, stating at the same time that his delay was due to the riot. On November 3,
1924, the respondent refused to accept said payment saying that according to existing law, he had
neither power nor discretion to accept the tax without the additional penalty of twenty-five per cent.
On request for reconsideration, the respondent again declared that he lacked power to grant the
request, although admitting that the additional tax of twenty-five per cent "seems unjust and
excessive."
Issue:
Is the power to extend the time prescribed for the payment of taxes be exercised by the CIR?
Held:
No. Under Section 1582 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2835, The Collector of
Internal Revenue may remit before payment any tax that appears to be unjustly assessed or
excessive. In the case at bar, the twenty-five per cent penalty for non-payment is not "unjustly
assessed" because it is assessed at all, and is not "excessive" because it is merely the amount
specifically fixed by the law (Section 1458 of the Administrative Code, as last amended by Act No.
3074). The Collector of Internal Revenue simply collects that which the law has said that he must
collect. He is not authorized to refund taxes as a matter of gratuity. Furthermore, applying the legal
maxim of Impossibilium nulla obligatio est in Taxation Cases, there might be excuses for non-
payment which would justify the interference of the courts. In the case at bar, there is no allegation
in the complaint that the inability of Lim Co Chui to pay their taxes on time was due to any order by
the Government or to any action taken by the Government, and no allegation that the delay in
payment was caused by the fault of him to whom it was to be paid. On the contrary, the averment in
the complaint is that the Chinese closed their homes and stores and stayed therein "as a result of a
mutual agreement had thereon. However, Acting Chief Justice Johnson is in the opinion that by
reason of the existence of a riot in the City of Manila at the time the taxes became due and payable,
it was impossible for Lim Co Chui to have left his house or place of business. He was not at fault. He
did all he could to pay his taxes when due, and should not have been penalized for things which he
could not prevent. The CIR had discretion to grant relief to the petitioner and should have done so as
a matter of simple justice.




CLEMENTE LACESTE v. PAULINO SANTOS, Director of Prisons. G.R. No.L-36886
February 1, 1932
Facts:
Clemente Laceste prays the court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas
corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment
any longer. Clemente Laceste, together with Nicolas Lachica, was charged and
convicted by the trial court for Rape and sentenced to commitment. Subsequently
Nicola Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was accordingly
relieved from the criminal prosecution by virtue of section 2, Act No. 1773, and article
448 of the (Spanish) Penal Code then in force, but Clemente continued serving his
sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his co-accused and the offended
party. Accordingly, He was not entitled to the benefits accruing from such marriage in
accordance with the last paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, in force
since the first of this year (1932), which is now applicable co-principals, accomplices
and accesories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
Issue:
Is Clemente Laceste entitled to the prospective effect of Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code?
Held:
Yes. Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same. It may be clearly seen that as far back as the year 1884, when the
Penal Code took effect in these Islands until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle
underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general
rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has
evidently been carried over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the
Philippines through article 22, quoted above. This is an exception to the general rule
that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the following
maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward) Article
22 of the new Penal Code is applicable to the petitioner, who comes within one of the
cases especially provided for in article 344 of the Code.