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The document discusses three Philippine Supreme Court cases related to the 1987 Constitution:
1) De Leon vs. Esguerra - Held that the governor's replacement of barangay officials after ratification of the 1987 Constitution was invalid, as the Provisional Constitution it relied on was superseded.
2) Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections - Held that Congress can simultaneously propose constitutional amendments and call a constitutional convention, as these are different powers granted by the Constitution.
3) Imong vs. Comelec - Held that while Congress has sole authority to call a constitutional convention, it can pass implementing laws in its legislative role, not just in its constituent assembly role.
The document discusses three Philippine Supreme Court cases related to the 1987 Constitution:
1) De Leon vs. Esguerra - Held that the governor's replacement of barangay officials after ratification of the 1987 Constitution was invalid, as the Provisional Constitution it relied on was superseded.
2) Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections - Held that Congress can simultaneously propose constitutional amendments and call a constitutional convention, as these are different powers granted by the Constitution.
3) Imong vs. Comelec - Held that while Congress has sole authority to call a constitutional convention, it can pass implementing laws in its legislative role, not just in its constituent assembly role.
The document discusses three Philippine Supreme Court cases related to the 1987 Constitution:
1) De Leon vs. Esguerra - Held that the governor's replacement of barangay officials after ratification of the 1987 Constitution was invalid, as the Provisional Constitution it relied on was superseded.
2) Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections - Held that Congress can simultaneously propose constitutional amendments and call a constitutional convention, as these are different powers granted by the Constitution.
3) Imong vs. Comelec - Held that while Congress has sole authority to call a constitutional convention, it can pass implementing laws in its legislative role, not just in its constituent assembly role.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SECTION 27, ARTICLE 18, 1987 CONSTITUTION DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA (G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987) MELENCIOHERRERA, !." FACTS" In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay aptain and the other petitioners Angel !. !ala"at, et al., as Barangay o#ncil"en of Barangay Dolores, $aytay, %i&al. 'n (e)r#ary 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon recei*ed a Me"orand#" antedated Dece")er 1, 198+ )#t signed )y respondent 'I ,o*ernor Ben-a"in .sg#erra on (e)r#ary 8, 1987 designating respondent (lorentino ,. Magno as Barangay aptain of Barangay Dolores, $aytay, %i&al. $he designation "ade )y the 'I ,o*ernor was /)y a#thority of the Minister of Local ,o*ern"ent./ Also on (e)r#ary 8, 1987, .sg#erra signed a Me"orand#", antedated Dece")er 1, 198+ designating respondents %e"igio M. $igas, et al., as "e")ers of the Barangay o#ncil of the sa"e Barangay and M#nicipality. 0etitioners "aintain that with the ratification of the 1987 onstit#tion, .sg#erra no longer has the a#thority to replace the" and to designate their s#ccessors. 1owe*er, respondents rely on !ection 2, Article III of the 0ro*isional onstit#tion, which pro*ided2 !.$I'3 2. All electi*e and appointi*e officials and e"ployees #nder the 1974 onstit#tion shall contin#e in office #ntil otherwise pro*ided )y procla"ation or e5ec#ti*e order or #pon the designation or appoint"ent and 6#alification of their s#ccessors, if s#ch appoint"ent is "ade within a period of one year fro" (e)r#ary 27, 198+. ISSUE" 8hether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners was *alidly "ade d#ring the one9year period which ended on (e)r#ary 27, 1987. HELD" 3'. 8hile (e)r#ary 8, 1987 is ostensi)ly still within the one year deadline #nder the 0ro*isional onstit#tion, the sa"e "#st )e dee"ed to ha*e )een o*erta:en )y !ection 27, Article ;<III of the 1987 onstit#tion reading2 =$his onstit#tion shall ta:e effect i""ediately #pon its ratification )y a "a-ority of the *otes cast in a ple)iscite held for the p#rpose and shall s#persede all pre*io#s onstit#tions.> $he 1987 onstit#tion was ratified in a ple)iscite on (e)r#ary 2, 1987. By that date, the 0ro*isional onstit#tion "#st )e dee"ed to ha*e )een s#perseded. 1a*ing )eco"e inoperati*e, !ection 2, Article III of the 0ro*isional onstit#tion co#ld not )e relied on )y the respondent 'I ,o*ernor. $he "e"orand#" dated (e)r#ary 8, 1987 )y the respondent 'I ,o*ernor co#ld no longer ha*e any legal force and effect. $he act of ratification is the act of *oting )y the people. $he can*ass of the *otes thereafter is "erely the "athe"atical confir"ation of what was done d#ring the date of the ple)iscite, and the procla"ation of the 0resident is "erely the official confir"atory declaration of an act which was act#ally done )y the (ilipino people in adopting the onstit#tion when they cast their *otes on the date of the ple)iscite. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SECTIONS 1 # 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION GON$ALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (GR. NO L2819%, NOVEM&ER 9, 19%7) CONCEPCION, C.!." FACTS" $he ongress passed 4 resol#tions si"#ltaneo#sly. $he first, proposing a"end"ents to the onstit#tion so as to increase the "e")ership of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es fro" a "a5i"#" of 12?, as pro*ided in the present onstit#tion, to a "a5i"#" of 18?. $he second, calling a con*ention to propose a"end"ents to said onstit#tion, the con*ention to )e co"posed of two @2A electi*e delegates fro" each representati*e district, to )e elected in the general elections. And the third, proposing that the sa"e onstit#tion )e a"ended so as to a#thori&e !enators and "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es to )eco"e delegates to the afore"entioned constit#tional con*ention, witho#t forfeiting their respecti*e seats in ongress. !#)se6#ently, ongress passed a )ill, which, #pon appro*al )y the 0resident, )eca"e %ep#)lic Act 3o. B914 pro*iding that the a"end"ents to the onstit#tion proposed in the afore"entioned resol#tions )e s#)"itted, for appro*al )y the people, at the general elections. $he petitioner assails the constit#tionality of the said law contending that the ongress cannot si"#ltaneo#sly propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion and call for the holding of a constit#tional con*ention. ISSUES" @1A Is %ep#)lic Act 3o. B914 constit#tionalC @2A 8'3 ongress can si"#ltaneo#sly propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion and call for the holding of a constit#tional con*entionC HELD" D.! as to )oth iss#es. $he constit#ent power or the power to a"end or re*ise the onstit#tion, is different fro" the law9"a:ing power of ongress. ongress can directly propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion and at the sa"e ti"e call for a onstit#tional on*ention to propose a"end"ents. Indeed, the power to a"end the onstit#tion or to propose a"end"ents thereto is not incl#ded in the general grant of legislati*e powers to ongress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people E as the repository of so*ereignty in a rep#)lican state, s#ch as o#rsE to "a:e, and, hence, to a"end their own (#nda"ental Law. ongress "ay propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion "erely )eca#se the sa"e e5plicitly grants s#ch power. 1ence, when e5ercising the sa"e, it is said that !enators and Me")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es act, not as "e")ers of ongress, )#t as co"ponent ele"ents of a constit#ent asse")ly. 8hen acting as s#ch, the "e")ers of ongress deri*e their a#thority fro" the onstit#tion, #nli:e the people, when perfor"ing the sa"e f#nction, for their a#thority does not e"anate fro" the onstit#tion E they are the *ery so#rce of all powers of go*ern"ent, incl#ding the onstit#tion itself . !ince, when proposing, as a constit#ent asse")ly, a"end"ents to the onstit#tion, the "e")ers of ongress deri*e their a#thority fro" the (#nda"ental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not ha*e the final say on whether or not their acts are within or )eyond constit#tional li"its. 'therwise, they co#ld )r#sh aside and set the sa"e at na#ght, contrary to the )asic tenet that o#rs is a go*ern"ent of laws, not of "en, and to the rigid nat#re of o#r onstit#tion. !#ch rigidity is stressed )y the fact that, the onstit#tion e5pressly confers #pon the !#pre"e o#rt, the power to declare a treaty #nconstit#tional, despite the e"inently political character of treaty9"a:ing power. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES IM&ONG VS. COMELEC 35 SCRA 28 (1970) FACTS" 0etitioners Man#el I")ong and %a#l ,on&ales, )oth interested in r#nning as candidates in the 1971 onstit#tional on*ention, filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, i"p#gning the constit#tionality of %A +142, clai"ing that it pre-#dices their rights as candidates. ongress, acting as a onstit#ent Asse")ly, passed %esol#tion 3o.2 which called for the onstit#tional on*ention to propose onstit#tional a"end"ents. After its adoption, ongress, acting as a legislati*e )ody, enacted %.A. B91B i"ple"enting said resol#tion, restating entirely the pro*isions of said resol#tion. $hereafter, ongress, acting as a onstit#ent Asse")ly, passed %esol#tion 3o. B a"ending the %esol#tion 3o. 2 )y pro*iding that =555 any other details relating to the specific apportion"ent of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of the onstit#tional on*ention shall )e e")odied in an i"ple"enting legislation 555> ongress, acting as a legislati*e )ody, enacted %.A. +142, i"ple"enting %esol#tion 3os. 2 and B, and e5pressly repealing %.A. B91B. ISSUE" May ongress in acting as a legislati*e )ody enact %.A.+142 to i"ple"ent the resol#tion passed )y it in its capacity as a onstit#ent Asse")lyC HELD" D.!. $he o#rt declared that while the a#thority to call a onstit#tional on*ention is *ested )y the onstit#tion solely and e5cl#si*ely in ongress acting as a constit#tional asse")ly, the power to enact the i"ple"enting details or specifics of the general law does not e5cl#si*ely pertain to ongress, the ongress in e5ercising its co"prehensi*e legislati*e power @not as a onstit#tional Asse")lyA "ay pass the necessary i"ple"enting law pro*iding for the details of the onstit#tional on*entions, s#ch as the n#")er, 6#alification, and co"pensation of its "e")er. $he reasons cited )y the o#rt in #pholding the constit#tionality of the enact"ent of %.A. +142 are as follows2 1. ongress, acting as a onstit#ent Asse")ly p#rs#ant to Article ;< of the onstit#tion, has a#thority to propose constit#tional a"end"ents or call a con*ention for the p#rpose )y F *otes of each ho#se in -oint session asse")led )#t *oting separately. 2. !#ch grant incl#des all other powers essential to the effecti*e e5ercise of the principal power )y necessary i"plication. 4. I"ple"enting details are within the a#thority of the ongress not only as a onstit#ent Asse")ly )#t also in the e5ercise of its co"prehensi*e legislati*e power which enco"passes all "atters not e5pressly or )y necessary i"plication withdrawn or re"o*ed )y the onstit#tion fro" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 1 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the a")it of legislati*e action so long as it does not contra*ene any pro*ision of the onstit#tionG and B. ongress as a legislati*e )ody "ay th#s enact necessary i"ple"enting legislation to fill in the gaps which ongress as a onstit#ent Asse")ly has o"itted. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ARTICLE 3VII, SECTION 15, 1973 CONSTITUTION OCCENA VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L5%350, APRIL 2, 1981 FERNANDO, C.!." FACTS" $he challenge in these two prohi)ition proceedings is against the *alidity of three Batasang 0a")ansa %esol#tions proposing constit#tional a"end"ents. 0etitioners #rged that the a"end"ents proposed are so e5tensi*e in character that they go far )eyond the li"its of the a#thority conferred on the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa as s#ccessor of the Interi" 3ational Asse")ly. (or the", what was done was to re*ise and not to a"end. 0etitioners !a"#el 'ccena and %a"on A. ,on&ales, )oth "e")ers of the 0hilippine Bar and for"er delegates to the 1971 onstit#tional on*ention that fra"ed the present onstit#tion, are s#ing as ta5payers. $he rather #northodo5 aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1974 onstit#tion is not the f#nda"ental law. $he s#its for prohi)ition were filed respecti*ely on March + and March 12, 1981. ISSUES" 8hether or not the 1974 onstit#tion is already in effect. 8hether or not the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa has the power to propose a"end"ents. 8hether or not the three resol#tions are *alid. HELD" 1.Des. it is "#ch too late in the day to deny the force and applica)ility of the 1974 onstit#tion. In the dispositi*e portion of Ha*ellana *. $he .5ec#ti*e !ecretary, dis"issing petitions for prohi)ition and "anda"#s to declare in*alid its ratification, this o#rt stated that it did so )y a *ote of si5 to fo#r. It then concl#ded2 /$his )eing the *ote of the "a-ority, there is no f#rther -#dicial o)stacle to the new onstit#tion )eing considered in force and effect./ 8ith s#ch a prono#nce"ent )y the !#pre"e o#rt and with the recognition of the cardinal post#late that what the !#pre"e o#rt says is not only entitled to respect )#t "#st also )e o)eyed, a factor for insta)ility was re"o*ed. $he !#pre"e o#rt can chec: as well as legiti"ate. In declaring what the law is, it "ay not only n#llify the acts of coordinate )ranches )#t "ay also s#stain their *alidity. In the latter case, there is an affir"ation that what was done cannot )e stig"ati&ed as constit#tionally deficient. $he "ere dis"issal of a s#it of this character s#ffices. $hat is the "eaning of the concl#ding state"ent in Ha*ellana. !ince then, this o#rt has in*aria)ly applied the present onstit#tion. $he latest case in point is 0eople *. !ola, pro"#lgated )arely two wee:s ago. D#ring the first year alone of the effecti*ity of the present onstit#tion, at least ten cases "ay )e cited. 2. Des.$he e5istence of the power of the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa is ind#)ita)le. $he applica)le pro*ision in the 197+ A"end"ents is 6#ite e5plicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads th#s2 /$he Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa shall ha*e the sa"e powers and its Me")ers shall ha*e the sa"e f#nctions, responsi)ilities, rights, pri*ileges, and dis6#alifications as the interi" 3ational Asse")ly and the reg#lar 3ational Asse")ly and the Me")ers thereof./ 'ne of s#ch powers is precisely that of proposing a"end"ents. Article ;<II, !ection 17 of the 1974 onstit#tion in its $ransitory 0ro*isions *ested the Interi" 3ational Asse")ly with the power to propose a"end"ents #pon special call )y the 0ri"e Minister )y a *ote of the "a-ority of its "e")ers to )e ratified in accordance with the Article on A"end"ents. 8hen, therefore, the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa, #pon the call of the 0resident and 0ri"e Minister (erdinand .. Marcos, "et as a constit#ent )ody it acted )y *irt#e 'f s#ch i"potence Its a#thority to do so is clearly )eyond do#)t. It co#ld and did propose the a"end"ents e")odied in the resol#tions now )eing assailed. 4. Des.$he 6#estion of whether the proposed resol#tions constit#te a"end"ents or re*ision is of no rele*ance. It s#ffices to 6#ote fro" the opinion of H#stice Ma:asiar, spea:ing for the o#rt, in Del %osario *. o""ission on .lections to dispose of this contention. 8hether the onstit#tional on*ention will only propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion or entirely o*erha#l the present onstit#tion and propose an entirely new onstit#tion )ased on an Ideology foreign to the de"ocratic syste", is of no "o"entG )eca#se the sa"e will )e s#)"itted to the people for ratification. 'nce ratified )y the so*ereign people, there can )e no de)ate a)o#t the *alidity of the new onstit#tion. $he fact that the present onstit#tion "ay )e re*ised and replaced with a new one ... is no arg#"ent against the *alidity of the law )eca#se Ia"end"entI incl#des the Ire*isionI or total o*erha#l of the entire onstit#tion. At any rate, whether the onstit#tion is "erely a"ended in part or re*ised or totally changed wo#ld )eco"e i""aterial the "o"ent the sa"e is ratified )y the so*ereign people./ 81.%.('%., the petitions are dis"issed for lac: of "erit. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SECTIONS 1 # 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (GR. NO. L34150, OCTO&ER 1%, 1971) &ARREDO, !." FACTS" A onstit#tional on*ention was called #pon to propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, in which, the delegates to the said on*ention were all elected #nder and )y *irt#e of resol#tions and the i"ple"enting legislation thereof, %ep#)lic Act +142. $he on*ention appro*ed 'rganic %esol#tion 3o. 1, a"ending section one of article 7 of the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines so as to lower the *oting age to 18. !aid resol#tion also pro*ided in its !ection 4 that the partial a"end"ent, which refers only to the age 6#alification for the e5ercise of s#ffrage shall )e witho#t pre-#dice to other a"end"ents that will )e proposed in the f#t#re )y the 1971 onstit#tional on*ention on other portions of the a"ended !ection or on other portions of the entire onstit#tion. $he "ain thr#st of the petition is that 'rganic %esol#tion 3o. 1 and the other i"ple"enting resol#tions thereof s#)se6#ently appro*ed )y the on*ention ha*e no force and effect as laws in so far as they are in contra*ention to !ection 1 Article ;< of the onstit#tion. Jnder the said pro*ision, the proposed a"end"ent in 6#estion cannot )e presented to the people for ratification separately fro" each and all of the other a"end"ents to )e drafted and proposed )y the on*ention. ISSUE" Is the %esol#tion appro*ed )y the 1971 onstit#tional on*ention constit#tionalC HELD" 3'. 'rganic %esol#tion 3o. 1 of the onstit#tional on*ention of 1971 and the i"ple"enting acts and resol#tions of the on*ention, insofar as they pro*ide for the holding of a ple)iscite, as well as the resol#tion of the respondent o"elec co"plying therewith are n#ll and *oid. $he o#rt is of the opinion that in pro*iding for the 6#estioned ple)iscite )efore it has finished, and separately fro", the whole draft of the constit#tion it has )een called to for"#late, the on*entionIs 'rganic %esol#tion 3o. 1 and all s#)se6#ent acts of the on*ention i"ple"enting the sa"e *iolate the condition in !ection 1, Article ;< that there sho#ld only )e one /election/ or ple)iscite for the ratification of all the a"end"ents the on*ention "ay propose. 8e are not denying any right of the people to *ote on the proposed a"end"entG 8e are only holding that #nder !ection 1, Article ;< of the onstit#tion, the sa"e sho#ld )e s#)"itted to the" not separately fro" )#t together with all the other a"end"ents to )e proposed )y this present on*ention. 0rescinding already fro" the fact that #nder !ection 4 of the 6#estioned resol#tion, it is e*ident that no fi5ed fra"e of reference is pro*ided the *oter, as to what finally will )e conco"itant 6#alifications that will )e re6#ired )y the final draft of the constit#tion to )e for"#lated )y the on*ention of a *oter to )e a)le to en-oy the right of s#ffrage, there are other considerations which "a:e it i"possi)le to *ote intelligently on the proposed a"end"ent. 3o one :nows what changes in the f#nda"ental principles of the constit#tion the on*ention will )e "inded to appro*e. $o )e "ore specific, we do not ha*e any "eans of foreseeing whether the right to *ote wo#ld )e of any significant *al#e at all. 8ho can say whether or not later on the on*ention "ay decide to pro*ide for *arying types of *oters for each le*el of the political #nits it "ay di*ide the co#ntry into. $he root of the diffic#lty in other words, lies in that the on*ention is precisely on the *erge of introd#cing s#)stantial changes, if not radical ones, in al"ost e*ery part and aspect of the e5isting social and political order enshrined in the present onstit#tion. 1ow can a *oter in the proposed ple)iscite intelligently deter"ine the effect of the red#ction of the *oting age #pon the different instit#tions which the on*ention "ay esta)lish and of which presently he is not gi*en any ideaC learly, there is i"proper s#)"ission. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SANIDAD VS. COMELEC 73 SCRA 333 (197%) FACTS" 0resident Marcos iss#ed 0.D. 991 calling for a national referend#" on 'cto)er 1+, 197+ for the iti&ens Asse")lies @=Barangay>A to resol*e, a"ong other things, the iss#es of "artial law, the interi" asse")ly, its replace"ent, the powers of s#ch replace"ent, the period of its e5istence, the length of the period for the e5ercise )y the 0resident of his present powers. $hereafter, 0.D.1?41 was iss#ed, a"ending 0.D. 991 )y declaring the pro*isions of 0.D. 229 applica)le as to the "anner of *oting and can*assing of *otes in )arangays for the national referend#"9 ple)iscite of 'cto)er 1+, 197+. 0.D. 1?44 was also iss#ed, declaring therein that the 6#estion of the contin#ance of "artial law will )e s#)"itted for referend#" at the sa"e ti"e as the s#)"ission of his @0residentA proposed a"end"ents to the onstit#tion thro#gh a ple)iscite on 'cto)er 1+, 197+. 0etitioner !anidad filed s#it for 0rohi)ition and 0reli"inary In-#nction, see:ing to en-oin the 'M.L. fro" holding and cond#cting said %eferend#"90le)iscite on the )asis that #nder the 1947 and 1974 onstit#tion, there is no grant to the inc#")ent 0resident to e5ercise the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 2 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 constit#ent power to propose a"end"ents to the new onstit#tion, hence, the %eferend#"90le)iscite on 'cto)er 1+ has no legal )asis. 0etitioner ,#&"an filed another action asserting that the power to propose a"end"ents to or re*ision of the onstit#tion d#ring the transition period is e5pressly conferred to the interi" 3ational Asse")ly #nder sec.1+, Art. ;<II of the onstit#tion. A si"ilar action was instit#ted )y petitioners ,on&ales and !alapantan arg#ing that2 1. .*en granting hi" legislati*e powers #nder the "artial law, the inc#")ent 0resident cannot act as a constit#ent asse")ly to propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion, 2. A referend#"9ple)iscite is #ntena)le #nder the onstit#tions of 1947 and 1974, 4. $he s#)"ission of the proposed a"end"ents in s#ch a short period of ti"e for deli)eration renders the ple)iscite a n#llity, B. $o lift "artial law, the 0resident need not cons#lt the people *ia referend#", and 7. Allowing 179year9olds to *ote wo#ld a"o#nt to an a"end"ent of the onstit#tion, which confines the right of s#ffrage to those citi&ens of the 0hilippines 18 years of age and a)o*e. $he !olicitor ,eneral, in his co""ent for respondent 'M.L., "aintains that2 1. 0etitioners ha*e no standing to s#e 2. $he iss#e raised is political in nat#re, )eyond -#dicial cogni&ance of the co#rt 4. At this state of the transition period, only the inc#")ent 0resident has the a#thority to e5ercise constit#ent power B. $he referend#"9ple)iscite is a step towards nor"ali&ation. ISSUES" Do the petitioners ha*e the standing to s#eC 1. Is the 6#estion of the constit#tionality of the 0residential Decrees 991, 1?41, and 1?44 political or -#dicialC 2. Does the 0resident possess the power to propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion as well as set #p the re6#ired "achinery and prescri)e the proced#re for the ratification of his proposal, in the a)sence of an interi" 3ational Asse")lyC 4. Is the s#)"ission to the people of the proposed a"end"ents within the ti"e fra"e allowed therefore a s#fficient and proper s#)"issionC
HELD" 1. D.!. At the instance of ta5payers, laws pro*iding for the dis)#rse"ent of p#)lic f#nds "ay )e en-oined #pon the theory that the e5pendit#re of p#)lic f#nds )y the !tate for the p#rpose of e5ec#ting an #nconstit#tional act constit#tes a "isapplication of s#ch f#nds. 2. It is a -#dicial 6#estion. 4. D.!. If the 0resident has )een legiti"ately discharging the legislati*e f#nctions of the Interi" Asse")ly, there is no reason why he cannot *alidly discharge the f#nction of that asse")ly to propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion, which is )#t ad-#nct, altho#gh pec#liar, to its gross legislati*e power. $his is not to say that the 0resident has con*erted his office into a constit#ent asse")ly of that nat#re nor"ally constit#ted )y the legislat#re. %ather, with the Interi" Asse")ly not con*ened and only the 0residency and !#pre"e o#rt in operation, the #rges of a)sol#te necessity render it i"perati*e #pon the 0resident to act as agent for and in )ehalf of the people to propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion. 0arenthetically, )y its *ery constit#tion, the !#pre"e o#rt possesses no capacity to propose a"end"ents witho#t constit#tional infractions. (or the 0resident to shy away fro" that act#ality and decline to #nderta:e the a"ending process wo#ld lea*e the go*ern"ental "achinery at a stale"ate or create in the powers of the !tate a destr#cti*e *ac##". After all, the constit#ent asse")lies or constit#tional con*entions, li:e the 0resident now, are "ere agents of the people. B. D.!. Art. ;<I of the onstit#tion "a:es no pro*ision as to the specific date when the ple)iscite shall )e held, )#t si"ply states that =it shall )e held not later than 4 "onths after the appro*al of s#ch a"end"ent or re*ision.> $he period fro" !epte")er 21 to 'cto)er 1+, or a period of three wee:s is not too short for free de)ates or disc#ssions on the referend#"9ple)iscite iss#es. $he iss#es are not new. $hey are the iss#es of the day, and the people ha*e )een li*ing with 7. the" since the procla"ation of "artial law fo#r years ago. $he referend#"s of 1974 and 1977 carried the sa"e iss#e of "artial law. $hat notwithstanding, the contested )rief period for disc#ssion is not witho#t co#nterparts in pre*io#s ple)iscites for constit#tional a"end"ents. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC 270 SCRA 10%, MARCH 19, 1997 FACTS" 0ri*ate respondent Delfin filed with the 'M.L. a =0etition to A"end the onstit#tion, to Lift $er" Li"its of .lecti*e 'fficials, )y 0eopleKs a"end"ents to the onstit#tion granted #nder !ection 2, Art. ;<II of the 1987 onstit#tion. %.A. +747 and 'M.L. %esol#tion 3o. 24??. $he proposed a"end"ents consist of the s#)"ission of this proposition to the peopleE=Do yo# appro*e the lifting of the ter" li"its of all electi*e officials, a"ending for the p#rpose section B and 7 of Art.<I, !ection B of Art.<II, and !ection 8 of Art. ; of the 0hilippine onstit#tionC> $he 'M.L. iss#ed an order directing the p#)lication of the petition and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, !enator %a#l %oco, the IB0, De"o:rasya9 Ipagtanggol ang Lonstit#syon @DILA, 0#)lic Interest Law enter, and La)an ng De"o:rati:ong 0ilipino @LABA3A appeared as inter*enors9 oppositors. !enator %oco "o*ed to dis"iss the Delfin 0etition on the gro#nd that it is not the initiatory party cogni&a)le )y the 'M.L.. 0etitioners filed a special ci*il action directing respondents 'M.L. and DelfinKs 0etition to directly propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion thro#gh the syste" of initiati*e #nder sec.2 of Art. ;<II of the 1987 onstit#tion. 0etitioners raise the following arg#"ents2 1. $he constit#tional pro*ision on peopleKs initiati*e to a"end the onstit#tion can only )e i"ple"ented )y law to )e passed )y ongress. 3o s#ch law has )een passed. 2. %.A. +747 failed to pro*ide s#)title initiati*e on the onstit#tion, #nli:e in the other "odes of initiati*e. It only pro*ides for the effecti*ity of the law after the p#)lication in print "edia indicating that the Act co*ers only laws and not constit#tional a"end"ents )eca#se the latter ta:es effect only #pon ratification and not after p#)lication. 4. 'M.L. %esol#tion 3o.24??, adopted on Han#ary 1+, 1991 to go*ern the =cond#ct of initiati*e on the onstit#tion and initiati*e and referend#" on national and local laws>, is #ltra *ires insofar as initiati*e or a"end"ents to the onstit#tion are concerned, since the 'M.L. has no power to pro*ide r#les and reg#lation for the e5ercise of the right of initiati*e to a"end the onstit#tion. 'nly the ongress is a#thori&ed )y the onstit#tion to pass the i"ple"enting law. B. $he peopleKs initiati*e is li"ited to a"end"ents to the onstit#tion, to the re*ision thereof. .5tending or lifting of the ter" li"its constit#tes a re*ision and is therefore o#tside the power of the peopleKs initiati*e. 7. (inally, ongress has not yet appropriated f#nds for peopleKs initiati*e, neither the 'M.L. nor any other depart"ent, agency or office of the go*ern"ent has realigned f#nds for the p#rpose. $he !#pre"e o#rt ga*e d#e co#rse to this petition and granted the Motions for Inter*ention filed )y 0etitioners9Inter*enors DIL, MABI3I, IB0, LABA3, and !enator %oco. ISSUES" 1. 8hether !ec. 2, Art. ;<II of the 1987 onstit#tion is a self9e5ec#ting pro*isionC 2. 8hether %.A.+747 is a s#fficient stat#tory i"ple"entation of the said constit#tional pro*isionC 4. 8hether the 'M.L. resol#tion is *alidC B. 8hether the lifting of ter" li"its of electi*e national and local officials as proposed wo#ld constit#te a re*ision, or an a"end"ent to the onstit#tionC HELD" 3'. Altho#gh the "ode of a"end"ent which )ypasses congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on congressional action. 8hile the onstit#tion has recogni&ed or granted that right, the people cannot e5ercise it if the ongress for whate*er reason, does not pro*ide for its i"ple"entation. 1. 3'. %.A. +747 is ins#fficient and inco"plete to f#lly co"ply with the power and d#ty of the ongress to enact the stat#tory i"ple"entation of sec.2, Art.;<II of the onstit#tion. Altho#gh said Act intended to incl#de the syste" of initiati*e on a"end"ents to the onstit#tion, it is dee"ed inade6#ate to co*er that syste" and accordingly pro*ide for a local initiati*e re6#ired for proposing onstit#tional changes. 2. 3'. $he 'M.L. %esol#tion insofar as it prescri)es r#les and reg#lations on the cond#ct of initiati*e on a"end"ents to the onstit#tion is *oid, as e5pressed in the Latin "a5i" =0otestas delegate non delegari potest. In e*ery case of per"issi)le delegation, it "#st )e shown that the delegation itself is *alid. 4. $he resol#tion of this iss#e is held to )e #nnecessary, if not acade"ic, as the proposal to lift the ter" li"its of electi*e local and national officials is an a"end"ent to the onstit#tion and not a re*ision. $h#s, the petition was granted, and the 'M.L. is per"anently en-oined fro" ta:ing cogni&ance of any petition for initiati*e on a"end"ents to the onstit#tion #ntil a s#fficiently law shall ha*e )een *alidly enacted to pro*ide for the i"ple"entation of the syste". LAM&INO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 174153, OCTO&ER 25, 200% FACTS" 'n 17 (e)r#ary 2??+, petitioners in ,.%. 3o. 17B174, na"ely %a#l L. La")ino and .rico B. A#"entado @/La")ino ,ro#p/A, with other gro#ps and indi*id#als, co""enced gathering signat#res for an initiati*e petition to change the 1987 onstit#tion. 'n 27 A#g#st 2??+, the La")ino ,ro#p filed a petition with the 'M.L. to hold a ple)iscite that will ratify their initiati*e petition #nder !ection 7@)A and @cA and !ection 7 of %ep#)lic Act 3o. +747 or the Initiati*e and %eferend#" Act @/%A +747/A. $he La")ino ,ro#p alleged that their petition had the s#pport of +,427,972 indi*id#als constit#ting at least twel*e per centum San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 3 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 @12MA of all registered *oters, with each legislati*e district represented )y at least three per centum @4MA of its registered *oters. $he La")ino ,ro#p also clai"ed that 'M.L. election registrars had *erified the signat#res of the +.4 "illion indi*id#als. $he La")ino ,ro#pIs initiati*e petition changes the 1987 onstit#tion )y "odifying !ections 197 of Article <I @Legislati*e Depart"entA and !ections 19B of Article <II @.5ec#ti*e Depart"entA and )y adding Article ;<III entitled /$ransitory 0ro*isions./ $hese proposed changes will shift the present Bica"eral90residential syste" to a Jnica"eral90arlia"entary for" of go*ern"ent. $he La")ino ,ro#p prayed that after d#e p#)lication of their petition, the 'M.L. sho#ld s#)"it the following proposition in a ple)iscite for the *otersI ratification. 'n 4? A#g#st 2??+, the La")ino ,ro#p filed an A"ended 0etition with the 'M.L. indicating "odifications in the proposed Article ;<III @$ransitory 0ro*isionsA of their initiati*e. ISSUE" 8hether the La")ino ,ro#pIs initiati*e petition co"plies with !ection 2, Article ;<II of the onstit#tion on a"end"ents to the onstit#tion thro#gh a peopleIs initiati*e. HELD" 3'. $he co#rt declared that La")ino ,ro#pIs initiati*e is *oid and #nconstit#tional )eca#se it dis"ally fails to co"ply with the re6#ire"ent of !ection 2, Article ;<II of the onstit#tion that the initiati*e "#st )e /directly proposed )y the people thro#gh initiati*e #pon a petition./ $he essence of a"end"ents /directly proposed )y the people thro#gh initiati*e #pon a petition/ is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition )y the people. $his "eans two essential ele"ents "#st )e present. (irst, the people "#st a#thor and th#s sign the entire proposal. 3o agent or representati*e can sign on their )ehalf. !econd, as an initiati*e #pon a petition, the proposal "#st )e e")odied in a petition. $hese essential ele"ents are present only if the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents is first shown to the people who e5press their assent )y signing s#ch co"plete proposal in a petition. $h#s, an a"end"ent is /directly proposed )y the people thro#gh initiati*e #pon a petition/ only if the people sign on a petition that contains the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents. $he f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents "ay )e either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition "#st state the fact of s#ch attach"ent. $his is an ass#rance that e*ery one of the se*eral "illions of signatories to the petition had seen the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents )efore signing. 'therwise, it is physically i"possi)le, gi*en the ti"e constraint, to pro*e that e*ery one of the "illions of signatories had seen the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents )efore signing. !ection 2, Article ;<II of the onstit#tion does not e5pressly state that the petition "#st set forth the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents. 1owe*er, the deli)erations of the fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion clearly show that the fra"ers intended to adopt the rele*ant A"erican -#rispr#dence on peopleIs initiati*e. In partic#lar, the deli)erations of the onstit#tional o""ission e5plicitly re*eal that the fra"ers intended that the people "#st first see the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents )efore they sign, and that the people "#st sign on a petition containing s#ch f#ll te5t. Indeed, !ection 7@)A of %ep#)lic Act 3o. +747, the Initiati*e and %eferend#" Act that the La")ino ,ro#p in*o:es as *alid, re6#ires that the people "#st sign the /petition 5 5 5 as signatories./ $he proponents of the initiati*e sec#re the signat#res fro" the people. $he proponents sec#re the signat#res in their pri*ate capacity and not as p#)lic officials. $he proponents are not disinterested parties who can i"partially e5plain the ad*antages and disad*antages of the proposed a"end"ents to the people. $he proponents present fa*ora)ly their proposal to the people and do not present the arg#"ents against their proposal. $he proponents, or their s#pporters, often pay those who gather the signat#res. $h#s, there is no pres#"ption that the proponents o)ser*ed the constit#tional re6#ire"ents in gathering the signat#res. $he proponents )ear the )#rden of pro*ing that they co"plied with the constit#tional re6#ire"ents in gathering the signat#res 9 that the petition contained, or incorporated )y attach"ent, the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents. (or s#re, the great "a-ority of the +.4 "illion people who signed the signat#re sheets did not see the f#ll te5t of the proposed changes )efore signing. $hey co#ld not ha*e :nown the nat#re and effect of the proposed changes, a"ong which are2 1. $he ter" li"its on "e")ers of the legislat#re will )e lifted and th#s "e")ers of 0arlia"ent can )e re9elected indefinitelyG 2. $he interi" 0arlia"ent can contin#e to f#nction indefinitely #ntil its "e")ers, who are al"ost all the present "e")ers of ongress, decide to call for new parlia"entary elections. $h#s, the "e")ers of the interi" 0arlia"ent will deter"ine the e5piration of their own ter" of officeG 4. 8ithin B7 days fro" the ratification of the proposed changes, the interi" 0arlia"ent shall con*ene to propose f#rther a"end"ents or re*isions to the onstit#tion. $hese three specific a"end"ents are not stated or e*en indicated in the La")ino ,ro#pIs signat#re sheets. $he people who signed the signat#re sheets had no idea that they were proposing these a"end"ents. $hese three proposed changes are highly contro*ersial. $he people co#ld not ha*e inferred or di*ined these proposed changes "erely fro" a reading or rereading of the contents of the signat#re sheets. $he onstit#tion entr#sts to the people the power to directly propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion. $his o#rt tr#sts the wisdo" of the people e*en if the "e")ers of this o#rt do not personally :now the people who sign the petition. 1owe*er, this tr#st e"anates fro" a f#nda"ental ass#"ption2 the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ent is first shown to the people )efore they sign the petition, not after they ha*e signed the petition. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. CAMPOS RUEDA (G.R. N+. L13250, O/0. 29, 1971) FACTS" $his is an appeal interposed )y petitioner Antonio a"pos %#eda, ad"inistrator of the estate of the deceased DoNa Maria de la .strella !oriano <da. de erdeira, fro" the decision of the respondent ollector of Internal %e*en#e, assessing against and de"anding fro" the for"er the s#" 01+1,87B.97 as deficiency state and inheritance ta5es, incl#ding interests and penalties, on the transfer of intangi)le personal properties sit#ated in the 0hilippines and )elonging to said Maria de la .strella !oriano <da. de erdeira. Maria de la .strella !oriano <da. de erdeira @Maria erdeira for shortA is a !panish national, )y reason of her "arriage to a !panish citi&en and was a resident of $angier, Morocco fro" 1941 #p to her death on Han#ary 2, 1977. At the ti"e of her de"ise she left, a"ong others, intangi)le personal properties in the 0hilippines./ $hen ca"e this portion2 /'n !epte")er 29, 1977, petitioner filed a pro*isional estate and inheritance ta5 ret#rn on all the properties of the late Maria erdeira. 'n the sa"e date, respondent, pending in*estigation, iss#ed an assess"ent for estate and inheritance ta5es which ta5 lia)ilities were paid )y petitioner. 'n 3o*e")er 17, 1977, an a"ended ret#rn was filed . . . where intangi)le personal properties with were clai"ed as e5e"pted fro" ta5es. 'n 3o*e")er 24, 1977, respondent, pending in*estigation, iss#ed another assess"ent for estate and inheritance ta5es. In a letter dated Han#ary 11, 197+, respondent denied the re6#est for e5e"ption on the gro#nd that the law of $angier is not reciprocal to !ection 122 of the 3ational Internal %e*en#e ode. 1ence, respondent de"anded the pay"ent '( deficiency estate and inheritance ta5es incl#ding ad *alore" penalties, s#rcharges, interests and co"pro"ise penalties . . . . In a letter dated (e)r#ary 8, 197+, and recei*ed )y respondent on the following day, petitioner re6#ested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the clai" for ta5 e5e"ption of the intangi)le personal properties and the i"position of the 27M and 7M ad *alore" penalties. 1owe*er, respondent denied this re6#est, in his letter dated May 7, 197+ . . . and recei*ed )y petitioner on May 21, 197+. %espondent pre"ised the denial on the gro#nds that there was no reciprocity Owith $angier, which was "oreo*erP a "ere principality, not a foreign co#ntry. onse6#ently, respondent de"anded the pay"ent of deficiency estate and inheritance ta5es incl#ding s#rcharges, interests and co"pro"ise penalties ISSUE" Is $angier a foreign co#ntryC HELD" Des. It does not ad"it of do#)t that if a foreign co#ntry is to )e identified with a state, it is re6#ired in line with 0o#ndIs for"#lation that it )e a politically organi&ed so*ereign co""#nity independent of o#tside control )o#nd )y ties of nationhood, legally s#pre"e within its territory, acting thro#gh a go*ern"ent f#nctioning #nder a regi"e of law. 9 It is th#s a so*ereign person with the people co"posing it *iewed as an organi&ed corporate society #nder a go*ern"ent with the legal co"petence to e5act o)edience its co""ands. It has )een referred to as a )ody9politic organi&ed )y co""on consent for "#t#al defense and "#t#al safety and to pro"ote the general welfare. orrectly has it )een descri)ed )y .s"ein as /the -#ridical personification of the nation./ $his is to *iew it in the light its historical de*elop"ent. $he stress is on its )eing a nation, its people occ#pying a definite territory, politically organi&ed, e5ercising )y "eans of its go*ern"ent its so*ereign will o*er the indi*id#als within it and "aintaining its separate international personality. Las:i co#ld spea: of it then as a territorial society di*ided into go*ern"ent and s#)-ects, clai"ing within its allotted area a s#pre"acy o*er all other instit#tions. McI*er si"ilarly wo#ld point to the power entr#sted to its go*ern"ent to "aintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisites satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. .*en on the ass#"ption then that $angier is )ereft of international personality petitioner has not s#ccessf#lly "ade o#t a case. It )ears repeating that fo#r days after the filing of this petition on Han#ary +, 1978 in ollector of Internal %e*en#e *. De Lara, it was specifically held )y #s2 /onsidering the !tate of alifornia as a foreign co#ntry in relation to section 122 of o#r $a5 ode we )elie*e and hold, as did the $a5 o#rt, that the Ancilliary Ad"inistrator is entitled to e5e"ption fro" the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 4 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 inheritance ta5 on the intangi)le personal property fo#nd in the 0hilippines./ $here can )e no do#)t that alifornia as a state in the A"erican Jnion was lac:ing in the alleged re6#isite of international personality. 3onetheless, it was held to )e a foreign co#ntry within the "eaning of !ection 122 of the 3ational Internal %e*en#e ode. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE &ACANI V. NACOCO 5GRN L9%57 NOVEM&ER 29, 195%6 &AUTISTA ANGELO, !." FACTS" $he plaintiffs are co#rt stenographers assigned in Branch <I of the o#rt of (irst Instance of Manila. D#ring the pendency of i*il ase 3o. 2294 of said co#rt, entitled (rancisco !ycip *s. 3ational ocon#t orporation, Assistant orporate o#nsel (ederico Ali:pala, co#nsel for defendant, re6#ested said stenographers for copies, of the transcript of the stenographic notes ta:en )y the" d#ring the hearing. 0laintiffs co"plied with the re6#est )y deli*ering to o#nsel Ali:pala the needed transcript containing 71B pages and thereafter s#)"itted to hi" their )ills for the pay"ent of their fees. $he 3ational ocon#t orporation paid the a"o#nt of 07+B to Leopoldo $. Bacani and 017? to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of 01 per page. Jpon inspecting the )oo:s of this corporation, the A#ditor ,eneral disallowed the pay"ent of these fees and so#ght the reco*ery of the a"o#nts paid. $he respondents arg#e that 3ational ocon#t orporation "ay )e considered as incl#ded in the ter" /,o*ern"ent of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines/ for the p#rposes of the e5e"ption of the legal fees pro*ided for in %#le 194? of the %#les of o#rt. ISSUE" 8hether or not 3A'' is a part of the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines )y *irt#e of its perfor"ance of go*ern"ent f#nctions. HELD" 3o, 3A'' does not ac6#ire that stat#s for the si"ple reason that it does not co"e #nder the classification of "#nicipal or p#)lic corporation. $o resol*e the iss#e in this case re6#ires a little digression on the nat#re and f#nctions of o#r go*ern"ent as instit#ted in o#r onstit#tion. $o )egin with, we state that the ter" /,o*ern"ent/ "ay )e defined as /that instit#tion or aggregate of instit#tions )y which an independent society "a:es and carries o#t those r#les of action which are necessary to ena)le "en to li*e in a social state, or which are i"posed #pon the people for"ing that society )y those who possess the power or a#thority of prescri)ing the"/ @J.!. *s. Dorr, 2 0hil., 442A. $his instit#tion, when referring to the national go*ern"ent, has reference to what o#r onstit#tion has esta)lished co"posed of three great depart"ents, the legislati*e, e5ec#ti*e, and the -#dicial, thro#gh which the powers and f#nctions of go*ern"ent are e5ercised. $hese f#nctions are twofold2 constit#te and "inistrant. $he for"er are those which constit#te the *ery )onds of society and are co"p#lsory in nat#reG the latter are those that are #nderta:en only )y way of ad*ancing the general interests of society, and are "erely optional. $o this latter class )elongs the organi&ation of those corporations owned or controlled )y the go*ern"ent to pro"ote certain aspects of the econo"ic life of o#r people s#ch as the 3ational ocon#t orporation. $hese are what we call go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporations which "ay ta:e on the for" of a pri*ate enterprise or one organi&ed with powers and for"al characteristics of a pri*ate corporation #nder the orporation Law. B#t while 3A'' was organi&ed for the "inistrant f#nction of pro"oting the cocon#t ind#stry, howe*er, it was gi*en a corporate power separate and distinct fro" o#r go*ern"ent, for it was "ade s#)-ect to the pro*isions of o#r orporation Law in so far as its corporate e5istence and the powers that it "ay e5ercise are concerned @sections 2 and B, o""onwealth Act 3o. 718A. =,o*ern"ent of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines/ #sed in section 2 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode refers only to that go*ern"ent. entity thro#gh which the f#nctions of the go*ern"ent are e5ercised as an attri)#te of so*ereignty, and in this are incl#ded those ar"s thro#gh which political a#thority is "ade effecti*e whether they )e pro*incial, "#nicipal or other for" of local go*ern"ent. $hese are what we call "#nicipal corporations. $hey do not incl#de go*ern"ent entities which are gi*en a corporate personality. separate and distinct fro" the go*ern"ent and Iwhich are go*erned )y the orporation Law. $heir powers, d#ties and lia)ilities ha*e to )e deter"ined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. As this o#rt has aptly said, /$he "ere fact that the ,o*ern"ent happens to )e a "a-ority stoc:holder does not "a:e it a p#)lic corporation/ @3ational oal o. *s. ollector of Internal %e*en#e, B+ 0hil., 78+9797A. /By )eco"ing a stoc:holder in the 3ational oal o"pany, the ,o*ern"ent di*ested itself of its so*ereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporation. Jnli:e the ,o*ern"ent, the corporation "ay )e s#ed witho#t its consent, and is s#)-ect to ta5ation. Det the 3ational oal o"pany re"ains an agency or instr#"entality of go*ern"ent./ @,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippine Islands *s. !pringer, 7? 0hil., 288.A THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE PVTA VS.CIR 5GRN L32052 !UL- 25, 19756 FACTS" 0ri*ate respondents filed with the I% a petition, alleging their e"ploy"ent relationship, the o*erti"e ser*ices in e5cess of the reg#lar eight ho#rs a day rendered )y the", and the fail#re to pay the" o*erti"e co"pensation in accordance with o""onwealth Act 3o. BBB. $heir prayer was for the differential )etween the a"o#nt act#ally paid to the" and the a"o#nt allegedly d#e the". 0etitioner 0hilippine <irginia $o)acco Ad"inistration denied the allegations. $he then 0residing H#dge Arsenio $. Martine& of respondent o#rt s#stained the clai"s of pri*ate respondents for o*erti"e ser*ices fro" Dece")er 24, 19+4 #p to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 197?, and directing petitioner to pay the sa"e, "in#s what it had already paid. 0etitioner clai"s that the "atter is )eyond the -#risdiction of the I% as it is e5ercising go*ern"ental f#nctions and that it is e5e"pt fro" the operation of .A. BBB, in*o:ing the doctrine anno#nced in the leading Agric#lt#ral redit and ooperati*e (inancing Ad"inistration decision, and the distinction )etween constit#ent and "inistrant f#nctions of go*ern"ents as set forth in Bacani *. 3ational ocon#t orporation. ISSUE" 8hether or not the traditional classification of f#nction of go*ern"ent as "inistrant and constit#ent applica)le in the case at )ar. HELD" 3o. $he irrele*ance of s#ch a distinction considering the needs of the ti"es was clearly pointed o#t )y the present hief H#stice. Jnder this traditional classification, s#ch constit#ent f#nctions are e5ercised )y the !tate as attri)#tes of so*ereignty, and not "erely to pro"ote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people 9 these latter f#nctions )eing "inistrant, the e5ercise of which is optional on the part of the go*ern"ent./ 3onetheless, as he e5plained so pers#asi*ely2 /$he growing co"ple5ities of "odern society, howe*er, ha*e rendered this traditional classification of the f#nctions of go*ern"ent 6#ite #nrealistic, not to say o)solete. $he areas which #sed to )e left to pri*ate enterprise and initiati*e and which the go*ern"ent was called #pon to enter optionally, and only I)eca#se it was )etter e6#ipped to ad"inister for the p#)lic welfare than is any pri*ate indi*id#al or gro#p of indi*id#als,I contin#e to lose their well9defined )o#ndaries and to )e a)sor)ed within acti*ities that the go*ern"ent "#st #nderta:e in its so*ereign capacity if it is to "eet the increasing social challenges of the ti"es. 1ere as al"ost e*erywhere else the tendency is #ndo#)tedly towards a greater sociali&ation of econo"ic forces. 1ere of co#rse this de*elop"ent was en*isioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, )y the onstit#tion itself in its declaration of principle concerning the pro"otion of social -#stice./ $h#s was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani *. 3ational ocon#t orporation, )ased on the 8ilsonian classification of the tas:s inc#")ent on go*ern"ent into constit#ent and "inistrant in accordance with the laisse& faire principle. 81.%.('%., the appealed 'rder of March 21, 197? and the %esol#tion of respondent o#rt, denying a "otion for reconsideration are here)y affir"ed. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD (G.R. NO. L9959, DECEM&ER 13, 191%) TRENT, !." FACTS" A)o#t QB??,???, were s#)scri)ed and paid into the treas#ry of the 0hilippine Islands )y the inha)itants of the !panish Do"inions of the relief of those da"aged )y the earth6#a:e which too: place in the 0hilippine Islands on H#ne 4, 18+4. !#)se6#ent thereto a central relief )oard was appointed to distri)#te the "oneys th#s *ol#ntarily contri)#ted and allotted Q4+7,7?4.7? to the *ario#s s#fferers na"ed in its resol#tion. By order of the ,o*ernor9,eneral of the 0hilippine Islands, a list of these allot"ents, together with the na"es of those entitled thereto, was p#)lished in the 'fficial ,a&ette of Manila. $hese were later distri)#ted #p to the s#" of Q4?,299.+7, lea*ing a )alance of Q4+7,B?4.87. Jpon the petition of the go*erning )ody of the Monte de 0iedad, the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent, )y order, directed its treas#rer to t#rn o*er to the for"er the s#" of Q8?,??? of the relief f#nd in install"ents of Q2?,??? each and were recei*ed on the following dates2 (e)r#ary 17, March 12, April 1B, and H#ne 2, 1884, and are still in the possession of the Monte de 0iedad. 'n acco#nt of *ario#s petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to who" the a)o*e9"entioned allot"ents were "ade, the 0hilippine Islands filed a s#it against the Monte de 0iedad a reco*er, /thro#gh the Attorney9,eneral and in representation of the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippine Islands,/ the Q8?.???, together with interest. After d#e trial, -#dg"ent was entered in fa*or of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and "ade the following contentions2 that the Q8?,???, gi*en to the Monte de 0iedad y a-a de Ahorros, were so gi*en as a donation, and that said donation had )een clearedG that the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippine Islands has not s#)rogated the !panish ,o*ern"ent in its rights, as regards an i"portant s#" of "oney a)o*e"entionedG that the only persons who co#ld clai" to )e da"aged )y this pay"ent to the Monte, if it was #nlawf#l, are the donors or San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 5 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the cest#is 6#e tr#stent, th#s, the plaintiff is not the proper party to )ring the actionG that the co#rt erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this s#it )ro#ght )y the Ins#lar ,o*ern"ent against the defendant appellant. ISSUES" 8hether or not the Q8?,??? recei*ed )y Monte de 0iedad was in for" of donation. 8hether or not the o)ligation on the part of the Monte de 0iedad to ret#rn the Q8?,??? to the ,o*ern"ent, e*en considering it a loan, was wiped o#t on the change of so*ereignty. 8hether or not the ,o*ern"ent is a proper party to the case #nder the doctrine of parens patriae. 8hether or not the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent is )o#nd )y the stat#te of li"itations. HELD" 1.3o.Doc#"entary e*idence shows that Monte de 0iedad, after setting forth in its petition to the ,o*ernor9,eneral its financial condition and its a)sol#te necessity for "ore wor:ing capital, as:ed that o#t of the s#" of Q1??,??? held in the $reas#ry of the 0hilippine Islands, there )e transferred to it the s#" of Q8?,???. $he Monte de 0iedad agreed that if the transfer of these f#nds sho#ld not )e appro*ed )y the ,o*ern"ent of !pain, the sa"e wo#ld )e ret#rned forthwith. It did not as: that the Q8?,??? )e gi*en to it as a donation. $he Depart"ent of (inance, acting #nder the orders of the ,o*ernor9,eneral, #nderstood that the Q8?,??? was transferred to the Monte de 0iedad well :new that it recei*ed this s#" as a loan interest./ (#rther"ore, the Monte de 0iedad recogni&ed and considered as late as March 41, 19?2, that it recei*ed the Q8?,??? /as a ret#rna)le loan, and witho#t interest./ $h#s, there cannot )e the slightest do#)t the fact that the Monte de 0iedad recei*ed the Q8?,??? as a "ere loan or deposit and not as a donation. 2.3o. o#rt r#led that if legal pro*isions are in conflict with the political character, constit#tion or instit#tions of the new so*ereign, they )eca"e inoperati*e or lost their force #pon the cession of the 0hilippine Islands to the Jnited !tates, )#t if they are a"ong /that great )ody of "#nicipal law which reg#lates pri*ate and do"estic rights,/ they contin#ed in force and are still in force #nless they ha*e )een repealed )y the present ,o*ern"ent. (ro" the nat#re and class of the s#)-ect "atter, it is clear that it falls within the latter class. $hey are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. $hey conferred #pon the !panish ,o*ern"ent the right and d#ty to s#per*ise, reg#late, and to so"e e5tent control charities and charita)le instit#tions. $he present so*ereign, in e5e"pting /pro*ident instit#tions, sa*ings )an:s, etc.,/ all of which are in the nat#re of charita)le instit#tions, fro" ta5ation, placed s#ch instit#tions, in so far as the in*est"ent in sec#rities are concerned, #nder the general s#per*ision of the Ins#lar $reas#rer. 4.Des.$he gro#nd #pon which the right of the ,o*ern"ent to "aintain the action rests on the fact that the "oney, )eing gi*en to a charity )eca"e a p#)lic property, only applica)le to the specific p#rposes to which it was intended to )e de*oted. It is )#t within those li"its consecrated to the p#)lic #se, and )eca"e part of the p#)lic reso#rces for pro"oting the happiness and welfare of the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent. $o deny the ,o*ern"entIs right to "aintain this action wo#ld )e contrary to so#nd p#)lic policy. $he !#pre"e o#rt of the Jnited !tates in !ohier *s. Mass. ,eneral 1ospital, r#led that2 =insane persons and person not :nown, or not in )eing, apply to the )eneficiaries of charities, who are often in capa)le of *indicating their rights, and -#stly loo: for protection to the so*ereign a#thority, acting as parens patriae. $hey show that this )eneficient f#nctions has not ceased to e5ist #nder the change of go*ern"ent fro" a "onarchy to a rep#)licG )#t that it now resides in the legislati*e depart"ent, ready to )e called into e5ercise whene*er re6#ired for the p#rposes of -#stice and right, and is a clearly capa)le of )eing e5ercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whate*er.> hancelor Lent says2 In this co#ntry, the legislat#re or go*ern"ent of the !tate, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of p#)lic nat#re, )y *irt#e of its general s#perintending a#thority o*er the p#)lic interests, where no other person is entr#sted with it. @B Lent o"., 7?8, note.A B.3o. In 27 yc., 1??+, the r#le, s#pported )y n#"ero#s a#thorities, is stated as follows2 In the a)sence of e5press stat#tory pro*ision to the contrary, stat#te of li"itations do not as a general r#le r#n against the so*ereign or go*ern"ent, whether state or federal. B#t the r#le is otherwise where the "ischief to )e re"edied are of s#ch a nat#re that the state "#st necessarily )e incl#ded, where the state goes into )#siness in concert or in co"petition with her citi&ens, or where a party see:s to enforces his pri*ate rights )y s#it in the na"e of the state or go*ern"ent, so that the latter is only a no"inal party. In the instant case the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent is not a "ere no"inal party )eca#se it, in )ringing and prosec#ting this action, is e5ercising its so*ereign f#nctions or powers and is see:ing to carry o#t a tr#st de*eloped #pon it when the 0hilippine Islands were ceded to the Jnited !tates. (or the foregoing reasons the -#dg"ent appealed fro" is affir"ed. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE CO 7IM CHAN V. VALDE$ TAN 7EH 75 PHIL 113, SEPTEM&ER 17, 1945 FERIA, !" FACTS" 0etitioner filed a "otion for "anda"#s praying that the respondent -#dge )e ordered to contin#e the proceedings in ci*il case no. 4?12 which was initiated #nder the regi"e of the so9called %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines esta)lished d#ring the Hapanese "ilitary occ#pation of the islands. $he respondent -#dge ref#sed to ta:e cogni&ance of and contin#e the proceedings on the following gro#nds2 @1A the procla"ation iss#ed on 'cto)er 24, 19BB )y ,en. Mac Arth#r had the effect of in*alidating and n#llifying all -#dicial proceedings and -#dg"ents of the co#rts of the 0hilippines #nder the 0hilippine .5ec#ti*e o""ission and the %ep#)lic esta)lished d#ring the Hapanese occ#pationG@2A the lower co#rts ha*e no -#risdiction to ta:e cogni&ance of and contin#e -#dicial proceedings pending in the co#rts of the def#nct %ep#)lic in the a)sence of ena)ling law granting s#ch a#thorityG @4A the go*ern"ent esta)lished in the 0hilippines d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation was not a de facto go*ern"ent. ISSUES" 1. 8hether the go*ern"ent esta)lished d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation was a de facto go*ern"ent. 2. 8hether the -#dicial acts and proceedings of the co#rts e5isting in the 0hilippines #nder the 0hil. .5ec#ti*e o""ission and the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines were good and *alid and re"ained so e*en after the li)eration or reocc#pation of the 0hilippines )y the J! and (ilipino forces. 4. 8hether the procla"ation iss#ed )y ,en. Mac Arth#r declaring =all laws, reg#lations and processes of any other go*ern"ent in the 0hilippines than that of the o""onwealth are n#ll and *oid and witho#t legal effect in areas of the 0hilippines free of ene"y occ#pation and control> has in*alidated al -#dg"ents and -#dicial acts and proceedings of the said co#rts. B. 8hether the co#rts of o""onwealth, which were the sa"e co#rts e5isting prior to and contin#e d#ring the Hapanese "ilitary occ#pation of the 0hilippines "ay contin#e those proceedings in said co#rts at the ti"e the 0hilippines were reocc#pied and li)erated )y the J! and (ilipino forces and the o""onwealth of the 0hilippines were reesta)lished. HELD" 1. D.!. $he go*ern"ent esta)lished #nder the na"es of 0hilippine .5ec#ti*e o""ission and %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation was a ci*il go*ern"ent and a de facto go*ern"ent of the second :ind2 that which is esta)lished and "aintained )y "ilitary forces who in*ade and occ#py a territory of the ene"y in the co#rse of war. $he disting#ishing characteristics of this :ind of de facto go*ern"ent areG @1A that its e5istence is "aintained )y acti*e "ilitary power within the territories, and against the rightf#l a#thority of an esta)lished and lawf#l go*ern"entG and @2A that while it e5ists it "#st necessarily )e o)eyed in ci*il "atters )y pri*ate citi&ens who, )y acts of o)edience rendered in s#)"ission to s#ch force, do not )eco"e responsi)le, as wrongdoers, for those acts, tho#gh not warranted )y the laws of the rightf#l go*ern"ent. 2. D.!. Being a de facto go*ern"ent, it necessarily follows that the -#dicial acts and proceedings of the co#rts of -#stice of those go*ern"ents, which are not of a political co"ple5ion, were good and *alid, and, )y *irt#e of the well :nown principle of postli"iny in international law, re"ained good and *alid after the li)eration or reocc#pation of the 0hilippines )y the A"erican and (ilipino forces. 4. 3'. $he phrase =processes of any other go*ern"ent> is )road and "ay refer not only to -#dicial processes, )#t also to ad"inistrati*e or legislati*e, as well as constit#tional processes of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines or other go*ern"ental agencies esta)lished in the Islands d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation. $a:ing into consideration the fact that, according to the well9:nown principles of international law, all -#dg"ents and -#dicial proceedings, which are not of a political co"ple5ion, of the de facto go*ern"ent d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation were good and *alid )efore and re"ained so after the occ#pied territory had co"e again into the power of the tit#lar so*ereign, it sho#ld )e pres#"ed that it was not, and co#ld not ha*e )een, the intention of the ,en. Mac Arth#r, in #sing the phrase =processes of any go*ern"ent> to refer to -#dicial processes, in *iolation of said principles of international law. $he only reasona)le constr#ction of the said phrase is that it refers to go*ern"ental processes other than -#dicial processes, or co#rt proceedings, for according to a well9:nown stat#tory constr#ction, stat#te o#ght ne*er to )e constr#ed to *iolate the law of nations if any other possi)le constr#ction re"ains. B. D.!. Altho#gh in theory, the a#thority of the local ci*il and -#dicial ad"inistration is s#spended as a "atter of co#rse as soon as "ilitary occ#pation ta:es place, in practice, the in*ader does not #s#ally ta:e the ad"inistration of -#stice into his own hands, )#t San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 6 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 contin#es the ordinary co#rts or tri)#nals to ad"inister the laws of the co#ntry to which he is en-oined, #nless a)sol#tely pre*ented. If the proceedings pending in the different co#rts of the Islands prior to the Hapanese "ilitary occ#pation had )een contin#ed d#ring the Hapanese "ilitary ad"inistration, the 0hilippine .5ec#ti*e o""ission and the so9called %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, it stands to reason the sa"e co#rts, which )eco"e reesta)lished and concei*ed of as ha*ing )een in contin#ed e5istence #pon the reocc#pation and li)eration of the 0hilippines )y *irt#e of the principle of postli"iny, "ay contin#e the proceedings in cases then pending in said co#rts, witho#t necessity of enacting laws conferring -#risdiction #pon the" to contin#e said proceedings. CONCEPT OF THE STATE PEOPLE V. GO$O 53 SCRA 47%, OCTO&ER 2%, 1973 FERNANDO, !" FACTS" Loreta ,o&o )o#ght a ho#se and lot located inside the J! 3a*al %eser*ation within the territorial -#risdiction of 'langapo ity. !he de"olished the ho#se and )#ilt another one in its place witho#t sec#ring a )#ilding per"it fro" the ity Mayor of 'langapo ity. $he ity o#rt of 'langapo fo#nd her g#ilty of *iolating a "#nicipal ordinance that re6#ires per"it fro" the "#nicipal "ayor for constr#ction of )#ilding as well as any "odification, repairs or de"olition thereof. 'n appeal with the o#rt of Appeals, ,o&o p#t in iss#e the *alidity of s#ch ordinance )y in*o:ing d#e process. !he li:ewise 6#estioned the applica)ility of the ordinance to her in *iew of the location of her dwelling within the na*al )ase leased to the A"erican Ar"ed (orcesG she contended that the "#nicipal go*ern"ent cannot e5ercise therein ad"inistrati*e -#risdiction. ISSUES" 1. 8hether "#nicipal ordinance is *alidC 2. 8hether the "#nicipal corporation retains its ad"inistrati*e -#risdiction o*er the area where ,o&oKs ho#se was locatedC HELD" 1. D.!, the "#nicipal ordinance is *alid. $he a#thority to re6#ire )#ilding per"its is predicated #pon the general welfare cla#se. Its scope is wide, well9nigh all e")racing, co*ering e*ery aspect of p#)lic health, p#)lic "orals, p#)lic safety, and the well )eing and good order of the co""#nity. 2. D.!, the "#nicipal corporation retains its ad"inistrati*e -#risdiction o*er the said area. By the agree"ent, the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent "erely consents that the Jnited !tates e5ercise -#risdiction in certain cases. $his consent was gi*en p#rely as a "atter of co"ity, co#rtesy or e5pediency. $he 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent has not a)dicated its so*ereignty o*er the )ases as part of the 0hilippine territory or di*ested itself co"pletely of -#risdiction o*er offenses co""itted therein. Jnder the ter"s of the treaty, the Jnited !tates ,o*ern"ent has prior or preferential )#t not e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of s#ch offenses. $he 0hilippine -#risdiction retains not only -#risdictional rights not granted, )#t also s#ch ceded rights as the Jnited !tates Military a#thorities for reasons of their own decline to "a:e #se of. Moreo*er, the concept of so*ereignty as a#to9li"itation, is the property of a state9force d#e to which it has the e5cl#si*e capacity of legal self9deter"ination and self9restriction. 5 5 5 A state is not precl#ded fro" allowing another power to participate in the e5ercise of -#risdictional right o*er certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it )y no "eans follows that s#ch areas )eco"e i"pressed with an alien character. $hey retain their stat#s as nati*e soil. $hey are still s#)-ect to its a#thority. Its -#risdiction "ay )e di"ished, )#t it does not disappear. !o it is with the )ases #nder lease to the A"erican ar"ed forces )y *irt#e of the "ilitary )ases agree"ent of 19B7. they are not and cannot )e foreign territory. CONCEPT OF THE STATE LAUREL V. MISA 77 PHIL 85%, !ANUAR- 30, 1947 PER CURIAM" FACTS" !o"eti"e in May 19B7, Anastacio La#rel, herein petitioner, a (ilipino citi&en, was arrested )y the J! Ar"y and was interned, #nder a co""it"ent order =for his acti*e colla)oration with the Hapanese d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation>. 1e was charged with treason as defined and penali&ed )y Art. 11B of the 0enal ode. B#t in !epte")er 19B7, he was t#rned o*er to the o""onwealth go*ern"ent and since then he has )een #nder the c#stody of the Director of 0risons. 0etitioner then filed a petition for ha)eas corp#s "ainly asserting that he cannot )e prosec#ted for the cri"e of treason for the reason @1A that the so*ereignty of the legiti"ate go*ern"ent in the 0hilippines and, conse6#ently, the correlati*e allegiance of (ilipino citi&ens thereto was then s#spendedG and @2A that there was a change of so*ereignty o*er these Islands #pon the procla"ation of the 0hilippine %ep#)lic. ISSUES" 1. 8hether the so*ereignty of the legiti"ate go*ern"ent in the 0hilippines and, conse6#ently, the correlati*e allegiance of (ilipino citi&ens were s#spended d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation. 2. 8hether the petitioner can )e prosec#ted for the cri"e of treason )y gi*ing aid and s#pport to the ene"y d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation. HELD" 1. 3'. $he a)sol#te and per"anent allegiance of the inha)itants of a territory occ#pied )y the ene"y to their legiti"ate go*ern"ent or so*ereign is not a)rogated or se*ered )y the ene"yKs occ#pation, )eca#se the so*ereignty of the go*ern"ent or so*ereign de -#re is not transferred there)y to the occ#pier and if its is not transferred to the occ#pant it "#st necessarily re"ain *ested in the legiti"ate go*ern"entG that the so*ereignty *ested in the tit#lar go*ern"ent "#st )e disting#ished fro" the e5ercise of the rights inherent thereto, and "ay )e destroyed, or se*ered and transferred to another, )#t it cannot )e s#spended )eca#se the e5istence of so*ereignty cannot )e s#spended witho#t p#tting it o#t of e5istence or di*esting the possessor thereof at least d#ring the so9called period of s#spensionG that what "ay )e s#spended is the e5ercise of the rights of so*ereignty with the control and go*ern"ent of the territory occ#pied )y the ene"y passes te"porarily to the occ#pantG 5 5 5 and that as a corollary of the concl#sion that the so*ereignty itself is not s#spended and s#)sists d#ring the ene"y occ#pation, the allegiance of the inha)itants to their legiti"ate go*ern"ent or so*ereign s#)sists, and therefore there is no s#ch thing as s#spended allegiance. 2. D.!. Article 11B of the %e*ised 0enal ode was applica)le to treason co""itted against the national sec#rity of the legiti"ate go*ern"ent )eca#se the inha)itants of the occ#pied territory were still )o#nd )y their allegiance to the latter d#ring the ene"yKs occ#pation. H#st as a citi&en or s#)-ect of a go*ern"ent or so*ereign "ay )e prosec#ted for and con*icted of treason co""itted in a foreign co#ntry, in the sa"e way a inha)itant of a territory occ#pied )y the "ilitary forces of the ene"y "ay co""it treason against his own legiti"ate or so*ereign if he adheres to the ene"ies of the latter )y gi*ing the" aid and co"fort. CONCEPT OF THE STATE RUFF- VS. CHIEF OF STAFF 75 PHIL 875, AUGUST 20, 194% TUASON, !" FACTS" D#ring the Hapanese occ#pation, herein petitioner, %a"on %#ffy, a 0ro*incial o""ander of the 0hilippine onsta)#lary, retreated in the "o#ntains instead of s#rrendering to the ene"y. 1e organi&ed and led a g#errilla o#tfit :nown as Bolo o")at $ea" or Bolo Area. $he said Bolo Area was a contingent of the + th Military District, which has )een recogni&ed and placed #nder the operational control of the J! Ar"y in the !o#th 0acific. !o"eti"e later, ol. H#rado effected a change of co""and in the Bolo Area. Ma-or %#ffy who was then acting as o""anding 'fficer for the Bolo Area was relie*ed of his position. Later on or on 'cto)er 19, 19BB, Lie#t. ol H#rado was slain allegedly )y the petitioners. It was this "#rder which ga*e rise to petitionerKs trial. $he trial co#rt con*icted petitioner and he now filed this instant petition with the contention that he was not s#)-ect to "ilitary law at the ti"e the offense for which he had )een placed on trial was co""itted. 0etitioners contended that )y the ene"y occ#pation of the 0hilippines, the 3ational Defense Act and all laws and reg#lations creating and go*erning the e5istence of the 0hilippine Ar"y incl#ding the Articles of 8ar, were s#spended and in a)eyance d#ring s#ch )elligerent occ#pation. 1e also assailed the constit#tionality of 94d Article of 8ar which pro*ides that =any person s#)-ect to "ilitary law who co""its "#rder in the ti"e of war sho#ld s#ffer death or i"prison"ent for life, as the co#rt "artial "ay direct.> 0etitioner arg#ed that the said law was in *iolation of Article <II, section 2 of the onstit#tion since 94d of Article of 8ar fails to allow a re*iew )y the !#pre"e o#rt of -#dg"ents of co#rts "artial i"posing death or life i"prison"ent. ISSUES" 1. 8hether petitioner was s#)-ect to "ilitary law at the ti"e the alleged offense was co""itted. 2. 8hether 94d of Articles of 8ar was constit#tional. HELD" 1. D.!, petitioner was s#)-ect to "ilitary law at the ti"e the alleged offense was co""itted. $he r#le that laws of political nat#re or affecting political relations are considered s#perseded or in a)eyance d#ring the "ilitary occ#pation, is intended for the go*erning of the ci*il inha)itants of the occ#pied territory. It is not intended for and does not )ind the ene"ies in ar"s. By the occ#pation of the 0hilippines )y Hapanese forces, the officers and "en of the 0hilippine ar"y did not cease to )e f#lly in the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 7 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ser*ice, tho#gh, in a "eas#re, only in "eas#re, they were not s#)-ect to the "ilitary -#risdiction, if they were not in acti*e d#ty. In the latter case, li:e officers and soldiers on lea*e of a)sence or held as prisoners of war, they co#ld not )e held g#ilty of )reach of the discipline of the co""and or of a neglect of d#ty 5 5 5G )#t for an act #n)eco"ing of a gentle"an or an act which constit#tes an offense of the class specified in the 97 th Article of 8ar, they "ay in general )e legally held s#)-ect to "ilitary -#risdiction and trial. Moreo*er, petitioners, )y their acceptance of appoint"ents as officers in the Bolo Area fro" the ,eneral 1ead6#arters of the + th Military District, they )eca"e "e")ers of the 0hilippine Ar"y a"ena)le to the Articles of 8ar. 5 5 5 As officers in the Bolo Area and the + th Military District, the petitioners operated #nder the orders of a d#ly esta)lished and d#ly appointed co""anders of the Jnited !tates Ar"y and th#s co*ered )y Article 2 of the Articles of 8ar which pro*ides for persons s#)-ect to "ilitary law. 2. D.!, 94d of the Articles of 8ar was constit#tional. It does not *iolate Article <II, section 2 of the onstit#tion which pro*ides that =the 3ational Asse")ly "ay not depri*e the !#pre"e o#rt of its original -#risdiction o*er all cri"inal cases in which the penalty i"posed is death or life i"prison"ent>. o#rt Martial are agencies of e5ec#ti*e character, and one of the a#thorities =for ordering of co#rts "artial has )een held to )e attached to the constit#tional f#nctions of the 0resident as o""ander in hief, independently of legislation>. Jnli:e co#rts of law, they are not a portion of the -#diciary. 5 5 5 co#rt "artial are in fact si"ply instr#"entalities of the e5ec#ti*e power, pro*ided )y ongress for the 0resident as o""ander in hief, to aid hi" in properly co""anding the ar"y and na*y and enforcing discipline therein, and #tili&ed #nder his orders or those of his a#thori&ed "ilitary representati*es. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II 1%2 SCRA 88 (1988) FACTS" 0ri*ate respondents Anthony %ossi and %alph 8yers @deceasedA were )oth e"ployed as ga"e roo" attendants in the special ser*ices depart"ent of the J! 3a*al !tation @3A<!$AA. $hey were ad*ised that their e"ploy"ent had )een con*erted fro" per"anent f#ll9 ti"e to per"anent part9ti"e. $heir reaction was to protect the con*ersion and to instit#te grie*ance proceedings. $he hearing officer reco""ended the reinstate"ent of pri*ate respondents to per"anent f#ll9ti"e stat#s pl#s )ac: wages. In a letter addressed to petitioner Morea#, o""anding 'fficer of !#)ic 3a*al Base, petitioner !anders, !pecial !er*ices Director of 3A<!$A, disagreed with the reco""endation and as:ed for its re-ection. Morea#, e*en )efore the start of the grie*ance hearings, sent a letter to the hief of 3a*al 0ersonnel e5plaining the change of the pri*ate respondentKs stat#s and re6#ested conc#rrence therewith. 0ri*ate respondents filed s#it for da"ages clai"ing that the letters contained li)elo#s i"p#tations that had e5posed the" to ridic#le and had ca#sed the" "ental ang#ish, and pre-#dg"ent of the grie*ance proceedings was an in*asion of their personal and proprietary rights. $hey "a:e it clear that petitioners were )eing s#ed in their personal capacity. A "otion to dis"iss on the gro#nd of lac: of -#risdiction was filed )y the petitioner and was denied. ISSUE" 8ere the petitioners perfor"ing their official d#ties when they did the acts for which they are )eing s#ed for da"agesC HELD" D.!. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are )eing called to acco#nt were perfor"ed )y the" in the discharge of their official d#ties. !anders as director of the special ser*ices depart"ent of 3A<!$A, #ndo#)tedly had s#per*ision o*er its personnel incl#ding the pri*ate respondents and had a hand in their e"ploy"ent, wor:, assign"ents, discipline, dis"issal and other related "atters. $he act of Morea# is deadly official in nat#re, perfor"ed )y hi" as the i""ediate s#perior of !anders and directly answera)le to 3a*al 0ersonnel in "atters in*ol*ing the special depart"ent of 3A<!$A. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- REPU&LIC VS. SANDOVAL 220 SCRA 124 (1993) FACTS" By reason of the Mendiola "assacre, wherein 12 rallyists died in their 6#est for =gen#ine agrarian refor">, 0resident A6#ino iss#ed Ad"inistrati*e 'rder 3o.11 which created the iti&enKs Mendiola o""ission for the p#rpose of cond#cting an in*estigation for the disorders, death and cas#alties that too: place. $he "ost significant reco""endation of the o""ission was for the deceased and other *icti"s of Mendiola incident to )e co"pensated )y the go*ern"ent. D#e to the reco""endation, petitioners filed a for"al letter of de"and for co"pensation fro" the go*ern"ent to which the latter did not ta:e heed. $he gro#p then instit#ted an action for da"ages against the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines together with "ilitary officers and personnel in*ol*ed in Mendiola incident. %espondent H#dge !ando*al dis"issed the co"plaint as against the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines on the )asis that there was no wa*er )y the state. 1ence, the petition for certiorari. ISSUE" 8hether the !tate )y *irt#e of the ad"inistrati*e order wai*ed its i""#nity fro" s#itC HELD" 3'. (irstly, reco""endation "ade )y the co""ission does not in any way "ean that lia)ility a#to"atically attaches to the state. In effect, the sa"e shall only ser*e as a ca#se of action on the e*ent that any party decides to litigate his or her clai". $he co""ission is "erely a preli"inary *en#e. !econdly, whate*er acts or #tterances that then 0resident A6#ino "ay ha*e said or done, the sa"e are not tanta"o#nt to the state ha*ing wai*ed its i""#nity fro" s#it. $he principle of state i""#nity fro" s#it does not apply in this case, as when the relief de"anded )y the s#it re6#ires no affir"ati*e official action on the part of the state nor the affir"ati*e discharge of any o)ligation which )elongs to the state in its political capacity, e*en tho#gh the officers or agents who are "ade defendants clai" to hold or act only )y *irt#e of a title of the state and as its agents and ser*ants. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- FESTE!O VS. FERNANDO 94 PHIL 504 (1954) FACTS" 0laintiff ar"en (este-o filed an action against defendant Isaias (ernando, Director of B#rea# of 0#)lic 8or:s for #nlawf#lly ta:ing possession of portions of her three parcels of land and ca#sing the constr#ction of irrigation canal witho#t o)taining right of way and witho#t her consent or :nowledge. $he lower co#rt r#led in fa*or of plaintiff (este-o. 'n appeal, defendant (ernando in*o:ed his )eing a p#)lic officer of the go*ern"ent of the 0hilippines and th#s, en-oys i""#nity fro" s#it and sho#ld )e a)sol*ed fro" lia)ility for da"ages. ISSUE" May defendant in*o:e i""#nity fro" s#itC HELD" 3'. 'rdinarily, the officer or e"ployee co""itting the tort is personally lia)le and "ay )e s#ed as any other citi&en and held answera)le for whate*er in-#ry. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- SECTION 3, ARTICLE 3VI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION U.S.A VS. GUINTO (G.R. NO. 7%%07 FE&RUAR- 2%, 1990) CRU$, !. FACTS" In the first case, the pri*ate respondents are s#ing se*eral officers of the J.!. Air (orce stationed in lar: Air Base in connection with the )idding cond#cted )y the" for contracts for )ar)er ser*ices in the )ase. In the second case, pri*ate respondents filed a co"plaint for da"ages against pri*ate petitioners for his dis"issal as coo: in the J.!. Air (orce %ecreation enter at the Hohn 1ay Air !tation. In the third case, pri*ate respondent, who was e"ployed as a )arrac:s )oy in a J.!. Base, was arrested following a )#y9)#st operation cond#cted )y the indi*id#al petitioners, officers of the J.!. Air (orce and special agents of the Air (orce 'ffice of !pecial In*estigators. 1e then filed a co"plaint for da"ages against the indi*id#al petitioners clai"ing that it was )eca#se of their acts that he was re"o*ed. In the fo#rth case, a co"plaint for da"ages was filed )y the pri*ate respondents against the pri*ate petitioners, for in-#ries allegedly s#stained )y the plaintiffs as a res#lt of the acts of the defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants )eat the" #p, handc#ffed the" and #nleashed dogs on the" which )it the" in se*eral parts of their )odies and ca#sed e5tensi*e in-#ries to the". $hese cases ha*e )een consolidated )eca#se they all in*ol*e the doctrine of state i""#nity. $he Jnited !tates of A"erica was not i"pleaded in the co"plaints )elow )#t has "o*ed to dis"iss on the gro#nd that they are in effect s#its against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its "otions )y the respondent -#dges. ISSUE" 8hether or not the Doctrine of !tate I""#nity is not applica)le there)y "a:ing the !tate lia)le HELD" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 8 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 3'. 8hile s#a)le, the petitioners are ne*ertheless not lia)le. It is o)*io#s that the clai" for da"ages cannot )e allowed on the strength of the e*idence, which ha*e )een caref#lly e5a"ined. $he traditional r#le of i""#nity e5e"pts a !tate fro" )eing s#ed in the co#rts of another !tate witho#t its consent or wai*er. $his r#le is a necessary conse6#ence of the principles of independence and e6#ality of !tates. 1owe*er, the r#les of International Law are not petrifiedG they are constantly de*eloping and e*ol*ing. And )eca#se the acti*ities of states ha*e "#ltiplied, it has )een necessary to disting#ish the" 9 )etween so*ereign and go*ern"ental acts @-#re i"periiA and pri*ate, co""ercial and proprietary acts @-#re gestionisA. $he res#lt is that !tate i""#nity now e5tends only to acts -#re i"perii. $he restricti*e application of !tate i""#nity is now the r#le in the Jnited !tates, the Jnited Lingdo" and other states in 8estern .#rope. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. !tated differently, a !tate "ay )e said to ha*e descended to the le*el of an indi*id#al and can th#s )e dee"ed to ha*e tacitly gi*en its consent to )e s#ed only when it enters into )#siness contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the e5ercise of its so*ereign f#nctions. In this case the pro-ects are an integral part of the na*al )ase which is de*oted to the defense of )oth the Jnited !tates and the 0hilippines, indisp#ta)ly a f#nction of the go*ern"ent of the highest orderG they are not #tili&ed for nor dedicated to co""ercial or )#siness p#rposes. $here is no 6#estion that the Jnited !tates of A"erica, li:e any other state, will )e dee"ed to ha*e i"pliedly wai*ed its non9s#a)ility if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or pri*ate capacity, as in the cases at )ar. It is only when the contract in*ol*es its so*ereign or go*ern"ental capacity that no s#ch wai*er "ay )e i"plied. A !tate "ay )e said to ha*e descended to the le*el of an indi*id#al and can th#s )e dee"ed to ha*e tacitly gi*en its consent to )e s#ed only when it enters into )#siness contracts. The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated special agents, the !nited "tates government should be liable for their torts. $here see"s to )e a fail#re to disting#ish )etween (1'89.90: and .9'89.90: and a "isconception that the two ter"s are synony"o#s. !#a)ility depends on the consent of the state to )e s#ed, lia)ility on the applica)le law and the esta)lished facts. $he circ#"stance that a state is s#a)le does not necessarily "ean that it is lia)leG on the other hand, it can ne*er )e held lia)le if it does not first consent to )e s#ed. Lia)ility is not conceded )y the "ere fact that the state has allowed itself to )e s#ed. 8hen the state does wai*e its so*ereign i""#nity, it is only gi*ing the plaintiff the chance to pro*e, if it can, that the defendant is lia)le. T;) ('9* '209/.) )(0'8.9(;)( ' 21.) +< .9'89.90: , ,+0 (1'89.90:. $he go*ern"ent "ay )e held lia)le #nder this r#le only if it first allows itself to )e s#ed thro#gh any of the accepted for"s of consent. Moreo*er, the agent perfor"ing his reg#lar f#nctions is not a special agent e*en if he is so deno"inated, as in the case at )ar. 3o less i"portant, the said pro*ision appears to reg#late only the relations of the local state with its inha)itants and, hence, applies only to the 0hilippine go*ern"ent and not to foreign go*ern"ents i"pleaded in o#r co#rts. $he co"plaints against the petitioners in the co#rt )elow were aptly dis"issed. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- SECTION 3, ARTICLE 3VI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION VETERANS MANPO=ER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICE, INC. VS CA (G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEM&ER 25, 1992) FACTS" A s#it was filed against the 0 hief for fail#re to act on the re6#est )y petitioner see:ing to set aside the findings of 0AD0A' e5pelling it fro" 0AD0A' and considering its application for renewal of its license e*en witho#t a certificate of "e")ership fro" 0AD0A'. A Motion to Dis"iss was filed in*o:ing that it is a s#it against the !tate which had not gi*en its consent. ISSUES" 8hether or not the action ta:en )y the petitioners is a s#it against the !tate. 8hether of not the 0 hief and 09!J!IA are lia)le in their pri*ate capacities. 8hether or not the Me"orand#" of Agree"ent constit#te as an i"plied consent of the !tate to )e s#ed HELD" Des, it is a s#it against the !tate, the 0 hief and 09!J!IA )eing instr#"entalities of the !tate e5ercising the go*ern"ental f#nction of reg#lating the organi&ation and operation of pri*ate detecti*e watch"en or sec#rity g#ard agencies. .*en if its action prospers, the pay"ent of its "onetary clai"s "ay not )e enforced )eca#se the !tate did not consent to appropriate the necessary f#nds for the p#rpose. 3o, since the acts for which the 0 hief and 09!J!IA are )eing called to acco#nt in this case, were perfor"ed )y the" as part of their official d#ties, witho#t "alice, gross negligence or )ad faith, no reco*ery "ay )e held against the" in their pri*ate capacities. 3o, the Me"orand#" of Agree"ent did not constit#te an i"plied consent )y the !tate to )e s#ed )eca#se it was intended to professionali&e the ind#stry and to standardi&ed the salaries of the sec#rity g#ards. It is "erely incidental to the p#rpose of %A 3o. 7B87 which is to reg#late the organi&ation and operation of pri*ate sec#rity agencies. $he !tate is dee"ed to ha*e gi*en tacitly its consent to )e s#ed when it enters into a contract. 1owe*er, it does not apply where the contact relates to the e5ercise of its so*ereign f#nctions. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- SECTION 3, ARTICLE 3VI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION MERRITT >(. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. NO. L11154, MARCH 21, 191%) TRENT, !. FACTS" Merritt, while riding his "otorcycle was hit )y an a")#lance owned )y the 0hilippine ,eneral 1ospital. A dri*er e"ployed )y the hospital dro*e it. In order for Merritt to s#e the 0hilippine go*ern"ent, Act 3o. 2B77 was enacted )y the 0hilippine Legislat#re a#thori&ing Merritt to )ring s#it against the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippine Islands and a#thori&ing the Attorney9,eneral of said Islands to appear in said s#it. A s#it was then filed )efore the (I of Manila, which fi5ed the responsi)ility for the collision solely on the a")#lance dri*er and deter"ined the a"o#nt of da"ages to )e awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed fro" the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the a"o#nt of da"ages and defendant in rendering the a"o#nt against the go*ern"ent.
ISSUE" 8hether or not defendant, ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines, wai*ed its i""#nity fro" s#it as well as conceded its lia)ility to the plaintiff when it enacted Act 3o. 2B77 HELD" 3'. By consenting to )e s#ed, a state si"ply wai*es its i""#nity fro" s#it. It does not there)y concede its lia)ility to the plaintiff, or create any ca#se of action in his fa*or, or e5tend its lia)ility to any ca#se not pre*io#sly recogni&ed. It "erely gi*es a re"edy to enforce a pre9e5isting lia)ility and s#)"it itself to the -#risdiction of the co#rt, s#)-ect to its right to interpose any lawf#l defense. $he ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines Islands is only lia)le, for the acts of its agents, officers and e"ployees when they act as special agents. A special agent is one who recei*es a definite and fi5ed order or co""ission, foreign to the e5ercise of the d#ties of his office if he is a special official. $he special agent acts in representation of the state and )eing )o#nd to act as an agent thereof, he e5ec#tes the tr#st confided to hi". $his concept does not apply to any e5ec#ti*e agent who is an e"ployee of the acting ad"inistration and who on his own responsi)ility perfor"s the f#nctions which are inherent in and nat#rally pertain to his office and which are reg#lated )y law and the reg#lations. $he responsi)ility of the state is li"ited to that which it contracts thro#gh a special agent, d#ly e"powered )y a definite order or co""ission to perfor" so"e act or charged with so"e definite p#rpose which gi*es rise to the clai", and not where the clai" is )ased on acts or o"issions i"p#ta)le to a p#)lic official charged with so"e ad"inistrati*e or technical office who can )e held to the proper responsi)ility in the "anner laid down )y the law of ci*il responsi)ility. $he cha#ffe#r of the a")#lance of the ,eneral 1ospital was not s#ch an agent. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- SECTION 3, ARTICLE 3VI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AMIGA&LE VS. CUENCA (G.R. NO. L2%400 FE&RUAR- 29, 1972) MA7ALINTAL, !. FACTS" A"iga)le is the registered owner of a lot co*ered )y a $ransfer ertificate of $itle, where no annotation in fa*or of the go*ern"ent of any right or interest in the property appears at the )ac: of the certificate. 8itho#t prior e5propriation or negotiated sale, the go*ern"ent #sed a portion of said lot for the constr#ction of the Mango and ,orordo A*en#es. It appears that said a*en#es already e5isted since 1921. In 1978, A"iga)leIs co#nsel wrote the 0resident of the 0hilippines, re6#esting pay"ent of the portion of her lot which had )een appropriated )y the go*ern"ent. $he clai" was indorsed to the A#ditor ,eneral, who disallowed it. A"iga)le then filed in the co#rt a 6#o a co"plaint against the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and 3icolas #enca, in his capacity as o""issioner of 0#)lic 1ighways for the reco*ery of ownership and possession of the land tra*ersed )y the Mango and ,orordo A*en#es. !he also so#ght the pay"ent of co"pensatory da"ages for the illegal occ#pation of her land, "oral da"ages, attorneyIs fees and the costs of the s#it. $he ,o*ern"ent had not gi*en its consent to )e s#ed. ISSUE" 8hether or not the appellant "ay properly s#e the go*ern"ent #nder the facts of the case
HELD" D.!. 8here the go*ern"ent ta:es away property fro" a pri*ate landowner for p#)lic #se witho#t going thro#gh the legal process of e5propriation or negotiated sale, the aggrie*ed party "ay properly "aintain a s#it against the go*ern"ent witho#t there)y *iolating the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 9 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 doctrine of go*ern"ental i""#nity fro" s#it witho#t its consent. $he doctrine of go*ern"ental i""#nity fro" s#it cannot ser*e as an instr#"ent for perpetrating an in-#stice on a citi&en. 1ad the go*ern"ent followed the proced#re indicated )y the go*erning law at the ti"e, a co"plaint wo#ld ha*e )een filed )y it, and only #pon pay"ent of the co"pensation fi5ed )y the -#dg"ent, or after tender to the party entitled to s#ch pay"ent of the a"o#nt fi5ed, "ay it /ha*e the right to enter in and #pon the land so conde"ned, to appropriate the sa"e to the p#)lic #se defined in the -#dg"ent./ If there were an o)ser*ance of proced#ral reg#larity, petitioners wo#ld not )e in the sad plaint they are now. It is #nthin:a)le then that precisely )eca#se there was a fail#re to a)ide )y what the law re6#ires, the go*ern"ent wo#ld stand to )enefit. It is not too "#ch to say that when the go*ern"ent ta:es any property for p#)lic #se, which is conditioned #pon the pay"ent of -#st co"pensation, to )e -#dicially ascertained, it "a:es "anifest that it s#)"its to the -#risdiction of a co#rt. $here is no tho#ght then that the doctrine of i""#nity fro" s#it co#ld still )e appropriately in*o:ed. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- REPU&LIC VS. SANDIGAN&A-AN 204 SCRA 212 (1991) FACTS" $he 0,, filed with the !andigan)ayan a co"plaint for recon*eyance, re*ersion, acco#nting, restit#tion, and da"ages against pri*ate respondents Bien*enido $antoco and Do"inador !antiago, et al. 0ri*ate respondents -ointly "o*ed =to stri:e o#t so"e portions of the co"plaint and for )ill of partic#lars of other portions>, which "otion was opposed )y the 0,,. $he !andigan)ayan ga*e the 0,, B7 days to e5pand its co"plaint to "a:e "ore specific certain allegations. 0ri*ate respondents then presented a =Motion to lea*e to file interrogatories #nder %#le 27 of the %#les of o#rt>. $he !andigan)ayan denied pri*ate respondentsK "otions. 0ri*ate respondents filed an Answer to with o"p#lsory o#nterclai". In response, the 0,, presented a =%eply to o#nterclai" with Motion to Dis"iss co"p#lsory co#nterclai".> 0ri*ate respondents filed a pleading deno"inated =Interrogatories to 0laintiff>, and =A"ended Interrogatories to 0laintiff> as well as a "otion for prod#ction and inspection of doc#"ents. $he !andigan)ayan ad"itted the A"ended Interrogatories and granted the "otion for prod#ction and inspection of doc#"ents respecti*ely. $he 0,, "o*ed for reconsideration, arg#ing that the doc#"ents are pri*ileged in character since they are intended to )e #sed against the 0,, andRor its o""ission in *iolation of !ec.B of .' 3o. 1, <122 aA 3o ci*il action shall lie against the o""ission or any "e")er thereof for anything done or o"itted in the discharge of the tas: conte"plated )y this 'rder. )A 3o "e")er or staff )y the o""ission shall )e re6#ired to testify or prod#ce e*idence in any -#dicial, legislati*e or ad"inistrati*e proceedings concerning "atter within its official cogni&ance. $he !andigan)ayan pro"#lgated two %esol#tions. $he first, denying reconsideration of the %esol#tion allowing prod#ction of the doc#"ents, and the second, reiterating, )y i"plication the per"ission to ser*e the a"ended interrogatories on the plaintiff. ISSUE" Is the 0,, i""#ne fro" s#itC HELD" 3'. $he state is of co#rse i""#ne fro" s#it in the sense that it cannot, as a r#le, )e s#ed witho#t its consent. B#t it is a5io"atic that in filing an action, it di*ests itself of its so*ereign character and sheds its i""#nity fro" s#it, descending to the le*el of an ordinary litigant. $he 0,, cannot clai" a s#perior or preferred stat#s to the !tate, e*en while ass#"ing of an act for the !tate. $he s#ggestion that the !tate "a:es no i"plied wai*er of i""#nity )y filing a s#it e5cept when in doing so it acts in, or in "atters concerning, its proprietary or non9go*ern"ental capacity, is #naccepta)le. It atte"pts a distinction witho#t s#pport in principle or precedent. 'n the contrary, =the consent of the !tate to )e s#ed "ay )e gi*en e5pressly or i"pliedly.> .5press consent "ay )e "anifested either thro#gh a general law or a special law. I"plied consent is gi*en when the !tate itself co""ences litigation or when it enters into a contract. REPU&LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PA&LO FELICIANO AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. NO. 70853? MARCH 12, 1987 FACTS" 0etitioner see:s the re*iew of the decision of the Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt dated April 4?, 1987, which dis"issed the co"plaint of respondent 0a)lo (eliciano for reco*ery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the gro#nd of non9s#a)ility of the !tate. 'n Han#ary 22, 197?, (eliciano filed a co"plaint with then o#rt of (irst Instance of a"arines !#r against the %0, represented )y the Land A#thority, for the reco*ery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of fo#r @BA lots with an aggregate area of 1,4+B.B177 hectares, sit#ated in the Barrio of !al*acion, M#nicipality of $ina")ac, a"arines !#r. (eliciano alleged that he )o#ght the property in 6#estion fro" <ictor ,ardiola )y *irt#e of a ontract of !ale dated May 41, 1972, followed )y a Deed of A)sol#te !ale on 'cto)er 4?, 197BG that ,ardiola had ac6#ired the property )y p#rchase fro" the heirs of (rancisco A)ra&ado whose title to the said property was e*idenced )y an informacion posesoria that #pon his p#rchase of the property, he too: act#al possession of the sa"e, introd#ced *ario#s i"pro*e"ents therein and ca#sed it to )e s#r*eyed in H#ly 1972, which s#r*ey was appro*ed )y the Director of Lands on 'cto)er 2B,197B. 'n 3o*e")er 1, 197B, 0resident %a"on Magsaysay iss#ed 0rocla"ation 3o. 9? reser*ing for settle"ent p#rposes, #nder the ad"inistration of the 3ational %esettle"ent and %eha)ilitation Ad"inistration @3A%%AA, a tract of land sit#ated in the M#nicipalities of $ina")ac and !ir#"a, a"arines !#r, after which the 3A%%A and its s#ccessor agency, the Land A#thority, started s#)9di*iding and distri)#ting the land to the settlersG that the property in 6#estion, while located within the reser*ation esta)lished #nder 0rocla"ation 3o. 9?, was the pri*ate property of (eliciano and sho#ld therefore )e e5cl#ded therefro". (eliciano prayed that he )e declared the rightf#l and tr#e owner of the property in 6#estion consisting of 1,4+B.B177 hectaresG that his title of ownership )ased on informacion posesoria of his predecessor9in9interest )e declared legally *alid and s#)sisting and that defendant )e ordered to cancel and n#llify all awards to the settlers. ISSUE" 8hether or not the !tate can )e s#ed for reco*ery and possession of a parcel of land HELD" A s#it against the !tate, #nder settled -#rispr#dence is not per"itted, e5cept #pon a showing that the !tate hasconsented to )e s#ed, either e5pressly or )y i"plication thro#gh the #se of stat#tory lang#age too plain to )e "isinterpreted. It "ay )e in*o:ed )y the co#rts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. 8ai*er of i""#nity, )eing a derogation of so*ereignty, will not )e inferred lightly, )#t "#st )e constr#ed instrictissimi #uris @of strictest rightA. Moreo*er, the 0rocla"ation is not a legislati*e act. $he consent of the !tate to )e s#ed "#st e"anate fro" stat#tory a#thority. 8ai*er of !tate i""#nity can only )e "ade )y an act of the legislati*e )ody. Also, it is noteworthy, that as pointed o#t )y the !olicitor ,eneral, that the informacion posesoria registered in the 'ffice of the %egister of Deed of a"arines !#r on !epte")er 24, 1972 was a /reconstit#ted/ possessory infor"ationG it was /reconstit#ted fro" the d#plicate presented to this office @%egister of DeedsA )y Dr. 0a)lo (eliciano,/ witho#t the s#)"ission of proof that the alleged d#plicate was a#thentic or that the original thereof was lost. %econstit#tion can )e *alidly "ade only in case of loss of the original. $hese circ#"stances raise gra*e do#)ts as to the a#thenticity and *alidity of the informacion posesoria relied #pon )y respondent (eliciano. Adding to the d#)io#sness of said doc#"ent is the fact that /possessory infor"ation calls for an area of only 1?? hectares,/ whereas the land clai"ed )y respondent (eliciano co"prises 1,4+B.B177 hectares, later red#ced to 7?199?+B hectares. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUI$ 13% SCRA 487 (1985) FACTS" 0etitioner in*ited the s#)"ission of )ids for repair of its whar*es and shoreline in the !#)ic Bay Area. .ligion and o. responded to the in*itation and s#)"itted )ids. !aid co"pany was re6#ested )y telegra" to confir" its price proposals and for the na"e of its )onding co"pany, and fro" which it co"plied. Later, the Jnited !tates, thro#gh its agents, infor"ed said co"pany that it was not 6#alified to recei*e an award at the pro-ect for the poorly co"pleted pro-ects it awarded to third parties. $he co"pany s#ed petitioner for specific perfor"ance and if no longer possi)le, for da"ages. It also as:ed for a writ of preli"inary in-#nction to restrain the defendants fro" entering into contracts with others. $he Jnited !tates entered a special appearance for the p#rpose only of 6#estioning the -#risdiction of the co#rt o*er the s#)-ect "atter of the co"plaint and the persons of the defendants, the s#)-ect "atter of the co"plaint )eing acts and o"issions of the indi*id#al defendants as agents of the defendant Jnited !tates of A"erica, a foreign so*ereign which has not gi*en its consent to this s#it or any other s#it for the ca#se of action asserted in the co"plaint. J! filed a "otion to dis"iss and opposed the writ. $he trial co#rt denied the "otion and iss#ed a writ. ISSUE" 8hether the J! "ay )e s#edC HELD" 3o. The traditional rule of "tate immunit$ e%empts a "tate from being sued in the courts of another "tate without its consent or San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 10 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 waiver. $his r#le is a necessary conse6#ence of the principles of independence and e6#ality of !tates. &owever, the rules of 'nternational (aw are not petrified) the$ are constantl$ developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessar$ to distinguish them * between sovereign and governmental acts +#ure imperii, and private, commercial and proprietar$ acts +#ure gestionis,. The result is that "tate immunit$ now e%tends onl$ to acts #ure imperii. $he restricti*e application of !tate i""#nity is now the r#le in the Jnited !tates, the Jnited Lingdo" and other states in western .#rope. @!ee o6#ia and Defensor9!antiago, 0#)lic International Law, pp. 2?792?9 O198BP.A The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. !tated differently, a state "ay )e said to ha*e descended to the le*el of an indi*id#al and can )e th#s dee"ed to ha*e tacitly gi*en its consent to )e s#ed only when the contract relates to the e5ercise of its so*ereign f#nctions. In this case, the pro-ects are an integral part of the na*al )ase which is de*oted to the defense of )oth the J! and the 0hilippines, #ndisp#ted a f#nction of the go*ern"ent of the highest order, they are not #tili&ed for nor dedicated to co""ercial or )#siness p#rposes. The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lope, !" #hil. $%& '%("(). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apart"ent )#ildings to the Jnited !tates of A"erica for the #se of its "ilitary officials. $he plaintiffs s#ed to reco*er possession of the pre"ises on the gro#nd that the ter" of the leases had e5pired, $hey also as:ed for increased rentals #ntil the apart"ents shall ha*e )een *acated. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- THE HOL- SEE VS. DEL ROSARIO !R 238 SCRA 524 (1994) FACTS" Lot 79A is registered #nder the na"e of the petitioner $he 1oly !ee. $his lot is contig#o#s to lots 79B and 79D registered in the na"e of 0hilippine %ealty orporation @0%A. $hese three lots were sold thro#gh an agent Msgr. Do"ingo irilos Hr. to %a"on Lic#p. Lic#p assigned his rights to pri*ate respondent !tar)right !ales .nt. Inc. @!!.IA. D#e to ref#sal of the s6#atters to *acate the lots, a disp#te arose as to who of the parties has the responsi)ility of e*iction and clearing the land. !!.I insists that petitioner sho#ld clear the property of the s6#atters. 0etitioner ref#sed and proposed that either !!.I #nderta:e the e*iction or that the earnest "oney )e ret#rned. Msgr. irilos ret#rned the 01??,???.?? earnest "oney, and the property was sold to $ropicana 0roperties and De*elop"ent orporation @$ropicanaA. !!.I filed s#it for ann#l"ent of sale, specific perfor"ance and da"ages against Msgr. irilos, 0%, and $ropicana. $he petitioner and Msgr. irilos "o*ed to dis"iss for lac: of -#risdiction )ased on so*ereign i""#nity fro" s#it. It was denied on the gro#nd that petitioner =shed off its so*ereign i""#nity )y entering into the )#siness contract> in 6#estion. A "otion for reconsideration was also denied. 1ence, this special ci*il action for certiorari. ISSUE" Did the 1oly !ee properly in*o:e so*ereign i""#nity for its non9 s#a)ilityC HELD" D.!. In the case at )ar, lot 79A was ac6#ired as a donation fro" the archdiocese of Manila for the site of its "ission or the Apostolic 3#niciat#re in the 0hilippines. $he s#)se6#ent disposal was "ade )eca#se the s6#atters li*ing thereon "ade it i"possi)le for petitioner to #se it for the p#rpose of the donation. 0etitioner did not sell lot 79A for profit or gain. $here are two conflicting concepts of so*ereign i""#nity, each widely held and fir"ly esta)lished. According to the /.'((9/'. +2 '8(+.10) 0;)+2:, a so*ereign cannot, witho#t its consent, )e "ade a respondent in the co#rts of another so*ereign. According to the ,)@)2 +2 2)(029/09>) 0;)+2:, the i""#nity of the so*ereign is recogni&ed only with regard to p#)lic acts or acts -#re i"perii of a state, )#t not with regard to pri*ate acts or acts -#re gestionis @Jnited !tates of A"erica *. %#i&, 14+ !%A B87 O1987PG o6#ia and Defensor9!antiago, 0#)lic International Law 19B O198BPA. $he 2)(029/09>) 0;)+2:, which is intended to )e a sol#tion to the host of pro)le"s in*ol*ing the iss#e of so*ereign i""#nity, has created pro)le"s of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in co#ntries which follow the restricti*e theory ha*e diffic#lty in characteri&ing whether a contract of a so*ereign state with a pri*ate party is an act -#re gestionis or an act -#re i"perii. $he restricti*e theory ca"e a)o#t )eca#se of the entry of so*ereign states into p#rely co""ercial acti*ities re"otely connected with the discharge of go*ern"ental f#nctions. $his is partic#larly tr#e with respect to the o""#nist states which too: control of nationali&ed )#siness acti*ities and international trading. $his o#rt has considered the following transactions )y a foreign state with pri*ate parties as acts *ure imperii2 @1A the lease )y a foreign go*ern"ent of apart"ent )#ildings for #se of its "ilitary officers @!y6#ia *. Lope&, 8B 0hil. 412 O19B9PG @2A the cond#ct of p#)lic )idding for the repair of a wharf at a Jnited !tates 3a*al !tation @Jnited !tates of A"erica *. %#i&, s#pra.AG and @4A the change of e"ploy"ent stat#s of )ase e"ployees @!anders *. <eridiano, 1+2 !%A 88 O1988PA. 'n the other hand, this o#rt has considered the following transactions )y a foreign state with pri*ate parties as acts *ure gestionis+ @1A the hiring of a coo: in the recreation center, consisting of three resta#rants, a cafeteria, a )a:ery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the Hohn 1ay Air !tation in Bag#io ity, to cater to A"erican ser*ice"en and the general p#)lic @Jnited !tates of A"erica *. %odrigo, 182 !%A +BB O199?PAG and @2A the )idding for the operation of )ar)er shops in lar: Air Base in Angeles ity @Jnited !tates of A"erica *. ,#into, 182 !%A +BB O199?PA. $he operation of the resta#rants and other facilities open to the general p#)lic is #ndo#)tedly for profit as a co""ercial and not a go*ern"ental acti*ity. By entering into the e"ploy"ent contract with the coo: in the discharge of its proprietary f#nction, the Jnited !tates go*ern"ent i"pliedly di*ested itself of its so*ereign i""#nity fro" s#it. In the a)sence of legislation defining what acti*ities and transactions shall )e considered /co""ercial/ and as constit#ting acts -#re gestionis, we ha*e to co"e o#t with o#r own g#idelines, tentati*e they "ay )e. ertainly, the "ere entering into a contract )y a foreign state with a pri*ate party cannot )e the #lti"ate test. !#ch an act can only )e the start of the in6#iry. $he logical 6#estion is whether the foreign state is engaged in the acti*ity in the reg#lar co#rse of )#siness. If the foreign state is not engaged reg#larly in a )#siness or trade, the partic#lar act or transaction "#st then )e tested )y its nat#re. If the act is in p#rs#it of a so*ereign acti*ity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act -#re i"perii, especially when it is not #nderta:en for gain or profit. As held in Jnited !tates of A"erica *. ,#into, @s#praA2 /$here is no 6#estion that the Jnited !tates of A"erica, li:e any other state, will )e dee"ed to ha*e i"pliedly wai*ed its non9s#a)ility if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or pri*ate capacity. It is only when the contract in*ol*es its so*ereign or go*ern"ental capacity that no s#ch wai*er "ay )e i"plied./ In the case at )ench, if petitioner has )o#ght and sold lands in the ordinary co#rse of a real estate )#siness, s#rely the said transaction can )e categori&ed as an act -#re gestionis. 1owe*er, petitioner has denied that the ac6#isition and s#)se6#ent disposal of Lot 79A were "ade for profit )#t clai"ed that it ac6#ired said property for the site of its "ission or the Apostolic 3#nciat#re in the 0hilippines. 0ri*ate respondent failed to disp#te said clai". Jnder Art.41@AA of the 19+1 <ienna on*ention on Diplo"atic %elations, a diplo"atic en*oy is granted i""#nity fro" the ci*il and ad"inistrati*e -#risdiction of the recei*ing state o*er any real action relating to pri*ate i""o*a)le property sit#ated in the territory of the recei*ing state which the en*oy holds on )ehalf of the sending state for the p#rposes of the "ission. If this i""#nity is pro*ided for a diplo"atic en*oy with all the "ore reason sho#ld i""#nity )e recogni&ed as regards the so*ereign itself, which in this case is the 1oly !ee. Moreo*er the Depart"ent of the (oreign Affairs has for"ally inter*ened and officially certified that the .")assy of the 1oly !ee is a d#ly accredited diplo"atic "issionary to the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and as s#ch is e5e"pt fro" local -#risdiction and entitled to all the rights, pri*ileges and i""#nities of a diplo"atic "ission or e")assy in this co#rt. $he deter"ination of the e5ec#ti*e ar" of the go*ern"ent that a state or instr#"entality is entitled to so*ereign or diplo"atic i""#nity is a political 6#estion that is concl#si*e #pon the co#rts. 8here the plea of i""#nity is reac6#ired and affir"ed )y the e5ec#ti*e )ranch, it is the d#ty of the co#rts to accept this clai" so as not to e")arrass the e5ec#ti*e ar" of the go*ern"ent in cond#cting the co#ntryKs foreign relations. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- REPU&LIC VS. VILLASOR 54 SCRA 84 (1973) FACTS" A decision was rendered in a !pecial 0roceeding against the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines there)y confir"ing the ar)itration award of 01,712,49+.B? in fa*or of respondent corporation. After the decision )eca"e final and e5ec#tory, respondent -#dge iss#ed an order directing the sheriff to e5ec#te the said decision, and the corresponding alias writ of e5ec#tion was th#s iss#ed. 1ence the sheriff ser*ed notices of garnish"ent with se*eral )an:s especially the "onies d#e to the A(0 in the for" of deposits s#fficient to co*er the a"o#nt "entioned in the writ. 03B and 0hilippine <eterans Ban: recei*ed s#ch notice. As certified )y the A(0 o"ptroller, these f#nds of the A(0 with the said )an:s are p#)lic f#nds for the pensions, pay, and allowances of its "ilitary and ci*ilian personnel. $he petitioner, in this certiorari and prohi)ition proceedings, challenges the *alidity of the 'rder iss#ed )y H#dge <illasor declaring the decision final and e5ec#tory and s#)se6#ently iss#ing an alias writ of e5ec#tion directed against the f#nds of the A(0 in p#rs#ance thereof. ISSUE" May the writs of e5ec#tion and notices of garnish"ent )e s#ed against p#)lic f#ndsC HELD" 3'. Altho#gh the !tate "ay gi*e its consent to )e s#ed )y pri*ate parties, there is corollary that p#)lic f#nds cannot )e the o)-ect of garnish"ent proceedings e*en if the consent to )e s#ed has )een pre*io#sly granted and the stateKs lia)ility has )een ad-#dged. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 11 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $h#s in the case of o""ission of 0#)lic 1ighways *s. !an Diego, s#ch a well9settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of H#stice $eehan:ee. $he #ni*ersal r#le that where the state gi*es its consent to )e s#ed )y pri*ate parties either )y general or special law, it "ay li"it clai"antKs action only #p to the co"pletion of proceedings anterior to the stage of e5ec#tion and that the power of the co#rts ends when the -#dg"ent is rendered, since the go*ern"ent f#nds and properties "ay not )e sei&ed #nder writs of e5ec#tion or garnish"ent to satisfy s#ch -#dg"ent, is )ased on o)*io#s considerations of p#)lic policy. Dis)#rse"ent of p#)lic f#nds "#st )e co*ered )y the corresponding appropriations as re6#ired )y law. $he f#nctions and p#)lic ser*ices rendered )y the !tate cannot )e allowed to )e paraly&ed or disr#pted )y di*ersion of p#)lic f#nds fro" their legiti"ate and specific o)-ect is appropriated )y law. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC 227 SCRA %93 (1993) FACTS" $he DA% and !#ltan !ec#rity Agency entered into a contract for sec#rity ser*ices to )e pro*ided )y the latter to the said go*ern"ental entity. !e*eral g#ards of the agency assigned to the petitionerKs pre"ises filed a co"plaint for #nderpay"ent of wages, non9pay"ent of 14 th "onth pay, #nifor" allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and o*erti"e pay as well as for da"ages, )efore the %egional Ar)itration, against the petitioner and the agency. $he .5ec#ti*e La)or ar)iter rendered a decision finding the petitioner and the agency -ointly and se*erally lia)le for the pay"ent of the "oney clai"s. $he decision )eca"e final and e5ec#tory. $he La)or Ar)iter then iss#ed a writ of e5ec#tion which res#lted in the property of the petitioner )eing le*ied. $he petitioner asserts the r#le of non9s#a)ility of the !tate. ISSUE" an the Depart"ent of Agric#lt#re )e s#ed #nder the contract entered with the agencyC HELD" D.!. $he )asic post#late #nder Art. ; section 4 of the onstit#tion that =the !tate "ay not )e s#ed witho#t its consent> is not a)sol#te for it does not say that the !tate "ay not )e s#ed #nder any circ#"stances. 'n the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only con*eys =that the !tate "ay not )e s#ed witho#t its consent.> Its i"port then is that the !tate "ay at ti"es )e s#ed. $he !tateKs consent "ay )e gi*en either e5pressly or i"pliedly. .5press consent "ay )e "ade thro#gh a general law wai*ing the i""#nity of the !tate fro" s#it which is fo#nd in Act 4?84, where the 0hilippine go*ern"ent =consents and s#)"its to )e s#ed #pon any "oney clai" in*ol*ing lia)ility arising fro" contract, e5press or i"plied, which co#ld ser*e as )asis of ci*il action )etween pri*ate parties.> I"plied consent on the other hand, is conceded when the !tate itself co""ences litigation, th#s opening itself to co#nterclai" or when it enters into a contract. In this sit#ation, the go*ern"ent is dee"ed to ha*e descended to the le*el of the other contracting party and to ha*e di*ested itself of its so*ereign i""#nity. $he r#le relied #pon )y the 3L% is not, howe*er, witho#t 6#alification. 3ot all contracts entered into )y the go*ern"ent operate as a wai*er of its non9s#a)ility. Distinction "#st still )e "ade )etween one which was e5ec#ted in the e5ercise of its so*ereign f#nction and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the instant case, the petitioner has not pretended to ha*e ass#"ed a capacity apart fro" its )eing a go*ern"ental entity when it entered into the 6#estioned contract, not that it co#ld ha*e in fact perfor"ed any act proprietary in character, )#t )e that as it "ay, the clai"s of pri*ate respondents arising fro" the contract for sec#rity ser*ices clearly constit#te "oney clai"s for which Act 4?84 gi*es the consent of the state to )e s#ed. 1owe*er, when the !tate gi*es its consent to )e s#ed, it does not there)y necessarily consent to an #nrestricted e5ec#tion against it. 8hen the !tate wai*es i""#nity, all it does, in effect, is to gi*e the other party an opport#nity to pro*e, if it can, that the state has any lia)ility. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- PN& VS. PA&ALAN 83 SCRA 595 (1978) FACTS" A -#dg"ent was rendered against 0hilippine <irginia $o)acco Ad"inistration @0<$AA. H#dge Ha*ier 0a)alan iss#ed a writ of e5ec#tion followed thereafter )y a notice of garnish"ent of the f#nds of respondent 0<$A which were deposited with the 0hilippine 3ational Ban: @03BA. 03B o)-ected on the constit#tional law doctrine of non9s#a)ility of a state. It alleged that s#ch f#nds are p#)lic in character. ISSUE" 8as the contention of 03B correctC HELD" 3'. It is to )e ad"itted that #nder the present onstit#tion, what was for"erly i"plicit as a f#nda"ental doctrine in constit#tional law has )een set forth in e5press ter"s2 =$he !tate "ay not )e s#ed witho#t its consent.> If the f#nds appertained to one of the reg#lar depart"ents or offices in the go*ern"ent, then, certainly s#ch a pro*ision wo#ld lie a )ar to garnish"ent. !#ch is not the case here. ,arnish"ent wo#ld lie. $he !#pre"e o#rt, in a case )ro#ght )y the sa"e petitioner precisely in*o:ing s#ch doctrine, left no do#)t that the f#nds of a p#)lic corporation co#ld properly )e "ade the o)-ect of a notice of garnish"ent. It is well settled that when the go*ern"ent enters into co""ercial )#siness, its a)andons its so*ereign capacity and is to )e treated li:e any other corporation. @Manila 1otel ."ployees Association *s. Manila 1otel o"panyA THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- RA-O VS. CFI OF &ULACAN 110 SCRA 4%0 (1981) FACTS" D#ring the height of the infa"o#s typhoon Lading, the 30, acting thro#gh its plant s#perintendent, Ben-a"in ha*e&, opened or ca#sed to )e opened si"#ltaneo#sly all the three floodgates of the Angat Da". $he "any #nfort#nate *icti"s of the "an9ca#sed flood filed with the respondent co#rt ele*en co"plaints for da"ages against the 30 and Ben-a"in ha*e&. 30 filed separate answers to each of the ele*en co"plaints and in*o:ed in each answer a special and affir"ati*e defense that in the operation of the Angat Da", it is perfor"ing a p#rely go*ern"ental f#nction. 1ence, it cannot )e s#ed witho#t the e5press consent of the !tate. $he respondent co#rt dis"issed the case on the gro#nds that said defendant perfor"s a p#rely go*ern"ental f#nction in the operation of the Angat Da" and cannot therefore )e s#ed for da"ages in the instant cases in connection therewith. ISSUE" 8as the 30 perfor"ing a go*ern"ental f#nction with respect to the "anage"ent and operation of the Angat Da"C HELD" D.!. 1owe*er, it is not necessary to deter"ine whether 30 perfor"s a go*ern"ental f#nction with respect to the "anage"ent and operation of the Angat Da". It is s#fficient to say that the go*ern"ent has organi&ed a pri*ate corporation, p#t "oney in it and has allowed itself to s#e and )e s#ed in any co#rt #nder its charter. As a go*ern"ent owned and controlled corporation, it has personality of its own, distinct and separate fro" that of the go*ern"ent. Moreo*er, the charter pro*ision that the 30 can s#e and )e s#ed in any co#rt is witho#t 6#alification on the ca#se of action as the one instit#ted )y the petitioners. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- &UREAU OF PRINTING VS. &UREAU OF PRINTING EMPLO-EES ASSOCIATION 1 SCRA 340 (19%1) FACTS" B#rea# of 0rinting ."ployees Association filed a case against herein petitioners B#rea# of 0rinting, !erafin !al*ador, and Mariano Ledes"a. $he co"plaint alleged that !al*ador and Ledes"a ha*e )een engaging in #nfair la)or practices )y interfering with, or coercing the e"ployees of the B#rea# of 0rinting, partic#larly the "e")ers of the co"plaining association, in the e5ercise of their right to self9organi&ation, and )y discri"inating in regard to hiring and ten#re of their e"ploy"ent in order to disco#rage the" fro" p#rs#ing their #nion acti*ities. Answering the co"plaint, !al*ador and Ledes"a denied the charges, and contended that the B#rea# of 0rinting has no -#ridical personality to s#e and )e s#ed. ISSUE" an the B#rea# of 0rinting )e s#edC HELD" 3'. As a go*ern"ent office, witho#t any -#ridical capacity, it cannot )e s#ed. $he B#rea# of 0rinting is an instr#"entality of the go*ern"entG it operates #nder the direct s#per*ision of the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary. It is designed to "eet the printing needs of the go*ern"ent. It is pri"arily a ser*ice )#rea#. It is o)*io#sly not engaged in )#siness or occ#pation for pec#niary profit. It has no corporate e5istence. Its appropriations are pro*ided for in the )#dget. It is not s#)-ect to the -#risdiction of the o#rt of Ind#strial %elations. Any s#it, action or proceeding against the B#rea# of 0rinting wo#ld act#ally )e a s#it, action or proceeding against the go*ern"ent itself. $he go*ern"ent cannot )e s#ed witho#t its consent, "#ch less o*er its o)-ection. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- MO&IL PHILS. E3PLORATION, INC. VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE 18 SCRA 1120 (19%%) FACTS" (o#r cases of rotary drill parts were shipped fro" a)road consigned to Mo)il 0hilippines. $he #sto"s Arrastre later deli*ered to San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 12 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the )ro:er of the consignee three cases only of the ship"ent. Mo)il 0hilippines .5ploration Inc. filed s#it in the (I against the #sto"s Arrastre !er*ice and the B#rea# of #sto"s to reco*er the *al#e of the #ndeli*ered cases pl#s other da"ages. $he defendants filed a "otion to dis"iss the co"plaint on the gro#nd that not )eing a person #nder the law, defendants cannot )e s#ed. After the plaintiff opposed the "otion, the co#rt dis"issed the co"plaint on the gro#nd that neither the #sto"s Arrastre !er*ice nor the B#rea# of #sto"s is s#a)le. ISSUE" an the #sto"s Arrastre !er*ice or the B#rea# of #sto"s )e s#edC HELD" 3'. $he B#rea# of #sto"s, acting as part of the "achinery of the national go*ern"ent in the operations of arrastre ser*ice, p#rs#ant to e5press legislati*e "andate and a necessary incident of its pri"e go*ern"ental f#nction, is i""#ne fro" s#it, there )eing no stat#te to the contrary. $he B#rea# of #sto"s has no personality of its own apart fro" that of the go*ern"ent. Its pri"ary f#nction is go*ern"ental, that of assessing and collecting lawf#l re*en#es fro" i"ported articles and all other tariff and c#sto"s d#ties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. $o this f#nction, arrastre is a necessary incident. Altho#gh said arrastre f#nction is dee"ed proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the pri"ary and go*ern"ental f#nction of the B#rea# of #sto"s, so that engaging in the sa"e does not necessarily render said B#rea# lia)le to s#it. (or otherwise, it co#ld not perfor" its go*ern"ental f#nction witho#t necessarily e5posing itself to s#it. !o*ereign i""#nity granted as to the end sho#ld not )e denied as to the necessary "eans to that end. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION VS COURT OF APPEALS 1%7 SCRA 28 (1988) FACTS" .rnest !i":e went to Manila International Airport to "eet his f#t#re son9in9law. 8hile wal:ing towards the *iewing dec: or the terrace to get a )etter *iew of the inco"ing passengers, he slipped o*er an ele*ation a)o#t fo#r inches high, and he fell on his )ac: and )ro:e his thigh )one. 1e filed an action for da"ages )ased on 6#asi9delict with the (I of %i&al against the i*il Aerona#tics Ad"inistration or AA as the entity e"powered to ad"inister, operate, "anage, control, "aintain, and de*elop the MIA. H#dg"ent was rendered in his fa*or, and on appeal to the o#rt of Appeals, -#dg"ent was affir"ed. ISSUE" 8hether the AA, )eing an agency of the go*ern"ent, can )e "ade a party defendantC HELD" D.!. 3ot all go*ern"ent entities whether corporate or not are i""#ne fro" s#its. I""#nity fro" s#its is deter"ined )y the character of the o)-ects for which the entity was organi&ed. $he AA is not i""#ne fro" s#it it )eing engaged in f#nctions pertaining to a pri*ate entity. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far fro" )eing the e5cl#si*e prerogati*e of the state, "ay "ore than the constr#ction of p#)lic roads, )e #nderta:en )y pri*ate concerns. $he AA was created not to "aintain a necessity of the go*ern"ent, )#t to r#n what is essentially a )#siness e*en if the re*en#es )e not its pri"e o)-ecti*e )#t rather the pro"otion of tra*el and the con*enience of the tra*eling p#)lic. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS. !UDGE FIRME 195 SCRA %92 (1991) FACTS" 0etitioner M#nicipality of !an (ernando, La Jnion, is a "#nicipality corporation. %espondent H#dge %o"eo 3. (ir"e is i"pleaded in his official capacity as the presiding -#dge, while pri*ate respondents are heirs of the deceased La#reano Banina, !r. 'n Dece")er 1+, 19+7, a collision occ#rred in*ol*ing a passenger -eep, a gra*el and sand tr#c:, and a d#"p tr#c: of the M#nicipality of !an (ernando, La Jnion which was dri*en )y Alfredo Bislig. D#e to the i"pact, se*eral passengers of the -eep incl#ding Banina, !r. died. $he heir of Banina, !r. instit#ted a co"plaint for da"ages against the owner and dri*er of the passenger -eep. 1owe*er, the aforesaid defendant filed a third party co"plaint against the petitioner and the dri*er of the d#"p tr#c: of the petitioner. $hereafter, the pri*ate respondents a"ended the co"plaint wherein the petitioner and its reg#lar e"ployee Alfredo Bislig were i"pleaded for the first ti"e as defendants. 0etitioner filed its answer and raised affir"ati*e defenses s#ch as lac: of ca#se of action, non9s#a)ility of the state, prescription of ca#se of action, and the negligence of the owner and dri*er of the passenger -eep as the pro5i"ate ca#se of the collision. 'n 'cto)er 1?, 1979, the trial co#rt rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and defendants M#nicipality of san (ernando, La Jnion and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay -ointly and se*erally the plaintiffs. $he co"plaint against the dri*er and the owner of the passenger -eep was dis"issed. 0etitioner filed a "otion for reconsideration and for a new trial. 1owe*er, respondent -#dge iss#ed another order denying the "otion for reconsideration of the order for ha*ing )een filed o#t of ti"e. 1ence, this petition. ISSUE" 8hether the "#nicipality is lia)le for the tort co""itted )y its e"ployeeC HELD" 3'. $he test of lia)ility of the "#nicipality depends on whether or not the dri*er acting in )ehalf of the "#nicipality is perfor"ing go*ern"ental or proprietary f#nctions. It has already )een re"ar:ed that "#nicipal corporations are s#a)le )eca#se their charters grant the" the co"petence to s#e and )e s#ed. 3e*ertheless, they are generally not lia)le for torts co""itted )y the" in the discharge of go*ern"ental f#nctions and can )e held answera)le only if it can )e shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In per"itting s#ch entities to )e s#ed, the state "erely gi*es the clai"ants the right to show the defendant was not acting in its go*ern"ental capacity when the in-#ry was inflicted or that the case co"es #nder the e5ceptions recogni&ed )y law. (ailing this, the clai"ants cannot reco*er. In the case at )ar, the dri*er of the d#"p tr#c: of the "#nicipality insists that he was on his way to 3ag#ilan %i*er to get a load of sand and gra*el for the repair of the !an (ernando "#nicipal street. In the a)sence of any e*idence to the contrary, the reg#larity of the perfor"ance of official d#ty is pres#"ed. 1ence, the dri*er of the d#"p tr#c: was perfor"ing d#ties or tas:s pertaining to his office. After caref#l e5a"ination of e5isting laws and -#rispr#dence, we arri*e at the concl#sion that the "#nicipality cannot )e held lia)le for the torts co""itted )y its reg#lar e"ployee, who was then engaged in the discharge of go*ern"ental f#nctions. 1ence, the death of the passenger, tragic and deplora)le tho#gh, it "ay )e i"posed on the "#nicipality no d#ty to pay the "onetary co"pensation. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- MUNICIPALIT- OF SAN MIGUEL, &ULACAN VS. FERNANDE$ 130 SCRA 5% (1984) FACTS" In i*il ase 3o. +?B9B, the then (I of B#lacan rendered -#dg"ent holding herein petitioner "#nicipality lia)le to respondents I"perio, et al. 8hen the -#dg"ent )eca"e final, respondent -#dge iss#ed a writ of e5ec#tion to satisfy the sa"e. 0etitioner "#nicipality filed a "otion to 6#ash the writ on the gro#nd that the "#nicipalityKs property or f#nds are p#)lic e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion. $he "otion was denied. $he respondent -#dge iss#ed another order re6#iring )oth the "#nicipal and pro*incial treas#rer to co"ply with the "oney -#dg"ent. 8hen the treas#rers failed to do so, respondent -#dge iss#ed an order for their arrest and that they will )e released #pon co"pliance, hence the present petition. ISSUE" 8hether the f#nds of the "#nicipality in the hands of the 0ro*incial and M#nicipal $reas#rers of B#lacan and !an Mig#el, respecti*ely are p#)lic f#nds which are e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tionC HELD" D.!. M#nicipal f#nds in possession of "#nicipal and pro*incial treas#rers are p#)lic f#nds e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion. $he reason for those was e5plained in the case of M#nicipality of 0aoay *s. Manaois Sthat are held in tr#st for the people intended and #sed for the acco"plices of the p#rposes for which "#nicipal corporations are created and that to s#)-ect said properties and p#)lic f#nds to e5ec#tion wo#ld "aterially i"pede, e*en defeat and in so"e instance destroy said p#rpose.> $h#s it is clear that all the f#nds of petitioner "#nicipality in the possession of the M#nicipal $reas#rer of !an Mig#el as well as those in the possession of the 0ro*incial $reas#rer of B#lacan are also p#)lic f#nds and as s#ch they are e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion. Besides 0D BB7, :nown as the Decree on Local (iscal Ad"inistration, pro*ides in section 4 @aA that =no "oney shall )e paid o#t of the treas#ry e5cept in p#rs#ance of a lawf#l appropriation or other specific stat#tory a#thority.> 'therwise stated, there "#st )e a corresponding appropriation in the for" of an ordinance d#ly passed )y the !angg#niang Bayan )efore any "oney of the "#nicipality "ay )e paid o#t. In the case at )ar, it has not )een shown that the !angg#niang Bayan has passed any ordinance to this effect. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT- MUNICIPALIT- OF MA7ATI VS. COURT OF APPEALS 190 SCRA 20% (1990) FACTS" An e5propriation proceeding was initiated )y petitioner M#nicipality of Ma:ati against pri*ate respondent Ad"iral (inance reditors onsorti#" Inc., 1o"e B#ilding !yste" and %eality orp., and Arceli 0. Ho in*ol*ing a parcel of land and i"pro*e"ents thereon located at !an Antonio <illage, Ma:ati. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 13 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 An action for e"inent do"ain was filed. Attached to the petitionerKs co"plaint was a certification that a )an: acco#nt had )een opened with the 03B. After the decision has )eco"e final and e5ec#tory, a writ of e5ec#tion was iss#ed and a notice of garnish"ent was ser*ed #pon the "anager of 03B where the petitioner had )an: acco#nts. 1owe*er, the sheriff was infor"ed that a hold code was placed on the acco#nt of the petitioner. $he petitioner contended that its f#nds at the 03B coc:ed neither )e garnished nor le*ied #pon e5ec#tion for to do so wo#ld res#lt in the dis)#rse"ent of p#)lic f#nds witho#t the proper appropriation re6#ired #nder the law. In a petition with the o#rt of Appeals, petitioner alleges for the first ti"e that it has act#ally two acco#nts with the 03B, one e5cl#si*ely for the e5propriation of the s#)-ect property with the o#tstanding )alance of 099, 7B4. 9B. $he other acco#nt was for the o)ligations and other p#rposes of the "#nicipal go*ern"ent with a )alance of 017?,?98,B21.72. ISSUE" 8hether the )an: acco#nt of a "#nicipality "ay )e le*ied on e5ec#tion to satisfy a "oney -#dg"ent against it a)sent showing that the "#nicipal co#ncil has passed an ordinance appropriating fro" its p#)lic f#nds an a"o#nt corresponding to the )alance d#e to the %$ decisionC HELD" D.!. !ince the first 03B acco#nt was specifically opened for e5propriation proceedings it has initiated o*er the s#)-ect property, there is no o)-ection to the garnish"ent or le*y #nder e5ec#tion of f#nds therein a"o#nting to 0B,9+7,7?+.B?, the f#nds garnished in e5cess of 099,7B4.9B, which are p#)lic f#nds ear"ar:ed for the "#nicipal go*ern"ent. 'ther stat#tory o)ligations are e5e"pted fro" e5ec#tion witho#t the proper appropriation re6#ired #nder the law. $he f#nds deposited in the 2 nd 03B acco#nt are p#)lic f#nds of the "#nicipal go*ern"ent. $he r#le is well9settled that p#)lic f#nds are not s#)-ect to le*y and e5ec#tion, #nless otherwise pro*ided )y the stat#te. More partic#larly, the properties of a "#nicipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for p#)lic #se cannot )e attached and sold on e5ec#tion sale to satisfy a "oney -#dg"ent against the "#nicipality. M#nicipal re*en#es deri*ed fro" ta5es, licenses and "ar:et fees, and which are intended pri"arily and e5cl#si*ely for the p#rpose of financing go*ern"ental acti*ities and f#nctions of the "#nicipality are e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion. $he foregoing r#le finds application in the case at )ar. $his is not to say that pri*ate respondents are left with no legal reco#rse. 8hen a "#nicipality fails or ref#ses witho#t -#stifia)le reason to effect pay"ent of a final "oney -#dg"ent rendered against it, the clai"ant "ay a*ail of the re"edy of "anda"#s in order to co"pel the enact"ent and appro*al of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding dis)#rse"ent of "#nicipal f#nds. $he co#rt will not condone petitionerKs )latant ref#sal to settle its o)ligation arising fro" an e5propriation proceeding it has in fact initiated. 8ithin the conte5t of the stateKs inherent power of e"inent do"ain, -#st co"pensation "eans not only the correct deter"ination of the a"o#nt to )e paid to the owner of the land )#t also the pay"ent of the land within a reasona)le ti"e fro" its ta:ing. $he stateKs power of e"inent do"ain sho#ld )e e5ercised within the )o#nds of fair play and -#stice. In the case at )ar, considering that *al#a)le property has )een ta:en, the co"pensation to )e paid is fi5ed, and the "#nicipal has had "ore than reasona)le ti"e to pay f#ll co"pensation. CIT- OF CALOOCAN VS. ALLARDE G.R. NO. 107271? SEPTEM&ER 10, 2003 FACTS" In 1972, Mayor Marcial !a"son of aloocan a)olished the position of Assistant ity Ad"inistrator and 17 other positions *ia 'rdinance 3o. 17B9. $he affected e"ployees assailed the legality of the a)olition. $he (I in 1974 declared a)olition illegal and ordered the reinstate"ent of all the dis"issed e"ployees and the pay"ent of their )ac:9wages and other e"ol#"ents. $he ity ,o*ern"ent appealed the decision )#t s#ch was dis"issed. In 198+ the ity paid !antiago 077,?84.47 as partial pay"ent of her )ac:9wages. $he others were paid in f#ll. In 1987 the ity appropriated f#nds for her #npaid )ac: salaries @s#pple"ental )#dget T4A )#t the ity ref#sed to release the "oney to !antiago. $he ity of aloocan arg#ed that !antiago was not entitled to )ac: wages. 'n H#ly 27, 1992 !heriff astillo le*ied and sold at p#)lic a#ction one of the "otor *ehicles of the ity ,o*ern"ent for 01??,???. $he a"o#nt was gi*en to !antiago. $he ity ,o*ern"ent 6#estioned the *alidity of the sale of "otor *ehicleG properties of the "#nicipality were e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion. H#dge Allarde denied the "otion and directed the sheriff to le*y and sched#le at p#)lic a#ction 4 "ore *ehicles. 'n 'cto)er 7, 1994 the ity o#ncil of aloocan passed 'rdinance 3o. ?14B which incl#ded the a"o#nt of 0B49,477.1B clai"ed )y !antiago as )ac:9wages, pl#s interest. H#dge Allarde iss#ed an order to the ity $reas#rer to release the chec: )#t the ity $reas#rer canKt do so )eca#se the Mayor ref#ses to sign the chec:. 'n May 7, 1994. H#dge Allarde ordered the !heriff to i""ediately garnish the f#nds of the ity ,o*ern"ent of aloocan corresponding to the clai" of !antiago. 3otice of garnish"ent was forwarded to the 03B )#t the ity $reas#rer sent an ad*ice letter to 03B that the garnish"ent was illegal and that it wo#ld hold 03B lia)le for any da"ages which "ay )e ca#sed )y the withholding the f#nds of the city. ISSUE" 8hether or not the f#nds of ity of aloocan, in 03B, "ay )e garnished @i.e. e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tionA, to satisfy !antiagoKs clai". HELD" ,arnish"ent is considered a specie of attach"ent )y "eans of which the plaintiff see:s to s#)-ect to his clai" property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or "oney owed )y s#ch third person or garnishee to the defendant. $he r#le is and has always )een that all go*ern"ent f#nds deposited in the 03B or any other official depositary of the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent )y any of its agencies or instr#"entalities, whether )y general or special deposit, re"ain go*ern"ent f#nds and "ay not )e s#)-ect to garnish"ent or le*y, in the a)sence of a corresponding appropriation as re6#ired )y law. .*en tho#gh the r#le as to i""#nity of a state fro" s#it is rela5ed, the power of the co#rts ends when the -#dg"ent is rendered. Altho#gh the lia)ility of the state has )een -#dicially ascertained, the state is at li)erty to deter"ine for itself whether to pay the -#dg"ent or not, and e5ec#tion cannot iss#e on a -#dg"ent against the state. !#ch stat#tes do not a#thori&e a sei&#re of state property to satisfy -#dg"ents reco*ered, and only con*ey an i"plication that the legislat#re will recogni&e s#ch -#dg"ent as final and "a:e pro*ision for the satisfaction thereof. 1owe*er, the r#le is not a)sol#te and ad"its of a well9 defined e5ception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as re6#ired )y law. In s#ch a case, the "onetary -#dg"ent "ay )e legally enforced )y -#dicial processes. 1erein, the ity o#ncil of aloocan already appro*ed and passed 'rdinance 3o. ?14B, !eries of 1992, allocating the a"o#nt of 0B49,477.1B for !antiagoKs )ac:9wages pl#s interest. $his case, th#s, fell s6#arely within the e5ception. $he -#dg"ent of the trial co#rt co#ld then )e *alidly enforced against s#ch f#nds. ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES VILLAVICENCIO VS. LU7&AN (39 PHIL 778) FACTS" %espondent H#sto L#:)an, Mayor of the city of Manila, for the )est of all reasons, to e5ter"inate *ise, ordered the segregated district for wo"en of ill rep#te, which had )een per"itted for a n#")er of years in the ity of Manila, closed. $he wo"en were :ept confined to their ho#ses in the district )y the police. At a)o#t "idnight of 'cto)er 27, the police, acting p#rs#ant to the orders fro" the chief of the police and H#sto L#:)an, descended #pon the ho#ses, h#stled so"e 17? in"ates into patrol wagons, and placed the" a)oard the stea"ers =orregidor> and =3egros>. $hey had no :nowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. $he two stea"ers with their #nwilling passengers sailed for Da*ao d#ring the night of 'cto)er 27, 1918. ISSUE" 8hether or not the act of the Mayor of the ity of Manila is constit#tional. HELD" $he !#pre"e o#rt conde"ned the "ayorKs act. %espondentKs intention to s#ppress the social e*il was co""#ta)le. B#t his "ethods were #nlawf#ll. Alien prostit#tes can )e e5pelled fro" the 0hilippines in confor"ity with an act of ongress. $he ,o*ernor9,eneral can order the e*iction of #ndesira)le aliens after a hearing fro" the Islands. 'ne can search in *ain for any law, order, or reg#lation, which e*en hints at the right of the Mayor of the ity of Manila or the hief of 0olice of that ity to force citi&ens of the 0hilippine Islands, and these wo"en despite their )eing in a sense, lepers of society are ne*ertheless not chattels )#t 0hilippine citi&ens protected )y the sa"e constit#tional g#arantees as other citi&ens. Law defines power. $he law is the only s#pre"e power in o#r syste" of go*ern"ent, and e*ery "an who )y accepting office participates in its f#nctions is only the "ore strongly )o#nd to s#)"it to that s#pre"acy, and to o)ser*e the li"itations which gi*es itself and i"poses #pon the e5ercise of the a#thority which it gi*es. $he f#nda"ental rights of life, li)erty and the p#rs#it of happiness, considered as indi*id#al possessions, are sec#red )y those "a5i"s of constit#tional law which are the "on#"ents showing the *ictorio#s progress of the race in sec#ring to "en the )lessings of ci*ili&ation #nder the reign of -#st and e6#al laws, so that, in the fa"o#s lang#age of the Massach#setts Bill of %ights, the go*ern"ent of the co""onwealth "ay )e =go*ern"ent of laws and not of "en>.
ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES 7URODA VS. !ALANDONI 83 PHIL. 171 FACTS" !higenori L#roda, for"erly a Lie#tenant9,eneral of the Hapanese I"perial Ar"y and o""anding ,eneral of the Hapanese I"perial (orces in the 0hilippines d#ring a period co*ering 19B4 and 19BB, San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 14 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 who is now charged )efore a Military o""ission with ha*ing #nlawf#lly disregarded and failed /to discharge his d#ties as s#ch co""ander to control the operations of "e")ers of his co""and, per"itting the" to co""it )r#tal atrocities and other high cri"es against nonco")atant ci*ilians and prisoners of the I"perial Hapanese (orces, in *iolation of the laws and c#sto"s of war/ E co"es )efore this o#rt see:ing to esta)lish the illegality of .' 3o. +8, which esta)lished a 3ational 8ar ri"es 'ffices and pro*ides that persons acc#sed as war cri"inals shall )e tried )y "ilitary co""issionG and to per"anently prohi)it respondents fro" proceeding with the case of petitioner. L#roda arg#es that .' 3o. +8 is illegal on the gro#nd that it *iolates not only the pro*isions of o#r constit#tional law )#t also o#r local laws, to say nothing of the fact @thatA the 0hilippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the 1ag#e on*ention on %#les and %eg#lations co*ering Land 8arfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of Ucri"esI not )ased on law, national and international. 1ence, petitioner arg#es E /$hat in *iew of the fact that this co""ission has )een e"panelled )y *irt#e of an #nconstit#tional law and an illegal order, this co""ission is witho#t -#risdiction to try herein petitioner./ ISSUE" 8hether or not the 0hilippines can adopt the r#les and reg#lations laid down on $he 1ag#e and ,ene*a on*entions notwithstanding that it is not a signatory thereto and whether it can create a Military o""ission to try *iolations of the 1ag#e on*entionC HELD" Des. .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +8, esta)lishing a 3ational 8ar ri"es 'ffice and prescri)ing r#les and reg#lations go*erning the trial of acc#sed war cri"inals, was iss#ed )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines on the 29th day of H#ly, 19B7. $his o#rt holds that this order is *alid and constit#tional. Article 2 of o#r onstit#tion pro*ides in its section 4, that
/$he 0hilippines reno#nces war as an instr#"ent of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation./ In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, incl#ding the 1ag#e on*ention, the ,ene*a on*ention and significant precedents of international -#rispr#dence esta)lished )y the Jnited 3ations, all those persons, "ilitary or ci*ilian, who ha*e )een g#ilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the co""ission of cri"es and offenses conse6#ential and incidental thereto, in *iolation of the laws and c#sto"s of war, of h#"anity and ci*ili&ation, are held acco#nta)le therefor. onse6#ently, in the pro"#lgation and enforce"ent of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +8, the 0resident of the 0hilippines has acted in confor"ity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of o#r onstit#tion. $he pro"#lgation of said e5ec#ti*e order is an e5ercise )y the 0resident of his powers as o""ander in hief of all o#r ar"ed forces, as #pheld )y this o#rt in the case of Da"ashita *s. !tyer L9129, B2 'ff. ,a&., +7BA 1 when we said /8ar is not ended si"ply )eca#se hostilities ha*e ceased. After cessation of ar"ed hostilities, incidents of war "ay re"ain pending which sho#ld )e disposed of as in ti"e of war. UAn i"portant incident to a cond#ct of war is the adoption of "eas#res )y the "ilitary co""and not only to repel and defeat the ene"ies )#t to sei&e and s#)-ect to disciplinary "eas#res those ene"ies who in their atte"pt to thwart or i"pede o#r "ilitary effort ha*e *iolated the law of war.I @.5 parte V#irin, 417 J. !., 1G +4 !#p. t., 2.A Indeed, the power to create a "ilitary co""ission for the trial and p#nish"ent of war cri"inals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the lang#age of a writer, a "ilitary co""ission Uhas -#risdiction so long as a technical state of war contin#es. $his incl#des the period of an ar"istice, or "ilitary occ#pation, #p to the effecti*e date of a treaty of peace, and "ay e5tend )eyond, )y treaty agree"ent.I @owls, $rial of 8ar ri"inals )y Military $ri)#nals, A"erican Bar Association Ho#rnal, H#ne, 19BB.A/ onse6#ently, the 0resident as o""ander in hief is f#lly e"powered to cons#""ate this #nfinished aspect of war, na"ely, the trial and p#nish"ent of war cri"inals, thro#gh the iss#ance and enforce"ent of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +8. 0etitioner arg#es that respondent Military o""ission has no -#risdiction to try petitioner for acts co""itted in *iolation of the 1ag#e on*ention and the ,ene*a on*ention )eca#se the 0hilippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 19B7. It cannot )e denied that the r#les and reg#lations of the 1ag#e and ,ene*a con*entions for" part of and are wholly )ased on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these r#les and principles were accepted )y the two )elligerent nations, the Jnited !tates and Hapan, who were signatories to the two on*entions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the #hilippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our ,onstitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. (#rther"ore, when the cri"es charged against petitioner were allegedly co""itted, the 0hilippines was #nder the so*ereignty of the Jnited !tates, and th#s we were e6#ally )o#nd together with the Jnited !tates and with Hapan, to the rights and o)ligations contained in the treaties )etween the )elligerent co#ntries. $hese rights and o)ligations were not erased )y o#r ass#"ption of f#ll so*ereignty. If at all, o#r e"ergence as a free state entitles #s to enforce the right, on o#r own, of trying and p#nishing those who co""itted cri"es against o#r people. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES AGUSTIN VS. EDU 88 SCRA 195 FACTS" A presidential letter of instr#ction @L'IA prescri)ing the #se of triang#lar reflectori&ed early warning de*ices to pre*ent *ehic#lar accidents was assailed for the lac: of a legislati*e enact"ent that wo#ld a#thori&e the iss#ance of said L'I. $he petition 6#oted two whereas cla#ses of the assailed L'I2 O8hereasP, the ha&ards posed )y s#ch o)str#ctions to traffic ha*e )een recogni&ed )y international )odies concerned with traffic safety, the 19+8 <ienna on*ention on %oad !igns and !ignals and the Jnited 3ations 'rgani&ation @J.3.AG O8hereasP, the said <ienna on*ention which was ratified )y the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent #nder 0.D. 3o. 2?7, reco""ended the enact"ent of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and de*ices. ISSUE" 8hether or not a legislati*e enact"ent is necessary in order to a#thori&e the iss#ance of said L'I )ased on the 19+8 <ienna on*ention on %oad !igns and !ignals and the Jnited 3ations 'rgani&ation @J.3.A. HELD" 3ot any"ore. $he petition "#st )e dis"issed for lac: of "erit. It cannot )e disp#ted that this Declaration of 0rinciple fo#nd in the onstit#tion possesses rele*ance2 /$he 0hilippines W W W adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, W W W./ $he 19+8 <ienna on*ention on %oad !igns and !ignals is i"pressed with s#ch a character. It is not for this co#ntry to rep#diate a co""it"ent to which it had pledged its word. $he concept of 0acta s#nt ser*anda stands in the way of s#ch an attit#de, which is, "oreo*er, at war with the principle of international "orality. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ICHONG VS. HERNANDE$ 101 PHIL. 1155 FACTS" 0etitioner filed a s#it to in*alidate the %etail $rade 3ationali&ation Law, on the pre"ise that it *iolated se*eral treaties which #nder the r#le of pacta s#nt ser*anda, a generally accepted principle of international law, sho#ld )e o)ser*ed )y the o#rt in good faith. ISSUE" 8hether or not the %etail $rade 3ationali&ation Law is #nconstit#tional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally accepted principles of international law. HELD" $he !#pre"e o#rt said it saw no conflict. $he reason gi*en )y the o#rt was that the %etail $rade 3ational Law was passed in the e5ercise of the police power which cannot )e )argained away thro#gh the "edi#" of a treaty or a contract. $he law in 6#estion was enacted to re"edy a real act#al threat and danger to national econo"y posed )y alien do"inance and control of the retail )#siness and free citi&ens and co#ntry fro" s#ch do"inance and controlG that the enact"ent clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the !tate, thr# which and )y which it protects its own personality and ins#res its sec#rity and f#t#re. %es#"ing what we ha*e set forth a)o*e we hold that the disp#ted law was enacted to re"edy a real act#al threat and danger to national econo"y posed )y alien do"inance and control of the retail )#siness and free citi&ens and co#ntry fro" s#ch do"inance and controlG that the enact"ent clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the state, thro#gh which and )y which it protects its own personality and ins#res its sec#rity and f#t#reG that the law does not *iolate the e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion )eca#se s#fficient gro#nds e5ist for the distinction )etween alien and citi&en in the e5ercise of occ#pation reg#lated, nor the d#e process of the law cla#seG )eca#se the law is prospecti*e in operation and recogni&es the pri*ilege of aliens already engaged in the occ#pation and reasona)ly protects their pri*ilegeG that the wisdo" and efficacy of the law to carry o#t its o)-ecti*es appear to #s to )e plainly e*ident 9 as a "atter of fact it see"s not only appropriate )#t act#ally necessary 9 and that in any case s#ch "atter falls within the prerogati*e of the legislat#re, with whose power and discretion the -#dicial depart"ent of the ,o*ern"ent "ay not interfereG that the pro*isions of the law are clearly e")raced in the title, and this s#ffers fro" no d#plicity and has not "isled the legislat#re of the seg"ent of the pop#lation affectedG and that it cannot )e said to )e *oid for s#pposed conflict with treaty o)ligations )eca#se no treaty has act#ally )een entered into on the s#)-ect and the police power "ay not )e c#rtailed or s#rrendered )y any treaty or any other con*entional agree"ent. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES GON$ALES VS. HECHANOVA 9 SCRA 230 FACTS" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 15 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 %espondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary a#thori&ed the i"portation of tons of foreign rice to )e p#rchased fro" pri*ate so#rces. 0etitioner ,on&ales 9 a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo 0alay and orn 0lanters Association filed this petition, a*erring that, in "a:ing or atte"pting to "a:e said i"portation of foreign rice, the afore"entioned respondents /are, '/09,A @90;+10 B129(*9/09+, +2 9, )C/)(( +< B129(*9/09+,/, )eca#se %A 3o. 4B72 which allegedly repeals or a"ends %A 3o. 22?7 9 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by -the .ice and ,orn /dministration or any other government agency.0 %espondent contended a"ong others that the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines has already entered into two contracts for the p#rchase of rice, one with the %ep#)lic of <ietna", and another with the ,o*ern"ent of B#r"aG that these contracts constit#te *alid e5ec#ti*e agree"ents #nder international lawG that s#ch agree"ents )eca"e )inding and effecti*e #pon signing thereof )y representati*es of the parties theretoG that in case of conflict )etween %ep#)lic Act 3os. 22?7 and 4B72 on the one hand, and the afore"entioned contracts, on the other, the latter sho#ld pre*ail, )eca#se, if a treaty and a stat#te are inconsistent with each other, the conflict "#st )e resol*ed 9 #nder the A"erican -#rispr#dence 9 in fa*or of the one which is latest in point of ti"e. ISSUE" 8hether or not the respondents, in atte"pting to i"port foreign rice, are acting witho#t -#risdiction or in e5cess of -#risdiction. HELD" Des. $he respondents acted witho#t -#risdiction or in e5cess of -#risdiction. It is respondents contend that the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines has already entered into two @2A contracts for the p#rchase of rice, one with the %ep#)lic of <iet 3a", and another with the ,o*ern"ent of B#r"aG that these contracts constit#te *alid e5ec#ti*e agree"ents #nder international lawG that s#ch agree"ents )eca"e )inding and effecti*e #pon signing thereof )y representati*es of the parties theretoG that in case of conflict )etween %ep#)lic Act 3os. 22?7 and 4B72 on the one hand, and the afore"entioned contracts, on the other, the latter sho#ld pre*ail, )eca#se, if a treaty and a stat#te are inconsistent with each other, the conflict "#st )e resol*ed E #nder the A"erican -#rispr#dence E in fa*or of the one which is latest in point of ti"eG that petitioner herein assails the *alidity of acts of the e5ec#ti*e relati*e to foreign relations in the cond#ct of which the !#pre"e o#rt cannot interfereG and that the afore"entioned contracts ha*e already )een cons#""ated, the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines ha*ing already paid the price of the rice in*ol*ed therein thro#gh irre*oca)le letters of credit in fa*or of the sellers of said co""odity. 8e find no "erit in this pretense. $he o#rt is not satisfied that the stat#s of said contracts as alleged e5ec#ti*e agree"ents has )een s#fficiently esta)lished. $he parties to said contracts do not appear to ha*e regarded the sa"e as e5ec#ti*e agree"ents. 1ut, even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of .epublic /cts 2os. &&34 and $"5&. /lthough the #resident may, under the /merican constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Jnder the onstit#tion, the "ain f#nction of the .5ec#ti*e is to enforce laws enacted )y ongress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. $he A"erican theory to the effect that, in the e*ent of conflict )etween a treaty and a stat#te, the one which is latest in point of ti"e shall pre*ail, is not applica)le to the case at )ar, for respondents not only ad"it, )#t, also, insist that the contracts ad*erted to are not treaties. !aid theory "ay )e -#stified #pon the gro#nd that treaties to which the Jnited !tates is signatory re6#ire the ad*ice and consent of its !enate, and, hence, of a )ranch of the legislati*e depart"ent. 3o s#ch -#stification can )e gi*en as regards e5ec#ti*e agree"ents not a#thori&ed )y pre*io#s legislation, witho#t co"pletely #psetting the principle of separation of powers and the syste" of chec:s and )alances which are f#nda"ental in o#r constit#tional set #p and that of the Jnited !tates. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES IN RE" GARCIA 2 SCRA 984, 19%1 FACTS" Jnder the $reaty on Acade"ic Degrees and the .5ercise of 0rofessions )etween the 0hilippines and !pain, nationals of each of the two co#ntries who ha*e o)tained the re6#ired degrees can practice their professions within the territory of the other. .fren ,arcia, a (ilipino, finished law in the Jni*ersity of Madrid, !pain and was allowed to practice the law profession therein. 1e in*o:es the treaty in order for hi" to )e allowed to practice in the 0hilippines witho#t ta:ing the )ar e5a"inations. ISSUE" 8hether or not the $reaty can "odify reg#lations go*erning ad"ission to 0hilippine Bar. HELD" 3o. It is clear, #nder Article 1 of the $reaty, that the pri*ileges pro*ided therein are "ade e5pressly s#)-ect to the laws and, reg#lations of the contracting !tate in whose territory it is desired to e5ercise the legal professionG and !ection 1 of %#le 127, in connection with !ections 2, 9, and 1+ thereof, which ha*e the force of law, re6#ire that )efore anyone can practice the legal profession in the 0hilippines he "#st first s#ccessf#lly pass the re6#ired )ar e5a"inations. Moreo*er, the $reaty was intended to go*ern (ilipino citi&ens desiring to practice their profession in !pain, and the citi&ens of !pain desiring to practice their profession in the 0hilippines. Applicant is a (ilipino iti&en desiring to practice the legal profession in the 0hilippines. 1e is therefore s#)-ect to the laws of his own co#ntry and is not entitled to the pri*ileges e5tended to !panish nationals desiring to practice in the 0hilippines. $he afore"entioned $reaty, concl#ded )etween the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and the !panish !tate co#ld not ha*e )een intended to "odify the laws and reg#lations go*erning ad"ission to the practice of law in the 0hilippines, for the reason that the 6xecutive 7epartment may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme ,ourt to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the #hilippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the ,ongress of the #hilippines . ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN AND $OSA %% PHIL 13, 1938 FACTS" $ran6#ilino Lag"an and 0ri"iti*o de !osa are charged with and con*icted of ref#sal to register for "ilitary training as re6#ired )y the a)o*e9"entioned stat#te. 'n appeal, Xosa arg#ed that he was fatherless and had a "other and eight )rothers to s#pport, while Lag"an alleged that he had a father to s#pport, had no "ilitary leanings, and did not wish to :ill or )e :illedG and )oth clai"ed that the stat#te was #nconstit#tional. ISSUE" 8hether or not the the 3ational Defense Law is *alid, #nder which the acc#sed were sentenced. HELD" Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt affir"ed their con*iction, holding that the law in 6#estion was )ased on the afore9cited constit#tional principle. $he 3ational Defense Law, in so far as it esta)lishes co"p#lsory "ilitary ser*ice, does not go against this constit#tional pro*ision )#t is, on the contrary, in faithf#l co"pliance therewith. $he d#ty of the ,o*ern"ent to defend the !tate cannot )e perfor"ed e5cept thro#gh an ar"y. $o lea*e the organi&ation of an ar"y to the will of the citi&ens wo#ld )e to "a:e this d#ty of the ,o*ern"ent e5c#sa)le sho#ld there )e no s#fficient "en who *ol#nteer to enlist therein. $he right of the ,o*ern"ent to re6#ire co"p#lsory "ilitary ser*ice is a conse6#ence of its d#ty to defend the !tate and is reciprocal with its d#ty to defend the life, li)erty, and property of the citi&en ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES AGLIPA- VS. RUI$ %4 PHIL 201 FACTS" $he petitioner, Mons. ,regorio Aglipay, !#pre"e 1ead of the 0hilippine Independent h#rch, see:s the iss#ance fro" this co#rt of a writ of prohi)ition to pre*ent the respondent Director of 0osts fro" iss#ing and selling postage sta"ps co""e"orati*e of the $hirty9third International .#charistic ongress. In May, 194+, the Director of 0osts anno#nced in the dailies of Manila that he wo#ld order the iss#ance of postage sta"ps co""e"orating the cele)ration in the ity of Manila of the $hirty9 third International .#charistic ongress, organi&ed )y the %o"an atholic h#rch. In spite of the protest of the petitionerIs attorney, the respondent p#)licly anno#nced ha*ing sent to the Jnited !tates the designs of the postage for printing ISSUE" Is there a *iolation of principle of separation of ch#rch and stateC HELD" In the case at )ar, it appears that the respondent Director of 0osts iss#ed the postage sta"ps in 6#estion #nder the pro*isions of Act. 3o. B?72 of the 0hilippine Legislat#re. Act 3o. B?72 conte"plates no religio#s p#rpose in *iew. 8hat it gi*es the Director of 0osts is the discretionary power to deter"ine when the iss#ance of special postage sta"ps wo#ld )e /ad*antageo#s to the ,o*ern"ent./ 'f co#rse, the phrase /ad*antageo#s to the ,o*ern"ent/ does not a#thori&e the *iolation of the onstit#tion. It does not a#thori&e the appropriation, #se or application of p#)lic "oney or property for the #se, )enefit or s#pport of a partic#lar sect or ch#rch. In the present case, howe*er, the iss#ance of the postage sta"ps in 6#estion )y the Director of 0osts and the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 16 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 issued and sold for the benefit of the .oman ,atholic ,hurch. 2or were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. 'n the contrary, it appears fro" the letter of the Director of 0osts of H#ne 7, 194+, incorporated on page 2 of the petitionerIs co"plaint, that the only p#rpose in iss#ing and selling the sta"ps was /to ad*ertise the 0hilippines and attract "ore to#rists to this co#ntry./ $he officials concerned "erely too: ad*antage of an e*ent considered of international i"portance /to gi*e p#)licity to the 0hilippines and its people/. It is significant to note that the sta"ps as act#ally designed and printed, instead of showing a atholic h#rch chalice as originally planned, contains a "ap of the 0hilippines and the location of the ity of Manila, and an inscription as follows2 /!eat ;;;III International .#charistic ongress, (e). 497, 1947./ 8hat is e"phasi&ed is not the .#charistic ongress itself )#t Manila, the capital of the 0hilippines, as the seat of that congress. It is o)*io#s that while the iss#ance and sale of the sta"ps in 6#estion "ay )e said to )e insepara)ly lin:ed with an e*ent of a religio#s character, the res#lting propaganda, if any, recei*ed )y the %o"an atholic h#rch, was not the ai" and p#rpose of the ,o*ern"ent. 8e are of the opinion that the ,o*ern"ent sho#ld not )e e")arrassed in its acti*ities si"ply )eca#se of incidental res#lts, "ore or less religio#s in character, if the p#rpose had in *iew is one which co#ld legiti"ately )e #nderta:en )y appropriate legislation. $he "ain p#rpose sho#ld not )e fr#strated )y its s#)ordination to "ere incidental res#lts not conte"plated. $here is no *iolation of the principle of separation of ch#rch and state. $he iss#ance and sale of the sta"ps in 6#estion "ay)e said to )e separa)ly lin:ed with an e*ent of a religio#s character, the res#lting propaganda, if any, recei*ed )y the atholic h#rch, was not the ai" and p#rpose of the go*ern"ent @to pro"ote to#ris"A. TARUC VS. DE LA CRU$ G.R. NO. 144801? MARCH 10, 2005 CORONA, 8." FACTS" 0etitioners were lay "e")ers of the 0hilippine Independent h#rch @0IA. 'n H#ne 28, 1994, D#e to petitionersK ada"ant dri*e to create dissension within the diocese )y cele)rating their own open "ass witho#t participation fro" the parish priest, Bishop de la r#& declared petitioners e5pelledRe5co""#nicated fro" the 0hilippine Independent h#rch. $he good Bishop did so as a last resort, as he first pleaded to the petitionersK to cease fro" riling #p the co""#nity against the diocese. Beca#se of the order of e5p#lsionRe5co""#nication, petitioners filed a co"plaint for da"ages with preli"inary in-#nction against Bishop de la r#& )efore the %egional $rial o#rt. $hey contended that their e5p#lsion was illegal )eca#se it was done witho#t trial th#s *iolating their right to d#e process of law. ISSUE" 8hether or not the co#rts ha*e -#risdiction to hear a case in*ol*ing the e5p#lsionRe5co""#nication of "e")ers of a religio#s instit#tionC HELD" $he o#rt r#les that they do not ha*e s#ch -#risdiction. $he e5p#lsionRe5co""#nication of "e")ers of a religio#s instit#tionRorgani&ation is a "atter )est left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said instit#tionRorgani&ation. It is not for the co#rts to e5ercise control o*er ch#rch a#thorities in the perfor"ance of their discretionary and official f#nctions. %ather, it is for the "e")ers of religio#s instit#tionsRorgani&ations to confor" to -#st ch#rch reg#lations. =i*il o#rts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religio#s organi&ation e5cept for the protection of ci*il or property rights. $hose rights "ay )e the s#)-ect of litigation in a ci*il co#rt, and the co#rts ha*e -#risdiction to deter"ine contro*erted clai"s to the title, #se, or possession of ch#rch property.> ')*io#sly, there was no *iolation of a ci*il rights in the present case. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES CALALANG VS. =ILLIAMS 70 P;9.. 72%, 1940 FACTS" $he 3ational $raffic o""ission, in its resol#tion of H#ly 17, 19B?, resol*ed to reco""end to the Director of 0#)lic 8or:s and to the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications that ani"al9drawn *ehicles )e prohi)ited fro" passing along %osario !treet e5tending fro" 0la&a alderon de la Barca to Das"ariNas !treet, fro" 724? a.". to 1224? p.". and fro" 124? p.". to 724? p.".G and along %i&al A*en#e e5tending fro" the railroad crossing at Antipolo !treet to .chag#e !treet, fro" 7 a.". to 11 p."., fro" a period of one year fro" the date of the opening of the olgante Bridge to trafficG that the hair"an of the 3ational $raffic o""ission, on H#ly 18, 19B? reco""ended to the Director of 0#)lic 8or:s the adoption of the "eas#re proposed in the resol#tion afore"entioned, in p#rs#ance of the pro*isions of o""onwealth Act 3o. 7B8 which a#thori&es said Director of 0#)lic 8or:s, with the appro*al of the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations to reg#late and control the #se of and traffic on national roadsG that on A#g#st 2, 19B?, the Director of 0#)lic 8or:s, in his first indorse"ent to the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications, reco""ended to the latter the appro*al of the reco""endation "ade )y the hair"an of the 3ational $raffic o""ission as aforesaid, with the "odification that the closing of %i&al A*en#e to traffic to ani"al9drawn *ehicles )e li"ited to the portion thereof e5tending fro" the railroad crossing at Antipolo !treet to A&carraga !treetG that on A#g#st 1?, 19B?, the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications, in his second indorse"ent addressed to the Director of 0#)lic 8or:s, appro*ed the reco""endation of the latter that %osario !treet and %i&al A*en#e )e closed to traffic of ani"al9drawn *ehicles, )etween the points and d#ring the ho#rs as a)o*e indicated, for a period of one year fro" the date of the opening of the olgante Bridge to trafficG that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting hief of 0olice of Manila ha*e enforced and ca#sed to )e enforced the r#les and reg#lations th#s adoptedG that as a conse6#ence of s#ch enforce"ent, all ani"al9drawn *ehicles are not allowed to pass and pic: #p passengers in the places a)o*e9"entioned to the detri"ent not only of their owners )#t of the riding p#)lic as well. $he petitioner f#rther contends that the r#les and reg#lations pro"#lgated )y the respondents p#rs#ant to the pro*isions of o""onwealth Act 3o. 7B8 constit#te an #nlawf#l interference with legiti"ate )#siness or trade and a)ridge the right to personal li)erty and freedo" of loco"otion. o""onwealth Act 3o. 7B8 was passed )y the 3ational Asse")ly in the e5ercise of the para"o#nt police power of the state. ISSUE" 8hether the r#les Y reg#lations pro"#lgated p#rs#ant to the pro*isions of o""onwealth Act 3o. 7B8 considered as constit#tionalC HELD" Des. !aid Act, )y *irt#e of which the r#les and reg#lations co"plained of were pro"#lgated, ai"s to pro"ote safe transit #pon and a*oid o)str#ctions on national roads, in the interest and con*enience of the p#)lic. In enacting said law, therefore, the 3ational Asse")ly was pro"pted )y considerations of p#)lic con*enience and welfare. It was inspired )y a desire to relie*e congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a "enace to p#)lic safety. 0#)lic welfare, then, lies at the )otto" of the enact"ent of said law, and the state in order to pro"ote the general welfare "ay interfere with personal li)erty, with property, and with )#siness and occ#pations. 0ersons and property "ay )e s#)-ected to all :inds of restraints and )#rdens, in order to sec#re the general co"fort, health, and prosperity of the state @J.!. *s. ,o"e& Hes#s, 41 0hil., 218A. $o this f#nda"ental ai" of o#r ,o*ern"ent the rights of the indi*id#al are s#)ordinated. Li)erty is a )lessing witho#t which life is a "isery, )#t li)erty sho#ld not )e "ade to pre*ail o*er a#thority )eca#se then society will fall into anarchy. 3either sho#ld a#thority )e "ade to pre*ail o*er li)erty )eca#se then the indi*id#al will fall into sla*ery. $he citi&en sho#ld achie*e the re6#ired )alance of li)erty and a#thority in his "ind thro#gh ed#cation and personal discipline, so that there "ay )e esta)lished the res#ltant e6#ili)ri#", which "eans peace and order and happiness for all. $he "o"ent greater a#thority is conferred #pon the go*ern"ent, logically so "#ch is withdrawn fro" the resid##" of li)erty which resides in the people. $he parado5 lies in the fact that the apparent c#rtail"ent of li)erty is precisely the *ery "eans of ins#ring its preser*ation. 0etitioner finally a*ers that the r#les and reg#lations co"plained of infringe #pon the constit#tional precept regarding the pro"otion of social -#stice to ins#re the well9)eing and econo"ic sec#rity of all the people. $he pro"otion of social -#stice, howe*er, is to )e achie*ed not thro#gh a "ista:en sy"pathy towards any gi*en gro#p. Social *ustice is -neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,- but the humaniation of laws and the equaliation of social and economic forces by the State so that *ustice in its rational and ob*ectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social *ustice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the 9overnment of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally *ustifiable, or extra: constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time:honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 78 SCRA 194, 1977 FACTS" %espondent ,on&ales is a share tenant of Angeles et al., on land de*oted to s#gar cane and cocon#ts. $he landowners sold the property to petitioners Al"eda witho#t notifying respondent in writing of the sale. $he sale was registered with the %egister of Deeds. %espondent th#s s#ed for rede"ption )efore the A%. 0etitioners co#nter that long )efore the e5ec#tion of the deed of sale, ,licerio Angeles and his nephew esar Angeles first offered the sale of the land to respondent )#t the latter said that he had no "oneyG that respondent, instead, went personally to the ho#se of petitioners and i"plored the" to )#y the land for fear that if so"eone else wo#ld )#y the land, he "ay not )e ta:en in as tenantG that respondent is a "ere d#""y of so"eone deeply interested in )#ying the landG that respondent "ade to tender of pay"ent or any *alid consignation in co#rt at the ti"e he filed the co"plaint for rede"ption. $he Agrarian o#rt rendered -#dg"ent a#thori&ing respondent to redee" the land for 02B,???.??, the said a"o#nt to )e San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 17 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 deposited )y hi" with the ler: of o#rt within 17 days fro" receipt of the decision. 'n appeal, the A affir"ed the assailed decision. $heir "otion for reconsideration was denied. 1ence, the present petition for re*iew. ISSUE" Is there a tenantIs right of rede"ption in s#gar and cocon#t landsC HELD" Des. A"ong those e5e"pted fro" the a#to"atic con*ersion to agric#lt#ral leasehold #pon the effecti*ity of the Agric#lt#ral Land %efor" ode in 19+4 or e*en after its a"end"ents @ode of Agrarian %efor"sA are s#gar lands. !ection B thereof states2 //gricultural share tenancy thro#gho#t the co#ntry, as herein defined, is here)y declared contrary to p#)lic policy and shall )e a#to"atically con*erted to agricultural leasehold #pon the effecti*ity of this section. . . . 0ro*ided, $hat in order not to -eopardi&e international co""it"ents, lands de*oted to crops co*ered )y "ar:eting allot"ents shall )e "ade the s#)-ect of a separate procla"ation )y the 0resident #pon reco""endation of the depart"ent head that ade6#ate pro*isions, s#ch as the organi&ation of cooperati*es "ar:eting agree"ent, or si"ilar other wor:a)le arrange"ents, ha*e )een "ade to ins#re efficient "anage"ent on all "atters re6#iring synchroni&ation of the agric#lt#ral with the processing phases of s#ch crops . . ./ !#gar is, of co#rse, one crop co*ered )y "ar:eting allot"ents. In other words, this section recogni&es share tenancy in s#gar lands #ntil after a special procla"ation is "ade, which procla"ation shall ha*e the sa"e effect of an e5ec#ti*e procla"ation of the operation of the Depart"ent of Agrarian %efor" in any region or localityG the share tenants in the lands affected will )eco"e agric#lt#ral lessees at the )eginning of the agric#lt#ral year ne5t s#cceeding the year in which the procla"ation is "ade. B#t, there is nothing reada)le or e*en discerni)le in the law denying to tenants in s#gar lands the right of pre9e"ption and rede"ption #nder the ode. $he e5e"ption is p#rely li"ited to the tenancy syste"G it does not e5cl#de the other rights conferred )y the ode, s#ch as the right of pre9e"ption and rede"ption. In the sa"e "anner, cocon#t lands are e5e"pted fro" the ode only with respect to the consideration and tenancy syste" pre*ailing, i"plying that in other "atters the right of pre9 e"ption and rede"ption which does not refer to the consideration of the tenancy the pro*isions of the ode apply. $h#s, !ection 47 states2 /3otwithstanding the pro*isions of the preceding !ections, in the case of fishponds, salt)eds and lands principally planted to citr#s, cocon#ts, cacao, coffee, d#rian, and other si"ilar per"anent trees at the ti"e of the appro*al of this ode, the consideration, as well as the tenancy syste" pre*ailing, shall )e go*erned )y the pro*isions of %ep#)lic Act 3#")ered .le*en 1#ndred and 3inety93ine, as a"ended./ ;t is to be noted that under the new ,onstitution, property ownership is impressed with social function. #roperty use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social *ustice, may -regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, en*oyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits.- 'ne go*ern"ental policy of recent date pro-ects the e"ancipation of tenants fro" the )ondage of the soil and the transfer to the" of the ownership of the land they till. $his is 0residential Decree 3o. 27 of 'cto)er 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant far"ers /of pri*ate agric#lt#ral lands de*oted to rice and corn #nder a syste" of sharecrop or lease9 tenancy, whether classified as landed estates or not/ shall )e dee"ed /owner of a portion constit#ting a fa"ily9si&e far" of fi*e @7A hectares if not irrigated and there @4A hectares if irrigated./ ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ONDO- VS. IGNACIO 97 SCRA %11, 1980 FACTS" 0etitioner .strella 'ndoy filed a clai" for co"pensation for the death of her son, Hose 'ndoy, who drowned while in the e"ploy of respondent <irgilio Ignacio. %espondent "o*ed to dis"iss on the gro#nd of lac: of e"ployer9e"ployee relationship. 1owe*er, d#ring the hearing of the case, respondent s#)"itted affida*its e5ec#ted )y the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing *essel that the deceased, a fisher"an, was in that ship, #ndenia)ly a "e")er of the wor:ing force, )#t after )eing in*ited )y friends to a drin:ing spree, left the *essel, and thereafter was fo#nd dead. $he referee s#""arily ignored the affida*it of the chief9"ate of respondent e"ployer to the effect /that so"eti"e in 'cto)er, 19+8, while Hose 'ndoy, "y co9wor:er, was in the act#al perfor"ance of his wor: with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on 'cto)er 22, 19+8. $hat the deceased died in line of D#ty./ $he hearing officer or referee dis"issed the clai" for lac: of "erit. A "otion for reconsideration was d#ly filed, )#t the then !ecretary of La)or, denied s#ch "otion for reconsideration for lac: of "erit. 1ence this petition for re*iew. ISSUE" 8hether or not the clai" for co"pensation was *alidly dis"issed. HELD" $here is e*idence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned while /in the act#al perfor"ance of his wor:/ with the shipping enterprise of pri*ate respondent. .*en witho#t s#ch e*idence, the petitioner co#ld ha*e relied on the presumption of compensability #nder the Act once it is shown that the death or disa)ility arose in the co#rse of e"ploy"ent, with the )#rden of o*erthrowing it )eing cast on the person or entity resisting the clai". $his o#rt, in recogni&ing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this ,ourt resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. 8hat was said in <ictorias Milling o., Inc. *. 8or:"enIs o"pensation o""ission is not a"iss2 /$here is need, it see"s, e*en at this late date, for Opri*ate respondentP and other e"ployers to )e re"inded of the high estate accorded the 8or:"enIs o"pensation Act in the constit#tional sche"e of social -#stice and protection to la)or./ 3o other -#dicial attit#de "ay )e e5pected in the face of a clearly e5pressed legislati*e deter"ination which antedated the constit#tionally a*owed concern for social -#stice and protection to la)or. It is easily #nderstanda)le why the -#diciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which e*en if decepti*ely pla#si)le, wo#ld res#lt in fr#strating s#ch a national policy./ $o )e "ore specific, the principle of social -#stice is in this sphere strengthened and *itali&ed. /s between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social *ustice in these cases is not equality but protection.0 ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES SALONGA VS. FARRALES 105 SCRA 359, 1981 FACTS" Defendant (arrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land. .*en prior to the ac6#isition )y defendant (arrales of the land aforesaid, plaintiff !alonga was already in possession as lessee of so"e 17+ s6#are "eters thereof, on which she had erected a ho#se, paying rentals thereon first to the original owners and later to defendant (arrales. (arrales filed an e-ect"ent case for non9pay"ent of rentals against plaintiff. H#dg"ent was later rendered in fa*or of defendant (arrales and ordering the therein defendants, incl#ding plaintiff herein and her h#s)and, to *acate the portion occ#pied )y the" and to pay rentals in arrears. .*idence showed that plaintiff offered to p#rchase fro" said defendant the land in disp#te, )#t, defendant, despite the fact that said plaintiffIs order to p#rchase was -#st, fair and reasona)le persistently ref#sed s#ch offer, and instead, insisted to e5ec#te the -#dg"ent rendered in the e-ect"ent case. 0laintiff then filed a co"plaint against defendant (arrales praying the latter )e ordered to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land in 6#estion. ISSUE" Is the plaintiff entitled for specific perfor"anceC HELD" 3o. If plaintiffIs offer to p#rchase was, as aforesaid persistently ref#sed )y defendant, it is o)*io#s that no "eeting of the "inds too: place and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of sale, was e*er perfected )etween the". !ince contracts are enforcea)le only fro" the "o"ent of perfection, and there is here no perfected contract at all, it goes witho#t saying that plaintiff has a)sol#tely nothing to enforce against defendant (arrales, and the fact that defendant (arrales pre*io#sly sold portions of the land to other lessees si"ilarly sit#ated as plaintiff herein, does not change the sit#ation )eca#se, as to said other lessees, a perfected contract e5isted which is not the case with plaintiff. ;t must be remembered that social *ustice cannot be invo<ed to trample on the rights of property owners who under our ,onstitution and laws are also entitled to protection. $he social -#stice consecrated in o#r constit#tion was not intended to ta:e away rights fro" a person and gi*e the" to another who is not entitled thereto. 6vidently, the plea for social *ustice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the ,ourt to grant. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES SECRETAR- OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS. MANALO G.R. N+. L47841, O/0+8)2 7, 2008 FACTS" $he case at )ar in*ol*es the rights to life, li)erty and sec#rity in the first petition for a writ of a"paro filed )efore this o#rt. $his case was originally a 0etition for 0rohi)ition, In-#nction, and $e"porary %estraining 'rder to stop herein petitioners andRor their officers and agents fro" depri*ing the" of their right to li)erty and other )asic rights and en-oined the" fro" ca#sing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, c#rtailing, a)ridging, or depri*ing the" of their right to life, li)erty, and other )asic rights as g#aranteed #nder Article III, !ection 1 of the 1987 onstit#tion. 8hile the A#g#st 24, 2??7 0etition was pending, the %#le on the 8rit of A"paro too: effect on 'cto)er 2B, 2??7. (orthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and '"ni)#s Motion to $reat .5isting 0etition as A"paro 0etition. 'n 'cto)er 27, 2??7, the o#rt resol*ed to treat the A#g#st 24, 2??7 0etition as a petition #nder the A"paro %#le San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 18 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 'n Dece")er 2+, 2??7, the o#rt of Appeals rendered a decision in fa*or of herein respondents. 1ence, this appeal. $his pertains to the a)d#ction of %ADM'3D MA3AL' and %.D3ALD' MA3AL' who were forci)ly ta:en fro" their respecti*e ho"es in Brgy. B#hol na Mangga, !an Ildefonso, B#lacan on 1B (e)r#ary 2??+ )y #nidentified ar"ed "en and thereafter were forci)ly disappeared. After the said incident, relati*es of the *icti"s filed a case for A)d#ction in the ci*il co#rt against the herein s#spects2 Michael dela r#&, Madning dela r#&, 0#ti Dela r#&, 0#la Dela r#&, %andy Mendo&a and %#dy Mendo&a as alleged "e")ers of the iti&en Ar"ed (orces ,eographical Jnit @A(,JA. $he a)d#ction was perpetrated )y ar"ed "en who were s#fficiently identified )y the petitioners @herein respondentsA to )e "ilitary personnel and A(,J a#5iliaries. %ay"ond recalled that the si5 ar"ed "en who )arged into his ho#se thro#gh the rear door were "ilitary "en )ased on their attire of fatig#e pants and ar"y )oots, and the A(,J a#5iliaries, na"ely2 Michael de la r#&, Madning de la r#&, 0#ti de la r#& and 0#la de la r#&, all "e")ers of the A(,J and residents of M#&on, !an Ildefonso, B#lacan, and the )rothers %andy Mendo&a and %#dy Mendo&a, also A(,J "e")ers, ser*ed as loo:o#ts d#ring the a)d#ction. %ay"ond was s#re that three of the si5 "ilitary "en were ,anata, who headed the a)d#cting tea", 1ilario, who dro*e the *an, and ,eorge. !#)se6#ent incidents of their long capti*ity, as narrated )y the petitioners, *alidated their assertion of the participation of the ele"ents of the 7th Infantry Di*ision, 0hilippine Ar"y, and their A(,J a#5iliaries. 8e are con*inced, too, that the reason for the a)d#ction was the s#spicion that the petitioners were either "e")ers or sy"pathi&ers of the 30A, considering that the a)d#ctors were loo:ing for La Bestre, who t#rned o#t to )e %olando, the )rother of petitioners. $he efforts e5erted )y the Military o""and to loo: into the a)d#ction were, at )est, "erely s#perficial. $he in*estigation of the 0ro*ost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Di*ision foc#sed on the one9sided *ersion of the A(,J a#5iliaries in*ol*ed. $his one9sidedness "ight )e d#e to the fact that the 0ro*ost Marshall co#ld del*e only into the participation of "ilitary personnel, )#t e*en then the 0ro*ost Marshall sho#ld ha*e refrained fro" o#trightly e5c#lpating the A(,J a#5iliaries he perf#nctorily in*estigate. ,en. 0alparanKs participation in the a)d#ction was also esta)lished. At the *ery least, he was aware of the petitionersK capti*ity at the hands of "en in #nifor" assigned to his co""and. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no contro*ersion to the fir" clai" of %ay"ond that he @,en. 0alparanA "et the" in person in a safeho#se in B#lacan and told the" what he wanted the" and their parents to do or not to )e doing. ,en. 0alparanKs direct and personal role in the a)d#ction "ight not ha*e )een shown )#t his :nowledge of the dire sit#ation of the petitioners d#ring their long capti*ity at the hands of "ilitary personnel #nder his co""and )espo:e of his ind#)ita)le co""and policy that #na*oida)ly enco#raged and not "erely tolerated the a)d#ction of ci*ilians witho#t d#e process of law and witho#t pro)a)le ca#se. -e now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no .uarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents /a$mond and /e$naldo 0analo has now passed as the$ have escaped from captivit$ and surfaced. 1ut while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not =free in every sense of the word0 as their =movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their 8udicial /ffidavits and testified against 'in the case of .aymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the /rmed >orces of the #hilippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents? rights to life, liberty and security.0 .espondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, <ept captive or even <illed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person. 1laborating on the 2right to securit$, in general,3 respondents point out that this right is 2often associated with libert$)3 it is also seen as an 2e%pansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment.3 Conceding that there is no right to securit$ e%pressl$ mentioned in Article ''' of the 1485 Constitution, the$ submit that their rights 2to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitar$ detention places fall under the general coverage of the right to securit$ of person under the writ of Amparo.3 The$ submit that the Court ought to give an e%pansive recognition of the right to securit$ of person in view of the "tate 6olic$ under Article '' of the 1485 Constitution which enunciates that, 2The "tate values the dignit$ of ever$ human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.3 'n sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and libert$, and a violation of their right to securit$. ISSUE" 8hether the 0etition for iss#ance of 8rit A"paro sho#ld )e grantedC HELD" Des. 8hile the right to life #nder Article III, !ection 1O12?P g#arantees essentially the right to )e ali*e9 #pon which the en-oy"ent of all other rights is preconditioned 9 the right to sec#rity of person is a g#arantee of the sec#re 6#ality of this life, *i&2 =$he life to which each person has a right is not a life li*ed in fear that his person and property "ay )e #nreasona)ly *iolated )y a powerf#l r#ler. %ather, it is a life li*ed with the ass#rance that the go*ern"ent he esta)lished and consented to, will protect the sec#rity of his person and property. $he ideal of sec#rity in life and propertyZ per*ades the whole history of "an. It to#ches e*ery aspect of "anKs e5istence.> In a )road sense, the right to sec#rity of person =e"anates in a personKs legal and #ninterr#pted en-oy"ent of his life, his li")s, his )ody, his health, and his rep#tation. It incl#des the right to e5ist, and the right to en-oy"ent of life while e5isting, and it is in*aded not only )y a depri*ation of life )#t also of those things which are necessary to the en-oy"ent of life according to the nat#re, te"pera"ent, and lawf#l desires of the indi*id#al.> A closer loo: at the right to sec#rity of person wo#ld yield *ario#s per"#tations of the e5ercise of this right. >irst, the right to sec#rity of person is =freedo" fro" fear.> In its =whereas> cla#ses, the Jni*ersal Declaration of 1#"an %ights @JD1%A en#nciates that =a world in which h#"an )eings shall en-oy freedo" of speech and )elief and freedo" fro" fear and want has )een proclai"ed as the highest aspiration of the co""on people.> e"phasis s#ppliedA !o"e scholars post#late that =freedo" fro" fear> is not only an aspirational principle, )#t essentially an indi*id#al international h#"an right.O12BP It is the =right to sec#rity of person> as the word =sec#rity> itself "eans =freedo" fro" fear.> Article 4 of the JD1% pro*ides, *i&2 .*eryone has the right to life, li)erty and sec#rity of person.O12+P e"phasis s#ppliedA In f#rtherance of this right declared in the JD1%, Article 9@1A of the International o*enant on i*il and 0olitical %ights @I0%A also pro*ides for the right to sec#rity of person, *i&2 1. .*eryone has the right to li)erty and sec#rity of person. 3o one shall )e s#)-ected to ar)itrary arrest or detention. 3o one shall )e depri*ed of his li)erty e5cept on s#ch gro#nds and in accordance with s#ch proced#re as are esta)lished )y law. e"phasis s#ppliedA $he 0hilippines is a signatory to )oth the JD1% and the I0%. In the conte5t of !ection 1 of the A"paro %#le, =freedo" fro" fear> is the right and any threat to the rights to life, li)erty or sec#rity is the actiona)le wrong. (ear is a state of "ind, a reactionG threat is a sti"#l#s, a ca#se of action. (ear ca#sed )y the sa"e sti"#l#s can range fro" )eing )aseless to well9fo#nded as people react differently. $he degree of fear can *ary fro" one person to another with the *ariation of the prolificacy of their i"agination, strength of character or past e5perience with the sti"#l#s. $h#s, in the a"paro conte5t, it is "ore correct to say that the =right to sec#rity> is act#ally the =freedo" fro" threat.> <iewed in this light, the =threatened with *iolation> la#se in the latter part of !ection 1 of the A"paro %#le is a for" of *iolation of the right to sec#rity "entioned in the earlier part of the pro*ision. Second, the right to sec#rity of person is a g#arantee of )odily and psychological integrity or sec#rity. Article III, !ection II of the 1987 onstit#tion g#arantees that, as a general r#le, oneKs )ody cannot )e searched or in*aded witho#t a search warrant. 0hysical in-#ries inflicted in the conte5t of e5tralegal :illings and enforced disappearances constit#te "ore than a search or in*asion of the )ody. It "ay constit#te dis"e")er"ent, physical disa)ilities, and painf#l physical intr#sion. As the degree of physical in-#ry increases, the danger to life itself escalates. 3ota)ly, in cri"inal law, physical in-#ries constit#te a cri"e against persons )eca#se they are an affront to the )odily integrity or sec#rity of a person. 0hysical tort#re, force, and *iolence are a se*ere in*asion of )odily integrity. 8hen e"ployed to *itiate the free will s#ch as to force the *icti" to ad"it, re*eal or fa)ricate incri"inating infor"ation, it constit#tes an in*asion of )oth )odily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the h#"an person incl#des the e5ercise of free will. Article III, !ection 12 of the 1987 onstit#tion "ore specifically proscri)es )odily and psychological in*asion, *i&2 @2A 3o tort#re, force, *iolence, threat or inti"idation, or any other "eans which *itiate the free will shall )e #sed against hi" @any person #nder in*estigation for the co""ission of an offenseA. !ecret detention places, solitary, inco""#nicado or other si"ilar for"s of detention are prohi)ited. 0arenthetically, #nder this pro*ision, threat and intimidation that *itiate the free will 9 altho#gh not in*ol*ing in*asion of )odily integrity 9 ne*ertheless constit#te a *iolation of the right to sec#rity in the sense of =freedo" fro" threat> as afore9disc#ssed. Article III, !ection 12 g#arantees freedo" fro" deh#"ani&ing a)#ses of persons #nder in*estigation for the co""ission of an offense. <icti"s of enforced disappearances who are not e*en #nder s#ch in*estigation sho#ld all the "ore )e protected fro" these degradations. An o*ert#re to an interpretation of the right to sec#rity of person as a right against tort#re was "ade )y the .#ropean o#rt of 1#"an %ights @.1%A in the recent case of 0opo* *. %#ssia.O14?P In this case, the clai"ant, who was lawf#lly detained, alleged that the state a#thorities had physically a)#sed hi" in prison, there)y *iolating his right to sec#rity of person. Article 7@1A of the .#ropean on*ention on 1#"an %ights pro*ides, *i&2 =.*eryone has the right to li)erty and sec#rity of person. 3o one shall )e depri*ed of his li)erty sa*e in the following cases and in accordance with a proced#re prescri)ed )y law ...> @e"phases s#ppliedA Article 4, on the other hand, pro*ides that =@nAo one shall )e s#)-ected to tort#re or to inh#"an or degrading treat"ent or p#nish"ent.> Altho#gh San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 19 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill9treat"ent was fo#nd )aseless, the .1% relied hea*ily on the concept of sec#rity in holding, *i&2 ...the applicant did not )ring his allegations to the attention of do"estic a#thorities at the ti"e when they co#ld reasona)ly ha*e )een e5pected to ta:e "eas#res in order to ens#re his sec#rity and to in*estigate the circ#"stances in 6#estion. 555 555 555 ... the a#thorities failed to ens#re his sec#rity in c#stody or to co"ply with the proced#ral o)ligation #nder Art.4 to cond#ct an effecti*e in*estigation into his allegations.O141P @e"phasis s#ppliedA $he J.3. o""ittee on the .li"ination of Discri"ination against 8o"en has also "ade a state"ent that the protection of the )odily integrity of wo"en "ay also )e related to the right to sec#rity and li)erty, *i&2 Zgender9)ased *iolence which i"pairs or n#llifies the en-oy"ent )y wo"en of h#"an rights and f#nda"ental freedo"s #nder general international law or #nder specific h#"an rights con*entions is discri"ination within the "eaning of article 1 of the on*ention @on the .li"ination of All (or"s of Discri"ination Against 8o"enA. $hese rights and freedo"s incl#de . . . the right to li)erty and sec#rity of person.
Third, the right to sec#rity of person is a g#arantee of protection of oneKs rights )y the go*ern"ent. In the conte5t of the writ of a"paro, this right is )#ilt into the g#arantees of the right to life and li)erty #nder Article III, !ection 1 of the 1987 onstit#tion and the right to sec#rity of person @as freedo" fro" threat and g#arantee of )odily and psychological integrityA #nder Article III, !ection 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State =guarantees full respect for human rights0 under /rticle ;;, Section %% of the %(!4 ,onstitution. A( 0;) A+>)2,D),0 9( 0;) /;9)< A1'2',0+2 +< +2*)2 ',* ()/1290:, 0;) C+,(090109+,'. A1'2',0)) +< 0;) 29A;0( 0+ .9<), .98)20: ',* ()/1290: +< E)2(+, 9( 2),*)2)* 9,)<<)/09>) 9< A+>)2,D),0 *+)( ,+0 '<<+2* E2+0)/09+, 0+ 0;)() 29A;0( )(E)/9'..: @;), 0;): '2) 1,*)2 0;2)'0. P2+0)/09+, 9,/.1*)( /+,*1/09,A )<<)/09>) 9,>)(09A'09+,(, +2A',9F'09+, +< 0;) A+>)2,D),0 'EE'2'01( 0+ )C0),* E2+0)/09+, 0+ >9/09D( +< )C02'.)A'. G9..9,A( +2 ),<+2/)* *9('EE)'2',/)( (+2 0;2)'0( 0;)2)+<) ',*H+2 0;)92 <'D9.9)(, ',* 829,A9,A +<<),*)2( 0+ 0;) 8'2 +< B1(09/). ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ME-ER VS. NE&RAS7A 2%2 US 390 519226 FACTS" %o)ert Meyer, while an instr#ctor in Xion 0arochial !chool, was tried and con*icted in the district of 1a"ilton, 3e)ras:a #nder an infor"ation which charged hi" for #nlawf#lly teaching reading ,er"an lang#age to %ay"ond 0artpar, a ten year old child who had not s#ccessf#lly reached the eight grade. $he infor"ation was )ased #pon =An Act %elating to the $eaching of (oreign Lang#age in the !tate of 3e)ras:a,> which prohi)ited any s#)-ect in any lang#age other than .nglish to any person who has not s#ccessf#lly passed the eight grade. ISSUE" May the !tate prohi)it the teaching of foreign lang#age to children who has not reach a certain grade le*elC HELD" It was held that it is inco"petent for the go*ern"ent to prohi)it the teaching of the ,er"an lang#age to st#dents )etween certain age le*els since there is nothing inherently har"f#l in the lang#age that will i"pair the #p)ringing of the childG and in fact s#ch a s#)-ect co#ld i"pro*e his acade"ic )ac:gro#nd. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PIERCE VS. SOCIET- OF SISTERS 2%2 US 390 FACTS" $he !tate of 'regon passed a law re6#iring parentsRg#ardians of children ages 891+ to send their child to p#)lic school. $he "anifest p#rpose is to co"pel general attendance at p#)lic schools )y children 891+ who ha*e not co"pleted their 8 th grade. !ociety of !isters operates a pri*ate school. It owns *al#a)le )#ilding, especially constr#cted and e6#ipped for the school p#rposes. $he law has already ca#sed the withdrawal fro" its school of children, who wo#ld other wise contin#e attending the sa"e school. !ociety then filed a s#it to en-oin the enforce"ent of the law contending that the sa"e #nconstit#tional. ISSUE" May the !tate re6#ire children to attend only p#)lic schools )efore they reach a certain ageC HELD" $he f#nda"ental theory of li)erty #pon which the go*ern"ent #nder the onstit#tion reposes e5cl#des any general power of the !tate to standardi&e its children )y enforcing the" to accept instr#ction fro" p#)lic teachers only. $he child is not the "ere creat#re of the !tateG those who n#rt#re hi" and direct his destiny ha*e the right co#pled with the high d#ty, to recogni&e and prepare hi" for additional o)ligations. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES VIRTUOSO VS. MUNICIPAL !UDGE 82 SCRA 191, 1978 FACTS" 0etitioner (rancisco <irto#so, Hr. filed an application for the writ of ha)eas corp#s on the gro#nd that the preli"inary e5a"ination which led to the iss#ance of a warrant of arrest against hi" was a #seless for"ality as respondent M#nicipal H#dge failed to "eet the strict standard re6#ired )y the onstit#tion to ascertain whether there was a pro)a)le ca#se. 1e li:ewise alleged that aside fro" the constit#tional infir"ity that tainted the proced#re followed in the preli"inary e5a"ination, the )ail i"posed was clearly e5cessi*e. It was in the a"o#nt of 01+,???.??, the alleged ro))ery of a $< set )eing i"p#ted to petitioner It was later ascertained that the petitioner is a se*enteen year old "inor entitled to the protection and )enefits of the child and Do#th 8elfare ode. ISSUE" 8hether or not petitionerKs application for release sho#ld )e granted. HELD" Des. As a "inor, he co#ld )e pro*isionally released on recogni&ance in the discretion of a co#rt. This ,ourt should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the @outh and Welfare ,ode, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate. -The State recognies the vital role of the youth in nation:building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well:being.- ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES OPOSA VS. FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792, 1993 FACTS" $he petitioner, all "inors and alleges that the plaintiffs /are all citi&ens of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, ta5payers, and entitled to the f#ll )enefit, #se and en-oy"ent of the nat#ral reso#rce treas#re that is the co#ntryIs *irgin tropical rainforests, d#ly -oined and represented )y their parents instit#ted a co"plained as a ta5payersK class s#it and prayed for the rendering of -#dg"ent ordering defendant (actoran, then !ecretary of the D.3%, his agents, representati*es and other persons acting in his )ehalf to cancel all e5isting ti")er license agree"ents in the co#ntry and to cease and desist for" recei*ing, accepting, processing, renewing or appro*ing new ti")er license agree"ents. $he defendant "o*ed for the dis"issal of the co"plaint on two gro#nds2 1A lac: of ca#se of action against hi" and 2A the iss#e raised was a political 6#estion which properly pertains to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranches. $he trial co#rt dis"issed the co"plaint )ased on the afore"entioned gro#nds. $h#s, the petitioners filed a special ci*il action for certiorari see:ing to rescind and set aside. ISSUE" 8hether or not the said petitioners ha*e a cause of action to pre*ent the "isappropriation or i"pair"ent of the 0hilippine rainforests and ha*e the defendant stop for" recei*ing, processing and appro*ing ti")er license agree"ents. HELD" Des. $he petitioners ha*e a ca#se of action. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right7the right to a balanced and healthful ecolog$ which, for the first time in our constitutional histor$, is solemnl$ incorporated in the fundamental law. !ection 1+, Article II of the 1987 onstit#tion e5plicitly pro*ides that the !tate shall protect and ad*ance the right of the people to a )alanced and healthf#l ecology in accord with the rhyth" and har"ony of nat#re.$his right #nites with the right to health which is pro*ided for in !.. 17 of Article 2. -hile the right to a balanced and healthful ecolog$ is to be found under the 8eclaration of 6rinciples and "tate 6olicies and not under the 9ill of /ights, it does not follow that it is less important than an$ of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. "uch a right belongs to a different categor$ of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self7 preservation and self7perpetuation 77 aptl$ and fittingl$ stressed b$ the petitioners 77 the advancement of which ma$ even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for the$ are assumed to e%ist from the inception of humankind. If they are now e5plicitly "entioned in the f#nda"ental charter, it is )eca#se of the well9fo#nded fear of its fra"ers that #nless the rights to a )alanced and healthf#l ecology and to health are "andated as state policies )y the onstit#tion itself, thereb$ highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the da$ would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come :: generations San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 20 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. $he right to a )alanced and healthf#l ecology carries with it the correlati*e d#ty to refrain fro" i"pairing the en*iron"ent. $he said right i"plies, a"ong "any other things, the -#dicio#s "anage"ent and conser*ation of the co#ntryIs forests. ..'. 3o.192 and the Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987 ha*e set the o)-ecti*es which ser*e as the )ases for policy for"#lation and ha*e defined the powers and f#nctions of the D.3%, the pri"ary go*ern"ent agency for the proper #se and de*elop"ent of the co#ntries nat#ral reso#rces. $he right of the petitioners and all they represent to a )alanced and healthf#l ecology is as clear as the D.3%Ks d#ty to protect and ad*ance the said right. A denial or *iolation of that right )y the owner who has the correlati*e d#ty or o)ligation to respect or protect the sa"e gi*es rise to a ca#se of action. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES LLDA VS. CA 231 SCRA 292, 1994 FACTS" $he $as: (orce a"arin D#"psite of '#r Lady of Lo#rdes 0arish, Barangay a"arin, aloocan ity, filed a letter9co"plaint with the petitioner, see:ing to stop the operation of the open gar)age d#"psite in $ala .state, Barangay a"arin, aloocan ity d#e to its har"f#l effects on the health of the residents and the possi)ility of poll#tion of the water content of the s#rro#nding area. $he LLDA cond#cted an on9site in*estigation, "onitoring and test sa"pling of the leachate that seeps fro" said d#"psite to the near)y cree: which is a tri)#tary of the Marilao %i*er. $he LLDA Legal and $echnical personnel fo#nd that the ity ,o*ern"ent of aloocan was "aintaining an open d#"psite at the a"arin area witho#t first sec#ring an .n*iron"ental o"pliance ertificate @.A fro" the .n*iron"ental Manage"ent B#rea# @.MBA of the Depart"ent of .n*iron"ent and 3at#ral %eso#rces, and clearance fro" LLDA as re6#ired #nder %ep#)lic Act 3o. B87?, 7 as a"ended )y 0residential Decree 3o. 814 and .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 927 $he LLDA iss#ed a ease and Desist 'rder ordering the ity ,o*ern"ent of aloocan, Metropolitan Manila A#thority, their contractors, and other entities, to co"pletely halt, stop and desist fro" d#"ping any for" or :ind of gar)age and other waste "atter at the a"arin d#"psite. 1owe*er, the ity ,o*ern"ent of aloocan filed with the %$ an action for the declaration of n#llity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the iss#ance of a writ of in-#nction. LLDA then filed a "otion of Dis"iss on the gro#nd that their order was "erely s#)-ect to re*iew of the A and not the %$. ISSUE" 8hether or not the LLDA ha*e the power and a#thority to iss#e a cease and desist order HELD" Des. $he LLDA, as a speciali&ed ad"inistrati*e agency, is specifically "andated #nder %ep#)lic Act 3o. B87? and its a"endatory laws to carry o#t and "a:e effecti*e the declared national policy of pro"oting and accelerating the de*elop"ent and )alanced growth of the Lag#na La:e incl#ding aloocan ity with d#e regard and ade6#ate pro*isions for en*iron"ental "anage"ent and control, preser*ation of the 6#ality of h#"an life and ecological syste"s, and the pre*ention of #nd#e ecological dist#r)ances, deterioration and poll#tion. Jnder %A B87? it a#thori&es LLDA to 2make, alter or modif$ orders re.uiring the discontinuance of pollution.3 /ssuming arguendo that the authority to issue a -cease and desist order- were not expressly conferred by law, there is *urisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is li<ewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the e5ercise, therefore, of its e5press powers #nder its charter as a reg#latory and 6#asi9-#dicial )ody with respect to poll#tion cases in the Lag#na La:e region, the authority of the LL7/ to issue a -cease and desist order- is, perforce, implied. Atherwise, it may well be reduced to a -toothless- paper agency. In this connection, it "#st )e noted that in 0oll#tion Ad-#dication Board *. o#rt of Appeals, et al., 27 the o#rt r#led that the 0oll#tion Ad-#dication Board @0ABA has the power to iss#e an e59parte cease and desist order when there is pri"a facie e*idence of an esta)lish"ent e5ceeding the allowa)le standards set )y the anti9poll#tion laws of the co#ntry. $he ponente, Associate H#stice (lorentino 0. (eliciano, declared2 /.5 parte cease and desist orders are per"itted )y law and reg#lations in sit#ations li:e that here presented precisely )eca#se stopping the contin#o#s discharge of poll#ti*e and #ntreated effl#ents into the ri*ers and other inland waters of the 0hilippines cannot )e "ade to wait #ntil protracted litigation o*er the #lti"ate correctness or propriety of s#ch orders has r#n its f#ll co#rse, incl#ding "#ltiple and se6#ential appeals s#ch as those which !olar has ta:en, which of co#rse "ay ta:e se*eral years. $he rele*ant poll#tion control stat#te and i"ple"enting reg#lations were enacted and pro"#lgated in the e5ercise of that per*asi*e, so*ereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and co"fort of the p#)lic, as well as the protection of plant and ani"al life, co""only designated as the police power. It is a constit#tional co""onplace that the ordinary re6#ire"ents of proced#ral d#e process yield to the necessities of protecting *ital p#)lic interests li:e those here in*ol*ed, thro#gh the e5ercise of police power. . . ./ The immediate response to the demands of -the necessities of protecting vital public interests- gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the 7eclaration of #rinciples and State #olicies or the %(!4 ,onstitution. /rticle ;;, Section %B which provides+ -The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.- /s a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non:impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state -to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.- &! ;t is to be borne in mind that the #hilippines is party to the Cniversal 7eclaration of Human .ights and the /lma ,onference 7eclaration of %(4! which recognie health as a fundamental human right. &( The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LL7/, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LL7/ been complied with by the ,ity 9overnment of ,aloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary. $he charter of LLDA, %ep#)lic Act 3o. B87?, as a"ended, instead of conferring #pon the LLDA the "eans of directly enforcing s#ch orders, has pro*ided #nder its !ection B @dA the power to instit#te /necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall co""ence to i"ple"ent or contin#e i"ple"entation of any pro-ect, plan or progra" within the Lag#na de Bay region witho#t pre*io#s clearance fro" the LLDA./ learly, said pro*ision was designed to in*est the LLDA with s#fficiently )road powers in the reg#lation of all pro-ects initiated in the Lag#na La:e region, whether )y the go*ern"ent or the pri*ate sector, insofar as the i"ple"entation of these pro-ects is concerned. It was "eant to deal with cases which "ight possi)ly arise where decisions or orders iss#ed p#rs#ant to the e5ercise of s#ch )road powers "ay not )e o)eyed, res#lting in the thwarting of its la#da)le o)-ecti*e. $o "eet s#ch contingencies, then the writs of "anda"#s and in-#nction which are )eyond the power of the LLDA to iss#e, "ay )e so#ght fro" the proper co#rts. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES GARCIA VS. &OARD OF INVESTMENTS 191 SCRA 288, 1990 FACTS" $his is a petition to ann#l and set aside the decision of the Board of In*est"ents @B'IARDepart"ent of $rade and Ind#stry @D$IA appro*ing the transfer of the site of the proposed petroche"ical plant fro" Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstoc: for that plant fro" naphtha only to naphtha andRor li6#efied petrole#" gas @L0,A. Jnder 0.D. 3o. 18?4 dated Han#ary 1+, 1981, 77+ hectares of the p#)lic do"ain located in La"ao, Li"ay, Bataan were reser*ed for the 0etroche"ical Ind#strial Xone #nder the ad"inistration, "anage"ent, and ownership of the 0hilippine 3ational 'il o"pany @03'A. $he Bataan %efining orporation @B%A is a wholly go*ern"ent owned corporation, located at Bataan. It prod#ces +?M of the national o#tp#t of naphtha. $aiwanese in*estors in a petroche"ical pro-ect for"ed the Bataan 0etroche"ical orporation @B0A and applied with B'I for registration as a new do"estic prod#cer of petroche"icals. Its application specified Bataan as the plant site. 'ne of the ter"s and conditions for registration of the pro-ect was the #se of /naphtha crac:er/ and /naphtha/ as feedstoc: or f#el for its petroche"ical plant. $he petroche"ical plant was to )e a -oint *ent#re with 03'. B0 was iss#ed a certificate of registration on (e)r#ary 2B, 1988 )y B'I. B0 was gi*en pioneer stat#s and accorded fiscal and other incenti*es )y B'I, li:e, @1A e5e"ption fro" ta5es on raw "aterials, @2A repatriation of the entire proceeds of li6#idation in*est"ents in c#rrency originally "ade and at the e5change rate o)taining at the ti"e of repatriationG and @4A re"ittance of earnings on in*est"ents. As additional incenti*e, the 1o#se of %epresentati*es appro*ed a )ill introd#ced )y the petitioner eli"inating the B8M ad *alore" ta5 on naphtha if and when it is #sed as raw "aterials in the petroche"ical plant. 1owe*er, in (e)r#ary, 1989, A.$. hong, chair"an of J!I (ar .ast orporation, the "a-or in*estor in B0, personally deli*ered to $rade San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 21 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 !ecretary Hose oncepcion a letter dated Han#ary 27, 1989 ad*ising hi" of B0Is desire to a"end the original registration certification of its pro-ect )y changing the -o) site fro" Li"ay, Bataan, to Batangas. $he reason add#ced for the transfer was the ins#rgency and #nsta)le la)or sit#ation, and the presence in Batangas of a h#ge li6#efied petrole#" gas @L0,A depot owned )y the 0hilippine !hell orporation. $he petitioner *igoro#sly opposed the proposal and no less than 0resident A6#ino e5pressed her preference that the plant )e esta)lished in Bataan in a conference with the $aiwanese in*estors, the !ecretary of 3ational Defense and $he hief of !taff of the Ar"ed (orces. Despite speeches in the !enate and 1o#se opposing the transfer of the pro-ect to Batangas, B0 filed its re6#est for appro*al of the a"end"ents. Its application is as follows2 /@1A increasing the in*est"ent a"o#nt fro" J!Q22? "illion to J!Q42? "illionG @2A increasing the prod#ction capacity of its naphtha crac:er, polythylene plant and polypropylene plantG @4A changing the feedstoc: fro" naphtha only to /naphtha andRor li6#efied petrole#" gasG/ and @BA transferring the -o) site fro" Li"ay, Bataan, to Batangas. B'I states that it has ta:en a p#)lic position preferring Bataan o*er Batangas as the site of the petroche"ical co"ple5, as this wo#ld pro*ide a )etter distri)#tion of ind#stries aro#nd the Metro Manila area. In ad*ocating the choice of Bataan as the pro-ect site for the petroche"ical co"ple5, the B'I, howe*er, "ade it clear in its *iew that the B'I or the go*ern"ent for that "atter co#ld only reco""end as to where the pro-ect sho#ld )e located. $he B'I recogni&es and respects the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who wo#ld in the final analysis pro*ide the f#nding or ris: capital for the pro-ect. ISSUE" 8hether or not there was a)#se of discretion on the part of the Board of In*est"ents for yielding to the wishes of the in*estor, the national interest notwithstandingC HELD" D.!. #nder !ection 1?, Article ;II of the 1987 onstit#tion, it is the d#ty of the !tate to /reg#late and e5ercise a#thority o*er foreign in*est"ents within its national -#risdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities./ $he de*elop"ent of a self9reliant and independent national econo"y effecti*ely controlled )y (ilipinos is "andated in !ection 19, Article II of the onstit#tion. A petroche"ical ind#stry is not an ordinary in*est"ent opport#nity. It sho#ld not )e treated li:e a gar"ent or e")roidery fir", a shoe9"a:ing *ent#re, or e*en an asse")ler of cars or "an#fact#rer of co"p#ter chips, where the B'I reasoning "ay )e accorded f#ller faith and credit. $he petroche"ical ind#stry is essential to the national interest. ;n this particular 1#, venture, not only has the 9overnment given unprecedented favors, but through its regulatory agency, the 1A;, it surrenders even the power to ma<e a company abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the >ilipino people. $he o#rt, therefore, holds and finds that the B'I co""itted a gra*e a)#se of discretion in appro*ing the transfer of the petroche"ical plant fro" Bataan to Batangas and a#thori&ing the change of feedstoc: fro" naphtha only to naphtha andRor L0, for the "ain reason that the final say is in the in*estor all other circ#"stances to the contrary notwithstanding. 3o cogent ad*antage to the go*ern"ent has )een shown )y this transfer. $his is a rep#diation of the independent policy of the go*ern"ent e5pressed in n#"ero#s laws and the onstit#tion to r#n its own affairs the way it dee"s )est for the national interest.U Ane can but remember the words of a great >ilipino leader who in part said he would not mind having a government run li<e hell by >ilipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the 1A; allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ASSO. OF SMALL LANDO=NERS VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM 175 SCRA 343, 1989 FACTS" In ancient "ythology, Antae#s was a terri)le giant who )loc:ed and challenged 1erc#les for his life on his way to Mycenae after perfor"ing his ele*enth la)or. $he two wrestled "ightily and 1erc#les fl#ng his ad*ersary to the gro#nd thin:ing hi" dead, )#t Antae#s rose e*en stronger to res#"e their str#ggle. $his happened se*eral ti"es to 1erc#lesI increasing a"a&e"ent. (inally, as they contin#ed grappling, it dawned on 1erc#les that Antae#s was the son of ,aea and co#ld ne*er die as long as any part of his )ody was to#ching his Mother .arth. $h#s forewarned, 1erc#les then held Antae#s #p in the air, )eyond the reach of the s#staining soil, and cr#shed hi" to death. Mother .arth. $he s#staining soil. $he gi*er of life, witho#t whose in*igorating to#ch e*en the powerf#l Antae#s wea:ened and died. $he cases )efore #s are not as fancif#l as the foregoing tale. B#t they also tell of the ele"ental forces of life and death, of "en and wo"en who, li:e Antae#s, need the s#staining strength of the precio#s earth to stay ali*e. /Land for the Landless/ is a slogan that #nderscores the ac#te i")alance in the distri)#tion of this precio#s reso#rce a"ong o#r people. B#t it is "ore than a slogan. $hro#gh the )rooding cent#ries, it has )eco"e a )attlecry dra"ati&ing the increasingly #rgent de"and of the dispossessed a"ong #s for a plot of earth as their place in the s#n. %ecogni&ing this need, the onstit#tion in 1947 "andated the policy of social -#stice to /ins#re the well9)eing and econo"ic sec#rity of all the people,/ especially the less pri*ileged. In 1974, the new onstit#tion affir"ed this goal, adding specifically that /the !tate shall reg#late the ac6#isition, ownership, #se, en-oy"ent and disposition of pri*ate property and e6#ita)ly diff#se property ownership and profits.I !ignificantly, there was also the specific in-#nction to /for"#late and i"ple"ent an agrarian refor" progra" ai"ed at e"ancipating the tenant fro" the )ondage of the soil./ $he onstit#tion of 1987 was not to )e o#tdone. Besides echoing these senti"ents, it also adopted one whole and separate Article ;III on !ocial H#stice and 1#"an %ights, containing grandiose )#t #ndo#)tedly sincere pro*isions for the #plift of the co""on people. $hese incl#de a call in the following words for the adoption )y the !tate of an agrarian refor" progra". $he cases in*ol*ed ha*e )een consolidated )eca#se they concern co""on legal 6#estions, incl#ding serio#s challenges to the constit#tionality of %A ++77 otherwise :nown as the o"prehensi*e Agrarian %efor" Law of 1988 and other s#pple"entary to %A ++77 s#ch as 0D 27 @pro*iding for the co"p#lsory ac6#isition of pri*ate lands for distri)#tion a"ong tenant9far"ers and to specify "a5i"#" land ownership in fa*or of the )eneficiaries of 0D 27A 0res. 0roc. 141 @instit#ting A%0A and .' 229 @pro*iding the "echanics of i"ple"entation of A%0A %A ++77 is the "ost recent legislation, signed into law )y 0res. A6#ino on H#ne 1?, 1988. ISSUE" 8'3 %A ++77, 0D 77, 0roc. 41 Y .os 228 Y 229 considered as *alid and constit#tionalC HELD" D.!. $he assailed laws are considered as a *alid e5ercise of )oth police power and of e"inent do"ain. $he e5tent that it sets retention li"its is an e5ercise of police power. It "#st )e noted that li:e ta5ation, the power of e"inent do"ain co#ld )e #sed as an i"ple"ent of police power of the state. $he e5pressed o)-ecti*e of the law was the pro"otion of the welfare of the farners, which ca"e clearly #nder the police power of the state. $o achie*e this p#rpose, the law pro*ided for the e5propriation of agric#lt#ral lands @s#)-ect to "ini"#" retention li"its for the landownerA to )e distri)#ted a"ong the peasantry. As the ponencia o)ser*ed2 $he cases )efore #s present no :notty co"plication insofar as the 6#estion of co"pensa)le ta:ing is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the ,onstitution. 1ut where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a ta<ing under the power of eminent domain for which payment of *ust compensation is imperative. The ta<ing contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. 8hat is re6#ired is the s#rrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said e5cess and all )eneficial rights accr#ing to the owner in fa*or of the far"er9)eneficiary. $his is definitely an e5ercise not of the police power )#t of the power of e"inent do"ain. ;t bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual ta<ing of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and en*oyment, to entitle them to the *ust compensation mandated by the ,onstitution. $he e5propriation )efore #s affects all pri*ate agric#lt#ral lands whene*er fo#nd and of whate*er :ind as long as they are in e5cess of the "a5i"#" retention li"its allowed their owners. $his :ind of e5propriation is intended for the )enefit not only of a partic#lar co""#nity or of a s"all seg"ent of the pop#lation )#t of the entire (ilipino nation, fro" all le*els of o#r society, fro" the i"po*erished far"er to the land9gl#tted owner. Its p#rpose does not co*er only the whole territory of this co#ntry )#t goes )eyond in ti"e to the foreseea)le f#t#re, which it hopes to sec#re and edify with the *ision and the sacrifice of the present generation of (ilipinos. ,enerations yet to co"e are as in*ol*ed in this progra" as we are today, altho#gh hopef#lly only as )eneficiaries of a richer and "ore f#lfilling life we will g#arantee to the" to"orrow thro#gh o#r tho#ghtf#lness today. And, finally, let it not )e forgotten that it is no less than the onstit#tion itself that has ordained this re*ol#tion in the far"s, calling for /a -#st distri)#tion/ a"ong the far"ers of lands that ha*e heretofore )een the prison of their drea"s )#t can now )eco"e the :ey at least to their deli*erance. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 22 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 !#ch a progra" will in*ol*e not "ere "illions of pesos. $he cost will )e tre"endo#s. onsidering the *ast areas of land s#)-ect to e5propriation #nder the laws )efore #s, we esti"ate that h#ndreds of )illions of pesos will )e needed, far "ore indeed than the a"o#nt of 07? )illion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is )y o#r present standards. !#ch a"o#nt is in fact not e*en f#lly a*aila)le at this ti"e. 8e ass#"e that the fra"ers of the onstit#tion were aware of this diffic#lty when they called for agrarian refor" as a top priority pro-ect of the go*ern"ent. It is a part of this ass#"ption that when they en*isioned the e5propriation that wo#ld )e needed, they also intended that the -#st co"pensation wo#ld ha*e to )e paid not in the orthodo5 way )#t a less con*entional if "ore practical "ethod. $here can )e no do#)t that they were aware of the financial li"itations of the go*ern"ent and had no ill#sions that there wo#ld )e eno#gh "oney to pay in cash and in f#ll for the lands they wanted to )e distri)#ted a"ong the far"ers. 8e "ay therefore ass#"e that their intention was to allow s#ch "anner of pay"ent as is now pro*ided for )y the A%0 Law, partic#larly the pay"ent of the )alance @if the owner cannot )e paid f#lly with "oneyA, or indeed of the entire a"o#nt of the -#st co"pensation, with other things of *al#e. 8e "ay also s#ppose that what they had in "ind was a si"ilar sche"e of pay"ent as that prescri)ed in 0.D. 3o. 27, which was the law in force at the ti"e they deli)erated on the new harter and with which they pres#"a)ly agreed in principle. In relation thereto, the -#st co"pensation to )e "ade )y the ,o*ern"ent in the for" of financial instr#"ents and not "oney is -#stified )y the re*ol#tionary character of of the sche"e and the need to allow the go*ern"ent ti"e to raise the f#nds needed. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES &ASCO VS. PAGCOR 197 SCRA 52, 1991 FACTS" 0etitioners see: to ann#l the 0hilippine A"#se"ent and ,a"ing orporation @0A,'%A harter 9 0D 18+9, )eca#se it is allegedly contrary to "orals, p#)lic policy and order. 0etitioners also clai" that said 0D has a /ga")ling o)-ecti*e/ and that !ection 14 par 2 of the sa"e 0D which e5e"pts 0A,'% fro" paying any ta5, any :ind of ter" inco"e or otherwise as well as fees, charges as le*ies of whate*er nat#re whether national or local is *iolati*e of the principles of local a#tono"y for it is a wai*er of the right of the ity of Manila to i"pose ta5es and legal fees. ISSUE" 8hether or not the local a#tono"y cla#se is *iolated )y 0D 18+9 HELD" $he petitionerKs contentions are witho#t "erit for the following reasons2 1. $he ity of Manila, )eing a "ere M#nicipal corporation hits no inherent right to i"pose ta5es 2. $he harter of the ity of Manila is s#)-ect to control )y ongress. It sho#ld )e stressed that -municipal corporations are mere creatures of ,ongress- which has the power to -create and abolish municipal corporations- due to its -general legislative powers-. ,ongress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. /nd if ,ongress can grant the ,ity of Danila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even ta<e bac< the power. 4. $he ity of ManilaIs power to i"pose license fees on ga")ling, has long )een re*o:ed. 'nly the 3ational ,o*ern"ent has the power to iss#e /licenses or per"its/ for the operation of ga")ling. 3ecessarily, the power to de"and or collect license fees which is a conse6#ence of the iss#ance of /licensesor per"its/ is no longer *ested in the ity of Manila. ". Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the 2ational 9overnment. #/9,A. is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. 5. The power of local government to -impose taxes and fees- is always sub*ect to -limitations- which ,ongress may provide by law. !ince 0D 18+9 re"ains an /operati*eII law, its /e5e"ption cla#se/ re"ains as an e5ception to the e5ercise of the power of local go*ern"ents to i"pose ta5es and fees. It cannot therefore )e *iolati*e )#t rather is consistent with the principle of local a#tono"y. Besides, the principle of local a#tono"y #nder the 1987 onstit#tion si"ply "eans /decentrali&ation/. It does not "a:e local go*ern"ents so*ereign within the slate or an 9 i"peri#rn in i"perio. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES LIM&ONA VS. MANGELIN 170 SCRA 78%, 1989 FACTS" 0etitioner is the elected spea:er of the Batangas, pa"poo: of entral Mindanao @Asse")ly for )refityA. %espondents are "e")ers of said Asse")ly. ongress"an Matala", hair"an of the o""ittee on M#sli" Affairs of the 1o#se of %epresentati*e in*ited the petitioner in his capacity as spea:er of the Asse")ly to participate in cons#ltation and dialog#e regarding the charting of the a#tono"o#s go*ern"ent of M#sli" Mindanao to )e held in Manila. 0etitioner sent a telegra" thro#gh the !ecretary of the Asse")ly to all the "e")ers thereof infor"ing that =there will )e no session this 3o*e")er> in *iew of the in*itation of ong. Matala". 1owe*er, on 3o*e")er 2, 1987, the Asse")ly held session and declared the seat of the !pea:er *acant. $his was reiterated in another session on 3o*e")er 7 of sa"e year. %espondents allege that )eca#se the !angg#niang 0a"poo:@sA are /a#tono"o#s,/ the co#rts "ay not rightf#lly inter*ene in their affairs, "#ch less stri:e down their acts.
ISSUE" Are the so9called a#tono"o#s go*ern"ents of Mindanao, as they are now constit#ted, s#)-ect to the -#risdiction of the national co#rtsC In other words, what is the e5tent of self9go*ern"ent gi*en to the two a#tono"o#s go*ern"ents of %egion I; and ;IIC HELD" Des, it "ay ass#"e -#risdiction. In resol*ing this case the ! "ade a differentiation )etween decentrali&ation of ad"inistration and decentrali&ation of power. $here is D)/),02'.9F'09+, +< '*D9,9(02'09+, when the central go*ern"ent delegates ad"inistrati*e powers to political s#)di*isions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable,/ and ensure their fullest development as self7reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the sa"e ti"e, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. $he 0resident e5ercises IA),)2'. (1E)2>9(9+,I o*er the", )#t only to /ens#re that local affairs are ad"inistered according to law./ &e has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their #udgments with his own. D)/),02'.9F'09+, +< E+@)2, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the a#tono"o#s go*ern"ent is free to chart its own destiny and shape its f#t#re with "ini"#" inter*ention fro" central a#thorities. An e5a"ination of the *ery 0residential Decree creating the a#tono"o#s go*ern"ents of Mindanao pers#ades #s that they were ne*er "eant to e5ercise a#tono"y in the second sense, that is, in which the central go*ern"ent co""its an act of self9i""olation. 0residential Decree 3o. 1+18, in the first place, "andates that /the 0resident shall ha*e the power of general s#per*ision and control o*er A#tono"o#s %egions./ In the second place, the !angg#niang 0a"poo:, their legislati*e ar", is "ade to discharge chiefly ad"inistrati*e ser*ices. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PAMATONG VS. COMELEC G.R. N+. 1%1872, AE29. 13, 2004 FACTS" 0etitioner %e*. .lly <ele& 0a"atong filed his ertificate of andidacy for 0resident. %espondent o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A ref#sed to gi*e d#e co#rse to petitionerKs ertificate of andidacy in its %esol#tion 3o. +778 dated Han#ary 17, 2??B. $he decision, howe*er, was not #nani"o#s since o""issioners L#&*i"inda ,. $ancangco and Mehol L. !adain *oted to incl#de petitioner as they )elie*ed he had parties or "o*e"ents to )ac: #p his candidacy. 'n Han#ary 17, 2??B, petitioner "o*ed for reconsideration of %esol#tion 3o. +778. 0etitionerKs Motion for %econsideration was doc:eted as !00 @M0A 3o. ?B9??1. $he 'M.L., acting on petitionerKs Motion for %econsideration and on si"ilar "otions filed )y other aspirants for national electi*e positions, denied the sa"e #nder the aegis of '"ni)#s %esol#tion 3o. ++?B dated (e)r#ary 11, 2??B. $he 'M.L. declared petitioner and thirty9fi*e @47A others n#isance candidates who co#ld not wage a nationwide ca"paign andRor are not no"inated )y a political party or are not s#pported )y a registered political party with a national constit#ency. o""issioner !adain "aintained his *ote for petitioner. By then, o""issioner $ancangco had retired. In this 0etition (or 8rit of ertiorari, petitioner see:s to re*erse the resol#tions which were allegedly rendered in *iolation of his right to =e6#al access to opport#nities for p#)lic ser*ice> #nder !ection 2+, Article II of the 1987 onstit#tion,O)y li"iting the n#")er of 6#alified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide ca"paign andRor are no"inated )y political parties. In so doing, petitioner arg#es that the 'M.L. indirectly a"ended the constit#tional pro*isions on the electoral process and li"ited the power of the so*ereign people to choose their leaders. $he 'M.L. s#pposedly erred in dis6#alifying hi" since he is the "ost 6#alified a"ong all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constit#tional and legal 6#alifications for the office of the president, he is capa)le of waging a national ca"paign since he has n#"ero#s national organi&ations #nder his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international ca"paign since he has practiced law in other co#ntries, and he has a platfor" of go*ern"ent. 0etitioner li:ewise attac:s the *alidity of the for" for the ertificate of andidacy prepared )y the 'M.L.. 0etitioner clai"s that the for" does not pro*ide clear and reasona)le g#idelines for deter"ining the 6#alifications of candidates since it does not as: for the candidateKs )io9data and his progra" of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 23 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 go*ern"ent. ISSUE" 8hether the constit#tional pro*ision ens#ring =e6#al access to opport#nities for p#)lic office> creates a constit#tional right to r#n for or hold p#)lic office and, partic#larly in his case, to see: the presidencyC HELD" 3'.I"plicit in the petitionerKs in*ocation of the constit#tional pro*ision ens#ring =e6#al access to opport#nities for p#)lic office> is the clai" that there is a constit#tional right to r#n for or hold p#)lic office and, partic#larly in his case, to see: the presidency. There is none. What is recognied is merely a privilege sub*ect to limitations imposed by law. Section &B, /rticle ;; of the ,onstitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. $here is nothing in the plain lang#age of the pro*ision which s#ggests s#ch a thr#st or -#stifies an interpretation of the sort. $he =equal access0 pro*ision is a s#)s#"ed part of Article II of the onstit#tion, entitled =Declaration of 0rinciples and !tate 0olicies.> The provisions under the Article are generall$ considered not self7 e%ecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the 2e.ual access3 provision. (ike the rest of the policies enumerated in Article '', the provision does not contain an$ #udiciall$ enforceable constitutional right but merel$ specifies a guideline for legislative or e%ecutive action.:;< The disregard of the provision does not give rise to an$ cause of action before the courts. An in.uir$ into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self7e%ecutor$. The original wording of the present "ection 2=, Article '' had read, =The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties.0 Commissioner +now Chief >ustice, &ilario 8avide, >r. successfull$ brought forth an amendment that changed the word 2broaden3 to the phrase 2ensure e.ual access,3 and the substitution of the word 2office3 to 2service.3 &e e%plained his proposal in this wise? ' changed the word 2 broaden0 to =62SC.6 6EC/L /,,6SS TA0 because what is important would be e.ual access to the opportunit$. 'f $ou broaden, it would necessaril$ mean that the government would be mandated to create as man$ offices as are possible to accommodate as man$ people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. "o, in order that we should not mandate the "tate to make the government the number one emplo$er and to limit offices onl$ to what ma$ be necessar$ and e%pedient $et offering e.ual opportunities to access to it, ' change the word 2broaden.3 :5< mphasis supplied, Abviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the =7avide amendment0 indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy ob*ective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. 0oreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. 't is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properl$ defined. 9roadl$ written, the m$riad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirel$ open7ended. :8< -ords and phrases such as 2e.ual access,3 2opportunities,3 and 2public service3 are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainl$, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innatel$ unenforceable rights ma$ be sourced. As earlier noted, the pri*ilege of e6#al access to opport#nities to p#)lic office "ay )e s#)-ected to li"itations. !o"e *alid li"itations specifically on the pri*ilege to see: electi*e office are fo#nd in the pro*isionsO9P of the '"ni)#s .lection ode on =3#isance andidates> and 'M.L. %esol#tion 3o. +B72O1?P dated Dece")er 1?, 2??2 o#tlining the instances wherein the 'M.L. "ay "ot# proprio ref#se to gi*e d#e co#rse to or cancel a ertificate of andidacy. As long as the li"itations apply to e*ery)ody e6#ally witho#t discri"ination, howe*er, the e6#al access cla#se is not *iolated. .6#ality is not sacrificed as long as the )#rdens engendered )y the li"itations are "eant to )e )orne )y any one who is "inded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at )ar, there is no showing that any person is e5e"pt fro" the li"itations or the )#rdens which they create. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION 150 SCRA 530, 1987 FACTS" $he f#nda"ental right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern is in*o:ed in this special ci*il action for Manda"#s instit#ted )y petitioner <alentin L. Legaspi against the i*il !er*ice o""ission. $he respondent had earlier denied LegaspiIs re6#est for infor"ation on the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ilities of certain persons e"ployed as sanitarians in the 1ealth Depart"ent of e)# ity. $hese go*ern"ent e"ployees had allegedly represented the"sel*es as ci*il ser*ice eligi)les who passed the ci*il ser*ice e5a"inations for sanitarians. ISSUE" 8hether or not Legaspi sho#ld )e allowed s#ch right HELD" $he constit#tional right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern is recogni&ed in the Bill of %ights. These constitutional provisions are self:executing. $hey s#pply the r#les )y "eans of which the right to infor"ation "ay )e en-oyed )y g#aranteeing the right and "andating the d#ty to afford access to so#rces of infor"ation. 1ence, the f#nda"ental right therein recogni&ed "ay )e asserted )y the people #pon the ratification of the constit#tion witho#t need for any ancillary act of the Legislat#re. 8hat "ay )e pro*ided for )y the Legislat#re are reasona)le conditions and li"itations #pon the access to )e afforded which "#st, of necessity, )e consistent with the declared !tate policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re of all transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest. >or every right of the people recognied as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. $hat is the *ery essence of the Bill of %ights in a constit#tional regi"e. 'nly go*ern"ents operating #nder f#nda"ental r#les defining the li"its of their power so as to shield indi*id#al rights against its ar)itrary e5ercise can properly clai" to )e constit#tional. 8itho#t a go*ern"entIs acceptance of the li"itations i"posed #pon it )y the onstit#tion in order to #phold indi*id#al li)erties, witho#t an ac:nowledg"ent on its part of those d#ties e5acted )y the rights pertaining to the citi&ens, the Bill of %ights )eco"es a sophistry, and li)erty, the #lti"ate ill#sion. ;n recogniing the peopleFs right to be informed, both the %(4$ ,onstitution and the 2ew ,harter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, sub*ect to such limitations as may be provided by law. $he g#arantee has )een f#rther enhanced in the 3ew onstit#tion with the adoption of a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re, this ti"e /s#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law,/ in Article II, !ection 28 thereof, to wit2 !#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law, the !tate adopts and i"ple"ents a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest. @Art. II, !ec. 28A. In the $anada case, s#pra, the constit#tional g#arantee was )olstered )y what this o#rt declared as an i"perati*e d#ty of the go*ern"ent officials concerned to p#)lish all i"portant legislati*e acts and resol#tions of a p#)lic nat#re as well as all e5ec#ti*e orders and procla"ations of general applica)ility. 8e granted Manda"#s in said case, and in the process, 8e fo#nd occasion to e5po#nd )riefly on the nat#re of said d#ty2 . . . $hat d#ty "#st )e enforced if the onstit#tional right of the people to )e infor"ed on "atters of p#)lic concern is to )e gi*en s#)stance and reality. $he law itself "a:es a list of what sho#ld )e p#)lished in the 'fficial ,a&ette. !#ch listing, to o#r "ind, lea*es respondents with no discretion whatsoe*er as to what "#st )e incl#ded or e5cl#ded fro" s#ch p#)lication. @$anada *. $#*era, s#pra, at 49A The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records in the Affice of the .egister of 7eeds, is emphasied in Subido vs. Aaeta, s#pra2 6xcept, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and ob*ects of the person see<ing access to the records. ;t is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gae, or that scandal is not made of it. ;f it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. . . . @!#)ido *. '&aeta, s#pra at 488A. ;t is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this ,ourt that government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In the !#)ido case, 8e recogni&ed the a#thority of the %egister of Deeds to reg#late the "anner in which persons desiring to do so, "ay inspect, e5a"ine or copy records relating to registered lands. 1owe*er, the reg#lations which the %egister of Deeds "ay pro"#lgate are confined to2 . . . prescri)ing the "anner and ho#rs of e5a"ination to the end that da"age to or loss of, the records "ay )e a*oided, that #nd#e interference with the d#ties of the c#stodian of the )oo:s and doc#"ents and other e"ployees "ay )e pre*ented, that the right of other persons entitled to "a:e inspection "ay )e ins#red . . . @!#)ido *s. '&aeta, 8? 0hil. 484, 487A. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 24 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 Applying the !#)ido r#ling )y analogy, 8e recogni&ed a si"ilar a#thority in a "#nicipal -#dge, to reg#late the "anner of inspection )y the p#)lic of cri"inal doc:et records in the case of Baldo&a *s. Di"aano @Ad". Matter 3o. 112?9MH, May 7, 197+, 71 !%A 1BA. !aid ad"inistrati*e case was filed against the respondent -#dge for his alleged ref#sal to allow e5a"ination of the cri"inal doc:et records in his sala. Jpon a finding )y the In*estigating H#dge that the respondent had allowed the co"plainant to open and *iew the s#)-ect records, 8e a)sol*ed the respondent. In effect, 8e ha*e also held that the r#les and conditions i"posed )y hi" #pon the "anner of e5a"ining the p#)lic records were reasona)le. In )oth the !#)ido and the Baldo&a cases, 8e were e"phatic in '#r state"ent that the a#thority to reg#late the "anner of e5a"ining p#)lic records does not carry with it the power to prohi)it. A distinction has to )e "ade )etween the discretion to ref#se o#tright the disclos#re of or access to a partic#lar infor"ation and the a#thority to reg#late the "anner in which the access is to )e afforded. $he first is a li"itation #pon the a*aila)ility of access to the infor"ation so#ght, which only the Legislat#re "ay i"pose @Art. III, !ec. +, 1987 onstit#tionA. $he second pertains to the go*ern"ent agency charged with the c#stody of p#)lic records. Its a#thority to reg#late access is to )e e5ercised solely to the end that da"age to, or loss of, p#)lic records "ay )e a*oided, #nd#e interference with the d#ties of said agencies "ay )e pre*ented, and "ore i"portantly, that the e5ercise of the sa"e constit#tional right )y other persons shall )e ass#red @!#)ido *s. '&aeta, s#praA. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be sub*ect to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. ,ertainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Atherwise, the en*oyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of Dandamus in a proper case. B#t what is a proper case for Manda"#s to iss#eC In the case )efore Js, the p#)lic right to )e enforced and the conco"itant d#ty of the !tate are #ne6#i*oca)ly set forth in the onstit#tion. $he decisi*e 6#estion on the propriety of the iss#ance of the writ of Manda"#s in this case is, whether the infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner is within the a")it of the constit#tional g#arantee. $he incorporation in the onstit#tion of a g#arantee of access to infor"ation of p#)lic concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and infor"ation in a de"ocracy @Baldo&a *. Di"aano, Ad". Matter 3o. 112?9MH, May 7, 197+, 17 !%A 1BA. In the sa"e way that free disc#ssion ena)les "e")ers of society to cope with the e5igencies of their ti"e @$hornhill *s. Ala)a"a, 41? J.!. 88, 1?2 O1949PA, access to infor"ation of general interest aids the people in de"ocratic decision9"a:ing @87 1ar*ard Law %e*iew 17?7 O197BP )y gi*ing the" a )etter perspecti*e of the *ital iss#es confronting the nation. 1ut the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. ;t does not open every door to any and all information. Cnder the ,onstitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are -sub*ect to limitations as may be provided by law- '/rt. ;;;, Sec. 4, second sentence). $he law "ay therefore e5e"pt certain types of infor"ation fro" p#)lic scr#tiny, s#ch as those affecting national sec#rity. It follows that, in e*ery case, the a*aila)ility of access to a partic#lar p#)lic record "#st )e circ#"scri)ed )y the nat#re of the infor"ation so#ght, i.e., @aA )eing of p#)lic concern or one that in*ol*es p#)lic interest, and, @)A not )eing e5e"pted )y law fro" the operation of the constit#tional g#arantee. The threshold .uestion is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. $his 6#estion is first addressed to the go*ern"ent agency ha*ing c#stody of the desired infor"ation. 1owe*er, as already disc#ssed, this does not gi*e the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the go*ern"ent agency has the )#rden of showing that the infor"ation re6#ested is not of p#)lic concern, or, if it is of p#)lic concern, that the sa"e has )een e5e"pted )y law fro" the operation of the g#arantee. $o hold otherwise will ser*e to dil#te the constit#tional right. As aptly o)ser*ed, /. . . the go*ern"ent is in an ad*antageo#s position to "arshall and interpret arg#"ents against release . . ./ $o safeg#ard the constit#tional right, e*ery denial of access )y the go*ern"ent agency concerned is s#)-ect to re*iew )y the co#rts, and in the proper case, access "ay )e co"pelled )y a writ of Manda"#s. 'n determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. #ublic concern- like -public interest- is a term that eludes e%act definition. 9oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of sub#ects which the public ma$ want to know , either % because these directly affect their lives, or & simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citien. ;n the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. $he p#)lic concern in*o:ed in the case of $aNada *. $#*era, s#pra, was the need for ade6#ate notice to the p#)lic of the *ario#s laws which are to reg#late the actions and cond#ct of citi&ens. In !#)ido *s. '&aeta, s#pra, the p#)lic concern dee"ed co*ered )y the stat#tory right was the :nowledge of those real estate transactions which so"e )elie*ed to ha*e )een registered in *iolation of the onstit#tion. $he infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner in this case is the tr#th of the clai" of certain go*ern"ent e"ployees that they are ci*il ser*ice eligi)les for the positions to which they were appointed. $he onstit#tion e5pressly declares as a !tate policy that2 Appoint"ents in the ci*il ser*ice shall )e "ade only according to "erit and fitness to )e deter"ined, as far as practica)le, and e5cept as to positions which are policy deter"ining, pri"arily confidential or highly technical, )y co"petiti*e e5a"ination. @Art. I;, B, !ec. 2. O2PA. #ublic office being a public trust, G,onst., /rt. H;, Sec+ %I it is the legitimate concern of citiens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. #ublic officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. 1ut then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. >or Dandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while ref#sing to confir" or deny the clai"s of eligi)ility, the respondent has failed to cite any pro*ision in the i*il !er*ice Law which wo#ld li"it the petitionerIs right to :now who are, and who are not, ci*il ser*ice eligi)les. 8e ta:e -#dicial notice of the fact that the na"es of those who pass the ci*il ser*ice e5a"inations, as in )ar e5a"inations and licens#re e5a"inations for *ario#s professions, are released to the p#)lic. &ence, there is nothing secret about one@s civil service eligibilit$, if actuall$ possessed. 0etitionerIs re6#est is, therefore, neither #n#s#al nor #nreasona)le. And when, as in this case, the go*ern"ent e"ployees concerned clai" to )e ci*il ser*ice eligi)les, the p#)lic, thro#gh any citi&en, has a right to *erify their professed eligi)ilities fro" the i*il !er*ice o""ission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent ,ommission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Dandamus, therefore lies. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES VALMONTE VS. &ELMONTE 170 SCRA 25%, 1989 FACTS" 0etitioner <al"onte wrote a letter to respondent Bel"onte, ,eneral Manager of ,!I!, re6#esting the latter to f#rnish hi" the list of the na"es of the Batasang 0a")ansa "e")ers )elonging to the J3ID' and 0D09La)an who were a)le to sec#re clean loans i""ediately )efore the (e)r#ary 7 election thr# the intercessionR"arginal note of the then (irst Lady I"elda Marcos. $he Dep#ty ,eneral co#nsel of the ,!I! wrote )ac: the petitioner t#rning down his re6#est on the gro#nd that there e5ists a confidential relationship )etween the ,!I! and all those who )orrow fro" it, which confidence it is the ,!I! is d#ty )o#nd to preser*e. ISSUE" 8hether or not "anda"#s lies to co"pel respondent to perfor" the acts so#ght )y petitioner to )e done, in p#rs#ance of their right to infor"ation HELD" Des. $he peopleKs right to infor"ation is li"ited to "atters of p#)lic concern and is f#rther s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law. $he ,!I! is a tr#stee of contri)#tions fro" the go*ern"ent and its e"ployees and ad"inistration of *ario#s ins#rance progra"s for the )enefit of the latter. Cndeniably, its funds assume a public character. ;t is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximiing the benefits to insured government employees. $he p#)lic nat#re of the loana)le f#nds of the ,!I! and the p#)lic office held )y the alleged )orrowers "a:e the infor"ation so#ght clearly a "atter of p#)lic interest and concern. (#rther"ore, the /constit#ent9"inistrant/ dichoto"y characteri&ing go*ern"ent f#nction has long )een rep#diated. $hat the ,!I!, in granting the loans, was e5ercising a proprietary f#nction wo#ld not -#stify the e5cl#sion of the transactions fro" the co*erage and scope of the right to infor"ation. /espondent ne%t asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the A"'" are private in nature and hence, are not covered b$ the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees +a,ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions onl$. 't is argued that the records of the A"'", a government corporation performing proprietar$ functions, are outside the coverage of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 25 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the people@s right of access to official records. 't is further contended that since the loan function of the A"'" is merel$ incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered b$ the constitutional polic$ of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable onl$ to official transactions. (irst of all, the /constit#ent 9999"inistrant/ dichoto"y characteri&ing go*ern"ent f#nction has long )een rep#diated. In A(A *. onfederation of Jnions and ,o*ern"ent orporations and 'ffices O,.%. 3os. L921B8B and L924+?7, 3o*e")er 29, 19+9, 4? !%A +BBP, the o#rt said that the go*ern"ent, whether carrying o#t its so*ereign attri)#tes or r#nning so"e )#siness, discharges the sa"e f#nction of ser*ice to the people. Conse.uentl$, that the A"'", in granting the loans, was e%ercising a proprietar$ function would not #ustif$ the e%clusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Doreover, the intent of the members of the ,onstitutional ,ommission of %(!B, to include government:owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government7owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietar$ or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the ,ourt is convinced that transactions entered into by the 9S;S, a government:controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the peopleFs right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. 'n fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted b$ the A"'", sub#ect to reasonable regulations that the latter ma$ promulgate relating to the manner and hours of e%amination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records ma$ be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records ma$ be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records ma$ be insured However, although citiens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to -access to official records,- the ,onstitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the li<e in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES AJUINOSARMIENTO VS. MORATO 203 SCRA 515, 1991 FACTS" 0etitioner, a "e")er of respondent M$%B, wrote its records officer re6#esting that she )e allowed to e5a"ine the )oardIs records pertaining to the *oting slips acco"plished )y the indi*id#al )oard "e")ers after a re*iew of the "o*ies and tele*ision prod#ctions. It is on the )asis of said slips that fil"s are either )anned, c#t or classified accordingly. 0etitionerIs re6#est was denied )y respondent Morato on the gro#nd that whene*er the "e")ers of the )oard sit in -#dg"ent o*er a fil", their decisions as reflected in the indi*id#al *oting slips parta:e the nat#re of conscience *otes and as s#ch, are p#rely and co"pletely pri*ate and personal. 0etitioner co#nters that the records she wishes to e5a"ine are p#)lic in character and other than pro*iding for reasona)le conditions reg#lating the "anner and ho#rs of e5a"ination, respondents ha*e no a#thority to deny any citi&en see:ing e5a"ination of the )oardIs records. ISSUE" 8as the respondentsK denial of petitionerKs re6#est properC HELD" 8e find respondentsI ref#sal to allow petitioner to e5a"ine the records of respondent M$%B, pertaining to the decisions of the re*iew co""ittee as well as the indi*id#al *oting slips of its "e")ers, as *iolati*e of petitionerIs constit#tional right of access to p#)lic records. May the decisions of respondent Board and the indi*id#al "e")ers concerned, arri*ed at in an official capacity, )e considered pri*ateC ertainly not. As "ay )e gleaned fro" the decree @0D 198+A creating the respondent classification )oard, there is no do#)t that its *ery e5istence is p#)lic in characterG it is an office created to ser*e p#)lic interest. it )eing the case, respondents can Hay no *alid clai" to pri*acy. $he right to pri*acy )elongs to the indi*id#al acting in his pri*ate capacity and not to a go*ern"ental agency or officers tas:ed with, and acting in, the discharge of p#)lic d#ties. ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PROVINCE OF NORTH COTO&ATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL GR N+. 183591, O/0+8)2 14, 2008 FACTS" 8hen 0resident ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo ass#"ed office, the "ilitary offensi*e against the MIL( was s#spended and the go*ern"ent so#ght a res#"ption of the peace tal:s. $he MIL(, according to a leading MIL( "e")er, initially responded with deep reser*ation, )#t when 0resident Arroyo as:ed the ,o*ern"ent of Malaysia thro#gh 0ri"e Minister Mahathir Moha""ad to help con*ince the MIL( to ret#rn to the negotiating ta)le, the MIL( con*ened its entral o""ittee to serio#sly disc#ss the "atter and, e*ent#ally, decided to "eet with the ,%0. $he parties "et in L#ala L#"p#r on March 2B, 2??1, with the tal:s )eing facilitated )y the Malaysian go*ern"ent, the parties signing on the sa"e date the Agree"ent on the ,eneral (ra"ewor: for the %es#"ption of 0eace $al:s Between the ,%0 and the MIL(. $he MIL( thereafter s#spended all its "ilitary actions. (or"al peace tal:s )etween the parties were held in $ripoli, Li)ya fro" H#ne 2?922, 2??1, the o#tco"e of which was the ,%09MIL( $ripoli Agree"ent on 0eace @$ripoli Agree"ent 2??1A containing the )asic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation2 !ec#rity Aspect, %eha)ilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Do"ain Aspect. 8ith regard to the Ancestral Do"ain Aspect, the parties in $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1 si"ply agreed =that the sa"e )e disc#ssed f#rther )y the 0arties in their ne5t "eeting.> A second ro#nd of peace tal:s was held in y)er-aya, Malaysia on A#g#st 797, 2??1 which ended with the signing of the I"ple"enting ,#idelines on the !ec#rity Aspect of the $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1 leading to a ceasefire stat#s )etween the parties. $his was followed )y the I"ple"enting ,#idelines on the 1#"anitarian %eha)ilitation and De*elop"ent Aspects of the $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1, which was signed on May 7, 2??2 at 0#tra-aya, Malaysia. 3onetheless, there were "any incidence of *iolence )etween go*ern"ent forces and the MIL( fro" 2??2 to 2??4. Meanwhile, then MIL( hair"an !ala"at 1ashi" passed away on H#ly 14, 2??4 and he was replaced )y Al 1a- M#rad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MIL(. M#radKs position as chief peace negotiator was ta:en o*er )y Mohagher I6)al. In 2??7, se*eral e5ploratory tal:s were held )etween the parties in L#ala L#"p#r, e*ent#ally leading to the crafting of the draft M'A9AD in its final for", which, as "entioned, was set to )e signed last A#g#st 7, 2??8. Before the o#rt is what is perhaps the "ost contentio#s =consens#s> e*er e")odied in an instr#"ent [ the M'A9AD which is assailed principally )y the present petitions )earing doc:et n#")ers 184791, 184772, 184894, 184971 and 1849+2. o""only i"pleaded as respondents are the ,%0 0eace 0anel on Ancestral Do"ain and the 0residential Ad*iser on the 0eace 0rocess @0A00A 1er"ogenes .speron, Hr. 'n H#ly 24, 2??8, the 0ro*ince of 3orth ota)atoOand <ice9,o*ernor .""an#el 0iNol filed a petition, doc:eted as ,.%. 3o. 184791, for Manda"#s and 0rohi)ition with 0rayer for the Iss#ance of 8rit of 0reli"inary In-#nction and $e"porary %estraining 'rder. In*o:ing the right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern, petitioners see: to co"pel respondents to disclose and f#rnish the" the co"plete and official copies of the M'A9AD incl#ding its attach"ents, and to prohi)it the slated signing of the M'A9AD, pending the disclos#re of the contents of the M'A9AD and the holding of a p#)lic cons#ltation thereon. !#pple"entarily, petitioners pray that the M'A9AD )e declared #nconstit#tional. $his initial petition was followed )y se*eral other petitions )y other parties. $he o#rt ordered the consolidation of the petitions. ISSUE" 8hether there is a *iolation of the peopleKs right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern @1987 onstit#tion, Article III, !ec. 7A #nder a state policy of f#ll disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest @1987 onstit#tion, Article II, !ec. 28A incl#ding p#)lic cons#ltation #nder %ep#)lic Act 3o. 71+? @L'AL ,'<.%3M.3$ 'D. '( 1991C HELD" D.!. $he right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern shall )e recogni&ed. Access to official records, and to doc#"ents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to go*ern"ent research data #sed as )asis for policy de*elop"ent, shall )e afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law. As early as 19B8, in !#)ido *. '&aeta, the o#rt has recogni&ed the stat#tory right to e5a"ine and inspect p#)lic records, a right which was e*ent#ally accorded constit#tional stat#s. The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the %(4$ ,onstitution and the %(!4 ,onstitution, has been recognied as a self:executory constitutional right. In the 197+ case of Baldo&a *. 1on. H#dge Di"aano,the o#rt r#led that access to p#)lic records is predicated on the right of the people to ac6#ire infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern since, #ndo#)tedly, in a de"ocracy, the p#)ic has a legiti"ate interest in "atters of social and political significance. $he incorporation of this right in the onstit#tion is a recognition of the f#nda"ental role of free e5change of infor"ation in a de"ocracy. $here can )e no realistic perception )y the p#)lic of the nationKs pro)le"s, nor a "eaningf#l de"ocratic decision9"a:ing if they are denied access to infor"ation of general interest. Infor"ation is needed to ena)le the "e")ers of society to cope with the e5igencies of the ti"es. As has )een aptly o)ser*ed2 =Maintaining the flow of s#ch infor"ation depends on protection for )oth its ac6#isition and its disse"ination since, if either process is interr#pted, the flow ine*ita)ly ceases.> In the sa"e way that free disc#ssion ena)les "e")ers of society to cope with the e5igencies of their ti"e, access to infor"ation of general interest aids the people in de"ocratic decision9"a:ing )y gi*ing the" a )etter perspecti*e of the *ital iss#es confronting the nation, so that they "ay )e a)le to critici&e and participate in the affairs of the go*ern"ent in a responsi)le, reasona)le and effecti*e "anner. It is )y ens#ring an #nfettered and #ninhi)ited e5change of ideas a"ong a well9infor"ed San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 26 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 p#)lic that a go*ern"ent re"ains responsi*e to the changes desired )y the people. $he M'A9AD is a "atter of p#)lic concern
That the sub*ect of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. ;n fact, respondents admit that the DA/:/7 is indeed of public concern. ;n previous cases, the ,ourt found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the .egister of 7eeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of 9S;S funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Darcoses? alleged ill:gotten wealth,G%&3I and the identity of party:list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Cndoubtedly, the DA/:/7 sub*ect of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Datters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not disting#ishing as to the e5ec#tory nat#re or co""ercial character of agree"ents, the o#rt has categorically r#led that the right to infor"ation =conte"plates incl#sion of negotiations leading to the cons#""ation of the transaction.> ertainly, a cons#""ated contract is not a re6#ire"ent for the e5ercise of the right to infor"ation. 'therwise, the people can ne*er e5ercise the right if no contract is cons#""ated, and if one is cons#""ated, it "ay )e too late for the p#)lic to e5pose its defects.
.equiring a consummated contract will <eep the public in the dar< until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the ,onstitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citienry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the 1ill of .ights. 8e can allow neither an e"asc#lation of a constit#tional right, nor a retreat )y the !tate of its a*owed =policy of f#ll disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest.> Intended as a =splendid sy""etry> to the right to infor"ation #nder the Bill of %ights is the policy of p#)lic disclos#re #nder !ection 28, Article II of the onstit#tion. $he policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re en#nciated in a)o*e96#oted !ection 28 co"ple"ents the right of access to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern fo#nd in the Bill of %ights. $he right to infor"ation g#arantees the right of the people to de"and infor"ation, while !ection 28 recogni&es the d#ty of officialdo" to gi*e infor"ation e*en if no)ody de"ands. $he policy of p#)lic disclos#re esta)lishes a concrete ethical principle for the cond#ct of p#)lic affairs in a gen#inely open de"ocracy, with the peopleKs right to :now as the centerpiece. It is a "andate of the !tate to )e acco#nta)le )y following s#ch policy. $hese pro*isions are *ital to the e5ercise of the freedo" of e5pression and essential to hold p#)lic officials at all ti"es acco#nta)le to the people. 8hether !ection 28 is self9e5ec#tory, the records of the deli)erations of the onstit#tional o""ission so disclose. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE E3PORTERS, INC >(. HON. DRILON G.R. N+. 81958, !1,) 30, 1988, SARMIENTO, !. F'/0(" $he petitioner, 0hilippine Association of !er*ice .5porters, Inc. @0A!.I, for shortA, a fir" /engaged principally in the recr#it"ent of (ilipino wor:ers, "ale and fe"ale, for o*erseas place"ent,/ challenges the onstit#tional *alidity of Depart"ent 'rder 3o. 1, !eries of 1988, of the Depart"ent of La)or and ."ploy"ent, in the character of /,JID.LI3.! ,'<.%3I3, $1. $.M0'%A%D !J!0.3!I'3 '( D.0L'DM.3$ '( (ILI0I3' D'M.!$I A3D 1'J!.1'LD 8'%L.%!,/ in this petition for certiorari and prohi)ition. !pecifically, the "eas#re is assailed for /discri"ination against "ales or fe"alesG/ that it /does not apply to all (ilipino wor:ers )#t only to do"estic helpers and fe"ales with si"ilar s:illsG/ and that it is *iolati*e of the right to tra*el. It is held li:ewise to )e an in*alid e5ercise of the law"a:ing power, police power )eing legislati*e, and not e5ec#ti*e, in character. In this petition for certiorari and prohi)ition, 0A!.I, challenges the *alidity of Depart"ent 'rder 3o. 1 @deploy"ent )anA of the D'L. on the following gro#nds2 1A it is discri"inatory as it only applies to fe"ale wor:ersG 2A it is an in*alid e5ercise of the law"a:ing power. $he respondents in*o:e the police power of the 0hilippine !tate. I((1)" 8hether or not the enact"ent of D' 3o. 1 is a *alid e5ercise of police power. H).*" Des, it is a *alid e5ercise of police power. 0olice power has )een defined as the /state a#thority to enact legislation that "ay interfere with personal li)erty or property in order to pro"ote the general welfare./ It finds no specific onstit#tional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the harter. It is a f#nda"ental attri)#te of go*ern"ent that has ena)led it to perfor" the "ost *ital f#nctions of go*ernance. It constit#tes an i"plied li"itation on the Bill of %ights. 1owe*er, police power is not witho#t its own li"itations. It "ay not )e e5ercised ar)itrarily or #nreasona)ly. It is ad"itted that Depart"ent 'rder 3o. 1 is in the nat#re of a police power "eas#re. $he only 6#estion is whether or not it is *alid #nder the onstit#tion. The concept of police power is well:established in this *urisdiction. ;t has been defined as the -state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.- /s defined, it consists of '%) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, '&) in order to foster the common good. ;t is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all: comprehensive embrace. /Its scope, e*er9e5panding to "eet the e5igencies of the ti"es, e*en to anticipate the f#t#re where it co#ld )e done, pro*ides eno#gh roo" for an efficient and fle5i)le response to conditions and circ#"stances th#s ass#ring the greatest )enefits./ ;t finds no specific ,onstitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the ,harter. /long with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a f#nda"ental attri)#te of go*ern"ent that has ena)led it to perfor" the "ost *ital f#nctions of go*ernance. Marshall, to who" the e5pression has )een credited, refers to it s#ccinctly as the plenary power of the State -to govern its citiens.- /$he police power of the !tate . . . is a power coe5tensi*e with self9protection, and it is not inaptly ter"ed the Ilaw of o*erwhel"ing necessity.I It "ay )e said to )e that inherent and plenary power in the !tate which ena)les it to prohi)it all things h#rtf#l to the co"fort, safety, and welfare of society./ ;t constitutes an implied limitation on the 1ill of .ights. /ccording to >ernando, it is -rooted in the conception that men in organiing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citien or a group of citiens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare./ !ignificantly, the Bill of %ights itself does not p#rport to )e an a)sol#te g#aranty of indi*id#al rights and li)erties -6ven liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to oneFs will.- It is s#)-ect to the far "ore o*erriding de"ands and re6#ire"ents of the greater n#")er. 2otwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. >or all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Atherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citienry, there is a clear misuse of the power. D' 3o. 1 applies only to /fe"ale contract wor:ers,/ )#t it does not there)y "a:e an #nd#e discri"ination )etween the se5es. =.6#ality )efore the law/ ad"its of classifications, pro*ided that @1A s#ch classifications rest on s#)stantial distinctionsG @2A they are ger"ane to the p#rposes of the lawG @4A they are not confined to e5isting conditionsG and @BA they apply e6#ally to all "e")ers of the sa"e class. It is the a*owed o)-ecti*e of D' 3o. 1 to /enhance the protection for (ilipino fe"ale o*erseas wor:ers. Discri"ination in this case is -#stified. 0olice power is the do"ain of the legislat#re, )#t it does not "ean that s#ch an a#thority "ay not )e lawf#lly delegated. $he La)or ode itself *ests the D'L. with r#le"a:ing powers in the enforce"ent whereof. 1ence it is a *alid e5ercise of police power. ICHONG VS. HERNANDE$ 101 PHIL. 1155 FACTS" %ep#)lic Act 118? or co""only :nown as =An Act to %eg#late the %etail B#siness> was passed. $he said law pro*ides for a prohi)ition against foreigners as well as corporations owned )y foreigners fro" engaging fro" retail trade in o#r co#ntry. 0etitioner filed a s#it to in*alidate the %etail $rade 3ationali&ation Law, on the pre"ise that it *iolated se*eral treaties which #nder the r#le of pacta s#nt ser*anda, a generally accepted principle of international law, sho#ld )e o)ser*ed )y the o#rt in good faith. ISSUE" 8hether or not the %etail $rade 3ationali&ation Law is #nconstit#tional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally accepted principles of international law. HELD" $he !#pre"e o#rt said it saw no conflict. $he reason gi*en )y the o#rt was that the %etail $rade 3ational Law was passed in San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 27 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the e5ercise of the police power which cannot )e )argained away thro#gh the "edi#" of a treaty or a contract. $he law in 6#estion was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free the citiens and country from such dominance and controlJ that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. %es#"ing what we ha*e set forth a)o*e we hold that the disp#ted law was enacted to re"edy a real act#al threat and danger to national econo"y posed )y alien do"inance and control of the retail )#siness and free citi&ens and co#ntry fro" s#ch do"inance and controlG that the enact"ent clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the state, thro#gh which and )y which it protects its own personality and ins#res its sec#rity and f#t#reG that the law does not *iolate the e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion )eca#se s#fficient gro#nds e5ist for the distinction )etween alien and citi&en in the e5ercise of occ#pation reg#lated, nor the d#e process of the law cla#seG )eca#se the law is prospecti*e in operation and recogni&es the pri*ilege of aliens already engaged in the occ#pation and reasona)ly protects their pri*ilegeG that the wisdo" and efficacy of the law to carry o#t its o)-ecti*es appear to #s to )e plainly e*ident 9 as a "atter of fact it see"s not only appropriate )#t act#ally necessary 9 and that in any case s#ch "atter falls within the prerogati*e of the legislat#re, with whose power and discretion the -#dicial depart"ent of the ,o*ern"ent "ay not interfereG that the pro*isions of the law are clearly e")raced in the title, and this s#ffers fro" no d#plicity and has not "isled the legislat#re of the seg"ent of the pop#lation affectedG and that it cannot )e said to )e *oid for s#pposed conflict with treaty o)ligations )eca#se no treaty has act#ally )een entered into on the s#)-ect and the police power "ay not )e c#rtailed or s#rrendered )y any treaty or any other con*entional agree"ent. =ALTER LUT$, )0. '. >(. ANTONIO ARANETA, G.R. N+. L7859, D)/)D8)2 22, 1955, RE-ES, !.& L., !. F'/0(" 0laintiffs see: to reco*er ta5 fro" the respondent alleging that s#ch is #nconstit#tional and *oid, )eing le*ied for the aid and s#pport of the s#gar ind#stry e5cl#si*ely, which in plaintiffIs opinion is not a p#)lic p#rpose for which a ta5 "ay )e constit#tionally le*ied. $he action ha*ing )een dis"issed )y the o#rt of (irst Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the case directly to the !#pre"e o#rt. I((1)" 8hether or not the i"position of ta5 #nder the A 3o. 7+7 is a *alid e5ercise of police power. H).*" Des. $he ta5 is le*ied with a reg#latory p#rpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabiliation of the threatened sugar industry. ;n other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power. $he protection of a large ind#stry constit#ting one of the great so#rces of the stateIs wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the pop#lation of the !tate is affected to s#ch an e5tent )y p#)lic interests as to )e within the police power of the so*ereign.$he decision appealed fro" is affir"ed. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDO=NERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., )0. '. >(. HONORA&LE SECRETAR- OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. N+. 78742, !1.: 14, 1989, CRU$, !. F'/0(" In these consolidated cases, petitioners pri"arily assail the constit#tionality of %.A. 3o. ++77, 0.D. 3o. 27, 0roc. 3o. 141, and ..'. 3os. 228 and 229 arg#ing that no pri*ate property shall )e ta:en for p#)lic #se witho#t -#st co"pensation. $he respondent in*o:es the police power of the !tate. I((1)" 8hether or not the ta:ing of property #nder the said laws is a *alid e5ercise of police power or of the power of e"inent do"ain. H).*" It is an e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain. $he cases present no :notty co"plication insofar as the 6#estion of co"pensa)le ta:ing is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the ,onstitution. 1ut where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a ta<ing under the power of eminent domain for which payment of *ust compensation is imperative. The ta<ing contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer: beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. 8herefore, the o#rt holds the constit#tionality of %.A. 3o. ++77, 0.D. 3o. 27, 0roc. 3o. 141, and ..'. 3os. 228 and 229. 1owe*er, the title to all e5propriated properties shall )e transferred to the !tate only #pon f#ll pay"ent of co"pensation to their respecti*e owners. FLORENTINA A. LO$ANO >(. HONORA&LE ANTONIO M. MARTINE$, )0.'. G.R. N+. L%3419 D)/)D8)2 18, 198%, -AP, !. F'/0(" Batas 0a")ansa Bilang 22 @B0 22 for shortA, pop#larly :nown as the Bo#ncing hec: Law p#nishes a person /who "a:es or draws and iss#es any chec: on acco#nt or for *al#e, :nowing at the ti"e of iss#e that he does not ha*e s#fficient f#nds in or credit with the drawee )an: for the pay"ent of said chec: in f#ll #pon present"ent, which chec: is s#)se6#ently dishonored )y the drawee )an: for ins#fficiency of f#nds or credit or wo#ld ha*e )een dishonored for the sa"e reason had not the drawer, witho#t any *alid reason, ordered the )an: to stop pay"ent./ $hose who 6#estion the constit#tionality of B0 22 insist that it offends the constit#tional pro*ision for)idding i"prison"ent for de)t and it contra*enes the e6#al protection cla#se. I((1)" 8hether or not the enact"ent of B0 22 is a *alid e5ercise of police power. H).*" Des. The enactment of 1# && is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. ;t may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalie a person for non:payment of a debt ex contractu. 1ut certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawma<ing body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. /cts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. /n act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. $here is no s#)stance in the clai" that the stat#te in 6#estion denies e6#al protection of the laws or is discri"inatory, since it penali&es the drawer of the chec:, )#t not the payee. 8herefore, the decision rendered )y the respondent -#dge is here)y set aside. %ecent statistics of the entral Ban: show that one9third of the entire "oney s#pply of the co#ntry, ro#ghly totalling 042.4 )illion, consists of peso de"and depositsG the re"aining two9thirds consists of c#rrency in circ#lation. $hese de"and deposits in the )an:s constit#te the f#nds against which, a"ong others, co""ercial papers li:e chec:s, are drawn. $he "agnit#de of the a"o#nt in*ol*ed a"ply -#stifies the legiti"ate concern of the state in preser*ing the integrity of the )an:ing syste". (looding the syste" with worthless chec:s is li:e po#ring gar)age into the )loodstrea" of the nationIs econo"y. $he effects of the iss#ance of a worthless chec: transcends the pri*ate interests of the parties directly in*ol*ed in the transaction and to#ches the interests of the co""#nity at large. $he "ischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, )#t also an in-#ry to the p#)lic. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, in*ure the ban<ing system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. In s#", we find the enact"ent of B0 22 a *alid e5ercise of the police power and is not rep#gnant to the constit#tional inhi)ition against i"prison"ent for de)t. DECS > S', D9)A+ 180 SCRA 233, C21F, !. F'/0(" $he petitioner dis6#alified the pri*ate respondent who had act#ally ta:en and failed fo#r ti"es the 3ational Medical Ad"ission $est fro" ta:ing it again #nder its reg#lation. B#t the pri*ate respondent contends that he is still entitled and hence, applied to ta:e a fifth e5a"ination )ased on constit#tional gro#nds2 right to acade"ic freedo" and 6#ality ed#cation, d#e process and e6#al protection. 1e filed a petition for "anda"#s. $he respondent -#dge declared the said r#le in*alid and granted the petition. I((1)" 8hether or not the three fl#n: r#le is a *alid e5ercise of police power. H).*" Des. $he police power is *alidly e5ercised if @aA the interests of the p#)lic generally, as disting#ished fro" those of a partic#lar class, re6#ire the interference of the !tate, and @)A the "eans e"ployed are reasona)ly necessary to the attain"ent of the o)-ect so#ght to )e acco"plished and not #nd#ly oppressi*e #pon indi*id#als. $h#s, the sub*ect of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. ;t is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. 8hile e*ery person is entitled to aspire to )e a doctor, he does not ha*e a constit#tional right to )e a doctor. $he pri*ate respondent has failed the 3MA$ fi*e ti"es and this is s#fficed to say that he "#st yield to the challenged r#le and gi*e way to those )etter prepared. $he o#rt #pheld the constit#tionality of the 3MA$ as a "eas#re intended to li"it the ad"ission to "edical schools only to those who ha*e initially pro*ed their co"petence and preparation for a "edical ed#cation. $he decision of the respondent -#dge is re*ersed. -,+0 > IAC 148 SCRA %59, C21F, !. F'/0(" 0resident Marcos iss#ed ..'. +2+9A a"ending ..'. +2+, which prohibits the transport of carabaos or carabeefs fro" one pro*ince to San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 28 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 another for the purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of these animals. $he petitioner had transported si5 cara)aos fro" Mas)ate to Iloilo where they were confiscated for *iolation of the said order. 1e s#ed for reco*ery and challenges the constit#tionality of the said order. $he lower co#rt s#stained the confiscation of the cara)aos. 1e appealed the decision to the Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt which #pheld the lower co#rt. 1ence this petition for re*iew on certiorari. I((1)" 8hether or not the p#rpose of ..'. +2+9A is a *alid e5ercise of police power. H).*" 3o. We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be <illed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Abviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will ma<e it easier to <ill them there. /s for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply <illing the animal. 0erhaps so. 1owe*er, if the "o*e"ent of the li*e ani"als for the p#rpose of pre*enting their sla#ghter cannot )e prohi)ited, it sho#ld follow that there is no reason either to prohi)it their transfer as, not to )e flippant, dead "eat. 1ven if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalt$ is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out b$ the e%ecutive authorities, usuall$ the police onl$. In the $ori)io ase, the stat#te was s#stained )eca#se the penalty prescri)ed was fine and i"prison"ent, to )e i"posed )y the co#rt after trial and con*iction of the acc#sed. Jnder the challenged "eas#re, significantly, no s#ch trial is prescri)ed, and the property )eing transported is i""ediately i"po#nded )y the police and declared, )y the "eas#re itself, as forfeited to the go*ern"ent. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitraril$ confiscated b$ the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner onl$ after he had filed a complaint for recover$ and given a supersedeas bond of 612,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered b$ the trial court. The e%ecutive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediatel$ imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus den$ing him the centuries7old guarant$ of elementar$ fair pla$. In the instant case, the challenged "eas#re is an in*alid e5ercise of the police power )eca#se the "ethod e"ployed to conser*e the cara)aos is not reasona)ly necessary to the p#rpose of the law and, worse, is #nd#ly oppressi*e. Moreo*er, there was no s#ch press#re of ti"e or action calling for the petitionerIs pere"ptory treat"ent. $he properties in*ol*ed were not e*en ini"ical per se as to re6#ire their instant destr#ction. $h#s, the o#rt cannot say with e6#al certainty that it co"plies with the second re6#ire"ent, that there )e a lawf#l "ethod. $he reasona)le connection )etween the "eans e"ployed and the p#rpose so#ght to )e achie*ed )y the 6#estioned "eas#re is "issing. .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2+9A is here)y declared #nconstit#tional. C90: G+>K0 +< J1)F+, C90: > E29/0' 122 SCRA 759, G109)22)F, !2., ! F'/0(" %espondent 1i"layang 0ilipino filed a petition see:ing to ann#l !ection 9 of 'rdinance 3o. +118, !9+B, re6#iring pri*ate ce"eteries to reser*e +M of its total area for the )#rial of pa#pers, on the gro#nd that it is contrary to the onstit#tion. $he petitioner contends that the said order was a *alid e5ercise of police power #nder the general welfare cla#se. $he respondent co#rt declared the said order n#ll and *oid. 1ence, this instant petition. I((1)" 8hether or not !ection 9 of the ordinance in 6#estion is a *alid e5ercise of police power. H).*" 3o. !ection 9 cannot )e -#stified #nder the power granted to V#e&on ity to ta5, fi5 the license fee, and reg#late s#ch other )#siness, trades, and occ#pation as "ay )e esta)lished or practice in the ity.I @!#)sections II, !ec. 12, %.A. 747). The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial par< cemetery. /s defined, police power is Fthe power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and propertyF. ;n the instant case, Section ( of Ardinance 2o. B%%!, Series of %(B" of Eueon ,ity is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It depri*es a person of his pri*ate property witho#t d#e process of law, nay, e*en witho#t co"pensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six 'B) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a ta<ing without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of )#ilding or "aintaining a p#)lic ce"etery for this p#rpose, the city passes the )#rden to pri*ate ce"eteries. As a "atter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare cla#se or on i"plied powers of the "#nicipal corporation, not on any e5press pro*ision of law as stat#tory )asis of their e5ercise of power. $he petition for re*iew is here)y dis"issed POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN C90: +< M',9.' > C;9,)() C+DD1,90: 40 P;9. 349, !+;,(+,, !. F'/0(" $he plaintiff prayed that certain lands )e e5propriated for the p#rpose of constr#cting a p#)lic i"pro*e"ent into an e5tension of %i&al A*en#e, Manila which is necessary for the plaintiff to e5ercise in fee si"ple of certain parcels of land. $he defendant on the other hand, contends that the e5propriation was not necessary as a p#)lic i"pro*e"ent and that the plaintiff has no right to e5propriate the said ce"etery or any part or portion thereof for street p#rposes. $he lower co#rt declared that there was no necessity for the said e5propriation. 1ence, this appeal. I((1)" 8hether or not the o#rts can in6#ire into the necessity of e5propriation of delegate, s#ch as the ity of ManilaC H).*" The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. $he general power to e5ercise the right of e"inent do"ain "#st not )e conf#sed with the right to e5ercise it in a partic#lar case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by courts, but the general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. $he "o"ent the "#nicipal corporation or entity atte"pts to e5ercise the a#thority conferred, it "#st co"ply with the conditions acco"panying the a#thority. $he necessity for conferring the a#thority #pon a "#nicipal corporation to e5ercise the right of e"inent do"ain is ad"ittedly within the power of the legislat#re. 1ut whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. 8hen the co#rts co"e to deter"ine the 6#estion, they "#st only find @aA that a law or a#thority e5ists for the e5ercise of the right of e"inent do"ain, )#t @)A also that the right or a#thority is )eing e5ercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions i"posed #pon the a#thority conceded to the ity of Manila2 (irst, the land "#st )e pri*ateG and, second, the p#rpose "#st )e p#)lic. $he a#thority of the city of Manila to e5propriate pri*ate lands for p#)lic p#rposes, is not denied as pro*ided in its harter. 1owe*er, if the co#rt, #pon trial, finds that neither of these conditions e5ists or that either one of the" fails, certainly it cannot )e contended that the right is )eing e5ercised in accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does not show concl#si*ely that the plaintiff has definitely decided that there e5ists a necessity for e5propriation. $he decision of the lower co#rt is affir"ed. R)E18.9/ > PLDT 2% SCRA %20, R):)(, !.&.L., !. F'/0(" $he petitioner, %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, is a political entity e5ercising go*ern"ental powers thro#gh its )ranches and instr#"entalities, one of which is the B#rea# of $eleco""#nications. 8hile the respondent, 0hilippine Long Distance $elephone has the power to install, operate and "aintain a telephone syste" thro#gho#t the 0hilippines and to carry on the )#siness of electrical trans"ission of "essages within the 0hilippines and )etween the 0hilippines and the telephone syste"s of other co#ntries. !o"eti"e in 1944, the defendant and the %A o""#nications, Inc., entered into an agree"ent where)y telephone "essages, co#ld a#to"atically )e transferred to the lines of 0LD$G and *ice9*ersa. The 1ureau of Telecommunications set up its own 9overnment Telephone System by utiliing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trun< lines of the #L7T to enable government offices to call private parties. $he respondent said that the )#rea# was *iolating the conditions #nder which their 0ri*ate Branch .5change @0B;A is inter9connected with the 0LD$Is facilities. $he petitioner prayed co""anding the 0LD$ to e5ec#te a contract with it, thro#gh the B#rea#, for the #se of the facilities of defendantIs telephone syste". $he lower co#rt rendered -#dg"ent that it co#ld not co"pel the 0LD$ to enter into an agree"ent with the B#rea# )eca#se the parties were not in agree"ent. Both parties appealed. I((1)" 8hether or not the B#rea# of $eleco""#nications has the right to de"and interconnection )etween the ,o*ern"ent $elephone !yste" and the 0LD$. H).*" Des. It is tr#e that parties cannot )e coerced to enter into a contract where no agree"ent was "ade )etween the". (reedo" to stip#late s#ch ter"s and conditions is of the essence of o#r contract#al syste", and )y e5press pro*ision of the stat#te, a contract "ay )e ann#lled if tainted )y *iolence, inti"idation or #nd#e infl#ence @Articles 14?+, 144+, 1447, i*il ode of the 0hilippinesA. B#t the co#rt a 6#o has apparentl$ overlooked that while the /epublic ma$ not compel the 6(8T to celebrate a contract with it, the .epublic, in the exercise of the sovereign of eminent domain, may require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the 9overnment Telephone System and that of #L7T, as the needs of the government service may require, sub*ect San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 29 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 to the payment of *ust compensation. Jlti"ately, the )eneficiary of the interconnecting ser*ice wo#ld )e the #sers of )oth telephone syste"s, so that conde"nation wo#ld )e for p#)lic #se. P)+E.) >. F'B'2*+ GR 12172, A1A. 29 1958 F'/0(" $he "#nicipal co#ncil of Baao, a"arines !#r stating a"ong others that constr#ction of a )#ilding, which will destroy the *iew of the pla&a, shall not )e allowed and therefore )e destroyed at the e5pense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. 1erein appellant filed a written re6#est with the inc#")ent "#nicipal "ayor for a per"it to constr#ct a )#ilding ad-acent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in (a-ardoIs na"e, located along the national highway and separated fro" the p#)lic pla&a )y a cree:. $he re6#est was denied, for the reason a"ong others that the proposed )#ilding wo#ld destroy the *iew or )ea#ty of the p#)lic pla&a. Defendants reiterated their re6#est for a )#ilding per"it, )#t again the "ayor t#rned down the re6#est. 8here#pon, appellants proceeded with the constr#ction of the )#ilding witho#t a per"it, )eca#se they needed a place of residence *ery )adly, their for"er ho#se ha*ing )een destroyed )y a typhoon and hitherto they had )een li*ing on leased property. $hereafter, defendants were charged in *iolation of the ordinance and s#)se6#ently con*icted. 1ence this appeal. I((1)" 8hether or not the ordinance is a *alid e5ercise of police power. H).*" 3o. It is not a *alid e5ercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanentl$ deprive appellants of the right to use their own propert$) hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellantBs propert$ without #ust compensation. 8e do not o*erloo: that the "odern tendency is to regard the )ea#tification of neigh)orhoods as cond#ci*e to the co"fort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, e*ery str#ct#re that "ay )e erected on appellantsI land, regardless of its own )ea#ty, stands conde"ned #nder the ordinance in 6#estion, )eca#se it wo#ld interfere with the *iew of the p#)lic pla&a fro" the highway. $he appellants wo#ld, in effect, )e constrained to let their land re"ain idle and #n#sed for the o)*io#s p#rpose for which it is )est s#ited, )eing #r)an in character. To legall$ achieve that result, the municipalit$ must give appellants *ust compensation and an opportunity to be heard. R)E18.9/ >. V*'. D) C'(0)..>9 GR N+. 20%20, A1A.15, 1974 F'/0(" $he %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines occupied the land of ,armen D. vda. de ,astellvi from % 8uly %("4, by virtue of a contract of lease, on a year to year )asis @fro" H#ly 1 of each year to H#ne 4? of the s#cceeding yearA. $he %ep#)lic so#ght to renew the sa"e )#t astell*i ref#sed. $he A(0 ref#sed to *acate the leased pre"ises after the ter"ination of the contract )eca#se it wo#ld diffic#lt for the ar"y to *acate the pre"ises in *iew of the per"anent installations and other facilities worth al"ost 07??,???.?? that were erected and already esta)lished on the property. ,astellvi then brought suit to e*ect the #hilippine /ir >orce from the land. While this e*ectment case was pending, the .epublic filed on &B 8une %(5( complaints for eminent domain against the respondents over the $ parcels of land. In its co"plaint, the %ep#)lic alleged, a"ong other things, that the fair "ar:et *al#e of the a)o*e9"entioned lands, according to the o""ittee on Appraisal for the 0ro*ince of 0a"panga, was not "ore than 02,??? per hectare.$he co#rt a#thori&es the %ep#)lic to ta:e i""ediate possession of the lands #pon deposit of that a"o#nt with the 0ro*incial $reas#rer of 0a"panga.In 19+1, the trial co#rt, rendered its decision in the e-ect"ent case, finding that the #nani"o#s reco""endation of the co""issioners of 01?.?? per s6#are "eter for the 4 lots s#)-ect of the action is fair and -#stG and re6#ired the %ep#)lic to pay interests. I((1)" 8hether the ta:ing of astell*iKs property occ#rred in 19B7 or in 1979. H).*" $he %ep#)lic #rges that the /ta:ing / of astell*iIs property sho#ld )e dee"ed as of the year 19B7 )y *irt#e of afore96#oted lease agree"ent. In A"erican H#rispr#dence, <ol. 2+, 2nd edition, !ection 177, on the s#)-ect of /."inent Do"ain, we read the definition of /ta:ing/ @in e"inent do"ainA as follows2 -Ta<ing0#nder the power of e"inent do"ain "ay )e defined generally as entering #pon pri*ate property for "ore than a "o"entary period, and, #nder the warrant or color of legal a#thority, de*oting it to a p#)lic #se, or otherwise infor"ally appropriating or in-#rio#sly affecting it in s#ch a way as s#)stantially to o#st the owner and depri*e hi" of all )eneficial en-oy"ent thereof./ 0#rs#ant to the aforecited a#thority, a n#")er of circ#"stances "#st )e present in the /ta:ing/ of property for p#rposes of e"inent do"ain. F92(0, the e5propriator "#st enter a pri*ate property. $his circ#"stance is present in the instant case, when )y *irt#e of the lease agree"ent the %ep#)lic, thro#gh the A(0, too: possession of the property of astell*i. S)/+,*, the entrance into pri*ate property "#st )e for "ore than a "o"entary period. /Mo"entary/ "eans, /lasting )#t a "o"entG of )#t a "o"entIs d#ration/ @$he '5ford .nglish Dictionary, <ol#"e <I, page 79+AG /lasting a *ery short ti"eG transitoryG ha*ing a *ery )rief lifeG operati*e or rec#rring at e*ery "o"ent/ @8e)sterIs $hird International Dictionary, 19+4 edition.A $he word /"o"entary/ when applied to possession or occ#pancy of @realA property sho#ld )e constr#ed to "ean /a li"ited period/ not indefinite or per"anent. $he aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewa)le fro" year to year. T;) ),02: +, 0;) E2+E)20:, 1,*)2 0;) .)'(), 9( 0)DE+2'2:, ',* /+,(9*)2)* 02',(90+2:. T;) <'/0 0;'0 0;) R)E18.9/, 0;2+1A; 0;) AFP, /+,(021/0)* (+D) 9,(0'..'09+,( +< ' E)2D',),0 ,'012) *+)( ,+0 '.0)2 0;) <'/0 0;'0 0;) ),02: 9,0+ 0;) .',* @'( 02',(90+2:, +2 9,0),*)* 0+ .'(0 ' :)'2, '.0;+1A; 2),)@'8.) <2+D :)'2 0+ :)'2 8: /+,(),0 +< 0;) +@,)2 +< 0;) .',*. 1y express provision of the lease agreement the .epublic, as lessee, undertoo< to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the /># . ;t is claimed that the =;2T62T;A20 of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. 1ut this -;2T62T;A2- cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. ;ntent is to be deduced from the language employed by the parties, and the terms of the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mista<e or fraud the question being not what the intention wag, but what is expressed in the language used. Moreo*er, in order to -#dge the intention of the contracting parties, their conte"poraneo#s and s#)se6#ent acts shall )e principally considered @Art. 1471, i*il odeA. 'f the intention of the lessee +/epublic, in 14C5 was reall$ to occup$ permanentl$ Castellvi@s propert$, wh$ was the contract of lease entered into on $ear to $ear basisD -h$ was the lease agreement renewed from $ear to $earD -h$ did not the /epublic e%propriate this land of Castellvi in 14C4 when, according to the /epublic itself, it e%propriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a #et air baseD It "ight really ha*e )een the intention of the %ep#)lic to e5propriate the lands in 6#estion at so"e f#t#re ti"e, )#t certainly "ere notice "#ch less an i"plied notice of s#ch intention on the part of the %ep#)lic to e5propriate the lands in the f#t#re did not, and co#ld not, )ind the landowner, nor )ind the land itself. $he e5propriation "#st )e act#ally co""enced in co#rt. T;92*, the entry into the property sho#ld )e #nder warrant or color of legal a#thority. $his circ#"stance in the /ta:ing/ "ay )e considered as present in the instant case, )eca#se the %ep#)lic entered the astell*i property as lessee. F+120;, the property "#st )e de*oted to a p#)lic #se or otherwise infor"ally appropriated or in-#rio#sly affected. It "ay )e conceded that the circ#"stance of the property )eing de*oted to p#)lic #se is present )eca#se the property was #sed )y the air force of the A(0. F9<0;, the #tili&ation of the property for p#)lic #se "#st )e in s#ch a way as to o#st the owner and depri*e hi" of all )eneficial en-oy"ent of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the %ep#)lic into the property and its #tili&ation of the sa"e for p#)lic #se did not o#st astell*i and depri*e her of all )eneficial en-oy"ent of the property. astell*i re"ained as owner, and was contin#o#sly recogni&ed as owner )y the %ep#)lic, as shown )y the renewal of the lease contract fro" year to year, and )y the pro*ision in the lease contract where)y the %ep#)lic #ndertoo: to ret#rn the property to astell*i when the lease was ter"inated. 3either was astell*i depri*ed of all the )eneficial en-oy"ent of the property, )eca#se the %ep#)lic was )o#nd to pay, and had )een paying, astell*i the agreed "onthly rentals #ntil the ti"e when it filed the co"plaint for e"inent do"ain on H#ne 2+, 1979. It is clear, therefore, that the /ta:ing/ of astell*iIs property for p#rposes of e"inent do"ain cannot )e considered to ha*e ta:en place in 19B7 when the %ep#)lic co""enced to occ#py the property as lessee thereof. 8e find "erit in the contention of astell*i that two essential ele"ents in the /ta:ing/ of property #nder the power of e"inent do"ain, na"ely2 @1A that the entrance and occ#pation )y the conde"nor "#st )e for a per"anent, or indefinite period, and @2A that in de*oting the property to p#)lic #se the owner was o#sted fro" the property and depri*ed of its )eneficial #se, were not present when the %ep#)lic entered and occ#pied the astell*i property in 19B7. Jntena)le also is the %ep#)licIs contention that altho#gh the contract )etween the parties was one of lease on a year to year )asis, it was /in reality a "ore or less per"anent right to occ#py the pre"ises #nder the g#ise of lease with the Iright and pri*ilegeI to )#y the property sho#ld the lessor wish to ter"inate the lease,/ and /the right to )#y the property is "erged as an integral part of the lease relationship . . . so "#ch so that the fair "ar:et *al#e has )een agreed #pon, not as of the ti"e of p#rchase, )#t as of the ti"e of occ#pancy/. 17 8e cannot accept the %ep#)licIs contention that a lease on a year to year )asis can gi*e rise to a per"anent right to occ#py, since )y e5press legal pro*ision a lease "ade for a deter"inate ti"e, as was the lease of astell*iIs land in the instant case, ceases #pon the day fi5ed, witho#t need of a de"and @Article 1++9, i*il odeA. 3either can it )e said that the right of e"inent do"ain "ay )e e5ercised )y si"ply leasing the pre"ises to )e e5propriated @%#le +7, !ection 1, %#les of o#rtA. 3or can it )e accepted that the %ep#)lic wo#ld enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to )#y, or why the %ep#)lic sho#ld enter into a si"#lated contract of lease @/#nder San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 30 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the g#ise of lease/, as e5pressed )y co#nsel for the %ep#)licA when all the ti"e the %ep#)lic had the right of e"inent do"ain, and co#ld e5propriate astell*iIs land if it wanted to witho#t resorting to any g#ise whatsoe*er. 3either can we see how a right to )#y co#ld )e "erged in a contract of lease in the a)sence of any agree"ent )etween the parties to that effect. $o s#stain the contention of the %ep#)lic is to sanction a practice where)y in order to sec#re a low price for a land which the go*ern"ent intends to e5propriate @or wo#ld e*ent#ally e5propriateA it wo#ld first negotiate with the owner of the land to lease the land @for say ten or twenty yearsA then e5propriate the sa"e when the lease is a)o#t to ter"inate, then clai" that the /ta:ing/ of the property for the p#rposes of the e5propriation )e rec:oned as of the date when the ,o*ern"ent started to occ#py the property #nder the lease, and then assert that the *al#e of the property )eing e5propriated )e rec:oned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the fact that the *al#e of the property, for "any good reasons, had in the "eanti"e increased d#ring the period of the lease. $his wo#ld )e sanctioning what o)*io#sly is a decepti*e sche"e, which wo#ld ha*e the effect of depri*ing the owner of the property of its tr#e and fair "ar:et *al#e at the ti"e when the e5propriation proceedings were act#ally instit#ted in co#rt. $he %ep#)licIs clai" that it had the /right and pri*ilege/ to )#y the property at the *al#e that it had at the ti"e when it first occ#pied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. 8hat was agreed e5pressly in paragraph 3o. 7 of the lease agree"ent was that, sho#ld the lessor re6#ire the lessee to ret#rn the pre"ises in the sa"e condition as at the ti"e the sa"e was first occ#pied )y the A(0, the lessee wo#ld ha*e the /right and pri*ilege/ @or optionA of paying the lessor what it wo#ld fairly cost to p#t the pre"ises in the sa"e condition as it was at the co""ence"ent of the lease, in lie# of the lesseeIs perfor"ance of the #nderta:ing to p#t the land in said condition. $he /fair *al#e/ at the ti"e of occ#pancy, "entioned in the lease agree"ent, does not refer to the *al#e of the property if )o#ght )y the lessee, )#t refers to the cost of restoring the property in the sa"e condition as of the ti"e when the lessee too: possession of the property. !#ch fair *al#e cannot refer to the p#rchase price, for p#rchase was ne*er intended )y the parties to the lease contract. It is a r#le in the interpretation of contracts that /1owe*er general the ter"s of a contract "ay )e, they shall not )e #nderstood to co"prehend things that are distinct and cases that are different fro" those #pon which the parties intended to agree/ @Art. 1472, i*il odeA. @A n#")er of circ#"stances "#st )e present in the =ta:ing> of property for p#rposes of e"inent do"ain. F92(0, the e%propriator must enter a private propert$. S)/+,*, the entrance into private propert$ must be for more than a momentar$ period. T;92*, the entr$ into the propert$ should be under warrant or color of legal authorit$. F+120; , the propert$ must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informall$ appropriated or in#uriousl$ affected. F9<0; , the utiliEation of the propert$ for public use must be in such a wa$ as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial en#o$ment of the propert$ . ;t is clear, therefore, that the -ta<ing- of ,astellviFs property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have ta<en place in %("4 when the .epublic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. 8e find "erit in the contention of astell*i that two essential elements in the taking of propert$ under the power of eminent domain, namel$? +1, that the entrance and occupation b$ the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and +2, that in devoting the propert$ to public use the owner was ousted from the propert$ and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the /epublic entered and occupied the Castellvi propert$ in 14C5. Jnder !ection B of %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt, the =-#st co"pensation> is to )e deter"ined as of the date of the filing of the co"plaint. This Court has ruled that when the ta<ing of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or ta<es place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the #ust compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the .epublic was placed in possession of the ,astellvi property, by authority of the court, on %3 /ugust %(5(. The =ta<ing0 of the ,astellvi property for the purposes of determining the *ust compensation to be paid must, therefore, be rec<oned as of &B 8une %(5( when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.) AD9A'8.) >. C1),/' GR N+. 2%400, A1A1(0 15, 1974 F'/0(" <ictoria A"iga)le, is the registered owner of a lot in e)# ity. 8itho#t prior e5propriation or negotiated sale, the go*ern"ent #sed a portion of said lot for the constr#ction of the Mango and ,orordo A*en#es. A"iga)leIs co#nsel wrote to the 0resident of the 0hilippines, re6#esting pay"ent of theportion of her lot which had )een appropriated )y the go*ern"ent. $he clai" was indorsed tothe A#ditor ,eneral, who disallowed it in his 9th .ndorse"ent. $h#s, A"iga)le filed in theco#rt a 6#o a co"plaint, against the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and 3icolas #enca@o""issioner of 0#)lic 1ighwaysA for the reco*ery of ownership and possession of her lot. 'n H#ly 29, 1979, the co#rt rendered its decision holding that it had no -#risdiction o*er the plaintiffIs ca#se of action for the reco*ery of possession and ownership of the lot on the gro#nd that the go*ern"ent cannot )e s#ed witho#t its consent, that it had neither original nor appellate -#risdiction to hear and decide plaintiffIs clai" for co"pensatory da"ages, )eing a "oney clai" against the go*ern"entG and that it had long prescri)ed, nor did it ha*e -#risdiction o*er said clai" )eca#se the go*ern"ent had not gi*en its consent to )e s#ed. Accordingly, the co"plaint was dis"issed. I((1)" an the appellant s#e the go*ern"entC R1.9,A" Des. onsidering that no annotation in fa*or of the go*ern"ent appears at the )ac: of her certificate of title and that she has not e5ec#ted any deed of con*eyance of any portion of her lot to the go*ern"ent, the appellant re"ains the owner of the whole lot. /s registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available isfor the government to ma<e due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the ta<ing. As regards the clai" for da"ages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the for" of legal interest on the price of the land fro" the ti"e it was ta:en #p to the ti"e that pay"ent is "ade )y the go*ern"ent. In addition, the go*ern"ent sho#ld pay for attorneyIs fees, the a"o#nt of which sho#ld )e fi5ed )y the trial co#rt after hearing. @3'$.2 $he owner does not need to file the #s#al clai" for reco*ery of -#st co"pensation with the o""ission on A#dit if the go*ern"ent ta:es o*er his property and de*otes it to p#)lic #se witho#t the )enefit of e5propriation. 1e "ay i""ediatetly file a co"plaint with the proper co#rt for pay"ent of his property as the ar)itrary action of the go*ern"ent shall )e dee"ed a waiver of its i""#nity fro" s#it.A r#&, pg. 7BA P;9.9EE9,) P2)(( I,(09010) >(. COMELEC GR N+. 119%94, M': 22, 1995 F'/0(" $he 0hilippine 0ress Instit#te, Inc. @/00I/A is )efore this o#rt assailing the constit#tional *alidity of resol#tion 3o. 2772 iss#ed )y respondent o""ission on .lections @/o"elec/A and its corresponding o"elec directi*e dated 22 March 1997, thro#gh a 0etition for ertiorari and 0rohi)ition. 0etitioner 00I is a non9stoc:, non9profit organi&ation of news paper and "aga&ine p#)lishers. 'n 2 March 1997, o"elec pro"#lgated %esol#tion 3o. 2772, pro*iding for a o"elec !pace, which is a free print space of not less than one half @1R2A page in at least one newspaper of general circ#lation in e*ery pro*ince or city. In this 0etition for ertiorari and 0rohi)ition with prayer for the iss#ance of a $e"porary restraining order, 00I as:s #s to declare o"elec resol#tion 3o. 2772 #nconstit#tional and *oid on the gro#nd that it *iolates the prohi)ition i"posed )y the onstit#tion #pon the go*ern"ent, and any of its agencies, against the ta:ing of pri*ate property for p#)lic #se witho#t -#st co"pensation. I((1)" May 'M.L. co"pel the "e")ers of print "edia to donate =o"elec !pace>C H).*" 3'. $o co"pel print "edia co"panies to donate /o"elec space/ a"o#nts to /ta:ing/ of pri*ate personal property for p#)lic #se or p#rposes. $he ta:ing of print space here so#ght to )e effected "ay first )e appraised #nder the p#)lic of e5propriation of pri*ate personal property for p#)lic #se. The threshold requisites for a lawful ta<ing of private property for public use need to be examined here+ one is the necessity for the ta<ingJ another is the legal authority to effect the ta<ing. The element of necessity for the ta<ing has not been shown by respondent ,omelec. It has not )een s#ggested that the "e")ers of 00I are #nwilling to sell print space at their nor"al rates to o"elec for election p#rposes. Indeed, the #nwillingness or rel#ctance of o"elec to )#y print space lies at the heart of the pro)le". !i"ilarly, it has not )een s#ggested, let alone de"onstrated, that o"elec has )een granted the power of i""inent do"ain either )y the onstit#tion or )y the legislati*e a#thority. A reasona)le relationship )etween that power and the enforce"ent and ad"inistration of election laws )y o"elec "#st )e shownG it is not cas#ally to )e ass#"ed. $he ta:ing of pri*ate property for p#)lic #se it, of co#rse, a#thori&ed )y the onstit#tion, )#t not witho#t pay"ent of /-#st co"pensation/ @Article III, !ection 9A. And apparently the necessity of paying co"pensation for /o"elec space/ is precisely what is so#ght to )e a*oided )y respondent o""ission. $here is nothing at all to pre*ent newspaper and "aga&ine p#)lishers fro" *ol#ntarily gi*ing free print space to o"elec for the p#rposes conte"plated in %esol#tion 3o. 2772. !ection 2 of resol#tion 3o. 2772 does not, howe*er, pro*ide a constit#tional )asis for co"pelling p#)lishers, against their will, in the :ind of fact#al conte5t here present, to pro*ide free print space for o"elec p#rposes. !ection 2 does not constit#te a *alid e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain. As earlier noted, the "olicitor Aeneral also contended that "ection 2 of /esolution Fo. 2552, even if read as compelling publishers to donate Comelec space, ma$ be sustained as a valid e%ercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casuall$ to re.uire prolonged consideration on their part. >irstly, there was no effort 'and apparently no inclination on the part of ,omelec) to show that the police power : essentially a power of legislation : has been constitutionally delegated to respondent ,ommission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly ta<en in the legitimate San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 31 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful ta<ing under the police power. "ection 2 of /esolution Fo. 2552 is a blunt and heav$ instrument that purports, without a showing of e%istence of a national emergenc$ or other imperious public necessit$, indiscriminatel$ and without regard the the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magaEines located in different parts of the countr$, to take private propert$ of newspaper or magaEine publishers. 2o attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the ta<ing of print space confronted the ,omelec and that Section & of .esolution 2o. &44& was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to ,omelec. Section & does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State. S1D1.+,A >. G1)22)2+ GR 48%85, S)E0 30,1987 F'/0(" 'n Dece")er 7,1977, the 3ational 1o#sing A#thority @31AA filed a co"plaint for e5propriation of parcels of land co*ering appro5i"ately 27 hectares, @in Antipolo %i&alA incl#ding the lots of Loren&o !#"#long and ."ilia <idanes9Balaoing with an area of +,++7 s6#are "eters and 4,444 s6#are "eters respecti*ely. $he land so#ght to )e e5propriated were *al#ed )y the 31A at 01.?? per s6#are "eter adopting the "ar:et *al#e fi5ed )y the pro*incial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescri)ing the *al#ation of property in e5propriation proceedings. $ogether with the co"plaint was a "otion for i""ediate possession of the properties. $he 31A deposited the a"o#nt of 0178,98?.?? with the 0hilippine 3ational Ban:, representing the =total "ar:et *al#e> of the s#)-ect 27 hectares of land, p#rs#ant to 0residential Decree 122B which defines =the policy on the e5propriation of pri*ate property for sociali&ed ho#sing #pon pay"ent of -#st co"pensation.> 'n 17 Han#ary 1978, H#dge B#ena*ent#ra ,#errero iss#ed the order iss#ing a writ of possession in fa*or of 31A. !#"#long and <idanes9Balaoing filed a "otion for reconsideration on the gro#nd that they had )een depri*ed of the possession of their property witho#t d#e process of law. $his was, howe*er, denied. $hey filed a petition for certiorari with the !#pre"e o#rt. I((1)" 8hether the ta:ing of pri*ate property for =sociali&ed ho#sing,> which wo#ld )enefit a few and not all citi&ens, constit#tes ta:ing for =p#)lic #se.> H).*" Des. $he e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain is s#)-ect to certain li"itations i"posed )y the constit#tion @1974A, i.e. that pri*ate property shall not )e ta:en for p#)lic #se witho#t -#st co"pensation> @Art. I<, sec. 9AG and that no person shall )e depri*ed of life, li)erty, or property witho#t d#e process of law, nor shall any person )e denied the e6#al protection of the laws> @Art. I<, sec. 1A. The term =public use0 has ac.uired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signif$ing strict use or emplo$ment b$ the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. "pecificall$, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low7cost housing is recogniEed as a public purpose, not onl$ because of the e%panded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 145; Constitution made it incumbent upon the "tate to establish, maintain and ensure ade.uate social services including housing OArt. II, sec. 7P. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. $he p#)lic character of ho#sing "eas#res does not change )eca#se #nits in ho#sing pro-ects cannot )e occ#pied )y all )#t only )y those who satisfy prescri)ed 6#alifications. A )eginning has to )e "ade, for it is not possi)le to pro*ide ho#sing for all who need it, all at once. =!ociali&ed ho#sing> falls within the confines of =p#)lic #se>. <ario#s factors can co"e into play in the *al#ation of specific properties singled o#t for e5propriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. ;ndividual differences are never ta<en into account. $he *al#e of land is )ased on s#ch generalities as its possi)le c#lti*ation for rice, corn, cocon#ts, or other crops. <ery often land descri)ed as /cogonal/ has )een c#lti*ated for generations. B#ildings are descri)ed in ter"s of only two or three classes of )#ilding "aterials and esti"ates of areas are "ore often inacc#rate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for *ust compensation. To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. $he o*erwhel"ing "ass of landowners accept #n6#estioningly what is fo#nd in the ta5 declarations prepared )y local assessors or "#nicipal cler:s for the". $hey do not e*en loo: at, "#ch less analy&e, the state"ents. $he idea of e5propriation si"ply ne*er occ#rs #ntil a de"and is "ade or a case filed )y an agency a#thori&ed to do so. M',+(/' >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.( G.R. N+. 10%440 , 29 !',1'2: 199% F'/0(" 0etitioners inherited a piece of land which was later declared as national land"ar: d#e to )eing ascertained )y 3ational 1istoric Instit#te @31IA as the )irthplace of (eli5 D. Manalo, the fo#nder of Iglesia ni risto. 'n the opinion of !ecretary of H#stice, he said that the place "#st )e s#)-ected to the power of e"inent do"ain since places in*ested with #n#s#al historical interest is a p#)lic #se which s#ch power "ay )e a#thori&ed. $h#s, %ep#)lic, thro#gh the office of !olicitor ,eneral instit#ted a co"plaint for e5propriation and filed an #rgent "otion for the iss#ance for an order to per"it it to ta:e i""ediate possession of the property. $he trial co#rt iss#ed an order a#thori&ing %ep#)lic to ta:e o*er the property once the re6#ired s#" wo#ld ha*e )een deposited with the M#nicipal $reas#rer of $ag#ig, Metro Manila. The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint since such e%propriation would constituted an application of funds directl$ or indirectl$ for the use, benefit, or support of 'glesia ni Cristo, which is contrar$ to the provision of "ection 24 +2, Article G' of the 1485 Constitution. I((1)" 8hether or not the =p#)lic #se> re6#ire"ent of ."inent Do"ain is e5tant in the atte"pted e5propriation )y the %ep#)lic of a B929s6#are9 "eter parcel of land as declared )y the 31I as a national land"ar:C H).*" Des.According to H#stice Blac:, ter" =public use0 "eans one which confers benefit or advantage to the public and it is not confined to actual use by public. ;t may also be said to mean public usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. $he ter" /p#)lic #se,/ not ha*ing )een otherwise defined )y the constit#tion, "#st )e considered in its general concept of "eeting a p#)lic need or a p#)lic e5igency. 1+ Blac: s#""ari&es the characteri&ation gi*en )y *ario#s co#rts to the ter"G th#s2 0#)lic Jse. ."inent do"ain. $he constit#tional and stat#tory )asis for ta:ing property )y e"inent do"ain. (or conde"nation p#rposes, /p#)lic #se/ is one which confers sa"e )enefit or ad*antage to the p#)licG it is not confined to act#al #se )y p#)lic. It is "eas#red in ter"s of right of p#)lic to #se proposed facilities for which conde"nation is so#ght and, as long as p#)lic has right of #se, whether e5ercised )y one or "any "e")ers of p#)lic, a /p#)lic ad*antage/ or /p#)lic )enefit/ accr#es s#fficient to constit#te a p#)lic #se. Montana 0ower o. *s. Bo:"a, Mont. B77 0. 2d 7+9, 772, 774. 0#)lic #se, in constit#tional pro*isions restricting the e5ercise of the right to ta:e pri*ate property in *irt#e of e"inent do"ain, "eans a #se concerning the whole co""#nity as disting#ished fro" partic#lar indi*id#als. B#t each and e*ery "e")er of society need not )e e6#ally interested in s#ch #se, or )e personally and directly affected )y itG if the o)-ect is to satisfy a great p#)lic want or e5igency, that is s#fficient. %indge o. *s. Los Angeles o#nty, 2+2 J.!. 7??, B4 !.t. +89, +92, +7 L..d. 118+. $he ter" "ay )e said to "ean p#)lic #sef#lness, #tility, or ad*antage, or what is prod#cti*e of general )enefit. It "ay )e li"ited to the inha)itants of a s"all or restricted locality, )#t "#st )e in co""on, and not for a partic#lar indi*id#al. $he #se "#st )e a needf#l one for the p#)lic, which cannot )e s#rrendered witho#t o)*io#s general loss and incon*enience. A /p#)lic #se/ for which land "ay )e ta:en defies a)sol#te definition for it changes with *arying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and f#nctions of go*ern"ent, and other differing circ#"stances )ro#ght a)o#t )y an increase in pop#lation and new "odes of co""#nication and transportation. Lat& *. Brandon, 17+ onn., 721, 2B7 A.2d 779,78+. 17 $he *alidity of the e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain for traditional p#rposes is )eyond 6#estionG it is not at all to )e said, howe*er, that p#)lic #se sho#ld there)y )e restricted to s#ch traditional #ses. $he idea that /p#)lic #se/ is strictly li"ited to clear cases of /#se )y the p#)lic/ has long )een discarded. $he ta:ing to )e *alid "#st )e for p#)lic #se. $here was a ti"e when it was felt that a literal "eaning sho#ld )e attached to s#ch a re6#ire"ent. 8hate*er pro-ect is #nderta:en "#st )e for the p#)lic to en-oy, as in the case of streets or par:s. 'therwise, e5propriation is not allowa)le. It is not so any "ore. As long as the p#rpose of the ta:ing is p#)lic, then the power of e"inent do"ain co"es into play. As -#st noted, the constit#tion in at least two cases, to re"o*e any do#)t, deter"ines what is p#)lic #se. 'ne is the e5propriation of lands to )e s#)di*ided into s"all lots for resale at cost to indi*id#als. $he other is the transfer, thro#gh the e5ercise of this power, of #tilities and other pri*ate enterprise to the go*ern"ent. It is acc#rate to state then that at present whate*er "ay )e )eneficially e"ployed for the general welfare satisfies the re6#ire"ent of p#)lic #se. hief H#stice (ernando, writing the ponencia in H.M. $#ason Y o. *s. Land $en#re Ad"inistration, has *iewed the onstit#tion a dyna"ic instr#"ent and one that /is not to )e constr#ed narrowly or pedantically/ so as to ena)le it /to "eet ade6#ately whate*er pro)le"s the f#t#re has in store./ (r. Hoa6#in Bernas, a noted constit#tionalist hi"self, has aptly o)ser*ed that what, in fact, has #lti"ately e"erged is a concept of p#)lic #se which is -#st as )road as /p#)lic welfare./ 0etitioners as:2 B#t /@wAhat is the so9called #n#s#al interest that the e5propriation of @(eli5 ManaloIsA )irthplace )eco"e so *ital as to )e a p#)lic #se appropriate for the e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain/ when only "e")ers of the Iglesia ni risto wo#ld )enefitC $his atte"pt to gi*e so"e religio#s perspecti*e to the case deser*es little consideration, for what sho#ld )e significant is the principal o)-ecti*e of, not the cas#al conse6#ences that "ight follow fro", the e5ercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the mar<er is essentially to San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 32 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 recognie the distinctive contribution of the late >elix Danalo to the culture of the #hilippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the ;glesia ni ,risto. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the ;glesia ni ,risto than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. ;ndeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. EP$A >(. D1.': G.R. N+. L59%09, 29 AE29. 1987 F'/0(" A certain parcel of land was reser*ed )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines for petitioner .5port 0rocessing Xone A#thority @.0XAA for the esta)lish"ent of an e5port processing &one. 1owe*er, not all of the reser*ed area was p#)lic land. $he petitioner "ade an offer to p#rchase the lands registered in the na"e of the pri*ate respondent, )#t, the parties failed to ha*e an agree"ent on the sale of the property. $h#s, the petitioner filed a co"plaint for e5propriation with a prayer for the iss#ance of a writ of possession against pri*ate respondent on the o#rt of (irst Instance of e)#. $he respondent -#dge fa*ored the petition and iss#ed a writ of possession a#thori&ing the petitioner to ta:e into possession the said property. 1a*ing deter"ined the -#st co"pensation as only the iss#e to )e resol*ed, the respondent -#dge iss#ed an order regarding the appoint"ent of certain persons as co""issioners who are tas:ed to report to the co#rt the -#st co"pensation for the properties so#ght to )e e5propriated. onse6#ently, co""issioners were appointed and, afterwards, reco""ended in their report that the a"o#nt of 017.?? per s6#are "eter as the fair and reasona)le *al#e of -#st co"pensation for the properties. !#)se6#ently, petitioners o)-ected to the said order on the gro#nds that 0.D. 3o. 1744 has s#perseded !ection 7 to 8 of %#le +7 of the %#les of co#rt on the ascertain"ent of -#st co"pensation thro#gh co""issioners. I((1)" 8hether or not !ections 7 to 8, %#le +7 of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt had )een repealed or dee"ed a"ended )y 0.D. 3o. 1744 insofar as the appoint"ent of co""issioners to deter"ine the -#st co"pensation is concerned. H).*" $he !#pre"e o#rt r#led that the 0.D. 3o. 1744, which eli"inates the co#rtKs discretion to appoint co""issioners p#rs#ant to %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt, is #nconstit#tional and *oid, since constit#tes an i"per"issi)le encroach"ent on -#dicial prerogati*es. $he deter"ination of /-#st co"pensation/ in e"inent do"ain cases is a -#dicial f#nction. $he e5ec#ti*e depart"ent or the legislat#re "ay "a:e the initial deter"inations )#t when a party clai"s a *iolation of the g#arantee in the Bill of %ights that pri*ate property "ay not )e ta:en for p#)lic #se witho#t -#st co"pensation, no stat#te, decree, or e5ec#ti*e order can "andate that its own deter"ination shag pre*ail o*er the co#rtIs findings. M#ch less can the co#rts )e M1,9/9E'.90: +< P'2'L'M1) >(. V.M. R)'.0: C+2E+2'09+, G.R. N+. 127820, 20 !1.: 1998 F'/0(" A co"plaint for e5propriation was filed )y the M#nicipality of 0araNa6#e against <.M. %ealty orporation in*ol*ing two parcels of land located at 0araNa6#e, Metro Manila. $he co"plaint was in p#rs#ant to !angg#niang Bayan %esol#tion 3o. 94997, !eries of 1994. $he co"plaint was for the p#rpose of alle*iateing the li*ing conditions of the #nderpri*ileged )y pro*iding ho"es for the ho"eless thro#gh a sociali&ed ho#sing pro-ect. 0re*io#sly, an offer for the sale of the property was "ade )y the petitioner, howe*er, the latter did not accept. $he %egional $rial o#rt of Ma:ati iss#ed order a#thori&ing the petitioner to ta:e possession of the s#)-ect property #pon deposit to the ler: of o#rt of an a"o#nt e6#i*alent to 17 percent of its fair "ar:et *al#e )ase on its c#rrent ta5 declaration. 1owe*er, #pon the pri*ate respondentKs "otion to dis"iss, the trial co#rt n#llified its pre*io#s order and dis"issed the case. $h#s, petitioner appealed to the o#rt of Appeals. B#t the appellate co#rt affir"ed in toto the trial co#rtKs decision. I((1)" 8hether or not the e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain is *alid. H).*"The following essential requisites must concur before an L9C can exercise the power of eminent domain+ '%) /n ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authoriing the local chief executive, in behalf of the L9C, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.' &) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.' $) There is payment of *ust compensation, as required under Section (, /rticle ;;; of the ,onstitution, and other pertinent laws.' ") / valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. $he !#pre"e o#rt r#led that there was no co"pliance with the first re6#isite since the "ayor so#ght to e5ercise the power of e"inent do"ain p#rs#ant to a resol#tion only. 'rdinance is not synony"o#s to resol#tion. An ordinance is a law, possesses a general or per"anent character, and "a:es third reading for its enact"ent necessary. 'n the other hand, a resol#tion is "erely a declaration of the senti"ent or opinion of a law"a:ing )ody on a specific "atter, te"porary in nat#re and its enact"ent re6#ired only the decision of "a-ority of all the !angg#nian "e")ers POWER OF TAXATION P'(/1'. >(. S)/2)0'2: +< P18.9/ =+2G( ',* C+DD1,9/'09+,( G.R. N+. L10405, 29 D)/)D8)2 19%0 F'/0(" 'n A#g#st 41, 197B, petitioner 8enceslao 0asc#al, as 0ro*incial ,o*ernor of %i&al, instit#ted this action for declaratory relief, with in-#nction, #pon the gro#nd that %ep#)lic Act 3o. 92?, entitled /An Act Appropriating (#nds for 0#)lic 8or:s/, appro*ed on H#ne 2?, 1974, contained, in section 19 @aA thereof, an ite" @B4OhPA of 087,???.?? for the construction, reconstruction, repair, e%tension and improvement of 6asig feeder road terminals, that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the said feeder roads were nothing but pro#ected and planned subdivision roads within the Antonio "ubdivision situated at 6asig, /iEal near !haw Bo#le*ard, not far away fro" the intersection )etween the latter and .D!A, which pro#ected feeder roads do not connect an$ government propert$ or an$ important premises to the main highwa$) that the aforementioned Antonio "ubdivision +as well as the lands on which said feeder roads were to be construed, were private properties of respondent >ose C. Hulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the "enate of the 6hilippines) that on 0a$, 14I;, respondent Hulueta, addressed a letter to the 0unicipal Council of 6asig, /iEal, offering to donate said pro#ected feeder roads to the municipalit$ of 6asig, /iEal) that, on >une 1;, 14I;, the offer was accepted b$ the council, sub#ect to the condition that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them) that no deed of donation in favor of the municipalit$ of 6asig was, however, e%ecuted) that on >ul$ 10, 14I;, respondent Hulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of /epublic Act. Fo. 420, and the sum of 68I,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the pro#ected feeder roads in .uestion) that the municipal council of #asig endorsed said letter of respondent Kulueta to the 7istrict 6ngineer of .ial, who, up to the present -has not made any endorsement thereon- that inasmuch as the pro*ected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of .epublic /ct 2o. (&3, the appropriation of #!5,333.33 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said pro*ected feeder roads, was illegal and, therefore, void ab initio -J that said appropriation of #!5,333.33 was made by ,ongress because its members were made to believe that the pro*ected feeder roads in question were -public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision-FJ that, -in order to give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation-, respondents Kulueta executed on 7ecember %&, %(5$, while he was a member of the Senate of the #hilippines, an alleged deed of donation of the four '") parcels of land constituting said pro*ected feeder roads, in favor of the 9overnment of the .epublic of the #hilippinesJ that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then 6xecutive SecretaryJ that being sub*ect to an onerous condition, said donation partoo< of the nature of a contractJ that, such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of ,ongress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the 9overnment, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio , for the construction of the pro*ected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Kulueta, I((1)" 8hether the contested ite" of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 92? #nconstit#tional and, therefor, illegalC H).*" 3o. $he 087,???.?? appropriation for the pro-ected feeder roads in 6#estion, the legality thereof depended #pon whether said roads were p#)lic or pri*ate property when the )ill, which, latter on, )eca"e %ep#)lic Act 92?, was passed )y ongress, or, when said )ill was appro*ed )y the 0resident and the dis)#rse"ent of said s#" )eca"e effecti*e, or on H#ne 2?, 1974 @see section 14 of said ActA. Inas"#ch as the land on which the pro-ected feeder roads were to )e constr#cted )elonged then to respondent X#l#eta, the res#lt is that said appropriation so#ght a pri*ate p#rpose, and hence, was n#ll and *oid. $he donation to the ,o*ern"ent, o*er fi*e @7A "onths after the appro*al and effecti*ity of said Act, "ade, according to the petition, for the p#rpose of gi*ing a /se")lance of legality/, or legali&ing, the appropriation in 6#estion, did not c#re its afore"entioned )asic defect. onse6#ently, a San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 33 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 -#dicial n#llification of said donation need not precede the declaration of #nconstit#tionality of said appropriation. Again, it is well9stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct in*ury in consequence of its enforcement. @et, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that -the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,- which may be en*oined at the request of a taxpayer.
%ep#)lic Act 3o. 92? is #nconstit#tional, since the legislat#re is witho#t power to appropriate p#)lic re*en#e for anything )#t a p#)lic p#rpose and the pro-ect feeder roads are at the ti"e pri*ate properties. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public purpose. P1,('.', >(. M1,9/9E'. &+'2* +< 0;) C90: +< M',9.' G.R. N+. L4817, 2% M': 1954 F'/0(" An ordinance was appro*ed )y the M#nicipal Board of the ity of Manila which i"poses a "#nicipal occ#pation ta5 on persons e5ercising *ario#s professions in the city and penali&es non9pay"ent of the ta5 )y a fine of not "ore than two h#ndred pesos or )y i"prison"ent of not "ore than si5 "onths or )y )oth s#ch fine and i"prison"ent in the discretion of the co#rt. The ordinance was in pursuance to paragraph +1, "ection 18 of the /evised Charter of the Cit$ of 0anila which empowers the 0unicipal 9oard of said cit$ to impose a municipal occupation ta%, not to e%ceed 6I0 per annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above referred to the plaintiffs, after having paid their occupation ta%, now being re.uired to pa$ the additional ta% prescribed in the ordinance. $he plaintiffs paid the said ta5 #nder protest. $he lower co#rt declared the *alidity of the law '10;+29F9,A 0;) ),'/0D),0 of the +2*9,',/), )#t declared the latter illegal and *oid since its penalty pro*ided for the non9 pay"ent of ta5 was not legally a#thori&ed. I((1)" Is this ordinance and the law a#thori&ing it constit#te class legislation, are #n-#st and oppressi*e, and a#thori&e what a"o#nts to do#)le ta5ationC H).*" 3'. $o )egin with defendantsI appeal, we find that the lower co#rt was in error in saying that the i"position of the penalty pro*ided for in the ordinance was witho#t the a#thority of law. The last paragraph + kk , of the ver$ section that authoriEes the enactment of this ta% ordinance +section 18 of the 0anila Charter, in e%press terms also empowers the 0unicipal 9oard to fi% penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not e%ceed to+sic, two hundred pesos fine or si% months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense. 1ence, the prono#nce"ent )elow that the ordinance in 6#estion is illegal and *oid )eca#se it i"poses a penalty not a#thori&ed )y law is clearly witho#t )asis. "econdl$, 'n raising the hue and cr$ of class legislation, the )#rden of plaintiffsI co"plaint is not that the professions to which they respecti*ely )elong ha*e )een singled o#t for the i"position of this "#nicipal occ#pation ta5G and in any e*ent, the Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. @ooley on $a5ation, <ol. B, Bth ed., pp. 449494497.A 0laintiffsI co"plaint is that while the law has a#thori&ed the ity of Manila to i"pose the said ta5, it has withheld that a#thority fro" other chartered cities, not to "ention "#nicipalities. We do not thin< it is for the courts to *udge what particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes in addition to those imposed by the 2ational 9overnment. That matter is peculiarly within the domain of the political departments and the courts would do well not to encroach upon it. Doreover, as the seat of the 2ational 9overnment and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other #hilippine city or municipality, Danila, no doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the professionals in Danila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces. $hirdly, 0laintiffs )rand the ordinance #n-#st and oppressi*e )eca#se they say that it creates discri"ination within a class in that while professionals with offices in Manila ha*e to pay the ta5, o#tsiders who ha*e no offices in the city )#t practice their profession therein are not s#)-ect to the ta5. 0laintiffs "a:e a distinction that is not fo#nd in the ordinance. $he ordinance i"poses the ta5 #pon e*ery person /e5ercising/ or /p#rs#ing/ E in the ity of Manila nat#rally E any one of the occ#pations na"ed, )#t does not say that s#ch person "#st ha*e his office in Manila. -hat constitutes e%ercise or pursuit of a profession in the cit$ is a matter of #udicial determination. The argument against double ta%ation ma$ not be invoked where one ta% is imposed b$ the state and the other is imposed b$ the cit$ +1 Coole$ on Ta%ation, Cth ed., p. C42,, it being widely recognied that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. L.'*+/ >. C+DD9((9+,)2 +< I,0)2,'. R)>),1) GR L19201, 1% !1,) 19%5 F'/0(" In 1977, the MB .state Inc., of Bacolod ity, donated 01?,???.?? in cash to (r. rispin %#i& then parish priest of <ictorias, 3egros 'ccidental, and predecessor of (r. asi"iro Lladoc, for the constr#ction of a new atholic h#rch in the locality. $he total sa"o#nt was act#ally spent for the p#rpose intended. 'n 4 March 1978, MB .state filed the donorKs gift ta5 ret#rn. Jnder date of 29 April 19+?, the o""issioner of Internal %e*en#e iss#ed as assess"ent for doneeKs gift ta5 against the atholic 0arish of <ictorias, 3egros 'ccidental, of which petitioner was the priest. $he ta5 a"o#nted to 01,47?.?? incl#ding s#rcharges, interest of 1M "onthly fro" 17 May 1978 to 17 H#ne 19+?, and the co"pro"ise for the late filing of the ret#rn. 0etitioner lodged a protest to the assess"ent and re6#ested the withdrawal thereof. $he protest and the "otion for reconsideration presented to the o""issioner of Internal %e*en#e were denied. $he petitioner appealed to the $A on 2 3o*e")er 19+?. After hearing, the $A affir"ed the decision of the o""issioner of Internal %e*en#e e5cept the i"position of co"pro"ise penalty of 02?. (r. Lladoc appealed to the !#pre"e o#rt. I((1)" 8hether a doneeKs gift ta5 "ay )e assessed against the atholic h#rch. H).*" Des. $he phrase =exempt from taxation,0 as e"ployed in the onstit#tion sho#ld not )e interpreted to "ean e5e"ption fro" all :inds of ta5es. !ection 22@4A, Art. <I of the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, e5e"pts fro" ta5ation ce"eteries, ch#rches and personages or con*ents, app#rtenant thereto, and all lands, )#ildings, and i"pro*e"ents #sed e5cl#si*ely for religio#s p#rposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra:distinguished from excise taxes. A doneeKs gift ta5 is not a property ta5 )#t an e5cise ta5 i"posed on the transfer of property )y way of gift inter *i*os. Its assess"ent was not on the property the"esel*es. It does not rest #pon general ownership, )#t an e5cise #pon the #se "ade of the properties, #pon the e5ercise of the pri*ilege of recei*ing the properties. $he i"position of s#ch e5cise ta5 on property #sed for religio#s p#rposes does not constit#te an i"pair"ent of the onstit#tion. A82' V'..): C+..)A) >(. AM19,+ GR L3908%, 15 !1,) 1988 F'/0(" 0etitioner A)ra <alley ollege is an ed#cational corporation and instit#tion of higher learning d#ly incorporated with the !. in 19B8. 'n + H#ly 1972, the M#nicipal and 0ro*incial treas#rers @,aspar Bos6#e and Ar"in ariaga, respecti*elyA and iss#ed a 3otice of !ei&#re #pon the petitioner for the college lot and )#ilding @'$ V984A for the satisfaction of said ta5es thereon. $he treas#rers ser*ed #pon the petitioner a 3otice of !ale on 8 H#ly 1972, the sale )eing held on the sa"e day. Dr. 0aterno Millare, then "#nicipal "ayor of Bang#ed, A)ra, offered the highest )id of 0 +,??? on p#)lic a#ction in*ol*ing the sale of the college lot and )#ilding. $he certificate of sale was correspondingly iss#ed to hi". $he petitioner filed a co"plaint on 1? H#ly 1972 in the co#rt a 6#o to ann#l and declare *oid the =3otice of !ei&#re> and the =3otice of !ale> of its lot and )#ilding located at Bang#ed, A)ra, for non9pay"ent of real estate ta5es and penalties a"o#nting to 07,1B?.41. 'n 12 April 1974, the parties entered into a stip#lation of facts adopted and e")odied )y the trial co#rt in its 6#estioned decision. $he trial co#rt r#led for the go*ern"ent, holding that the second floor of the )#ilding is )eing #sed )y the director for residential p#rposes and that the gro#nd floor #sed and rented )y 3orthern Mar:eting orporation, a co""ercial esta)lish"ent, and th#s the property is not )eing #sed =e5cl#si*ely> for ed#cational p#rposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner a*ailed of the instant petition for re*iew on certiorari with prayer for preli"inary in-#nction )efore the !#pre"e o#rt, )y filing said petition on 17 A#g#st 197B. I((1)2 8hether the ollege is e5e"pt fro" ta5es. H).*" Des. 8hile the o#rt allows a "ore li)eral and non9restricti*e interpretation of the phrase =e5cl#si*ely #sed for ed#cational p#rposes,> reasona)le e"phasis has always )een "ade that e5e"ption e5tends to facilities which are incidental to and reasona)ly necessary for the acco"plish"ent of the "ain p#rposes. 8hile the second floorKs #se, as residence of the director, is incidental to ed#cationG the lease of the first floor cannot )y any stretch of i"agination )e considered incidental to the p#rposes of ed#cation. $he test of e5e"ption fro" ta5ation is the #se of the property for p#rposes "entioned in the onstitit#tion. /donis 2otes+ $he ! stated that if only the -#dge had read the 1974 onstit#tion, he sho#ld ha*e :nown the difference )etween the 1947 and the 1974 onstit#tion and he co#ld not ha*e s#""arily dis"issed the case. $here is a s#)stantial distinction )etween the 1947 and the 1974 onstit#tion. In the 1935 C+,(090109+, the re6#ire"ent for e5e"ption for real property ta5es is 2e%clusivel$3 , while the 1973 C+,(090109+, re6#ires San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 34 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 2actuall$, directl$ J e%clusivel$3. $he ! re"anded to the o#rt of 'rigin for f#rther hearing. @e5cerpts fro" !a)a)an 3otesA ART. III BILL OF RIGHTS SEC.1 DUE PROCESS OF LAW I/;+,A >(. H)2,',*)F GR L7995? 31 M': 1957 F'/0(" %ep#)lic Act 3o. 118? is entitled /An Act to %eg#late the %etail B#siness./ In effect it nationali&es the retail trade )#siness. 0etitioner attac:s the constit#tionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the e6#al protection of the laws and depri*es of their li)erty and property witho#t d#e process of law. In answer, the respondents contend that the Act was passed in the *alid e5ercise of the police power of the !tate, which e5ercise is a#thori&ed in the onstit#tion in the interest of national econo"ic s#r*i*al. I((1)" 8hether or not the enact"ent of %.A 3o. 118? is constit#tional. H).*" Des. $he disp#ted law was enacted to re"edy a real act#al threat and danger to national econo"y posed )y alien do"inance and control of the retail )#siness and free citi&ens and co#ntry fro" do"inance and controlG that the enact"ent clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the !tate, thr# which and )y which it protects its own personality and ins#res its sec#rity and f#t#reG that the law does not *iolate the e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion )eca#se s#fficient gro#nds e5ist for the distinction )etween alien and citi&en in the e5ercise of the occ#pation reg#lated, nor the d#e process of law cla#se, )eca#se the law is prospecti*e in operation and recogni&es the pri*ilege of aliens already engaged in the occ#pation and reasona)ly protects their pri*ilege. $he petition is denied. 0etitioner, for and in his own )ehalf and on )ehalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships ad*ersely affected )y the pro*isions of %ep#)lic Act. 3o. 118?, )ro#ght this action to o)tain a -#dicial declaration that said Act is #nconstit#tional, and to en-oin the !ecretary of (inance and all other persons acting #nder hi", partic#larly city and "#nicipal treas#rers, fro" enforcing its pro*isions. 6etitioner attacks the constitutionalit$ of the Act, contending that? '%) it denies to alien residents the e.ual protection of the laws and deprives of their libert$ and propert$ without due process of law ) In answer, the !olicitor9,eneral and the (iscal of the ity of Manila contend that2 @1A the Act was passed in the *alid e5ercise of the police power of the !tate, which e5ercise is a#thori&ed in the onstit#tion in the interest of national econo"ic s#r*i*alG a. The police power. L $here is no 6#estion that the Act was appro*ed in the e5ercise of the police power, )#t petitioner clai"s that its e5ercise in this instance is attended )y a *iolation of the constit#tional re6#ire"ents of d#e process and e6#al protection of the laws. B#t )efore proceeding to the consideration and resol#tion of the #lti"ate iss#e in*ol*ed, it wo#ld )e well to )ear in "ind certain )asic and f#nda"ental, al)eit preli"inary, considerations in the deter"ination of the e*er rec#rrent conflict )etween police power and the g#arantees of d#e process and e6#al protection of the laws. 8hat is the scope of police power, and how are the d#e process and e6#al protection cla#ses related to itC 8hat is the pro*ince and power of the legislat#re, and what is the f#nction and d#ty of the co#rtsC $hese consideration "#st )e clearly and correctly #nderstood that their application to the facts of the case "ay )e )ro#ght forth with clarity and the iss#e accordingly resol*ed. It has )een said the police power is so far 9 reaching in scope, that it has )eco"e al"ost i"possi)le to li"it its sweep. As it deri*es its e5istence fro" the *ery e5istence of the !tate itself, it does not need to )e e5pressed or defined in its scopeG it is said to )e co9e5tensi*e with self9 protection and s#r*i*al, and as s#ch it is the "ost positi*e and acti*e of all go*ern"ental processes, the "ost essential, insistent and illi"ita)le. .specially is it so #nder a "odern de"ocratic fra"ewor: where the de"ands of society and of nations ha*e "#ltiplied to al"ost #ni"agina)le proportionsG the field and scope of police power has )eco"e al"ost )o#ndless, -#st as the fields of p#)lic interest and p#)lic welfare ha*e )eco"e al"ost all9e")racing and ha*e transcended h#"an foresight. 'therwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and de"ands of p#)lic interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressi*e world, so we cannot deli"it )eforehand the e5tent or scope of police power )y which and thro#gh which the !tate see:s to attain or achie*e interest or welfare. !o it is that onstit#tions do not define the scope or e5tent of the police power of the !tateG what they do is to set forth the li"itations thereof. $he "ost i"portant of these are the d#e process cla#se and the e6#al protection cla#se. b. Limitations on police power. L $he )asic li"itations of d#e process and e6#al protection are fo#nd in the following pro*isions of o#r onstit#tion2 !.$I'3 1.@1A 3o person shall )e depri*ed of life, li)erty or property witho#t d#e process of law, nor any person )e denied the e6#al protection of the laws. @Article III, 0hil. onstit#tionA $hese constit#tional g#arantees which e")ody the essence of indi*id#al li)erty and freedo" in de"ocracies, are not li"ited to citi&ens alone )#t are ad"ittedly #ni*ersal in their application, witho#t regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. c. The, equal protection clause. L $he e6#al protection of the law cla#se is against #nd#e fa*or and indi*id#al or class pri*ilege, as well as hostile discri"ination or the oppression of ine6#ality. It is not intended to prohi)it legislation, which is li"ited either in the o)-ect to which it is directed or )y territory within which is to operate. It does not de"and a)sol#te e6#ality a"ong residentsG it "erely re6#ires that all persons shall )e treated ali:e, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The e.ual protection clause is not infringed b$ legislation which applies onl$ to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds e%ists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. d. The due process clause. L $he d#e process cla#se has to do with the reasona)leness of legislation enacted in p#rs#ance of the police power. Is there p#)lic interest, a p#)lic p#rposeG is p#)lic welfare in*ol*edC Is the Act reasona)ly necessary for the acco"plish"ent of the legislat#reIs p#rposeG is it not #nreasona)le, ar)itrary or oppressi*eC Is there s#fficient fo#ndation or reason in connection with the "atter in*ol*edG or has there not )een a capricio#s #se of the legislati*e powerC an the ai"s concei*ed )e achie*ed )y the "eans #sed, or is it not "erely an #n-#stified interference with pri*ate interestC $hese are the 6#estions that we as: when the d#e process test is applied. The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and e.ual protection of the laws is more apparent than real. 6roperl$ related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coe%ist. TH6 1/L/2,;29 ;S TH6 6SS62,6 or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. @et there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. "o the "tate can deprive persons of life, libert$ and propert$, provided there is due process of law) and persons ma$ be classified into classes and groups, provided ever$one is given the e.ual protection of the law. The test or standard, as alwa$s, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. /nd if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. e. Legislative discretion not sub*ect to *udicial review. L 3ow, in this "atter of EJUITA&LE &ALANCING, what is the proper place and role of the co#rtsC It "#st not )e o*erloo:ed, in the first place, that the legislat#re, which is the constit#tional repository of police power and e5ercises the prerogati*e of deter"ining the policy of the !tate, is )y force of circ#"stances pri"arily the -#dge of necessity, ade6#acy or reasona)leness and wisdo", of any law pro"#lgated in the e5ercise of the police power, or of the "eas#res adopted to i"ple"ent the p#)lic policy or to achie*e p#)lic interest. 'n the other hand, co#rts, altho#gh &ealo#s g#ardians of indi*id#al li)erty and right, ha*e ne*ertheless e*inced a rel#ctance to interfere with the e5ercise of the legislati*e prerogati*e. $hey ha*e done so early where there has )een a clear, patent or palpa)le ar)itrary and #nreasona)le a)#se of the legislati*e prerogati*e. Moreo*er, co#rts are not s#pposed to o*erride legiti"ate policy, and co#rts ne*er in6#ire into the wisdo" of the law. <. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. N 8e are f#lly satisfied #pon a consideration of all the facts and circ#"stances that the disp#ted law is not the prod#ct of racial hostility, pre-#dice or discri"ination, )#t the e5pression of the legiti"ate desire and deter"ination of the people, thr# their a#thori&ed representati*es, to free the nation fro" the econo"ic sit#ation that has #nfort#nately )een saddled #pon it rightly or wrongly, to its disad*antage. $he law is clearly in the interest of the p#)lic, nay of the national sec#rity itself, and indisp#ta)ly falls within the scope of police power, thr# which and )y which the !tate ins#res its e5istence and sec#rity and the s#pre"e welfare of its citi&ens. The 7ue #rocess of Law Limitation. '. .easonability, the test of the limitationJ determination by legislature decisive. N 8e now co"e to d#e process as a li"itation on the e5ercise of the police power. It has )een stated )y the highest a#thority in the Jnited !tates that2 . . . . And the guarant$ of due process, as has often been held, demands onl$ that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrar$ or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the sub#ect sought to be attained. . . . . San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 35 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 "o far as the re.uirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic polic$ ma$ reasonabl$ be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that polic$ b$ legislation adapted to its purpose. $he co#rts are witho#t a#thority either to declare s#ch policy, or, when it is declared )y the legislat#re, to o*erride it. If the laws passed are seen to ha*e a reasona)le relation to a proper legislati*e p#rpose, and are neither ar)itrary nor discri"inatory, the re6#ire"ents of d#e process are satisfied, and -#dicial deter"ination to that effect renders a co#rt functus officio. . . . @3e))ia *s. 3ew Dor:, 78 L. ed. 9B?, 97?, 977.A The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or ade.uac$ under all circumstances of the means adopted to carr$ out its purpose into effect. >udged b$ this test, disputed legislation, which is not merel$ reasonable but actuall$ necessar$, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness. $he necessity of the law in 6#estion is e5plained in the e5planatory note that acco"panied the )ill, which later was enacted into law2 This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. ;ts purpose is to prevent persons who are not citiens of the #hilippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. ;f the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this .epublic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent sta<e in our peopleFs welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. /ll aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people. ;n see<ing to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citiens of the #hilippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill see<s to ta<e away from the hands of persons who are not citiens of the #hilippines a power that can be wielded to paralye all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing rights. The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival. P;9.9EE9,) P;+(E;'0) F)209.9F)2 C+2E. >. T+22)( GR 98050, 17 M'2/; 1994 F'/0(" $he 0hil0hos Mo*e"ent for 0rogress @0M0IA, a la)or organi&ation co"posed of s#per*isory e"ployees of the 0hilippine 0hosphate (ertili&er orporation, filed a certification election on H#ly 7, 1989 with the Depart"ent of La)or and ."ploy"ent. $he "o*e was not contested )y the 0hilippine 0hosphate (ertili&er orporation "anage"ent and in fact was s#pported )y a position paper s#)"itted to the Mediator9Ar)iter on A#g#st 11, 1989. $he "anage"ent hailed the creation of a s#per*isorKs #nion pro*ided that they "eet all the necessary legal re6#ire"ents. 'n 'cto)er 14, 1989 the Mediator9Ar)iter Milado iss#ed an order for the holding of the elections e5cl#ding the technical, professional and confidential e"ployees. $hen on 3o*e")er17, 1989 respondent 0M0I prayed for the incl#sion of technical, professional and confidential e"ployees. 'n Dece")er 1B, 1989 )oth parties s#)"itted their position papers on the said s#)-ect "atter. Mr. Milado, allowing the "e")ership of other e"ployees as stated, granted the petition of 0M0I. 0etitioner then "o*ed to ha*e the technical, professional and confidential e"ployees re"o*ed fro" the "e")ership of the 0M0I on April 1+, 199? to the !ecretary of La)or and ."ploy"ent and a decision was "ade on A#g#st 7, 199? dis"issing the appeal and the s#)se6#ent "otion for reconsideration. $hen on H#ly 8, 1991 the o#rt iss#ed a te"porary restraining order against the holding of the certification election sched#led on H#ly 12, 1991 pending -#dicial re*iew. I((1)" 8hether or not 01IL01'! was denied d#e process when respondent Mediator9Ar)iter granted the a"ended petition of respondent 0M0I without according 6&'(6&K" a new opportunit$ to be heard. H).*" 3o. $he essence of d#e process is si"ply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain oneFs side or an opportunity to see< a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case, petitioner #H;L#HAS agreed to file its position paper with the Dediator:/rbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. 0oreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and e%amine the witnesses of the other part$. 9ut it did not) instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the 0ediator7Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opport#nity to *entilate its arg#"ents in its appeal to the !ecretary of La)or -,+0 >( IAC GR N+. 74457, 20 M'2/; 1987 F'/0(" .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2+9A prohi)ited the transportation of cara)aos and cara)eef fro" one pro*ince to another. $he cara)aos of petitioner were confiscated for *iolation of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o +2+9A while he was transporting the" fro" Mas)ate to Iloilo. 0etitioner challenged the constit#tionality of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2+9A. $he go*ern"ent arg#ed that .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2+9A was iss#ed in the e5ercise of police power to conser*e the cara)aos that were still fit for far" wor: or )reeding. I((1)" 8hether or 3ot .' 3o. +2+9A is a *iolation of !#)stanti*e D#e 0rocess. H).*" Des. $he thr#st of his petition is that the e5ec#ti*e order is #nconstit#tional insofar as it a#thori&es o#tright confiscation of the cara)ao or cara)eef )eing transported across pro*incial )o#ndaries. 1is clai" is that the penalty is in*alid )eca#se it is i"posed witho#t according the owner a right to )e heard )efore a co"petent and i"partial co#rt as g#aranteed )y d#e process. $he closed "ind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear /the other side/ )efore an opinion is for"ed or a decision is "ade )y those who sit in -#dg"ent. ')*io#sly, one side is only one9half of the 6#estionG the other half "#st also )e considered if an i"partial *erdict is to )e reached )ased on an infor"ed appreciation of the iss#es in contention. It is indispensa)le that the two sides co"ple"ent each other, as #nto the )ow the arrow, in leading to the correct r#ling after e5a"ination of the pro)le" not fro" one or the other perspecti*e only )#t in its totality. A -#dg"ent )ased on less that this f#ll appraisal, on the prete5t that a hearing is #nnecessary or #seless, is tainted with the *ice of )ias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressi*e regi"es, the insolence of power. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally spea<ing, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying co""entary on o#r -#dicial syste" that the -#rispr#dence of this co#ntry is rich with applications of this g#aranty as proof of o#r fealty to the r#le of law and the ancient r#di"ents of fair play. 8e ha*e consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to -the law of the land,- which 8aniel -ebster described almost two hundred $ears ago in the famous 8artmouth College Case, as -the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders *udgment only after trial.- It has to )e so if the rights of e*ery person are to )e sec#red )eyond the reach of officials who, o#t of "ista:en &eal or plain arrogance, wo#ld degrade the d#e process cla#se into a worn and e"pty catchword. This is not to sa$ that notice and hearing are imperative in ever$ case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. '%) The conclusive presumption , for e%ample, bars the admission of contrar$ evidence as long as such presumption is based on human e%perience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimatel$ presumed therefrom. '&) There are instances when the need for e%peditions action will #ustif$ omission of these re.uisites, as in the summar$ abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which ma$ be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safet$ and lives of the people. '$) 6ornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherentl$ pernicious and ma$ be summaril$ destro$ed. '") The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense ma$ be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the countr$ he has fled. '5) Lilth$ restaurants ma$ be summaril$ padlocked in the interet of the public health and bawd$ houses to protect the public morals. ;n such instances, previous *udicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. 'n the instant case, the carabaos were arbitraril$ confiscated b$ the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner onl$ after he had filed a complaint for recover$ and given a supersedeas bond of 612,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered b$ the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries:old guaranty of elementary fair play. It has already )een re"ar:ed that there are occasions when notice and hearing "ay )e *alidly dispensed with notwithstanding the #s#al re6#ire"ent for these "ini"#" g#arantees of d#e process. It is also conceded that s#""ary action "ay )e *alidly ta:en in ad"inistrati*e proceedings as proced#ral d#e process is not necessarily -#dicial only. In the e5ceptional cases accepted, howe*er. there is a -#stification for the o"ission of the right to a pre*io#s hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the pro)le" so#ght to )e corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 36 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 A.+,0) >. S'>)..',+ GR 131%52, M'2/; 9, 1998 F'/0(" 'n Dece")er 7, 199+, an infor"ation for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an inc#")ent Mayor of BiNan Lag#na and B#ena*ent#ra oncepcion predicated on a co"plaint filed )y H#*ie9Lyn 0#nong)ayan. 'n Dece")er 14, 199+, H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan, thro#gh her co#nsel Attorney %e"edios . Bal)in, and Assistant hief !tate 0rosec#tor Leonardo ,#ia), Hr., filed with the 'ffice of the o#rt Ad"inistrator a petition for a change of *en#e and to ha*e the case transferred and tried )y any of the %egional $rial o#rts in Metro Manila. D#ring the pendency of the petition for change of *en#e, or on 27 H#ne 1997, H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan, assisted )y her parents and co#nsel, e5ec#ted an affida*it of desistance. 'n H#ne 28, 1997, Atty. %a"on .asano on )ehalf of petitioners, "o*ed to ha*e the petition for change of *en#e dis"issed on the gro#nd that it had )eco"e "oot in *iew of co"plainantKs affida*it of desistance. 'n A#g#st 22, 1997, A!0 ,#ia) filed his co""ent on the "otion to dis"iss. ,#ia) asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of pri*ate co"plainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, wo#ld not prod#ce any legal effect since it was the p#)lic prosec#tor who had direction and control of the prosec#tion of the cri"inal action. 1e prayed for the denial of the "otion to dis"iss. $he co#rt granted the "otion to change *en#e. 'n !epte")er 17, 1997, the case was assigned )y raffle to Branch 74, %$ Manila, with respondent H#dge Ma5i"o A. !a*ellano, Hr.,presiding. 'n 'cto)er 7, 1997, H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan, thro#gh Atty. Bal)in, s#)"itted to the Manila co#rt, a co"pliance where she reiterated her decision to a)ide )y her Affida*it of Desistance. 1owe*er, in an 'rder, dated ?9 'cto)er 1997, H#dge !a*ellano fo#nd pro)a)le ca#se for the iss#ance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and oncepcion witho#t pre-#dice to, and independent of, this o#rts separate deter"ination as the trier of facts, of the *ol#ntariness and *alidity of the Opri*ate co"plainantIsP desistance in the light of the opposition of the p#)lic prosec#tor, Asst. hief !tate 0rosec#tor Leonardo ,#iya). 'n ?2 3o*e")er 1997, Alonte *ol#ntarily s#rrendered hi"self to Director !antiago $oledo of the 3ational B#rea# of In*estigation @3BIA, while oncepcion, in his case, posted the reco""ended )ail of 017?,???.??. 'n ?7 3o*e")er 1997, petitioners were arraigned and )oth pleaded not g#ilty to the charge. $he parties "anifested that they were wai*ing pre9trial. $he proceedings forthwith went on. 0er H#dge !a*ellano, )oth parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the "erits. B According to Alonte, howe*er, H#dge !a*ellano allowed the prosec#tion to present e*idence relati*e only to the 6#estion of the *ol#ntariness and *alidity of the affida*it of desistance It wo#ld appear that i""ediately following the arraign"ent, the prosec#tion presented pri*ate co"plainant H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan followed )y her parents. D#ring this hearing, 0#nong)ayan affir"ed the *alidity and *ol#ntariness of her affida*it of desistance. !he stated that she had no intention of gi*ing positi*e testi"ony in s#pport of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in f#rther prosec#ting the action. 0#nong)ayan confir"ed2 @iA $hat she was co"pelled to desist )eca#se of the harass"ent she was e5periencing fro" the "edia, @iiA that no press#res nor infl#ence were e5erted #pon her to sign the affida*it of desistance, and @iiiA that neither she nor her parents recei*ed a single centa*o fro" any)ody to sec#re the affida*it of desistance. Assistant !tate 0rosec#tor Marilyn a"po"anes then presented, in se6#ence2 @iA 0#nong)ayans parents, who affir"ed their signat#res on the affida*it of desistance and their consent to their da#ghters decision to desist fro" the case, and @iiA Assistant 0ro*incial 0rosec#tor Al)erto 3of#ente, who attested that the affida*it of desistance was signed )y 0#nong)ayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the sa"e was e5ec#ted freely and *ol#ntarily. (inally, a"po"anes "anifested that in light of the decision of pri*ate co"plainant and her parents not to p#rs#e the case, the !tate had no f#rther e*idence against the acc#sed to pro*e the g#ilt of the acc#sed. !he, then, "o*ed for the /dis"issal of the case/ against )oth Alonte and oncepcion. $here#pon, respondent -#dge said that /the case was s#)"itted for decision./ 'n 1? 3o*e")er 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an /Jrgent Motion to Ad"it to Bail./ D#ring the pendency thereof, Attorney 0hilip !igfrid A. (ort#n, the lead co#nsel for petitioner Alonte recei*ed a notice fro" the %$ Manila, Branch 74, notifying hi" of the sched#le of pro"#lgation, on 18 Dece")er 1997, of the decision on the case. $he co#nsel for acc#sed oncepcion denied ha*ing recei*ed any notice of the sched#led pro"#lgation. 'n 18 Dece")er 1997, after the case was called, Atty. !igrid (ort#n and Atty. Hose (la"iniano "anifested that Alonte co#ld not attend the pro"#lgation of the decision )eca#se he was s#ffering fro" "ild hypertension and was confined at the 3BI clinic and that, #pon the other hand, petitioner oncepcion and his co#nsel wo#ld appear not to ha*e )een notified of the proceedings. $he pro"#lgation, ne*ertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentiaG the reading concl#ded2 81.%.('%., -#dg"ent is here)y rendered finding the two @2A acc#sed Mayor Bayani Alonte and B#ena*ent#ra U8ella oncepcion A19.0: 8):+,* 2)'(+,'8.) *+180 +< 0;) ;)9,+1( /29D) +< RAPE, I((1)" 8as petitioner depri*ed of 0%'.DJ%AL DJ. 0%'.!!C 1eld2 Des. $he respondent H#dge co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction when, in total disregard of the %e*ised %#les on .*idence and e5isting doctrinal -#rispr#dence, he rendered a Decision in the case a .uo on the )asis of two @2A affida*its @0#nong)ayans and Bal)insA which were ,)90;)2 D'2G)* ,+2 +<<)2)* 9,0+ )>9*),/) 8: 0;) E2+()/109+,, nor @90;+10 A9>9,A 0;) E)0909+,)2 ', +EE+201,90: 0+ /2+(()C'D9,) 0;) '<<9',0( thereof, again in *iolation of petitioners right to d#e process @Article III, 1, onstit#tionA. The respondent 8udge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac< or excess of *urisdiction when he rendered a 7ecision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on the facts which would establish that complainant was raped by petitioner @%#le 119, Article III, 1, onstit#tionA, there)y setting a dangero#s precedent where heino#s offenses can res#lt in con*iction witho#t trial @then with "ore reason that si"pler offenses co#ld end #p with the sa"e res#ltA. 8urisprudence ac<nowledges that 7C6 #.A,6SS ;2 ,.;D;2/L #.A,667;29S, in particular, require 'a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with *udicial power to hear and determine the matter before itJ 'b) that *urisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accusedJ 'c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heardJ and 'd) that *udgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The Court must admit that it is puEEled b$ the somewhat strange wa$ the case has proceeded below. 6er >udge "avellano, after the waiver b$ the parties of the pre7trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that7 2The two +2, accused did not present an$ countervailing evidence during the trial. The$ did not take the witness stand to refute or den$ under oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant@s aforementioned affidavit which she e%pressl$ affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective law$ers, the$ rested and submitted the case for decision merel$ on the basis of the private complainant@s so called @desistance@ which, to them, was sufficient enough for their purposes. The$ left ever$thing to the so7called @desistance@ of the private complainant.3 /ccording to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on 34 2ovember %((4, aside from the arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed by #unongbayan. 8hile H#dge !a*ellano has clai"s that petitioners9acc#sed were each represented d#ring the hearing on ?7 3o*e")er 1997 with their respecti*e co#nsel of choiceG that none of their co#nsel interposed an intention to cross9e5a"ine rape *icti" H#*ielyn 0#nong)ayan, e*en after she attested, in answer to respondent -#dgeIs clarificatory 6#estions, the *ol#ntariness and tr#th of her two affida*its 9 one detailing the rape and the other detailing the atte"pts to )#y her desistanceG the opport#nity was "issedRnot #sed, hence waived . The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross7e%amine a witness @is a personal one and ma$ be waived.3 ;t should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it -not only must be voluntary, but must be <nowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and li<ely consequences.- Dere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver . The Solicitor 9eneral has aptly discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial+ '%) #etitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purposeJ %! '&) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent 8udge for the purposeJ and '$) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the ;nformation so as to *ustify any modification in the order of trial. &3 There can be no short:cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. 7ue process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our 1ill of .ights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. A,9'A >(. C+DD9((9+, +, E.)/09+,( GR 1049%1, 7 O/0+8)2 1994 F'/0(" In preparation for the synchroni&ed national and local elections sched#led on 11 May 1992, the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A iss#ed %esol#tion 2424 @>,#n Ban>A, pro"#lgating r#les and reg#lations on )earing, carrying and transporting of firear"s or other deadly weapons, on sec#rity personnel or )odyg#ards, on )earing ar"s )y "e")ers of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 37 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 sec#rity agencies or police organi&ations, and organi&ation or "aintenance of reaction forces d#ring the election period. 0#rs#ant to the =,#n Ban,> Mr. !erapio 0. $accad, !ergeant9at9Ar"s, 1o#se of %epresentati*es, wrote ongress"an (rancisc B. Aniag Hr., who was then ongress"an of the 1st District of B#lacan re6#esting the ret#rn of the 2 firear"s iss#ed to hi" )y the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. Aniag i""ediately instr#cted his dri*er, .rnesto Arellano, to pic: #p the firear"s fro" his ho#se at <alle <erde and ret#rn the" to ongress. $he police"en "anning the o#tpost flagged down the car dri*en )y Arellano as it approached the chec:point. $hey searched the car and fo#nd the firear"s neatly pac:ed in their g#n cases and placed in a )ag in the tr#n: of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. $hereafter, the police referred ArellanoKs case to the 'ffice of the ity 0rosec#tor for in6#est. $he referral did not incl#de Aniag as a"ong those charged with an election offense. $he ity 0rosec#tor in*ited Aniag to shed light on the circ#"stances "entioned in ArellanoKs sworn e5planation. Aniag e5plained that Arellano did not *iolate the firear"s )an as he in fact was co"plying with it when apprehended )y ret#rning the firear"s to ongress. $he 'ffice of the ity 0rosec#tor iss#ed a resol#tion reco""ending that the case against Arellano )e dis"issed and that the =#nofficial> charge against Aniag )e also dis"issed. 3e*ertheless, the 'M.L. directing the filing of infor"ation against Aniag and Arellano for *iolation of !ec. 2+1, par. @6A, of B0 881 otherwise :nown as the '"ni)#s .lection ode, in relation to !ec. 42 of %A 71++ I((1)" 8hether or not the "anner )y which 'M.L. proceeded against petitioner r#ns co#nter to the d#e process cla#se of the onstit#tion H).*" Des. The manner by which ,AD6L6, proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the ,onstitution T he facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the #2# with violation of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode. 2or was he sub*ected by the ,ity #rosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The non:disclosure by the ,ity #rosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires that the procedure established by law should be obeyed. The CK01(1C argues that petitioner was given the chance to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the Cit$ 6rosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of e%planation regarding the incident . This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. 7ue process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the ,onstitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. !#ch constit#ted a *iolation of his right to d#e process. 1ence, it cannot )e contended that petitioner was f#lly gi*en the opport#nity to "eet the acc#sation against hi" as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. $h#s, the warrantless search cond#cted )y the 030 is declared illegal and the firear"s sei&ed d#ring the search cannot )e #sed as e*idence in any proceeding against the petitioner. %esol#tion 3o. 929?829 is #nconstit#tional, and therefore, set aside. P;9.9EE9,) C+DD1,9/'09+, S'0)..90) C+2E. >. A./1'F GR 84818, D)/ 18, 1989 F'/0(" By *irt#e of %ep#)lic Act 771B, the 0hilippine o""#nications !atellite orporation @01IL'M!A$A was granted =a franchise to esta)lish, constr#ct, "aintain and operate in the 0hilippines, at s#ch places as the grantee "ay select, station or stations and associated e6#ip"ent and facilities for international satellite co""#nications.> !ince 19+8, It has )een leasing its satellite circ#its to 0LD$, 0hilippine ,lo)al o""#nications, and other teleco""#nication co"panies. It was e5e"pt fro" the -#risdiction of the 3ational $eleco""#nications o""ission @3$A. 1owe*er, p#rs#ant to .5ec#ti*e 'rder @.'A 19+, it was placed #nder the -#risdiction, control and reg#lation of 3$, incl#ding all its facilities and ser*ices and the fi5ing of rates. I"ple"enting said e5ec#ti*e order, 3$ re6#ired 01IL'M!A$ to apply for the re6#isite certificate of p#)lic con*enience.. 'n 9 !epte")er 1987, 01IL'M!A$ filed with 3$ an application for a#thority to contin#e operating and "aintaining the sa"e facilities, to contin#e pro*iding the international satellite co""#nications ser*ices, and to charge the c#rrent rates applied for in rendering s#ch ser*ices. 0ending hearing, it also applied for a pro*isional a#thority so that it can contin#e to operate and "aintain the facilities, pro*ide the ser*ices and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. $he 3$ e5tended the pro*isional a#thority of 01IL'M!A$, )#t it directed 01IL'M!A$ to charge "odified red#ced rates thro#gh a red#ction of 17M on the present a#thori&ed rates. 01IL'M!A$ assailed said order. I((1)" 8hether the 3$ is re6#ired to pro*ide notice and hearing to 01IL'M!A$ in its rate9fi5ing order, which fi5ed a te"porary rate pending final deter"ination of 01IL'M!A$Ks application. H).*" D.!. $he order in 6#estion which was iss#ed )y respondent Alc#a& no do#)t contains all the attri)#tes of a 6#asi9-#dicial ad-#dication. (ore"ost is the fact that said order pertains e5cl#si*ely to petitioner and to no other. (#rther, it is pre"ised on a finding of fact, altho#gh patently s#perficial, that there is "erit in a red#ction of so"e of the rates charged9 )ased on an initial e*al#ation of petitionerIs financial state"ents9witho#t affording petitioner the )enefit of an e5planation as to what partic#lar aspect or aspects of the financial state"ents warranted a corresponding rate red#ction. 3o rationali&ation was offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, disc#ssed, which pro"pted respondents to i"pose as "#ch as a fifteen percent @17MA rate red#ction. It is not far9fetched to ass#"e that petitioner co#ld )e in a )etter position to rationali&e its rates *is9a9*is the *ia)ility of its )#siness re6#ire"ents. $he rates it charges res#lt fro" an e5ha#sti*e and detailed st#dy it cond#cts of the "#lti9 faceted intricacies attendant to a p#)lic ser*ice #nderta:ing of s#ch nat#re and "agnit#de. 8e are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitionerIs ratiocination that an i""ediate red#ction in its rates wo#ld ad*ersely affect its operations and the 6#ality of its ser*ice to the p#)lic considering the "aintenance re6#ire"ents, the pro-ects it still has to #nderta:e and the financial o#tlay in*ol*ed. 3ota)ly, petitioner was not e*en afforded the opport#nity to cross9e5a"ine the inspector who iss#ed the report on which respondent 3$ )ased its 6#estioned order. At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made b$ respondent FTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its 2EC/S;:8C7;,;/L >C2,T;A2S.0 't, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessar$ since the assailed order is merel$ incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporar$ in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit. The 2T,, in the exercise of its rate:fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which con*ointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. The 2T, order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to #H;L,ADS/T and without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an =initial evaluation,0 which is a unilateral evaluation, but had #H;L,ADS/T been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to 2T,. .eduction of rates was made without affording #H;L,ADS/T the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. #H;L,ADS/T was not even afforded the opportunity to cross:examine the inspector who issued the report on which 2T, based its questioned order. While the 2T, may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of #H;L,ADS/T, such rate:fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. ANG TI&A- VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) %9 PHIL %35? G.R. NO. 4%49%? 27 FE& 1940 F'/0(" $here was agree"ent )etween Ang $i)ay and the 3ational La)or Jnion, Inc @3LJA. $he 3LJ alleged that the s#pposed lac: of leather "aterial clai"ed )y $ori)io $eodoro was )#t a sche"e adopted to syste"atically discharge all the "e")ers of the 3LJ, fro" wor:. And this a*er"ent is desired to )e pro*ed )y the petitioner with the records of the B#rea# of #sto"s and Boo:s of Acco#nts of nati*e dealers in leather. $hat 3ational 8or:erIs Brotherhood Jnion of Ang $i)ay is a co"pany or e"ployer #nion do"inated )y $ori)io $eodoro, which was alleged )y the 3LJ as an illegal one. $he I%, decided the case and ele*ated it to the !#pre"e o#rt, )#t a "otion for new trial was raised )y the 3LJ. B#t the Ang $i)ay filed a "otion for opposing the said "otion. I((1)" 8hether or not the "otion for new trial sho#ld )e granted. H).*" Des. $he interest of -#stice wo#ld )e )etter ser*ed if the "o*ant is gi*en opport#nity to present at the hearing the doc#"ents referred to in his "otion and s#ch other e*idence as "ay )e rele*ant to the "ain iss#e in*ol*ed. It "#st )e noted that the I% is a special co#rt. It is "ore an ad"inistrati*e )oard than a part of the integrated -#dicial syste" of the nation. C'/ is not narrowl$ constrained b$ technical rules of procedure, and e.uit$ and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound b$ an$ technical rules of legal evidence but ma$ inform its mind in such manner as it ma$ deem #ust and e.uitable. The fact, however, that the C'/ ma$ be said to be free from rigidit$ of certain procedural re.uirements does not mean that it can in #usticiable cases coming before it, entirel$ ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential re.uirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character2 '%) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present oneFs cause and submit evidence in support thereofJ '&) The tribunal must consider the evidence presentedJ '$) The decision must have something to support itselfJ '") The evidence must be substantialJ '5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearingJ or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affectedJ San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 38 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 'B) The tribunal or body or any of its *udges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinateJ '4) The 1oard or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can <now the various ;ssue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSIT- VS. HON. !UDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG 222 SCRA %44? G.R. 99327? 27 MA- 1993 F'/0(" Leonardo 1. <illa, a first year law st#dent of 0etitioner Jni*ersity, died of serio#s physical in-#ries at hinese ,eneral 1ospital after the initiation rites of A6#ila Legis. Bien*enido Mar6#e& was also hospitali&ed at the apitol Medical enter. 0etitioner Dean ynthia del astillo created a Hoint Ad"inistration9(ac#lty9!t#dent In*estigating o""ittee which was tas:ed to in*estigate and s#)"it a report within 72 ho#rs on the circ#"stances s#rro#nding the death of Lennie <illa. !aid notice also re6#ired respondent st#dents to s#)"it their written state"ents within twenty9fo#r @2BA ho#rs fro" receipt. Altho#gh respondent st#dents recei*ed a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the "eanti"e, they were placed on pre*enti*e s#spension. $he In*estigating o""ittee fo#nd a pri"a facie case against respondent st#dents for *iolation of %#le 4 of the Law !chool atalog#e entitled /Discipline./ %espondent st#dents were then re6#ired to file their written answers to the for"al charge. 0etitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent st#dents. $he Board fo#nd respondent st#dents g#ilty of *iolating %#les on Discipline which prohi)its participation in ha&ing acti*ities. 1owe*er, in *iew of the lac: of #nani"ity a"ong the "e")ers of the Board on the penalty of dis"issal, the Board left the i"position of the penalty to the Jni*ersity Ad"inistration. Accordingly, (r. Bernas i"posed the penalty of dis"issal on all respondent st#dents. %espondent st#dents filed with %$ Ma:ati a $%' since they are c#rrently enrolled. $his was granted. A day after the e5piration of the te"porary restraining order, Dean del astillo created a !pecial Board to in*estigate the charges of ha&ing against respondent st#dents A)as and Mendo&a. $his was re6#ested to )e stric:en o#t )y the respondents and arg#ed that the creation of the !pecial Board was totally #nrelated to the original petition which alleged lac: of d#e process. $his was granted and reinstate"ent of the st#dents was ordered. I((1)" 8as there denial of d#e process against the respondent st#dents. H).*" $here was no denial of d#e process, "ore partic#larly proced#ral d#e process. $he Dean of the Ateneo Law !chool, notified and re6#ired respondent st#dents to s#)"it their written state"ent on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent st#dents re6#ested thro#gh their co#nsel, copies of the charges. $he nat#re and ca#se of the acc#sation were ade6#ately spelled o#t in petitionersI notices. 0resent is the twin ele"ents of notice and hearing. The Dinimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus+ '%) the students must be informed in W.;T;29 of the nature and cause of any accusation against themJ '&) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired+ '$) they shall be informed of the evidence against them '") they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalfJ and '5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. It cannot serio#sly )e asserted that the a)o*e re6#ire"ents were not "et. 8hen, in *iew of the death of Leonardo <illa, petitioner ynthia del astillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law !chool, notified and re6#ired respondent st#dents on (e)r#ary 11, 1991 to s#)"it within twenty9fo#r ho#rs their written state"ent on the incident,
the records show that instead of filing a repl$, respondent students re.uested through their counsel, copies of the charges. -hile of the students mentioned in the Lebruar$ 11, 1441 notice dul$ submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an e%tension of up to Lebruar$ 18, 1441 to file their statements.
Ind#)ita)ly, the nat#re and ca#se of the acc#sation were ade6#ately spelled o#t in petitionersI notices dated (e)r#ary 1B and 2?, 1991. 30 It is to )e noted that the (e)r#ary 2?, 1991 letter which 6#oted %#le 3o. 4 of its %#les of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law !chool atalog#e was addressed indi*id#ally to respondent st#dents. 6etitioners@ noticesMletters dated (e)r#ary 11, (e)r#ary 1B and 2? clearl$ show that respondent students were given ample opportunit$ to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them. The re.uisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the ver$ start of the investigations before the >oint Administration Lacult$7 "tudent Committee, the law firm of AonEales 9atiler and 9ilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students. .espondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitionersF >ebruary %", %((% order, they were denied procedural due process. 9ranting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An /7D;2;ST./T;M6 #.A,667;29 conducted to investigate students@ participation in a haEing activit$ need not be clothed with the attributes of a #udicial proceeding. A closer e5a"ination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characteriEed the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to e%amine affiants7neoph$tes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in /lcua .
%espondent st#dentsI contention that the in*estigating co""ittee failed to consider their e*idence is far fro" the tr#th )eca#se the (e)r#ary 1B, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after recei*ing the written state"ents and hearing the testi"onies of se*eral witnesses. !i"ilarly, the Disciplinary BoardIs resol#tion dated March 1?, 1991 was preceded )y a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent st#dents were s#""oned to answer clarificatory 6#estions. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS P)+E.) >(. V)2' GR 45%85, N+>. 1%, 1937 F'/0(" $he instant petition ste"s fro" the application for )ail filed )y o Jn-ieng. 1e clai"s that he is innocent of the cri"e charged against hi", that he has no e5isting cri"inal record and that he wo#ld o)ser*e proper cond#ct in the f#t#re if his application for )ail is granted. $he application was referred to the Ins#lar 0ro)ation 'ffice, )#t was conse6#ently denied. $he denial was pre"ised on the gro#nd that Act Fo. C221 provides probation onl$ to those provinces with available funds for the salar$ of probation officers, and the province referred to has no sufficient funds. $h#s, petitioner now co"es )efore the o#rt assailing the constit#tionality of the Act for )eing *iolati*e of the e6#al protection cla#se. I((1)" 8hether or not there is a *iolation of the e6#al protection g#aranteeC H).*" Des. $he pro)ation act is in *iolation of the said constit#tional g#arantee. It constit#tes as a class legislation which discri"inates against persons of the sa"e class and fa*or others. 0ersonKs with si"ilar circ#"stances "ay )e afforded with the pri*ilege of pro)ation "erely d#e to the discretion of the pro*incial officers. 1ence, the o#rt r#led that the said order is not constit#tional. In the case at )ar, the res#ltant ine6#ality "ay )e said to flow fro" the #nwarranted delegation of legislati*e power, altho#gh perhaps this is necessarily the res#lt in e*ery case. In the instant case, one pro*ince "ay appropriate the necessary f#nd to defray the salary of a pro)ation officer, while another pro*ince "ay ref#se or fail to do so. In s#ch a case, the 0ro)ation Act wo#ld )e in operation in the for"er pro*ince )#t not in the latter. $his "eans that a person otherwise co"ing within the p#r*iew of the law wo#ld )e a)le to en-oy the )enefits of pro)ation in one pro*ince while another person si"ilarly sit#ated in another pro*ince wo#ld )e denied those sa"e )enefits. $his is o)no5io#s discri"ination. 8hile ine6#ality "ay res#lt in the application of the law and in the confer"ent of the )enefits therein pro*ided, ine6#ality is not in al cases the necessary res#lt. 8hate*er "ay )e the case, it is clear that !ection 11 of the 0ro)ation Act creates a sit#ation in which discri"ination and ine6#ality are per"itted or allowed. 8e are of the opinion that !ection 11 of Act. B221 per"its of the denial of the e6#al protection of the law and is on that acco#nt )ad. We see no difference = 16TW662 / L/W WH;,H 762;6S 6EC/L #.AT6,T;A20 and a = L/W WH;,H #6.D;TS A> SC,H 762;/L0. / law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of un*ust and illegal discrmmination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. I/;+,A >(. H)2,',*)F GR 7995, M': 31, 1957
F'/0(" 9s#pra9 I((1)" 8hether or not there is a *iolation of the e6#al protection cla#seC H).*" 3one. $he e6#al protection of the law cla#se is against #nd#e fa*or and indi*id#al or class pri*ilege, as well as hostile discri"ination or the oppression of ine6#ality. It is not intended to prohi)it legislation, which is li"ited either in the o)-ect to which it is directed or )y territory within which is to operate. It does not de"and a)sol#te e6#ality a"ong residentsG it "erely re6#ires that all persons shall )e treated ali:e, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies ali<e to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for ma<ing a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 39 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 VI. The 6qual #rotection Limitation a. ')-ections to alien participation in retail trade. E $he ne5t 6#estion that now poses sol#tion is, Does the law deny the e6#al protection of the lawsC As pointed o#t a)o*e, the "ere fact of alienage is the root and ca#se of the distinction )etween the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted countryJ his stay here is for personal convenienceJ he is attracted b$ the lure of gain and profit. &is aim or purpose of sta$, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturall$ lacking in that spirit of lo$alt$ and enthusiasm for this countr$ where he temporaril$ sta$s and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, s$mpath$ and consideration for his Lilipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and e%ploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved countr$ and his beloved kin and countr$men. $he e5perience of the co#ntry is that the alien retailer has shown s#ch #tter disregard for his c#sto"ers and the people on who" he "a:es his profit, that it has )een fo#nd necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it "ay see". /nother ob*ection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really ma<es a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he ma<es are not invested in industries that would help the countryFs economy and increase national wealth. $he alienIs interest in this co#ntry )eing "erely transient and te"porary, it wo#ld indeed )e ill9ad*ised to contin#e entr#sting the *ery i"portant f#nction of retail distri)#tion to his hands. $he practices resorted to )y aliens in the control of distri)#tion, as already pointed o#t a)o*e, their secret "anip#lations of stoc:s of co""odities and prices, their #tter disregard of the welfare of their c#sto"ers and of the #lti"ate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are "ere g#ests, which practices, "anip#lations and disregard do not attend the e5ercise of the trade )y the nationals, show the e5istence of real and act#al, positi*e and f#nda"ental differences )etween an alien and a national which f#lly -#stify the legislati*e classification adopted in the retail trade "eas#re. These differences are certainl$ a valid reason for the "tate to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. -e would be doing violence to fact and realit$ were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other. 8. 7ifference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. N $he a)o*e o)-ectiona)le characteristics of the e5ercise of the retail trade )y the aliens, which are act#al and real, f#rnish s#fficient gro#nds for legislati*e classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. !o"e "ay disagree with the wisdo" of the legislat#reIs classification. $o this we answer, that this is the prerogati*e of the law9"a:ing power. !ince the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated ali<e , and as it cannot be said that the classification is patentl$ unreasonable and unfounded, it is in dut$ bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of e.ual protection established b$ the Constitution. 1roadly spea<ing, the power of the legislature to ma<e distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. $he legislati*e power ad"its of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can )e *iolati*e of the constit#tional li"itation only when the classification is witho#t reasona)le )asis. (A*+,9( N+0)(" Jnder the a)o*e"entioned case, the case was decided #nder the 1947 onstit#tion wherein PARIT- RIGHTS were granted to J.!. iti&ens.) V9..)A'( >(. H91 C;9+,A T('9 P'+ H+ GR 29%4%, N+>. 10,1978 F'/0(" ity ordinance 3o +747, prohi)its aliens fro" )eing e"ployed or engaged or participate in any position or association or )#siness en#"erated therein, whether per"anent, te"porary or cas#al, witho#t first sec#ring an e"ploy"ent per"it fro" the Mayor of Manila is )eing 6#estioned )y the pri*ate respondent for allegedly in *iolation of the e6#al protection g#arantee. $he trial co#rt r#led in fa*or of the n#llity of the ordinance. 'n appeal, petitioner arg#es that the ordinance cannot )e in*alidated on the gro#nd that it *iolated the r#le on #nifor"ity of ta5ation, )eca#se it apples to p#re ta5 or re*en#es "eas#res and said ordinance is not s#ch )#t is an e5ercise of the police power of the state. I((1)" 8hether or not the said ordinance is #nconstit#tionalC H).*" $he ordinance is #nconstit#tional. The contention that it was not purel$ a ta% or revenue measure because its principle purpose was for regulation has no merit. ;t is obvious that TH6 A.7;2/2,6 W/S #C.#AS6L@ >A. TH6 ./;S;29 A> DA26@ C276. TH6 9C;S6 A> / .69CL/T;A2 . >urther, the assailed ordinance violates the equal protection clause. To require a person to get a wor< permit before he can be employed from the Dayor who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to the denial of the basic right of a person to engage in a means of livelihood. /liens once admitted cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. The contention that Krdinance Fo. =I;5 is not a purel$ ta% or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulator$ in nature has no merit. -hile it is true that the first part which re.uires that the alien shall secure an emplo$ment permit from the 0a$or involves the e%ercise of discretion and #udgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for emplo$ment permits and therefore is regulator$ in character the second part which re.uires the pa$ment of 6I0.00 as emplo$ee@s fee is not regulator$ but a revenue measure. There is no logic or *ustification in exacting #53.33 from aliens who have been =,L6/.670 for employment. ;t is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. The #53.33 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive 1CT 16,/CS6 ;T >/;LS TA ,A2S;76. M/L;7 SC1ST/2T;/L 7;>>6.62,6S ;2 S;TC/T;A2 /DA29 ;27;M;7C/L /L;62S WHA /.6 .6EC;.67 TA #/@ ;T. /lthough the equal protection clause of the ,onstitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the sub*ect of the particular legislation. The same amount of #53.33 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Ardinance 2o. B5$4 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Dayor in the exercise of his discretion . 't has been held that where an ordinance of a municipalit$ fails to state an$ polic$ or to set up an$ standard to guide or limit the ma$or@s action, e%presses no purpose to be attained b$ re.uiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lac<s standard, thus conferring upon the Dayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. In hinese (lo#r I"porters Association *s. 0rice !ta)ili&ation Board, where a law granted a go*ern"ent agency power to deter"ine the allocation of wheat flo#r a"ong i"porters, the !#pre"e o#rt r#led against the interpretation of #ncontrolled power as it *ested in the ad"inistrati*e officer an ar)itrary discretion to )e e5ercised witho#t a policy, r#le, or standard fro" which it can )e "eas#red or controlled. It was also held in 0ri"icias *s. (#goso that the a#thority and discretion to grant and ref#se per"its of all classes conferred #pon the Mayor of Manila )y the %e*ised harter of Manila is not #ncontrolled discretion )#t legal discretion to )e e5ercised within the li"its of the law. 'rdinance 3o. +747 is *oid )eca#se it does not contain or s#ggest any standard or criterion to g#ide the "ayor in the e5ercise of the power which has )een granted to hi" )y the ordinance. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the ,onstitution. +/e.uiring a person before he can be emplo$ed to get a permit from the Cit$ 0a$or of 0anila who ma$ withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to den$ing him the basic right of the people in the 6hilippines to engage in a means of livelihood. -hile it is true that the 6hilippines as a "tate is not obliged to admit aliens within its territor$, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. $he shelter of protection #nder the d#e process and e6#al protection cla#se is gi*en to all persons, )oth aliens and citi&ens.A D1D.'+ >(. C+D).)/ GR 52245, !',. 22, 1980
F'/0(" $he 0etition alleges that petitioner, 0atricio D#"lao, is a for"er ,o*ernor of 3#e*a <i&caya. 0etitioner D#"lao specifically 6#estions the constit#tionality of section B of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 72 as discri"inatory and contrary to the e6#al protection and d#e process g#arantees of the onstit#tion. !aid !ection B pro*ides2 "ec. C. "pecial 8is.ualification 7 'n addition to violation of section 10 of Art. N''7C of the Constitution and dis.ualification mentioned in e%isting laws, which are hereb$ declared as dis.ualification for an$ of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. An$ retired elective provincial, cit$ of municipal official +1,who has received pa$ment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and +2,who shall have been =I $ears of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be .ualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. 0etitioner D#"lao alleges that the aforecited pro*ision is directed insidio#sly against hi", and that the classification pro*ided therein is )ased on /p#rely ar)itrary gro#nds and, therefore, class legislation. I((1)" 8hether or not said pro*ision *iolates the e6#al protection g#aranteeC H).*" 3o. 0etitioner D#"laoIs contention that section B of B0 Blg. 72 is discri"inatory against hi" personally is )elied )y the fact that se*eral petitions for the dis6#alification of other candidates for local positions )ased on the challenged pro*ision ha*e already )een filed with the 'M.L.. $his tellingly o*erthrows D#"laoIs contention of intentional or p#rposef#l discri"ination. $he assertion that !ection B of B0 Blg. 72 is contrary to the safeg#ard of e6#al protection is neither well ta:en. The constitutional guarantee of e.ual protection of the laws is sub#ect to rational San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 40 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 classification. 'f the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differentl$ from another class. >or purposes of public service, employees B5 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. 6mployees attaining that age are sub*ect to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to pro*incial, city, or "#nicipal positions, to re6#ire that candidates sho#ld not )e "ore than +7 years of age at the ti"e they ass#"e office, if applica)le to e*eryone, "ight or "ight not )e a reasona)le classification altho#gh, as the !olicitor ,eneral has inti"ated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. 'n the other hand, it "ight )e that persons "ore than +7 years old "ay also )e good electi*e local officials. o"ing now to the case of retirees. %etire"ent fro" go*ern"ent ser*ice "ay or "ay not )e a reasona)le dis6#alification for electi*e local officials. (or one thing, there can also )e retirees fro" go*ern"ent ser*ice at ages, say )elow +7. It "ay neither )e reasona)le to dis6#alify retirees, aged +7, for a +79year old retiree co#ld )e a good local official -#st li:e one, aged +7, who is not a retiree. B#t, in the case of a +79year old electi*e local official, who has retired fro" a pro*incial, city or "#nicipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government wor< is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government wor<, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would li<e to assume again . 't is for the ver$ reason that ine.ualit$ will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. >ust as that provision does not den$ e.ual protection, neither does it permit such denial @see 0eople *s. <era, +7 0hil. 7+ O1944PA. 0ersons si"ilarly sit#ated are si"ilarly treated. In fine, it )ears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of $ounger blood in local governments. The classification in .uestion being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid even if at times, it ma$ be susceptible to the ob#ection that it is marred b$ theoretical inconsistencies. @3'$.2 $he 6#estioned law is A)2D',) to the E12E+()( for which it was enactedA P;9.9EE9,) A((+/9'09+, +< S)2>9/) ECE+20)2(, 9,/. >(. D29..+, GR 81958, !1,) 30, 1988
F'/0(" 0hilippine Association of !er*ice .5porters, inc. @0A!.IA, is a do"estic corporation engaged principally in the recr#it"ent of (ilipino wor:ers, "ale and fe"ale for o*erseas e"ploy"ent. 0A!.I see:s to challenge the constit#tionality of the Depart"ent 'rder 3o. 1 series of 1998 of the Depart"ent of La)or. !aid order prohi)ited and s#spended the o*erseas deploy"ent of (ilipina Do"estic and ho#sehold wor:ers. $heir "ain contention is that the order is in*alid for the D'L. erroneo#sly e5ercised police power, which is an ad-#nct on the powers of congress, and not e5ec#ti*e in character. Moreo*er, it alleged that there was a *iolation of the e6#al protection cla#se for it only so#ght to s#spend the deploy"ent of (ilipina wor:ers, th#s there was discri"ination. I((1)" 8hether or not there is a *iolation of the e6#al protection cla#seC H).*" 3o. $he o#rt is satisfied that the classification "ade3 9 the preference for fe"ale wor:ers 9 rests on s#)stantial distinctions. As a "atter of -#dicial notice, the o#rt is well aware of the #nhappy plight that has )efallen o#r fe"ale la)or force a)road, especially do"estic ser*ants, a"id e5ploitati*e wor:ing conditions "ar:ed )y, in not a few cases, physical and personal a)#se. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered b$ migrant Lilipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed b$ testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Aovernment action. As precisel$ the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of e%ploitation. 'n fulfilling that dut$, the Court sustains the Aovernment@s efforts. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no e*idence that, e5cept perhaps for isolated instances, o#r "en a)road ha*e )een afflicted with an identical predica"ent. $he petitioner has proffered no arg#"ent that the ,o*ern"ent sho#ld act si"ilarly with respect to "ale wor:ers. The ,ourt, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the ,ourt is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence 'that women domestic wor<ers are being ill: treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstic< that the 9overnment acted in this case. It is e*idence capa)le indeed of #n6#estiona)le de"onstration and e*idence this o#rt accepts. $he o#rt cannot, howe*er, say the sa"e thing as far as "en are concerned. $here is si"ply no e*idence to -#stify s#ch an inference. !#ffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this ,ourt is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. 7iscrimination in this case is *ustified. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure . !n.uestionabl$, it is the avowed ob#ective of 8epartment Krder Fo. 1 to enhance the protection for Lilipino female overseas workers. 15 This Court has no .uarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Lilipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deplo$ment will be for their own good and welfare. HIMAGAN >(. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. N+. 113811 O/0+8)2 7, 1994, 7APUNAN, !." F'/0(" 0etitioner, a police"an was i"plicated in the :illing of Ben-a"in Machitar, Hr. and the atte"pted "#rder of Berna)e Machitar. After the infor"ations for "#rder and atte"pted "#rder were filed, the trial co#rt iss#ed an 'rder s#spending petitioner #ntil the ter"ination of the case on the )asis of !ection B7, %.A. +977. In response, petitioner filed a "otion to lift the order for his s#spension, relying on !ection B2 of 0.D. 8?7 of the i*il !er*ice Decree, that his s#spension sho#ld )e li"ited to 9? days. %espondent -#dge denied the "otion pointing o#t that #nder !ection B7 of %.A. +977, the acc#sed shall )e s#spended fro" office #ntil his case is ter"inated. $he "otion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, li:ewise, denied. 1ence, the petition for certiorari and "anda"#s to set aside the orders of respondent H#dge and to co""and hi" to lift petitionerIs pre*enti*e s#spension. 0etitioner posits that as a "e")er of the 0hilippine 3ational 0olice, he is co*ered )y the i*il !er*ice Law, partic#larly !ec. B2 of 0D 8?7 of the i*il !er*ice Decree, which li"its the "a5i"#" period of s#spension to ninety @9?A days. 1e clai"s that an i"position of pre*enti*e s#spension of o*er 9? days is contrary to the i*il !er*ice Law and wo#ld )e a *iolation of his constit#tional right to e6#al protection of laws. I((1)" 8hether or not the i"position of pre*enti*e s#spension of o*er 9? days is a *iolation of his constit#tional right to e6#al protection of lawsC H).* 3o. 1e clai"s that an i"position of pre*enti*e s#spension of o*er 9? days is contrary to the i*il !er*ice Law and wo#ld )e a *iolation of his constit#tional right to e6#al protection of laws. 1e f#rther asserts that the re6#ire"ents in !ec. B7 of %.A. +977 that /the co#rt shall i""ediately s#spend the acc#sed fro" office #ntil the case is ter"inated/ and the s#cceeding sentence, /!#ch case shall )e s#)-ect to contin#o#s trial and shall )e ter"inated within ninety @9?A days fro" arraign"ent of the acc#sed/ are )oth s#)stanti*e and sho#ld )e ta:en together to "ean that if the case is not ter"inated within 9? days, the period of pre*enti*e s#spension "#st )e lifted )eca#se of the co""and that the trial "#st )e ter"inated within ninety @9?A days fro" arraign"ent. 8e disagree. F92(0. $he lang#age of the first sentence of !ec. B7 of %.A. +977 is clear, plain and free fro" a")ig#ity. It gi*es no other "eaning than that the s#spension fro" office of the "e")er of the 030 charged with gra*e offense where the penalty is si5 years and one day or "ore shall last #ntil the ter"ination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same "ection providing that the trial must be terminated within ninet$ +40, da$s from arraignment does not .ualif$ or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independentl$ of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. $he second deals with the ti"e fro" within which the trial sho#ld )e finished. !#ppose the trial is not ter"inated within ninety days fro" arraign"ent, sho#ld the s#spension of acc#sed )e liftedC $he answer is certainly no. 8hile the law #ses the "andatory word /shall/ )efore the phrase /)e ter"inated within ninety @9?A days/, there is nothing in /.A. =45I that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Fonetheless, the >udge who fails to decide the case within the period without #ustifiable reason ma$ be sub#ect to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liabilit$. If the trial is #nreasona)ly delayed witho#t fa#lt of the acc#sed s#ch that he is depri*ed of his right to a speedy trial, he is not witho#t a re"edy. 1e "ay as: for the dis"issal of the case. !ho#ld the co#rt ref#se to dis"iss the case, the acc#sed can co"pel its dis"issal )y certiorari, prohi)ition or "anda"#s, or sec#re his li)erty )y ha)eas corp#s. S)/+,*. 0etitioner "isapplies !ec. B2 of 0D 8?7. A "etic#lo#s reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of pre*enti*e s#spension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. 8hat is "ore, !ection B2 e5pressly li"its the period of pre*enti*e s#spension to ninety @9?A days. !ec. 91 of %.A. +977 which states that /$he i*il !er*ice Law and its i"ple"enting r#les shall apply to all personnel of the Depart"ent/ si"ply "eans that the pro*isions of the i*il !er*ice Law and its i"ple"enting r#les and reg#lations are applica)le to "e")ers of the 0hilippine 3ational 0olice insofar as the pro*isions, r#les and reg#lations are not inconsistent with %.A. +977. ertainly, !ection B2 of the i*il !er*ice Decree which li"its the pre*enti*e s#spension to ninety @9?A days cannot apply to "e")ers of the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 41 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 030 )eca#se !ec. B7 of %.A. +997 pro*ides differently, that is, the s#spension where the penalty i"posed )y law e5ceeds si5 @+A years shall contin#e #ntil the case is ter"inated. T;92*. 0etitionerIs reliance on Layno and Deloso is "isplaced. $hese cases all ste""ed fro" charges in *iolation of %.A. 4?19 @1?+?A, otherwise :nown as the Anti9,raft and orr#pt 0ractices Act which, #nli:e %.A. +977, is silent on the d#ration of the pre*enti*e s#spension. !ec. 14 of %.A. 4?19 reads as follows2 F+120;. (ro" the deli)erations of the Bica"eral onference o""ittee on 3ational Defense relati*e to the )ill that )eca"e %.A. +977, the "eaning of !ection B7 of %.A. +977 insofar as the period of s#spension is concerned )eco"es all the "ore clear. $he foregoing disc#ssions re*eal the legislati*e intent to place on pre*enti*e s#spension a "e")er of the 030 charged with gra*e felonies where the penalty i"posed )y law e5ceeds si5 years of i"prison"ent and which s#spension contin#es #ntil the case against hi" is ter"inated. The reason why members of the #2# are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. ;f a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. $he e6#al protection cla#se e5ists to pre*ent #nd#e fa*or or pri*ilege. %ecogni&ing the e5istence of real differences a"ong "en, the e6#al protection cla#se does not de"and a)sol#te e6#ality. It "erely re6#ires that all persons shall )e treated ali:e, #nder li:e circ#"stances and conditions )oth as to the pri*ileges conferred and lia)ilities enforced. $h#s, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. 'f the classification is based on real and substantial differences ) is germane to the purpose of the law) applies to all members of the same class) and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification ma$ not be impugned as violating the Constitution@s e.ual protection guarantee. J19,0+ >(. COMELEC G.R. N+. 189%98, F)821'2:, 22. 2010 P1,+. C!" 3ote2 $he ! re*ersed its Dece")er 1, 2??9 decision *ia the M%s of 'M.L. and "o*ant9inter*enors FACTS" In preparation for the 2?1? elections, the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A iss#ed %esol#tion 3o. 8+78 [ the ,#idelines on the (iling of ertificates of andidacy @oA and 3o"ination of 'fficial andidates of %egistered 0olitical 0arties in onnection with the May 1?, 2?1? 3ational and Local .lections. !ec. B of %esol#tion 3o. 8+78 pro*ides that =Any person holding a p#)lic appointi*e office or position 5 5 5 shall )e considered ipso facto resigned fro" his office #pon the filing of his certificate of candidacy @a#to"atic resignationA howe*er it e5e"pts those elected officials saying that =Any person holding an electi*e office or position shall not )e considered resigned #pon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the sa"e or any other electi*e office or position.> !ec.14@par. 4A of %ep#)lic Act @=%.A.>A 3o. 94+9 pro*ides2 =5 5 5 any person holding a p#)lic appointi*e office or position 5 5 5 shall )e considered ipso facto resigned fro" hisRher office 5 5 5.> !ec. ++ of B0 Blg. 881, or the '"ni)#s .lection ode, reads2 =5 5 5 Any person holding a p#)lic appointi*e office or position 5 5 5 shall )e considered ipso facto resigned fro" his office #pon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.> 0etitioners were appointi*e officers of the go*ern"ent who were planning to r#n in the 2?1? elections so#ght the n#llification of !ec. B@aA on the gro#nd, a"ong others, that it is discri"inatory and *iolates the e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion. $he !#pre"e o#rt r#led in their fa*or. $his pro"pted the 'M.L. to file a "otion for reconsideration and the "o*ant9inter*enors with their own "otion for reconsideration9in9 inter*ention. ISSUES" 1A 8hether the assailed decision is contrary to the constit#tional proscription against the participation of p#)lic appointi*e officials and "e")ers of the "ilitary in partisan political acti*ity. 2A 8hether the assailed pro*isions do not *iolate the e6#al protection cla#se when they accord differential treat"ent to electi*e and appointi*e officials. 4A 8hether the assailed pro*isions do not s#ffer fro" the infir"ity of o*er)readth. HELD" D.! to all. $he o#rt now r#les that !ection B@aA of %esol#tion 8+78, !ection ++ of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, and the second pro*iso in the third paragraph of !ection 14 of %A 94+9 are not #nconstit#tional. W!ection B@aA of 'M.L. %esol#tion 8+78 o"pliant with Law !ection B@aA of 'M.L. %esol#tion 8+78 is a faithf#l reflection of the present state of the law and -#rispr#dence on the "atter, *i&.2 I,/1D8),0 AEE+9,09>) O<<9/9'.. 9 Jnder !ection 14 of %A 94+9, which reiterates !ection ++ of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, any person holding a p#)lic appointi*e office or position, incl#ding acti*e "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces of the 0hilippines, and officers and e"ployees in go*ern"ent9 owned or 9controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidac$.
I,/1D8),0 E.)/0)* O<<9/9'.. [ Jpon the other hand, p#rs#ant to !ection 1B of %A 9??+ or the (air .lection Act, which repealed !ection +7 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode and rendered ineffecti*e !ection 11 of %.A. 8B4+ insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only #pon the start of the ca"paign period corresponding to the positions for which they are r#nning, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidac$ for the same or an$ other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official "ay r#n for another position witho#t forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement Section &'"), /rticle ;H:1 of the %(!4 ,onstitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. T;) 9,0),09+, 0+ 9DE+() ' (029/0 .9D90'09+, +, 0;) E'209/9E'09+, +< /9>9. ()2>9/) +<<9/)2( ',* )DE.+:))( 9, E'209(', E+.909/'. /'DE'9A,( 9( 1,D9(0'G'8.). $o e"phasi&e its i"portance, this constit#tional )an on ci*il ser*ice officers and e"ployees is presently reflected and i"ple"ented )y a n#")er of stat#tes. @e.g. !ection B+@)A@2+A, hapter 7 and !ection 77, hapter 8 [ )oth of !#)title A, $itle I, Boo: < of the Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987A. !ection 2+1@iA of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 881 @the '"ni)#s .lection odeA f#rther "a:es inter*ention )y ci*il ser*ice officers and e"ployees in partisan political acti*ities an election offense. The intent of both ,ongress and the framers of our ,onstitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mista<en.
9ut "ection 2+C,, Article 'N79 of the 1485 Constitution and the implementing statutes appl$ onl$ to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that =GtIhe civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the 9overnment, including government:owned or controlled corporations with original charters.0 This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. #olitical partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included. NSection "'a) of .esolution !B4!, Section %$ of ./ ($B(, and Section BB of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode 7o 2ot Miolate the 6qual #rotection ,lause In tr#th, this o#rt has already r#led s6#arely on whether these dee"ed9 resigned pro*isions challenged in the case at )ar *iolate the e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion in (ariNas, et al. *. .5ec#ti*e !ecretary, et al.
$he petitioners in (ariNas th#s )ro#ght an e6#al protection challenge against !ection 1B, with the end in *iew of ha*ing the dee"ed9resigned pro*isions =apply e6#ally> to )oth elected and appointi*e officials. 8e held, howe*er, that the legal dichotom$ created b$ the (egislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. onse6#ently, the contention that !ection 1B of the (air .lection Act, in relation to !ections ++ and +7 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, infringed on the e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion, failed "#ster. In said case, the o#rt r#led that2 2"ubstantial distinctions clearl$ e%ist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. An the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. /nother substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, ,hapter !, Title ;, Subsection /. ,ivil Service ,ommission, 1oo< M of the /dministrative ,ode of %(!4 '6xecutive Arder 2o. &(&), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or ta<e 'sic) part in any election except to vote. Cnder the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to ta<e part in political and electoral activities. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 42 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 1y repealing Section B4 but retaining Section BB of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. "ince the classification #ustif$ing "ection 1C of /ep. Act Fo. 400=, i.e., elected officials vis7O7vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the e.ual protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.3 $he o#rt declared these pro*isions co"pliant with the e6#al protection cla#se. It held that (9) in reg#lating the speech of its e"ployees, the state as e"ployer has interests that differ significantly fro" those it possesses in reg#lating the speech of the citi&enry in generalG (99) the co#rts "#st therefore )alance the legiti"ate interest of e"ployee free e5pression against the interests of the e"ployer in pro"oting efficiency of p#)lic ser*icesG (999) if the e"ployeesK e5pression interferes with the "aintenance of efficient and reg#larly f#nctioning ser*ices, the li"itation on speech is not #nconstit#tionalG and (9>) the Legislat#re is to )e gi*en so"e fle5i)ility or latit#de in ascertaining which positions are to )e co*ered )y any stat#tory restrictions. Therefore, insofar as government emplo$ees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an ;2T6.6ST:1/L/2,;29 /##.A/,H, a means7end scrutin$ that e%amines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in .uestion. NSection "'a) of .esolution !B4!, Section %$ of ./ ($B(, and Section BB of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode 7o 2ot Suffer from Averbreadth >irst , according to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overl$ broad because the$ appl$ indiscriminatel$ to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard for the t$pe of position being held b$ the emplo$ee running for elective office and the degree of influence that ma$ be attendant thereto. Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy+ the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a =powerful political machine0 that has amassed =the scattered powers of government wor<ers0 so as to give itself and its incumbent wor<ers an =unbrea<able grasp on the reins of power.0 Second , the assailed 8ecision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overl$ broad because the$ are made to appl$ indiscriminatel$ to all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard for the t$pe of elective office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or baranga$ level. The Court ruled that? A perusal of /esolution 8=58 will immediatel$ disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in connection with the Day %3, &3%3 2ational and Local 6lections. Abviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section "'a) of .esolution !B4!, were issued specifically for purposes of the Day %3, &3%3 2ational and Local 6lections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section "'a) of ./ !B4! applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the Day %3, &3%3 2ational and Local 6lections. An this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section "'a) is clearly unsustainable. "imilarl$, a considered review of "ection 1; of /A 4;=4 and "ection == of the Kmnibus 1lection Code, in con#unction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these provisions are li<ewise not intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices. The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices, since these are the only elections in this country which involve nonpartisan public offices. ;n this regard, it is well to note that from as far bac< as the enactment of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode in %(!5, ,ongress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by S#6,;/L .CL6S, including a separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section $( of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode. In the Jnited !tates, clai"s of facial o*er)readth ha*e )een entertained only where, in the -#dg"ent of the co#rt, the possi)ility that protected speech of others "ay )e "#ted and percei*ed grie*ances left to fester @d#e to the possi)le inhi)itory effects of o*erly )road stat#tesA o#tweighs the possi)le har" to society in allowing so"e #nprotected speech or cond#ct to go #np#nished. (acial o*er)readth has li:ewise not )een in*o:ed where a li"iting constr#ction co#ld )e placed on the challenged stat#te, and where there are readily apparent constr#ctions that wo#ld c#re, or at least s#)stantially red#ce, the alleged o*er)readth of the stat#te.
;n the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less li<ely evil of having arguably protected candidacies bloc<ed by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. &92'+A+ )0 '.. >. T;) P;9.9EE9,) T210; C+DD9((9+, GR N+. 192935? D)/)D8)2 7, 2010 !. M),*+F' FACTS" COMMISSIONER !OSE T. ALMONTE >(. HONORA&LE CONRADO M. VASJUE$ ',* CONCERNED CITI$ENS G.R. N+. 953%7 M': 23, 1995 $o p#t this case in perspecti*e it sho#ld )e stated at the o#tset that it does not concern a de"and )y a citi&en for infor"ation #nder the freedo" of infor"ation g#arantee of the onstit#tion. %ather it concerns the power of the 'ffice of the '")#ds"an to o)tain e*idence in connection with an in*estigation cond#cted )y it *is9a9*is the clai" of pri*ilege of an agency of the ,o*ern"ent. F'/0(" 0etitioner Al"onte was for"erly o""issioner of the .cono"ic Intelligence and In*estigation B#rea# @.IIBA, while 0ere& is hief of the .IIBIs B#dget and (iscal Manage"ent Di*ision. $he s#)poena d#ces tec#" was iss#ed )y the '")#ds"an in connection with his in*estigation of an anony"o#s letter, written )y an e"ployee of the .IIB and a concerned citi&en, alleging that f#nds representing sa*ings fro" #nfilled positions in the .IIB had )een illegally dis)#rsed. $here were #nfilled positions )eca#se one h#ndred ninety @19?A personnel were dis"issed, and allegedly, these 19? personnel contin#ed to recei*e their salaries as =ghost agents.> 0etitioner Al"onte denied the allegations and as:ed that the co"plaint )e dis"issed and the case considered closed. !i"ilarly petitioner 0ere&, )#dget chief of the .IIB, denied sa*ings had )een reali&ed fro" the i"ple"entation of of ..'. 3o. 127 @dis"issal of 19? personnel.A $ he ,raft In*estigation 'fficer of the '")#ds"anIs office, Hose (. !aNo as:ed for a#thority to cond#ct a preli"inary in*estigation. Anticipating the grant of his re6#est, he iss#ed a s#)poena to petitioners Al"onte and 0ere&, re6#iring the" to s#)"it their co#nter9affida*its and the affida*its of their witnesses, as well as a s#)poena d#ces tec#" to the hief of the .IIBIs Acco#nting Di*ision ordering hi" to )ring /all doc#"ents relating to 0ersonal !er*ices (#nds for the year 1988 and all e*idence, s#ch as *o#chers @salaryA for the whole plantilla of .IIB for 1988./ 0etitioners Al"onte and 0ere& "o*ed to 6#ash the s#)poena and the s#)poena d#ces tec#". %espondent '")#ds"an granted the "otion to 6#ash the s#)poena in *iew of the fact that there were no affida*its filed against petitioners. B#t he denied their "otion to 6#ash the s#)poena d#ces tec#". 1e r#led that petitioners were not )eing forced to prod#ce e*idence against the"sel*es, since the s#)poena d#ces tec#" was directed to the hief Acco#ntant, petitioner 3erio %ogado. In addition the '")#ds"an ordered the hief of the %ecords a !ection of the .IIB, petitioner .lisa %i*era, to prod#ce )efore the in*estigator /all doc#"ents relating to 0ersonnel !er*ice (#nds, for the year 1988, and all doc#"ents, salary *o#chers for the whole plantilla of the .IIB for 1988, within ten @1?A days fro" receipt hereof./ 0etitioners Al"onte and 0ere& "o*ed for reconsideration, stating that, the '")#ds"an can act only /in any appropriate case, and s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law/ and that the co"plaint in this case is #nsigned and #n*erified, th#s the case is not an appropriate one. According to the", those co"plainants who wrote the letter sho#ld )e identified and sho#ld sign the co"plaint. 'therwise, their right #nder the e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion will )e *iolated. $he "otion for reconsideration, ha*ing )een denied, hence, this petition. I((1)2 8o3 petitonerKs right to e6#al protection of the laws has )een *iolated. H).*" 3'. The Constitution e%pressl$ en#oins the Kmbudsman to act on an$ complaint filed -in any form or manner- concerning official acts or omissions. +Art. N', P 12,? The Kmbudsman and his 8eputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptl$ on complaints filed in an$ form or manner against public officials or emplo$ees of the Aovernment, or an$ subdivision, agenc$, or instrumentalit$ thereof, including government7 owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notif$ the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. $he '")#ds"an Act of 1989 pro*ides in \ 2+@2A2 $he 'ffice of the '")#ds"an shall recei*e co"plaints fro" any so#rce in whate*er for" concerning an official act or o"ission. It shall act on the co"plaint i""ediately and if it finds the sa"e entirely )aseless, it shall dis"iss the sa"e and infor" the co"plainant of s#ch dis"issal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasona)le gro#nd to in*estigate f#rther, it shall first f#rnish the respondent p#)lic officer or e"ployee with a s#""ary of the co"plaint and re6#ire hi" to s#)"it a written answer within se*enty9two ho#rs fro" receipt thereof. If the answer is fo#nd satisfactory, it shall dis"iss the case. Accordingly, in Dia& *. !andigan)ayan the o#rt held that testi"ony gi*en at a fact9finding in*estigation and charges "ade in a pleading in a case in co#rt constit#ted a s#fficient )asis for the '")#ds"an to co""ence in*estigation, )eca#se a for"al co"plaint was really not necessary. %ather than referring to the for" of co"plaints, therefore, the phrase /in an appropriate case/ in Art. ;I, \ 12 "eans any case concerning official act or o"ission which is alleged to )e /illegal, #n-#st, i"proper, or inefficient./ $he phrase /s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 43 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 "ay )e pro*ided )y law/ refers to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y ongress or, in the a)sence thereof, to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e i"posed )y the co#rts. Such limitations may well include a requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as exception to the general nature of the proceedings in the Affice of the Ambudsman. / reconciliation is thereby made between the demands of national security and the requirement of accountability enshrined in the ,onstitution. -hat has been said above disposes of petitioners@ contention that the anon$mous letter7complaint against them is nothing but a ve%atious prosecution. ;t only remains to say that the general investigation in the AmbudsmanF s office is precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the State from useless and expensive trials. There ma$ also be benefit resulting from such limited in camera inspection in terms of increased public confidence that the privilege is not being abused and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring. 2or is there violation of petitionerFs right to the equal protection of the laws. #etitioners complain that -in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,- while in proceedings before the Affice of the Ambudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation.
;n the first place, there can be no ob*ection to this procedure because it is provided in the ,onstitution itself. ;n the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints -in any form and in a manner,- the framers of the ,onstitution too< into account the well: <nown reticence of the people which <eep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. Thirdly, the Affice of the Ambudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those sub*ect to its *urisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. An the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple fol< who cannot afford to hire lawyers . $he '")#ds"an is designated )y the onstit#tion /protectors of the people/ and as s#ch they are re6#ired )y it /to act pro"ptly on co"plaints in any for" or "anner against p#)lic officials or e"ployees of the ,o*ern"ent, or any s#)di*ision, agency or instr#"entality thereof, incl#ding go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporation./ .*en if the s#)poenaed doc#"ents are treated as pres#"pti*ely pri*ileged, this decision wo#ld only -#stify ordering their inspection in ca"era )#t not their nonprod#ction. A)o*e all, there "#st )e a scr#p#lo#s protection of the doc#"ents deli*ered. $he o#rt th#s dis"issed the petition, )#t it is directed that the inspection of s#)poenaed doc#"ents )e "ade personally in ca"era )y the '")#ds"an, and with all the safeg#ards o#tlined in this decision. @NOTE" 0etitioners complain that -in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed , while in proceedings before the Affice of the Ambudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can )e no o)-ection to this proced#re )eca#se it is pro*ided in the onstit#tion itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints -in any form and in a manner,- the framers of the ,onstitution too< into account the well:<nown reticence of the people which <eep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this o#rt had occasion to point o#t, the 'ffice of the '")#ds"an is different fro" the other in*estigatory and prosec#tory agencies of the go*ern"ent )eca#se those s#)-ect to its -#risdiction are p#)lic officials who, thro#gh official press#re and infl#ence, can 6#ash, delay or dis"iss in*estigations held against the". 'n the other hand co"plainants are "ore often than not poor and si"ple fol: who cannot afford to hire lawyers. A ORMOC SUGAR COMPAN-, INC., >(. TREASURER OF ORMOC CIT- G.R. N+. L23794, F)821'2: 17, 19%8, &ENG$ON, !.P., !." F'/0(" In19+B, the M#nicipal Board of 'r"oc ity passed 'rdinance 3o. B i"posing /on any and all prod#ctions of centrif#gal s#gar "illed at the 'r"oc !#gar o"pany, Inc., in 'r"oc ity a "#nicipal ta5 e6#i*alent to one per cent#" @1MA per e5port sale to J!A and other foreign co#ntries./ 0ay"ents for said ta5 were "ade, #nder protest, )y 'r"oc !#gar o"pany, Inc. 'r"oc !#gar o"pany, Inc. filed )efore the (I with ser*ice of a copy #pon the !olicitor ,eneral, a co"plaint against the ity of 'r"oc as well as its $reas#rer, M#nicipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore9stated ordinance is #nconstit#tional for )eing *iolati*e of the e6#al protection cla#se and the r#le of #nifor"ity of ta5ation, aside fro" )eing an e5port ta5 for)idden #nder !ection 2287 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode.$he respondent asserted that the ta5 ordinance was within the cityIs power to enact #nder the Local A#tono"y Act and that the sa"e did not *iolate the afore9cited constit#tional li"itations. I((1)" 8hether or not the ordinance *iolates the e6#al protection cla#se. H).*" Des. $he onstit#tion in the )ill of rights pro*ides2 /. . . nor shall any person )e denied the e6#al protection of the laws./ $he e6#al protection cla#se applies only to persons or things identically sit#ated and does not )ar a reasona)le classification of the s#)-ect of legislation, and a classification is reasona)le where @1A it is )ased on s#)stantial distinctions which "a:e real differencesG @2A these are ger"ane to the p#rpose of the lawG @4A the classification applies not only to present conditions )#t also to f#t#re conditions which are s#)stantially identical to those of the presentG @BA the classification applies only to those who )elong to the sa"e class. A per#sal of the re6#isites instantly shows that the 6#estioned ordinance does not "eet the", for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Armoc Sugar ,ompany, ;nc. and none other. At the time of the ta%ing ordinance@s enactment, Krmoc "ugar Compan$, 'nc., was the onl$ sugar central in the cit$ of Krmoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The ta%ing ordinance should not be singular and e%clusive as to e%clude an$ subse.uentl$ established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the ta%. As it is now, even if later a similar compan$ is set up, it cannot be sub#ect to the ta% because the ordinance e%pressl$ points onl$ to Krmoc Cit$ "ugar Compan$, 'nc. as the entit$ to be levied upon. ART.2 SEARCHES & SEIZURES PEOPLE >(. MARTI G.R. N+. 815%1, !',1'2: 18,1991 FACTS" Andre Marti went to the )ooth of the Manila 0ac:ing and .5port (orwarders in the 0istang 0ilipino o"ple5, .r"ita, Manila, carrying with the" B gift9 wrapped pac:ages. $he pac:ages were not inspected )y Anita %eyes, the proprietress, as Marti ref#sed, who ass#red her that the pac:ages si"ply contained )oo:s, cigars, and glo*es and were gifts to his friend in X#rich. &owever, before deliver$ of appellant@s bo% to the 9ureau of Customs andM or 9ureau of 6osts, 0r. >ob /e$es, proprietor and husband of Anita /e$es, following standard operating procedure, opened the bo%es for final inspection. -hen he opened appellant@s bo%, a peculiar order emitted therefrom. &is curiosit$ aroused. &e s.ueeEed one of the bundles allegedl$ containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Kpening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. &e made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. >ob /e$es reported the incident to the F9' and re.uested a laborator$ e%amination of the samples he e%tracted from the cellophane wrapper. It t#rned o#t that the dried lea*es were "ari-#ana flowering tops as certified )y the forensic che"ist of the 3arcotics !ection of the 3BI. U $hereafter, an infor"ation was filed against appellant for *iolation of %.A. +B27 @Dangero#s Dr#gs ActA. Appellant contends that the e*idence s#)-ect of the i"p#ted offense had )een o)tained in *iolation of his constit#tional rights against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res and pri*acy of co""#nication and therefore arg#es that the sa"e sho#ld )e held inad"issi)le in e*idence. ISSUE" 8hether or not an act of a pri*ate indi*id#al, allegedly in *iolation of appellantIs constit#tional rights, )e in*o:ed against the stateC RULING" 3'. In the a)sence of go*ern"ental interference, the li)erties g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion cannot )e in*o:ed against the !tate. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of oneFs person, whether citien or alien, from interference by government.The contraband in the case at bar came into possession of the government without the latter transgressing appellantFs rights against unreasonable searches and seiures. $he constit#tional proscription against #nlawf#l searches and sei&#res applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tas<ed with the enforcement of the law. $h#s, it co#ld only )e in*o:ed against the !tate to who" the restraint against ar)itrary and #nreasona)le e5ercise of power is i"posed. ;f the search is made at the behest or initiation of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable searches and seiures cannot be invo<ed for only the act of private individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. ;n sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seiures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. STONEHILL >(. DIO7NO G.R. N+. L19550, !1,) 19, 19%7 F'/0(" Jpon application of the officers of the go*ern"ent @respondent prosec#torsA, se*eral -#dges @respondent -#dgesA iss#ed a total of B2 search warrants against petitioners Y or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to an$ peace officer, to search the persons named andM or the premises of their offices, warehouses, andM or San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 44 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 residences, and to seiEe several personal properties as the -sub*ect of the offenseJ stolen or embeelled or the fruits of the offense,- or -used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense- as violation of ,entral 1an< Laws, Tariff and ,ustoms Laws 'T,,), 2;., and the .#,.- Alleging that the afore"entioned search warrants are n#ll Y *oid, said petitioners !tonehill, et.al. filed wR the ! this original action for certiorari, prohi)ition, "anda"#s and in-#nction. I((1)(" 1. 8hether the right against #nlafwf#l search and sei&#res "ay )e in*o:ed )y artificial )eingsC 2. 8hether or not the search warrants in 6#estion were *alidly iss#edC 4. 8hether or not the articles sei&ed )y *irt#e of the warrants are ad"issi)le in e*idenceC H).*" 1. D.!. Artificial )eings are also entitiled to the g#arantee altho#gh they "ay )e re6#ired to open their )oo:s of acco#nts for e5a"ination )y the !tate in the e5ercise of 0'LI. 0'8.%. 2. D.!. $wo points "#st )e stressed in connection with Art. III, !ection 2 of the onstit#tion2 @aA that no warrant shall iss#e )#t #pon pro)a)le ca#se to )e deter"ined )y the -#dge in the "anner set forth thereinG and @)A that the warrant shall partic#larly descri)e the things to )e sei&ed. 3one of these re6#ire"ents has )een co"plied with. 'ndeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and #uridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central 9ank (aws, Tariff and Customs (aws, 'nternal /evenue +Code, and /evised 6enal Code./2o specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a conse.uence, it was impossible for the #udges who issued the warrants to have found the e%istence of a probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the part$ against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. $o #phold the *alidity of the warrants in 6#estion wo#ld )e to wipe o#t co"pletely one of the "ost f#nda"ental rights g#aranteed in o#r onstit#tion, for it wo#ld place the sanctity of the do"icile and the pri*acy of co""#nication and correspondence at the "ercy of the whi"s, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted L to outlaw the so:called general warrants. ;t is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of <een political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is li<ely to wrest it, even though by legal means. !#ch is the serio#sness of the irreg#larities co""itted in connection with the disp#ted search warrants, that this o#rt dee"ed it fit to a"end !ection 4 of %#le 122 of the for"er %#les of o#rt 1B )y pro*iding in its co#nterpart, #nder the %e*ised %#les of o#rt 17 that /a search warrant shall not iss#e #pon pro)a)le ca#se in connection with one specific offense./ 3ot satisfied with this 6#alification, the o#rt added thereto a paragraph, directing that -no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.- $he gra*e *iolation of the onstit#tion "ade in the application for the contested search warrants was co"po#nded )y the description therein "ade of the effects to )e searched for and sei&ed, to wit2 /Boo:s of acco#nts, financial records, *o#chers, -o#rnals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit -o#rnals, typewriters, and other doc#"ents andRor papers showing all )#siness transactions incl#ding dis)#rse"ent receipts, )alance sheets and related profit and loss state"ents./ $h#s, the warrants a#thori&ed the search for and sei&#re of records pertaining to /LL )#siness transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. $he warrants sanctioned the sei&#re of all records of the petitioners and the afore"entioned corporations, whate*er their nat#re, th#s openly contra*ening the e5plicit co""and of o#r Bill of %ights E that the things to )e sei&ed )e partic#larly descri)ed E as well as tending to defeat its "a-or o)-ecti*e2 the eli"ination of general warrants. 9eneral search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. $he warrants sanctioned the sei&#re of all records of the petitioners and the afore"entioned corporations, whate*er their nat#re, th#s openly contra*ening the e5plicit co""and of o#r Bill of %ights99 THAT THE THINGS TO &E SEI$ED &E PARTICULARL- DESCRI&ED9 as well as tending to defeat its "a-or o)-ecti*e2 the eli"ination of general warrants. 4. 3'. %elying #pon Moncado *s. 0eopleIs o#rt @8? 0hil. 1A, %espondent9 0rosec#tors "aintain that, e*en if the searches and sei&#res #nder consideration were #nconstit#tional, the doc#"ents, papers and things th#s sei&ed are ad"issi)le in e*idence against petitioners herein. !pon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimousl$ of the opinion that the position taken in the 0oncado case must be abandoned. !aid position was in line with the A"erican co""on law r#le, that the cri"inal sho#ld not )e allowed to go free "erely /)eca#se the consta)le has )l#ndered,/ #pon the theory that the constit#tional prohi)ition against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res is protected )y "eans other than the e5cl#sion of e*idence #nlawf#lly o)tained, s#ch as the co""on9law action for da"ages against the searching officer, against the party who proc#red the iss#ance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the e5ec#tion of an illegal search, their cri"inal p#nish"ent, resistance, witho#t lia)ility to an #nlawf#l sei&#re, and s#ch other legal re"edies as "ay )e pro*ided )y other laws. 1owe*er, "ost co""on law -#risdictions ha*e already gi*en #p this approach and e*ent#ally adopted THE E3CLUSIONAR- RULE, reali&ing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional in*unction against unreasonable searches and seiures. In the lang#age of H#dge Learned 1and2 -/s we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. ;n earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enoughJ but that is true no longer. Anly in case the prosecution which itself controls the seiing officials, <nows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed-. 8e hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case "#st )e, as it is here)y, a)andonedG that the warrants for the search of three @4A residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the %esol#tion of H#ne 29, 19+2 are n#ll and *oid. S+.9>), >(. M'G'(9'2 GR N+. 82585, N+>)D8)2 14, 1988 F'/0(" 0etitioner L#is Beltran contends, a"ong others, that his constit#tional rights were *iolated when respondent -#dge issued a warrant of arrest against him without personall$ e%amining the complainant and the witnesses, if an$, to determine probable cause. 0etitioner contends that the onstit#tion now re6#ires the -#dge to personally e5a"ine the co"plainant and his witnesses in his deter"ination of pro)a)le ca#se for the iss#ance of warrants of arrests. $he )asis for his contention was the fact that the word =personally> was added after the word =deter"ined>, and the phrase =other responsi)le officers as "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law> was o"itted. I((1)" Is the petitionerKs contention correctC H).*" 3o. $he pertinent onstit#tional pro*ision is highlighted herein )elow2
A20. III, S)/. 2. T;) 29A;0 +< 0;) E)+E.) 0+ 8) ()/12) 9, 0;)92 E)2(+,(, ;+1()(, E'E)2( ',* )<<)/0( 'A'9,(0 1,2)'(+,'8.) ()'2/;)( ',* ()9F12)( +< @;'0)>)2 ,'012) ',* <+2 ',: E12E+() (;'.. 8) 9,>9+.'8.), ',* ,+ ()'2/; @'22',0 +2 @'22',0 +< '22)(0 (;'.. 9((1) )C/)E0 1E+, E2+8'8.) /'1() 0+ 8) *)0)2D9,)* personally 8: 0;) B1*A) '<0)2 )C'D9,'09+, 1,*)2 +'0; +2 '<<92D'09+, +< 0;) /+DE.'9,',0 ',* 0;) @90,)(()( ;) D': E2+*1/), ',* E'209/1.'2.: *)(/2989,A 0;) E.'/) 0+ 8) ()'2/;)* ',* 0;) E)2(+,( +2 0;9,A( 0+ 8) ()9F)*. $he addition of the word -personally- after the word -determined- and the deletion of the grant of a#thority )y the 1974 onstit#tion to iss#e warrants to /other responsi)le officers as "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law/, has apparently con*inced petitioner Beltran that the onstit#tion now re6#ires the -#dge to personally e5a"ine the co"plainant and his witnesses deter"ination of pro)a)le ca#se for the iss#ance of warrants of arrest. $his is not an acc#rate interpretation. -hat the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing *udge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. 'n satisf$ing himself of the e%istence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, TH6 8C796 ;S 2AT .6EC;.67 TA #6.SA2/LL@ 6H/D;26 TH6 ,AD#L/;2/2T /27 H;S W;T26SS6S. Lollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall? +1, personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrestJ or +2, if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscalFs report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. !o#nd policy dictates this proced#re, otherwise -#dges wo#ld )e #nd#ly laden with the preli"inary e5a"ination and in*estigation of cri"inal co"plaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed )efore their co#rts. S9.>' >(. H+,+2'8.) P2)(9*9,A !1*A) +< RTC +< N)A2+( O29),0'. GR N+. 8175%, O/0+8)2 21, 1991 San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 45 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 F'/0(" 'n H#ne 12, 198+, <illa"or, Hr., chief of the 0 3arco" Detach"ent in D#"ag#ete ity, 0ro*ince of 3egros 'riental, filed an Application for !earch 8arrant with the %$ against petitioners !il*a. %espondent H#dge, on the sa"e day iss#ed !earch 8arrant 3o. 1, directing the police officers to search the roo" of Marlon !il*a in the residence of 3ico"edes !il*a for *iolation of %A +B27 otherwise :nown as Dangero#s Dr#gs Act of 1972. D#ring the search cond#cted )y the police officers, they also sei&ed "oney )elonging to petitioner Antonieta !il*a a"o#nting to 01,241.B?. $hereafter, Antonieta !il*a filed a "otion for the ret#rn of the said a"o#nt on the gro#nd that the search warrant only a#thori&ed the police officers to sei&e "ari-#ana dried lea*es, cigarettes and -oint, and that said officers failed or ref#sed to "a:e a ret#rn of the said search warrant in *iolation of !ec. 11, %#le 12+ of the %#les of o#rt. I((1)" 8hether or not petitionersK right to personal li)erty and sec#rity of ho"es against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res as conte"plated in Art. III, !ec. 2 of the 1987 onstit#tion was *iolated. H).*2 Des. $he a)o*e"entioned section and !ecs. 4 and B, %#le 12+ of the %#les of o#rt pro*ide that the -#dge "#st, before issuing a search warrant, determine, whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witness through searching questions and answers.The o#rt held that the -#dge failed to co"ply with the legal re6#ire"ent that he "#st e5a"ine the applicant and his witness in the for" of searching 6#estions and answers in order to deter"ine the e5istence of pro)a)le ca#ses as pro*ided in the said stat#tory pro*ision. The depositions of the witnesses did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blan<s provided. =$he Fprobable causeF re6#ired to -#stify the iss#ance of a search warrant co"prehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rel$ upon them and act in pursuant thereof.'f the 8 6#estions as:ed, the 1st, 2nd and Bth pertain to identity. $he 4rd and 7th are leading not searching 6#estions. $he +th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to )e sei&ed, which is identical to that in the !earch 8arrant and s#ffers fro" the sa"e lac: of partic#larity. The examination conducted W/S 9626./L ;2 2/TC.6 /27 D6.6L@ .6#6T;T;ACS of the deposition of said witness. Dere generaliation will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.- Li:ewise, this o#rt pre*io#sly declared that search warrants iss#ed are in*alid if it is d#e to the fail#re of the -#dge to e5a"ine the witness in the for" of searching 6#estions and answers. 0ertinent portion of the decision reads2 /Moreo*er, a per#sal of the deposition of 0RLt. (lorencio Angeles shows that it was too )rief and short. .6S#A2762T 8C796 7;7 2AT 6H/D;26 H;D F;2 TH6 >A.D A> S6/.,H;29 EC6ST;A2S /27 /2SW6.SF. A2 TH6 ,A2T./.@, TH6 EC6ST;A2S /SO67 W6.6 L6/7;29 /S TH6@ ,/LL67 >A. / S;D#L6 F@6SF A. F2AF /2SW6.. As held in V#intero *s. 3BI, Ithe 6#estions propo#nded )y respondent .5ec#ti*e H#dge to the applicantIs witness are not s#fficiently searching to esta)lish pro)a)le ca#se. /s<ing of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.- Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the *udge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As /the capricio#s disregard )y the -#dge in not co"plying with the re6#ire"ents )efore iss#ance of search warrants constit#tes a)#se of discretion/. $he officers i"ple"enting the search warrant clearly a)#sed their a#thority when they sei&ed the "oney of Antonieta !il*a. $his is highly irreg#lar considering that Antonieta !il*a was not e*en na"ed as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the sei&#re of "oney )#t only of "ari-#ana lea*es, cigarettes and -oints, and that the search warrant was iss#ed for the sei&#re of personal property @aA s#)-ect of the offense and @)A #sed or intended to )e #sed as "eans of co""itting an offense and 3'$ for personal property stolen or e")e&&led or other proceeds of fr#its of the offense. $h#s, the then presiding H#dge 'ntal li:ewise a)#sed his discretion when he re-ected the "otion of petitioner Antonieta !il*a see:ing the ret#rn of her sei&ed "oney. M+2',+ >(. V9>+ GR ,+. L2219%, !1,) 30, 19%7 F'/0(" 'n 3o*e")er 24, 19+1, 0etititoner han !a# 8ah, a hinese citi&en, arri*ed in the 0hilippines to *isit her co#sin, !a"e#l Malaps, together with her "inor son, with her first "arriage, (# Dan (#n. $hey were per"itted in the 0hilippines #nder a te"porary *isitorKs *isa for 2 "onths after they posted a cash )ond of 0B,???.??. !he "arried Morano, a (ilipino citi&en. $he o""issioner of I""igration as:ed the" to lea*e the co#ntry d#e to the e5piration of the e5tensions they applied for. 'nstead of leaving, the$ petitioned the CL' of 0anila for mandamus to compel the Commissioner to cancel petitionersB Alien Certificate of /egistration) prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing a warrant of arrest. $he trial co#rt r#led in fa*o#r of han )#t dis"issed the petition with respect to (# Dan (#n. Both petitioners and respondent appealed. 0etitioners assail the constit#tionality of !ec. 47 @aA of the I""igration Act of 19B?, which states that, 2The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of 'mmigration or an$ other officer designated b$ him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of 'mmigration after a determination b$ the 9oard of Commissioners of the e%istence of the ground deportation as charged against the alien %%%.3 0etitioners contend that the a)o*e pro*ision trenches #pon the constit#tional "andate in /rt. ;;;, Sec. % '$). They say that the ,onstitution limits to *udges the authority to issue warrants of arrest. I((1)" 8hether or not !ec. 47 @aA of the I""igration Act of 19B? is #nconstit#tional. H).*" 3o. $he o#rt held that, !ec. 1 @4A, Art. III does not re6#ire -#dicial inter*ention in the e5ec#tion of a final order of deportation iss#ed in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of *udicial power /S / ST6# #.6L;D;2/.@ A. ;2,;762T/L TA #.AS6,CT;A2 A. #.A,667;29S >A. / 9;M62 A>>62S6 A. /7D;2;ST./T;M6 /,T;A2, ,+0 '( / D6/SC.6 ;27;S#62S/1L6 TA ,/..@ ACT / M/L;7 76,;S;A2 1@ / ,AD#6T62T A>>;,;/L , such as legal order of deportation, issued by the ,ommissioner of ;mmigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation. ;t is thoroughly established that ,ongress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. Awing to the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after / fair though summary hearing, are made conclusive. The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crimeJ nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law with the polic$ of congress is purel$ accidental, and, though supported b$ the same facts, a criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and independent. ;n consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section %'$), /rticle ;;; of the ,onstitution aforesaid requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a *udge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. $he *iew, we, here e5press f#nds s#pport in the disc#ssions d#ring the constit#tional con*ention. $he con*ention recogni&ed, as sanctioned )y d#e process, possi)ilities and cases of depri*ation of li)erty, other than )y order of a co"petent co#rt. Indeed, the power to deport or e5pel aliens is an attri)#te of so*ereignty. !#ch power is planted on the /accepted "a5i" of international law, that e*ery so*ereign nation has the power, as inherent in so*ereignty, and essential to self9preser*ation, to for)id the entrance of foreigners within its do"inions./ !o it is, that this o#rt once aptly re"ar:ed that there can )e no contro*ersy on the fact that where aliens are ad"itted as te"porary *isitors, /the law is to the effect that te"porary *isitors who do not depart #pon the e5piration of the period of stay granted the" are s#)-ect to deportation )y the o""issioner of I""igration, for ha*ing *iolated the li"itation or condition #nder which they were ad"itted as non9i""igrants @I""igration Law, !ec. 47@aA, s#)section @7A .A. +14, as a"endedA. And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the o""issioner to iss#e warrants of arrest was challenged as #nconstit#tional )eca#se /s#ch power is only *ested in a -#dge )y !ection 1, paragraph 4, Article III of o#r onstit#tion/, this o#rt declared E -This argument overloo<s the fact that the stay of appellant 2g Hua To as temporary visitor is sub*ect to certain contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them, that in case of breach the ,ommissioner may require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has been filed. The ,ommissioner did nothing but to enforce such condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the ,ommissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under section $4 'a) of ,ommonwealth /ct B%$. / contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.- It is in this conte5t that we r#le that !ection 47 @aA of the I""igration Act of 19B? is not constit#tionally proscri)ed. H'2>): >(. S',09'A+ GR N+. 82544, !1,) 28, 1988 F'/0(" 0etitioners were a"ong the twenty9two s#spected pedophiles who were apprehended after a three7month surveillance b$ the Commission on 'mmigration and 8eportation +C'8, in 6agsan#an, (aguna. $hey were apprehended )y *irt#e of Mission 'rders iss#ed )y respondent !antiago. 0etitioner contends the *alidity of their detention in ID Detention enter, assailing, inter alia, that respondent *iolated Art. III, !ec. 2 of the 1987 onstit#tion prohi)iting #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res since ID agents were not clothed with *alid 8arrants of arrest, search and sei&#res as re6#ired )y the said pro*ision. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 46 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 I((1)(" 1. 8hether or not there was a *alid warrantless arrestC 2. Ass#"ing arg#endo that the arrest was not *alid, is there a *alid )asis for the confine"ent of herein petitionerC 4. Is the onstit#tional prohi)ition against warrantless arrest Y searches applica)le hereinC H).*" 1. D.!. $here can )e no 6#estion that the right against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res g#aranteed )y Article III, !ection 2 of the 1987 onstit#tion, is a*aila)le to all persons, incl#ding aliens, whether acc#sed of cri"e or not @Moncado *s. 0eopleIs o#rt, 8? 0hil. 1 O19B8P. 'ne of the constit#tional re6#ire"ents of a *alid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it "#st )e )ased #pon pro)a)le ca#se. 0ro)a)le ca#se has )een defined as referring to /s#ch facts and circ#"stances antecedent to the iss#ance of the warrant that in the"sel*es are s#fficient to ind#ce a ca#tio#s "an to rely on the" and act in p#rs#ance thereof>. $he 1987 %#les on ri"inal 0roced#re also pro*ide that an arrest without a warrant ma$ be effected b$ a peace officer or even a private person +1, when such person has committed, actuall$ committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence) and +2, when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it @%#le 114, !ection 7A. ;n this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three '$) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause *ustified the arrest and the seiure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seied as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence @!ection 12, %#le 12+, 1987 %#les on ri"inal 0roced#reA. 2. D.!. 6ven assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on B March 1988. 8arrants of arrest were iss#ed against the" on 7 March 1988 /for *iolation of !ection 47, B7 and B+ of the I""igration Act and !ection +9 of the Ad"inistrati*e ode.- / hearing is presently being conducted by a 1oard of Special ;nquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed ',ru vs. Dontoya, L:$(!&$, >ebruary &5, %(45, B& S,./ 5"$). -Where a personFs detention was later made by virtue of a *udicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic- @Beltran *s. ,arcia, L9B9?1B, April 4?, 1979, 89 !%A 717A. 't is a fundamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning @Mats#ra *s. Director of 0risons, 77 0hil. 1?7? O19B7PA. That petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest illegal. #etitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with >ohn "herman being naked, !nder those circumstances the C'8 agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed -pedophilia- defined as -psycho: sexual perversion involving children- ' Qraft71bbing 6s$chopatia "e%ualis, p. III) 6araphilia +or unusual se%ual activit$, in which children are the preferred se%ual ob#ect +-ebster@s Third Few 'nternational 8ictionar$, 1451 ed., p. 1==I, :"olicitor Aeneral@s /eturn of the -rit, on p. 10<. While not a crime under the .evised #enal ,ode, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well:being of our youth '/rticle ;;, Section %$, %(!4 ,onstitution). /t any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity @allanta *. <illan#e*a, L92B+B+ Y L92B+7B, H#ne 2?, 1977, 77 !%A 477G Bagcal *s. <illara&a, L9+177?, Han#ary 41, 1984, 12? !%A 727A. 4. 3'. $he deportation charges instit#ted )y respondent o""issioner are in accordance with !ection 47@aA of the 0hilippine I""igration Act of 19B?, in relation to !ection +9 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode. !ection 47@aA pro*ides in part2 'a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the ,ommissioner of ;mmigration and 7eportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the ,ommissioner of ;mmigration and 7eportation after a determination by the 1oard of ,ommissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alienJ The foregoing provision should be construed in its entiret$ in view of the summar$ and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the ver$ purpose of deportation proceedings would be defeated. Section $4'a) is not constitutionally proscribed 'Dorano vs. Mivo, L: &&%(B, 8une $3, %(B4, &3 S,./ 5B&). The specific constraints in both the %($5 and %(!4 ,onstitutions, which are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. 7eportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. /n order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. ;t is preventive, not a penal process. ;t need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary ,ourt proceedings. -;t is of course well:settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has bro<en the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders. The deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings . ;t is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. ;t is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unpre*udiced investigators. However, all the strict rules of evidence governing *udicial controversies do not need to be observedJ only such as are fundamental and essential, li<e the right of cross:examination. A.>'2)F >(. CFI G.R. N+. 45358, !',1'2: 29, 1937 F'/0(" 'n H#ne 4, 194+, the chief of the secret ser*ice of the Anti9Js#ry Board, of the Depart"ent of H#stice, presented to H#dge .d#ardo ,#tierre& Da*id then presiding o*er the o#rt of (irst Instance of $aya)as, an affida*it alleging that according to relia)le infor"ation, the petitioner :ept in his ho#se in Infanta, $aya)as, )oo:s, doc#"ents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers #sed )y hi" in connection with his acti*ities as a "oney9lender, charging #s#rio#s rates of interest in *iolation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affida*it, the chief of the secret ser*ice stated that his answers to the 6#estions were correct to the )est of his :nowledge and )elief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own <nowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Jpon the affida*it in 6#estion the -#dge, on said date, iss#ed the warrant which is the s#)-ect "atter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitionerIs ho#se at any ti"e of the day or night, the sei&#re of the )oo:s and doc#"ents a)o*e9 "entioned and the i""ediate deli*ery thereof to hi" to )e disposed of in accordance with the law. 8ith said warrant, se*eral agents of the Anti9 Js#ry Board entered the petitionerIs store and residence at se*en oIcloc: on the night of H#ne B, 194+, and sei&ed and too: possession of the following articles2 internal re*en#e licenses for the years 1944 to 194+, one ledger, two -o#rnals, two cash)oo:s, nine order )oo:s, fo#r note)oo:s, fo#r chec: st#)s, two "e"orand#"s, three )an:)oo:s, two contracts, fo#r st#)s, forty9eight st#)s of p#rchases of copra, two in*entories, two )#ndles of )ills of lading, one )#ndle of credit receipts, one )#ndle of st#)s of p#rchases of copra, two pac:ages of correspondence, one receipt )oo: )elonging to L#is (ernande&, fo#rteen )#ndles of in*oices and other papers, "any doc#"ents and loan contracts with sec#rity and pro"issory notes, 7?B chits, pro"issory notes and st#)s of #sed chec:s of the 1ong:ong Y !hanghai Ban:ing orporation. $he search for and sei&#re of said articles were "ade with the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest )elow the in*entories on the gro#nd that the agents sei&ed e*en the originals of the doc#"ents. As the articles had not )een )ro#ght i""ediately to the -#dge who iss#ed the search warrant, the petitioner, thro#gh his attorney, filed a "otion on H#ne 8, 194+, praying that the agent ."ilio L. !iongco, or any other agent, )e ordered i""ediately to deposit all the sei&ed articles in the office of the cler: of co#rt and that said agent )e declared g#ilty of conte"pt for ha*ing diso)eyed the order of the co#rt. $he petitioner as:s that the warrant of H#ne 4, 194+, iss#ed )y the o#rt of (irst Instance of $aya)as, ordering the search of his ho#se and the sei&#re, at any ti"e of the day or night, of certain acco#nting )oo:s, doc#"ents and papers )elonging to hi" in his residence sit#ated in Infanta, 0ro*ince of $aya)as, as well as the order of a later date, a#thori&ing the agents of the Anti9Js#ry Board to retain the articles sei&ed, )e declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in 6#estion )e ret#rned to hi". I((1)" Is the warrant of arrest herein illegally iss#edC H).*" D.!. !ection 1, paragraph 4, of Article III of the onstit#tion, relati*e to the )ill of rights, pro*ides that /$he right of the people to )e sec#re in their persons, ho#ses, papers, and effects against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res shall not )e *iolated, and no warrants shall iss#e )#t #pon pro)a)le ca#se, to )e deter"ined )y the -#dge after e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witnesses he "ay prod#ce, and partic#larly descri)ing the place to )e searched, and the persons or things to )e sei&ed./ !ection 97 of ,eneral 'rders, 3o. 78 pro*ides that -/ search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seied.- It will )e noted that )oth pro*isions require that there be not San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 47 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. ;n its broadest sense, an = A/TH0 includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfullyJ and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person ta<ing it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to 9od. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal <nowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual ma<ing the affidavit and see<ing the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause .The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that #6.8C.@ could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. It will li:ewise )e noted that section 1, paragraph 4, of Article III of the onstit#tion prohi)its #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res. Jnreasona)le searches and sei&#res are a "enace against which the constit#tional g#aranties afford f#ll protection. $he ter" -unreasonable search and seiure- is not defined in the Constitution or in Aeneral Krders, Fo. I8, and it is said to have no fi%ed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. /ll illegal searches and seiures are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seiure in any particular case is purely a *udicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seiure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured In *iew of the foregoing and #nder the a)o*e9cited a#thorities, it appears that TH6 />>;7/M;T , which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seiure of the boo<s, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was sub*ected. Another gro#nd alleged )y the petitioner in as:ing that the search warrant )e declared illegal and cancelled is that it was not s#pported )y other affida*its aside fro" that "ade )y the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot )e iss#ed #nless it )e s#pported )y affida*its "ade )y the applicant and the witnesses to )e presented necessarily )y hi". !ection 1, paragraph 4, of Article III of the onstit#tion pro*ides that no warrants shall iss#e )#t #pon pro)a)le ca#se, to )e deter"ined )y the -#dge after e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witnesses he "ay prod#ce. !ection 98 of ,eneral 'rders, 3o. 78 pro*ides that the -#dge or -#stice "#st, )efore iss#ing the warrant, e5a"ine #nder oath the co"plainant and any witnesses he "ay prod#ce and ta:e their depositions in writing. 't is the practice in this #urisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. 't is admitted that the #udge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied e%clusivel$ upon the affidavit made b$ agent 0ariano A. Almeda and that he did not re.uire nor take the deposition of an$ other witness. Feither the Constitution nor Aeneral Krders, Fo. I8 provides that it is of imperative necessit$ to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented b$ the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in re.uiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisf$ the committing magistrate of the e%istence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the #udge ma$ dispense with that of other witnesses. ;nasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because H;S O2AWL6796 A> TH6 >/,TS W/S 2AT #6.SA2/L but merely H6/.S/@, it is the duty of the *udge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct <nowledge, it is sufficient if the *udge is satisfied that there exists probable causeJ when the applicantFs <nowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal <nowledge of the facts is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is li<ewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal <nowledge of the facts. $he petitioner alleged as another gro#nd for the declaration of the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it a#thori&ed its e5ec#tion at night. !ection 1?1 of ,eneral 'rders, 3o. 78 a#thori&es that the search )e "ade at night when it is positi*ely asserted in the affida*it that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to )e searched. As we have declared the affidavit insufficient and the warrant issued e%clusivel$ upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is e.uall$ well founded and that the search could not legall$ be made at night. Kne of the grounds alleged b$ the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lac< of an adequate description of the boo<s and documents to be seied. !ection 1, paragraph 4, of Article III of the onstit#tion, and section 97 of ,eneral 'rders, 3o. 78 pro*ide that the affida*it to )e presented, which shall ser*e as the )asis for deter"ining whether pro)a)le ca#se e5ists and whether the warrant sho#ld )e iss#ed, must contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seied. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with but where, by the nature of the goods to be seied, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. $he only description of the articles gi*en in the affida*it presented to the -#dge was as follows2 /that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used b$ him in connection with his activities as mone$7lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law. Ta<ing into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did. $he last gro#nd alleged )y the petitioner, in s#pport of his clai" that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seied in order that the /nti:Csury 1oard might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation of the /nti:Csury Law. 'fishing expedition) At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised )efore the co#rt, it clearly appeared that the )oo:s and doc#"ents had really )een sei&ed to ena)le the Anti9Js#ry Board to cond#ct an in*estigation and later #se all or so"e of the articles in 6#estion as e*idence against the petitioner in the cri"inal cases that "ay )e filed against hi". $he sei&#re of )oo:s and doc#"ents )y "eans of a search warrant, for the p#rpose of #sing the" as e*idence in a cri"inal case against the person in whose possession they were fo#nd, is #nconstit#tional )eca#se it "a:es the warrant #nreasona)le, and it is e6#i*alent to a *iolation of the constit#tional pro*ision prohi)iting the co"p#lsion of an acc#sed to testify against hi"self. $herefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the doc#"ents in 6#estion were sei&ed for the p#rpose of #sing the" as e*idence against the petitioner in the cri"inal proceeding or proceedings for *iolation of the Anti9Js#ry Law, which it is atte"pted to instit#te against hi", we hold that the search warrant iss#ed is illegal and that the doc#"ents sho#ld )e ret#rned to hi". FKT1? 'n sum, the ruling ma$ be summariEed as follows? %. That the provisions of the ,onstitution and 9eneral Arders, 2o. 5!, relative to search and seiure, should be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full forceJ &. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict the en*oyment of the ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the individual, they should be strictly construedJ $. That the search and seiure made are illegal for the following reasons+ 'a) 1ecause the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had 2A personal <nowledge of the facts necessary to determine the existence or non:existence of probable cause, and 'b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seiing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the /nti: Csury LawJ ". That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could the search and seiure be made at nightJ 5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or complainant in cases where the latter has personal <nowledge of the facts, when the applicantFs or complainantFs <nowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the *udge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists J B. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seied is necessary, but where, by the nature of the articles to be seied, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issueJ @Adonis 3otes2 $he con-#ncti*e word OANDP in Art. 4, sec.4 is ,+0 to )e "eant as &OTH o"plainant Y 8itness sho#ld each prod#ce affida*its. $he H#dge "ay re6#ire the affida*it solely of the co"plainant if it is itself s#fficient to esta)lish pro)a)le ca#se. [ Al*are& *s. (IA S+29',+ M'0' >(. !1*A) !+()E;9,) &':+,' GR 50720, M'2/; 2%, 1984, D) C'(02+ !.
F'/0(" !oriano Mata was acc#sed #nder 0residential Decree @0DA 81?, as a"ended )y 0D 14?+, the infor"ation against hi" alleging that !oriano Mata offered, too: and arranged )ets on the Hai Alai ga"e )y =selling illegal tic:ets :nown as SMasiao tic:etsK witho#t any a#thority fro" the 0hilippine Hai Alai Y A"#se"ent orporation or fro" the go*ern"ent a#thorities concerned.> San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 48 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 6etitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to in.uire from the Cit$ Liscal its whereabouts, and to which in.uir$ >udge >osephine Q. 9a$ona replied, 2it is with the court3. $he H#dge then handed the records to the (iscal who attached the" to the records. $his led Mata to file a "otion to 6#ash and ann#l the search warrant and for the ret#rn of the articles sei&ed, citing and in*o:ing, a"ong others, !ection B of %#le 12+ of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt. $he "otion was denied )y the H#dge, stating that the co#rt has "ade a thoro#gh in*estigation and e5a"ination #nder oath of Bernardo J. ,oles and %eynaldo $. Mayote, "e")ers of the Intelligence !ection of 472nd 0 o.R0olice District II I30G that in fact the co#rt "ade a certification to that effectG and that the fact that doc#"ents relating to the search warrant were not attached i""ediately to the record of the cri"inal case is of no "o"ent, considering that the r#le does not specify when these doc#"ents are to )e attached to the records. Mata ca"e to the !#pre"e o#rt and prayed that the search warrant )e declared in*alid for its alleged fail#re to co"ply with the re6#isites of the onstit#tion and the %#les of o#rt I((1)" 8hether or not the search warrant was *alid. H).*" 3'. 8e hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for )eing *iolati*e of the onstit#tion and the %#les of o#rt. Jnder the onstit#tion /no search warrant shall iss#e )#t #pon pro)a)le ca#se to )e deter"ined )y the H#dge or s#ch other responsi)le officer as "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law after e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witnesses he "ay prod#ce/. More e"phatic and detailed is the i"ple"enting r#le of the constit#tional in-#nction, !ection B of %#le 12+ which pro*ides that the -#dge "#st )efore iss#ing the warrant personally e5a"ine on oath or affir"ation the co"plainant and any witnesses he "ay prod#ce and ta:e their depositions in writing, and attach the" to the record, in addition to any affida*its presented to hi". Dere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining 8udge has to ta<e depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the 8udge may be able to properly determine the existence or non:existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for per*ury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. -e, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegalit$ b$ the failure of the >udge to conform with the essential re.uisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. The *udgeFs insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by petitionerFs claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the bac< of the *oint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, )efore he filed his "otion to 6#ash the search warrant and for the ret#rn of the articles sei&ed, he was f#rnished, #pon his re6#est, certified tr#e copies of the said affida*its )y the ler: of o#rt )#t which certified tr#e copies do not )ear any certification at the )ac:. 6etitioner likewise claims that his %ero% cop$ of the said #oint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of respondent #udge. $his do#)t )eco"es "ore confir"ed )y respondent H#dgeIs own ad"ission, while insisting that she did e5a"ine thoro#ghly the applicants, that she did not take the deposition of 0a$ote and Aoles because to have done so would be to hold a #udicial proceeding which will be open and public, such that, according to her, the persons sub#ect of the intended raid will #ust disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else. o#ld it )e that the certification was "ade )elatedly to c#re the defect of the warrantC Be that as it "ay, there was no /deposition in writing/ attached to the records of the case in palpa)le disregard of the stat#tory prohi)ition heretofore 6#oted. %espondent H#dge i"presses this o#rt that the #rgency to stop the illegal ga")ling that l#res e*ery "an, wo"an and child, and e*en the lowliest la)orer who co#ld hardly "a:e )oth ends "eet -#stifies her action. !he clai"s that in order to a)ate the proliferation of this illegal /"asiao/ lottery, she tho#ght it "ore pr#dent not to cond#ct the ta:ing of deposition which is done #s#ally and p#)licly in the co#rt roo". $wo points "#st )e "ade clear. $he ter" /depositions/ is so"eti"es #sed in a )road sense to descri)e any written state"ent *erified )y oathG )#t in its "ore technical and appropriate sense the "eaning of the word is li"ited to written testi"ony of a witness gi*en in the co#rse of a -#dicial proceeding in ad*ance of the trial or hearing #pon oral e5a"ination. B A deposition is the testi"ony of a witness, p#t or ta:en in writing, #nder oath or affir"ation )efore a co""issioner, e5a"iner or other -#dicial officer, in answer to interloc#tory and cross interloc#tory, and #s#ally s#)scri)ed )y the witnesses. 7 $he searching 6#estions propo#nded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses "#st depend to a large e5tent #pon the discretion of the H#dge -#st as long as the answers esta)lish a reasona)le gro#nd to )elie*e the co""ission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one a#thori&ed )y law, and said answers partic#larly descri)e with certainty the place to )e searched and the persons or things to )e sei&ed. $he e5a"ination or in*estigation which "#st )e #nder oath "ay not )e in p#)lic. It "ay e*en )e held in the secrecy of his cha")ers. (ar "ore i"portant is that the e5a"ination or in*estigation is not "erely ro#tinary )#t one that is thoro#gh and elicit the re6#ired infor"ation. $o repeat, it "#st )e #nder oath and "#st )e in writing. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES >( NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO G.R. N+. 109%33, !1.: 20, 1994, MELO, !. F'/0(" Jpon application of !0'4 %ay"#ndo Jnti*eros, %$ H#dge Art#ro de ,#ia iss#ed in the "orning of !epte")er B, 1991 a search warrant a#thori&ing the search and sei&#re of an /#ndeter"ined 6#antity of Metha"pheta"ine 1ydrochloride co""only :nown as sha)# and its paraphernalias/ in the pre"ises of appellantIs ho#se. &owever, the search warrant was not implemented immediatel$ due to the lack of police personnel to form the raiding team. At a)o#t 9 oIcloc: in the e*ening of that day, a raiding tea" was finally organi&ed. In the final )riefing of the raiding tea" at the police station, it was agreed #pon that 0'1 <enerando L#na will )#y sha)# fro" appellant and after his ret#rn fro" appellantIs ho#se, the raiding tea" will i"ple"ent the search warrant. A "ar:ed "oney consisting of a 01?? )ill )earing serial no. 0V 429B?+ was gi*en )y the !tation o""ander to 0'1 L#na and entered in the police log)oo: 0'1 L#na with a co"panion proceeded to appellantIs ho#se to i"ple"ent the search warrant. Barangay apt. Maig#e, 3or"a del %osario and appellant witnessed the search at appellantIs ho#se. !0'4 de la r#& and 0'4 (rancisco fo#nd a )lac: canister containing sha)#, an al#"in#" foil, a palti: .22 cali)er atop the $< set, three #sed a""#nitions in a c#p and three wallets, one containing the "ar:ed "oney. !0'1 3o*ero fo#nd inside a show )o5 al#"in#" foils, nap:ins and a )#rner. 3or"ando del %osario was charged with Illegal 0ossession of (irear" and A""#nitions and Illegal !ale of %eg#lated Dr#gs. I((1)(" 1. 8hether or not the i"ple"entation of the search warrant was lawf#l and that the o)-ect sei&ed "ay )e #sed to pro*e Del %osarioKs g#iltC 2. 8hether the a""#nition was *alidly sei&ed as an incident to a lawf#l arrestC H).*" 1. 3o. According to the *ersion of the prosec#tion, d#ring the alleged )#y9 )#st operation, acc#sed9appellant handed o*er to <eneracion L#na, the alleged pose#r9)#yer, a 6#antity of sha)#, and L#na in t#rn paid acc#sed9 appellant a "ar:ed 1?? )ill and then returned to the police station and informed the raiding team that he had alread$ bought the shabu from accused7appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of accused7appellant to implement the search warrant. The version of the prosecution is highl$ incredible. $he record is de*oid of any reason why the police officers did not "a:e any atte"pt to arrest acc#sed9appellant at the ti"e he allegedly sold the sha)# to <eneracion L#na who was acco"panied )y another police officer. $hat was the opport#ne "o"ent to arrest acc#sed9appellant. The version foisted by the prosecution upon this ,ourt is contrary to human experience in the ordinary course of human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy:bust operation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur:buyer. That is the every reason why such a police operation is called a -1C@:1CST- operation. The police poseur:buyer -buys0 dangerous drugs from the pusher and -bust- 'arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to the police officer. 8e th#s entertain serio#s do#)ts that the sha)# contained in a s"all canister was act#ally sei&ed or confiscated at the residence of acc#sed9appellant. in conse6#ence, the "anner the police officers cond#cted the s#)se6#ent and "#ch9delayed search is highly irreg#lar. Jpon )arging into the residence of acc#sed9appellant, the police officers fo#nd hi" lying down and they i""ediately arrested and detained hi" in the li*ing roo" while they searched the other parts of the ho#se. Altho#gh they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in only after the police"en had already entered acc#sed9appellantIs residence @pp. 22924, tsn, Dece")er 11, 1991A, and, therefore, the police"en had "ore than a"ple ti"e to plant the sha)#. /t any rate, accused:appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seied at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu. Sale is totally different from possession. 0oreover, the search warrant implemented b$ the raiding part$ authoriEed only the search and seiure shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. = the descri)ed 6#antity of Metha"pheta"ine 1ydrochloride co""only :nown as sha)# and its paraphernalia/. / search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to underta<e a finishing expedition to seie and confiscate any and all <inds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The ,onstitution itself and the .ules of ,ourt, specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seied. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seie the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant. 2. 3'. 2either may it be maintained that the gun was seied in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, 7el .osarioFs arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seied, the same is not admissible in evidence. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 49 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 UD9. >. R'D+( GR 815%7, 9 !1,) 1990 F'/0(" $he %egional Intelligence 'perations Jnit of the apital o""and @%I'J9A0'MA recei*ed confidential infor"ation a)o#t a "e")er of the 30A !parrow Jnit @li6#idation s6#adA )eing treated for a g#nshot wo#nd at the !t. Agnes 1ospital in %oose*elt A*en#e, V#e&on ity. Jpon *erification, it was fo#nd that the wo#nded person, who was listed in the hospital records as %onnie Ha*elon, is act#ally %olando D#ral, a "e")er of the 30A li6#idation s6#ad, responsi)le for the :illing of 2 A0'M soldiers the day )efore. D#ral was then transferred to the %egional Medical !er*ices of the A0'M, for sec#rity reasons. 8hile confined thereat, D#ral was positi*ely identified )y eyewitnesses as the g#n"an who went on top of the hood of the A0'M "o)ile patrol car, and fired at the 2 A0'M soldiers seated inside the car.onse6#ently, D#ral was referred to the aloocan ity (iscal who cond#cted an in6#est and thereafter filed with the %egional $rial o#rt of aloocan ity an infor"ation charging %olando D#ral alias %onnie Ha*elon with the cri"e of =Do#)le M#rder with Assa#lt Jpon Agents of 0ersons in A#thority.> A petition for ha)eas corp#s was filed with the !#pre"e o#rt on )ehalf of %o)erto J"il, %olando D#ral, and %enato <illan#e*a. $he o#rt iss#ed the writ of ha)eas corp#s. A %et#rn of the 8rit was filed. J"il and <illan#e*a posted )ail )efore the %egional $rial o#rt of 0asay ity where charges for *iolation of the Anti9!#)*ersion Act had )een filed against the", and they were accordingly released. I((1)" 8hether D#ral can )e *alidly arrested witho#t any warrant of arrest for the cri"e of re)ellion. H).*" Des. D#ral was arrested for )eing a "e")er of the 3ew 0eoples Ar"y @30AA, an o#tlawed s#)*ersi*e organi&ation. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of .olando 7ural without warrant is *ustified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. $he cri"es of re)ellion, s#)*ersion, conspiracy or proposal to co""it s#ch cri"es, and cri"es or offenses co""itted in f#rtherance thereof or in connection therewith constit#te direct assa#lts against the !tate and are in the nat#re of contin#ing cri"es. $he arrest of persons in*ol*ed in the re)ellion whether as its fighting ar"ed ele"ents, or for co""itting non9*iolent acts )#t in f#rtherance of the re)ellion, is "ore an act of capt#ring the" in the co#rse of an ar"ed conflict, to 6#ell the re)ellion, than for the p#rpose of i""ediately prosec#ting the" in co#rt for a stat#tory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a *udge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a *udicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. $he a)sence of a -#dicial warrant is no legal i"pedi"ent to arresting or capt#ring persons co""itting o*ert acts of *iolence against go*ern"ent forces, or any other "ilder acts )#t e6#ally in p#rs#ance of the re)ellio#s "o*e"ent. The arrest or capture is thus impelled b$ the e%igencies of the situation that involves the ver$ survival of societ$ and its government and dul$ constituted authorities. P)+E.) >. S1/2+ GR 93239, 18 M'2/; 1991 F'/0(" 0at. (#lgencio went to Arlie %egaladoKs ho#se at . V#i"po to "onitor acti*ities of .dison !J%' @acc#sedA. "ucro was reported to be selling mari#uana at a chapel & meters away from /egaladoBs house. "ucro was monitored to have talked and e%changed things three times. These activities are reported through radio to 6M(t. "eraspi. A third )#yer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as %onnie Maca)ante. (ro" that "o"ent, 0RLt.!eraspi proceeded to the area. 8hile the police officers were at the Do#th 1ostel in Maaga"a !t. (#lgencio told Lt. !eraspi to intercept. Maca)ante was intercepted at Ma)ini and Maaga"a crossing in front of A:lan Medical center. Maca)ante saw the police and threw a tea )ag of "ari-#ana on the gro#nd. Maca)ante ad"itted )#ying the "ari-#ana fro" !#cro in front of the chapel. $he police tea" intercepted and arrested !J%' at the corner of . V#i"po and <eterans. %eco*ered were 19 stic:s and B tea)ags of "ari-#ana fro" a cart inside the chapel and another tea)ag fro" Maca)ante. I((1)" 8hether or not the arrest witho#t warrant is lawf#l. H).*" Des. Search and seiures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. .ule %&B, Sec %& of .ules of ,riminal #rocedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.'#eople v. ,astiller. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge re.uired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill re.uirements for its issuance . However, warantless search and seiures are legal as long as #.A1/1L6 ,/CS6 existed. The police officers have personal <nowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. /s police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties. @It was held that when a police officer sees the offense, altho#gh at a distance, or hears the distr#r)ances created there)y, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he "ay effect an arrest witho#t a warrant. $he offense is dee"ed co""itted in the presence or within the *iew of the officer.A PEOPLE >. RODRIGUE$A G.R. N+. 95902, F)821'2: 4, 1992, R)A'.'*+, !." F'/0(" I $ad#ran together with !R!gt. Molinawe and other officers recei*ed fro" a confidential infor"er that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohi)ited dr#gs in $agas, Daraga, Al)ay. !gt. Molinawe ga*e the "oney to $ad#ran who acted as the pose#r )#yer. 1e was told to loo: for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohi)ited dr#gs. After agreeing on the price of 02??.?? for 1?? gra"s of "ari-#ana, Don halted and later on Don ga*e $ad#ran /a certain o)-ect wrapped in a plastic/ which was later identified as "ari-#ana, and recei*ed pay"ent therefor. $hereafter, $ad#ran ret#rned to the head6#arters and "ade a report regarding his said p#rchase of "ari-#ana. !#)se6#ently, Ma-or Xeide" ordered a tea" to cond#ct an operation to apprehend the s#spects. In the e*ening of the sa"e date, appellant, Lonceras and !ego*ia was arrested. $he consta)les were not, howe*er, ar"ed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three acc#sed. $hereafter, agents of the 3arcotics o""and @3A%'MA cond#cted a raid in the ho#se of Ho*encio %odrig#e&a, father of appellant. D#ring the raid, they were a)le to confiscate dried "ari-#ana lea*es and a plastic syringe, a"ong others. $he search, howe*er, was not a#thori&ed )y any search warrant. $he %$ fo#nd %odrig#e&a g#ilty of *iolating the Dangero#s Dr#g Act. I((1)" 8hether or not the e*idence confiscated d#ring the raid cond#cted in the ho#se of Ho*encio %odrig#e&a is ad"issi)le in e*idence. H).*" 3'. / buy:bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at )ar, the ter" in flagrante delicto re6#ires that the s#spected dr#g dealer "#st )e ca#ght redhanded in the act of selling "ari-#ana or any prohi)ited dr#g to a person acting or posing as a )#yer. 'n the instant case, however, the procedure adopted b$ the FA/CK0 agents failed to meet this .ualification. 9ased on the ver$ evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried mari#uana leaves, C'C Taduran immediately released appellant /odrigueEa instead of arresting and taking him into his custod$. This act of C'C Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of mari#uana did take place, is decidedl$ contrar$ to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a bu$7bust operation . ;t is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been sub*ected to the sanctions imposed by law. ;t is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law. /s provided in the present ,onstitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authoried by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this ,ourt has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seiures even without a search warrant. Thus, '%) when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursionJ '&) when the search is incidental to a lawful arrestJ '$) when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs lawsJ '") when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration lawsJ '5) when it involves prohibited articles in plain viewJ or 'B) in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a search warrant. ;n the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the 2/.,AD agents in the house of 8ovencio .odriguea was not authoried by any search warrant. ;t does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. 1ence, appellantIs right against #nreasona)le search and sei&#re was clearly *iolated. The FA/CK0 agents could FKT have #ustified their act b$ invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had alread$ been put under surveillance for .uite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. @In the case at )ar, the police officer, acting as pose#r9)#yer in a =)#y9)#st operation>, inst7ead of arresting the s#spect and ta:ing hi" into c#stody after the sale, ret#rned to police head6#arters and filed his report. It was only in the e*ening of the sa"e day that the police officer, witho#t a warrant, arrested the s#spect at the latterKs ho#se where dried "ari-#ana lea*es were fo#nd and confiscated. It was held that the arrest and the sei&#re were #nlawf#l.A
R+.90+ G+ >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.( G.R. N+. 101837 F)821'2: 11, 1992, FELICIANO, !." F'/0(" On H#ly 2, 1991, petitioner entered 8ilson !t., where it is a one9 way street and started tra*elling in the opposite or /wrong/ direction. At the corner of 8ilson and H. A)ad !antos !ts., petitionerIs and .ldon Mag#anIs cars nearly )#"ped each other. 0etitioner alighted fro" his car, wal:ed San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 50 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 o*er and shot Mag#an inside his car. 0etitioner then )oarded his car and left the scene. A sec#rity g#ard at a near)y resta#rant was a)le to ta:e down petitionerIs car plate n#")er. <erification at the L$' showed that the car was registered to one .lsa Ang ,o.$he sec#rity g#ard of the )a:e shop positi*ely identified ,o as the sa"e person who had shot Mag#an. $he police la#nched a "anh#nt for petitioner. 'n H#ly 8, 1991, 0etitioner presented hi"self )efore the !an H#an 0olice !tation to *erify news reports that he was )eing h#nted )y the policeG he was acco"panied )y two @2A lawyers. $he police forthwith detained hi". $hat sa"e day, the police pro"ptly filed a co"plaint for fr#strated ho"icide against petitioner with the 'ffice of the 0ro*incial 0rosec#tor of %i&al. $he 0rosec#tor filed an infor"ation for "#rder )efore the %$. o#nsel for petitioner filed with the 0rosec#tor an o"ni)#s "otion for i""ediate release and proper preli"inary in*estigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was #nlawf#l and that no preli"inary in*estigation had )een cond#cted )efore the infor"ation was filed. I((1)" 8R3 a lawf#l warrantless arrest had )een effected )y the !an H#an 0olice in respect of petitioner ,o. H).*" 3'. !ection 7 of %#le 114 of the 1987 %#les on ri"inal 0roced#re pro*ides that =a peace officer or a pri*ate person "ay, witho#t warrant, arrest a person>2 +a, 8hen, in his presence, the person to )e arrested has co""itted, is act#ally co""itting, or is atte"pting to co""it an offenseG @b, 8hen an offense has in fact -#st )een co""itted, and he has personal :nowledge of facts indicating that the person to )e arrested has co""itted itG and +c, 555 In this case, there was no lawf#l warrantless arrest of petitioner within the "eaning of !ection 7 of %#le 114. #etitionerFs -arrest- too< place six 'B) days after the shooting of Daguan. The arresting officers obviousl$ were not present, within the "eaning of !ection 7@aA, at the ti"e petitioner had allegedly shot Mag#an. 2either could the -arrest- effected six 'B) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected -when Gthe shooting hadI in fact *ust been committed- within the meaning of Section 5'b). Doreover, none of the -arresting- officers had any -personal <nowledge- of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Daguan. $he infor"ation #pon which the police acted had )een deri*ed fro" state"ents "ade )y alleged e$ewitnesses to the shooting. That information did not, however, constitute -personal <nowledge.- ROMEO POSADAS >(. CA G.R. N+. 89139, A1A1(0 2, 1990, GANCA-CO, !. F'/0(" 'n 'cto)er 1+, 198+, 0atrol"an Jrsicio Jnga) and 0at. J")ra J"par, )oth "e")ers of the Integrated 3ational 0olice @I30A of Da*ao assigned with the Intelligence $as: (orce, were conducting a surveillance along Dagallanes Street, 7avao ,ity. -hile the$ were within the premises of the /iEal 0emorial Colleges the$ spotted petitioner carr$ing a buri bag and the$ noticed him to be acting suspiciousl$. The$ approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the 'F6. 6etitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get awa$ was thwarted b$ the two notwithstanding his resistance.The$ then checked the buri bag of the petitioner where the$ found one +1, caliber .;8 "mith J -esson revolver, two +2, rounds of live ammunition for a .;8 caliber gun, a smoke +tear gas, grenade, and two +2, live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. $hey )ro#ght the petitioner to the police station for f#rther in*estigation and as:ed hi" to show the necessary license or a#thority to possess firear"s and a""#nitions fo#nd in his possession )#t he failed to do so. 1e was prosec#ted for illegal possession of firear"s and a""#nitions in the %$ wherein after a plea of not g#ilty.0etitioner was fo#nd g#ilty of the offense charged. I((1)" 8R3 the warrantless search on the person of petitioner is *alid. H).*" Des. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not <now that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They *ust suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. The said circumstances did not *ustify an arrest without a warrant. &owever, there are man$ instances where a warrant and seiEure can be effected without necessaril$ being preceded b$ an arrest, foremost of which is the -STA# /27 S6/.,H- 'a.<.a. STA# P >.;SO without a search warrant at military or police chec<points. As between a warrantless search and seiure conducted at military or police chec<points and the search thereat in the case at bar , there is no .uestion that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. ;t is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. ,learly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seiures has not been violated. there are "any instances where a warrant and sei&#re can )e effected witho#t necessarily )eing preceded )y an arrest, fore"ost of which is the /stop and search/ witho#t a search warrant at "ilitary or police chec:points, the constit#tionality or *alidity of which has )een #pheld )y this o#rt in <al"onte *s. de <illa, 7 as follows2 /0etitioner <al"onteIs general allegation to the effect that he had )een stopped and searched witho#t a search warrant )y the "ilitary "anning the chec:points, witho#t "ore, i.e., witho#t stating the details of the incidents which a"o#nt to a *iolation of his right against #nlawf#l search and sei&#re, is not s#fficient to ena)le the o#rt to deter"ine whether there was a *iolation of <al"onteIs right against #nlawf#l search and sei&#re. 3ot all searches and sei&#res are prohi)ited. $hose which are reasona)le are not for)idden. A reasona)le search is not to )e deter"ined )y any fi5ed for"#la )#t is to )e resol*ed according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is par<ed on the public fair grounds, or simply loo<s into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. $he setting #p of the 6#estioned chec:points in <alen&#ela @and pro)a)ly in other areasA "ay )e considered as a security measure to enable the 2,.7, to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. hec:points "ay also )e regarded as "eas#res to thwart plots to desta)ili&e the go*ern"ent in the interest of p#)lic sec#rity. In this connection, the o#rt "ay ta:e -#dicial notice of the shift to #r)an centers and their s#)#r)s of the ins#rgency "o*e"ent, so clearly reflected in the increased :illings in cities of police and "ilitary "en )y 30A /sparrow #nits,/ not to "ention the a)#ndance of #nlicensed firear"s and the alar"ing rise in lawlessness and *iolence in s#ch #r)an centers, not all of which are reported in "edia, "ost li:ely )ro#ght a)o#t )y deteriorating econo"ic conditions 9 which all s#" #p to what one can rightly consider, at the *ery least, as a)nor"al ti"es. 1etween the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individualFs right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. $r#e, the "anning of chec:points )y the "ilitary is s#scepti)le of a)#se )y the "en in #nifor" in the sa"e "anner that all go*ern"ental power is s#scepti)le of a)#se. B#t, at the cost of occasional incon*enience, disco"fort and e*en irritation to the citi&en, the chec:points d#ring these a)nor"al ti"es, when cond#cted within reasona)le li"its, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peacef#l co""#nity./ $h#s, as )etween a warrantless search and sei&#re cond#cted at "ilitary or police chec:points and the search thereat in the case at )ar, there is no 6#estion that, indeed, the latter is "ore reasona)le considering that #nli:e in the for"er, it was effected on the )asis of a pro)a)le ca#se. $he pro)a)le ca#se is that when the petitioner acted s#spicio#sly and atte"pted to flee with the )#ri )ag there was a pro)a)le ca#se that he was concealing so"ething illegal in the )ag and it was the right and d#ty of the police officers to inspect the sa"e. It is too "#ch indeed to re6#ire the police officers to search the )ag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall ha*e o)tained a search warrant for the p#rpose. !#ch an e5ercise "ay pro*e to )e #seless, f#tile and "#ch too late. In 0eople *s. (I of %i&al, this o#rt held as follows2 /. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensa)ly necessary, the "echanics prescri)ed )y the onstit#tion and reiterated in the %#les of o#rt "#st )e followed and satisfied. B#t 8e need not arg#e that there are e5ceptions. $h#s in the e5traordinary e*ents where warrant is not necessary to effect a *alid search or sei&#re, or when the latter cannot )e perfor"ed e5cept witho#t warrant, what constit#tes a reasona)le or #nreasona)le search or sei&#re )eco"es p#rely a -#dicial 6#estion, deter"ina)le fro" the #ni6#eness of the circ#"stances in*ol*ed, incl#ding the p#rpose of the search or sei&#re, the presence or a)sence of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 51 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 pro)a)le ca#se, the "anner in which the search and sei&#re was "ade, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles proc#red./ $he o#rt reprod#ces with appro*al the following dis6#isition of the !olicitor ,eneral2 /$he assailed search and sei&#re "ay still )e -#stified as a:in to a -stop and fris<- sit#ation whose o)-ect is either to deter"ine the identity of a s#spicio#s indi*id#al or to "aintain the stat#s 6#o "o"entarily while the police officer see:s to o)tain "ore infor"ation. $his is ill#strated in the case of $erry *s. 'hio, 492 J.!. 1 @19+8A. In this case, two "en repeatedly wal:ed past a store window and ret#rned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third "an. $his aro#sed the s#spicion of a police officer. $o the e5perienced officer, the )eha*ior of the "en indicated that they were si&ing #p the store for an ar"ed ro))ery. 8hen the police officer approached the "en and as:ed the" for their na"es, they "#")led a reply. 8here#pon, the officer gra))ed one of the", sp#n hi" aro#nd and fris:ed hi". (inding a concealed weapon in one, he did the sa"e to the other two and fo#nd another weapon. In the prosec#tion for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and sei&#re was p#t #p. $he Jnited !tates !#pre"e o#rt held that /a police officer "ay in appropriate circ#"stances and in an appropriate "anner approach a person for the p#rpose of in*estigating possi)le cri"inal )eha*ior e*en tho#gh there is no pro)a)le ca#se to "a:e an arrest./ In s#ch a sit#ation, it is reasona)le for an officer rather than si"ply to shr#g his sho#lder and allow a cri"e to occ#r, to stop a s#spicio#s indi*id#al )riefly in order to deter"ine his identity or "aintain the stat#s 6#o while o)taining "ore infor"ation. . . . learly, the search in the case at )ar can )e s#stained #nder the e5ceptions heretofore disc#ssed, and hence, the constit#tional g#arantee against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res has not )een *iolated./ PEOPLE >(. ROGELIO MENGOTE G.R. N+. 87059, !1,) 22, 1992, CRU$, !. F'/0(" 'n A#g#st 8, 1987, the 8estern 0olice District @80DA received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious: loo<ing persons at the corner of 8uan Luna and 2orth 1ay 1oulevard in Tondo, Danila. A s#r*eillance tea" of plainclothes"en was forthwith dispatched to the place. 0atrol"en %olando Mercado and Al)erto H#an narrated that they saw two "en /loo:ing fro" side to side,/ one of who" was holding his a)do"en. The$ approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run awa$ but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. 'ne of the", who t#rned o#t to )e the acc#sed9appellant, was fo#nd with a .48 cali)er !"ith and 8esson re*ol*er with si5 li*e )#llets in the cha")er. 1is co"panion, later identified as 3icanor Morellos, had a fan :nife secreted in his front right pants poc:et. $he weapons were ta:en fro" the". An infor"ation was filed against the acc#sed9appellant )efore the %$ for illegal possession of firear"s. $he o#rt con*icted Mengote for *iolation of 0D 18++ and sentenced to recl#sion perpet#a. 't is submitted in the Appellant@s 9rief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seiEure. Fo warrant therefor having been previousl$ obtained. Feither could it have been seiEed as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of 0engote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. I((1)" 8R3 Mengote can )e held lia)le for illegal possession of firear"s. H).*" 3'. $here is no 6#estion that e*idence o)tained as a res#lt of an illegal search or sei&#re is inad"issi)le in any proceeding for any p#rpose. $hat is the a)sol#te prohi)ition of Article III, !ection 4@2A, of the onstit#tion. $his is the cele)rated e5cl#sionary r#le )ased on the -#stification gi*en )y H#dge Learned 1and that /only in case the prosec#tion, which itself controls the sei&ing officials, :nows that it cannot profit )y their wrong will the wrong )e repressed./ $he !olicitor ,eneral, while conceding the r#le, "aintains that it is not applica)le in the case at )ar. 1is reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the sei&#re of the re*ol*er fro" hi" were lawf#l #nder %#le 114, !ection 7, of the %#les of o#rt reading as follows2 !ec. 7. Arrest witho#t warrantG when lawf#l. A peace officer or pri*ate person "ay witho#t a warrant, arrest a person2 @aA 8hen, in his presence, the person to )e arrested has co""itted, is act#ally co""itting, or is atte"pting to co""it an offenseG @)A 8hen an offense has in fact -#st )een co""itted, and he has personal :nowledge of facts indicating that the person to )e arrested has co""itted itG and @cA 8hen the person to )e arrested is a prisoner who has escaped fro" a penal esta)lish"ent or place where he is ser*ing final -#dg"ent or te"porarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while )eing transferred fro" one confine"ent to another. In cases falling #nder paragraphs @aA and @)A hereof, the person arrested witho#t a warrant shall )e forthwith deli*ered to the nearest police station or -ail, and he shall )e proceeded against in accordance with %#le 112, !ection 7. 8e ha*e caref#lly e5a"ined the wording of this r#le and cannot see how we can agree with the prosec#tion. 0ar. @cA of !ection 7 is o)*io#sly inapplica)le as Mengote was not an escapee fro" a penal instit#tion when he was arrested. 8e therefore confine o#rsel*es to deter"ining the lawf#lness of his arrest #nder either 0ar. @aA or 0ar. @)A of this section. 0ar. @aA re6#ires that the person )e arrested @1A after he has co""itted or while he is act#ally co""itting or is at least atte"pting to co""it an offense, @2A in the presence of the arresting officer. $hese re6#ire"ents ha*e not )een esta)lished in the case at )ar. At the ti"e of the arrest in 6#estion, the acc#sed9appellant was "erely /loo:ing fro" side to side/ and /holding his a)do"en,/ according to the arresting officers the"sel*es. $here was apparently no offense that had -#st )een co""itted or was )eing act#ally co""itted or at least )eing atte"pted )y Mengote in their presence. $he !olicitor ,eneral submits that the actual e%istence of an offense was not necessar$ as long as 0engote@s acts created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused7appellant had committed it. The .uestion is, -hat offenseD -hat offense could possibl$ have been suggested b$ a person looking from side to side and holding his abdomen and in a place not e%actl$ forsakenD These are certainl$ not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. 't might have been different if 0engote had been apprehended at an ungodl$ hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alle$ at ; o@clock in the morning. 9ut he was arrested at 11?;0 in the morning and in a crowded street shortl$ after alighting from a passenger #eep with his companion. &e was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of da$. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that bus$ hour in the blaEe of the noonda$ sun. Kn the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, wh$ his e$es were darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. 'f the$ e%cited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about . ;n fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there were -suspicious:loo<ing- persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at 2orth 1ay 1oulevard.',AD#/.6 TH;S W;TH ## vs. #AS/7/S). The caller did not e%plain wh$ he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime. ;t would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched *ust because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach:ache, or if a peace officer: could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty loo< on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. $his si"ply cannot )e done in a free society. $his is not a police state where order is e5alted o*er li)erty or, worse, personal "alice on the part of the arresting officer "ay )e -#stified in the na"e of sec#rity. 'n the recent case of #eople v. Dalmstedt, the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. 'n 6eople v. Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carr$ing behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. &is suspicion aroused, he surreptitiousl$ e%amined the bag, which he found to contain mari#uana. &e then and there made the warrantless arrest and seiEure that we subse.uentl$ upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficientl$ established. The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officersF suspicion other than DengoteFs darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. 1y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had *ust been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence. $his case is si"ilar to #eople v. /minnudin, where the o#rt held that the warrantless arrest of the acc#sed was #nconstit#tional. $his was effected while he was co"ing down a *essel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other dise")ar:ing passengers. 1e had not co""itted nor was he act#ally co""itting or atte"pting to co""it an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. 1e was not e*en acting s#spicio#sly. In short, there was no pro)a)le ca#se that, as the prosec#tion incorrectly s#ggested, dispensed with the constit#tional re6#ire"ent of a warrant. 0ar. @)A is no less applica)le )eca#se its no less stringent re6#ire"ents ha*e also not )een satisfied. $he prosec#tion has not shown that at the ti"e of MengoteIs arrest an offense had in fact -#st )een co""itted and that the arresting officers had personal :nowledge of facts indicating that San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 52 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 Mengote had co""itted it. All they had was hearsay infor"ation fro" the telephone caller, and a)o#t a cri"e that had yet to )e co""itted. $he tr#th is that they did not :now then what offense, if at all, had )een co""itted and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the acc#sed9appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the police head6#arters, that they learned of the ro))ery in his ho#se and of MengoteIs s#pposed in*ol*e"ent therein. 8 As for the illegal possession or the firear" fo#nd on MengoteIs person, the police"en disco*ered this only after he had )een searched and the in*estigation cond#cted later re*ealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. 9efore these events, the peace officers had no <nowledge even of DengoteF identity, let alone the fact 'or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of 7angananFs house. /t the time of the arrest in question, the accused: appellant was merely -loo<ing from side to side- and -holding his abdomen,- according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had *ust been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Dengote in their presence. There was nothing to support the arresting officersF suspicion other than DengoteFs darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. #ar. 'b) is no less applicable because has not been shown that at the time of DengoteFs arrest an offense had in fact *ust been committed and that the arresting officers had personal <nowledge of facts indicating that Dengote had committed it. /ll they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed. SAMM- MALACAT >(. CA G.R. N+. 123595, D)/)D8)2 12, 1997, DAVIDE, !R., !. F'/0(" In response to )o") threats reported se*en days earlier, %odolfo D#, a "e")er of the 80D, along with 4 other police"en were on foot patrol along RueEon 9lvd, Ruiapo when the$ chanced upon 2 groups of 0uslim7looking men posted at opposite sides of RueEon 9lvd. The men were acting suspiciousl$ with their e$es moving ver$ fast. D# and his co"panions o)ser*ed the gro#ps for a)o#t 4? "ins. $he "e")ers fled when they approached one of the gro#ps. 1owe*er, D# ca#ght #p with the petitioner. Jpon searching the latter, he fo#nd a frag"entation grenade t#c:ed inside petitionerIs /front waist line./ 'ne of D#Ks co"panions apprehended A)d#l asan fro" who" a .48 cali)er pistol was reco*ered. !a""y Malacat was charged with *iolation of !ec.4 of 0D 18++ for illegal possession of hand grenade. I((1)" 8R3 the warrantless arrest of petitioner is *alid. H).*2 3o. .*en granting e5 gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were in*alid, as will )e disc#ssed )elow. $he general r#le as regards arrests, searches and sei&#res is that a warrant is needed in order to *alidly effect the sa"e. $he onstit#tional prohi)ition against #nreasona)le arrests, searches and sei&#res refers to those effected witho#t a *alidly iss#ed warrant, s#)-ect to certain e5ceptions. As regards *alid warrantless arrests, these are fo#nd in !ection 7, %#le 114 of the %#les of o#rt, which reads, in part2 !ec. 7. Arrest, witho#t warrantG when lawf#l A peace officer or a pri*ate person "ay, witho#t a warrant, arrest a person2 @aA 8hen, in his presence, the person to )e arrested has co""itted, is act#ally co""itting, or is atte"pting to co""it an offenseG @)A 8hen an offense has in fact -#st )een co""itted, and he has personal :nowledge of facts indicating that the person to )e arrested has co""itted itG and @cA 8hen the person to )e arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . A warrantless arrest #nder the circ#"stances conte"plated #nder !ection 7@aA has )een deno"inated as one -in flagrante delicto,- while that #nder !ection 7@)A has )een descri)ed as a -hot pursuit- arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following+ '%) customs searchesJ '&) search of moving vehiclesJ '$) seiure of evidence in plain viewJ '") consent searchesJ '5) a search incidental to a lawful arrestJ and 'B) a -stop and fris<.- In the instant petition, the trial co#rt *alidated the warrantless search as a /stop and fris:/ with /the sei&#re of the grenade fro" the acc#sed as an appropriate incident to his arrest,/ hence necessitating a )rief disc#ssion on the nat#re of these e5ceptions to the warrant re6#ire"ent. At the o#tset, we note that the trial co#rt conf#sed the concepts of a ISTOPANDFRIS7I and of a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LA=FUL ARREST. These two t$pes of warrantless searches differ in terms of the re.uisite .uantum of proof before the$ ma$ be validl$ effected and in their allowable scope. In a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LA=FUL ARREST, as the precedent arrest determines the validit$ of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is 6#estioned in a large "a-ority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was "erely #sed as a prete5t for cond#cting a search. 'n this instance, the law re.uires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer ma$ search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter ma$ reach for a weapon or for evidence to destro$, and seiEe an$ mone$ or propert$ found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which ma$ be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lac< of personal <nowledge on the part of @u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had *ust been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. 1a*ing th#s shown the in*alidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search cond#cted on petitioner co#ld not ha*e )een one incidental to a lawf#l arrest. 8e now proceed to the -#stification for and allowa)le scope of a ISTOPANDFRIS7I as a /li"ited protecti*e search of o#ter clothing for weapons,/ as laid down in $erry, th#s2 -e merel$ hold toda$ that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonabl$ to conclude in light of his e%perience that criminal activit$ ma$ be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing ma$ be armed and presentl$ dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable in.uiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others@ safet$, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefull$ limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. "uch a search is a reasonable search under the Lourth Amendment . . . Ather notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a -stop and fris<,- it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a -stop and fris<.- / =genuine reason0 must exist, in light of the police officerFs experience and surrounding conditions , to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. (inally, a I(0+E ',*<29(GI ser*es a T=OFOLD INTEREST" (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer ma$, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause) and (2) the more pressing interest of safet$ and self7preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadl$ weapon that could une%pectedl$ and fatall$ be used against the police officer. 1ere, there are at least three @4A reasons why the /stop9and9fris:/ was in*alid2 F92(0, we har)or gra*e do#)ts as to D#Is clai" that petitioner was a "e")er of the gro#p which atte"pted to )o") 0la&a Miranda two days earlier. $his clai" is neither s#pported )y any police report or record nor corro)orated )y any other police officer who allegedly chased that gro#p. Aside fro" i"pairing D#Is credi)ility as a witness, this li:ewise di"inishes the pro)a)ility that a gen#ine reason e5isted so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to f#rther tarnish the credi)ility of D#Is testi"ony, contrary to his clai" that petitioner and his co"panions had to )e chased )efore )eing apprehended, the affida*it of arrest e5pressly declares otherwise, i.e., #pon arri*al of fi*e @7A other police officers, petitioner and his co"panions were /i""ediately collared./ S)/+,*, there was nothing in petitionerIs )eha*ior or cond#ct which co#ld ha*e reasona)ly elicited e*en "ere s#spicion other than that his eyes were /"o*ing *ery fast/ an o)ser*ation which lea*es #s incred#lo#s since D# and his tea""ates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already +24? p."., th#s pres#"a)ly d#s:. 0etitioner and his co"panions were "erely standing at the corner and were not creating any co""otion or tro#)le, as D# e5plicitly declared on cross9e5a"ination2 V And what were they doingC A $hey were "erely standing. V Do# are s#re of thatC A Des, sir. V And when yo# saw the" standing, there were nothing or they did not create any co""otion. A 3one, sir. V 3either did yo# see the" create co""otionC A 3one, sir. T;92*, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. 2one was visible to @u, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Su and petitioner, an$ telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 53 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Su. 'n fact, as noted b$ the trial court? -hen the policemen approached the accused and his companions, the$ were not $et aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. The$ did not see an$ bulging ob#ect in his person. 8hat is #ne6#i*ocal then in this case are )latant *iolations of petitionerIs rights sole"nly g#aranteed in !ections 2 and 12@1A of Article III of the onstit#tion. PEOPLE >(. IDEL AMINNUDIN : AHNI G.R.N+. 748%9, !1.: %, 1988, CRU$, !. F'/0(2 Idel A"inn#din was arrested on H#ne 27, 198B, shortly after dise")ar:ing fro" the MR< 8ilcon 9 at a)o#t 824? in the e*ening, in Iloilo ity. $he 0 officers who were in fact waiting for hi" si"ply accosted hi", inspected his )ag and finding what loo:ed li:ed "ari-#ana lea*es too: hi" to their head6#arters for in*estigation. $he two )#ndles of s#spect articles were confiscated fro" hi" and later ta:en to the 3BI la)oratory for e5a"ination. 8hen they were *erified as "ari-#ana lea*es, an infor"ation for *iolation of the Dangero#s Dr#gs Act was filed against hi". According to the prosec#tion, the 0 officers had earlier recei*ed a tip fro" one of their infor"ers that the acc#sed9appellant was on )oard a *essel )o#nd for Iloilo ity and was carrying "ari-#ana. Acting on this tip, they waited for hi" in the e*ening of H#ne 27, 198B, and approached hi" as he descended fro" the gangplan: after the infor"er had pointed to hi". $hey detained hi" and inspected the )ag he was carrying. It was fo#nd to contain three :ilos of what were later analy&ed as "ari-#ana lea*es )y an 3BI forensic e5a"iner. In his defense, A"inn#din alleged that he was ar)itrarily arrested and i""ediately handc#ffed. 1is )ag was confiscated witho#t a search warrant. I((1)(2 1. 8R3 the arrest was legalC 2. 8R3 the sei&ed effects "ay )e #sed as e*idence as the search was allegedly an incident to a lawf#l arrestC
H).*" 1. 3o. $here was no warrant of arrest or search warrant iss#ed )y a -#dge after personal deter"ination )y hi" of the e5istence of pro)a)le ca#se. $he acc#sed9appellant was not ca#ght in flagrante nor was a cri"e a)o#t to )e co""itted or had -#st )een co""itted to -#stify the warrantless arrest allowed #nder %#le 114 of the %#les of o#rt. .*en e5pediency co#ld not )e in*o:ed to dispense with the o)tention of the warrant as in the case of %oldan *. Arca, for e5a"ple. ;t was held that vessels and aircraft are sub*ect to warrantless searches and seiures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quic<ly moved out of the locality or *urisdiction before the warrant can be secured. The present case presented no such urgency. >rom the conflicting declarations of the #, witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search /minnudin. His name was <nown. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. /nd from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a *udge that there was probable cause, indeed, to *ustify the issuance of a warrant. @et they did nothing to comply Doreover, the accused: appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had *ust done so. In the "any cases where this o#rt has s#stained the warrantless arrest of *iolators of the Dangero#s Dr#gs Act, it has always )een shown that they were ca#ght red9handed, as res#lt of what are pop#larly called /)#y9)#st/ operations of the narcotics agents. %#le 114 was clearly applica)le )eca#se at the precise ti"e of arrest the acc#sed was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. ;n the case at bar, the accused:appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had *ust done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplan< of the DQM Wilcon ( and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was li<e any of the other passengers innocently disembar<ing from the vessel. ;t was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the mari*uana that the suddenly became suspect and so sub*ect to apprehension. ;t was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification b$ the informer was the probable cause as determined b$ the officers +and not a #udge, that authoriEed them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediatel$ arrest him. 2. 3'. $he search was not an incident of a lawf#l arrest )eca#se there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not co"e #nder the e5ceptions allowed )y the %#les of o#rt. 1ence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the e*idence o)tained there)y was inad"issi)le. PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT 198 SCRA 401, G.R. N+. 91107, 19 !1, 1991 FACTS" Acc#sed9 appellant Mi:ael Mal"stead was charged for *iolation of !ection B, Art. II of %ep#)lic Act +B27, as a"ended, otherwise :nown as the Dangero#s Dr#gs Act of 1972, as a"ended. Acc#sed Mi:ael Mal"stedt, a !wedish national, entered the 0hilippines for the third ti"e in Dece")er 1988 as a to#rist. 'n May 11, 1989, the acc#sed went to 3angonogan )#s stop in !agada. An order to esta)lish a chec:point in the said area was )eca#se it was reported that in that sa"e "orning a a#casian co"ing fro" !agada had in his possession prohi)ited dr#gs. 8uring the inspection, suspecting the bulge on accused@s waist, C'C Aalutan re.uired him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging ob#ect turned out to be a pouch bag with ob#ects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped ob#ects. $he wrapped o)-ects t#rned o#t to contain hashish, a deri*ati*e of "ari-#ana. Before the acc#sed alighted fro" the )#s, he stopped to get two @2A tra*elling )ags fro" the l#ggage carrier. Jpon stepping o#t of the )#s, the officers got the )ags and opened the". A teddy )ear was fo#nd in each )agand when the officers opened the teddy )ears it also contained hashish. ISSUE" 8hether the search "ade )y the 3A%'M officer was illegal ha*ing no search warrant iss#ed. HELD" 3o. $he onstit#tion g#arantees the right of the people to )e sec#re in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seiEures. &owever, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawf#l arrest witho#t a warrant "ay )e "ade )y a peace officer or a pri*ate person #nder the following circ#"stances stated in !ec. 7, %#le 11? of the r#les on cri"inal proced#re. Acc#sed was searched and arrested while transporting prohi)ited dr#gs @hashishA. A cri"e was act#ally )eing co""itted )y the acc#sed and he was ca#ght in flagrante delicto. $h#s, the search "ade #pon his personal effects falls s6#arely #nder paragraph @1A of the foregoing pro*isions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawf#l arrest. While it is true that the 2/.,AD officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. P2+8'8.) /'1() has )een defined as s#ch facts and circ#"stances which co#ld lead a reasona)le, discreet and pr#dent "an to )elie*e that an offense has )een co""itted, and that the o)-ects so#ght in connection with the offense are in the place so#ght to )e searched. 8arrantless search of the personal effects of an acc#sed has )een declared )y this o#rt as *alid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of mari*uana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously and atte"pted to flee. -arrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared b$ this Court as valid, because of e%istence of probable cause, where the smell of mari#uana emanated from a plastic bag owned b$ the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciousl$, and attempted to flee. Aside from the persistent reports received b$ the FA/CK0 that vehicles coming from "agada were transporting mari#uana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Kfficer also received information that a Caucasian coming from "agada on that particular da$ had prohibited drugs in his possession. !aid infor"ation was recei*ed )y the o""anding 'fficer of 3A%'M the *ery sa"e "orning that acc#sed ca"e down )y )#s fro" !agada on his way to Bag#io ity. 8hen 3A%'M recei*ed the infor"ation, a few ho#rs )efore the apprehension of herein acc#sed, that a a#casian tra*elling fro" !agada to Bag#io ity was carrying with hi" prohi)ited dr#gs, there was no ti"e to o)tain a search warrant. In the $angli)en case, the police a#thorities cond#cted a s#r*eillance at the <ictory Liner $er"inal located at Bgy. !an 3icolas, !an (ernando 0a"panga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangero#s dr#gs, )ased on infor"ation s#pplied )y so"e infor"ers. Acc#sed $angli)en who was acting s#spicio#sly and pointed o#t )y an infor"er was apprehended and searched )y the police a#thorities. It was held that when faced with on9the spot infor"ation, the police officers had to act 6#ic:ly and there was no ti"e to sec#re a search warrant. ;t must be observed that, at first, the 2/.,AD officers merely conducted a routine chec< of the bus 'where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. ;t was only when one of the officers noticed a 1CL96 on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. >or is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do soR '%) The receipt of information by 2/.,AD that a ,aucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus ' &) the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, ta<en together as a whole, led the 2/.,AD officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. Lrom these circumstances arose a probable cause which #ustified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. 'n other words, the acts of the FA/CK0 officers in re.uiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 54 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 one of the wrapped ob#ects found inside said bag +which was discovered to contain hashish, as well as the two +2, travelling bags containing two +2, tedd$ bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted b$ accused@s own attempt to hide his identit$ b$ refusing to present his passport, and b$ the information received b$ the FA/CK0 that a Caucasian coming from "agada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the FA/CK0 agents of the abilit$ and facilit$ to act accordingl$, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of societ$. E(E',+ >(. CA G.R. N+. 120431. AE29. 1, 1998 FACTS" $he e*idence for the prosec#tion, )ased on the testi"ony of 0at. %o"eo 0agilagan, shows that on H#ly 1B, 1991, at a)o#t 1224? a."., he and other police officers, na"ely, 0at. 8ilfredo A6#ilino, !i"plicio %i*era, and .rlindo L#")oy of the 8estern 0olice District @80DA, 3arcotics Di*ision went to Xa"ora and 0andacan !treets, Manila to confir" reports of dr#g p#shing in the area. $hey saw petitioner selling /so"ething/ to another person. After the alleged )#yer left, they approached petitioner, identified the"sel*es as police"en, and fris:ed hi". The search $ielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of mari#uana . -hen asked if he had more mari#uana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where the$ found ten more cellophane tea bags of mari#uana. 0etitioner was )ro#ght to the police head6#arters where he was charged with possession of prohi)ited dr#gs. 'n H#ly 2B, 1991, petitioner posted )ail 4 and the trial co#rt iss#ed his order of release on H#ly 29, 1991. 0etitioner contends that the trial and appellate co#rts erred in con*icting hi" on the )asis of the following2 @aA the pieces of e*idence sei&ed were inad"issi)leG @)A ISSUE" 8R3 the "ari-#ana confiscated fro" the ho#se in addition to the "ari-#ana confiscated while .spano waa fris:ed "ay )e #sed as e*idenceC HELD" 3'. $he 1987 onstit#tion g#arantees freedo" against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res #nder Article III, !ection 2 which pro*ides2 /$he right of the people to )e sec#re in their persons, ho#ses, papers and effects against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res of whate*er nat#re and for any p#rposes shall )e in*iola)le, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall iss#e e5cept #pon pro)a)le ca#se to )e deter"ined personally )y the -#dge after e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witnesses he "ay prod#ce, and partic#larly descri)ing the place to )e searched and the persons or things to )e sei&ed./ /n exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. ;t may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. ;n this case, the ten cellophane bags of mari*uana seied at petitionerFs house after his arrest at #andacan and Kamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. As regards the )ric: of "ari-#ana fo#nd inside the appellantIs ho#se, the trial co#rt correctly ignored it apparently in *iew of its inad"issi)ility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellantFs house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under - S6/.,H D/76 ;2,;762T/L TA / L/W>CL /..6ST,- the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested , or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at )ar, appellant was ad"ittedly o#tside his ho#se when he was arrested. 1ence, it can hardly )e said that the inner portion of his ho#se was within his reach or control. The articles seiEed from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the 7A,T.;26 A> S6/.,H D/76 ;2,;762T/L TA / L/W>CL /..6ST. $he warrantless search made in his house, however, which $ielded ten cellophane bags of mari#uana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreo*er, it was )eyond the reach and control of petitioner. P'E' >(. M'A+ G.R. N+. L273%0, F)821'2: 28, 19%8 FACTS2 0etitioner Martin Alagao, head of the co#nter9intelligence #nit of the Manila 0olice Depart"ent, acting #pon a relia)le infor"ation recei*ed on 3o*e")er 4, 19++ to the effect that a certain ship"ent of personal effects, allegedly "isdeclared and #nder*al#ed, wo#ld )e released the following day fro" the c#sto"s &one of the port of Manila and loaded on two tr#c:s, and #pon orders of petitioner %icardo 0apa, hief of 0olice of Manila and a d#ly dep#ti&ed agent of the B#rea# of #sto"s, cond#cted s#r*eillance at gate 3o. 1 of the c#sto"s &one. 8hen the tr#c:s left gate 3o. 1 at a)o#t B24? in the afternoon of 3o*e")er B, 19++, ele"ents of the co#nter9intelligence #nit went after the tr#c:s and intercepted the" at the Agrifina ircle, .r"ita, Manila. $he load of the two tr#c:s, consisting of nine )ales of goods, and the two tr#c:s, were sei&ed on instr#ctions of the hief of 0olice. Jpon in*estigation, a person clai"ed ownership of the goods and showed to the police"en a /!tate"ent and %eceipts of D#ties ollected on Infor"al .ntry 3o. 1B7977?1/, iss#ed )y the B#rea# of #sto"s in the na"e of a certain Bien*enido 3ag#it. lai"ing to ha*e )een pre-#diced )y the sei&#re and detention of the two tr#c:s and their cargo, %e"edios Mago filed charges against the hief of 0olice and the #sto"s o""issioner. ISSUE" 8here petitioners allowed to search and sei&e the 6#estioned artices e*en witho#t a warrantC HELD" Des. The policemen had authorit$ to effect the seiEure without an$ search warrant issued b$ a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not re.uire said warrant in the instant case. $he ode a#thori&es persons ha*ing police a#thority #nder Section &&3$ of the Tariff and ,ustoms ,ode to enter, pass thro#gh or search any land, inclos#re, wareho#se, store or )#ilding, not being a dwelling houseG and also to inspect, search and e%amine an$ vessel or aircraft and any tr#n:, pac:age, )o5 or en*elope or any person on )oard, or stop and search and e5a"ine any *ehicle, )east or person s#spected of holding or con*eying any d#tia)le or prohi)ited article introd#ced into the 0hilippines contrary to law, witho#t "entioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 9ut in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said dwelling house ma$ be entered and searched onl$ upon warrant issued b$ a #udge or #ustice of the peace . . . ;t is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seiure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. 'n the instant case, we note that petitioner 0artin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make an$ search before the$ seiEed the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and a"ended petition, in the co#rt )elow %e"edios Mago and <alentin Lanopa did not e*en allege that there was a search. All that they co"plained of was, /$hat while the tr#c:s were on their way, they were intercepted witho#t any search warrant near the Agrifina ircle and ta:en to the Manila 0olice, where they were detained./ 1ut even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seiures is construed as recogniing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods , where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quic<ly moved out of the locality or *urisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. $he 6#estion whether a sei&#re or a search is #nreasona)le in the lang#age of the onstit#tion is a -#dicial and not a legislati*e 6#estionG )#t in deter"ining whether a sei&#re is or is not #nreasona)le, all of the circ#"stances #nder which it is "ade "#st )e loo:ed to. -The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity production and ta<en possession of our highways in battalions, until the slower, animal: drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. ,onstructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach and swift escape un<nown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so:called -bootleggingF or Frum running,F which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seiure without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilied to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common <nowledge. Cpon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seiure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a *udicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.- 1a*ing declared that the sei&#re )y the "e")ers of the Manila 0olice Depart"ent of the goods in 6#estion was in accordance with law and )y that sei&#re the B#rea# of #sto"s had ac6#ired -#risdiction o*er the goods for the p#rposes of the enforce"ent of the c#sto"s and tariff laws, to the e5cl#sion of the o#rt of (irst Instance of Manila, 8e ha*e th#s resol*ed the principal and decisi*e iss#e in the present case. P)+E.) >(. M1(' G.R. N+. 9%177, !',1'2: 27, 1993 San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 55 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 FACTS" In the "orning of Dece")er 14, 1989, $R!gt. Hes#s Belarga, leader of a 3A%'$I! 'MMA3D @3A%'MA tea" )ased at alarian, Xa")oanga ity, instr#cted !gt. A"ado Ani to cond#ct s#r*eillance and test )#y on a certain Mari M#sa of !#ter*ille, Xa")oanga ity. Infor"ation recei*ed fro" ci*ilian infor"er was that this Mari M#sa was engaged in selling "ari-#ana in said place. !o !gt. A"ado Ani, another 3A%'M agent, proceeded to !#ter*ille, in co"pany with a 3A%'M ci*ilian infor"er, to the ho#se of Mari M#sa to which ho#se the ci*ilian infor"er had g#ided hi". $he sa"e ci*ilian infor"er had also descri)ed to hi" the appearance of Mari M#sa. A"ado Ani was a)le to )#y one newspaper9 wrapped dried "ari-#ana for 01?.??. !gt. Ani ret#rned to the 3A%'M office and t#rned o*er the newspaper9wrapped "ari-#ana to $R!gt. Hes#s Belarga. !gt. Belarga inspected the st#ff t#rned o*er to hi" and fo#nd it to )e "ari-#ana. $he ne5t day, Dece")er 1B, 1989, a)o#t 124? 0.M., a )#y9 )#st was planned. !gt. A"ado Ani was assigned as the pose#r )#yer for which p#rpose he was gi*en 02?.?? @with !3 ,A977884A )y Belarga. $he )#y9)#st "oney had )een ta:en )y $R!gt. Hes#s Belarga fro" MR!gt. 3oh !ali Mihas#n, hief of In*estigation !ection, and for which Belarga signed a receipt. $he tea" #nder !gt. (oncargas was assigned as )ac:9#p sec#rity. A pre9arranged signal was arranged consisting of !gt. AniIs raising his right hand, after he had s#cceeded to )#y the "ari-#ana. $he two 3A%'M tea"s proceeded to the target site in two ci*ilian *ehicles. BelargaIs tea" was co"posed of !gt. Belarga, tea" leader, !gt. A"ado Ani, pose#r )#yer, !gt. Lego and !gt. Biong. Arri*ing at the target site, !gt. Ani proceeded to the ho#se of Mari M#sa, while the rest of the 3A%'M gro#p positioned the"sel*es at strategic places a)o#t 9? to 1?? "eters fro" Mari M#saIs ho#se. $R!gt. Belarga co#ld see what went on )etween Ani and s#spect Mari M#sa fro" where he was. Ani approached Mari M#sa, who ca"e o#t of his ho#se, and as:ed Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted so"e "ore st#ff. Ani ga*e Mari M#sa the 02?.?? "ar:ed "oney. After recei*ing the "oney, Mari M#sa went )ac: to his ho#se and ca"e )ac: and ga*e A"ado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried "ari-#ana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. on*inced that the contents were "ari-#ana, Ani wal:ed )ac: towards his co"panions and raised his right hand. $he two 3A%'M tea"s, riding the two ci*ilian *ehicles, sped towards !gt. Ani. Ani -oined BelargaIs tea" and ret#rned to the ho#se. At the ti"e !gt. Ani first approached Mari M#sa, there were fo#r persons inside his ho#se2 Mari M#sa, another )oy, and two wo"en, one of who" Ani and Belarga later ca"e to :now to )e Mari M#saIs wife. $he second ti"e, Ani with the 3A%'M tea" ret#rned to Mari M#saIs ho#se, the wo"an, who was later :nown as Mari M#saIs wife, slipped away fro" the ho#se. "gt. 9elarga frisked 0ari 0usa but could not find the 620.00 marked mone$ with him. 0ari 0usa was then asked where the 620.00 was and he told the FA/CK0 team he has given the mone$ to his wife +who had slipped awa$,. "gt. 9elarga also found a plastic bag containing dried mari#uana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. 0ari 0usa was then placed under arrest and brought to the FA/CK0 office. At !#ter*ille, !gt. Ani t#rned o*er to !gt. Belarga the two newspaper9 wrapped "ari-#ana he had earlier )o#ght fro" Mari M#sa. The appellant assails the seiEure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing mari#uana which the FA/CK0 agents found in the appellant@s kitchen. 't appears that after "gt. Ani gave the pre7arranged signal to the other FA/CK0 agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. The$ searched him to retrieve the marked mone$ but didn@t find it. !pon being .uestioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked mone$ to his wife. Thereafter, TM"gt. 9elarga and "gt. (ego went to the kitchen and noticed what TM"gt. 9elarga described as a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. The$ asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, the$ opened it and found dried mari#uana leaves. At the trial, the appellant .uestioned the admissibilit$ of the plastic bag and the mari*uana it contains but the trial court issued an Krder ruling that these are admissible in evidence. ISSUE" May all the e*idence herein confiscated )e e5l#ded #nder the e5cl#sionary r#leC HELD" 3'. B#ilt into the onstit#tion are g#arantees on the freedo" of e*ery indi*id#al against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res )y pro*iding in Article III, !ection 2, the following2 /$he right of the people to )e sec#re in their persons, ho#ses, papers, and effects against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res of whate*er nat#re and for any p#rpose shall )e in*iola)le, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall iss#e e5cept #pon pro)a)le ca#se to )e deter"ined personally )y the -#dge after e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witness he "ay prod#ce, and partic#larly descri)ing the place to )e searched and the persons or things to )e sei&ed./ (#rther"ore, the onstit#tion, in confor"ity with the doctrine laid down in !tonehill *. Dio:no, 4B declares inad"issi)le, any e*idence o)tained in *iolation of the freedo" fro" #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res. While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seiure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognied. Thus, in /lvero v. 7ion, the ,ourt stated that -GtIhe most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seiure as an incident to a lawful arrest.- %#le 12+, !ection 12 of the %#les of o#rt e5pressly a#thori&es a warrantless search and sei&#re incident to a lawf#l arrest, th#s2 There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authories the arresting officer to ma<e a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 19?9, the o#rt has r#led that -GaIn officer ma<ing an arrest may ta<e from the person arrested and money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause.- 1ence, in a buy:bust operation conducted to entrap a drug: pusher, the law enforcement agents may seie the mar<ed money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. In the case at )ar, the 3A%'M agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting hi" in his ho#se )#t fo#nd nothing. $hey then searched the entire ho#se and, in the :itchen, fo#nd and sei&ed a plastic )ag hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seiEure, as an incident to a suspect@s lawful arrest, ma$ e%tend be$ond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Ab*ects in the -plain view- of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are sub*ect to seiure and may be presented as evidence. $he - #L/;2 M;6W - doctrine "ay not, howe*er, )e #sed to la#nch #n)ridled searches and indiscri"inate sei&#res nor to e5tend a general e5ploratory search "ade solely to find e*idence of defendantIs g#ilt. $he -#L/;2 M;6W- 7A,T.;26 is usuall$ applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating ob*ect. (#rther"ore, the J.!. !#pre"e o#rt stated the following li"itations on the application of the doctrine2 /8hat the Iplain *iewI cases ha*e in co""on is that the police officer in each of the" had a prior -#stification for an intr#sion in the co#rse of which he ca"e inad*ertently across a piece of e*idence incri"inating the acc#sed. $he doctrine ser*es to s#pple"ent the prior -#stification 9 whether it )e a warrant for another o)-ect, hot p#rs#it, search incident to lawf#l arrest, or so"e other legiti"ate reason for )eing present #nconnected with a search directed against the acc#sed 9 and per"its the warrantless sei&#re. 'f co#rse, the e5tension of the original -#stification is legiti"ate only where it is i""ediately apparent to the police that they ha*e e*idence )efore the"G the Iplain *iewI doctrine "ay not )e #sed to e5tend a general e5ploratory search fro" one o)-ect to another #ntil so"ething incri"inating at last e"erges./ ;t has also been suggested that even if an ob*ect is observed in -plain view,- the -plain view- doctrine will not *ustify the seiure of the ob*ect where the incriminating nature of the ob*ect is not apparent from the -plain view- of the ob*ect. Stated differently, it must be = ;DD67;/T6L@ /##/.62T0 to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise sub*ect to seiure. 'n the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Lailing to retrieve the marked mone$ which the$ hoped to find, the FA/CK0 agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their plain view when the$ arrested the appellant as to #ustif$ its seiEure. The FA/CK0 agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before the$ sighted the plastic bag. Cnli<e Oer v. ,alifornia, where the police officer had reason to wal< to the doorway of the ad*acent <itchen and from which position he saw the mari*uana, the 2/.,AD agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence. 0oreover, when the FA/CK0 agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, the$ had no clue as to its contents. The$ had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. -hen the appellant refused to respond, the$ opened it and found the mari#uana. Cnli<e Oer v. ,alifornia, where the mari*uana was visible to the police officerFs eyes, the 2/.,AD agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. 1ven assuming then, that the FA/CK0 agents inadvertentl$ came across the plastic bag because it was within their plain view, what ma$ be said to be the ob#ect in their plain view was #ust the plastic bag and not the mari#uana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediatel$ apparent from the plain view of said ob#ect. ;t cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. 8e, therefore, hold that #nder the circ#"stances of the case, the /plain *iew/ doctrine does not apply and the "ari-#ana contained in the plastic )ag was sei&ed illegally and cannot )e presented in e*idence p#rs#ant to Article III, !ection 4@2A of the onstit#tion. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 56 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he e5cl#sion of this partic#lar e*idence does not, howe*er, di"inish, in any way, the da"aging effect of the other pieces of e*idence presented )y the prosec#tion to pro*e that the appellant sold "ari-#ana, in *iolation of Article II, !ection B of the Dangero#s Dr#gs Act of 1972. 8e hold that )y *irt#e of the testi"onies of !gt. Ani and $R!gt. Belarga and the two wrappings of "ari-#ana sold )y the appellant to !gt. Ani, a"ong other pieces of e*idence, the g#ilt of the appellant of the cri"e charged has )een pro*ed )eyond reasona)le do#)t. VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEM&ER 29, 1989 FACTS" 'n 2? Han#ary 1987, the 3ational apital %egion District o""and @3%DA was acti*ated to "aintain peace and order, the 3%D installed chec:points in *ario#s parts of <alen&#ela, Metro Manila. 0etitioners a*er that, )eca#se of the installation of said chec:points, the residents of <alen&#ela are worried of )eing harassed and of their safety )eing placed at the ar)itrary, capricio#s and whi"sical disposition of the "ilitary "anning the chec:points, considering that their cars and *ehicles are )eing s#)-ected to reg#lar searches and chec:9#ps, especially at night or at dawn, witho#t the )enefit of a search warrant andRor co#rt order. $heir alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 H#ly 1988, Ben-a"in 0arpon, a s#pply officer of the M#nicipality of <alen&#ela, B#lacan, was g#nned down allegedly in cold )lood )y the "e")ers of the 3%D "anning the chec:point along McArth#r 1ighway at Malinta, <alen&#ela, for ignoring andRor ref#sing to s#)"it hi"self to the chec:point and for contin#ing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. 0etitioner <al"onte also clai"s that, on se*eral occasions, he had gone thr# these chec:points where he was stopped and his car s#)-ected to searchRchec:9#p witho#t a co#rt order or search warrant. ISSUE2 8hether the warrantless search and sei&#re witho#t in the present case is illegal. HELD" 3o. 0etitionersI concern for their safety and apprehension at )eing harassed )y the "ilitary "anning the chec:points are not s#fficient gro#nds to declare the chec:points as per se illegal. 3o proof has )een presented )efore the o#rt to show that, in the co#rse of their ro#tine chec:s, the "ilitary indeed co""itted specific *iolations of petitionersI right against #nlawf#l search and sei&#re or other rights. $he constit#tional right against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res is a personal right in*oca)le only )y those whose rights ha*e )een infringed, or threatened to )e infringed. 8hat constit#tes a reasona)le or #nreasona)le search and sei&#re in any partic#lar case is p#rely a -#dicial 6#estion, deter"ina)le fro" a consideration of the circ#"stances in*ol*ed. 0etitioner <al"onteIs general allegation to the effect that he had )een stopped and searched witho#t a search warrant )y the "ilitary "anning the chec:points, witho#t "ore, i.e., witho#t stating the details of the incidents which a"o#nt to a *iolation of his right against #nlawf#l search and sei&#re, is not s#fficient to ena)le the o#rt to deter"ine whether there was a *iolation of <al"onteIs right against #nlawf#l search and sei&#re. 3ot all searches and sei&#res are prohi)ited. $hose which are reasona)le are not for)idden. A reasona)le search is not to )e deter"ined )y any fi5ed for"#la )#t is to )e resol*ed according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is par<ed on the public fair grounds, 4 or simply loo<s into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. The setting up of the questioned chec<points in Malenuela 'and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the 2,.7, to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. ,hec<points may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilie the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court ma$ take #udicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgenc$ movement, so clearly reflected in the increased :illings in cities of police and "ilitary "en )y 30A /sparrow #nits,/ not to "ention the a)#ndance of #nlicensed firear"s and the alar"ing rise in lawlessness and *iolence in s#ch #r)an centers, not all of which are reported in "edia, "ost li:ely )ro#ght a)o#t )y deteriorating econo"ic conditions 9999 which all s#" #p to what one can rightly consider, at the *ery least, as a)nor"al ti"es. 1etween the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individualFs right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of chec<points by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. 1ut, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citien, the chec<points during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. SEC. 3 PRIACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE RAMIRE$ >(. CA G.R. N+. 93833, S)E0)D8)2 28, 1995 FACTS" A ci*il case for da"ages was filed )y petitioner !ocorro D. %a"ire& in the %egional $rial o#rt of V#e&on ity alleging that the pri*ate respondent, .ster !. ,arcia, in a confrontation in the latterIs office, allegedly *e5ed, ins#lted and h#"iliated her in a /hostile and f#rio#s "ood/ and in a "anner offensi*e to petitionerIs dignity and personality,/ contrary to "orals, good c#sto"s and p#)lic policy./
In s#pport of her clai", petitioner prod#ced a *er)ati" transcript of the e*ent and so#ght "oral da"ages, attorneyIs fees and other e5penses of litigation in the a"o#nt of 0+1?,???.??, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awarda)le at the trial co#rtIs discretion. $he transcript on which the ci*il case was )ased was c#lled fro" a tape recording of the confrontation "ade )y petitioner. @on*ersation attached )elowA As a res#lt of petitionerIs recording of the e*ent and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, pri*ate respondent filed a cri"inal case )efore the %egional $rial o#rt of 0asay ity for *iolation of %ep#)lic Act B2??, 0etitioner filed a Motion to V#ash the Infor"ation on the gro#nd that the facts charged do not constit#te an offense, partic#larly a *iolation of %.A. B2??. In an order May 4, 1989, the trial co#rt granted the Motion to V#ash, agreeing with petitioner that 1A the facts charged do not constit#te an offense #nder %.A. B2??G and that 2A the *iolation p#nished )y %.A. B2?? refers to a the taping of a co""#nication )y a person other than a participant to the co""#nication.
0ri*ate respondent filed a 0etition for %e*iew on Certiorari with !, which forthwith referred the case to the A. A pro"#lgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial co#rtIs order is n#ll and *oid. 0etitioner filed a Motion for %econsideration which A denied. 1ence, this petition. ISSUE" 8hether or not the applica)le pro*ision of %ep#)lic Act B2?? does not apply to the taping of a pri*ate con*ersation b$ one of the parties to the conversation. HELD" (irst, legislati*e intent is deter"ined principally fro" the lang#age of a stat#te. 8here the lang#age of a stat#te is clear and #na")ig#o#s, the law is applied according to its e5press ter"s, and interpretation wo#ld )e resorted to only where a literal interpretation wo#ld )e either i"possi)le or a)s#rd or wo#ld lead to an in-#stice. !ection 1 of %.A. B2?? entitled, / An Act to 0rohi)it and 0enali&ed 8ire $apping and 'ther %elated <iolations of 0ri*ate o""#nication and 'ther 0#rposes,/ pro*ides2 !ec. 1. It shall )e #nlawf#ll for any person, not )eing a#thori&ed )y all the parties to any pri*ate co""#nication or spo:en word, to tap any wire or ca)le, or )y #sing any other de*ice or arrange"ent, to secretly o*erhear, intercept, or record s#ch co""#nication or spo:en word )y #sing a de*ice co""only :nown as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or wal:ie9tal:ie or tape recorder, or howe*er otherwise descri)ed. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally ma<es it illegal for any person, not authoried by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law ma<es no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalied by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. $he stat#teIs intent to penali&e all persons #na#thori&ed to "a:e s#ch recording is #nderscored )y the #se of the 6#alifier -any-. onse6#ently, as respondent o#rt of Appeals correctly concl#ded, /e*en a @personA pri*y to a co""#nication who records his pri*ate con*ersation with another witho#t the :nowledge of the latter @willA 6#alify as a *iolator/ #nder this pro*ision of %.A. B2??. / perusal of the Senate ,ongressional .ecords, moreover, supports the respondent courtFs conclusion that in enacting ../. "&33 our lawma<ers indeed contemplated to ma<e illegal, unauthoried tape recording of private conversations or communications ta<en either by the parties themselves or by third persons. $he #na")ig#ity of the e5press words of the pro*ision, ta:en together with the deli)erations fro" the ongressional %ecord, therefore plainly s#pports the *iew held )y the respondent co#rt that the pro*ision see:s to penali&e e*en those pri*y to the pri*ate co""#nications. Where the law ma<es no distinctions, one does not distinguish. !econd, the nat#re of the con*ersations is i""aterial to a *iolation of the stat#te. $he s#)stance of the sa"e need not )e specifically alleged in the infor"ation. 8hat %.A. B2?? penali&es are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording pri*ate co""#nications )y "eans of the de*ices en#"erated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section % of ../. "&33. (inally, petitionerIs contention that the phrase /pri*ate co""#nication/ in !ection 1 of %.A. B2?? does not incl#de /pri*ate con*ersations/ narrows the ordinary "eaning of the word /co""#nication/ to a point of a)s#rdity. The word ,ADDC2;,/T6 comes from the latin San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 57 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 word communicare , meaning -to share or to impart.- In its ordinary signification, co""#nication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, , as in a ,A2M6.S/T;A2, or signifies the -process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols 'as language signs or gestures)-. These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non: verbal, written or expressive communications of -meanings or thoughts- which are li<ely to include the emotionally:charged exchange, on >ebruary &&, %(!!, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latterFs office. /ny doubts about the legislative bodyFs meaning of the phrase -private communication- are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms -conversation- and -communication- were interchangeably used by Senator TaSada in his 6xplanatory 2ote to the bill quoted below+ It has )een said that innocent people ha*e nothing to fear fro" their conversations )eing o*erheard. B#t this state"ent ignores the #s#al nat#re of conversations as well the #ndenia)le fact that "ost, if not all, ci*ili&ed people ha*e so"e aspects of their li*es they do not wish to e5pose. (ree conversations are often characteri&ed )y e5aggerations, o)scenity, agreea)le falsehoods, and the e5pression of anti9 social desires of *iews not intended to )e ta:en serio#sly. $he right to 0;) privacy of communication , a"ong others, has e5pressly )een ass#red )y o#r onstit#tion. 3eedless to state here, the fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion "#st ha*e recogni&ed the nat#re of conversations )etween indi*id#als and the significance of "anIs spirit#al nat#re, of his feelings and of his intellect. $hey "#st ha*e :nown that part of the pleas#res and satisfactions of life are to )e fo#nd in the #na#dited, and <2)) )C/;',A) +< communication )etween indi*id#als E free fro" e*ery #n-#stifia)le intr#sion )y whate*er "eans.
'n Aaanan vs. 'ntermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authoriation did not violate ../. "&33 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those -device's) or arrangement's)- enumerated therein, following the principle that -penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.-
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of /.A. C200 suffer from no ambiguit$, and the statute itself e%plicitl$ mentions the unauthoriEed recording of private communications with the use of tape7recorders as among the acts punishable. '3<.%!A$I'32 0laintiff !occoro D. %a"ire& @h#chiA E ,ood Afternoon MIa". Defendant .ster !. ,arcia @.!,A E Ano )a ang nangyari sa Iyo, na:ali"ot :a na :#ng paano :a nap#nta rito, por:e "e")er :a na, "ags#")ong :a :#ng ano ang gagawin :o sa Iyo. 1J1I E Lasi, na:a d#ty a:o noon. .!, E $apos iniwan no. @"icA 1J1I E 1indi "Ia", pero ilan )eses na nila a:ong )inali:an, sa)ing ganoon E .!, E Ito and @sicA "asasa)i :o sa Iyo, ayaw :#ng @sicA "ag e5plain :a, :asi hanggang 1?2?? p."., :ina)#:asan hindi :a na p#"aso:. 3gayon a:o ang )a)ali: sa Iyo, nag9aaply :a sa !tates, nag9aaply :a sa re*iew "o, :#ng :a:ailanganin ang certification "o, :ali"#tan "o na :asi hindi :a sa a:in "a:a:ahingi. 1J1I E 1indi MIa". Lasi ang ano :o talaga noon i9cocontin#e :o #p to 1?2?? p.". .!, E 9astos ka, na:ali"#tan "o na :#ng paano :a p#"aso: dito sa hotel. Mags#")ong :a sa Jnion :#ng g#sto "o. 3a:ali"#tan "o na :#ng paano :a na:apaso: dito /Do yo# thin: that on yo#r own "a:a:apaso: :a :#ng hindi a:o. 0an#n#")yoyan na :ita @!in#s#")atan na :itaA. 1J1I E It#t#loy :o na MIa" sana ang d#ty :o. .!, E Laso ilang )eses na a:ong )ina)ali:an doon ng "ga no @sicA :o. .!, E 3a:ali"#tan "o na )a :#ng paano :a p#"aso: sa hotel, :#ng on yo#r own "erit ala" :o na"an :#ng gaano :a /:a )o)o/ "o. Mara"i ang nag9aaply ala" :ong hindi :a papasa. 1J1I E L#"#ha :a"i ng e5a" noon. .!, E 'o, pero hindi :a papasa. 1J1I E .h, )a:it a:o ang na:#ha ni Dr. $a"ayo .!, E L#:#nin :a :asi a:o. 1J1I E .h, di sana E .!, E 1#wag "ong ipag"ala:i na "ay #ta: :a :asi wala kang utak. A:ala "o )a "a:#:#ha :a dito :#ng hindi a:o. 1J1I E Mag9ee5plain a:o. .!, E 1#wag na, hindi a:o "ag9papa9e5plain sa Iyo, "a:aalala :a :#ng paano :a p#"a9rito. /6utang7ina/ sasa)i9sa)ihin "o :a"ag9ana: ng nanay at tatay "o ang "ga "ag#lang :o. .!, E 8ala na a:ong pa:iala", dahil nandito :a sa loo), nasa la)as :a p#wede :a ng hindi p#"aso:, o:ey yan nasaloo) :a #"alis :a doon. 1J1I E Lasi MIa", )in)ali:an a:o ng "ga taga Jnion. .!, E 3andiyan na rin a:o, pero h#wag "ong :ali"#tan na hindi :a "a:a:apaso: :#ng hindi a:o. L#ng hindi "o :ini:ilala yan o:ey lang sa a:in, dahil tapos :a na. 1J1I E Ina9ano :o "Ia" na #tang na loo). .!, E 1#wag na lang, hindi "o #tang na loo), :asi :#ng )aga sa no, nilapastangan "o a:o. 1J1I E 0aano :ita nilapastangananC .!, E Ma)#ti pa l#"a)as :a na. 1indi na a:o "a:i:ipag#sap sa Iyo. L#"a)as :a na. Mags#")ong :a.
C)/9.9' $1.1)0' >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.( (G.R. N+. 107838, F)821'2: 20, 199%) M),*+F', !., FACTS" ecilia X#l#eta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. 'n March 2+, 1982, ecilia entered the clinic of her h#s)and, a doctor of "edicine, and in the presence of her "other, a dri*er and pri*ate respondentIs secretary, forcibl$ opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband@s clinic and took 1I5 documents consisting of private correspondence between 8r. 0artin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, 8r. 0artin@s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seiEed for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for dis6#alification fro" the practice of "edicine which petitioner had filed against her h#s)and. Dr. Martin, hence )ro#ght an action for the reco*ery of the doc#"ents and papers and for da"ages against ecilia. $he trial co#rt rendered its -#dg"ent declaring Dr. Martin as the capitalRe5cl#si*e owner of the said properties. $he o#rt of Appeals affir"ed the decision of the trial co#rt. ISSUE" 8hether or not the doc#"ents and papers sei&ed )y ecilia are ad"issi)le in e*idence against Dr. Martin. HELD" 3'. $he doc#"ents and papers in 6#estion are inad"issi)le in e*idence. The constitutional in#unction declaring the privac$ of communication and correspondence :to be< inviolable is no less applicable simpl$ because it is the wife +who thinks herself aggrieved b$ her husband@s infidelit$, who is the part$ against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the ,onstitution is if there is a -lawful order Gfrom aI court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.- /ny violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible -for any purpose in any proceeding.- $he inti"acies )etween h#s)and and wife do not -#stify any one of the" in )rea:ing the drawers and ca)inets of the other and in ransac:ing the" for any telltale e*idence of "arital infidelity. A person, )y contracting "arriage, does not shed hisRher integrity or his right to pri*acy as an indi*id#al and the constit#tional protection is e*er a*aila)le to hi" or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses b$ making it privileged. Feither husband nor wife ma$ testif$ for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Feither ma$ be e%amined without the consent of the other as to an$ communication received in confidence b$ one from the other during the marriage, save for specified e%ceptions. 9ut one thing is freedom of communicationJ .uite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one <nows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the dut$ of fidelit$ that each owes to the other. FELIPE NAVARRO >( COURT OF APPEALS G.R. N+. 121087, A1A1(0 2%, 1999,MENDO$A, !. F'/0(" !tanley Hal)#ena and .nri6#e I:e Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the .ntertain"ent ity following reports that it was showing n#de dancers. After the three had seated the"sel*es at a ta)le and ordered )eer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and )egan to perfor" a strip act. As she re"o*ed her )rassieres, Hal)#ena )ro#ght o#t his ca"era and too: a pict#re. $his called the attention of Dante Li6#in, the floor "anager, who together with a sec#rity g#ard, Ale5 !ioco, approached Hal)#ena and de"anded to :now why he too: a pict#re which res#lted to a heated arg#"ent. 8hen Hal)#ena saw that !ioco was a)o#t to p#ll o#t his g#n, he ran o#t of the -oint followed )y his co"panions. $hey went to the police station to report the "atter. In a while, Li6#in and !ioco arri*ed on a "otorcycle who were "et )y petitioner 3a*arro who tal:ed with the" in a corner for aro#nd fifteen "in#tes. Afterwards, petitioner 3a*arro t#rned to Hal)#ena and, p#shing hi" to the wall, c#rsed hi". 0etitioner 3a*arro then p#lled o#t his firear" and coc:ed it, and, pressing it on the face of Hal)#ena. At this point, Lingan inter*ened. $he two then had a heated e5change. As Lingan was a)o#t to t#rn away, petitioner 3a*arro hit hi" with the handle of his pistol. Lingan fell on the floor, )lood flowing down his face. 1e tried to get #p, )#t petitioner 3a*arro ga*e hi" a fist )low on the forehead which floored hi". !nknown to petitioner Favarro, >albuena was able to record on tape the e%change between petitioner and the deceased. This was submitted as evidence. I((1)" 8hether or not the tape is ad"issi)le as e*idence in *iew of %A B2?? which prohi)it wire tappingC H).*" 3o, it "ay not. !ec. 1 of %A B2?? pro*ides that = It shall also )e #nlawf#l for any person, )e he a participant or not in the act or acts San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 58 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 penali&ed in the ne5t preceding sentence to :nowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other s#ch record, or copies thereof, of any co""#nication or spo:en word sec#red either )efore or after the effecti*e date of this Act in the "anner prohi)ited )y this lawG or to replay the sa"e for any other person or personsG or to co""#nicate the contents thereof, either *er)ally or in writing, or to f#rnish transcriptions thereof, whether co"plete or partial, to any other person2 0ro*ided, $hat the #se of s#ch record or any copies thereof as e*idence in any ci*il, cri"inal in*estigation or trial of offenses "entioned in section 4 hereof, shall not )e co*ered )y this prohi)ition The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of #.;M/T6 ,ADDC2;,/T;A2S. !ince the exchange between petitioner 2avarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. 3or is there any 6#estion that it was d#ly a#thenticated. A *oice recording is a#thenticated )y the testi"ony of a witness @1A that he personally recorded the con*ersationG @2A that the tape played in co#rt was the one he recordedG and @4A that the *oices on the tape are those of the persons s#ch are clai"ed to )elong. OPLE >. TORRES 9... 2o. %&4B!5J 8uly &$, %((!J #uno, 8. FACTS" 0etitioner Blas 'ple prays that the ! in*alidate Ad"inistrati*e 'rder 3o. 4?8 entitled /Adoption of a 3ational o"p#teri&ed Identification %eference !yste"/ on two i"portant constit#tional gro#nds2 one, it is a #s#rpation of the power of ongress to legislate, and two, it i"per"issi)ly intr#des on o#r citi&enryIs protected &one of pri*acy. ISSUE" 8hether A' 4?8 *iolates the constit#tionally "andated right to pri*acy HELD. -)(. /ssuming, arguendo, that /.A. 2o. $3! need not be the sub*ect of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the -right to be let alone.- The S, prescinds from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the ,onstitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that /.A. 2o. $3! is *ustified by some ,AD#6LL;29 ST/T6 ;2T6.6ST and that it is 2/..AWL@ 7./W2. /.A. 2o. $3! is predicated on two considerations+ '%) the need to provide our citiens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and '&) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons see<ing basic services. It is de)ata)le whether these interests are co"pelling eno#gh to warrant the iss#ance of A.'. 3o. 4?8. &UT =HAT IS NOT ARGUA&LE IS THE &ROADNESS, THE VAGUENESS, THE OVER&READTH OF A.O. NO. 308 =HICH IF IMPLEMENTED =ILL PUT OUR PEOPLEQS RIGHT TO PRIVAC- IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. $he heart of A.'. 3o. 4?8 lies in its !ection B which pro*ides for a 0op#lation %eference 3#")er @0%3A as a /co""on reference n#")er to esta)lish a lin:age a"ong concerned agencies/ thro#gh the #se of /Bio"etrics $echnology/ and /co"p#ter application designs./ A.'. 3o. 4?8 sho#ld also raise o#r antennas for a f#rther loo: will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is li"ited to )iological infor"ation alone for identification p#rposes. I, <'/0, 0;) S+.9/90+2 G),)2'. /.'9D( 0;'0 0;) '*+E09+, +< 0;) I*),09<9/'09+, R)<)2),/) S:(0)D @9.. /+,029810) 0+ 0;) IA),)2'09+, +< E+E1.'09+, *'0' <+2 *)>).+ED),0 E.',,9,A.I This is an admission that the #.2 will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of /.A. 2o. $3!. ,learly, the indefiniteness of /.A. 2o. $3! can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his #.2. $he potential for "is#se of the data to )e gathered #nder A.'. 3o. 4?8 cannot )e #nderplayed as the dissenters do. 0#rs#ant to said ad"inistrati*e order, an indi*id#al "#st present his 0%3 e*ery ti"e he deals with a go*ern"ent agency to a*ail of )asic ser*ices and sec#rity. 1is transactions with the go*ern"ent agency will necessarily )e recorded E whether it )e in the co"p#ter or in the doc#"entary file of the agency. $he indi*id#alIs file "ay incl#de his transactions for loan a*ail"ents, inco"e ta5 ret#rns, state"ent of assets and lia)ilities, rei")#rse"ents for "edication, hospitali&ation, etc. The more frequent the use of the #.2, the better the chance of building a huge formidable information base through the electronic lin<age of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposesJ but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. ;t does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. TH6.6 /.6 /LSA 2A ,A2T.ALS TA 9C/.7 /9/;2ST L6/O/96 A> ;2>A.D/T;A2. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is bro<en, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can ma<e use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and the ! held that A.'. 3o. 4?8 falls short of ass#ring that personal infor"ation which will )e gathered a)o#t o#r people will only )e processed for #ne6#i*ocally specified p#rposes. The lac< of proper safeguards in this regard of A.K. Fo. ;08 may interfere with the individualFs liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to trac< down his movementJ it ma$ also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self:incriminationJ it ma$ pave the wa$ for -fishing expeditions b$ government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seiEures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the #.2, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lac<s control over what can be read or placed on his ;7, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. The$ threaten the ver$ abuses that the 9ill of /ights seeks to prevent.
$he ! re-ected the arg#"ent of the !olicitor ,eneral that an indi*id#al has a reasona)le e5pectation of pri*acy with regard to the 3ational ID and the #se of )io"etrics technology as it stands on 6#ic:sand. TH6 .6/SA2/1L626SS A> / #6.SA2FS 6H#6,T/T;A2 A> #.;M/,@ 76#627S A2 / TWA:#/.T T6ST+ '%) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacyJ and '&) whether this expectation is one that society recognies as reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case determine the reasonableness of the expectation. &owever, other factors, such as customs, ph$sical surroundings and practices of a particular activit$, ma$ serve to create or diminish this e%pectation. $he #se of )io"etrics and co"p#ter technology in A.'. 3o. 4?8 does not ass#re the indi*id#al of a reasona)le e5pectation of pri*acy. 3e5t, the !olicitor ,eneral #rges the ! to *alidate A.'. 3o. 4?8Is a)ridg"ent of the right of pri*acy )y #sing THE RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TEST. 1e stressed that the p#rposes of A.'. 3o. 4?8 are2 @1A to strea"line and speed #p the i"ple"entation of )asic go*ern"ent ser*ices, @2A eradicate fra#d )y a*oiding d#plication of ser*ices, and @4A generate pop#lation data for de*elop"ent planning. 1e concl#des that these p#rposes -#stify the inc#rsions into the right to pri*acy for the "eans are rationally related to the end. $he ! was not i"pressed )y the arg#"ent. In Morfe *. M#t#c, the ! #pheld the constit#tionality of %.A. 4?19, the Anti9,raft and orr#pt 0ractices Act, as a *alid police power "eas#re. 8e declared that the law, in co"pelling a p#)lic officer to "a:e an ann#al report disclosing his assets and lia)ilities, his so#rces of inco"e and e5penses, did not infringe on the indi*id#alIs right to pri*acy. $he law was enacted to pro"ote "orality in p#)lic ad"inistration )y c#rtailing and "ini"i&ing the opport#nities for official corr#ption and "aintaining a standard of honesty in the p#)lic ser*ice. $he sa"e circ#"stances do not o)tain in the case at )ar. >or one, ../. $3%( is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, ../. $3%( itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalied, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. ;n the case at bar, /.A. 2o. $3! may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. $his approach is de"anded )y the 1987 onstit#tion whose entire "atri5 is designed to protect h#"an rights and to pre*ent a#thoritarianis". In case of do#)t, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not p#t in danger the rights protected )y the onstit#tions. In the case at )ar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing /.A. 2o. $3! pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. ,i*en the record9:eeping power of the co"p#ter, only the indifferent fail to percei*e the danger that A.'. 3o. 4?8 gi*es the go*ern"ent the power to co"pile a de*astating dossier against #ns#specting citi&ens. $h#s, the petition was ,%A3$.D. SECTION ! FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION THE UNITED STATES >( FELIPE &USTOS, ET AL. G.R. N+. L12592, M'2/; 8, 1918. F'/0(" In the latter part of 1917, n#"ero#s citi&ens of the 0ro*ince of 0a"panga asse")led, and prepared and signed a petition to the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary charging %o"an 0#nsalan, -#stice of the peace of Maca)e)e and Masantol, 0a"panga, with "alfeasance in office and as:ing for his re"o*al. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 59 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he .5ec#ti*e !ecretary referred the papers to the -#dge of first instance for the 7th H#dicial District re6#esting in*estigation, proper action, and report. $he -#stice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. $he -#dge of first instance, ha*ing esta)lished g#ilt, reco""ended to the ,o*ernor9,eneral that the respondent )e re"o*ed fro" his position as -#stice of the peace and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case )e trans"itted to the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary.Later the -#stice of the peace filled a "otion for a new trialG the -#dge of first instance granted the "otion, doc#"ents were introd#ced asserting that the -#stice of the peace was the *icti" of prosec#tion, and that charges were "ade for personal reasons. 1e was then ac6#itted. $hereafter, in 191+, a cri"inal action for li)el against the defendants who earlier initiated the petition for the -#dgeKs re"o*al was instit#ted. $he (I of 0a"panga fo#nd the defendants g#ilty. I((1)" 8hether or not the defendants are g#ilty of a li)el of %o"an 0#nsalan, -#stice of the peace of Maca)e)e and Masantol, 0ro*ince of 0a"panga. H).*" 3o.$he onstit#tion of the Jnited !tates and the !tate constit#tions g#arantee the right of freedo" of speech and press and the right of asse")ly and petition. 8e are therefore, not s#rprised to find 0resident McLinley in that Magna harta of 0hilippine Li)erty, the Instr#ction to the !econd 0hilippine o""ission, of April 7, 19??, laying down the in*iola)le r#le -That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the 9overnment for a redress of grievances.- $he 0hilippine Bill, the Act of ongress of H#ly 1, 19?2, and the Hones Law, the Act of ongress of A#g#st 29, 191+, in the nat#re of organic acts for the 0hilippines, contin#ed this g#aranty. $he words 6#oted are not #nfa"iliar to st#dents of onstit#tional Law, for they are the co#nterpart of the first a"end"ent to the onstit#tion of the Jnited !tates, which the A"erican people de"anded )efore gi*ing their appro*al to the onstit#tion. $hese paragraphs fo#nd in the 0hilippine Bill of %ights are not thread)are *er)iage. $he lang#age carries with it all the applica)le -#rispr#dence of great .nglish and A"erican onstit#tional cases. And what are these principlesD Golumes would inade.uatel$ answer. 9ut included are the following? The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. ,omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Den in public life may suffer under a hostile and an un*ust accusationJ the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. / public officer must not be too thin:s<inned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Anly thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Af course, criticism does not authoried defamation. Fevertheless, as the individual is less than the "tate, so must e%pected criticism be born for the common good . .ising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the ,hief 6xecutive, to the Legislature, to the 8udiciary : to any or all the agencies of 9overnment : #C1L;, A#;2;A2 should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticie *udicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit sub*ect for proper comment. ;f the people cannot criticie a *ustice of the peace or a *udge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muled . Attempted terroriEation of public opinion on the part of the #udiciar$ would be t$rann$ of the basest sort. The sword of 8amocles in the hands of a #udge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citiEen and to stand up bravel$ before an$ official. An the contrary, it is a 7CT@ which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. ;t is further the duty of all <now of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. 'n the words of 0r. >ustice Aa$ner, who contributed so largel$ to the law of libel. -The people are not obliged to spea< of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism.- $he .;9HT TA /SS6D1L6 /27 #6T;T;A2 is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. /SS6D1L@ means a right on the part of citiens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. #6T;T;A2 means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. +1,6ublic polic$, +2,the welfare of societ$, and +;,the orderl$ administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. $he ine*ita)le and incontesta)le res#lt has )een the de*elop"ent and adoption of the DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE. /The 7A,T.;26 A> #.;M;L6967 ,ADDC2;,/T;A2S rests upon public policy, Fwhich loo<s to the free and unfettered administration of *ustice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil:disposed and malignant slanderer.F- P29>9.)A) is classified as either A&SOLUTE or JUALIFIED. -ith the first, we are not concerned. /s to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. $he r#le is th#s stated )y Lord a"p)ell, . H. -/ communication made bona fide upon any sub*ect:matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained incriminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.- A pertinent illustration of the application of .ualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or dut$ in the matter. 6ven when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege ma$ still cover the mistake of the individual. 1ut the statements must be made under an honest sense of dutyJ a self: see<ing motive is destructive. #ersonal in*ury is not necessary. /ll persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of *ustice and of public affairs. The 7CT@ under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believe he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mista<en. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a part$ applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege. 'n the usual case D/L;,6 can be presumed from defamatory words. #.;M;L696 destroys that #.6SCD#T;A2. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. $he plaintiff "#st )ring ho"e to the defendant the e5istence of "alice as the tr#e "oti*e of his cond#ct. >alsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. A pri*ileged co""#nication sho#ld not )e s#)-ected to "icroscopic e5a"ination to disco*er gro#nds of "alice or falsity. !#ch e5cessi*e scr#tiny wo#ld defeat the protection which the law throws o*er pri*ileged co""#nications. $he #lti"ate test is that of )ona fides. 1a*ing ascertained the attit#de which sho#ld )e ass#"ed relati*e to the )asic rights of freedo" of speech and press and of asse")ly and petition, ha*ing e"phasi&ed the point that our (ibel (aw as a statute must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Krganic (aw, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this case with these principles. It is tr#e that the partic#lar words set o#t in the infor"ation, if said of a pri*ate person, "ight well )e considered li)elo#s per se. $he charges "ight also #nder certain concei*a)le conditions con*ict one of a li)el of a go*ern"ent official. /s a general rule words imputing to a *udge or a *ustice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. 1ut as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. 6xpress malice has not been proved by the prosecution. >urther, although the charges are probably not true as to the *ustice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. 9ood faith surrounded their action. #robable cause for them to thin< that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citiens : to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal : were *ustifiable. ;n no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citiens did not eagerly seie on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a *udge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. 2o undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the *ustice of the peace was proper. /nd finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the 6xecutive Secretary. The present facts are further essentiall$ different from those established in other cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of public officials. Dalice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the officer , have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. 8e find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the r#les concerning 6#alified pri*ilege, growing o#t of constit#tional g#aranties in o#r )ill of rights. Instead of p#nishing citi&ens for an honest San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 60 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 endea*or to i"pro*e the p#)lic ser*ice, we sho#ld rather co""end the" for their good citi&enship. $he defendants and appellants are ac6#itted. P)+E.) >(. A.'2/+, GR 4%551, D)/. 12, 1939 FACTS" As an after"ath of the decision rendered )y the o#rt of first Instance of 0a"panga in cri"inal case 3o. 7744, $he 0eople of the 0hilippines *s. !al*ador Alarcon, et al., con*icting the acc#sed therein E e5cept one E of the cri"e of ro))ery co""itted in )and, a denunciator$ letter, signed b$ (uis 0. Taruc, was addressed to &is 1%cellenc$, the 6resident of the 6hilippines. A copy of said letter fo#nd its way to the herein respondent, (ederico MaNgahas who, as col#"nist of the $ri)#ne, a newspaper of general circ#lation in the 0hilippines, 6#oted the letter in an article p#)lished )y hi" in the iss#e of that paper of !epte")er 24, 1947. $he o)-ectiona)le portion, written in !panish, is inserted in the following petition of the pro*incial fiscal of 0a"panga, filed with the o#rt of (irst Instance of that pro*ince on !epte")er 29, 1947. 'n the sa"e date, the lower co#rt ordered the respondent to appear and show ca#se. $he respondent appeared and filed an answer, alleging that the p#)lication of the letter in 6#estion is in line with the constit#tional g#arantee of freedo" of the press. ISSUE" 8hether the p#)lication of the letter in 6#estion is within the p#r*iew of constit#tional g#arantee of freedo" of the press, hence the acc#sed cannot )e held g#ilty in conte"pt of co#rtC HELD" 1. D.!. $he ele"ents of conte"pt )y newspaper p#)lications are well defined )y the cases ad-#dicated in this as in other -#risdictions. 2ewspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering *ustice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punish able by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. ;t must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of *ustice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all:important duty of the court to administer *ustice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter complained of was published after the Court of Lirst 'nstance of 6ampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robber$ in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. $he fact that a "otion to reconsider its order confiscating the )ond of the acc#sed therein was s#)se6#ently filed "ay )e ad"ittedG )#t, the i"portant consideration is that it was then witho#t power to reopen or "odify the decision which it had rendered #pon the "erits of the case, and co#ld not ha*e )een infl#enced )y the 6#estioned p#)lication. 'f it be contended, however, that the publication of the .uestioned letter constitutes contempt of the Court of Appeals where the appeal in the criminal case was then pending, as was the theor$ of the provincial fiscal below which was accepted b$ the lower court, we ta<e the view that in the interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated *udicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority and de corum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court be comes thereb$ charged with the authorit$ to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal. $he !olicitor9,eneral, in his )rief, s#ggests that /e*en if there had )een nothing "ore pending )efore the trial co#rt, this still had -#risdiction to p#nish the acc#sed for conte"pt, for the reason that the p#)lication scandali&ed the co#rt. $he r#le s#ggested, which has its origin at co""on law, is in*ol*ed in so"e do#)t #nder "odern .nglish law and in the Jnited !tates, -the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press.- Kther considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As stated, the rule imported into this #urisdiction is that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering #ustice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summaril$ punishable b$ the courts) that the rule is otherwise after the case is ended. I, '0 .)'(0 0@+ 9,(0',/)(, 0;9( C+120 ;'( )C)2/9()* 0;) E+@)2 0+ E1,9(; <+2 /+,0)DE0 I+, 0;) E2)()2>'09>) ',* +, 0;) >9,*9/'09>) E29,/9E.), +, 0;) /+22)/09>) ',* ,+0 +, 0;) 2)0'.9'0+2: 9*)' +< E1,9(;D),0I. ,ontempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense , and in considering the probable effects of the article alleged to be contemptuous, ever$ fair and reasonable inference consistent with the theor$ of defendant@s innocence will be indulged, and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law e%ists as to the guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the due administration of #ustice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he must be ac.uitted. A:)2 P2+*1/09+, PT- L0*. >(. C'E1.+,A GR 82380, AE29., 29, 1988, FELICIANO, !. FACTS" $he petitioner infor"ed pri*ate respondent H#an 0once .nrile a)o#t the pro-ected "otion pict#re entitled /$he (o#r Day %e*ol#tion/ enclosing a synopsis of it, the f#ll te5t of which is set o#t )elow2 $he (o#r Day %e*ol#tion is a si5 ho#r "ini9series a)o#t 0eople 0owerEa #ni6#e e*ent in "odern history that9"ade possi)le the 0eacef#l re*ol#tion in the 0hilippines in 198+. (aced with the tas: of dra"ati&ing these re"ar:a)le e*ents, screenwriter Da*id 8illia"son and history 0rof Al Mcoy ha*e chosen a /doc#9dra"a/ style and created Ofo#rP fictitio#s characters to trace the re*ol#tion fro" the death of !enator A6#ino, to the (e) re*ol#tion and the fleeing of Marcos fro" the co#ntry. 0ri*ate respondent .nrile replied that /he wo#ld not and will not appro*e of the #se, appropriation, reprod#ction andRor e5hi)ition of his na"e, or pict#re, or that of any "e")er of his fa"ily in any cine"a or tele*ision prod#ction, fil" or other "edi#" for ad*ertising or co""ercial e5ploitation/. 0etitioners acceded to this de"and and the na"e of pri*ate respondent .nrile was deleted fro" the "o*ie script. 'n 24 (e)r#ary 1988, pri*ate respondent filed a o"plaint with application for $e"porary %estraining 'rder and 8ilt of 0retion with the %egional $rial o#rt of Ma:ati see:ing to en-oin petitioners fro" prod#cing the "o*ie /$he (o#r Day %e*ol#tion/. $he co"plaint alleged that petitionersI prod#ction of the "ini9series witho#t pri*ate respondentIs consent and o*er his o)-ection, constit#tes an o)*io#s *iolation of his right of pri*acy. ISSUE" 8hether or not petitionersK right to freedo" of e5pression o#tweigh pri*ate respondent .nrileKs right to pri*acyC HELD" D.!. $he freedo" of speech incl#des the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. In o#r day and age, "otion pict#res are a #ni*ersally #tili&ed *ehicle of co""#nication and "edi#" of e5pression. Along with the press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information, education and entertainment. Motion pict#res are i"portant )oth as a "edi#" for the co""#nication of ideas and the e5pression of the artistic i"p#lse. $heir effects on the perception )y o#r people of iss#es and p#)lic officials or p#)lic fig#res as well as the pre*ailing c#lt#ral traits is considera)le. ;mportance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. $here is no clear di*iding line )etween what in*ol*es :nowledge and what affords pleas#re. If s#ch a distinction were s#stained, there is a di"in#tion of the )asic right to free e5pression./This freedom is available in our country both to locally:owned and to foreign:owned motion picture companies. >urthermore, the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. $he co#nter9)alancing clai" of pri*ate respondent is to a right of privacy. $he right of pri*acy or /the right to )e let alone,/ li:e the right of free e5pression, is not an a)sol#te right. / limited intrusion into a personFs privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of apublic character. Succinctly put, TH6 .;9HT A> #.;M/,@ cannot be invo<ed resist publication and dissemination of D/TT6.S A> #C1L;, ;2T6.6ST. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publiciing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. (agunEad v. Gda. de AonEales, on which private respondent relies heavil$, recogniEed a right to privac$ in a conte%t which included a claim to freedom of speech and of e%pression. (agunEad involved a suit for enforcement of a licensing agreement between a motion picture producer as licensee and the widow and famil$ of the late 0oises 6adilla as licensors. $his agree"ent ga*e the licensee the right to prod#ce a "otion pict#re portraying the life of Moises 0adilla, a "ayoralty candidate of the 3acionalista 0arty for the M#nicipality of Magallon, 3egros 'ccidental d#ring the 3o*e")er 1971 elections and for whose "#rder, ,o*ernor %afael Lacson, a "e")er of the Li)eral 0arty then in power and his "en were tried and con*icted. 'n affirming the #udgment of the lower court enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had produced the motion picture and e%hibited it but refused to pa$ the stipulated ro$alties, the Court, through 0me. >ustice 0elencio7&errera, said? /3either do we agree with petitionerIs s#)"ission that the Licensing Agree"ent is n#ll and *oid for lac: of, or for ha*ing an illegal ca#se or consideration, while it is tr#e that petitioner had p#rchased the rights to the )oo: entitled I$he Moises 0adilla !tory,I that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and a#thority fro" the deceased heirs to portray p#)licly episodes in said deceasedIs life and in that of his "other and the "e")ers of his fa"ily. As held in !ch#yler *. #rtis, @O1897P, 1B7 3D B4B, B2 3., 41 L%A 28+. B9 A" !t %ep +71A, @a privilege ma$ be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memor$, but the privilege e%ists for San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 61 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memor$ of the deceased.@ 0etitionerIs a*er"ent that pri*ate respondent did not ha*e any property right o*er the life of Moises 0adilla since the latter was a p#)lic fig#re, is neither well ta:en. Being a p#)lic fig#re ipso facto does not a#to"atically destroy in toto a personIs right to pri*acy. $he right to in*ade a personIs pri*acy to disse"inate p#)lic infor"ation does not e5tend to a fictional or no*eli&ed representation of a person, no "atter how p#)lic a fig#re he or she "ay )e @,arner *. $riangle 0#)lications, D3D, 97 (. !#pp., 7+B, 7B9 O1971PA. 'n the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner e%erted efforts to present a true7to7life stor$ of 0oises 6adilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab stor$ of torture and brutalit$./ I, L'A1,F'*, 0;) C+120 ;'* ,))*, '( @) ;'>) 9, 0;) 9,(0',0 /'(), 0+ *)'. @90; /+,02'E+()* /.'9D( 0+ <2))*+D +< (E))/; ',* +< )CE2)((9+, ',* 0+ E29>'/:. L'A1,F'* 0;) .9/),()) 9, )<<)/0 /.'9D)*, 9, 0;) ,'D) +< <2))*+D +< (E))/; ',* )CE2)((9+,, a right to produce a motion picture biography at least partly -fictionalied- of Doises #adilla without the consent of and without paying pre:agreed royalties to the widow and family of #adilla. I, 2)B)/09,A 0;) .9/),())Q( /.'9D, 0;) C+120 ('9*? Lastly, neither do we find "erit in petitionerIs contention that the Licensing Agree"ent infringes on the constit#tional right of freedo" of speech and of the press, in that, as a citi&en and as a newspaper"an, he had the right to e5press his tho#ghts in fil" on the p#)lic life of Moises 0adilla witho#t prior restraint. $he right of freedo" of e5pression, indeed, occ#pies a preferred position in the Ihierarchy of ci*il li)ertiesI $he pre*ailing doctrine is that the ,L6/. /27 #.6S62T 7/296. .CL6 is s#ch a li"itation. Another criterion for per"issi)le li"itation on freedo" of speech and of the press, which incl#des s#ch *ehicles of the "ass "edia as radio, tele*ision and the "o*ies, is the F1/L/2,;29:A>:;2T6.6STS T6STF . $he principle @re.uires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interpla$ of interests observable in a given situation or t$pe of situation@ In the case at )ar, the interests o)ser*a)le are the right to pri*acy asserted )y respondent and the right of freedo" of e5pression in*o:ed )y petitioner. Taking into account the interpla$ of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented and considering the obligations assumed in the (icensing Agreement entered into b$ petitioner, the validit$ of such agreement will have to be upheld particularl$ because the limits of freedom of e%pression are reached when e%pression touches upon matters of essentiall$ private concern. 8hether the I&ALANCING OF INTERESTS TESTI or the ICLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TESTI )e applied in respect of the instant 0etitions, the o#rt )elie*es that a different concl#sion "#st here )e reached2 $he prod#ction and fil"ing )y petitioners of the pro-ected "otion pict#re /The Lour 8a$ /evolution does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent@s right of privac$. 1. ;t may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent 8udge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. $he respondent H#dge has restrained petitioners fro" fil"ing and prod#cing the entire proposed "otion pict#re. It is i"portant to note that in Lag#n&ad, there was no prior restrain of any :ind i"posed #pon the "o*ie prod#cer who in fact co"pleted and e5hi)ited the fil" )iography of Moises 0adilla. Beca#se of the preferred character of the constit#tional rights of freedo" of speech and of e5pression, a weighty pres#"ption of in*alidity *itiates "eas#res of prior restraint #pon the e5ercise of s#ch freedo"s. $he in*alidity of a "eas#re of prior restraint does not, of co#rse, "ean that no s#)se6#ent lia)ility "ay lawf#lly )e i"posed #pon a person clai"ing to e5ercise s#ch constit#tional freedo"s. The respondent 8udge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex:parte Temporary .estraining Arder one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a #reliminary ;n*unction twenty '&3) days laterJ for the pro*ected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence 2AT exhibited to any audience. 2either private respondent nor the respondent trial 8udge <new what the completed film would precisely loo< li<e. There was, in other words, 2A -,L6/. /27 #.6S62T 7/296.- of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. 2. $he s#)-ect "atter of /$he (o#r Day %e*ol#tion/ relates to the non7 blood$ change of government that took place at 1pifanio de los "antos Avenue in Lebruar$ 148=, and the train of e*ents which led #p to that deno#e"ent. learly, s#ch s#)-ect "atter is one of p#)lic interest and concern. ;ndeed, it is, petitionersF argue, of international interest. The sub*ect thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate sub*ect for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The sub*ect matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and ,6.T/;2L@ 2AT TA TH6 #.;M/T6 L;>6 A> #.;M/T6 .6S#A2762T #A2,6 62.;L6. Cnli<e in Lagunad, which concerned the life story of Doises #adilla necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalied, of private respondent #once 6nrile. /$he (o#r Day %e*ol#tion/ is not principally a)o#t, nor is it foc#sed #pon, the "an H#an 0once .nrileG )#t it is co"pelled, if it is to )e historical, to refer to the role played )y H#an 0once .nrile in the precipitating and the constit#ent e*ents of the change of go*ern"ent in (e)r#ary 198+. 4. The e%tent of the intrusion upon the life of private respondent >uan 6once 1nrile that would be entailed b$ the production and e%hibition of The Lour 8a$ /evolution would, therefore, be L;D;T67 ;2 ,H/./,T6.. $he e5tent of that intr#sion, as this o#rt #nderstands the synopsis of the proposed fil", "ay )e generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to <eep that film a truthful historical account. #rivate respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in -The >our 7ay .evolution- any part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of his family. B. At all rele*ant ti"es, d#ring which the "o"ento#s e*ents, clearly of p#)lic concern, that petitioners propose to fil" were ta:ing place, pri*ate respondent was what 0rofs. 0rosser and Leeton ha*e referred to as a /p#)lic fig#re2/ -/ #C1L;, >;9C.6 has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a Fpublic personage.F He is, in other words, a celebrity. ')*io#sly to )e incl#ded in this category are those who ha*e achie*ed so"e degree of rep#tation )y appearing )efore the p#)lic, as in the case of an actor, a professional )ase)all player, a p#gilist, or any other entertainer. $he list is, howe*er, )roader than this. ;t includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the 9rand 6xalted .uler of a lodge. ;t includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right of privacy. $hree reasons were gi*en, "ore or less indiscri"ately, in the decisions/ that they had so#ght p#)licity and consented to it, and so co#ld not co"plain when they recei*ed itG that their personalities and their affairs had already )eco"e p#)lic, and co#ld no longer )e regarded as their own pri*ate )#sinessG and that the press had a pri*ilege, #nder the onstit#tion, to infor" the p#)lic a)o#t those who ha*e )eco"e legiti"ate "atters of p#)lic interest. 'n one or another of these gro#nds, and so"eti"es all, it was held that there was no lia)ility when they were gi*en additional p#)licity, as to "atters legiti"ately within the scope of the p#)lic interest they had aro#sed. The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public to <now what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press and other agencies of information to tell it. F26WSF includes all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary humdrum routine, and which ha*e Ithat indefina)le 6#ality of infor"ation which aro#ses p#)lic attention.I To a ver$ great e%tent the press, with its e%perience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definition of news, as a glance at an$ morning newspaper will sufficientl$ indicate. It incl#des ho"icide and other cri"es, arrests and police raides, s#icides, "arriages and di*orces, accidents, a death fro" the #se of narcotics, a wo"an with a rare disease, the )irth of a child to a twel*e year old girl, the reappearance of one s#pposed to ha*e )een "#rdered years ago, and #ndo#)tedly "any other si"ilar "atters of gen#ine, if "ore or less deplora)le, pop#lar appeal. #rivate respondent is a -public figure- precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in >ebruary %(!B. 1ecause his participation therein was ma*or in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to ma<e reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a -public figure- is necessarily 2/..AW6. than that of an ordinary citien. #rivate respondent has not retired into the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 62 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 seclusion of simple private citienship. He continues to be a -public figure.- /fter a successful political campaign during which his participation in the 67S/ .evolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the #hilippines. 7. $he line of e6#ili)ri#" in the specific conte5t of the instant case )etween the constit#tional freedo" of speech and of e5pression and the right of pri*acy, "ay )e "ar:ed o#t in ter"s of a re6#ire"ent that the proposed "otion pict#re "#st )e fairly tr#thf#l and historical in its presentation of e*ents. There must, in other words, be no <nowing or rec<less disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the 67S/ .evolution. There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Dme. 8ustice Delencio:Herrera in Lagunad referred to as -matters of essentially private concern.- To the extent that -The >our 7ay .evolution- limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the 67S/ .evolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the 67S/ .evolution, the intrusion into private respondentFs privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. !#ch portrayal "ay )e carried o#t e*en witho#t a license fro" pri*ate respondent. &+2B'. >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.( GR 12%4%%, !',. 14, 1999, &ELLOSILLO, !. FACTS" 0etitioners Art#ro Bor-al and Ma5i"o !oli*en are a"ong the incorporators of 0hilippines $oday, Inc. @0$IA, now 0hil!$A% Daily, Inc., owner of $he 0hilippine !tar. Between May and H#ly 1989 a series of articles written )y petitioner Bor-al was p#)lished on different dates in his col#"n Haywal:er. $he articles dealt with the alleged ano"alo#s acti*ities of an -organier of a conference without naming or identif$ing private respondent. 3either did it refer to the (3L$ as the conference therein "entioned. $hereafter, pri*ate respondent filed a co"plaint with the 3ational 0ress l#) @30A against petitioner Bor-al for #nethical cond#ct. 1e acc#sed petitioner Bor-al of #sing his col#"n as a for" of le*erage to o)tain contracts for his p#)lic relations fir", AA Bor-al Associates. In t#rn, petitioner Bor-al p#)lished a re-oinder to the challenge of pri*ate respondent not only to protect his na"e and honor )#t also to ref#te the clai" that he was #sing his col#"n for character assassination. 7 Apparently not satisfied with his co"plaint with the 30, pri*ate respondent filed a cri"inal case for li)el against petitioners Bor-al and !oli*en, a"ong others. ISSUE" 8hether the disp#ted articles constit#te pri*ileged co""#nications as to e5e"pt the a#thor fro" lia)ility. HELD" D.!. ;n order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. I0 9( '.(+ ,+0 (1<<9/9),0 0;'0 0;) +<<),*)* E'20: 2)/+A,9F)* ;9D().< '( 0;) E)2(+, '00'/G)* +2 *)<'D)*, 810 90 D1(0 8) (;+@, 0;'0 '0 .)'(0 ' 0;92* E)2(+, /+1.* 9*),09<: ;9D '( 0;) +8B)/0 +< 0;) .98).+1( E18.9/'09+,. %egretta)ly, these re6#isites ha*e not )een co"plied with in the case at )ar. The questioned articles written by 1or*al do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as the organier of the conference. The first of the 8aywal<er articles which appeared in the $% Day %(!( issue of The #hilippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private respondent was the person referred to therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there were millions of -heroes- of the 67S/ .evolution and anyone of them could be -self:proclaimed- or an -organier of seminars and conferences. As a "atter of fact, in his H#ne 1989 col#"n petitioner Bor-al wrote a)o#t the /so9called (irst 3ational onference on Land $ransportation whose principal organi&ers are not specified/ . 3either did the disclose the identity of the conference organi&er since these contained only an en#"eration of na"es where pri*ate respondent (rancisco 8enceslao was descri)ed as .5ec#ti*e Director and !po:es"an and not as a conference organi&er. $he printo#t and tentati*e progra" of the conference were de*oid of any indication of 8enceslao as organi&er. $he printo#t which contained an article entitled /8ho 'rgani&ed the 3L$C/ did not e*en "ention pri*ate respondentIs na"e, while the tentati*e progra" only deno"inated pri*ate respondent as /<ice hair"an and .5ec#ti*e Director,/ and not as organi&er. 2o less than private respondent himself admitted that the >2,LT had several organiers and that he was only a part of the organiation, th#s 9 Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person spo<en of in 1or*alFs columns. $he for"er e*en called #p col#"nist Bor-al to in6#ire if he @8enceslaoA was the one referred to in the s#)-ect articles. 1is letter to the editor p#)lished in the B H#ne 1989 iss#e of $he 0hilippine !tar e*en showed pri*ate respondent 8enceslaoIs #ncertainty 9 ;dentification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the ob*ect of the verbal attac<. It is well to note that the re*elation of the identity of the person all#ded to ca"e not fro" petitioner Bor-al )#t fro" pri*ate respondent hi"self when he s#pplied the infor"ation thro#gh his B H#ne 1989 letter to the editor. 1ad pri*ate respondent not re*ealed that he was the /organi&er/ of the (3L$ referred to in the Bor-al articles, the p#)lic wo#ld ha*e re"ained in )lissf#l ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the ele"ent of identifia)ility alone the case falls. 8e now proceed to resol*e the other iss#es and pass #pon the pertinent findings of the co#rts a 6#o on wether the disp#ted articles constit#te pri*ileged co""#nications as to e5e"pt the a#thor fro" lia)ility. Art. 47B. %e6#ire"ent for p#)licity. 9 .*ery defa"atory i"p#tation is pres#"ed to )e "alicio#s, e*en if it )e tr#e, if no good intention and -#stifia)le "oti*e for "a:ing it is shown, e5cept in the following cases2 1A A pri*ate co""#nication "ade )y any person to another in the perfor"ance of any legal, "oral or social d#tyG and, 2A A fair and tr#e report, "ade in good faith, witho#t any co""ents or re"ar:s, of any -#dicial, legislati*e or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nat#re, or of any state"ent, report or speech deli*ered in said proceedings, or of any other act perfor"ed )y p#)lic officers in the e5ercise of their f#nctions. / #.;M;L6967 ,ADDC2;,/T;A2 may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. /1SALCT6L@ #.;M;L6967 ,ADDC2;,/T;A2S are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. /n example is found in Sec. %%, /rt. M;, of the %(!4 ,onstitution which exempts a member of ,ongress from liability for any speech or debate in the ,ongress or in any ,ommittee thereof. Cpon the other hand, EC/L;>;67L@ #.;M;L6967 ,ADDC2;,/T;A2S containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or *ustifiable motive. To this genre belong -private communications- and -fair and true report without any comments or remar<s.- ;ndisputably, petitioner 1or*alFs questioned writings are not within the exceptions of /rt. $5" of The .evised #enal ,ode for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remar<s. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under /rt. $5" is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since >/;. ,ADD62T/.;6S A2 D/TT6.S A> #C1L;, ;2T6.6ST are li<ewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nationFs penal code but in the 1ill of .ights of the ,onstitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. Art. III, !ec. B, pro*ides2 3o law shall )e passed a)ridging the freedo" of speech, of e5pression, or of the press, or the right of the people to peacea)ly asse")le and petition the go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances. In the case of J.! *s. B#stos, this ,ourt ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press . To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well p#t )y H#stice Malcol" in B#stos2 @6ublic polic$, the welfare of societ$, and the orderl$ administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.@ The doctrine formulated in these two '&) cases resonates the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. $o reiterate, >/;. ,ADD62T/.;6S A2 D/TT6.S A> #C1L;, ;2T6.6ST are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is *udicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a #C1L;, #6.SA2 ;2 H;S #C1L;, ,/#/,;T@, it is not necessarily actionable. ;n order that such discreditable imputation to a public San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 63 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. ;f the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mista<en, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. In his testi"ony, pri*ate respondent spelled o#t the o)-ecti*es of the conference th#s 9 5 5 5 5 $he principal conference o)-ecti*e is to co"e #p with a draft of an '"ni)#s Bill that will e")ody a long ter" land transportation policy for presentation to ongress in its ne5t reg#lar session in H#ly. !ince last Han#ary, the 3ational onference on Land $ransportation @3L$A, the conference secretariat, has )een enlisting s#pport fro" all sectors to ens#re the s#ccess of the pro-ect.27 O$!3, 29 H#ly 1991, p. 17.P 0ri*ate respondent li:ewise testified that the (3L$ was raising f#nds thro#gh solicitation fro" the p#)lic 9 The declared ob*ective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with #C1L;, ;2T6.6ST. An organi&ation s#ch as the (3L$ ai"ing to rein*ent and reshape the transportation laws of the co#ntry and see:ing to so#rce its f#nds for the pro-ect fro" the p#)lic at large cannot dissociate itself fro" the p#)lic character of its "ission. As s#ch, it cannot )#t in*ite close scr#tiny )y the "edia o)liged to infor" the p#)lic of the legiti"acy of the p#rpose of the acti*ity and of the 6#alifications and integrity of the personalities )ehind it.
RE-ES >(.&AGATSING GR %53%%, N+>. 9, 1983, F)2,',*+, !. FACTS" 0etitioner, retired H#stice HB L. %eyes, on )ehalf of the Anti9 Bases oalition so#ght a per"it fro" the ity of Manila to hold a peacef#l "arch and rally on 'cto)er 2+, 1984 fro" 22?? to 72?? in the afternoon, starting fro" the L#neta, a p#)lic par:, to the gates of the Jnited !tates .")assy, hardly two )loc:s away. 'nce there, and in an open space of p#)lic property, a short progra" wo#ld )e held. $he filing of this s#it for "anda"#s with alternati*e prayer for writ of preli"inary "andatory in-#nction on 'cto)er 2?, 1984 was d#e to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not )een infor"ed of any action ta:en on his re6#est on )ehalf of the organi&ation to hold a rally. It t#rned o#t that on 'cto)er 19, s#ch per"it was denied. 0etitioner was #naware of s#ch a fact as the denial was sent )y ordinary "ail. $he reason for ref#sing a per"it was d#e to police intelligence reports which strongly "ilitate against the ad*isa)ility of iss#ing s#ch per"it at this ti"e and at the place applied for./ $o )e "ore specific, reference was "ade to persistent intelligence reports affir"OingP the plans of s#)*ersi*eRcri"inal ele"ents to infiltrate andRor disr#pt any asse")ly or congregations where a large n#")er of people is e5pected to attend./ ISSUE" 8hether or not there was a denial of freedo" of e5pression arising fro" the denial of the per"itC HELD" Des. $he onstit#tion is 6#ite e5plicit2 /3o law shall )e passed a)ridging the freedo" of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peacea)ly to asse")le and petition the ,o*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances./ >ree speech, li<e free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subse.uent liabilit$ whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a -clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Gthe StateI has a right to prevent.- (reedo" of asse")ly connotes the right of the people to "eet peacea)ly for cons#ltation and disc#ssion of "atters of p#)lic concern. ;t is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. ;t is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 1ven prior to the 14;I Constitution, >ustice 0alcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessar$ conse.uence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. $o paraphrase the opinion of H#stice %#tledge, spea:ing for the "a-ority of the A"erican !#pre"e o#rt in $ho"as *. ollins, it was not )y accident or coincidence that the rights to freedo" of speech and of the press were co#pled in a single g#arantee with the rights of the people peacea)ly to asse")le and to petition the go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances. All these rights, while not identical, are insepara)le. In e*ery case, therefore, where there is a li"itation placed on the e5ercise of this right, the -#diciary is called #pon to e5a"ine the effects of the challenged go*ern"ental act#ation. The sole *ustification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. 2. 3owhere is the rationale that #nderlies the freedo" of e5pression and peacea)le asse")ly )etter e5pressed than in this e5cerpt fro" an opinion of H#stice (ran:f#rter2 't must never be forgotten, however, that the 9ill of /ights was the child of the 1nlightenment. 9ack of the guarant$ of free speech la$ faith in the power of an appeal to reason b$ all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. 't was in order to avert force and e%plosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guarant$ of free speech was given a generous scope. 9ut utterance in a conte%t of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. "uch utterance was not meant to be sheltered b$ the Constitution. 8hat was rightf#lly stressed is the a)andon"ent of reason, the #tterance, whether *er)al or printed, )eing in a conte5t of *iolence. It "#st always )e re"e")ered that this right li:ewise pro*ides for a safety *al*e, allowing parties the opport#nity to gi*e *ent to their *iews, e*en if contrary to the pre*ailing cli"ate of opinion. (or if the peacef#l "eans of co""#nication cannot )e a*ailed of, resort to non9peacef#l "eans "ay )e the only alternati*e. 3or is this the sole reason for the e5pression of dissent. It "eans "ore than -#st the right to )e heard of the person who feels aggrie*ed or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. ;ts value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well:defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. Ane may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloa< of dissent. The ,onstitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. .esort to force is ruled out and outbrea<s of violence to be avoided. $he #t"ost cal" tho#gh is not re6#ired. As pointed o#t in an early 0hilippine case, penned in 19?7 to )e precise, Jnited !tates *. Ap#rado2 /It is rather to )e e5pected that "ore or less disorder will "ar: the p#)lic asse")ly of the people to protest against grie*ances whether real or i"aginary, )eca#se on s#ch occasions feeling is always wro#ght to a high pitch of e5cite"ent, and the greater the grie*ance and the "ore intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a r#le, will )e the disciplinary control of the leaders o*er their irresponsi)le followers./ ;t bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invo<ed, riotous conduct, in*ury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. $o gi*e free rein to oneIs destr#cti*e #rges is to call for conde"nation. It is to "a:e a "oc:ery of the high estate occ#pied )y intellect#al li)erty in o#r sche"e of *al#es. 4. There can be no legal ob*ection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. $he 0hilippines is co""itted to the *iew e5pressed in the pl#rality opinion, of 1949 *intage, of H#stice %o)erts in 1ag#e *. I'2 IWhenever the title of streets and par<s may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citiens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citiens. $he pri*ilege of a citi&en of the Jnited !tates to #se the streets and par:s for co""#nication of *iews on national 6#estions "ay )e reg#lated in the interest of allG it is not a)sol#te, )#t relati*e, and "#st )e e5ercised in s#)ordination to the general co"fort and con*enience, and in consonance with peace and good orderG )#t it "#st not, in the g#ise of reg#lation, )e a)ridged or denied./ $he a)o*e e5cerpt was 6#oted with appro*al in 0ri"icias *. (#goso. 0ri"icias "ade e5plicit what was i"plicit in M#nicipality of a*ite *. %o-as, a 1917 decision, where this o#rt categorically affir"ed that pla&as or par:s and streets are o#tside the co""erce of "an and th#s n#llified a contract that leased 0la&a !oledad of plaintiff9"#nicipality. %eference was "ade to s#ch pla&a /)eing a pro"enade for p#)lic #se,/ which certainly is not the only p#rpose that it co#ld ser*e. $o repeat, there can )e no *alid reason why a per"it sho#ld not )e granted for the proposed "arch and rally starting fro" a p#)lic par: that is the L#neta. B. 2either can there be any valid ob*ection to the use of the streets to the gates of the CS 6mbassy, hardly two bloc<s away at the .oxas 1oulevard. 0ri"icias *. (#goso has resol*ed any l#r:ing do#)t on the "atter. In holding that the then Mayor (#goso of the ity of Manila sho#ld grant a per"it for a p#)lic "eeting at 0la&a Miranda in V#iapo, this o#rt categorically declared2 /'#r concl#sion finds s#pport in the decision in the case of 8illis o5 *s. !tate of 3ew 1a"pshire, 412 J.!., 7+9. In that case, the stat#te of 3ew 1a"pshire 0. L. chap. 1B7, section 2, pro*iding that Uno parade or procession #pon any gro#nd a)#tting thereon, shall )e per"itted #nless a special license therefor shall first )e o)tained fro" the select"en of the town or fro" licensing co""ittee,I was constr#ed )y the !#pre"e o#rt of 3ew 1a"pshire as not conferring #pon the licensing )oard #nfettered discretion to ref#se to grant the license, and held *alid. And the !#pre"e o#rt of the Jnited !tates, in its decision @19B1A penned )y hief H#stice 1#ghes affir"ing the -#dg"ent of the !tate !#pre"e o#rt, held that Ta statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 64 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, . . .I/ 3or sho#ld the point "ade )y hief H#stice 1#ghes in a s#)se6#ent portion of the opinion )e ignored. -,ivil liberties, as guaranteed by the ,onstitution, imply the existence of an organied society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. $he control of tra*el on the streets of cities is the "ost fa"iliar ill#stration of this recognition of social need. 8here a restriction of the #se of highways in that relation is desired to pro"ote the p#)lic con*enience in the interest of all, it cannot )e disregarded )y the atte"pted e5ercise of so"e ci*il right which in other circ#"stances wo#ld )e entitled to protection./ 7. $here is a no*el aspect to this case. If the rally were confined to L#neta, no 6#estion, as noted, wo#ld ha*e arisen. So, too, if the march would end at another par<. /s previously mentioned though, there would be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the Cnited States 6mbassy at .oxas 1oulevard. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the /nti:1ases ,oalition. The 6hilippines is a signator$ of the Gienna Convention on 8iplomatic /elations and binding on the 6hilippines. The second paragraph of its Article 22 reads? 2. The receiving "tate is under a special dut$ to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against an$ intrusion or damage and to prevent an$ disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignit$./ $he onstit#tion adopts the generall$ accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, $o the e5tent that the <ienna on*ention is a restate"ent of the generally accepted principles of international law, it sho#ld )e a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a *ustification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the 6mbassy. Doreover, respondent Dayor relied on Ardinance 2o. 4&(5 of the ,ity of Danila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred '533) feet from any foreign mission or chanceryJ and for other purposes. Cnless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. 6ven if shown then to be applicable, that question still confronts this ,ourt. 1y way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of '%)the date, '&)the #C1L;, #L/,6 where and '$)the time when it will ta<e place. ;f it were a #.;M/T6 #L/,6, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid ob*ections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. ;t is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. ;f he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper *udicial authority. (ree speech and peacea)le asse")ly, along with the other intellect#al freedo"s, are highly ran:ed in o#r sche"e of constit#tional *al#es. It cannot )e too strongly stressed that on the -#diciary, 9 e*en "ore so than on the other depart"ents 9 rests the gra*e and delicate responsi)ility of ass#ring respect for and deference to s#ch preferred rights. 3o *er)al for"#la, no sanctifying phrase can, of co#rse, dispense with what has )een so felicitio#sly ter"ed )y H#stice 1ol"es /as the so*ereign prerogati*e of -#dg"ent./ 3onetheless, the pres#"ption "#st )e to incline the weight of the scales of -#stice on the side of s#ch rights, en-oying as they do precedence and pri"acy. ,learly then, to the extent that there may be inconsistencies between this resolution and that of 2avarro v. Millegas, that case is pro tanto modified. So it was made clear in the original resolution of Actober &5, %(!$. 9. %espondent Mayor posed the iss#e of the applica)ility of 'rdinance 3o. 7297 of the ity of Manila prohi)iting the holding or staging of rallies or de"onstrations within a radi#s of fi*e h#ndred @7??A feet fro" any foreign "ission or chanceryG and for other p#rposes. 't is to be admitted that it finds support in the previousl$ .uoted Article 22 of the Gienna Convention on 8iplomatic /elations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 533 feet. 6ven if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied, it does not follow that respondent Dayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. ;t could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents itself. /s in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 533 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated. Should it come, then the qualification and observation of 8ustices Da<asiar and #lana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less. P90' >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.( GR 8080%, O/0. 5, 1989 F'/0(" 'n Dece")er 1 and 4, 1984, p#rs#ing an Anti9!"#t a"paign initiated )y the Mayor of the ity of Manila, %a"on D. Bagatsing, ele"ents of the !pecial Anti93arcotics ,ro#p, A#5iliary !er*ices B#rea#, 8estern 0olice District, I30 of the Metropolitan 0olice (orce of Manila, sei&ed and confiscated fro" dealers, distri)#tors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewal:s, "aga&ines, p#)lications and other reading "aterials )elie*ed to )e o)scene, pornographic and indecent and later )#rned the sei&ed "aterials in p#)lic at the Jni*ersity )elt along .M. %ecto A*en#e, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and se*eral officers and "e")ers of *ario#s st#dent organi&ations. A"ong the p#)lications sei&ed, and later )#rned, was =0inoy 0lay)oy> "aga&ines p#)lished and co9edited )y Leo 0ita. 'n 7 Dece")er 1984, 0ita filed a case for in-#nction with prayer for iss#ance of the writ of preli"inary in-#nction see:ing to en-oin and or restrain Bagatsing, a)rera and their agents fro" confiscating his "aga&ines or fro" otherwise pre*enting the sale or circ#lation thereof clai"ing that the "aga&ine is a decent, artistic and ed#cational "aga&ine which is not per se o)scene, and that the p#)lication is protected )y the onstit#tional g#arantees of freedo" of speech and of the press. I((1)" 8hether the Mayor can order the sei&#re of =o)scene> "aterials as a res#lt of an anti9s"#t ca"paign. H).*" 3'. 8e cannot 6#arrel with the )asic post#late s#ggested )y appellant that sei&#re of allegedly o)scene p#)lications or "aterials deser*es close scr#tiny )eca#se of the constitutional guarantee protecting the right to express oneself in print 'Sec. (, /rt. ;M), and the protection afforded by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seiure 'Sec. $, /rt. ;M). It "#st )e e6#ally conceded, howe*er, that freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, /lso well settled is the rule that the right against unreasonable searches and seiures recognies certain exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seiure, or search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or movable structure $he o#rt states at the o#tset that it is not the first ti"e that it is )eing as:ed to prono#nce what IO&SCENEI "eans or what "a:es for an o)scene or pornographic literat#re. .arly on, in 6eople vs. Qottinger, the o#rt laid down TH6 T6ST, in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows+ -whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.- -/2ATH6. T6ST,/ so Lottinger f#rther declares, -is that which shoc<s the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.- Lottinger hastened to say, howe*er, that -GwIhether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case,- and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the -*udgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.- A)o#t three decades later, this o#rt pro"#lgated 6eople v. Ao 6in, 1? a prosec#tion #nder Article 2?1 of the %e*ised 0enal ode. ,o 0in was also e*en ha&ier2 . . . 8e agree with co#nsel for appellant in part. If s#ch pict#res, sc#lpt#res and paintings are shown in art e5hi)its and art galleries for the ca#se of art, to )e *iewed and appreciated )y people interested in art, there wo#ld )e no offense co""itted. &owever, the pictures here in .uestion were used not e%actl$ for art@s sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the s#pposed artistic 6#alities of said pict#res were )eing co""erciali&ed so that the ca#se of art was of secondary or "inor i"portance. ,ain and profit wo#ld appear to ha*e )een the "ain, if not the e5cl#si*e consideration in their e5hi)itionG and it wo#ld not )e s#rprising if the persons who went to see those pict#res and paid entrance fees for the pri*ilege of doing so, were not e5actly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art e5hi)itions and galleries to satisfy and i"pro*e their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisf$ing their morbid curiosit$ and taste, and lust, and for love for e%citement, including the $outh who because of their immaturit$ are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures. As the o#rt declared, the iss#e is a co"plicated one, in which the fine lines ha*e neither )een drawn nor di*ided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if -the pictures here in question were used not exactly for artFs sa<e but rather for commercial purposes,- the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 65 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 It was 0eople *. 0adan y Alo*a, 14 howe*er, that introd#ced to 0hilippine -#rispr#dence the -redeeming- element that should accompan$ the work, to save it from a valid prosecution. 8e 6#ote2 . . . -e have had occasion to consider offenses like the e%hibition of still or moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenit$ and as offensive to morals. ;n those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of artJ that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer na<edness, as models in tableaux vivants. 1ut an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no roo" for art. 'ne can see nothing in it )#t clear and #n"itigated o)scenity, indecency, and an offense to p#)lic "orals, inspiring and ca#sing as it does, nothing )#t l#st and lewdness, and e5erting a corr#pting infl#ence specially on the yo#th of the land. . . . In a "#ch later decision, ,on&ale& *. Lalaw Latig)a:, the o#rt, following trends in the Jnited !tates, adopted the test " -Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material ta<en as a whole appeals to prurient interest.- Oalaw: Oatigba< represented a mar<ed departure from Oottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the -7AD;2/2T TH6D6- of the wor< rather than isolated passages, which were central to Oottinger 'although both cases are agreed that -contemporary community standards- are the final arbiters of what is -obscene-). Lalaw9Latig)a: #ndertoo: "oreo*er to "a:e the deter"ination of o)scenity essentially a -#dicial 6#estion and as a conse6#ence, to te"per the wide discretion Lottinger had gi*en #nto law enforcers. The lack of uniformit$ in /merican *urisprudence as to what constitutes -obscenity- has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recogniEe the constitutional dimension of the problem. Apparentl$, the courts have assumed that obscenit$ is not included in the guarant$ of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrar$, if vague theories of what is acceptable to societ$. And :t<here is little likelihood, sa$s Tribe, that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it will ever do so until the Court recogniEes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless, although it is sub#ect 7777 as in all speech 7777 to regulation in the interests of :societ$ as a whole< 7777 but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how human se%ualit$ should be regarded and portra$ed. ;n the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut :::: provided it is smut. >or obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide:ranging influences, and <eep in step with the rapid advance of civiliation. What shoc<ed our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation. 8ames 8oyce and 7.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their wor<s are considered important literature today. &( 9oyaFs La Da*a desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but now adorns the worldFs most prestigious museums. B#t neither sho#ld we say that /o)scenity/ is a )are @no p#n intendedA "atter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the di*ergent perceptions of "en and wo"en that ha*e pro)a)ly co"po#nded the pro)le" rather than resol*ed it. 8hat the o#rt is i"pressing, plainly and si"ply, is that the .uestion is not, and has not been, an eas$ one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. -e share Tribe@s disappointment over the discouraging trend in American decisional law on obscenit$ as well as his pessimism on whether or not an acceptable solution is in sight. ;n the final analysis perhaps, the tas< that confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a -perfect- definition of -obscenity-, if that is possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with the problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the petition. 1owe*er, this "#ch we ha*e to say. Cndoubtedly, -immoral- lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. ;n free expression cases, this ,ourt has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a -clear and present danger- that would warrant State interference and action. 1ut, so we asserted in .eyes v. 1agatsing, -the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would *ustify adverse action . . . lies on the . . . authoritGiesI.- -There must be ob*ective and convincing, not sub*ective or con*ectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger.- /It is essential for the *alidity of . . . pre*io#s restraint or censorship that the . . . a#thority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the p#)lic welfare, peace or safety "ay re6#ire./ /$o -#stify s#ch a li"itation, there "#st )e proof of s#ch weight and s#fficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test./ As we so strongl$ stressed in 9agatsing, a case involving the deliver$ of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be '%) clear but also, '&) present, to *ustify State action to stop the speech. 0eanwhile, the Aovernment must allow it +the speech,. 't has no choice. &owever, if it acts notwithstanding that 'absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, 7C6 #.A,6SS. $he o#rt is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to *ustify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which "andatory in-#nction had )een so#ght )elow. (irst of all, they were not possessed of a lawf#l co#rt order2 @1A finding the said "aterials to )e pornography, and @2A a#thori&ing the" to carry o#t a search and sei&#re, )y way of a search warrant. The Court of Appeals has no .uarrel that . . . freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the right to protect societ$ from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals. ;= Feither do we. 9ut it brings us back to s.uare one? were the literature so confiscated pornographicD That we have laws punishing the author, publisher and sellers of obscence publications +"ec. 1, Art. 201, /evised 6enal Code, as amended b$ 6.8. Fo. 4=0 and 6.8. Fo. 4=4,, is also fine, but the .uestion, again, is? &as the petitioner been found guilt$ under the statuteD The fact that the former respondent DayorFs act was sanctioned by -police power- is no license to seie property in disregard of due process. Hence, we ma<e this resume. %. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a *udge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in orderJ &. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seied are -obscene-, and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and actionJ $. The *udge must determine whether or not the same are indeed -obscene+- the question is to be resolved on a case:to:case basis and on His HonorFs sound discretion. +a matter of #udicial determination, ". ;f, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed forJ 5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under /rticle &3% of the .evised #enal ,odeJ B. /ny conviction is sub*ect to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the properties seied are indeed -obscene- These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the ,onstitution or applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the ,ivil ,ode or the .evised #enal code. 3'$.2 In other words, the deter"ination of what is 2obscene3 is a B1*9/9'. <1,/09+,. SOCIAL =EATHER STATIONS, INC. V. COMELEC G.R. N+.147571? M': 5, 2001 F'/0(" 0etitioners )ro#ght this action for prohi)ition to en-oin the o""ission on .lections fro" enforcing \7.B of %A. 3o.9??+ @(air .lection ActA. 0etitioner !8! states that it wishes to cond#ct an election s#r*ey thro#gho#t the period of the elections )oth at the national and local le*els and release to the "edia the res#lts of s#ch s#r*ey as well as p#)lish the" directly. 0etitioner La"ahalan 0#)lishing orporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to p#)lish election s#r*ey res#lts #p to the last day of the elections on May 1B,2??1. #etitioners claimed that said provision, which prohibited the publication of surveys affecting national candidates fifteen days before an election, and surveys affecting local candidates seven days before an election. %espondent o""ission on .lections -#stifies the restrictions in \7.B of %.A. 3o. 9??+ as necessary to pre*ent the "anip#lation and corr#ption of the electoral process )y #nscr#p#lo#s and erroneo#s s#r*eys -#st )efore the election. I((1)" 8hether or not \7.B of %.A. 3o. 9??+ constit#tes an #nconstit#tional a)ridg"ent of freedo" of speech, e5pression, and the press. H).*" D.!. $he !#pre"e o#rt in its "a-ority opinion concl#ded that the disp#ted pro*ision constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of speech, expression and the press. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 66 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $o )e s#re, \7.B lays a prior restraint on freedo" of speech, e5pression, and the press )y prohi)iting the p#)lication of election s#r*ey res#lts affecting candidates within the prescri)ed periods of fifteen @17A days i""ediately preceding a national election and se*en @7A days )efore a local election. 1ecause of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, =any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this ,ourt bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . =. $he ,o*ern"ent Sth#s carries a hea*y )#rden of showing -#stification for the enforce"ent of s#ch restraint.K$here is th#s a re*ersal of the nor"al pres#"ption of *alidity that inheres in e*ery legislation. 3or "ay it )e arg#ed that )eca#se of Art. I;9, \B of the onstit#tion, which gi*es the 'M.L. s#per*isory power to reg#late the en-oy"ent or #tili&ation of franchise for the operation of "edia of co""#nication, no pres#"ption of in*alidity attaches to a "eas#re li:e \7.B. >or as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the ,AD6L6, under /rt. ;H:,, U" is limited to ensuring =equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply0 as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for =public information campaigns and forums among candidates.0 $his o#rt stated2 $he technical effect of Article I; @A @BA of the onstit#tion "ay )e seen to )e that no presumption of invalidit$ arises in respect of e%ercises of supervisor$ or regulator$ authorit$ on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing e.ual opportunit$ among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation ma$ result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. 0/. >!"T'C1 QA6!FAF dissents. &e re#ects as inappropriate the test of clear and present danger for determining the validit$ of PI.B. Indeed, as has )een pointed o#t in 's"eNa *. 'M.L., this test was originally for"#lated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech cases. &ence, while it ma$ be useful for determining the validit$ of laws dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiar$ speech, it ma$ not be ade.uate for such regulations as the one in .uestion. Lor such a test is concerned with .uestions of the gravit$ and imminence of the danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of PI.C and similar regulations. Instead, M%. HJ!$I. LA0J3A3 p#rports to engage in a for" of )alancing )y =weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest Gin free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible electionsI is served by the regulation of the free en*oyment of the right(P. After can*assing the reasons for the prohi)ition, i.e., to pre*ent last9"in#te press#re on *oters, the creation of )andwagon effect to fa*or candidates, "isinfor"ation, the 2#unking3 of weak and 2losing3 candidates b$ their parties, and the form of election cheating called 2dagdag7bawas3 and invoking the "tateBs power to supervise media of information during the election period @pages 1191+A, the dissenting opinion si"ply concl#des2 <iewed in the light of the legiti"ate and significant o)-ecti*es of !ection 7.B, it "ay )e seen that its li"iting i"pact on the rights of free speech and of the press is not #nd#ly repressi*e or #nreasona)le. Indeed, it is a "ere restriction, not an a)sol#te prohi)ition, on the p#)lication of election s#r*eys. It is li"ited in d#rationG it applies only d#ring the period when the *oters are pres#"a)ly conte"plating who" they sho#ld elect and when they are "ost s#scepti)le to s#ch #nwarranted pers#asion. $hese s#r*eys "ay )e p#)lished thereafter. @0ages 17918A The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. ;nstead, reliance is placed on /rt. ;H:,, U". /s already stated, the purpose of /rt. ;H:,, U" is to =ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor for public information campaigns and forums among candidates.0 Hence the validity of the ban on media advertising. It is noteworthy that %.A. 3o. 9??+, \1B has lifted the )an and now allows candidates to ad*ertise their candidacies in print and )roadcast "edia. Indeed, to s#stain the )an on the p#)lication of s#r*ey res#lts wo#ld sanction the censorship of all spea:ing )y candidates in an election on the gro#nd that the #s#al )o")asts and hyper)olic clai"s "ade d#ring the ca"paigns can conf#se *oters and th#s de)ase the electoral process. ;n sum, the dissent has engaged only in a balancing at the margin. This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression, and the press with little protection. (or anyone who can )ring a pla#si)le -#stification forward can easily show a rational connection )etween the stat#te and a legiti"ate go*ern"ental p#rpose. In contrast, the )alancing of interest #nderta:en )y then H#stice astro in ,on&ales *. 'M.L.,O7P fro" which the dissent in this case ta:es its c#e, was a strong one res#lting in his concl#sion that \7?9B of %.A. 3o. B88?, which li"ited the period of election ca"paign and partisan political acti*ity, was an #nconstit#tional a)ridg"ent of freedo" of e5pression. T;) OK&29', T)(0 $he Jnited !tates !#pre"e o#rt, thro#gh hief H#stice 8arren, held in !nited "tates v. K@9rien2 -G/I government regulation is sufficiently *ustified G%I if it is within the constitutional power of the 9overnmentJ G&I if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interestJ G$I if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expressionJ and G"I if the incidental restriction on alleged >irst /mendment freedoms Gof speech, expression and pressI is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.- This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content7based from content7neutral regulations and is said to have become canonical in the review of such laws. It is noteworthy that the K@9rien test has )een applied )y this o#rt in at least two cases. Cnder this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is -not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.- Moreo*er, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. '#r in6#iry sho#ld accordingly foc#s on these two considerations as applied to \7.B. $o s#""ari&e then, we hold that \7.B is in*alid )eca#se According to the o#rt, !ection 7.B was in*alid )eca#se of three reasons2 '%) it imposed a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, '&) it was a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression was only for a limited period, and '$) the governmental interest sought to be promoted could be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. $he petition for prohi)ition was granted. >irst. Sec. 5." fails to meet criterion of the A?1rien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest ma<es such interest =not unrelated to the suppression of free expression.0 1y prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, U5." actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same sub*ect matter by 26WS#/#6. ,ALCD2;STS, ./7;A /27 TM ,ADD62T/TA.S, /.D,H/;. TH6A.;STS, /27 ATH6. A#;2;A2 D/O6.S. ;n effect, U5." shows a 1;/S for a particular sub*ect matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring #6.SA2/L A#;2;A2 to ST/T;ST;,/L .6SCLTS. $he constit#tional g#arantee of freedo" of e5pression "eans that =the go*ern"ent has no power to restrict e5pression )eca#se of its "essage, its ideas, its s#)-ect "atter, or its content.>O11P $he inhi)ition of speech sho#ld )e #pheld only if the e5pression falls within one of the few #nprotected categories dealt with in haplins:y *. 3ew 1a"pshire,O12P th#s2 $here are certain well9defined and narrowly li"ited classes of speech, the pre*ention and p#nish"ent of which ha*e ne*er )een tho#ght to raise any onstit#tional pro)le". $hese incl#de the lewd and o)scene, the profane, the li)elo#s, and the ins#lting or SfightingK words F those which )y their *ery #tterance inflict in-#ry or tend to incite an i""ediate )reach of the peace. O!P#ch #tterances are no essential part of any e5position of ideas, and are of s#ch slight social *al#e as a step to tr#th that any )enefit that "ay )e deri*ed fro" the" is clearly o#tweighed )y the social interest in order and "orality. 3or is there -#stification for the prior restraint which \7.B lays on protected speech. In 3ear *. Minnesota,O14P it was held2 O$heP protection e*en as to pre*io#s restraint is not a)sol#tely #nli"ited. B#t the li"itation has )een recogni&ed only in e5ceptional cases. . . . 3o one wo#ld 6#estion )#t that a go*ern"ent "ight pre*ent act#al o)str#ction to its recr#iting ser*ice or the p#)lication of the sailing dates of transports or the n#")er and location of troops. 'n si"ilar gro#nds, the pri"ary re6#ire"ents of decency "ay )e enforced against o)scene p#)lications. $he sec#rity of the co""#nity life "ay )e protected against incite"ents to acts of *iolence and the o*erthrow )y force of orderly go*ern"ent . . . . $h#s, contrary to the clai" of the !olicitor ,eneral, the prohibition imposed by U5." cannot be *ustified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constit#tes a total s#ppression of a category of speech and is not "ade less so )eca#se it is only for a period of fifteen @17A days i""ediately )efore a national election and se*en @7A days i""ediately )efore a local election. This sufficientl$ distinguishes PI.C from /.A. Fo. ==C=, P11+b,, which this Court found to be valid in 2ational #ress ,lub v. ,AD6L6, and AsmeSa v. ,AD6L6,< Lor the ban imposed by ../. 2o. BB"B, U%%'b) is not only authoried by a specific constitutional provision, but it also provided an alternative so that, as this ,ourt pointed out in AsmeSa, there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media advertisements by the ,AD6L6, space and ,AD6L6, hour. Second. 6ven if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 67 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 of free expression is only incidental, U5." nonetheless fails to meet criterion of the A?1rien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, \7.B ai"s at the pre*ention of last9"in#te press#re on *oters, the creation of )andwagon effect, =-#n:ing> of wea: or =losing> candidates, and resort to the for" of election cheating called =dagdag9 )awas.> #raiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. $h#s, #nder the Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987,O17P the 'M.L. is gi*en the power2 T+ (0+E ',: 9..)A'. '/09>90:, +2 /+,<9(/'0), 0)'2 *+@,, ',* (0+E ',: 1,.'@<1., .98).+1(, D9(.)'*9,A +2 <'.() ).)/09+, E2+E'A',*', '<0)2 *1) ,+09/) ',* ;)'29,A. $his is s#rely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in U5.". 0#rs#ant to this power of the 'M.L., it can confiscate )og#s s#r*ey res#lts calc#lated to "islead *oters. andidates can ha*e their own s#r*eys cond#cted. 3o right of reply can )e in*o:ed )y others. 3o principle of e6#ality is in*ol*ed. It is a free "ar:et to which each candidate )rings his ideas. As for the p#rpose of the law to pre*ent )andwagon effects, it is do#)tf#l whether the ,o*ern"ent can deal with this nat#ral9 eno#gh tendency of so"e *oters. !o"e *oters want to )e identified with the =winners.> !o"e are s#scepti)le to the herd "entality. an these )e legiti"ately prohi)ited )y s#ppressing the p#)lication of s#r*ey res#lts which are a for" of e5pressionC It has )een held that =O"ereP legislati*e preferences or )eliefs respecting "atters of p#)lic con*enience "ay well s#pport reg#lation directed at other personal acti*ities, )#t )e ins#fficient to -#stify s#ch as di"inishes the e5ercise of rights so *ital to the "aintenance of de"ocratic instit#tions.> 1ecause of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, /any syste" of prior restraints of e5pression co"es to this o#rt )earing a hea*y pres#"ption against its constit#tional *alidity. . . . $he ,o*ern"ent Ith#s carries a hea*y )#rden of showing -#stification for the enforce"ent of s#ch restraint.I/ $here is th#s a re*ersal of the nor"al pres#"ption of *alidity that inheres in e*ery legislation. 2or may it be argued that because of /rt. ;H:,, U" of the ,onstitution, which gives the ,AD6L6, supervisory power to regulate the en*oyment or utiliation of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure li<e U5.". >or as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the ,AD6L6, under /rt. ;H:,, U" is limited to ensuring -equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply- as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for -public information campaigns and forums among candidates.- NOTE" T;) power to regulate, *+)( ,+0 9,/.1*) 0;) power to prohibit. ASSEMBLY & PETITION PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO G.R. N+. L1800, !',1'2: 27, 1948,F)29', !. FACTS" 0ri"icias, *ia petition for "anda"#s, so#ght to co"pel (#goso to iss#e a per"it for the holding of a p#)lic "eeting at 0la&a Miranda to petition the go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances. $he 0hilippine legislat#re has delegated the e5ercise of the police power to the M#nicipal Board of the ity of Manila, the legislati*e )ody of the ity. It has )een granted the following legislati*e powers, to wit2 /@pA to pro*ide for the prohi)ition and s#ppression of riots, affrays, dist#r)ances, and disorderly asse")lies, @#A to reg#late the #se of streets, a*en#es ... par:s, ce"eteries and other p#)lic places./ $h#s, the M#nicipal Board enacted sections 8BB and 1119 of the %e*ised 'rdinances of 1927, which prohi)it, as an offense against p#)lic peace, and penali&e as a "isde"eanor, /any act, in any p#)lic place, "eeting, or procession, tending to dist#r) the peace or e5cite a riotG or collect with other persons in a )ody or crowd for any #nlawf#l p#rposeG or dist#r) or dis6#iet any congregation engaged in any lawf#l asse")ly./ !.. 1119 states that the streets and p#)lic places of the city shall )e :ept free and clear for the #se of the p#)lic, and the sidewal:s and crossings for the pedestrians, and the sa"e shall only )e #sed or occ#pied for other p#rposes as pro*ided )y ordinance or reg#lationZ 6rovided that the holding of an$ parade or procession in an$ street or public places shall onl$ be done if a 0a$orBs permit is securedT The 0a$orBs reason for refusing the permit was his reasonable ground to believe, based on previous utterances and the fact that passions on the part of the losing groups remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the dul$ constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. 1owe*er, petitionerKs re6#est was for a per"it /to hold a peacef#l p#)lic "eeting./ ISSUE" 8as the MayorKs ref#sal to grant the per"it to peacea)ly asse")le *iolati*e of the onstit#tionC HELD" D.!. T;) 29A;0( +< <2))*+D +< (E))/; ',* 0+ E)'/)<1..: '(()D8.) ',* E)0909+, 0;) A+>)2,D),0 <+2 2)*2)(( +< A29)>',/)( '2) <1,*'D),0'. E)2(+,'. 29A;0( +< 0;) E)+E.) 2)/+A,9F)* ',* A1'2',0))* 8: 0;) C+,(090109+,. The exercise of those rights is not absoluteJ it may be regulated so that it shall in*ure the equal en*oyment of others having equal rights, or the rights of the community or society. $he power to reg#late the e5ercise of s#ch rights is the /police power/999 the power to prescri)e reg#lations, to pro"ote the health, "orals, peace, ed#cation, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people999 e5ercised )y the legislati*e )ranch )y the enact"ent of laws reg#lating those rights, and it "ay )e delegated to political s#)di*isions, s#ch as towns, "#nicipalities, and cities a#thori&ing their legislati*e )odies, called "#nicipal and city co#ncils to enact ordinances for the p#rpose. !.. 1119 is s#scepti)le to two constr#ctions2 '%) That the Dayor has unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly ) 9+2 '&) That the applicant has the right to a permit, which shall be granted by the Dayor, sub*ect only to the latterFs reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimie the ris< of disorder. The ,ourt adopted the second constructionJ the ordinance only confers upon the Dayor the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the meeting may be held. ;t does not confer upon him unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license. / statute requiring persons using the public streets to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly, WH6.6 TH6 L;,62S;29 /CTHA.;T;6S /.6 ST.;,TL@ L;D;T67 , in the issuance of licenses, to consider the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing. Atherwise, it would be tantamount to authoriing the Dayor to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings. The Dunicipal 1oard is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, par<s, and the other public places. IREGULATEI includes the power to control, govern, and restrain, but not suppress or prohibit. The legislative police power of the 0unicipal 9oard to enact ordinances regulating reasonabl$ the e%ercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citiEens in the streets and other public places cannot be delegated to the Dayor by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action b$ which its impartial e%ecution can be secured or partialit$ and oppression prevented. =/n ordinance in that case sub*ects to the unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or control his action. 1is action or non9action "ay proceed fro" en"ity or pre-#dice, fro" partisan &eal or ani"osity, fro" fa*oritis" and other i"proper infl#ences and "oti*es easy of conceal"ent.> /n ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power is void. I, 0;) )C)2/9() +< E+.9/) E+@)2, 0;) /+1,/9. D':, 9, 90( *9(/2)09+,, 2)A1.'0) 0;) )C)2/9() +< (1/; 29A;0( 9, ' 2)'(+,'8.) D',,)2, 810 /',,+0 (1EE2)(( 0;)D, *92)/0.: +2 9,*92)/0.:, 8: '00)DE09,A 0+ /+DD90 0;) E+@)2 +< *+9,A (+ 0+ 0;) D':+2 +2 ',: +0;)2 +<<9/)2. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, ma<ing him in its exercise a petty tyrant. -;t is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief that the law interferes.- /Krdinances to be valid must be reasonable) the$ must not be oppressive) the$ must be fair and impartial) the$ must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement to rest on official discretion0 =Where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than partial and discriminating in its practical operation.0 @$he o#rt cited a J.!. caseA The power of municipalities to regulate the use of public streets is conceded. The privilege of a citien to use the streets may be regulated in the interest of allJ it is not absolute. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways is consistent with civil liberties, a means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. 8here a restriction of the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 68 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 #se of highways is designed to pro"ote the p#)lic con*enience in the interest of all, it cannot )e disregarded )y the atte"pted e5ercise of so"e ci*il right which in other circ#"stances wo#ld )e entitled to protection. As reg#lation of the #se of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional e5ercise of control )y local go*ern"ent, the 6#estion is whether that control is e5erted so as not to deny or #nwarrantedly a)ridge the right of asse")ly and the opport#nities for the co""#nication of tho#ght and the disc#ssion of p#)lic 6#estions i""e"orially associated with resort to p#)lic places. $he o#rt, citing a J.!. case, held+ =/ municipal ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public par<s, or public buildings of the city and authoriing the director of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit 'and not merely to regulate) when after investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the application, he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power. Streets and par<s have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citiens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citiens. The privilege of a citien to use the streets and par<s for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of allJ it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good orderJ 1CT ;T DCST 2AT, ;2 TH6 9C;S6 A> .69CL/T;A2, 16 /1.;7967 A. 762;67. ;f the Ardinance =does not ma<e comfort or convenience in the use of streets or par<s the standard of official action,0 instead, it enables a single official to refuse a permit on his D6.6 A#;2;A2 that such refusal will prevent Friots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage, ;T ;S MA;7. ;t can be an instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs. 0oreover, the power conferred upon the Legislature to ma<e laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority, e%cept police regulation which are conferred upon the legislative bod$ of a municipal corporation. The police power to regulate the use of streets and other public places has been conferred b$ the (egislature upon the 0unicipal 9oard of the Cit$. The (egislature has not conferred upon the 0a$or the same power. Besides, a grant of #nreg#lated and #nli"ited power to grant or ref#se a per"it for the #se of streets and other p#)lic places for processions, parades, or "eetings, wo#ld )e n#ll and *oid. Jnder o#r de"ocratic syste" of go*ern"ent, no s#ch #nli"ited power "ay )e *alidly granted to any officer of the go*ern"ent, e5cept perhaps in cases of national e"ergency. /FEAR OF SERIOUS IN!UR- /',,+0 '.+,) B1(09<: (1EE2)((9+, +< <2)) (E))/; ',* '(()D8.:. It is the f#nction of speech to free "en fro" the )ondage of irrational fears. To *ustify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practicedJ that the danger apprehended is imminent and the evil to be prevented is a serious one.> ;mminent danger can -#stify prohi)ition '3LD I( the e*il apprehended is 2).'09>).: ()29+1(. $hat speech is li:ely to res#lt in so"e *iolence or in destr#ction of property is not eno#gh to -#stify its s#ppression. There must be the probability of serious in*ury to the state. MALA&ANAN >. RAMENTO G.R. N+. L%2270? M': 21, 1984, F)2,',*+, !. F'/0(" 0etitioners were st#dents of ,regorio Araneta Jni*ersity, granted )y the school a#thorities to hold a "eeting, howe*er they "#st co"ply with so"e ter"s and conditions. Instead of following the ter"s and conditions, the st#dents contin#ed their "arch to the Life !cience )#ilding, outside the area stated in the permit. lasses were dist#r)ed d#e to the noise. It was o#tside the area co*ered )y their per"it. The$ continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severel$ critical of the !niversit$ authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non7academic emplo$ee, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. $hen on !epte")er 9, 1982, they were infor"ed thro#gh a "e"orand#" that they were #nder pre*enti*e s#spension for their fail#re to e5plain the holding of an illegal asse")ly in front of the Life !cience B#ilding. $he *alidity thereof was challenged )y petitioners )oth )efore the (I of %i&al and )efore the Ministry of .d#cation, #lt#re and !ports. %espondent, %a"ento, as director of the 3ational apital %egion, fo#nd petitioners g#ilty of the charge of holding an illegal asse")ly which was characteri&ed )y the *iolation of the per"it granted res#lting in the dist#r)ance of classes and oral defa"ation. The penalt$ was suspension for one academic $ear. I((1)(" 1. 8hether or not the decision of responded *iolates the constit#tional rights of freedo" of peacea)le asse")ly and free speechC 2. 8hether or not the s#spension "eted o#t )y the school a#thorities are not *iolati*e of d#e processC H).*" 1. NO. As is 6#ite clear fro" the opinion in R):)( >. &'A'0(9,A, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are e")raced in the concept of freedo" of e5pression, which is identified with the li)erty to disc#ss p#)licly and tr#thf#lly, any "atter of p#)lic interest witho#t censorship or p#nish"ent and which -is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing . . . of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.- In the a)o*e case, a per"it was so#ght to hold a peacef#l "arch and rally fro" the L#neta p#)lic par: to the gates of the Jnited !tates .")assy, hardly two )loc:s away, where in an open space of p#)lic property, a short progra" wo#ld )e held, 2ecessarily then, the question of the use of a public par< and of the streets leading to the Cnited States 6mbassy was before this ,ourt. We held that streets and par<s have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and have been used for purposes of assembly to communicate thoughts between citiens and to discuss public issues. $he sit#ation here is different. $he asse")ly was to )e held NOT in a public place )#t in private premises , property of respondent Jni*ersity. $here is in the %eyes opinion as part of the s#""ary this rele*ant e5cerpt2 -The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will ta<e place. ;f it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.- 0etitioners did see: s#ch consent. It was granted. According to the petition2 /'n A#g#st 27, 1982, )y *irt#e of a per"it granted to the" )y the school ad"inistration, the !#pre"e !t#dent o#ncil where yo#r petitioners are a"ong the officers, held a ,eneral Asse")ly at the <MA! )as:et)all co#rt of the respondent Jni*ersity./ $here was an e5press ad"ission in the o""ent of pri*ate respondent Jni*ersity as to a per"it ha*ing )een granted for petitioners to hold a st#dent asse")ly. The specific question to be resolved then is whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech. 0etitioners in*o:e their rights to peacea)le asse")ly and free speech. $hey were entitled to do so. $hey en-oy the said right li:e the rest of the citi&ens the freedo" to e5press their *iews and co""#nicate their tho#ghts to those disposed to listen in gatherings s#ch as was held in this case. $hey do not, shed their constit#tional rights to freedo" of speech or e5pression at the schoolho#se gate. While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognied, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. 'n a "ore specific le*el, there is pers#asi*e force to this for"#lation in the (ortas opinion2 The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. /mong those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending schoolJ it is also an important part of the educational process. / studentFs rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. 8hen he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the ca"p#s d#ring the a#thori&ed ho#rs, he may express his opinions, e*en on contro*ersial s#)-ects li:e the conflict in <ietna", if he does so without Fmaterially and substantially interferGingI with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the schoolF and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . 1ut conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason : whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior : materially disrupts classwor< or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunied by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.- ')-ection is "ade )y pri*ate respondents to the tenor of the speeches )y the st#dent leaders. ;f in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. !t#dent leaders are hardly the ti"id, diffident types. $hey are li:ely to )e asserti*e and dog"atic. $hey wo#ld )e ineffecti*e if d#ring a rally they spea: in the g#arded and -#dicio#s lang#age of the acade"e. At any rate, e*en a sy"pathetic a#dience is not disposed to accord f#ll credence to their fiery e5hortations. $hey ta:e into acco#nt the e5cite"ent of the occasion, the propensity of spea:ers to e5aggerate, the e5#)erance of yo#th. They may give the spea<ers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity ta<ing place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without pre*udice to the ta<ing of disciplinary action for conduct, which -materially disrupts classwor< or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.- San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 69 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 'ne last "atter. The ob*ection was raised that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, That is true, but hardly decisive. Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case, especially so where a decision on a question of law is imperatively called for, and time being of the essence, this ,ourt has invariably viewed the issue as ripe for ad*udication. 8hat cannot )e too s#fficiently stressed is that the constit#tional rights to peacea)le asse")ly and free speech are in*o:ed )y petitioners. Doreover, there was, and very li<ely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public. That they have a right to do as citiens entitled to all the protection in the 1ill of .ights. It wo#ld )e "ost appropriate then, as was done in the case of %eyes *. Bagatsing, for this o#rt to lay down the principles for the g#idance of school a#thorities and st#dents ali:e. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to students of educational institutions. 2ecessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be sub*ected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to present. As a corollary, the #t"ost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or #tterances "ade. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. ;f the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. ;n granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of wor< of the non:academic personnel. 2. D.!. 6ven if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. ;t does not follow however, that the petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired. /dmittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the bas<etball court, of the MD/S building of the Cniversity. Doreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of %a"ento, the concerted acti*ity went on #ntil 724?p". 0ri*ate respondent co#ld th#s, ta:e disciplinary action. 'n those facts, howe*er, an ad"onition, e*en a cens#re certainly not a s#spension co#ld )e the appropriate penalty. While the discretion of both respondent Cniversity and responded .amento is recognied, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser penalty. ;f the consent of proportionally between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question . To avoid this constitutional ob*ection, it is the holding of this court that a one:wee< suspension would be punishment enough. DELA CRU$ >. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. N+. 12%183, M'2/; 25, 1999, &)..+(9..+, !. FACTS" $he respecti*e school principals s#)"itted reports to the !ecretary of D.! regarding the participation of p#)lic school teachers @petitionersA in an illegal stri:e and their defiance to the ret#rn9to9wor: order iss#ed )y the D.! !ecretary. $he !ec. of D.! on his own filed an ad"inistrati*e co"plaint against the petitioners for the said acts which were considered as a *iolation of the i*il !er*ice Decree of the 0hilippines. (or fail#re to s#)"it their answers the !ec. of D.! iss#ed an order of dis"issal against the teachers which was i"ple"ented i""ediately. 0etitioners appealed to the Merit !yste"s 0rotection Board @M!0BA and then to the i*il !er*ice o""ission @!A. $he ! fo#nd petitioners g#ilty of /cond#ct pre-#dicial to the )est interest of the ser*ice/ for ha*ing participated in the "ass actions and i"posed #pon the" the red#ced penalty of si5 @+A "onthsI s#spension. 1owe*er, in *iew of the length of ti"e that petitioners had )een o#t of the ser*ice )y reason of the i""ediate i"ple"entation of the dis"issal orders of !ecretary ariNo, the ! li:ewise ordered petitionersI a#to"atic reinstate"ent in the ser*ice witho#t )ac: wages. 0etitioners were #nhappy with the ! decision. $hey initially filed petitions for certiorari with the ! which were all referred to the A. $he A r#led that the 6#estioned resol#tions of the i*il !er*ice o""ission finding petitioners g#ilty of cond#ct pre-#dicial to the )est interest of the ser*ice were )ased on reasona)le and -#stifia)le gro#ndsG that petitionersI percei*ed grie*ances were no e5c#se for the" not to cond#ct classes and defy the ret#rn9to9wor: order iss#ed )y their s#periorsG that the i""ediate e5ec#tion of the dis"issal orders of !ecretary ariNo was sanctioned #nder law. 0etitioners contend that the o#rt of Appeals grie*o#sly erred in affir"ing the ! resol#tions finding the" g#ilty of cond#ct pre-#dicial to the )est interest of the ser*ice when their only /offense/ was to e5ercise their constit#tional right to peacea)ly asse")le and petition the go*ern"ent for redress of their grie*ances. Moreo*er petitioners insist that the "ass actions of !epte")erR'cto)er 199? were not /stri:es/ as there was no act#al disr#ption of classes. 0etitioners therefore as: for e5oneration or, in the alternati*e, award of )ac: wages for the period of three @4A years when they were not allowed to wor: while awaiting resol#tion of their appeals )y the M!0B and !, ded#cting the period of si5 @+A "onthsI s#spension e*ent#ally "eted the". ISSUES" 1. 8'3 the p#)lic school teachers were in*ol*ed in a =stri:e>C 2. 8'3 the teachers sho#ld )e penali&ed for participating in the stri:eC 4. 8'3 penali&ing the teachers for participation in the stri:e a"o#nts to a denial of their right to peacea)ly asse")leC HELD" 1. -ES. $he persistent ref#sal of the stri:ing teachers to call the "ass actions )y the con*entional ter" /stri:e/ did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as unauthoried stoppages of wor< the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachersF economic grievances. $he "ass actions staged )y Metro Manila p#)lic school teachers amounted to a stri<e in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthoried stoppage of or absence from wor< which it was said teachersF sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons L to protest and pressure the G+>)2,D),0 to correct what, a"ong other grie*ances, the stri:ers percei*ed to )e the #n-#st or pre-#dicial i"ple"entation of the salary standardi&ation law insofar as they were concerned, the non9pay"ent or delay in pay"ent of *ario#s fringe )enefits and allowances to which they were entitled, and the i"position of additional teaching loads and longer teaching ho#rs. 2. -ES. $he teachers were penali&ed not )eca#se they e5ercised their right to peacea)ly asse")le )#t )eca#se of the "anner )y which s#ch right was e5ercised, i.e., going on #na#thori&ed and #nilateral a)sences th#s disr#pting classes in *ario#s schools in Metro Manila which prod#ced ad*erse effects #pon the st#dents for whose ed#cation the teachers were responsi)le. /lthough petitioners contend that classes were not actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately appointed by Secretary ,ariSo, that the prompt remedial action ta<en by Secretary ,ariSo might have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary. =This ,ourt denies the claim that the teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, li<e any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to pre*udice the public welfare.0 The public school teachers in these mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. An the contrary, they committed acts pre*udicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go bac< even after they had been ordered to do so. 1ad the teachers a*ailed of their free ti"e 9 recess, after classes, wee:ends or holidays 9 to dra"ati&e their grie*ances and to dialog#e with the proper a#thorities within the )o#nds of law, no one 9 not the D.!, the ! or e*en the !#pre"e o#rt 9 co#ld ha*e held the" lia)le for their participation in the "ass actions. 4. NO. In /olando Aan v. Civil "ervice Commission, it was held that for the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances to be upheld, li<e any other liberty, it must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to pre*udice the public welfare. $he p#)lic school teachers in the case of the 199? "ass actions did not e5ercise their constit#tional rights within reasona)le li"its. An the contrary, they committed acts pre*udicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go bac< even after they had been ordered to do so. H'* 0;) 0)'/;)2( '>'9.)* +< 0;)92 <2)) 09D) N 2)/)((, '<0)2 /.'(()(, @))G),*( +2 ;+.9*':( N 0+ *2'D'09F) 0;)92 A29)>',/)( ',* 0+ *9'.+A1) @90; 0;) E2+E)2 '10;+2909)( @90;9, 0;) 8+1,*( +< .'@, ,+ +,) N ,+0 0;) DECS, 0;) CSC +2 )>), 0;) S1E2)D) C+120 N /+1.* ;'>) ;).* 0;)D .9'8.) <+2 0;)92 E'209/9E'09+, 9, 0;) D'(( '/09+,(. $he arg#"ent that the rights of free e5pression and asse")ly co#ld not )e lightly disregarded as they occ#py a preferred position in the hierarchy of ci*il li)erties is not applica)le to defend the *alidity of the 199? "ass actions )eca#se there is a higher consideration in*ol*ed here which is the ed#cation of the yo#th.
PHILIPPINE &LOOMING MILLS EMPLO-EES ORGANI$ATION >. PHILIPPINE &LOOMING MILLS CO. INC. G.R. N+. L31195, !1,) 5, 1973, M'G'(9'2, !. F'/0(" !o"eti"e in 19+9, petitioner decided to stage a "ass de"onstration in MalacaNang in protest against alleged a)#ses of the 0asig 0olice. %espondent o"pany, howe*er re6#ested petitioner that San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 70 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the first9shift wor:ers sho#ld not participate in the stri:e for it will #nd#ly pre-#dice the nor"al operation of the co"pany. Despite the warning, all the wor:ers incl#ding those who were in first9shift still participated in the rally. 6rior to that, respondent compan$ informed that workers who belong in the first7shift, who were without previous leave of absence approved b$ the compan$, who shall participate in the rall$ shall be dismissed for it is a clear violation of the e%isting C9A and is tantamount to an illegal strike. %espondent co"pany then filed a charge against petitioners and later dis"issed so"e of its e"ployees. I((1)(" 8hether or not the constit#tional freedo"s of speech and e5pression of the petitioner were *iolated )y the respondent co"pany in pre*enting so"e of its e"ployees to participate in the rally and later dis"issed so"e of the". H).*" 3o. $here is need of )riefly restating )asic concepts and principles which #nderlie the iss#es posed )y the case at )ar. @1A In a de"ocracy, the preser*ation and enhance"ent of the dignity and worth of the h#"an personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of o#r ci*ili&ation. $he in*iola)le character of "an as an indi*id#al "#st )e /protected to the largest possi)le e5tent in his tho#ghts and in his )eliefs as the citadel of his person. @2A The 1ill of .ights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security -against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles.0 In the pithy lang#age of Mr. H#stice %o)ert Hac:son, the purpose of the 1ill of .ights is to withdraw -certain sub*ects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of ma*orities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. AneFs rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a voteJ they depend on the outcome of no elections.- Las:i proclai"ed that /the happiness of the indi*id#al, not the well9)eing of the !tate, was the criterion )y which its )eha*io#r was to )e -#dged. 1is interests, not its power, set the li"its to the a#thority it was entitled to e5ercise. @4A The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphoris" of H#stice 1ol"es, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherishJ or as !ocrates insin#ated, not only to protect the "inority who want to tal:, )#t also to )enefit the "a-ority who ref#se to listen. And as H#stice Do#glas cogently stresses it, the li)erties of one are the li)erties of allG and the li)erties of one are not safe #nless the li)erties of all are protected. @BA The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to manFs en*oyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citiens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citiEen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and emplo$ees. @7A While the 1ill of .ights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognied. 1ecause these freedoms are -delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society- and the -threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,- they -need breathing space to survive,- permitting government regulation only -with narrow specificity.- 0roperty and property rights can )e lost thr# prescriptionG )#t h#"an rights are i"prescripti)le. If h#"an rights are e5ting#ished )y the passage of ti"e, then the Bill of %ights is a #seless atte"pt to li"it the power of go*ern"ent and ceases to )e an efficacio#s shield against the tyranny of officials, of "a-orities, of the infl#ential and powerf#l, and of oligarchs 9 political, econo"ic or otherwise. 'n the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occup$ a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutionsJ and such priorit$ gives these liberties the sanctit$ and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. $he superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its ob*ect or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights . An the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. !o it has )een stressed that the (1)= >.667ADS A> S#66,H0 and (2)=A> TH6 #.6SS0 as well as (3)=A> #6/,6>CL /SS6D1L@ /27 A> #6T;T;A2 >A. .67.6SS A> 9.;6M/2,6S0 are absolute when directed against public officials or -when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed,- even relying on the balancing:of:interests test. $he respondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations, after opining that the "ass de"onstration was not a declaration of stri:e, concl#ded that )y their /concerted act and the occ#rrence of a te"porary stoppage of wor:,/ herein petitioners are g#ilty of )argaining in )ad faith and hence *iolated the collecti*e )argaining agree"ent with pri*ate respondent 0hilippine Bloo"ing Mills o., Inc. "et against and tested b$ the foregoing principles governing a democratic societ$, such a conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners was against alleged abuses of some #asig policemen, 2AT against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the ,hief 6xecutive, against the police officers of the municipality of #asig. They exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. /s a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Cnion and its members from the harassment of local police officers. ;t was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to ta<e up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to wor< free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their respective tas<s to enhance its productivity as well as profits. &erein respondent emplo$er did not even offer to intercede for its emplo$ees with the local police. 8as it sec#ring peace for itself at the e5pense of its wor:ersC 8as it also inti"idated )y the local police or did it enco#rage the local police to terrori&e or *e5 its wor:ersC ;ts failure to defend its own employees all the more wea<ened the position of its laborers vis:a:vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have been all the more emboldened thereby to sub*ect its lowly employees to further indignities. ;n see<ing sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utiliing only the weapons afforded them by the ,onstitution he untrammelled en*oyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. !#ch apprehended loss or da"age wo#ld not spell the difference )etween the life and death of the fir" or its owners or its "anage"ent. $he e"ployeesI pathetic sit#ation was a star: reality a)#sed, harassed and persec#ted as they )elie*ed they were )y the peace officers of the "#nicipality. /s above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis:a:vis the local police of #asig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Daterial loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being bro<en in morale and brutalied in spirit can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is li<e rubbing salt on bruised tissues. As heretofore stated, TH6 #.;D/,@ A> HCD/2 .;9HTS, >.667AD A> 6H#.6SS;A2, A> #6/,6>CL /SS6D1L@ /27 A> #6T;T;A2 >A. .67.6SS A> 9.;6M/2,6S o*er #.A#6.T@ .;9HTS has )een s#stained. ."phatic reiteration of this )asic tenet as a co*eted )oon at once the shield and ar"or of the dignity and worth of the h#"an personality, the all9cons#"ing ideal of o#r enlightened ci*ili&ation )eco"es '#r d#ty, if freedo" and social -#stice ha*e any "eaning at all for hi" who toils so that capital can prod#ce econo"ic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the emplo$er, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from emplo$ment of the demonstrating emplo$ees, stretches undul$ the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is -a potent means of inhibiting speech- and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. The collective bargaining agreement which fi%es the working shifts of the emplo$ees, according to the respondent Court of 'ndustrial /elations, in effect imposes on the workers the dut$ . . . to observe regular working hours. $he strained constr#ction of the o#rt of Ind#strial %elations that s#ch stip#lated wor:ing shifts deny the wor:ers the right to stage a "ass de"onstration against police a)#ses d#ring wor:ing ho#rs, constit#tes a *irt#al tyranny o*er the "ind and life of the wor:ers and deser*es se*ere conde"nation. %en#nciation of the freedo" sho#ld not )e predicated on s#ch a slender gro#nd. The mass demonstration staged b$ the emplo$ees on 0arch C, 14=4 could not have been legall$ en#oined b$ an$ court, for such an in#unction would be trenching upon the freedom of e%pression of the workers, even if it legall$ appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. $he respondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations in the case at )ar concedes that the "ass de"onstration was not a declaration of a stri:e /as the sa"e is not rooted San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 71 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 in any ind#strial disp#te altho#gh there is a concerted act and the occ#rrence of a te"porary stoppage of wor:./ The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Cnion that only the first and regular shift from B /.D. to & #.D. should report for wor< in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Cnion members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with *urisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. irc#lation is one of the aspects of freedo" of e5pression. If de"onstrators are red#ced )y one9third, then )y that "#ch the circ#lation of the iss#es raised )y the de"onstration is di"inished. $he "ore the participants, the "ore persons can )e apprised of the p#rpose of the rally. Moreo*er, the a)sence of one9third of their "e")ers will )e regarded as a s#)stantial indication of dis#nity in their ran:s which will ener*ate their position and a)et contin#ed alleged police persec#tion. At any rate, the Jnion notified the co"pany two days in ad*ance of their pro-ected de"onstration and the co"pany co#ld ha*e "ade arrange"ents to co#nteract or pre*ent whate*er losses it "ight s#stain )y reason of the a)sence of its wor:ers for one day, especially in this case when the Jnion re6#ested it to e5c#se only the day9shift e"ployees who will -oin the de"onstration on March B, 19+9 which re6#est the Jnion reiterated in their telegra" recei*ed )y the co"pany at 927? in the "orning of March B, 19+9, the day of the "ass de"onstration @pp. B29B4, rec.A. There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in re#ecting the re.uest of the !nion for e%cuse from work for the da$ shifts in order to carr$ out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a gro#nd for dis"issal the "ass de"onstration held against the 0asig police, not against the co"pany, is gross *indicti*eness on the part of the e"ployer, which is as #nchristian as it is #nconstit#tional. III The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. 1ecause the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and wor<ers to *oin the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight '!) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in !ection B@a91A in relation to !ection 4 of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 877, otherwise :nown as the Ind#strial 0eace Act. !ection 4 of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 877 g#arantees to the e"ployees the right /to engage in concerted acti*ities for . . . "#t#al aid or protection/G while !ection B@a91A regards as an #nfair la)or practice for an e"ployer /to interfere with, restrain or coerce e"ployees in the e5ercise of their rights g#aranteed in !ection $hree./ 8e repeat that the o)*io#s p#rpose of the "ass de"onstration staged )y the wor:ers of the respondent fir" on March B, 19+9, was for their "#t#al aid and protection against alleged police a)#ses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the e"ployees to engage in s#ch a co""on action to )etter shield the"sel*es against s#ch alleged police indignities. $he insistence on the part of the respondent fir" that the wor:ers for the "orning and reg#lar shifts sho#ld not participate in the "ass de"onstration, #nder pain of dis"issal, was as heretofore stated, /a potent "eans of inhi)iting speech./ !#ch a concerted action for their "#t#al help and protection, deser*es at least e6#al protection as the concerted action of e"ployees in gi*ing p#)licity to a letter co"plaint charging a )an: president with i""orality, nepotis", fa*oritis" and discri"ination in the appoint"ent and pro"otion of )an: e"ployees. 8e f#rther r#led in the %ep#)lic !a*ings Ban: case, s#pra, that for the e"ployees to co"e within the protecti*e "antle of !ection 4 in relation to !ection B@a91A of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 877, /it is not necessary that #nion acti*ity )e in*ol*ed or that collecti*e )argaining )e conte"plated,/ as long as the concerted acti*ity is for the f#rtherance of their interests. As stated clearly in the stip#lation of facts e")odied in the 6#estioned order of respondent o#rt dated !epte")er 17, 19+9, the co"pany, /while e5pressly ac:nowledging, that the de"onstration is an inaliena)le right of the Jnion g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion,/ nonetheless e"phasi&ed that /any de"onstration for that "atter sho#ld not #nd#ly pre-#dice the nor"al operation of the co"pany/ and /warned the 0BM.' representati*es that wor:ers who )elong to the first and reg#lar shifts, who witho#t pre*io#s lea*e of a)sence appro*ed )y the o"pany, partic#larly the officers present who are the organi&ers of the de"onstration, who shall fail to report for wor: the following "orning @March B, 19+9A shall )e dis"issed, )eca#se s#ch fail#re is a *iolation of the e5isting BA and, therefore, wo#ld )e a"o#nting to an illegal stri:e @GA/ @p. III, petitionerIs )riefA. !#ch threat of dis"issal tended to coerce the e"ployees fro" -oining the "ass de"onstration. 1owe*er, the iss#es that the e"ployees raised against the local police, were "ore i"portant to the" )eca#se they had the co#rage to proceed with the de"onstration, despite s#ch threat of dis"issal. $he "ost that co#ld happen to the" was to lose a dayIs wage )y reason of their a)sence fro" wor: on the day of the de"onstration. 'ne dayIs pay "eans "#ch to a la)orer, "ore especially if he has a fa"ily to s#pport. Det, they were willing to forego their one9day salary hoping that their de"onstration wo#ld )ring a)o#t the desired relief fro" police a)#ses. B#t "anage"ent was ada"ant in ref#sing to recogni&e the s#perior legiti"acy of their right of free speech, free asse")ly and the right to petition for redress. Beca#se the respondent co"pany ostensi)ly did not find it necessary to de"and fro" the wor:ers proof of the tr#th of the alleged a)#ses inflicted on the" )y the local police, it there)y concedes that the e*idence of s#ch a)#ses sho#ld properly )e s#)"itted to the corresponding a#thorities ha*ing -#risdiction o*er their co"plaint and to who" s#ch co"plaint "ay )e referred )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines for proper in*estigation and action with a *iew to disciplining the local police officers in*ol*ed. 'n the other hand, while the respondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations fo#nd that the de"onstration /paraly&ed to a large e5tent the operations of the co"plainant co"pany,/ the respondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations did not "a:e any finding as to the fact of loss act#ally s#stained )y the fir". $his significant circ#"stance can only "ean that the fir" did not s#stain any loss or da"age. It did not present e*idence as to whether it lost e5pected profits for fail#re to co"ply with p#rchase orders on that dayG or that penalties were e5acted fro" it )y c#sto"ers whose orders co#ld not )e filled that day of the de"onstrationG or that p#rchase orders were cancelled )y the c#sto"ers )y reason of its fail#re to deli*er the "aterials orderedG or that its own e6#ip"ent or "aterials or prod#cts were da"aged d#e to a)sence of its wor:ers on March B, 19+9. 'n the contrary, the co"pany sa*ed a si&a)le a"o#nt in the for" of wages for its h#ndreds of wor:ers, cost of f#el, water and electric cons#"ption that day. !#ch sa*ings co#ld ha*e a"ply co"pensated for #nreali&ed profits or da"ages it "ight ha*e s#stained )y reason of the a)sence of its wor:ers for only one day. I< /part from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight '!) leaders of the wor<ers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from wor<, constitutes a denial of social *ustice li<ewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. !ection 7 of Article II of the onstit#tion i"poses #pon the !tate /the pro"otion of social -#stice to ins#re the well9)eing and econo"ic sec#rity of all of the people,/ which g#arantee is e"phasi&ed )y the other directi*e in !ection + of Article ;I< of the onstit#tion that /the !tate shall afford protection to la)or . . ./ %espondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations as an agency of the !tate is #nder o)ligation at all ti"es to gi*e "eaning and s#)stance to these constit#tional g#arantees in fa*or of the wor:ing "anG for otherwise these constit#tional safeg#ards wo#ld )e "erely a lot of /"eaningless constit#tional patter./ Jnder the Ind#strial 0eace Act, the o#rt of Ind#strial %elations is en-oined to effect the policy of the law /to eli"inate the ca#ses of ind#strial #nrest )y enco#raging and protecting the e5ercise )y e"ployees of their right to self9organi&ation for the p#rpose of collecti*e )argaining and for the pro"otion of their "oral, social and econo"ic well9 )eing./ It is "ost #nfort#nate in the case at )ar that respondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations, the *ery go*ern"ental agency designed therefor, failed to i"ple"ent this policy and failed to :eep faith with its a*owed "ission its raison dIetre as ordained and directed )y the onstit#tion. ;t has been li<ewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of *urisdictionJ and as a consequence its *udgment is null and void and confers no rights. %elief fro" a cri"inal con*iction sec#red at the sacrifice of constit#tional li)erties, "ay )e o)tained thro#gh ha)eas corp#s proceedings e*en long after the finality of the -#dg"ent. $h#s, ha)eas corp#s is the re"edy to o)tain the release of an indi*id#al, who is con*icted )y final -#dg"ent thro#gh a forced confession, which *iolated his constit#tional right against self9 incri"inationG or who is denied the right to present e*idence in his defense as a depri*ation of his li)erty witho#t d#e process of law, e*en after the acc#sed has already ser*ed sentence for twenty9two years. Both the respondents o#rt of Ind#strial %elations and pri*ate fir" trenched #pon these constit#tional i""#nities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to s#ch rights and aggra*ated the inh#"anity to which the aggrie*ed wor:ers clai"ed they had )een s#)-ected )y the "#nicipal police. 1a*ing *iolated these )asic h#"an rights of the la)orers, the ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations ousted itself of *urisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. %ecognition and protection of s#ch freedo"s are i"perati*e on all p#)lic offices incl#ding the co#rts 28 as well as pri*ate citi&ens and corporations, the e5ercise and en-oy"ent of which "#st not )e n#llified )y "ere proced#ral r#le pro"#lgated )y the o#rt Ind#strial %elations e5ercising a p#rely delegate legislati*e power, when e*en a law enacted )y ongress "#st yield to the #ntra""elled en-oy"ent of these h#"an rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to en*oy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. ;t is a continuing immunity to be invo<ed and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Atherwise these guarantees in the 1ill of .ights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. /nd in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 72 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and eal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. <I. Does the "ere fact that the "otion for reconsideration was filed two @2A days late defeat the rights of the petitioning e"ployeesC 'r "ore directly and concretely, does the inad*ertent o"ission to co"ply with a "ere o#rt of Ind#strial %elations proced#ral r#le go*erning the period for filing a "otion for reconsideration or appeal in la)or cases, pro"#lgated p#rs#ant to a legislati*e delegation, pre*ail o*er constit#tional rightsC $he answer sho#ld )e o)*io#s in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations over basic human rights sheltered by the ,onstitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the ,onstitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,F but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the en*oyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the ,onstitution and the law. / period of five '5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved wor<ers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the o#rt of Appeals and the !#pre"e o#rt, a period of fifteen @17A days has )een fi5ed for the filing of the "otion for re hearing or reconsideration @!ee. 1?, %#le 71G !ec. 1, %#le 72G !ec. 1, %#le 7+, %e*ised %#les of o#rtA. $he delay in the filing of the "otion for reconsideration co#ld ha*e )een only one day if !epte")er 28, 19+9 was not a !#nday. $his fact accent#ates the #nreasona)leness of the o#rt of Ind#strial are concerned. It is a proced#ral r#le that generally all ca#ses of action and defenses presently a*aila)le "#st )e specifically raised in the co"plaint or answerG so that any ca#se of action or defense not raised in s#ch pleadings, is dee"ed wai*ed. 1owe*er, a constit#tional iss#e can )e raised any ti"e, e*en for the first ti"e on appeal, if it appears that the deter"ination of the constit#tional iss#e is necessary to a decision of the case, the *ery lis mota of the case witho#t the resol#tion of which no final and co"plete deter"ination of the disp#te can )e "ade. It is th#s seen that a proced#ral r#le of ongress or of the !#pre"e o#rt gi*es way to a constit#tional right. In the instant case, the proced#ral r#le of the o#rt of Ind#strial %elations, a creat#re of ongress, "#st li:ewise yield to the constit#tional rights in*o:ed )y herein petitioners e*en )efore the instit#tion of the #nfair la)or practice charged against the" and in their defense to the said charge. &':', >(. E2D90' G.R. N+. 1%9838, AE29. 25, 200%, AF/1,', !. F'/0(" 0etitioners allege that they are citi&ens and ta5payers of the 0hilippines and that their rights as organi&ations and indi*id#als were *iolated when the rally they participated in on 'cto)er +, 2??7 was *iolently dispersed )y police"en i"ple"enting Batas 0a")ansa @B.0.A 3o. 88?. Malacanang also iss#ed a policy deno"inated as =ali)rated 0re9e"pti*e %esponse> @0%A on all rallies. !aid =0% 0olicy> pro*ides, a"ong others2 The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community. Cnlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The ma*ority of law:abiding citiens have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government. We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society. The$ assail 1atas #ambansa 2o. !!3 as well as the polic$ of =,alibrated #reemptive .esponse- or C6/ and seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the -no permit, no rally- policy and the ,#. policy recentl$ announced. 6etitioners contend that 9atas 6ambansa Fo. 880 is clearl$ a violation of the Constitution and the International o*enant on i*il and 0olitical %ights and other h#"an rights treaties of which the 0hilippines is a signatory. The$ argue that 9.6. Fo. 880 re.uires a permit before one can stage a public assembl$ regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also c#rtails the choice of *en#e and is th#s rep#gnant to the freedo" of e5pression cla#se as the ti"e and place of a p#)lic asse")ly for" part of the "essage for which the e5pression is so#ght. (#rther"ore, it is not content9ne#tral as it does not apply to "ass actions in s#pport of the go*ern"ent. $he words /lawf#l ca#se,/ /opinion,/ /protesting or infl#encing/ s#ggest the e5position of so"e ca#se not espo#sed )y the go*ern"ent. Also, the phrase /"a5i"#" tolerance/ shows that the law applies to asse")lies against the go*ern"ent )eca#se they are )eing tolerated. As a content9)ased legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutin$ test. %espondentKs arg#e2 1. 0etitioners ha*e no standing )eca#se they ha*e not presented e*idence that they had )een =in-#red, arrested or detained )eca#se of the 0%,> and that =those arrested stand to )e charged with *iolating Batas 0a")ansa O3o.P 88? and other offenses.> 2. 3either B.0. 3o. 88? nor 0% is *oid on its face. 0etitioners cannot honestly clai" that the ti"e, place and "anner reg#lation e")odied in B.0. 3o. 88? *iolates the three9pronged test for s#ch a "eas#re, to wit2 @aA B.0. 3o. 88? is content9ne#tral, i.e., it has no reference to content of reg#lated speechG @)A B.0. 3o. 88? is narrowly tailored to ser*e a significant go*ern"ental interest, i.e., the interest cannot )e e6#ally well ser*ed )y a "eans that is less intr#si*e of free speech interestsG and @cA B.0. 3o. 88? lea*es open alternati*e channels for co""#nication of the infor"ation. 3. B.0. 3o. 88? is content9ne#tral as seen fro" the te5t of the law. !ection 7 re6#ires the state"ent of the p#)lic asse")lyKs ti"e, place and "anner of cond#ct. It entails traffic re9ro#ting to pre*ent gra*e p#)lic incon*enience and serio#s or #nd#e interference in the free flow of co""erce and trade. (#rther"ore, nothing in B.0. 3o. 88? a#thori&es the denial of a per"it on the )asis of a rallyKs progra" content or the state"ents of the spea:ers therein, e5cept #nder the constit#tional precept of the =clear and present danger test.> $he stat#s of B.0. 3o. 88? as a content9 ne#tral reg#lation has )een recogni&ed in 's"eNa *. o"elec. 4. Adiong *. o"elec held that B.0. 3o. 88? is a content9 ne#tral reg#lation of the ti"e, place and "anner of holding p#)lic asse")lies and the law passes the test for s#ch reg#lation, na"ely, these reg#lations need only a s#)stantial go*ern"ental interest to s#pport the". 7. !angalang *. Inter"ediate Appellate o#rtO9P held that a local chief e5ec#ti*e has the a#thority to e5ercise police power to "eet =the de"ands of the co""on good in ter"s of traffic decongestion and p#)lic con*enience.> (#rther"ore, the discretion gi*en to the "ayor is narrowly circ#"scri)ed )y !ections 7 @dA, and + @aA, @)A, @cA, @dA, @eA, 14 and 17 of the law. 6. $he standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. =lear and con*incing e*idence that the p#)lic asse")ly will create a clear and present danger to p#)lic order, p#)lic safety, p#)lic con*enience, p#)lic "orals or p#)lic health> and =i""inent and gra*e danger of a s#)stanti*e e*il> )oth e5press the "eaning of the =clear and present danger test.> 7. 0% is si"ply the responsi)le and -#dicio#s #se of "eans allowed )y e5isting laws and ordinances to protect p#)lic interest and restore p#)lic order. $h#s, it is not acc#rate to call it a new r#le )#t rather it is a "ore pro9acti*e and dyna"ic enforce"ent of e5isting laws, reg#lations and ordinances to pre*ent chaos in the streets. It does not replace the r#le of "a5i"#" tolerance in B.0. 3o. 88?. %espondent Mayor Hoselito Atien&a, for his part, s#)"itted in his o""ent that the petition in ,.%. 3o. 1+9848 sho#ld )e dis"issed on the gro#nd that %ep#)lic /ct 2o. 4%B3 gives the Dayor power to deny a permit independently of 1.#. 2o. !!3J that his denials of permits were under the =clear and present danger0 rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other peopleJ that 8. 1. L. .eyes v. 1agatsing,G%%I #rimicias v. >ugoso,G%&I and 8acinto v. ,/,G%$I have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring a permitJ that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rightsJ and that 1.#. 2o. !!3 is not a content:based regulation because it covers all rallies. $he petitions were ordered consolidated on (e)r#ary 1B, 2??+. After the s#)"ission of all the o""ents, the o#rt set the cases for oral arg#"ents on April B, 2??+,O1BP stating the principal iss#es, as follows2 San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 73 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 I((1)(" 1. 'n the constit#tionality of Batas 0a")ansa 3o. 88?, specifically !ections B, 7, +, 12 14@aA and 1B@aA thereof, and %ep#)lic Act 3o. 71+?2 @aA Are these content9ne#tral or content9)ased reg#lationsC @)A Are they *oid on gro#nds of o*er)readth or *ag#enessC @cA Do they constit#te prior restraintC @dA Are they #nd#e delegations of powers to MayorsC @eA Do they *iolate international h#"an rights treaties and the Jni*ersal Declaration of 1#"an %ightsC 2. 'n the constit#tionality and legality of the policy of ali)rated 0ree"pti*e %esponse @0%A2 @aA Is the policy *oid on its face or d#e to *ag#enessC @)A Is it *oid for lac: of p#)licationC @cA Is the policy of 0% *oid as applied to the rallies of !epte")er 2+ and 'cto)er B, 7 and +, 2??7C H).*" P)0909+,)2(K (0',*9,A /',,+0 8) ()29+1(.: /;'..),A)*. Their right as citiEens to engage in peaceful assembl$ and e%ercise the right of petition, as guaranteed b$ the Constitution, is directl$ affected b$ 9.6. Fo. 880 which re.uires a permit for all who would publicl$ assemble in the nationBs streets and parks. $hey ha*e, in fact, p#rposely engaged in p#)lic asse")lies witho#t the re6#ired per"its to press their clai" that no s#ch per"it can )e *alidly re6#ired witho#t *iolating the onstit#tional g#arantee. %espondents, on the other hand, ha*e challenged s#ch action as contrary to law and dispersed the p#)lic asse")lies held witho#t the per"it. I. &.P. 880 IS CONSTITUTIONAL $he first point to "ar: is that the right to peacea)ly asse")le and petition for redress of grie*ances is, together with freedo" of speech, of e5pression, and of the press, a right that en-oys pri"acy in the real" of constit#tional protection. (or these rights constit#te the *ery )asis of a f#nctional de"ocratic polity, witho#t which all the other rights wo#ld )e "eaningless and #nprotected. As stated in Hacinto *. A, the o#rt, as early as the onset of this cent#ry, in J.!. *. Ap#rado, already #pheld the right to asse")ly and petition, as follows2 There is no question as to the petitioners? rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organie or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the ,onstitution, partic#larly !ections B and 8 of the Bill of %ights, !ection 2@7A of Article I;, and !ection 4 of Article ;III. H#rispr#dence a)o#nds with hallowed prono#nce"ents defending and pro"oting the peopleKs e5ercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this cent#ry, this o#rt in J.!. *s. Ap#rado, already #pheld the right to asse")ly and petition and e*en went as far as to ac:nowledge2 = ;t is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mar< the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. 1ut if the prosecution be permitted to seie upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterie the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who too< part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. ;f instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.0 Again, in 0ri"icias *. (#goso, the ,ourt li<ewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and par<s. 3e5t, howe*er, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In 0ri"icias, this o#rt said2 The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognied and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. 1ut it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well: ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be in*urious to the equal en*oyment of others having equal rights, nor in*urious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign =police power,0 which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. $his so*ereign police power is e5ercised )y the go*ern"ent thro#gh its legislati*e )ranch )y the enact"ent of laws reg#lating those and other constit#tional and ci*il rights, and it "ay )e delegated to political s#)di*isions, s#ch as towns, "#nicipalities and cities )y a#thori&ing their legislati*e )odies called "#nicipal and city co#ncils enact ordinances for p#rpose. 1. It is th#s clear that the o#rt is called #pon to protect the e5ercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peacef#l asse")ly, arising fro" the denial of a per"it. $he onstit#tion is 6#ite e5plicit2 =3o law shall )e passed a)ridging the freedo" of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peacea)ly to asse")le and petition the ,o*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances.> (ree speech, li:e free press, "ay )e identified with the li)erty to disc#ss p#)licly and tr#thf#lly any "atter of p#)lic concern witho#t censorship or p#nish"ent. $here is to )e then no pre*io#s restraint on the co""#nication of *iews or s#)se6#ent lia)ility whether in li)el s#its, prosec#tion for sedition, or action for da"ages, or conte"pt proceedings #nless there )e a =clear and present danger of a s#)stanti*e e*il that Othe !tateP has a right to pre*ent.> >reedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. ;t is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. ;t is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. .*en prior to the 1947 onstit#tion, H#stice Malcol" had occasion to stress that it is a necessary conse6#ence of o#r rep#)lican instit#tions and co"ple"ents the right of free speech. $o paraphrase the opinion of H#stice %#tledge, spea:ing for the "a-ority of the A"erican !#pre"e o#rt in $ho"as *. ollins, it was not )y accident or coincidence that the rights to freedo" of speech and of the press were co#pled in a single g#arantee with the right of the people peacea)ly to asse")le and to petition the go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances. All these rights, while not identical, are insepara)le. In e*ery case, therefore, where there is a li"itation placed on the e5ercise of this right, the -#diciary is called #pon to e5a"ine the effects of the challenged go*ern"ental act#ation. $he sole -#stification for a li"itation on the e5ercise of this right, so f#nda"ental to the "aintenance of de"ocratic instit#tions, is the danger, of a character )oth gra*e and i""inent, of a serio#s e*il to p#)lic safety, p#)lic "orals, p#)lic health, or any other legiti"ate p#)lic interest. 2. 3owhere is the rationale that #nderlies the freedo" of e5pression and peacea)le asse")ly )etter e5pressed than in this e5cerpt fro" an opinion of H#stice (ran:f#rter2 =It "#st ne*er )e forgotten, howe*er, that the Bill of %ights was the child of the .nlighten"ent. Bac: of the g#aranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason )y all the peacef#l "eans for gaining access to the "ind. It was in order to a*ert force and e5plosions d#e to restrictions #pon rational "odes of co""#nication that the g#aranty of free speech was gi*en a genero#s scope. B#t #tterance in a conte5t of *iolence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and )eco"e part of an instr#"ent of force. !#ch #tterance was not "eant to )e sheltered )y the onstit#tion.> 8hat was rightf#lly stressed is the a)andon"ent of reason, the #tterance, whether *er)al or printed, )eing in a conte5t of *iolence. It "#st always )e re"e")ered that this right li:ewise pro*ides for a safety *al*e, allowing parties the opport#nity to gi*e *ent to their *iews, e*en if contrary to the pre*ailing cli"ate of opinion. (or if the peacef#l "eans of co""#nication cannot )e a*ailed of, resort to non9peacef#l "eans "ay )e the only alternati*e. 3or is this the sole reason for the e5pression of dissent. It "eans "ore than -#st the right to )e heard of the person who feels aggrie*ed or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its *al#e "ay lie in the fact that there "ay )e so"ething worth hearing fro" the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well7 defined limits. -hat is guaranteed is peaceable assembl$. Kne ma$ not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. $he onstit#tion frowns on disorder or t#"#lt attending a rally or asse")ly. %esort to force is r#led o#t and o#t)rea:s of *iolence to )e a*oided. $he #t"ost cal" tho#gh is not re6#ired. As pointed o#t in an early 0hilippine case, penned in 19?7 to )e precise, Jnited !tates *. Ap#rado2 =It is rather to )e e5pected that "ore or less disorder will "ar: the p#)lic asse")ly of the people to protest against grie*ances whether real or i"aginary, )eca#se on s#ch occasions feeling is always wro#ght to a high pitch of e5cite"ent, and the greater the grie*ance and the "ore intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a r#le, will )e the disciplinary control of the leaders o*er their irresponsi)le followers.> San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 74 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 It )ears repeating that for the constit#tional right to )e in*o:ed, rioto#s cond#ct, in-#ry to property, and acts of *andalis" "#st )e a*oided. $o gi*e free rein to oneKs destr#cti*e #rges is to call for conde"nation. It is to "a:e a "oc:ery of the high estate occ#pied )y intellect#al li)erty in o#r sche"e of *al#es. There can be no legal ob*ection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. $he 0hilippines is co""itted to the *iew e5pressed in the pl#rality opinion, of 1949 *intage of, H#stice %o)erts in 1ag#e *. I'2 =8hene*er the title of streets and par:s "ay rest, they ha*e i""e"orially )een held in tr#st for the #se of the p#)lic and, ti"e o#t of "ind, ha*e )een #sed for p#rposes of asse")ly, co""#nicating tho#ghts )etween citi&ens, and disc#ssing p#)lic 6#estions. !#ch #se of the streets and p#)lic places has, fro" ancient ti"es, )een a part of the pri*ileges, i""#nities, rights and li)erties of citi&ens. $he pri*ilege of a citi&en of the Jnited !tates to #se the streets and par:s for co""#nication of *iews on national 6#estions "ay )e reg#lated in the interest of allG it is not a)sol#te, )#t relati*e, and "#st )e e5ercised in s#)ordination to the general co"fort and con*enience, and in consonance with peace and good orderG )#t "#st not, in the g#ise of respondents, )e a)ridged or denied.> $he a)o*e e5cerpt was 6#oted with appro*al in 0ri"icias *. (#goso. 0ri"icias "ade e5plicit what was i"plicit in M#nicipality of a*ite *. %o-as, a 1917 decision, where this o#rt categorically affir"ed that pla&as or par:s and streets are o#tside the co""erce of "an and th#s n#llified a contract that leased 0la&a !oledad of plaintiff9"#nicipality. %eference was "ade to s#ch pla&a =)eing a pro"enade for p#)lic #se,> which certainly is not the only p#rpose that it co#ld ser*e. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a public par< that is the Luneta. B. 2either can there be any valid ob*ection to the use of the streets to the gates of the CS embassy, hardly two bloc<s away at the .oxas 1oulevard. #rimicias v. >ugoso has resolved any lur<ing doubt on the matter. ;n holding that the then Dayor >ugoso of the ,ity of Danila should grant a permit for a public meeting at #laa Diranda in Euiapo, this ,ourt categorically declared+ ='#r concl#sion finds s#pport in the decision in the case of 8illis o5 *. !tate of 3ew 1a"pshire, 412 J.!., 7+9. In that case, the stat#te of 3ew 1a"pshire 0.L. chap. 1B7, section 2, pro*iding that no parade or procession #pon any gro#nd a)#tting thereon, shall )e per"itted #nless a special license therefor shall first )e o)tained fro" the select"en of the town or fro" licensing co""ittee,K was constr#ed )y the !#pre"e o#rt of 3ew 1a"pshire as not conferring #pon the licensing )oard #nfettered discretion to ref#se to grant the license, and held *alid. And the !#pre"e o#rt of the Jnited !tates, in its decision @19B1A penned )y hief H#stice 1#ghes affir"ing the -#dg"ent of the !tate !#pre"e o#rt, held that Sa stat#te re6#iring persons #sing the p#)lic streets for a parade or procession to proc#re a special license therefor fro" the local a#thorities is not an #nconstit#tional a)ridg"ent of the rights of asse")ly or of freedo" of speech and press, where, as the stat#te is constr#ed )y the state co#rts, the licensing a#thorities are strictly li"ited, in the iss#ance of licenses, to a consideration of the ti"e, place, and "anner of the parade or procession, with a *iew to conser*ing the p#)lic con*enience and of affording an opport#nity to pro*ide proper policing, and are not in*ested with ar)itrary discretion to iss#e or ref#se license, W W W. =3or sho#ld the point "ade )y hief H#stice 1#ghes in a s#)se6#ent portion of the opinion )e ignored2 =i*il li)erties, as g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion, i"ply the e5istence of an organi&ed society "aintaining p#)lic order witho#t which li)erty itself wo#ld )e lost in the e5cesses of #nrestricted a)#ses. $he a#thority of a "#nicipality to i"pose reg#lations in order to ass#re the safety and con*enience of the people in the #se of p#)lic highways has ne*er )een regarded as inconsistent with ci*il li)erties )#t rather as one of the "eans of safeg#arding the good order #pon which they #lti"ately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection.0 5 5 5
+. 5 5 5 $he principle #nder A"erican doctrines was gi*en #tterance )y hief H#stice 1#ghes in these words2 =$he 6#estion, if the rights of free speech and peacea)le asse")ly are to )e preser*ed, is not as to the a#spices #nder which the "eeting is held )#t as to its p#rposeG not as to the relations of the spea:ers, )#t whether their #tterances transcend the )o#nds of the freedo" of speech which the onstit#tion protects.> $here co#ld )e danger to p#)lic peace and safety if s#ch a gathering were "ar:ed )y t#r)#lence. $hat wo#ld depri*e it of its peacef#l character. It is tr#e that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not de*oid of discretion in deter"ining whether or not a per"it wo#ld )e granted. It is not, howe*er, #nfettered discretion. 8hile pr#dence re6#ires that there )e a realistic appraisal not of what "ay possi)ly occ#r )#t of what "ay pro)a)ly occ#r, gi*en all the rele*ant circ#"stances, still the ass#"ption [ especially so where the asse")ly is sched#led for a specific p#)lic place [ is that the per"it "#st )e for the asse")ly )eing held there. $he e5ercise of s#ch a right, in the lang#age of H#stice %o)erts, spea:ing for the A"erican !#pre"e o#rt, is not to )e =a)ridged on the plea that it "ay )e e5ercised in so"e other place.> 5 5 5 8. 1y way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will ta<e place. ;f it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid ob*ections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. ;t is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. ;f he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper *udicial authority . >ree speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ran<ed in our scheme of constitutional values. ;t cannot be too strongly stressed that on the *udiciary, :: even more so than on the other departments V rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. 2o verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by 8ustice Holmes =as the sovereign prerogative of *udgment.0 2onetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of *ustice on the side of such rights, en*oying as they do precedence and primacy. 5 5 5. B.0. 3o. 88? was enacted after this o#rt rendered its decision in %eyes. $he pro*isions of B.0. 3o. 88? practically codify the r#ling in %eyes2 ;t is very clear, therefore, that 1.#. 2o. !!3 is 2AT /2 /1SALCT6 1/2 A> #C1L;, /SS6D1L;6S 1CT / .6ST.;,T;A2 TH/T S;D#L@ .69CL/T6S TH6 T;D6, #L/,6 /27 D/226. A> TH6 /SS6D1L;6S. This was adverted to in AsmeSa v. ,omelec,G&3I where the ,ourt referred to it as a =content:neutral0 regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies A fair and i"partial reading of B.0. 3o. 88? th#s readily shows that it refers to all :inds of p#)lic asse")liesO22P that wo#ld #se p#)lic places. $he reference to =lawf#l ca#se> does not "a:e it content9)ased )eca#se asse")lies really ha*e to )e for lawf#l ca#ses, otherwise they wo#ld not )e =peacea)le> and entitled to protection. 3either are the words =opinion,> =protesting> and =infl#encing> in the definition of p#)lic asse")ly content )ased, since they can refer to any s#)-ect. $he words =petitioning the go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances> co"e fro" the wording of the onstit#tion, so its #se cannot )e a*oided. (inally, "a5i"#" tolerance is for the protection and )enefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the e5pressions in the rally. (#rther"ore, TH6 #6.D;T can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. $his is a recogni&ed e5ception to the e5ercise of the right e*en #nder 0;) U,9>)2('. D)/.'2'09+, +< H1D', R9A;0( ',* 0;) I,0)2,'09+,'. C+>),',0 +, C9>9. ',* P+.909/'. R9A;0(. Jni*ersal Declaration of 1#"an %ights Article 2? 1. .*eryone has the right to freedo" of peacef#l asse")ly and association. 5 5 5 Article 29 1. .*eryone has d#ties to the co""#nity in which alone the free and f#ll de*elop"ent of his personality is possi)le. 2. In the e5ercise of his rights and freedo"s, e*eryone shall )e s#)-ect only to s#ch li"itations as are deter"ined )y law solely for the p#rpose of sec#ring d#e recognition and respect for the rights and freedo"s of others and of "eeting the -#st re6#ire"ents of "orality, p#)lic order and the general welfare in a de"ocratic society. 4. $hese rights and freedo"s "ay in no case )e e5ercised contrary to the p#rposes and principles of the Jnited 3ations. $he International o*enant on i*il and 0olitical %ights Article 19. 1. .*eryone shall ha*e the right to hold opinions witho#t interference. 2. .*eryone shall ha*e the right to freedo" of e5pressionG this right shall incl#de freedo" to see:, recei*e and i"part infor"ation and ideas of all :inds, regardless of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 75 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the for" of art, or thro#gh any other "edia of his choice. 4. $he e5ercise of the rights pro*ided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special d#ties and responsi)ilities. It "ay therefore )e s#)-ect to certain restrictions, )#t these shall only )e s#ch as are pro*ided )y law and are necessary2 @aA (or respect of the rights or rep#tations of othersG @)A (or the protection of national sec#rity or of p#)lic order @ordre p#)licA, or of p#)lic health or "orals. C+,02'2: 0+ E)0909+,)2K( /.'9D, THE LA= IS VER- CLEAR ',* 9( nowhere vague in its provisions. OP18.9/P *+)( ,+0 ;'>) 0+ 8) *)<9,)*. I0( +2*9,'2: D)',9,A 9( @)..G,+@,. 8e)sterKs Dictionary defines it, th#s2 p#)lic, n, 5 5 5 2a2 an organi&ed )ody of people 5 5 5 42 a gro#p of people disting#ished )y co""on interests or characteristics 5 5 5. Fot ever$ e%pression of opinion is a public assembl$. The law refers to 2rall$, demonstration, march, parade, procession or an$ other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place.3 "o it does not cover an$ and all kinds of gatherings. 2either is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils ,ongress has the right to prevent. $here is, li:ewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. /s to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard V the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. B'a). The reference to 2imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil3 in "ec. =+c, substantiall$ means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent 0a$or has the same power independentl$ under /epublic Act Fo. 51=0:2C< is thus not necessar$ to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued b$ the parties in their arguments. >inally, for those who cannot wait, Section %5 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom par<s where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time+ !ec. 17. (reedo" par:s. [ .*ery city and "#nicipality in the co#ntry shall within si5 "onths after the effecti*ity of this Act esta)lish or designate at least one s#ita)le =freedo" par:> or "all in their respecti*e -#risdictions which, as far as practica)le, shall )e centrally located within the po)lacion where de"onstrations and "eetings "ay )e held at any ti"e witho#t the need of any prior per"it. In the cities and "#nicipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respecti*e "ayors shall esta)lish the freedo" par:s within the period of si5 "onths fro" the effecti*ity this Act. $his )rings #p the point, howe*er, of co"pliance with this pro*ision. $he !olicitor ,eneral stated d#ring the oral arg#"ents that, to his :nowledge, only e)# ity has declared a freedo" par: [ (#ente 's"eNa. $hat of Manila, the !#n:en ,ardens, has since )een con*erted into a golf co#rse, he added. ;f this is so, the degree of observance of 1.#. 2o. !!3?s mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom par< within six months from its effectivity in %(!5, or &3 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been ta<en for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of %(!B.
,onsidering that the existence of such freedom par<s is an essential part of the law?s system of regulation of the people?s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the ,ourt is constrained to rule that after thirty '$3) days from the finality of this 7ecision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public par< or plaa of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section %5 of the law. >or without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. =/dvance notices0 should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings. II. THE CPR IS NULL # VOID $he o#rt now co"es to the "atter of the 0%. As stated earlier, the !olicitor ,eneral has conceded that the #se of the ter" sho#ld now )e discontin#ed, since it does not "ean anything other than the "a5i"#" tolerance policy set forth in B.0. 3o. 88?. $his is stated in the Affida*it of respondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary .d#ardo .r"ita, s#)"itted )y the !olicitor ,eneral, th#s2 /t any rate, the ,ourt rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by 1.#. 2o. !!3, ,#. serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. /ccordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the following+ !ec. 4. Definition of ter"s. [ (or p#rposes of this Act2 5 5 5 @cA =Ma5i"#" tolerance> "eans the highest degree of restraint that the "ilitary, police and other peace :eeping a#thorities shall o)ser*e d#ring a p#)lic asse")ly or in the dispersal of the sa"e. 5 5 5 !ec. 9. 3on9interference )y law enforce"ent a#thorities. [ Law enforce"ent agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a p#)lic asse")ly. 1owe*er, to ade6#ately ens#re p#)lic safety, a law enforce"ent contingent #nder the co""and of a responsi)le police officer "ay )e detailed and stationed in a place at least one h#ndred @1??A "eters away fro" the area of acti*ity ready to "aintain peace and order at all ti"es. !ec. 1?. 0olice assistance when re6#ested. [ It shall )e i"perati*e for law enforce"ent agencies, when their assistance is re6#ested )y the leaders or organi&ers, to perfor" their d#ties always "indf#l that their responsi)ility to pro*ide proper protection to those e5ercising their right peacea)ly to asse")le and the freedo" of e5pression is pri"ordial. $owards this end, law enforce"ent agencies shall o)ser*e the following g#idelines2 @aA Me")ers of the law enforce"ent contingent who deal with the de"onstrators shall )e in co"plete #nifor" with their na"eplates and #nits to which they )elong displayed pro"inently on the front and dorsal parts of their #nifor" and "#st o)ser*e the policy of ="a5i"#" tolerance> as herein definedG @)A $he "e")ers of the law enforce"ent contingent shall not carry any :ind of firear"s )#t "ay )e e6#ipped with )aton or riot stic:s, shields, crash hel"ets with *isor, gas "as:s, )oots or an:le high shoes with shin g#ardsG @cA $ear gas, s"o:e grenades, water cannons, or any si"ilar anti9riot de*ice shall not )e #sed #nless the p#)lic asse")ly is attended )y act#al *iolence or serio#s threats of *iolence, or deli)erate destr#ction of property. !ec. 11. Dispersal of p#)lic asse")ly with per"it. [ 3o p#)lic asse")ly with a per"it shall )e dispersed. 1owe*er, when an asse")ly )eco"es *iolent, the police "ay disperse s#ch p#)lic asse")ly as follows2 @aA At the first sign of i"pending *iolence, the ran:ing officer of the law enforce"ent contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the p#)lic asse")ly and as: the latter to pre*ent any possi)le dist#r)anceG @)A If act#al *iolence starts to a point where roc:s or other har"f#l o)-ects fro" the participants are thrown at the police or at the non9participants, or at any property ca#sing da"age to s#ch property, the ran:ing officer of the law enforce"ent contingent shall a#di)ly warn the participants that if the dist#r)ance persists, the p#)lic asse")ly will )e dispersedG @cA If the *iolence or dist#r)ance pre*ailing as stated in the preceding s#)paragraph sho#ld not stop or a)ate, the ran:ing officer of the law enforce"ent contingent shall a#di)ly iss#e a warning to the participants of the p#)lic asse")ly, and after allowing San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 76 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 a reasona)le period of ti"e to lapse, shall i""ediately order it to forthwith disperseG @dA 3o arrest of any leader, organi&er or participant shall also )e "ade d#ring the p#)lic asse")ly #nless he *iolates d#ring the asse")ly a law, stat#te, ordinance or any pro*ision of this Act. !#ch arrest shall )e go*erned )y Article 127 of the %e*ised 0enal ode, as a"endedG @dA Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or )reach of the peace d#ring the p#)lic asse")ly "ay )e peacef#lly dispersed. 5 5 5 !ec. 12. Dispersal of p#)lic asse")ly witho#t per"it. [ 8hen the p#)lic asse")ly is held witho#t a per"it where a per"it is re6#ired, the said p#)lic asse")ly "ay )e peacef#lly dispersed. !ec. 14. 0rohi)ited acts. [ $he following shall constit#te *iolations of the Act2 @eA ')str#cting, i"peding, disr#pting or otherwise denying the e5ercise of the right to peacef#l asse")lyG @fA $he #nnecessary firing of firear"s )y a "e")er of any law enforce"ent agency or any person to disperse the p#)lic asse")lyG @gA Acts descri)ed here#nder if co""itted within one h#ndred @1??A "eters fro" the area of acti*ity of the p#)lic asse")ly or on the occasion thereof2 5 5 5 B. the carrying of firear"s )y "e")ers of the law enforce"ent #nitG 7. the interfering with or intentionally dist#r)ing the holding of a p#)lic asse")ly )y the #se of a "otor *ehicle, its horns and lo#d so#nd syste"s. >urthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. ;n such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police = an application0 duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law. In s#", this o#rt reiterates ITS &ASIC POLIC- OF UPHOLDING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF OUR PEOPLE, ESPECIALL- FREEDOM OF E3PRESSION AND FREEDOM OF ASSEM&L-. In se*eral policy addresses, hief H#stice Arte"io <. 0angani)an has repeatedly *owed to #phold the li)erty of o#r people and to n#rt#re their prosperity. 1e said that =in cases in*ol*ing li)erty, the scales of -#stice sho#ld weigh hea*ily against the go*ern"ent and in fa*or of the poor, the oppressed, the "arginali&ed, the dispossessed and the wea:. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict f#nda"ental rights co"e to the co#rts with a hea*y pres#"ption against their *alidity. $hese laws and actions are s#)-ected to heightened scr#tiny.> SUMMAR-" 1. >or this reason, the so:called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struc< down as a dar<ness that shrouds freedom. ;t merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to *ustify abuses. 2. An the other hand, 1.#. 2o. !!3 cannot be condemned as unconstitutionalJ it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedomsJ it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. F'2 <2+D 8)9,A 9,(9*9+1(, OD'C9D1D 0+.)2',/)P 9( <+2 0;) 8),)<90 +< 2'..:9(0(, ,+0 0;) A+>)2,D),0. $. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally =permits0 is valid because it is sub*ect to the constitutionally:sound =clear and present danger0 standard. &'0'( P'D8',(' &.A. 880 A, A/0 E,(129,A T;) F2)) EC)2/9() &: T;) P)+E.) O< T;)92 R9A;0 P)'/)'8.: T+ A(()D8.) A,* P)0909+, T;) G+>)2,D),0 5A,*6 F+2 O0;)2 P12E+()( &) 90 ),'/0)* 8: 0;) &'0'(',A P'D8',(' 9, ()((9+, '(()D8.)*" S)/09+, 1. T90.) . R T;9( A/0 (;'.. 8) G,+@, '( OT;) P18.9/ A(()D8.: A/0 +< 1985.P S)/. 2. D)/.'2'09+, +< E+.9/:. R T;) /+,(090109+,'. 29A;0 +< 0;) E)+E.) E)'/)'8.: 0+ '(()D8.) ',* E)0909+, 0;) A+>)2,D),0 <+2 2)*2)(( +< A29)>',/)( 9( )((),09'. 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()) T;) 1,,)/)(('2: <929,A +< <92)'2D( 8: ' D)D8)2 +< ',: .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 'A),/: +2 ',: E)2(+, 0+ *9(E)2() 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.:? (<) A/0( 9, >9+.'09+, +< S)/09+, 10 ;)2)+<? (A) A/0( *)(/298)* ;)2)1,*)2 9< /+DD900)* @90;9, +,) ;1,*2)* (100) D)0)2( <2+D 0;) '2)' +< '/09>90: +< 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: +2 +, 0;) +//'(9+, 0;)2)+<" 1. 0;) /'22:9,A +< ' *)'*.: +2 +<<),(9>) @)'E+, +2 *)>9/) (1/; '( <92)'2D, E9..8+C, 8+D8, ',* 0;) .9G)? 2. 0;) /'22:9,A +< ' 8.'*)* @)'E+, ',* 0;) .9G)? San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 78 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 3. 0;) D'.9/9+1( 812,9,A +< ',: +8B)/0 9, 0;) (02))0( +2 0;+2+1A;<'2)(? 4. 0;) /'22:9,A +< <92)'2D( 8: D)D8)2( +< 0;) .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 1,90? 5. 0;) 9,0)2<)29,A @90; +2 9,0),09+,'..: *9(01289,A 0;) ;+.*9,A +< ' E18.9/ '(()D8.: 8: 0;) 1() +< ' D+0+2 >);9/.), 90( ;+2,( ',* .+1* (+1,* (:(0)D(. S)/. 14. P),'.09)(. R A,: E)2(+, <+1,* A19.0: ',* /+,>9/0)* +< ',: +< 0;) E2+;9890)* '/0( *)<9,)* 9, 0;) 9DD)*9'0).: E2)/)*9,A ()/09+, (;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* '( <+..+@(" (') >9+.'09+, +< (18E'2'A2'E; (') (;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* 8: 9DE29(+,D),0 +< +,) D+,0; ',* +,) *': 0+ (9C D+,0;(? (8) >9+.'09+,( +< (18E'2'A2'E;( (8), (/), (*), ()), (<), ',* 90)D 4, (18E'2'A2'E; (A) (;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* 8: 9DE29(+,D),0 +< (9C D+,0;( ',* +,) *': 0+ (9C :)'2(? (/) >9+.'09+, +< 90)D 1, (18E'2'A2'E; (A) (;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* 8: 9DE29(+,D),0 +< (9C D+,0;( ',* +,) *': 0+ (9C :)'2( @90;+10 E2)B1*9/) 0+ E2+()/109+, 1,*)2 P2)(9*),09'. D)/2)) N+. 18%%? (*) >9+.'09+,( +< 90)D 2, 90)D 3, +2 90)D 5 +< (18E'2'A2'E; (A) (;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* 8: 9DE29(+,D),0 +< +,) *': 0+ 0;920: *':(. S)/. 15. F2))*+D E'2G(. R E>)2: /90: ',* D1,9/9E'.90: 9, 0;) /+1,02: (;'.. @90;9, (9C D+,0;( '<0)2 0;) )<<)/09>90: +< 0;9( A/0 )(0'8.9(; +2 *)(9A,'0) '0 .)'(0 +,) (190'8.) O<2))*+D E'2GP +2 D'.. 9, 0;)92 2)(E)/09>) B129(*9/09+,( @;9/;, '( <'2 '( E2'/09/'8.), (;'.. 8) /),02'..: .+/'0)* @90;9, 0;) E+8.'/9+, @;)2) *)D+,(02'09+,( ',* D))09,A( D': 8) ;).* '0 ',: 09D) @90;+10 0;) ,))* +< ',: E29+2 E)2D90. I, 0;) /909)( ',* D1,9/9E'.909)( +< M)02+E+.90', M',9.', 0;) 2)(E)/09>) D':+2( (;'.. )(0'8.9(; 0;) <2))*+D E'2G( @90;9, 0;) E)29+* +< (9C D+,0;( <2+D 0;) )<<)/09>90: 0;9( A/0. S)/. 1%. C+,(090109+,'.90:.NS;+1.* ',: E2+>9(9+, +< 0;9( A/0 8) *)/.'2)* 9,>'.9* +2 1,/+,(090109+,'., 0;) >'.9*90: +2 /+,(090109+,'.90: +< 0;) +0;)2 E2+>9(9+,( (;'.. ,+0 8) '<<)/0)* 0;)2)8:. S)/. 17. R)E)'.9,A /.'1(). R A.. .'@(, *)/2))(, .)00)2( +< 9,(021/09+,(, 2)(+.109+,(, +2*)2(, +2*9,',/)( +2 E'20( 0;)2)+< @;9/; '2) 9,/+,(9(0),0 @90; 0;) E2+>9(9+,( +< 0;9( A/0 '2) ;)2)8: 2)E)'.)*, 'D),*)*, +2 D+*9<9)* '//+2*9,A.:. S)/. 18. E<<)/09>90:. R T;9( A/0 (;'.. 0'G) )<<)/0 1E+, 90( 'EE2+>'.. AEE2+>)*, O/0+8)2 22, 1985. G2)A+29+ AA.9E': >(. !1', R19F G.R. N+. L45459, M'2/; 13, 1937, L'12)., !. F'/0(" 9s#pra9 I((1)" 8hether or not there was a *iolation of the freedo" of religionC H).*" 3o. $he prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. 8itho#t the necessity of ad*erting to the historical )ac:gro#nd of this principle in o#r co#ntry, it is s#fficient to say that o#r history, not to spea: of the history of "an:ind, has ta#ght #s that the #nion of ch#rch and state is pre-#dicial to )oth, for occasions "ight arise when the state will #se the ch#rch, and the ch#rch the state, as a weapon in the f#rtherance of their respecti*e ends and ai"s. $he Malolos onstit#tion recogni&ed this principle of separation of ch#rch and state in the early stages of o#r constit#tional de*elop"entG it was inserted in the $reaty of 0aris )etween the Jnited !tates and !pain of Dece")er 1?, 1898, reiterated in 0resident McLinleyIs Instr#ctions to the 0hilippine o""ission, reaffir"ed in the 0hilippine Bill of 19?2 and in the A#tono"y Act of A#g#st 29, 191+, and finally e")odied in the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines as the s#pre"e e5pression of the (ilipino 0eople. It is al"ost trite to say now that in this co#ntry we en-oy )oth religio#s and ci*il freedo". All the officers of the ,o*ern"ent, fro" the highest to the lowest, in ta:ing their oath to s#pport and defend the onstit#tion, )ind the"sel*es to recogni&e and respect the constit#tional g#arantee of religio#s freedo", with its inherent li"itations and recogni&ed i"plications. ;t should be stated that what is guaranteed by our ,onstitution is .6L;9;ACS L;16.T@, not mere .6L;9;ACS TAL6./T;A2. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. .eligion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his ,reator is recognied. And, in so far as it instills into the "inds the p#rest principles of "orality, its infl#ence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the >ilipino people, in the preamble of their ,onstitution, implored -the aid of 7ivine #rovidence, in order to esta)lish a go*ern"ent that shall e")ody their ideals, conser*e and de*elop the patri"ony of the nation, pro"ote the general welfare, and sec#re to the"sel*es and their posterity the )lessings of independence #nder a regi"e of -#stice, li)erty and de"ocracy,/ they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. $he ele*ating infl#ence of religion in h#"an society is recogni&ed here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscri"inately accorded to religio#s sects and deno"inations. '#r onstit#tion and laws e5e"pt fro" ta5ation properties de*oted e5cl#si*ely to religio#s p#rposes @sec. 1B, s#)sec. 4, Art. <I, onstit#tion of the 0hilippines and sec. 1, s#)sec. 'rdinance appended theretoG Assess"ent Law, sec. 4BB, par OcP, Ad". odeA sectarian aid is not prohi)ited when a priest, preacher, "inister or other religio#s teacher or dignitary as s#ch is assigned to the ar"ed forces or to any penal instit#tion, orphanage or leprosari#" @sec. 14, s#)sec. 4 Art. <I, onstit#tion of the 0hilippinesA. 'ptional religio#s instr#ction in the p#)lic schools is )y constit#tional "andate allowed @sec. 7, Art. ;III, onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad. odeA. $h#rsday and (riday of 1oly 8ee:, $han:sgi*ing Day, hrist"as Day, and !#ndays are "ade legal holidays @sec. 29, Ad". odeA )eca#se of the sec#lar idea that their o)ser*ance is cond#ci*e to )eneficial "oral res#lts. $he law allows di*orce )#t p#nishes polyga"y and )iga"yG and certain cri"es against religio#s worship are considered cri"es against the f#nda"ental laws of the state @see arts. 142 and 144, %e*ised 0enal odeA. Act 3o. B?72 conte"plates no religio#s p#rpose in *iew. 8hat it gi*es the Director of 0osts is the discretionary power to deter"ine when the iss#ance of special postage sta"ps wo#ld )e /ad*antageo#s to the ,o*ern"ent./ 'f co#rse, the phrase /ad*antageo#s to the ,o*ern"ent/ does not a#thori&e the *iolation of the onstit#tion. It does not a#thori&e the appropriation, #se or application of p#)lic "oney or property for the #se, )enefit or s#pport of a partic#lar sect or ch#rch. In the present case, howe*er, the iss#ance of the postage sta"ps in 6#estion )y the Director of 0osts and the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the .oman ,atholic ,hurch. 2or were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. 'n the contrary, it appears fro" the letter of the Director of 0osts of H#ne 7, 194+, incorporated on page 2 of the petitionerIs co"plaint, that the only p#rpose in iss#ing and selling the sta"ps was /to ad*ertise the 0hilippines and attract "ore to#rists to this co#ntry./ $he officials concerned "erely too: ad*antage of an e*ent considered of international i"portance /to gi*e p#)licity to the 0hilippines and its people/. It is significant to note that the sta"ps as act#ally designed and printed, instead of showing a atholic h#rch chalice as originally planned, contains a "ap of the 0hilippines and the location of the ity of Manila, and an inscription as follows2 /!eat ;;;III International .#charistic ongress, (e). 497, 1947./ 8hat is e"phasi&ed is not the .#charistic ongress itself )#t Manila, the capital of the 0hilippines, as the seat of that congress. It is o)*io#s that while the iss#ance and sale of the sta"ps in 6#estion "ay )e said to )e insepara)ly lin:ed with an e*ent of a religio#s character, the res#lting propaganda, if any, recei*ed )y the %o"an atholic h#rch, was not the ai" and p#rpose of the ,o*ern"ent. 8e are of the opinion that the ,o*ern"ent sho#ld not )e e")arrassed in its acti*ities si"ply )eca#se of incidental res#lts, "ore or less religio#s in character, if the p#rpose had in *iew is one which co#ld legiti"ately )e #nderta:en )y appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. A,*2)( G'2/)(, )0. '., >(. H+,. N1D)29',+ G. E(0),F+, )0. '.. G.R. N+. L53487, M': 25, 1981,AM19,+, !. FACTS" $he )arangay co#ncil of <alencia, 'r"oc ity issued four '") resolutions regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Micente >errer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. 'ne of the resol#tions f#rther pro*ided that the )arangay co#ncil, in accordance with the practice in .astern Leyte, o#ncil"an $o"as a)atingan, the Chairman or her"ano "ayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of "an Gicente Lerrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one $ear and until the election of his successor as chairman of the ne%t feast da$. "everal da$s after the fiesta or on April 11, 145=, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Lather Ksmea allegedl$ uttered defamator$ remarks against the baranga$ captain, 0anuel C. Geloso, apparentl$ in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Geloso to file against Lather Ksmea in the cit$ court of Krmoc Cit$ a charge for grave oral defamation. Lather Ksmea retaliated b$ filing administrative complaints against Geloso on the grounds of immoralit$, grave abuse of authorit$, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law. 0eanwhile, the image of "an Gicente Lerrer remained in the Catholic church of Galencia. 9ecause Lather Ksmea did not accede to the re.uest of Cabatingan to have custod$ of the image and maliciousl$ ignored the council@s resolutions, the council enacted another resolution, authoriEing the hiring of a law$er to file a replevin case against Lather Ksmea for the recover$ of the image. An 8une %", %(4B, the barangay council passed another resolution, appointing Meloso as its representative in the replevin case. The replevin case was filed in the cit$ court of Krmoc Cit$ against Lather Ksmea and 9ishop Cipriano !rgel. After the )arangay co#ncil had posted a cash )ond of eight h#ndred pesos, (ather 's"ea San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 79 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 t#rned o*er the i"age to the co#ncil. ln his answer to the co"plaint for reple*in, he assailed the constit#tionality of the said resol#tions li)rary Later, he and three other persons, Andres ,arces, a "e")er of the Aglipayan h#rch, and two atholic lay"en, Hes#s .d#llantes and 3icetas Dagar, filed against the )arangay co#ncil and its "e")ers @e5cl#ding two "e")ersA a co"plaint in the o#rt of (irst Instance at 'r"oc ity, praying for the ann#l"ent of the said resol#tions. $he lower co#rt dis"issed the co"plaint. lt #pheld the *alidity of the resol#tions. ISSUE" 8hether the resol#tions contra*ene !ection 7 of Article III of the onstit#tion. HELD" NO. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Micente >errer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents . 'ne of the highlights of the fiesta was the "ass. onse6#ently, the i"age of the patron saint had to )e placed in the ch#rch when the "ass was cele)rated. If there is nothing #nconstit#tional or illegal in holding a fiesta and ha*ing a patron saint for the )arrio, then any acti*ity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint @s#ch as the ac6#isition and display of his i"ageA cannot )e )randed as illegal. /s noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio:religious affair. ;ts celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses. $he )arangay co#ncil designated a lay"an as the c#stodian of the wooden i"age in order to forestall any s#spicion that it is fa*oring the atholic ch#rch. / more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a laymanFs custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas. $he contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affida*its. 0etitioner ,arces swore that the said resol#tions favored the Catholic church. 'n the other hand, petitioners Dagar and .d#llantes swore that the resol#tions pre#udiced the Catholics )eca#se they co#ld see the i"age in the ch#rch only once a year or d#ring the fiesta. The ,ourt finds that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saintFs image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if >ather Asmea had ta<en the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of ',+0;)2 9D'A) of San Micente >errer to be installed in his church. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. >ather Asmea claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. I< 90 /;++()( 0+ /;',A) 90( D9,* ',* *)/9*)( 0+ A9>) 0;) 9D'A) 0+ 0;) C'0;+.9/ /;12/; 0;'0 '/09+, @+1.* ,+0 >9+.'0) 0;) C+,(090109+, 8)/'1() 0;) 9D'A) @'( '/M192)* @90; private funds ',* 9( 90( E29>'0) E2+E)20:. $he co#ncil has the right to ta:e "eas#res to reco*er possession of the i"age )y enacting %esol#tions 3os. 1? and 12. 2ot every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. ;n AA.9E': >(. R19F, B" #hil. &3%, what was involved was /ct 2o. "35& which appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of postage sta"ps with new designs. Jnder the law, the Director of 0osts, with the appro*al of the Depart"ent 1ead and the 0resident of the 0hilippines, iss#ed in 194+ postage sta"ps to co""e"orate the cele)ration in Manila of the 44rd International .#charistic ongress sponsored )y the atholic h#rch. The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the #hilippines. The design of the stamps showed a map of the #hilippines and nothing about the ,atholic ,hurch. 2o religious purpose was intended. $he instant case is easily disting#isha)le fro" GerEosa vs. LernandeE, B9 0hil., +27 and 77 0hil. 4?7, where a religio#s )rotherhood, La Archicofradia del !antisi"o !acra"ento, organi&ed for the p#rpose of raising f#nds to "eet the e5penses for the ann#al fiesta in honor of the Most 1oly !acra"ent and the <irgin Lady of ,#adal#pe, was held acco#nta)le for the f#nds which it held as tr#stee. (inding that the petitioners ha*e no ca#se of action for the ann#l"ent of the )arangay resol#tions, the lower co#rtIs -#dg"ent dis"issing their a"ended petition is affir"ed. AD)29/', &98.) S+/9)0: >(. C90: +< M',9.' G.R. N+. L9%37, AE29. 30, 1957, F).9C, !. F'/0(" 0laintiff9appellant is a foreign, non9stoc:, non9profit, religio#s, "issionary corporation d#ly registered and doing )#siness in the 0hilippines. In the co#rse of its "inistry, plaintiffIs 0hilippine agency has )een distri)#ting and selling )i)les andRor gospel portions thereof @e5cept d#ring the Hapanese occ#pationA thro#gho#t the 0hilippines and translating the sa"e into se*eral 0hilippine dialects. 'n May 29 1974, the acting ity $reas#rer of the ity of Manila infor"ed plaintiff that it was cond#cting the )#siness of general "erchandise since 3o*e")er, 19B7, witho#t pro*iding itself with the necessary MayorIs per"it and "#nicipal license. 0laintiff protested against this re6#ire"ent, )#t the ity $reas#rer de"anded that plaintiff deposit and pay the s#" of 07, 891.B7 which it paid #nder protest. A s#it was )ro#ght )y plaintiff against defendant. I((1)" 8'3 the imposition of the fees constit#te ', 9DE'92D),0 of the free7e%ercise of religion of the petitioner as imposed on its sale and distribution of bibles. H).*" -ES. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and en*oyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. /ny restraint of such right can only be *ustified li<e other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. The fees under Ardinance 2o. &5&(, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and en*oyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. $here is a difference when the ta5 is i"posed #pon the inco"e or property of the religio#s organi&ation and one i"posed against the acts of disse"inating religio#s infor"ation. $o ta5 the latter is i"pair the free e5ercise and en-oy"ent of its religio#s profession and worship as well as its rights of disse"ination of religio#s )eliefs regardless of the a"o#nt of s#ch fees. /s to Ardinance 2o. $333 requiring the obtention of a mayor?s permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 80 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 occupations enumerated therein, we do not find that it imposes any charge upon the en*oyment of a right granted by the ,onstitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. Ardinance 2o. $333 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. B#t as Ardinance 2o. &5&( of the ,ity of Danila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff:appellant and defendant: appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiffFs right to the free exercise and en*oyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, 8e find that 'rdinance 3o. 4???, as a"ended, is also inapplica)le to said )#siness, trade or occ#pation of the plaintiff. /In the case of M#rdoc: *s. 0ennsyl*ania, it was held that an ordinance re6#iring that a license )e o)tained )efore a person co#ld can*ass or solicit orders for goods, paintings, pict#res, wares or "erchandise cannot )e "ade to apply to "e")ers of Heho*ahIs 8itnesses who went a)o#t fro" door to door distri)#ting literat#re and soliciting people to Ip#rchaseI certain religio#s )oo:s and pa"phlets, all p#)lished )y the 8atch $ower Bi)le Y $ract !ociety. $he IpriceI of the )oo:s was twenty9fi*e cents each, the IpriceI of the pa"phlets fi*e cents each. It was shown that in "a:ing the solicitations there was a re6#est for additional Icontri)#tionI of twenty9 fi*e cents each for the )oo:s and fi*e cents each for the pa"phlets. Lesser s#" were accepted, howe*er, and )oo:s were e*en donated in case interested persons were witho#t f#nds. An the above facts the Supreme ,ourt held that it could not be said that petitioners were engaged in commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be described as embraced in the occupation of selling boo<s and pamphlets. $hen the o#rt contin#ed2 FWe do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government. !ee ,ros-ean *s. A"erican 0ress o., 297 J.!., 244, 27?, 8? L. ed. ++?, ++8, 7+ !. t. BBB. 8e ha*e here so"ething 6#ite different, for e5a"ple, fro" a ta5 on the inco"e of one who engages in religio#s acti*ities or a ta5 on property #sed or e"ployed in connection with those acti*ities. It is one thing to i"pose a ta5 on the inco"e or property of a preacher. It is 6#ite another thing to e5act a ta5 fro" hi" for the pri*ilege of deli*ering a ser"on. $he ta5 i"posed )y the ity of Heannette is a flat license ta5, pay"ent of which is a condition of the e5ercise of these constit#tional pri*ileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its en*oyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can ma<e its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all Fthose who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . . ;t is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. 1ut that is to disregard the nature of this tax. ;t is a license tax : a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the 1ill of .ights . . . The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this ,ourt has repeatedly struc< down. . . . It is not a no"inal fee i"posed as a reg#latory "eas#re to defray the e5penses of policing the acti*ities in 6#estion. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license ta5 le*ied and collected as a condition to the p#rs#it of acti*ities whose en-oy"ent is g#aranteed )y the constit#tional li)erties of press and religion and ine*ita)ly tends to s#ppress their e5ercise. $hat is al"ost #nifor"ly recogni&ed as the inherent *ice and e*il of this flat license ta5.I 2or could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an official or manager even if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh *s. !tate of Ala)a"a @42+ J.!. 7?1A or )y the Jnited !tates itself as held in the case of $#c:er *s. $e5as @42+ J.!. 717A. In the for"er case the !#pre"e o#rt e5pressed the opinion that the right to en-oy freedo" of the press and religion occ#pies a preferred position as against the constit#tional right of property owners. IA.)(9' ,9 C29(0+ >(. CA G.R. N+. 119%73, !1.: 2%, 199%, P1,+, !. F'/0(" 0etitioner Iglesia ni risto, a d#ly organi&ed religio#s organi&ation, has a tele*ision progra" entitled /Ang Iglesia ni risto/ aired on hannel 2 e*ery !at#rday and on hannel 14 e*ery !#nday. $he progra" presents and propagates petitionerIs religio#s )eliefs, doctrines and practices often ti"es in co"parati*e st#dies with other religions. 0etitioner s#)"itted to the respondent Board of %e*iew for Mo*ing 0ict#res and $ele*ision the <$% tapes of its $< progra" !eries 3os. 11+, 119, 121 and 128. The 9oard classified the series as N or not for public viewing on the ground that the$ offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is e%pressl$ prohibited b$ law. In its first co#rse of action against respondent Board, I3 appealed to the 'ffice of the 0resident where it was fa*ored and then again, )efore the V#e&on ity %$ alleging that the respondent Board acted witho#t -#risdiction or with gra*e a)#se of discretion in re6#iring petitioner to s#)"it the <$% tapes of its $< progra" and in 59rating the", where it I3 again won )#t was directed to refrain fro" attac:ing other religions. $he o#rt of Appeals re*ersed the sa"e. I((1)" 1. 8hether the M$%B has -#risdiction to re*iew petitionerIs $< progra" entitled /Ang Iglesia ni ristoC 2. 8hether the action of respondent M$%B 59rating petitionerIs $< 0rogra" !eries 3os. 117, 119, and 121 sho#ld )e s#stainedC H).*" 1. -ES. The right to religious profession and worship has a TWA: >AL7 /S#6,T, vi ., '%) freedom to believe and '&) freedom to act on oneFs beliefs. The =first is absolute0 as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The =second is sub*ect to regulation0 where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. We thus re*ect petitionerFs postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent 1oard. ;ts public broadcast on TM of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The ,ourt reiterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. / laisse faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the ,ourt against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in o#r shore, the )loodiest and )itterest wars fo#ght )y "en were ca#sed )y irreconcila)le religio#s differences. '#r co#ntry is still not safe fro" the rec#rrence of this st#ltifying strife considering o#r warring religio#s )eliefs and the fanaticis" with which so"e of #s cling and claw to these )eliefs. .*en now, we ha*e yet to settle the near cent#ry old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which ha*e )een no#rished )y the "istr#st and "is#nderstanding )etween o#r hristian and M#sli" )rothers and sisters. $he )ewildering rise of weird religio#s c#lts espo#sing *iolence as an article of faith also pro*es the wisdo" of o#r r#le re-ecting a strict let alone policy on the e5ercise of religion. (or s#re, we shall contin#e to s#)-ect any act pinching the space for the free e5ercise of religion to a heightened scr#tiny )#t we shall not lea*e its rational e5ercise to the irrationality of "an. >or when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still. 2. NO. (irst, The evidence shows that the respondent 1oard x:rated petitioners TM series for -attac<ing- either religions, especially the ,atholic church. /n examination of the evidence will show that the so:called -attac<s- are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. $he *ideotapes were not *iewed )y the respondent co#rt as they were not presented as e*idence. Det they were considered )y the respondent co#rt as indecent, contrary to law and good c#sto"s, hence, can )e prohi)ited fro" p#)lic *iewing #nder section 4@cA of 0D 198+. This ruling clearly suppresses petitionerFs freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. !econd, e*en a sideglance at section 4 of 0D 3o. 198+ will re*eal that, the gro#nd -attac<s against another religion- in 59rating the religio#s progra" of petitioner, is not among the grounds to *ustify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitionerFs television program. The ground attack against another religion was merel$ added b$ the respondent 9oard in its /ules. This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoar$ doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot e%pand the letter and spirit of the law the$ seek to enforce. $hird, in 59rating the $< progra" of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. 'n American 9ible "ociet$ v. Cit$ of 0anila, this Court held? -The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and en*oyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. /ny restraint of such right can be *ustified li<e other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is aclear and present danger of an$ substantive evil which the "tate has the right to prevent. In <ictoriano *s. .li&alde %ope 8or:ers Jnion, we f#rther r#led that /. . . it is only where it is #na*oida)ly necessary to pre*ent ani""ediate and gra*e danger to the sec#rity and welfare of the co""#nity that infringe"ent of religio#s freedo" "ay )e -#stified, and only to the s"allest e5tent necessary to a*oid the danger./ (astl$, the records show that the decision of the respondent 9oard, affirmed b$ the respondent appellate court, is completel$ bereft of findings of facts to #ustif$ the conclusion that the sub#ect video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the t$pe of harm the tapes will bring about especiall$ the gravit$ and imminence of the threatened harm. #rior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be *ustified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has ta<en the life of a reality already on ground. E&RALINAG )0. '.. >(. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CE&U G.R N+. 95770, M'2/; 1, 1993 FACTS" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 81 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 All the petitioners in these two cases were e%pelled from their classes b$ the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as re.uired b$ /epublic Act Fo. 12=I and b$ 8epartment Krder Fo. 8 of 81C" making the flag ceremon$ compulsor$ in all educational institutions. Heho*ahIs 8itnesses ad"ittedly teach their children not to sal#te the flag, sing the national anthe", and recite the patriotic pledge for they )elie*e that those are /acts of worship or religious devotion which the$ cannot conscientiousl$ give . . . to an$one or an$thing e%cept Aod. The$ feel bound b$ the 9ible@s command to guard ourselves from idols * 1 >ohn I?21. The$ consider the flag as an image or idol representing the "tate. $hey thin: the action of the local a#thorities in co"pelling the flag sal#te and pledge transcends constit#tional li"itations on the !tateIs power and in*ades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the onstit#tion protect against official control 1owe*er, the petitioners herein ha*e not raised in iss#e the constit#tionality of the a)o*e pro*ision of the new Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987. $hey ha*e targeted only %ep#)lic Act 3o. 12+7 and the i"ple"enting orders of the D.!. ISSUE" 8hether or not the e5p#lsion of st#dents )y reason of not #pholding the flag sal#te law is #nconstit#tionalC HELD" D.!. $he 4?9year old decision of ! in ,erona #pholding the flag sal#te law and appro*ing the e5p#lsion of st#dents who ref#se to o)ey it, is not lightly to )e trifled with. It is so"ewhat ironic howe*er, that after the ,erona r#ling had recei*ed legislati*e cachet )y its in corporation in the Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987, the present o#rt )elie*es that the ti"e has co"e to re9 e5a"ine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from oneFs *ob or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of >ilipinos who cut their teeth on the 1ill of .ights which guarantees their rights to free speech NN and the free exercise of religious profession and worship @!ec. 7, Article III, 1987 onstit#tionG Article I<, !ection 8, 1974 onstit#tionG Article III, !ection 1O7P, 1947 onstit#tionA. .eligious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his ,reator @hief H#stice .nri6#e M. (ernandoIs separate opinion in ,er"an *s. Barangan, 147 !%A 71B, 74?9741A. The right to religious profession and worship has a TWA:>AL7 /S#6,T, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on oneFs belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is sub*ect to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare The sole *ustification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom +according to the late Chief >ustice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aerman vs. 9arangan, 1;I "C/A I1C, I15, is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right 'and duty) to prevent.- /bsent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not *ustified. The S, is not persuaded that by exempting the 8ehovahFs Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a -small portion of the school population- will sha<e up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation -untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes- @,erona *s. !ec. of .d#cation, 1?+ 0hil. 2, 2B,. /fter all, what the petitioners see< only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the ,onstitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, #hilippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of -patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citienship, and moral and spiritual values @!ec. 4O2P, Art. ;I<, 1987 onstit#tionA as part of the c#rric#la. 6xpelling or banning the petitioners from #hilippine schools will bring about the very situation that this ,ourt had feared in 9erona. >orcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities. As Mr. H#stice Hac:son re"ar:ed in 8est <irginia *s. Barnette, 419 J.!. +2B @19B4A2 . . . $o )elie*e that patriotis" will not flo#rish if patriotic cere"onies are *ol#ntary and spontaneo#s instead of a co"p#lsory ro#tine is to "a:e an #nflattering esti"ate of the appeal of o#r instit#tions to free "inds. . . . 8hen they Odi*ersityP are so har"less to others or to the !tate as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. B#t freedo" to differ is not li"ited to things that do not "atter "#ch. $hat wo#ld )e a "ere shadow of freedo". $he test of its s#)stance is the right to differ as to things that to#ch the heart of the e5isting order. (#rther"ore, let it )e noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . . L assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion L is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. / desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. @Meyer *s. 3e)ras:a, 2+2 J.!. 49?, +7 L. ed. 1?B2, 1?B+.A Doreover, the expulsion of members of 8ehovahFs Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as #hilippine citiens, under the %(!4 ,onstitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to -protect and promote the right of all citiens to quality education . . . and to ma<e such education accessible to all 'Sec. %, /rt. H;M). S, holds that a similar exemption may be accorded to the 8ehovahFs Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however -biarre- those beliefs may seem to others. 2evertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises . It is appropriate to recall the Hapanese occ#pation of o#r co#ntry in 19B2919BB when e*ery (ilipino, regardless of religio#s pers#asion, in fear of the in*ader, sal#ted the Hapanese flag and )owed )efore e*ery Hapanese soldier. 0erhaps, if petitioners had li*ed thro#gh that dar: period of o#r history, they wo#ld not 6#i))le now a)o#t sal#ting the 0hilippine flag. (or when li)eration ca"e in 19BB and o#r own flag was pro#dly hoisted aloft again, it was a )ea#tif#l sight to )ehold that "ade o#r hearts po#nd with pride and -oy o*er the newly9regained freedo" and so*ereignty of o#r nation. Altho#gh the o#rt #pholds in this decision the petitionersI right #nder o#r onstit#tion to ref#se to sal#te the 0hilippine flag on acco#nt of their religio#s )eliefs, we hope, ne*ertheless, that another foreign in*asion of o#r co#ntry will not )e necessary in order for o#r co#ntry"en to appreciate and cherish the 0hilippine flag. E(02'*' >(. E(/29012 A.M. N+. P021%51, !1,) 22, 200% (NOTE" S029/0 ,)102'. 8),)>+.),/) *is9]9*is S029/0 S)E'2'09+,H S029/0 N)102'.90:) FACTS" In a sworn9letter co"plaint dated H#ly 27, 2???, co"plainant Ale-andro .strada re6#ested H#dge Hose (. aoi)es, Hr., presiding -#dge of Branch 274, %egional $rial o#rt of Las 0iNas ity, for an in*estigation of respondent !oledad .scritor, co#rt interpreter in said co#rt, for li*ing with a "an not her h#s)and, and ha*ing )orne a child within this li*e9in arrange"ent. .strada )elie*es that .scritor is co""itting an i""oral act that tarnishes the i"age of the co#rt, th#s she sho#ld not )e allowed to re"ain e"ployed therein as it "ight appear that the co#rt condones her act.O2P onse6#ently, respondent was charged with co""itting =disgracef#l and i""oral cond#ct> #nder Boo: <, $itle I, hapter <I, !ec. B+@)A@7A of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode. /espondent 1scritor testified that when she entered the #udiciar$ in 1444, she was alread$ a widow, her husband having died in 1448. "he admitted that she started living with (uciano Ruilapio, >r. without the benefit of marriage more than twent$ $ears ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. "he also admitted that she and Ruilapio have a son. 9ut as a member of the religious sect known as the >ehovahBs -itnesses and the -atch Tower and 9ible Tract "ociet$, respondent asserted that their con#ugal arrangement is in conformit$ with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. 'n fact, after ten $ears of living together, she e%ecuted on >ul$ 28, 1441, a 28eclaration of 6ledging Laithfulness.3 Lor >ehovahBs -itnesses, the 8eclaration allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned b$ their spouses to enter into marital relations . The 8eclaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world e%cept in countries where divorce is allowed. As laid o#t )y the tenets of their faith, the 8ehovah?s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities? approval of the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Knl$ couples who have been baptiEed and in good standing ma$ e%ecute the 8eclaration, which re.uires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective spousesB commission of adulter$ are investigated before the declarations are e%ecuted. 1scritor and RuilapioBs declarations were e%ecuted in the usual and approved form prescribed b$ the >ehovahBs -itnesses, approved b$ elders of the congregation where the declarations were e%ecuted, and recorded in the -atch Tower Central Kffice. 0oreover, the >ehovahBs congregation believes that once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the validit$ of the declarations ceases, and the couple should legaliEe their union. In .scritorKs case, altho#gh she was widowed in 1998, there)y lifting the legal i"pedi"ent to "arry on her part, her "ate was still not capacitated to re"arry. $h#s, their declarations re"ained *alid. 'n sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the con#ugal arrangement between 1scritor and Ruilapio and the$ remain members in good standing in the congregation. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 82 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ISSUE" 8hether or not the Ad"inistrati*e case herein sho#ld )e dis"issedC HELD" D.!. In o#r decision dated A#g#st B, 2??4, after a long and ard#o#s scr#tiny into the origins and de*elop"ent of the religion cla#ses in the Jnited !tates @J.!.A and the 0hilippines, we held that in resol*ing clai"s in*ol*ing religio#s freedo" '% ) 1626MAL62T 26CT./L;T@ A. /,,ADDA7/T;A2, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framewor< underlying the religion clauses in our ,onstitutionJ and '&) in deciding respondent?s =plea of exemption based on the >ree 6xercise ,lause0 'from the law with which she is administratively charged), it is the ,AD#6LL;29 ST/T6 ;2T6.6ST T6ST, the strictest test, which must be applied. In s#", a re*iew of the 'ld 8orld antecedents of religion shows the "o*e"ent of esta)lish"ent of religion as an engine to pro"ote state interests, to the principle of non9esta)lish"ent to allow the free e5ercise of religion. (1) R).9A9+, C.'1()( 9, 0;) U.S. C+,0)C0 J.!. history has produced TWA identifiably different, even opposing, strains of *urisprudence on the religion clauses. %. >irst is TH6 ST/27/.7 A> S6#/./T;A2, which ma$ take the form of either 'a) strict separation or 'b) the tamer version of strict neutrality or separation , or what Dr. 8ustice ,arpio refers to as the second theory of governmental neutrality . Although the latter form is not as hostile to religion as the former , both are anchored on the 8effersonian premise that a =wall of separation0 must exist between the state and the ,hurch to protect the state from the church. Both protect the principle of ch#rch9state separation with a rigid reading of the principle. &. An the other hand, the second standard, the 1626MAL62T 26CT./L;T@ A. /,,ADDA7/T;A2, is buttressed by the view that 0;) @'.. +< ()E'2'09+, 9( D)',0 0+ E2+0)/0 0;) /;12/; <2+D 0;) (0'0). FIRST STANDARD" S029/0 S)E'2'09+, ',* S029/0 N)102'.90:HS)E'2'09+, $he STRICT SEPARATIONIST believes that the 6stablishment ,lause was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state?s hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two. According to this Heffersonian *iew, an =absolute barrier0 to formal interdependence of religion and state needs to be erected. .eligious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state. 2or could the state ad*ust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. 'nly the co"plete separation of religion fro" politics wo#ld eli"inate the for"al infl#ence of religio#s instit#tions and pro*ide for a free choice a"ong political *iews, th#s a strict =wall of separation> is necessary. "trict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is deepl$ embedded in American histor$ and contemporar$ practice that enormous amounts of aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion from government in return for huge amounts of mostl$ indirect aid from religion. (or e5a"ple, less than twenty9fo#r ho#rs after ongress adopted the (irst A"end"entKs prohi)ition on laws respecting an esta)lish"ent of religion, ongress decided to e5press its than:s to ,od Al"ighty for the "any )lessings en-oyed )y the nation with a resol#tion in fa*or of a presidential procla"ation declaring a national day of $han:sgi*ing and 0rayer. $h#s, strict separationists are ca#ght in an aw:ward position of clai"ing a constit#tional principle that has ne*er e5isted and is ne*er li:ely to. The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the STRICT NEUTRALIT- OR SEPARATIONIST VIE=, @or, the governmental neutralit$ theor$A finds )asis in .*erson *. Board of .d#cation, where the o#rt declared that HeffersonKs =wall of separation> encaps#lated the "eaning of the (irst A"end"ent. 1owe*er, unli<e the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the =wall of separation0 does not require the state to be their adversary.0 .ather, the state must be 26CT./L in its relations with groups of religious believers and non:believers. =!tate power is no "ore to )e #sed so as to handicap religions than it is to fa*or the".> The strict neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or pri*ileges or i"poses d#ties or o)ligations. Anly secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not per"it, "#ch less re6#ire, acco""odation of sec#lar progra"s to religio#s )elief. The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if applied in interpreting the 6stablishment ,lause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of religious expression in the >ree 6xercise ,lause. As pointed o#t )y H#stice ,old)erg in his conc#rring opinion in A)ington !chool District *. !che"ppP strict neutrality could lead to =a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious0 which is prohibited by the ,onstitution.0rofessor La#rence $ri)e co""ented in his a#thoritati*e treatise, *i&2 $o "ost o)ser*ers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with the very idea of a free exercise clause. $he (ra"ers, whate*er specific applications they "ay ha*e intended, clearly en*isioned religion as so"ething specialG they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing the free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science. The strict neutrality approach all but erases this distinction. $h#s it is not s#rprising that the OJ.!.P !#pre"e o#rt has re-ected strict ne#trality, per"itting and so"eti"es "andating religio#s classifications. $h#s, the dilemma of the separationist approach, whether in the form of strict separation or strict neutrality, is that while the 8effersonian wall of separation =captures the spirit of the /merican ideal of church:state separation,0 in real life, church and state are not and cannot be totally separate. This is all the more true in contemporary times when both the government and religion are growing and expanding their spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in the intersection of government and religion at many points. SECOND STANDARD" &),)>+.),0 N)102'.90:HA//+DD+*'09+, $he theory of )ene*olent ne#trality or acco""odation is pre"ised on a different *iew of the =wall of separation,> associated with 8illia"s, fo#nder of the %hode Island colony. Cnli<e the 8effersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state 1enevolent neutrality recognies that religion plays an important role in the public life of the Cnited States as shown by many traditional government practices which, to strict neutralit$, pose 1stablishment Clause .uestions. Among these are the inscription of 2'n Aod -e Trust3 on American currenc$) the recognition of America as 2one nation under Aod3 in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag) the "upreme CourtBs time7honored practice of opening oral argument with the invocation 2Aod save the !nited "tates and this &onorable Court3) and the practice of Congress and ever$ state legislature of pa$ing a chaplain, usuall$ of a particular 6rotestant denomination, to lead representatives in pra$er. These practices clearl$ show the preference for one theological viewpoint* the existence of and potential for intervention by a god * over the contrar$ theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and government agencies also cooperate in the building of low7cost housing and in other forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral dimension. EC'DE.)( +< '//+DD+*'09+,( 9, AD)29/', B129(E21*),/) also a)o#nd, incl#ding, )#t not li"ited to the C.S. ,ourt declaring the following acts as constitutional+ a state hiring a #resbyterian minister to lead the legislature in daily prayers, or requiring employers to pay wor<ers compensation when the resulting inconsistency between wor< and Sabbath leads to dischargeJ for government to give money to religiously:affiliated organiations to teach adolescents about proper sexual behaviorJ or to provide religious school pupils with boo<sJ or bus rides to religious schoolsJ or with cash to pay for state:mandated standardied tests. (1) L)A9(.'09>) A/0( ',* 0;) F2)) EC)2/9() C.'1() As with the other rights #nder the onstit#tion, the rights e")odied in the %eligion cla#ses are in*o:ed in relation to go*ern"ental action, al"ost in*aria)ly in the for" of legislati*e acts. 9enerally spea<ing, a legislative act that purposely aids or inhibits religion will be challenged as unconstitutional, either because it violates the >ree 6xercise ,lause or the 6stablishment ,lause or both. This is true whether one subscribes to the separationist approach or the benevolent neutrality or accommodationist approach. B#t the "ore diffic#lt religion cases in*ol*e legislati*e acts which ha*e a sec#lar p#rpose and general applica)ility, )#t "ay incidentally or inad*ertently aid or )#rden religio#s e5ercise. $ho#gh the go*ern"ent action is not religio#sly "oti*ated, these laws ha*e a =)#rdenso"e effect> on religio#s e5ercise. $he benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government?s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person?s or institution?s religion. As H#stice Brennan e5plained, the =government GmayI ta<e religion into accountWto exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.0 ;n the ideal world, the legislature would recognie the religions and their practices and would consider them, when practical, in enacting laws of general application. 1ut when San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 83 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and burdened may turn to the courts for protection. $h#s, what is so#ght #nder the theory of acco""odation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its =burdensome effect,0 whether by the legislature or the courts. Most of the free e5ercise clai"s )ro#ght to the J.!. o#rt are for e5e"ption, not in*alidation of the facially ne#tral law that has a =)#rdenso"e> effect. (2) FREE E3ERCISE !129(E21*),/)" S;)28)20, -+*)2 ',* SD90; $he pinnacle of free exercise protection and the theory of accommodation in the J.!. )losso"ed in the case of !her)ert *. <erner, which ruled that state regulation that indirectly restrains or punishes religious belief or conduct must be sub*ected to strict scrutiny under the >ree 6xercise ,lause. According to !her)ert, when a law of general application infringes religious exercise, albeit incidentally, the state interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount and compelling as to override the free exercise claim. Atherwise, the ,ourt itself will carve out the exemption. ;t is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the landJ but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some =compelling state interest0 intervenes. Thus, Sherbert and subsequent cases held that when government action burdens, even inadvertently, a sincerely held religious belief or practice, the state must *ustify the burden by demonstrating that the law embodies a compelling interest, that no less restrictive alternative exists, and that a religious exemption would impair the state?s ability to effectuate its compelling interest. As in other instances of state action affecting f#nda"ental rights, negati*e i"pacts on those rights de"and the highest le*el of -#dicial scr#tiny. After !her)ert, this strict scr#tiny )alancing test res#lted in co#rt9"andated religio#s e5e"ptions fro" facially9ne#tral laws of general application whene*er #n-#stified )#rdens were fo#nd. Then, in the %(4& case of Wisconsin v. @oder,GB%I the C.S. ,ourt again ruled that religious exemption was in order, notwithstanding that the law of general application had a criminal penalty. Csing heightened scrutiny, the ,ourt overturned the conviction of /mish parents for violating Wisconsin compulsory school:attendance laws. The ,ourt, in effect, granted exemption from a neutral, criminal statute that punished religiously motivated conduct. The cases of Sherbert and @oder laid out the following doctrines+ @a) free exercise clause claims were sub*ect to heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test if government substantially burdened the exercise of religionJ 'b) heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test governed cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty, as well as cases where the burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted in the forfeiture of a government benefitJ and 'c) the ,ourt could carve out accommodations or exemptions from a facially neutral law of general application, whether general or criminal. $he !her)ert9Doder doctrine had fi*e "ain co"ponents. (irst, action was protectedEcond#ct )eyond speech, press, or worship was incl#ded in the shelter of freedo" of religion. 3either !her)ertKs ref#sal to wor: on the !a))ath nor the A"ish parentsK ref#sal to let their children attend ninth and tenth grades can )e classified as cond#ct protected )y the other cla#ses of the (irst A"end"ent. !econd, indirect i"positions on religio#s cond#ct, s#ch as the denial of twenty9si5 wee:s of #ne"ploy"ent ins#rance )enefits to Adel !her)ert, as well as direct restraints, s#ch as the cri"inal prohi)ition at iss#e in Doder, were prohi)ited. $hird, as the lang#age in the two cases indicate, the protection granted was extensive. Anly extremely strong governmental interests *ustified impingement on religious conduct, as the absolute language of the test of the >ree 6xercise ,lause suggests. (3) ACCOMMODATION 1,*)2 0;) R).9A9+, C.'1()( A <2)) )C)2/9() /.'9D co#ld res#lt to THREE 7INDS OF ACCOMMODATION2 'a) those which are found to be constitutionally compelled, i.e., required by the >ree 6xercise ,lauseJ 'b) those which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., not required by the >ree 6xercise ,lause but nonetheless permitted by the 6stablishment ,lauseJ and 'c) those which the religion clauses prohibit. A. MANDATOR- ACCOMMODATION res#lts when the o#rt finds that acco""odation is required by the >ree 6xercise ,lause, i.e, when the o#rt itself car*es o#t an e5e"ption. This accommodation occurs when all three conditions of the compelling interest test are met+
+1, a statute or government action has burdened claimantBs free e%ercise of religion, and there is no doubt as to the sincerit$ of the religious beliefG +2, the state has failed to demonstrate a particularl$ important or compelling governmental goal in preventing an e%emption) and +;, that the state has failed to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive means. ;n these cases, the ,ourt finds that the in*ury to religious conscience is so great and the advancement of public purposes is incomparable that only indifference or hostility could explain a refusal to ma<e exemptions. $h#s, if the stateKs o)-ecti*e co#ld )e ser*ed as well or al"ost as well )y granting an e5e"ption to those whose religio#s )eliefs are )#rdened )y the reg#lation, the o#rt "#st grant the e5e"ption. The @oder case is an example where the ,ourt held that the state must accommodate the religious beliefs of the /mish who ob*ected to enrolling their children in high school as required by law. $he !her)ert case is another e5a"ple where the o#rt held that the state #ne"ploy"ent co"pensation plan "#st acco""odate the religio#s con*ictions of !her)ert. &. PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION , the o#rt finds that the State may, but is not required to, accommodate religious interests. $he J.!. 8al& case ill#strates this sit#ation where the J.!. !#pre"e o#rt #pheld the constit#tionality of tax exemption given by 2ew @or< to church properties, but did not rule that the state was required to provide tax exemptions. $he o#rt declared that =@tAhe li"its of per"issi)le state acco""odation to religion are )y no "eans co9 e5tensi*e with the noninterference "andated )y the (ree .5ercise la#se.> 'ther e5a"ples are Xorach *. la#son, allowing released ti"e in p#)lic schools and Marsh *. ha")ers, allowing pay"ent of legislati*e chaplains fro" p#)lic f#nds. 0arenthetically, the o#rt in !"ith has r#led that this is the only acco""odation allowed )y the %eligion la#ses. C. PROHI&ITED ACCOMMODATION. as when the ,ourt finds no basis for a mandatory accommodation, or it determines that the legislative accommodation runs afoul of the establishment or the free exercise clause, it results to a ;n this case, the ,ourt finds that establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests. $o say that there are *alid e5e"ptions )#ttressed )y the (ree .5ercise la#se does not "ean that all clai"s for free e5ercise e5e"ptions are *alid. /n example where accommodation was prohibited is Dc,ollum v. 1oard of 6ducation, where the ,ourt ruled against optional religious instruction in the public school premises. ,i*en that a free e5ercise clai" co#ld lead to three different res#lts, the 6#estion now re"ains as to how the o#rt sho#ld deter"ine which action to ta:e. In this regard, it is the strict scr#tiny9co"pelling state interest test which is "ost in line with the )ene*olent ne#trality9acco""odation approach. Jnder the benevolent:neutrality theory, the principle #nderlying the (irst A"end"ent is that <2))*+D 0+ /'22: +10 +,)K( *109)( 0+ ' S1E2)D) &)9,A 9( ', 9,'.9),'8.) 29A;0, ,+0 +,) *)E),*),0 +, 0;) A2'/) +< .)A9(.'012). %eligio#s freedo" is seen as a s#)stanti*e right and not "erely a pri*ilege against discri"inatory legislation. With religion loo<ed upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. 4. %eligion la#ses in the 0hilippine onte5t2 onstit#tion, H#rispr#dence and 0ractice a. J! onstit#tion and -#rispr#dence *is9]9*is 0hilippine onstit#tion By -#5taposing the A"erican onstit#tion and -#rispr#dence against that of the 0hilippines, it is i""ediately clear that one cannot si"ply concl#de that we ha*e adoptedEloc:, stoc: and )arrelEthe religion cla#ses as e")odied in the (irst A"end"ent, and therefore, the J.!. o#rtKs interpretation of the sa"e. Jnli:e in the J.!. where legislati*e e5e"ptions of religion had to )e #pheld )y the J.!. !#pre"e o#rt as constit#ting per"issi*e acco""odations, si"ilar e5e"ptions for religion are "andatory acco""odations #nder o#r own constit#tions. $h#s, o#r 1947, 1974 and 1987 onstit#tions contain pro*isions on ta5 e5e"ption of ch#rch property,O124P salary of religio#s officers in go*ern"ent instit#tions, O12BP and optional religio#s instr#ction.O127P '#r own prea")le also in*o:es the aid of a di*ine )eing.O12+P $hese constit#tional pro*isions are wholly o#rs and ha*e no co#nterpart in the J.!. onstit#tion or its a"end"ents. $hey all re*eal witho#t do#)t that the (ilipino people, in adopting these constit#tions, "anifested their adherence to the )ene*olent ne#trality approach that re6#ires acco""odations in interpreting the religion cla#ses. $he arg#"ent of Mr. H#stice arpio that the A#g#st B, 2??4 ponencia was erroneo#s insofar as it asserted that the 1947 onstit#tion incorporates the 8al& r#ling as this case was decided s#)se6#ent to the 1947 onstit#tion is a "isreading of the ponencia. 8hat the ponencia pointed o#t was that e*en as early as 1947, or "ore than three decades )efore the J.!. o#rt co#ld *alidate the e5e"ption in 8al& as a for" or per"issi)le acco""odation, we ha*e already incorporated the sa"e in o#r onstit#tion, as a "andatory acco""odation. $here is no a")ig#ity with regard to the 0hilippine onstit#tionKs depart#re fro" the J.!. onstit#tion, insofar as religio#s acco""odations are concerned. It is ind#)ita)le that benevolent neutrality: San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 84 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 accommodation, whether mandator$ or permissive, is the spirit, intent and fra"ewor: #nderlying the 0hilippine onstit#tion.O128P As stated in o#r Decision, dated A#g#st B, 2??42 The history of the religion clauses in the %(!4 ,onstitution shows that these clauses were largely adopted from the >irst /mendment of the C.S. ,onstitution 5555 0hilippine -#rispr#dence and co""entaries on the religio#s cla#ses also contin#ed to )orrow a#thorities fro" J.!. -#rispr#dence witho#t artic#lating the star: distinction )etween the two strea"s of J.!. -#rispr#dence Oi.e., separation and )ene*olent ne#tralityP. 'ne "ight si"ply concl#de that the 0hilippine onstit#tions and -#rispr#dence also inherited the disarray of J.!. religion cla#se -#rispr#dence and the two identifia)le strea"sG th#s, when a religion cla#se case co"es )efore the o#rt, a separationist approach or a )ene*olent ne#trality approach "ight )e adopted and each will ha*e J.!. a#thorities to s#pport it. 'r, one "ight concl#de that as the history of the (irst A"end"ent as narrated )y the o#rt in .*erson s#pports the separationist approach, 0hilippine -#rispr#dence sho#ld also follow this approach in light of the 0hilippine religion cla#sesK history. As a res#lt, in a case where the party clai"s religio#s li)erty in the face of a general law that inad*ertently )#rdens his religio#s e5ercise, he faces an al"ost ins#r"o#nta)le wall in con*incing the o#rt that the wall of separation wo#ld not )e )reached if the o#rt grants hi" an e5e"ption. $hese concl#sions, howe*er, are not and were ne*er warranted )y the 1987, 1974 and 1947 onstit#tions as shown )y other pro*isions on religion in all three constit#tions. It is a cardinal r#le in constit#tional constr#ction that the constit#tion "#st )e interpreted as a whole and apparently conflicting pro*isions sho#ld )e reconciled and har"oni&ed in a "anner that will gi*e to all of the" f#ll force and effect. >rom this construction, it will be ascertained that the intent of the framers was to adopt a benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the #hilippine constitutions, and the enforcement of this intent is the goal of construing the constitution 8e therefore re-ect Mr. H#stice arpioKs total adherence to the J.!. o#rtKs interpretation of the religion cla#ses to effecti*ely deny acco""odations on the sole )asis that the law in 6#estion is ne#tral and of general application. (or e*en if it were tr#e that =an #n)ro:en line of J.!. !#pre"e o#rt decisions> has ne*er held that =an indi*id#alKs religio#s )eliefs Odo notP e5c#se hi" fro" co"pliance with an otherwise *alid law prohi)iting cond#ct that the !tate is free to reg#late,> our own ,onstitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and exempt religion. #hilippine *urisprudence shows that the ,ourt has allowed exemptions from a law of general application, in effect, interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and permissive accommodations. $o ill#strate, in A"erican Bi)le !ociety *. ity of Manila, the Court granted to plaintiff e%emption from a law of general application based on the >ree 6xercise ,lause. In this case, plaintiff was re6#ired )y an ordinance to sec#re a "ayorKs per"it and a "#nicipal license as ordinarily re6#ired of those engaged in the )#siness of general "erchandise #nder the cityKs ordinances. 0laintiff arg#ed that this a"o#nted to =religio#s censorship and restrained the free e5ercise and en-oy"ent of religio#s profession, to wit2 the distri)#tion and sale of )i)les and other religio#s literat#re to the people of the 0hilippines.> Altho#gh the o#rt categorically held that the 6#estioned ordinances were not applica)le to plaintiff as it was not engaged in the )#siness or occ#pation of selling said ="erchandise> for profit, it also r#led that applying the ordinance to plaintiff and re6#iring it to sec#re a license and pay a license fee or ta5 wo#ld i"pair its free e5ercise of religio#s profession and worship and its right of disse"ination of religio#s )eliefs =as the power to ta5 the e5ercise of a pri*ilege is the power to control or s#ppress its en-oy"ent.> $he decision states in part, *i&2 The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and en*oyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. /ny restraint of such right can only be *ustified li<e other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. /t this point, we must emphasie that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality:accommodation approach does not mean that the ,ourt ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. $his is an erroneo#s reading of the fra"ewor: which the dissent of Mr. H#stice arpio see"s to entertain. /lthough benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the ,ourt ought to view religion clause cases, the interest of the state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the test L to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden religious exercise. 555 8hile the o#rt cannot adopt a doctrinal for"#lation that can eli"inate the diffic#lt 6#estions of -#dg"ent in deter"ining the degree of )#rden on religio#s practice or i"portance of the state interest or the s#fficiency of the "eans adopted )y the state to p#rs#e its interest, the o#rt can set a doctrine on the ideal towards which religio#s cla#se -#rispr#dence sho#ld )e directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in #hilippine *urisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the ,ourt should ta<e off in interpreting religion clause cases. $he ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religio#s li)erty =not only for a minority, however small: not only for a ma*ority, however large but for each of us0 to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. II. $1. J%%.3$ 0%'..DI3,! 8e now res#"e fro" where we ended in o#r A#g#st B, 2??4 Decision. As "entioned, what re"ained to )e resol*ed, #pon which re"and was necessary, pertained to the final tas: of s#)-ecting this case to the caref#l application of the compelling state interest test, i.e., deter"ining whether respondent is entitled to e5e"ption, an iss#e which is essentially fact#al or e*identiary in nat#re. There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration of *ustice. Indeed, the pro*isions )y which respondentKs relationship is said to ha*e i"pinged, e.g., Boo: <, $itle I, hapter <I, !ec. B+@)A@7A of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode, Articles 44B and 4B9 of the %e*ised 0enal ode, and e*en the pro*isions on "arriage and fa"ily in the i*il ode and (a"ily ode, all clearly de"onstrate the !tateKs need to protect these sec#lar interests. Be that as it "ay, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our ,onstitution. ;t is a fundamental right that en*oys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights L =the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,0 in the words of 8efferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state?s interest is important, because our ,onstitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the >ree 6xercise ,lause as a source of right by itself. $h#s, it is not the State?s broad interest in =protecting the institutions of marriage and the family,0 or even =in the sound administration of *ustice0 that must be weighed against respondent?s claim, but the State?s narrow interest in refusing to ma<e an exception for the cohabitation which respondent?s faith finds moral. ;n other words, the government must do more than assert the ob*ectives at ris< if exemption is givenJ it must precisely show how and to what extent those ob*ectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor 9eneral failed to do. $o paraphrase H#stice Blac:"#nKs application of the co"pelling interest test, the State?s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. ;n the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. $he !tate has ne*er so#ght to prosec#te respondent nor her partner. $he !tateKs asserted interest th#s a"o#nts only to the sy")olic preser*ation of an #nenforced prohi)ition. Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. H. Bellosillo and <it#g, in their conc#rring opinions in o#r Decision, dated A#g#st B, 2??4, to deny the e5e"ption wo#ld effecti*ely )rea: #p =an otherwise ideal #nion of two indi*id#als who ha*e "anaged to stay together as h#s)and and wife Oappro5i"ately twenty9fi*e yearsP> and ha*e the effect of defeating the *ery s#)stance of "arriage and the fa"ily. $he !olicitor ,eneral also arg#ed against respondentKs religio#s freedo" on the )asis of "orality, i.e., that =the con-#gal arrange"ent of respondent and her li*e9in partner sho#ld not )e condoned )eca#se ad#ltero#s relationships are constantly frowned #pon )y society>G and =that !tate laws on "arriage, which are "oral in nat#re, ta:e clear precedence o*er the religio#s )eliefs and practices of any ch#rch, religio#s sect or deno"ination on "arriage. <erily, religio#s )eliefs and practices sho#ld not )e per"itted to o*erride laws relating to p#)lic policy s#ch as those of "arriage.> $he a)o*e arg#"ents are "ere reiterations of the arg#"ents raised )y M"e. H#stice Dnares9!antiago in her dissenting opinion to o#r Decision dated A#g#st B, 2??4, which she offers again in toto. $hese arg#"ents ha*e already )een addressed in o#r decision dated A#g#st B, 2??4.O17BP In said Decision, we noted that M"e. H#stice Dnares9!antiagoKs dissenting opinion dwelt "ore on the standards of "orality, witho#t categorically holding that religio#s freedo" is not in iss#e.P 8e, therefore, went into a disc#ssion on "orality, in order to show that2 @aA $he p#)lic "orality e5pressed in the law is necessarily sec#lar for in o#r constit#tional order, the religion cla#ses prohi)it the state fro" esta)lishing a religion, incl#ding the "orality it sanctions. $h#s, when the law spea:s of =i""orality> in the i*il !er*ice Law or =i""oral> in the ode of 0rofessional %esponsi)ility for lawyers, or =p#)lic "orals> in the %e*ised 0enal ode, or ="orals> in the 3ew i*il ode,O179P or ="oral character> in the onstit#tion,O1+?P the distinction )etween p#)lic and sec#lar "orality on the one hand, and religio#s "orality, on the other, sho#ld )e :ept in "indG San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 85 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 @)A /lthough the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interestsJ @cA $he -#risdiction of the o#rt e5tends only to p#)lic and sec#lar "orality. 8hate*er prono#nce"ent the o#rt "a:es in the case at )ar sho#ld )e #nderstood only in this real" where it has a#thority. @dA 1a*ing disting#ished )etween p#)lic and sec#lar "orality and religio#s "orality, the "ore diffic#lt tas: is deter"ining which i""oral acts #nder this p#)lic and sec#lar "orality fall #nder the phrase =disgracef#l and i""oral cond#ct> for which a go*ern"ent e"ployee "ay )e held ad"inistrati*ely lia)le.'nly one cond#ct is in 6#estion )efore this o#rt, i.e., the con-#gal arrange"ent of a go*ern"ent e"ployee whose partner is legally "arried to another which 0hilippine law and -#rispr#dence consider )oth i""oral and illegal. While there is no dispute that under settled *urisprudence, respondent?s conduct constitutes =disgraceful and immoral conduct,0 the case at bar involves the defense of religious freedom, therefore none of the cases cited by Dme. 8ustice @nares:Santiago apply. There is no *urisprudence in #hilippine *urisdiction holding that the defense of religious freedom of a member of the 8ehovah?s Witnesses under the same circumstances as respondent will not prevail over the laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law. We cannot summarily conclude therefore that her conduct is li<ewise so =odious0 and =barbaric0 as to be immoral and punishable by law. In this case, the government?s conduct may appear innocent and nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. ;n the interpretation of a document, such as the 1ill of .ights, designed to protect the minority from the ma*ority, the question of which perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreo*er, the te5t, history, str#ct#re and *al#es i"plicated in the interpretation of the cla#ses, all point toward this perspecti*e. $h#s, s#)stanti*e e6#alityEa reading of the religion cla#ses which lea*es )oth politically do"inant and the politically wea: religio#s gro#ps e6#al in their ina)ility to #se the go*ern"ent @lawA to assist their own religion or )#rden othersEma<es the most sense in the interpretation of the 1ill of .ights, a document designed to protect minorities and individuals from mobocracy in a democracy 'the ma*ority or a coalition of minorities). As pre*io#sly disc#ssed, our ,onstitution adheres to TH6 1626MAL62T 26CT./L;T@ /##.A/,H that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the >ree 6xercise ,lause.$h#s, in arg#ing that respondent sho#ld )e held ad"inistrati*ely lia)le as the arrange"ent she had was 2illegal per se because, b$ universall$ recogniEed standards, it is inherentl$ or b$ its ver$ nature bad, improper, immoral and contrar$ to good conscience,3 the !olicitor ,eneral failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. >inally, even assuming that the AS9 has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. /gain, the Solicitor 9eneral utterly failed to prove this element of the test. 'ther than the two doc#"ents offered as cited a)o*e which esta)lished the sincerity of respondentKs religio#s )elief and the fact that the agree"ent was an internal arrange"ent within respondentKs congregation, no iota of e*idence was offered. In fact, the records are )ereft of e*en a fee)le atte"pt to proc#re any s#ch e*idence to show that the "eans the state adopted in p#rs#ing this co"pelling interest is the least restricti*e to respondentKs religio#s freedo". Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent 6scritor?s con*ugal arrangement cannot be penalied as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. $he o#rt recogni&es that state interests "#st )e #pheld in order that freedo"s 9 incl#ding religio#s freedo" 9 "ay )e en-oyed. ;n the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so TH6 ST/T6 ;2T6.6ST sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. ;2 TH6 /1S62,6 A> / SHAW;29 TH/T SC,H ST/T6 ;2T6.6ST 6H;STS, D/2 DCST 16 /LLAW67 TA SC1S,.;16 TA TH6 ;2>;2;T6. ESTRADA >(. ESCRITUR SUMMAR-" 1enevolent 2eutrality recogni&es that the go*ern"ent "#st p#rs#e its sec#lar goals and interests, )#t at the sa"e ti"e, stri*e to #phold religio#s li)erty to the greatest e5tent possi)le within fle5i)le constit#tional li"its. $h#s, altho#gh the "orality conte"plated )y laws is sec#lar +secular moralit$,, )ene*olent ne#trality co#ld allow for acco""odation of "orality )ased n religion +religious secularit$,, pro*ided it does not offend co"pelling state interests. $he COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST in*ol*es a three9step process. $he o#rt e5plained this process in detail, )y showing the 6#estions which "#st )e answered in each step, viE? 1. 2&as the statute or government action created a burden on the free e%ercise of religionD3 The courts often look into the sincerit$ of the religious belief, but without in.uiring into the truth of the belief. $he (%.. .;.%I!. LAJ!. prohi)its in6#iring a)o#t its tr#th. 2. $he o#rt then as:s2 2's there a sufficientl$ compelling state interest to #ustif$ the infringement of religious libert$D3 In this step, $1. ,'<.%3M.3$ 1A! $' .!$ABLI!1 $1A$ I$! 0J%0'!.! A%. L.,I$IMA$. ('% $1. !$A$. A3D $1A$ $1.D A%. 'M0.LLI3,. 3. $he o#rt as:s2 2&as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least instrusive means possible so that the free e%ercise is not infringed an$ more thanh necessar$ to achieve the legitimate goal of the stateD3 $he analysis re6#ires the state to show that the "eans in which it is achie*eing its legiti"ate state o)-ecti*e is the L.A!$ I3$%J!I<. M.A3!, i.e., it has chosen a way to achie*e its legiti"ate state end that i"poses as little as possi)le on religio#s li)erties. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS GR NO. 88211, S)E0)D8)2. 15, 1989 F'/0(" (erdinand .. Marcos was deposed fro" the presidency *ia the non9*iolent =people power> re*ol#tion and forced into e5ile. 0res. ora&on . A6#ino was declared 0resident of the 0hils #nder a re*ol#tionary go*ern"ent. 1owe*er, the ratification of the 1987 onstit#tion f#rther strengthened the legiti"acy of Mrs A6#inoKs a#thority. $he co#ntry was far fro" )eing sta)ili&ed, tho#gh, as contin#ed threats fro" *ario#s sectors ranging fro" the re)els to the followers of the Marcoses and e*en those that were initiators of the people power re*ol#tion. 0r. 0arcos has signified, in his deathbed, to return to the 6hils. 9ut 0rs A.uino considering the dire conse.uences to the nation of his return has stood firml$ on the decision to bar the his and his famil$Bs return. $he case for petitioners is fo#nded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to ret#rn to the 0hilippines is g#aranteed #nder the following pro*isions of the Bill of %ights, to wit2 !ection 1. 3o person shall )e depri*ed of life, li)erty, or property witho#t d#e process of law, nor shall any person )e denied the e6#al protection of the laws. 555 555 555 !ection +. $he li)erty of a)ode and of changing the sa"e within the li"its prescri)ed )y law shall not )e i"paired e5cept #pon lawf#l order of the co#rt. 3either shall the right to tra*el )e i"paired e5cept in the interest of national sec#rity, p#)lic safety, or p#)lic health, as "ay )e pro*ided )y law. $he petitioners contend that the 0resident is witho#t power to i"pair the li)erty of a)ode of the Marcoses )eca#se only a court "ay do so within the limits prescribed b$ law. 3or "ay the 0resident i"pair their right to tra*el )eca#se no law has a#thori&ed her to do so. $hey ad*ance the *iew that )efore the right to tra*el "ay )e i"paired )y any a#thority or agency of the go*ern"ent, there "#st )e legislation to that effect. The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of 0r. 0arcos and his famil$ to return to the 6hilippines is guaranteed. I((1)" 1. 8hether or not the right of the Marcoses of the li)erty of a)ode and the right to tra*el are *iolatedC 2. 8hether the 0resident has the power to )ar the petitioners fro" ret#rning ho"eC H).*" 1. 3'. ;t must be emphasied that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the #hilippines to other countries or within the #hilippines. $hese are what the right to tra*el wo#ld nor"ally San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 86 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 connote. 6ssentially, the right involved is the right to return to oneFs country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. $h#s, the Jni*ersal Declaration of 1#"ans %ights and the International o*enant on i*il and 0olitical %ights treat the right to freedo" of "o*e"ent and a)ode within the territory of a state, the right to lea*e a co#ntry, and the right to enter oneIs co#ntry as separate and distinct rights. $he Declaration spea:s of the -right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state- OArt. 14@1AP separately fro" the -right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.- OArt. 14@2A.P 'n the other hand, the o*enant g#arantees the /right to li)erty of "o*e"ent and freedo" to choose his residence/ OArt. 12@1AP and the right to /)e free to lea*e any co#ntry, incl#ding his own./ OArt. 12@2AP which rights "ay )e restricted )y s#ch laws as /are necessary to protect national sec#rity, p#)lic order, p#)lic health or "orals or the separate rights and freedo"s of others./ OArt. 12@4AP as disting#ished fro" the /right to enter his own co#ntry/ of which one cannot )e /ar)itrarily depri*ed./ OArt. 12@BA.P ;t would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to oneFs country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The right to return to oneFs country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the 1ill of .ights , which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well: considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our ,onstitution, is part of the law of the land G/rt. ;;, Sec. & of the ,onstitution.I H+@)>)2, 90 9( distinct and separate from the right to travel ',* en*oys a different protection under the ;nternational ,ovenant of ,ivil and #olitical .ights, i.e., against being -arbitrarily deprived- thereof. 2. D.!. To the 6resident, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the e%ercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the #residentFs residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. 't is founded on the dut$ of the 6resident, as steward of the people. $o paraphrase $heodore %oose*elt, it is not only the power of the 0resident )#t also his d#ty to do anything not for)idden )y the onstit#tion or the laws that the needs of the nation de"and. ;t is a '% ) power borne by the #residentFs duty to preserve and defend the ,onstitution. ;t also may be viewed as a '&) power implicit in the #residentFs duty to ta<e care that the laws are faithfully executed . It wo#ld not )e acc#rate, howe*er, to state that /e5ec#ti*e power/ is the power to enforce the laws, for the 0resident is head of state as well as head of go*ern"ent and whate*er powers inhere in s#ch positions pertain to the office #nless the onstit#tion itself withholds it. (#rther"ore, the onstit#tion itself pro*ides that the e5ec#tion of the laws is only one of the powers of the 0resident. ;t also grants the #resident other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the countryFs foreign relations. Altho#gh the 1987 onstit#tion i"poses li"itations on the e5ercise of specific powers of the 0resident, it "aintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of /e5ec#ti*e power./ orollarily, the powers of the #resident cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the ,onstitution. >aced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Darcoses to return to the #hilippines, the #resident is, under the ,onstitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, ha*ing sworn to defend and #phold the onstit#tion, the 0resident has the o)ligation #nder the onstit#tion to protect the people, pro"ote their welfare and ad*ance the national interest. It "#st )e )orne in "ind that the onstit#tion, aside fro" )eing an allocation of power is also a social contract where)y the people ha*e s#rrendered their so*ereign powers to the !tate for the co""on good. 1ence, lest the officers of the ,o*ern"ent e5ercising the powers delegated )y the people forget and the ser*ants of the people )eco"e r#lers, the onstit#tion re"inds e*eryone that /OsPo*ereignty resides in the people and all go*ern"ent a#thority e"anates fro" the"./ OArt. II, !ec. 1.P RICARDO L. MANOTOC, !R. >(. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. N+. L%2100, M': 30, 198%, FERNAN, !." FACTS" 0etitioner %icardo L. Manotoc, Hr., is one of the two principal stoc:holders of $rans9Ins#lar Manage"ent, Inc. and the Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc., a stoc: )ro:erage ho#se. (ollowing the /r#n/ on stoc: )ro:erages ca#sed )y stoc: )ro:er !anta"ariaIs flight fro" this -#risdiction, petitioner, who was then in the Jnited !tates, ca"e ho"e, and together with his co9stoc:holders, filed a petition with the !ec#rities and .5change o""ission for the appoint"ent of a "anage"ent co""ittee for Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc and for $rans9Ins#lar Manage"ent, Inc. $he petition relati*e to the Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. was granted and a "anage"ent co""ittee was organi&ed and appointed. 0ending disposition of !. ase, the !. re6#ested the o""issioner of I""igration not to clear petitioner for depart#re and a "e"orand#" to this effect was iss#ed )y the o""issioner. 8hen a $orrens title s#)"itted to and accepted )y Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. was s#spected to )e a fa:e, si5 of its clients filed si5 separate cri"inal co"plaints against petitioner and one %a#l Le*eri&a, Hr., as president and *ice9president, respecti*ely, of Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. In d#e co#rse, corresponding cri"inal charges for estafa were filed )y the in*estigating fiscal. In all cases, petitioner has )een ad"itted to )ail with (,J Instance orporation as s#rety. 0etitioner filed )efore each of the trial co#rts a "otion entitled, /"otion for per"ission to lea*e the co#ntry,/ stating as gro#nd therefor his desire to go to the Jnited !tates, /relati*e to his )#siness transactions and opport#nities./ $he prosec#tion opposed said "otion and after d#e hearing, )oth trial -#dges denied the sa"e. ISSUE" 8hether or not the constit#tional right of li)erty of a)ode is herein *iolatedC HELD" 3'. / court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the #hilippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The ob*ect of a bail bond is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of <eeping him, pending the trial, and at the sa"e ti"e, to p#t the acc#sed as "#ch #nder the power of the co#rt as if he were in c#stody of the proper officer, and to sec#re the appearance of the acc#sed so as to answer the call of the co#rt and do what the law "ay re6#ire of hi"./ The condition imposed upon petitioner to ma<e himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. The result of the obligation assumed by appellee 'surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the *urisdiction of the #hilippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the *urisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the #hilippines they would have no binding force outside of said *urisdiction. Indeed, if the acc#sed were allowed to lea*e the 0hilippines witho#t s#fficient reason, he "ay )e placed )eyond the reach of the co#rts. -The effect of a recogniance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to <eepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment . The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state.- ;f the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose *urisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the co#rt is recogni&ed )y petitioner hi"self, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total li)erty to lea*e the co#ntry, for he wo#ld not ha*e filed the "otion for per"ission to lea*e the co#ntry in the first place, if it were otherwise. Also, petitioner@s case is not on all fours with the "hepherd case. 'n the latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent necessit$ for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel thereb$ satisf$ing the court that she would compl$ with the conditions of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the a)o*e. As aptly o)ser*ed )y the !olicitor ,eneral in his co""ent2 A per#sal of petitionerIs IMotion for 0er"ission to Lea*e the o#ntryI will show that it is solely predicated on petitionerIs wish to tra*el to the Jnited !tates where he will, allegedly attend to so"e )#siness transactions and search for )#siness opport#nities. Lrom the tenor and import of petitioner@s motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to #ustif$ the grant of #udicial imprimatur thereto. 0etitioner has not s#fficiently shown that there is a)sol#te necessity for hi" to tra*el a)road. 0etitionerIs "otion )ears no indication that the alleged )#siness transactions co#ld not )e #nderta:en )y any other person in his )ehalf. 3either is there any hint that petitionerIs a)sence fro" the Jnited !tates wo#ld a)sol#tely precl#de hi" fro" ta:ing ad*antage of )#siness opport#nities therein, nor is there any showing that petitionerIs non9presence in the Jnited !tates wo#ld ca#se hi" irrepara)le da"age or pre-#dice. #etitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. He merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. $he co#rt cannot allow the acc#sed to lea*e the co#ntry witho#t the assent of the s#rety )eca#se in accepting a )ail )ond or recogni&ance, the go*ern"ent i"pliedly agrees /that it will not ta:e any proceedings with the principal that will increase the ris:s of the s#reties or affect their re"edies against hi". $he constitutional right to travel being invo<ed by petitioner is not an absolute right. #etitioner?s contention that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the co#rts which granted hi" )ail nor the !ec#rities and .5change o""ission which has no -#risdiction o*er his li)erty, co#ld not pre*ent hi" fro" e5ercising his constit#tional right to tra*el, is #ntena)le. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 87 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he constit#tional right to tra*el )eing in*o:ed )y petitioner is not an a)sol#te right. !ection 7, Article I< of the 1974 onstit#tion states2 /$he li)erty of a)ode and of tra*el shall not )e i"paired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.- $o o#r "ind, the order of the trial co#rt releasing petitioner on )ail constit#tes s#ch lawf#l order as conte"plated )y the a)o*e96#oted constit#tional pro*ision. RICARDO C. SILVERIO >(. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. N+. 94284, AE29. 8, 1991, MELENCIOHERRERA, !. FACTS" 0etitioner was charged with *iolation of !ection 2? @BA of the %e*ised !ec#rities Act. In d#e ti"e, he posted )ail for his pro*isional li)erty. More than two @2A years after the filing of the Infor"ation, respondent 0eople of the 0hilippines filed an Jrgent e5 parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to iss#e a hold9depart#re 'rder against acc#sed9petitioner on the gro#nd that he had gone a)road se*eral ti"es witho#t the necessary o#rt appro*al res#lting in postpone"ents of the arraign"ent and sched#led hearings. The /egional Trial Court issued an Krder directing the 8epartment of Loreign Affairs to cancel 6etitioner@s passport or to den$ his application therefor, and the Commission on 'mmigration to prevent 6etitioner from leaving the countr$. $his order was based primaril$ on the Trial Court@s finding that since the filing of the 'nformation the accused has not $et been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused /icardo C. "ilverio, "r. has left the countr$ and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court/. 0etitionerIs Motion for %econsideration was denied. 0etitionerIs ertiorari 0etition )efore the o#rt of Appeals was li:ewise denied. 6etitioner takes the posture, that while the 1485 Constitution recogniEes the power of the Courts to curtail the libert$ of abode within the limits prescribed b$ law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel onl$ on grounds of interest of national securit$, public safet$ or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 14;I and 145; Constitutions. Jnder the 1947 onstit#tion, the li)erty of a)ode and of tra*el were treated #nder one pro*ision. Article III, !ection 1 @BA thereof reads2 /$he li)erty of a)ode and of changing the sa"e within the li"its prescri)ed )y law shall not )e i"paired./ $he 1974 onstit#tion altered the 1947 te5t )y e5plicitly incl#ding the li)erty of tra*el, th#s2 /$he li)erty of a)ode and of tra*el shall not )e i"paired e5cept #pon lawf#l order of the co#rt or when necessary in the interest of national sec#rity, p#)lic safety, or p#)lic health/ @Article I<, !ection 7A. $he 1987 onstit#tion has split the two freedo"s into two distinct sentences and treats the" differently, to wit2 /!ec. +. $he li)erty of a)ode and of changing the sa"e within the li"its prescri)ed )y law shall not )e i"paired e5cept #pon lawf#l order of the co#rt. 3either shall the right to tra*el )e i"paired e5cept in the interest of national sec#rity, p#)lic safety, or p#)lic health, as "ay )e pro*ided )y law./ 6etitioner thus theoriEes that under the 1485 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel onl$ on the grounds of national securit$, public safet$, or public health. ISSUE" 8hether or not the right to tra*el can )e i"paired #pon lawf#l order of the o#rt, even on grounds other than the -interest of national security, public safety or public health- HELD" D.!. /rticle ;;;, Section B of the %(!4 ,onstitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without ,ourt Arder, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of -national security, public safety, or public health- and -as may be provided by law,- a limitive phrase which did not appear in the %(4$ text @$he onstit#tion, Bernas, Hoa6#in ,., !.H., <ol. I, (irst .dition, 1987, p. 2+4A. /pparently, the phraseology in the %(!4 ,onstitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel #rocessing ,enter, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party Article III, !ection + of the 1987 onstit#tion should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the ,ourts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. 8hen )y law -#risdiction is conferred on a o#rt or -#dicial officer, all a#5iliary writs, process and other "eans necessary to carry it into effect "ay )e e"ployed )y s#ch o#rt or officer @%#le 147, !ection +, %#les of o#rtA. #etitionerFs argument that the ruling in Danotoc, 8r., v. ,ourt of /ppeals, et al. 'supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to ma<e himself available at all times whenever the ,ourt requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the %(!4 ,onstitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the %($5, the %(4$, or the %(!4 ,onstitution. 1esides, the Danotoc ruling on that point was but a re:affirmation of that laid down long before in #eople v. Cy Tuising, B% #hil. "3" '%($5). #etitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the ,ourt when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. 1olding an acc#sed in a cri"inal case within the reach of the o#rts )y pre*enting his depart#re fro" the 0hilippines "#st )e considered as a *alid restriction on his right to tra*el so that he "ay )e dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the #eople of the #hilippines. ;t is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to ,ourt Arders and processes. SEC. " RIGHT TO INFORMATION LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION 150 SCRA 530, 1987 FACTS" 9!J0%A9 ISSUE" 8hether or not Legaspi sho#ld )e allowed s#ch right HELD" $he constit#tional right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern is recogni&ed in the Bill of %ights. These constitutional provisions are self:executing. $hey s#pply the r#les )y "eans of which the right to infor"ation "ay )e en-oyed )y g#aranteeing the right and "andating the d#ty to afford access to so#rces of infor"ation. 1ence, the f#nda"ental right therein recogni&ed "ay )e asserted )y the people #pon the ratification of the constit#tion witho#t need for any ancillary act of the Legislat#re. 8hat "ay )e pro*ided for )y the Legislat#re are reasona)le conditions and li"itations #pon the access to )e afforded which "#st, of necessity, )e consistent with the declared !tate policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re of all transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest. >or every right of the people recognied as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. $hat is the *ery essence of the Bill of %ights in a constit#tional regi"e. 'nly go*ern"ents operating #nder f#nda"ental r#les defining the li"its of their power so as to shield indi*id#al rights against its ar)itrary e5ercise can properly clai" to )e constit#tional. 8itho#t a go*ern"entIs acceptance of the li"itations i"posed #pon it )y the onstit#tion in order to #phold indi*id#al li)erties, witho#t an ac:nowledg"ent on its part of those d#ties e5acted )y the rights pertaining to the citi&ens, the Bill of %ights )eco"es a sophistry, and li)erty, the #lti"ate ill#sion. ;n recogniing the peopleFs right to be informed, both the %(4$ ,onstitution and the 2ew ,harter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, sub*ect to such limitations as may be provided by law. $he g#arantee has )een f#rther enhanced in the 3ew onstit#tion with the adoption of a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re, this ti"e /s#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law,/ in Article II, !ection 28 thereof, to wit2 !#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law, the !tate adopts and i"ple"ents a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest. @Art. II, !ec. 28A. In the $anada case, s#pra, the constit#tional g#arantee was )olstered )y what this o#rt declared as an i"perati*e d#ty of the go*ern"ent officials concerned to p#)lish all i"portant legislati*e acts and resol#tions of a p#)lic nat#re as well as all e5ec#ti*e orders and procla"ations of general applica)ility. 8e granted Manda"#s in said case, and in the process, 8e fo#nd occasion to e5po#nd )riefly on the nat#re of said d#ty2 . . . $hat d#ty "#st )e enforced if the onstit#tional right of the people to )e infor"ed on "atters of p#)lic concern is to )e gi*en s#)stance and San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 88 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 reality. $he law itself "a:es a list of what sho#ld )e p#)lished in the 'fficial ,a&ette. !#ch listing, to o#r "ind, lea*es respondents with no discretion whatsoe*er as to what "#st )e incl#ded or e5cl#ded fro" s#ch p#)lication. @$anada *. $#*era, s#pra, at 49A The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records in the Affice of the .egister of 7eeds, is emphasied in Subido vs. Aaeta, s#pra2 6xcept, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and ob*ects of the person see<ing access to the records. ;t is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gae, or that scandal is not made of it. ;f it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. . . . @!#)ido *. '&aeta, s#pra at 488A. ;t is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this ,ourt that government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In the !#)ido case, 8e recogni&ed the a#thority of the %egister of Deeds to reg#late the "anner in which persons desiring to do so, "ay inspect, e5a"ine or copy records relating to registered lands. 1owe*er, the reg#lations which the %egister of Deeds "ay pro"#lgate are confined to2 . . . prescri)ing the "anner and ho#rs of e5a"ination to the end that da"age to or loss of, the records "ay )e a*oided, that #nd#e interference with the d#ties of the c#stodian of the )oo:s and doc#"ents and other e"ployees "ay )e pre*ented, that the right of other persons entitled to "a:e inspection "ay )e ins#red . . . @!#)ido *s. '&aeta, 8? 0hil. 484, 487A. Applying the !#)ido r#ling )y analogy, 8e recogni&ed a si"ilar a#thority in a "#nicipal -#dge, to reg#late the "anner of inspection )y the p#)lic of cri"inal doc:et records in the case of Baldo&a *s. Di"aano @Ad". Matter 3o. 112?9MH, May 7, 197+, 71 !%A 1BA. !aid ad"inistrati*e case was filed against the respondent -#dge for his alleged ref#sal to allow e5a"ination of the cri"inal doc:et records in his sala. Jpon a finding )y the In*estigating H#dge that the respondent had allowed the co"plainant to open and *iew the s#)-ect records, 8e a)sol*ed the respondent. In effect, 8e ha*e also held that the r#les and conditions i"posed )y hi" #pon the "anner of e5a"ining the p#)lic records were reasona)le. In )oth the !#)ido and the Baldo&a cases, 8e were e"phatic in '#r state"ent that the a#thority to reg#late the "anner of e5a"ining p#)lic records does not carry with it the power to prohi)it. A distinction has to )e "ade )etween the discretion to ref#se o#tright the disclos#re of or access to a partic#lar infor"ation and the a#thority to reg#late the "anner in which the access is to )e afforded. $he first is a li"itation #pon the a*aila)ility of access to the infor"ation so#ght, which only the Legislat#re "ay i"pose @Art. III, !ec. +, 1987 onstit#tionA. $he second pertains to the go*ern"ent agency charged with the c#stody of p#)lic records. Its a#thority to reg#late access is to )e e5ercised solely to the end that da"age to, or loss of, p#)lic records "ay )e a*oided, #nd#e interference with the d#ties of said agencies "ay )e pre*ented, and "ore i"portantly, that the e5ercise of the sa"e constit#tional right )y other persons shall )e ass#red @!#)ido *s. '&aeta, s#praA. Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be sub*ect to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. ,ertainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Atherwise, the en*oyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of Dandamus in a proper case. B#t what is a proper case for Manda"#s to iss#eC In the case )efore Js, the p#)lic right to )e enforced and the conco"itant d#ty of the !tate are #ne6#i*oca)ly set forth in the onstit#tion. $he decisi*e 6#estion on the propriety of the iss#ance of the writ of Manda"#s in this case is, whether the infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner is within the a")it of the constit#tional g#arantee. $he incorporation in the onstit#tion of a g#arantee of access to infor"ation of p#)lic concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and infor"ation in a de"ocracy @Baldo&a *. Di"aano, Ad". Matter 3o. 112?9MH, May 7, 197+, 17 !%A 1BA. In the sa"e way that free disc#ssion ena)les "e")ers of society to cope with the e5igencies of their ti"e @$hornhill *s. Ala)a"a, 41? J.!. 88, 1?2 O1949PA, access to infor"ation of general interest aids the people in de"ocratic decision9"a:ing @87 1ar*ard Law %e*iew 17?7 O197BP )y gi*ing the" a )etter perspecti*e of the *ital iss#es confronting the nation. 1ut the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. ;t does not open every door to any and all information. Cnder the ,onstitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are -sub*ect to limitations as may be provided by law- '/rt. ;;;, Sec. 4, second sentence). $he law "ay therefore e5e"pt certain types of infor"ation fro" p#)lic scr#tiny, s#ch as those affecting national sec#rity. It follows that, in e*ery case, the a*aila)ility of access to a partic#lar p#)lic record "#st )e circ#"scri)ed )y the nat#re of the infor"ation so#ght, i.e., @aA )eing of p#)lic concern or one that in*ol*es p#)lic interest, and, @)A not )eing e5e"pted )y law fro" the operation of the constit#tional g#arantee. The threshold .uestion is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. $his 6#estion is first addressed to the go*ern"ent agency ha*ing c#stody of the desired infor"ation. 1owe*er, as already disc#ssed, this does not gi*e the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the go*ern"ent agency has the )#rden of showing that the infor"ation re6#ested is not of p#)lic concern, or, if it is of p#)lic concern, that the sa"e has )een e5e"pted )y law fro" the operation of the g#arantee. $o hold otherwise will ser*e to dil#te the constit#tional right. As aptly o)ser*ed, /. . . the go*ern"ent is in an ad*antageo#s position to "arshall and interpret arg#"ents against release . . ./ $o safeg#ard the constit#tional right, e*ery denial of access )y the go*ern"ent agency concerned is s#)-ect to re*iew )y the co#rts, and in the proper case, access "ay )e co"pelled )y a writ of Manda"#s. 'n determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. #ublic concern- like -public interest- is a term that eludes e%act definition. 9oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of sub#ects which the public ma$ want to know , either % because these directly affect their lives, or & simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citien. ;n the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. $he p#)lic concern in*o:ed in the case of $aNada *. $#*era, s#pra, was the need for ade6#ate notice to the p#)lic of the *ario#s laws which are to reg#late the actions and cond#ct of citi&ens. In !#)ido *s. '&aeta, s#pra, the p#)lic concern dee"ed co*ered )y the stat#tory right was the :nowledge of those real estate transactions which so"e )elie*ed to ha*e )een registered in *iolation of the onstit#tion. $he infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner in this case is the tr#th of the clai" of certain go*ern"ent e"ployees that they are ci*il ser*ice eligi)les for the positions to which they were appointed. $he onstit#tion e5pressly declares as a !tate policy that2 Appoint"ents in the ci*il ser*ice shall )e "ade only according to "erit and fitness to )e deter"ined, as far as practica)le, and e5cept as to positions which are policy deter"ining, pri"arily confidential or highly technical, )y co"petiti*e e5a"ination. @Art. I;, B, !ec. 2. O2PA. #ublic office being a public trust, G,onst., /rt. H;, Sec+ %I it is the legitimate concern of citiens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. #ublic officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. 1ut then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. >or Dandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while ref#sing to confir" or deny the clai"s of eligi)ility, the respondent has failed to cite any pro*ision in the i*il !er*ice Law which wo#ld li"it the petitionerIs right to :now who are, and who are not, ci*il ser*ice eligi)les. 8e ta:e -#dicial notice of the fact that the na"es of those who pass the ci*il ser*ice e5a"inations, as in )ar e5a"inations and licens#re e5a"inations for *ario#s professions, are released to the p#)lic. &ence, there is nothing secret about one@s civil service eligibilit$, if actuall$ possessed. 0etitionerIs re6#est is, therefore, neither #n#s#al nor #nreasona)le. And when, as in this case, the go*ern"ent e"ployees concerned clai" to )e ci*il ser*ice eligi)les, the p#)lic, thro#gh any citi&en, has a right to *erify their professed eligi)ilities fro" the i*il !er*ice o""ission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent ,ommission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Dandamus, therefore lies. VALMONTE VS. &ELMONTE 170 SCRA 25%, 1989 FACTS" 9!J0%A9 San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 89 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ISSUE" 8hether or not "anda"#s lies to co"pel respondent to perfor" the acts so#ght )y petitioner to )e done, in p#rs#ance of their right to infor"ation HELD" Des. $he peopleKs right to infor"ation is li"ited to "atters of p#)lic concern and is f#rther s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law. $he ,!I! is a tr#stee of contri)#tions fro" the go*ern"ent and its e"ployees and ad"inistration of *ario#s ins#rance progra"s for the )enefit of the latter. Cndeniably, its funds assume a public character. ;t is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximiing the benefits to insured government employees. $he p#)lic nat#re of the loana)le f#nds of the ,!I! and the p#)lic office held )y the alleged )orrowers "a:e the infor"ation so#ght clearly a "atter of p#)lic interest and concern. (#rther"ore, the /constit#ent9"inistrant/ dichoto"y characteri&ing go*ern"ent f#nction has long )een rep#diated. $hat the ,!I!, in granting the loans, was e5ercising a proprietary f#nction wo#ld not -#stify the e5cl#sion of the transactions fro" the co*erage and scope of the right to infor"ation. /espondent ne%t asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the A"'" are private in nature and hence, are not covered b$ the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees +a,ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions onl$. 't is argued that the records of the A"'", a government corporation performing proprietar$ functions, are outside the coverage of the people@s right of access to official records. 't is further contended that since the loan function of the A"'" is merel$ incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered b$ the constitutional polic$ of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable onl$ to official transactions. (irst of all, the /constit#ent 9999"inistrant/ dichoto"y characteri&ing go*ern"ent f#nction has long )een rep#diated. In A(A *. onfederation of Jnions and ,o*ern"ent orporations and 'ffices O,.%. 3os. L921B8B and L924+?7, 3o*e")er 29, 19+9, 4? !%A +BBP, the o#rt said that the go*ern"ent, whether carrying o#t its so*ereign attri)#tes or r#nning so"e )#siness, discharges the sa"e f#nction of ser*ice to the people. Conse.uentl$, that the A"'", in granting the loans, was e%ercising a proprietar$ function would not #ustif$ the e%clusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. Doreover, the intent of the members of the ,onstitutional ,ommission of %(!B, to include government:owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government7owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietar$ or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the ,ourt is convinced that transactions entered into by the 9S;S, a government:controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the peopleFs right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. 'n fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted b$ the A"'", sub#ect to reasonable regulations that the latter ma$ promulgate relating to the manner and hours of e%amination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records ma$ be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records ma$ be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records ma$ be insured However, although citiens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to -access to official records,- the ,onstitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the li<e in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTO&ATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL GR N+. 183591, O/0+8)2 14, 2008 FACTS" 8hen 0resident ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo ass#"ed office, the "ilitary offensi*e against the MIL( was s#spended and the go*ern"ent so#ght a res#"ption of the peace tal:s. $he MIL(, according to a leading MIL( "e")er, initially responded with deep reser*ation, )#t when 0resident Arroyo as:ed the ,o*ern"ent of Malaysia thro#gh 0ri"e Minister Mahathir Moha""ad to help con*ince the MIL( to ret#rn to the negotiating ta)le, the MIL( con*ened its entral o""ittee to serio#sly disc#ss the "atter and, e*ent#ally, decided to "eet with the ,%0. $he parties "et in L#ala L#"p#r on March 2B, 2??1, with the tal:s )eing facilitated )y the Malaysian go*ern"ent, the parties signing on the sa"e date the Agree"ent on the ,eneral (ra"ewor: for the %es#"ption of 0eace $al:s Between the ,%0 and the MIL(. $he MIL( thereafter s#spended all its "ilitary actions. (or"al peace tal:s )etween the parties were held in $ripoli, Li)ya fro" H#ne 2?922, 2??1, the o#tco"e of which was the ,%09MIL( $ripoli Agree"ent on 0eace @$ripoli Agree"ent 2??1A containing the )asic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation2 !ec#rity Aspect, %eha)ilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Do"ain Aspect. 8ith regard to the Ancestral Do"ain Aspect, the parties in $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1 si"ply agreed =that the sa"e )e disc#ssed f#rther )y the 0arties in their ne5t "eeting.> A second ro#nd of peace tal:s was held in y)er-aya, Malaysia on A#g#st 797, 2??1 which ended with the signing of the I"ple"enting ,#idelines on the !ec#rity Aspect of the $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1 leading to a ceasefire stat#s )etween the parties. $his was followed )y the I"ple"enting ,#idelines on the 1#"anitarian %eha)ilitation and De*elop"ent Aspects of the $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1, which was signed on May 7, 2??2 at 0#tra-aya, Malaysia. 3onetheless, there were "any incidence of *iolence )etween go*ern"ent forces and the MIL( fro" 2??2 to 2??4. Meanwhile, then MIL( hair"an !ala"at 1ashi" passed away on H#ly 14, 2??4 and he was replaced )y Al 1a- M#rad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MIL(. M#radKs position as chief peace negotiator was ta:en o*er )y Mohagher I6)al. In 2??7, se*eral e5ploratory tal:s were held )etween the parties in L#ala L#"p#r, e*ent#ally leading to the crafting of the draft M'A9AD in its final for", which, as "entioned, was set to )e signed last A#g#st 7, 2??8. Before the o#rt is what is perhaps the "ost contentio#s =consens#s> e*er e")odied in an instr#"ent [ the M'A9AD which is assailed principally )y the present petitions )earing doc:et n#")ers 184791, 184772, 184894, 184971 and 1849+2. o""only i"pleaded as respondents are the ,%0 0eace 0anel on Ancestral Do"ain and the 0residential Ad*iser on the 0eace 0rocess @0A00A 1er"ogenes .speron, Hr. 'n H#ly 24, 2??8, the 0ro*ince of 3orth ota)atoOand <ice9,o*ernor .""an#el 0iNol filed a petition, doc:eted as ,.%. 3o. 184791, for Manda"#s and 0rohi)ition with 0rayer for the Iss#ance of 8rit of 0reli"inary In-#nction and $e"porary %estraining 'rder. In*o:ing the right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern, petitioners see: to co"pel respondents to disclose and f#rnish the" the co"plete and official copies of the M'A9AD incl#ding its attach"ents, and to prohi)it the slated signing of the M'A9AD, pending the disclos#re of the contents of the M'A9AD and the holding of a p#)lic cons#ltation thereon. !#pple"entarily, petitioners pray that the M'A9AD )e declared #nconstit#tional. $his initial petition was followed )y se*eral other petitions )y other parties. $he o#rt ordered the consolidation of the petitions. ISSUE" 8hether there is a *iolation of the peopleKs right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern @1987 onstit#tion, Article III, !ec. 7A #nder a state policy of f#ll disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest @1987 onstit#tion, Article II, !ec. 28A incl#ding p#)lic cons#ltation #nder %ep#)lic Act 3o. 71+? @L'AL ,'<.%3M.3$ 'D. '( 1991C HELD" D.!. $he right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern shall )e recogni&ed. Access to official records, and to doc#"ents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to go*ern"ent research data #sed as )asis for policy de*elop"ent, shall )e afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law. As early as 19B8, in !#)ido *. '&aeta, the o#rt has recogni&ed the stat#tory right to e5a"ine and inspect p#)lic records, a right which was e*ent#ally accorded constit#tional stat#s. The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the %(4$ ,onstitution and the %(!4 ,onstitution, has been recognied as a self:executory constitutional right. In the 197+ case of Baldo&a *. 1on. H#dge Di"aano,the o#rt r#led that access to p#)lic records is predicated on the right of the people to ac6#ire infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern since, #ndo#)tedly, in a de"ocracy, the p#)ic has a legiti"ate interest in "atters of social and political significance. $he incorporation of this right in the onstit#tion is a recognition of the f#nda"ental role of free e5change of infor"ation in a de"ocracy. $here can )e no realistic perception )y the p#)lic of the nationKs pro)le"s, nor a "eaningf#l de"ocratic decision9"a:ing if they are denied access to infor"ation of general interest. Infor"ation is needed to ena)le the "e")ers of society to cope with the e5igencies of the ti"es. As has )een aptly o)ser*ed2 =Maintaining the flow of s#ch infor"ation depends on protection for )oth its ac6#isition and its disse"ination since, if either process is interr#pted, the flow ine*ita)ly ceases.> In the sa"e way that free disc#ssion ena)les "e")ers of society to cope with the e5igencies of their ti"e, access to infor"ation of general interest aids the people in de"ocratic decision9"a:ing )y gi*ing the" a )etter perspecti*e of the *ital iss#es confronting the nation, so that they "ay )e a)le to critici&e and participate in the affairs of the go*ern"ent in a responsi)le, reasona)le and effecti*e "anner. It is )y ens#ring an #nfettered and #ninhi)ited e5change of ideas a"ong a well9infor"ed p#)lic that a go*ern"ent re"ains responsi*e to the changes desired )y the people. $he M'A9AD is a "atter of p#)lic concern San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 90 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011
That the sub*ect of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. ;n fact, respondents admit that the DA/:/7 is indeed of public concern. ;n previous cases, the ,ourt found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the .egister of 7eeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of 9S;S funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Darcoses? alleged ill:gotten wealth,G%&3I and the identity of party:list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Cndoubtedly, the DA/:/7 sub*ect of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Datters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not disting#ishing as to the e5ec#tory nat#re or co""ercial character of agree"ents, the o#rt has categorically r#led that the right to infor"ation =conte"plates incl#sion of negotiations leading to the cons#""ation of the transaction.> ertainly, a cons#""ated contract is not a re6#ire"ent for the e5ercise of the right to infor"ation. 'therwise, the people can ne*er e5ercise the right if no contract is cons#""ated, and if one is cons#""ated, it "ay )e too late for the p#)lic to e5pose its defects.
.equiring a consummated contract will <eep the public in the dar< until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the ,onstitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citienry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the 1ill of .ights. 8e can allow neither an e"asc#lation of a constit#tional right, nor a retreat )y the !tate of its a*owed =policy of f#ll disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest.> Intended as a =splendid sy""etry> to the right to infor"ation #nder the Bill of %ights is the policy of p#)lic disclos#re #nder !ection 28, Article II of the onstit#tion. $he policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re en#nciated in a)o*e96#oted !ection 28 co"ple"ents the right of access to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern fo#nd in the Bill of %ights. $he right to infor"ation g#arantees the right of the people to de"and infor"ation, while !ection 28 recogni&es the d#ty of officialdo" to gi*e infor"ation e*en if no)ody de"ands. $he policy of p#)lic disclos#re esta)lishes a concrete ethical principle for the cond#ct of p#)lic affairs in a gen#inely open de"ocracy, with the peopleKs right to :now as the centerpiece. It is a "andate of the !tate to )e acco#nta)le )y following s#ch policy. $hese pro*isions are *ital to the e5ercise of the freedo" of e5pression and essential to hold p#)lic officials at all ti"es acco#nta)le to the people. 8hether !ection 28 is self9e5ec#tory, the records of the deli)erations of the onstit#tional o""ission so disclose. E/;'A'2': >(. S)/2)0'2: +< !1(09/) G.R. N+. 132%01, O/0+8)2 12, 1998 FACTS" 'n H#ne 27, 199+, this o#rt affir"ed the con*iction of petitioner Leo .chegaray y 0ilo for the cri"e of rape of the 1? year9old da#ghter of his co""on9law spo#se and the i"position #pon hi" of the death penalty for the said cri"e. 0etitioner d#ly filed a Motion for %econsideration raising "ainly fact#al iss#es, and on its heels, a !#pple"ental Motion for %econsideration raising for the first ti"e the iss#e of the constit#tionality of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 7+79 @the death penalty lawA and the i"position of the death penalty for the cri"e of rape. 'n (e)r#ary 7, 1998, this o#rt denied petitionerIs Motion for %econsideration and !#pple"ental Motion for %econsideration with a finding that ongress d#ly co"plied with the re6#ire"ents for the rei"position of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not #nconstit#tional. In the "eanti"e, ongress had seen it fit to change the "ode of e5ec#tion of the death penalty fro" electroc#tion to lethal in-ection,OBP and passed %ep#)lic Act 3o. 8177, A3 A$ D.!I,3A$I3, D.A$1 BD L.$1AL I3H.$I'3 A! $1. M.$1'D '( A%%DI3, 'J$ A0I$AL 0J3I!1M.3$, AM.3DI3, ('% $1. 0J%0'!. A%$IL. 81 '( $1. %.<I!.D 0.3AL 'D., A! AM.3D.D BD !.$I'3 2B '( %.0JBLI A$ 3'. 7+79.O7P 0#rs#ant to the pro*isions of said law, the !ecretary of H#stice pro"#lgated the %#les and %eg#lations to I"ple"ent %ep#)lic Act 3o. 8177 @/i"ple"enting r#les/AO+P and directed the Director of the B#rea# of orrections to prepare the Lethal In-ection Man#al. 'n March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a 0etition for 0rohi)ition, In-#nction andRor $e"porary %estraining 'rder to en-oin respondents !ecretary of H#stice and Director of the B#rea# of 0risons fro" carrying o#t the e5ec#tion )y lethal in-ection of petitioner #nder %.A. 3o. 8177 and its i"ple"enting r#les as these are #nconstit#tional and *oid for )eing, a"ong others2 @dAan #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power )y ongress, @eA an #nlawf#l e5ercise )y respondent !ecretary of the power to legislate, and @fA an #nlawf#l delegation of delegated powers )y the !ecretary of H#stice to respondent Director. ISSUE" 8as there #nd#e delegation with respect to the restriction i"posed on the accessi)ility of the Man#al of .5ec#tionC HELD" D.!. A caref#l reading of %.A. 3o. 8177 wo#ld show that there is no #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power fro" the !ecretary of H#stice to the Director of the B#rea# of orrections for the si"ple reason that #nder the Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987, the B#rea# of orrections is a "ere constit#ent #nit of the Depart"ent of H#stice. (#rther, the Depart"ent of H#stice is tas:ed, a"ong others, to ta:e charge of the /ad"inistration of the correctional syste"./ 1ence, the i"port of the phraseology of the law is that the !ecretary of H#stice sho#ld s#per*ise the Director of the B#rea# of orrections in pro"#lgating the Lethal In-ection Man#al, in cons#ltation with the Depart"ent of 1ealth. 1owe*er, the %#les and %eg#lations to I"ple"ent %ep#)lic Act 3o. 8177 s#ffer serio#s flaws that co#ld not )e o*erloo:ed. $o )egin with, so"ething )asic appears "issing in !ection 19 of the i"ple"enting r#les which pro*ides2 /!.. 19. .;.J$I'3 0%'.DJ%.. 9 Details of the proced#re prior to, d#ring and after ad"inistering the lethal in-ection shall )e set forth in a "an#al to )e prepared )y the Director. $he "an#al shall contain details of, a"ong others, the se6#ence of e*ents )efore and after e5ec#tionG proced#res in setting #p the intra*eno#s lineG the ad"inistration of the lethal dr#gsG the prono#nce"ent of deathG and the re"o*al of the intra*eno#s syste". "aid manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authoriEed prison personnel./ Thus, the ,ourts finds in the first paragraph of Section %( of the implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of 8ustice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the 7irector of the 1ureau of ,orrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. 1eing a mere constituent unit of the 7epartment of 8ustice, the 1ureau of ,orrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of 8ustice as the rule:ma<ing authority under ../. 2o. !%44. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid. As to the second paragraph of section 19, the ,ourt finds the requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. ;t sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. $he contents of the "an#al are "atters of p#)lic concern /which the p#)lic "ay want to :now, either )eca#se these directly affect their li*es, or si"ply )eca#se s#ch "atters nat#rally aro#se the interest of an ordinary citi&en./O+2P !ection 7 of Article III of the 1987 onstit#tion pro*ides2 /!.. 7. $he right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern shall )e recogni&ed. Access to official records, and to doc#"ents and papers pertaining to official acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to go*ern"ent research data #sed as a )asis for policy de*elop"ent, shall )e afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itation as "ay )e pro*ided )y law./ $he incorporation in the onstit#tion of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the sa"e way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision:ma<ing by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. C;'>)F >(. PCGG G.R. N+. 13071%, D)/)D8)2 9, 1998, PANGANI&AN, !." FACTS" 0etitioner as:s this o#rt to define the nat#re and the e5tent of the peopleIs constit#tional right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern. 7oes this right include access to the terms of government negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusionR Day the government, through the #residential ,ommission on 9ood 9overnment '#,99), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Darcos heirs as regards their alleged ill:gotten wealthR More specifically, are the IG),)2'. AA2))D),0I and IS1EE.)D),0'. AA2))D),0,I )oth dated Dece")er 28, 1994 and e5ec#ted )etween the 0,, and the Marcos heirs, *alid and )indingC San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 91 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 T;) C'() These are the main .uestions raised in this original action seeking
+1, to prohibit and :e<n#oin respondents :6CAA and its chairman< from privatel$ entering into, perfecting andMor e%ecuting an$ greement with the heirs of the late 6resident Lerdinand 1. 0arcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Lerdinand 0arcos located in the 6hilippines andMor abroad * including the so7called 0arcos gold hoard) and +2, to :c<ompel respondent:s< to make public all negotiations and agreement, be the$ ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the 6CAA and the 0arcos heirs. T;) F'/0( 0etitioner (rancisco I. ha*e&, as /ta5payer, citi&en and for"er go*ern"ent official who initiated the prosec#tion of the Marcoses and their cronies who co""itted #n"itigated pl#nder of the p#)lic treas#ry and the syste"atic s#)-#gation of the co#ntryIs econo"y,/ alleges that what i"pelled hi" to )ring this action were se*eral news reports 2 )annered in a n#")er of )roadsheets so"eti"e in !epte")er 1997. $hese news ite"s referred to @1A the alleged disco*ery of )illions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in *ario#s coded acco#nts in !wiss )an:sG and @2A the reported e5ec#tion of a co"pro"ise, )etween the go*ern"ent @thro#gh 0,,A and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. 0etitioner, in*o:ing his constit#tional right to infor"ation 4 and the correlati*e d#ty of the state to disclose p#)licly all its transactions in*ol*ing the national interest, B de"ands that respondents "a:e p#)lic any and all negotiations and agree"ents pertaining to 0,,Is tas: of reco*ering the MarcosesI ill9gotten wealth. 1e clai"s that any co"pro"ise on the alleged )illions of ill9gotten wealth in*ol*es an iss#e of /para"o#nt p#)lic interest,/ since it has a /de)ilitating effect on the co#ntryIs econo"y/ that wo#ld )e greatly pre-#dicial to the national interest of the (ilipino people. 1ence, the people in general ha*e a right to :now the transactions or deals )eing contri*ed and effected )y the go*ern"ent. %espondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a co"pro"ise agree"ent with the Marcos heirs. $hey clai", tho#gh, that petitionerIs action is pre"at#re, )eca#se there is no showing that he has as:ed the 0,, to disclose the negotiations and the Agree"ents. And e*en if he has, 0,, "ay not yet )e co"pelled to "a:e any disclos#re, since the proposed ter"s and conditions of the Agree"ents ha*e not )eco"e effecti*e and )inding. ISSUE" 8hether or not this o#rt co#ld re6#ire the 0,, to disclose to the p#)lic the details of any agree"ent, perfected or not, with the MarcosesC HELD" (irst !#)stanti*e Iss#e2 0#)lic Disclos#re of $er"s of Any Agree"ent, 0erfected or 3ot In see:ing the p#)lic disclos#re of negotiations and agree"ents pertaining to a co"pro"ise settle"ent with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill9 gotten wealth, petitioner in*o:es the following pro*isions of the onstit#tion2 !ec. 7 OArticle IIIP. $he right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern shall )e recogni&ed. Access to official records, and to doc#"ents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to go*ern"ent research data #sed as )asis for policy de*elop"ent, shall )e afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law. !ec. 28 OArticle IIP. !#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law, the !tate adopts and i"ple"ents a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest. %espondentsI opposite *iew is that the a)o*e constit#tional pro*isions refer to co"pleted and operati*e official acts, not to those still )eing considered. As regards the assailed Agree"ents entered into )y the 0,, with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accr#ed, )eca#se said Agree"ents ha*e not )een appro*ed )y the 0resident, and the Marcos heirs ha*e failed to f#lfill their e5press #nderta:ing therein. $h#s, the Agree"ents ha*e not )eco"e effecti*e. %espondents add that they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another co"pro"ise with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill9gotten assets. $he I9,<+2D'09+,I and the I02',('/09+,(I referred to in the s#)-ect pro*isions of the onstit#tion have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognied restrictions+ (1) ,'09+,'. ()/1290: D'00)2( ',* 9,0)..9A),/) 9,<+2D'09+, (2) 02'*) ()/2)0( ',* 8',G9,A 02',('/09+,( (3) /29D9,'. D'00)2(, ',* (4) +0;)2 /+,<9*),09'. 9,<+2D'09+,. Li"itations to the %ight2 (1) N'09+,'. S)/1290: M'00)2( At the *ery least, this -#risdiction recogni&es the co""on law holding that there is a go*ern"ental pri*ilege against p#)lic disclos#re with respect to state secrets regarding "ilitary, diplo"atic and other national sec#rity "atters. B#t where there is no need to protect s#ch state secrets, the pri*ilege "ay not )e in*o:ed to withhold doc#"ents and other infor"ation, pro*ided that they are e5a"ined /in strict confidence/ and gi*en /scr#p#lo#s protection./ Li:ewise, infor"ation on inter9go*ern"ent e5changes prior to the concl#sion of treaties and e5ec#ti*e agree"ents "ay )e s#)-ect to reasona)le safeg#ards for the sa:e of national interest. (2) T2'*) S)/2)0( ',* &',G9,A T2',('/09+,( $he drafters of the onstit#tion also #ne6#i*ocally affir"ed that, aside fro" national sec#rity "atters and intelligence infor"ation, trade or ind#strial secrets +pursuant to the 'ntellectual 6ropert$ Code and other related laws, as well as )an:ing transactions @pursuant to the "ecrec$ of 9ank 8eposits Act 28, are also e5e"pted fro" co"p#lsory disclos#re. (3) C29D9,'. M'00)2( Also e5cl#ded are classified law enforce"ent "atters, s#ch as those relating to the apprehension, the prosec#tion and the detention of cri"inals, which co#rts "ay nor in6#ire into prior to s#ch arrest, detention and prosec#tion. .fforts at effecti*e law enforce"ent wo#ld )e serio#sly -eopardi&ed )y free p#)lic access to, for e5a"ple, police infor"ation regarding resc#e operations, the wherea)o#ts of f#giti*es, or leads on co*ert cri"inal acti*ities. (4) O0;)2 C+,<9*),09'. I,<+2D'09+, $he .thical !tandards Act f#rther prohi)its p#)lic officials and e"ployees fro" #sing or di*#lging /confidential or classified infor"ation officially :nown to the" )y reason of their office and not "ade a*aila)le to the p#)lic./ 'ther ac:nowledged li"itations to infor"ation access incl#de diplo"atic correspondence, closed door a)inet "eetings and e5ec#ti*e sessions of either ho#se of ongress, as well as the internal deli)erations of the !#pre"e o#rt. S/+E)" M'00)2( +< P18.9/ C+,/)2, ',* T2',('/09+,( I,>+.>9,A P18.9/ I,0)2)(0 In <al"onte *. Bel"onte Hr., the o#rt e"phasi&ed that the infor"ation so#ght "#st )e -matters of public concern,- access to which may be limited by law. !i"ilarly, the state policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re e5tends only to -transactions involving public interest- and "ay also )e -sub*ect to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.- As to the "eanings of the ter"s IPU&LIC INTERESTI and IPU&LIC CONCERN,I the o#rt, in Legaspi *. i*il !er*ice o""ission, el#cidated2 In deter"ining whether or not a partic#lar infor"ation is of p#)lic concern there is no rigid test which can )e applied. /0#)lic concern/ li:e /p#)lic interest/ is a ter" that el#des e5act definition. 1oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of sub*ects which the public may want to <now, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citien. In the final analysis, it is for the co#rts to deter"ine on a case )y case )asis whether the "atter at iss#e is of interest or i"portance, as it relates to or affects the p#)lic. onsidered a p#)lic concern in the a)o*e9"entioned case was the -legitimate concern of citiens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.- !o was the need to gi*e the general p#)lic ade6#ate notification of *ario#s laws that reg#late and affect the actions and cond#ct of citi&ens, as held in $aNada. Li:ewise did the -public nature of the loanable funds of the 9S;S and the public office held by the alleged borrowers 'members of the defunct 1atasang #ambansa)- qualify the information sought in Malmonte as matters of public interest and concern. In A6#ino9!ar"iento *. Morato, the o#rt also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit if their official functions are public in characterJ hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records. Jnder R)E18.9/ A/0 N+. %713, p#)lic officials and e"ployees are mandated to -provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, GandI ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate . . .,- except when -otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest.- ;n particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of government and government: owned or controlled corporationsJ and the statements of assets, liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees. ;n general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 92 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants. Cndeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thoughtJ but thoughts and ideas must be well:informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticie as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. ertainly, it is )y ens#ring an #nfettered and #ninhi)ited e5change of ideas a"ong a well9 infor"ed p#)lic that a go*ern"ent re"ains responsi*e to the changes desired )y the people. T;) N'012) +< 0;) M'2/+()(Q A..)A)* I..G+00), =)'.0; .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 1, pro"#lgated on (e)r#ary 28, 198+, only two @2A days after the Marcoses fled the co#ntry, created the 0,, which was pri"arily tas:ed to assist the 0resident in the reco*ery of *ast go*ern"ent reso#rces allegedly a"assed )y for"er 0resident Marcos, his i""ediate fa"ily, relati*es and close associates )oth here and a)road. Jnder .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 2, iss#ed twel*e @12A days later, all persons and entities who had :nowledge or possession of ill9gotten assets and properties were warned and, #nder pain of penalties prescri)ed )y law, prohi)ited fro" concealing, transferring or dissipating the" or fro" otherwise fr#strating or o)str#cting the reco*ery efforts of the go*ern"ent. 'n May 7, 198+, another directi*e @.' 3o. 1BA was iss#ed gi*ing additional powers to the 0,, which, ta:ing into acco#nt the o*erriding considerations of national interest and national s#r*i*al, re6#ired it to achie*e e5peditio#sly and effecti*ely its *ital tas: of reco*ering ill9gotten wealth. With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the DarcosesF alleged ill:gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. 8e "ay also add that - ;LL:9ATT62 W6/LTH,- by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the afore"entioned .5ec#ti*e 'rders, -ill:gotten wealth- refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former #resident Darcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or propertiesJ or their having ta<en undue advantage of their public officeJ or their use of powers, influences or relationships, -resulting in their un*ust enrichment and causing grave damage and pre*udice to the >ilipino people and the .epublic of the #hilippines.- ,learly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As s#ch, #pon recon*eyance they will )e ret#rned to the p#)lic treas#ry, s#)-ect only to the satisfaction of positi*e clai"s of certain persons as "ay )e ad-#dged )y co"petent co#rts. Another declared o*erriding consideration for the e5peditio#s reco*ery of ill9gotten wealth is that it "ay )e #sed for national econo"ic reco*ery. 8e )elie*e the foregoing dis6#isition settles the 6#estion of whether petitioner has a right to respondentsI disclos#re of any agree"ent that "ay )e arri*ed at concerning the MarcosesI p#rported ill9gotten wealth. A//)(( 0+ I,<+2D'09+, +, N)A+09'09,A T)2D( 1ut does the constitutional provision li<ewise guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreementR This same clarification was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations, which we quote hereunder+ M%. !JA%.X. And when we say transactions which sho#ld )e disting#ished fro" contracts, agree"ents, or treaties or whate*er, does the ,entle"an refer to the steps leading to the cons#""ation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itselfC M%. '0L.. The transactions used here, ' suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and alread$ a consummated contract, 0r. 6residing Kfficer. M%. !JA%.X. $his conte"plates incl#sion of negotiations 2leading3 to the cons#""ation of the transactionC M%. '0L.. Ses, sub#ect to reasonable safeguards on the national interest. ,onsidering the intent of the ,onstitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the #,99 and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to ta<e up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill:gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra:agency or inter:agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the -exploratory- stage. $here is a need, of co#rse, to o)ser*e the sa"e restrictions on disclos#re of infor"ation in general, as disc#ssed earlier E s#ch as on "atters in*ol*ing national sec#rity, diplo"atic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified infor"ation. S#$%&'( ) R&*+% %' F',- A..'$&/%&'( SSS EDE.+:))( A((+/9'09+, >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.( GR 85279, !1.: 28,1989 FACTS" A co"plaint for da"ages was filed )y the !!! against the officers and "e")ers of the !!! ."ployees Association alleging that on H#ne 9, 1987, said officers and "e")ers staged an illegal stri:e and )arricaded the entrances to the !!! )#ilding. !aid action pre*ented non9 stri:ing e"ployees fro" reporting for wor: and clients fro" transacting with the !!!. !aid stri:e was reported to the 0#)lic !ector La)or Manage"ent o#ncil that ordered the stri:ers to ret#rn to wor:. !tri:ers ref#sed conse6#ently inc#rring da"ages for the !!!. ISSUE" 8hether or not !!! e"ployees ha*e the right to stri:e. HELD" 3'. $he 1987 onstit#tion, in the Article on !ocial H#stice and 1#"an %ights, pro*ides that the !tate /shall g#arantee the rights of all wor:ers to self9organi&ation, collecti*e )argaining and negotiations, and peacef#l concerted acti*ities, incl#ding the right to stri:e in accordance with law/ OArt. ;III, !ec. 4P. 1y itself, this provision would seem to recognie the right of all wor<ers and employees, including those in the public sector, to stri<e. 1ut the ,onstitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub:/rticle on the ,ivil Service ,ommission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as -all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the 9overnment, including government:owned or controlled corporations with original charters,- that -GtIhe right to self: organiation shall not be denied to government employees- G/rt. ;H'1), Sec. &'%) and '53)I. #arenthetically, the 1ill of .ights also provides that -GtIhe right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged- G/rt. ;;;, Sec. !I. Thus , while there is no question that the ,onstitution recognies the right of government employees to organie , it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to stri<e. %esort to the intent of the fra"ers of the organic law )eco"es helpf#l in #nderstanding the "eaning of these pro*isions. / reading of the proceedings of the ,onstitutional ,ommission that drafted the %(!4 ,onstitution would show that in recogniing the right of government employees to organie , the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to stri<e. $h#s, o""issioner .#logio %. Ler#", one of the sponsors of the pro*ision that /OtPhe right to self9organi&ation shall not )e denied to go*ern"ent e"ployees/ OArt. I;@BA, !ec. 2@7AP, in answer to the apprehensions e5pressed )y o""issioner A")rosio B. 0adilla, <ice9 0resident of the o""ission, e5plained2 M%. L.%JM. I thin: what I will try to say will not ta:e that long. When we proposed this amendment providing for self: organiation of government employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to organie, they also have the right to stri<e. $hat is a different "atter. 8e are only tal:ing a)o#t organi&ing, #niting as a #nion. 8ith regard to the right to stri:e, e*eryone will re"e")er that in the Bill of %ights, there is a pro*ision that the right to for" associations or societies whose p#rpose is not contrary to law shall not )e a)ridged. 3ow then, if the p#rpose of the state is to prohi)it the stri:es co"ing fro" e"ployees e5ercising go*ern"ent f#nctions, that co#ld )e done )eca#se the "o"ent that is prohi)ited, then the #nion which will go on stri:e will )e an illegal #nion. And that pro*ision is carried in %ep#)lic Act 877. In %ep#)lic Act 877, wor:ers, incl#ding those fro" the go*ern"ent9owned and controlled, are allowed to organi&e )#t they are prohi)ited fro" stri:ing. !o, the fear of o#r honora)le <ice90resident is #nfo#nded. It does not "ean that )eca#se we appro*e this resol#tion, it carries with it the right to stri:e. $hat is a different "atter. As a "atter of fact, that s#)-ect is now )eing disc#ssed in the o""ittee on !ocial H#stice )eca#se we are trying to find a sol#tion to this pro)le". 8e :now that this pro)le" e5istsG that the "o"ent we allow any)ody in the go*ern"ent to stri:e, then what will happen if the "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces will go on stri:eC 8hat will happen to those people trying to protect #sC !o that is a "atter of disc#ssion in the o""ittee on !ocial H#stice. 1ut, ; repeat, the right to form an organiation 7A6S 2AT ,/..@ with it the right to stri<e. O%ecord of the onstit#tional o""ission, *ol. I, p. 7+9P. B#t are e"ployees of the !!! co*ered )y the prohi)ition against stri:esC San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 93 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he o#rt is of the considered *iew that they are. onsidering that #nder the 1987 onstit#tion -GtIhe civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the 9overnment, including government:owned or controlled corporations with original charters- G/rt. ;H'1), Sec. &'%)J see also Sec. % of 6.A. 2o. %!3 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as -government employees-I and that the SSS is one such government:controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under ../. 2o. %%B%, its employees are part of the civil service O3A!.' *. 3L%, ,.%. 3os. +987? Y 7?297, 3o*e")er 2B, 1988P and are co*ered )y the i*il !er*ice o""issionIs "e"orand#" prohi)iting stri:es. $his )eing the case, the stri:e staged )y the e"ployees of the !!! was illegal. The general rule in the past and up to the present is that -the terms and conditions of employment in the 9overnment, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by L/W- +"ection 11, the 'ndustrial 6eace Act, /.A. Fo. 85I, as amended and Article 255, the (abor Code, 6.8. Fo. CC2, as amended,. Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government wor<ers cannot use the same weapons employed by wor<ers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in #.;M/T6 ;27CST.@ is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. .elations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Sub*ect to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionied private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. ;n 9AM6.2D62T 6D#LA@D62T, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. /nd this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. It is the stand, therefore, of this o""ission that 1@ .6/SA2 A> TH6 2/TC.6 A> TH6 #C1L;, 6D#LA@6. and TH6 #6,CL;/. ,H/./,T6. A> TH6 #C1L;, S6.M;,6, it must necessarily regard the right to stri<e given to unions in private industry as not applying to public employees and civil service employees. ;t has been stated that the 9overnment, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service , and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they employ. ..'. 3o. 18?, which pro*ides g#idelines for the e5ercise of the right to organi&e of go*ern"ent e"ployees, while clinging to the sa"e philosophy, has, howe*er, relaxed the r#le to allow negotiation where the ter"s and conditions of e"ploy"ent in*ol*ed are not a"ong those fi5ed )y law. $h#s2 !.$I'3 14. $er"s and conditions of e"ploy"ent or i"pro*e"ents thereof, e5cept those that are fi5ed )y law, "ay )e the s#)-ect of negotiations )etween d#ly recogni&ed e"ployeesI organi&ations and appropriate go*ern"ent a#thorities. $he sa"e e5ec#ti*e order has also pro*ided for the general "echanis" for the settle"ent of la)or disp#tes in the p#)lic sector, to wit2 !.$I'3 1+. $he i*il !er*ice and la)or laws and proced#res, whene*er applica)le, shall )e followed in the resol#tion of co"plaints, grie*ances and cases in*ol*ing go*ern"ent e"ployees. In case any disp#te re"ains #nresol*ed after e5ha#sting all the a*aila)le re"edies #nder e5isting laws and proced#res, the parties "ay -ointly refer the disp#te to the O0#)lic !ector La)or9Manage"entP o#ncil for appropriate action. 9overnment employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the ,ongress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. ;f there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the #ublic Sector Labor:Danagement ,ouncil for appropriate action . 1ut employees in the civil service may not resort to stri<es, wal<outs and other temporary wor< stoppages, li<e wor<ers in the private sector, to pressure the 9overnment to accede to their demands. V9/0+29',+ >(. E.9F'.*) R+E) =+2G)2(Q U,9+, GR 2524%, S)E0. 12,1974 FACTS" Appellee Ben-a"in <ictoriano is a "e")er of /Iglesia ni risto/, an e"ployee of the .li&alde %ope (actory, Inc, and a "e")er of the .li&alde %ope 8or:ersI Jnion which had with the o"pany a BA containing a /.+()* (;+E pro*ision which states that Me")ership in the Jnion shall )e re6#ired as a condition of e"ploy"ent for all per"anent e"ployees wor:ers co*ered )y this Agree"ent. !nder "ection C+a,, paragraph C, of /A 85I, the emplo$er was not precluded from making an agreement with a labor organiEation to re.uire as a condition of emplo$ment membership therein, if such labor organiEation is the representative of the emplo$ees. 8hen %A 447? was enacted, it introd#ced an a"end"ent2 ... /)#t s#ch agree"ent shall not co*er "e")ers of any religio#s sects which prohi)it affiliation of their "e")ers in any s#ch la)or organi&ation/. As a member of a sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with an$ labor organiEation, appellee resigned from the !nion. Thereafter, the !nion asked the Compan$ to separate Appellee from service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the !nion as a member. Appellee filed an action for in-#nction. ISSUE" 8'3 %A 447? is #nconstit#tional since it infringes on the right to for" lawf#l associationsC HELD" 3o. %A 447? does not infringe right to association. Both the onstit#tion and %A 877 recogni&e freedo" of association. What the ,onstitution and the ;ndustrial #eace /ct recognie and guarantee is the -right- to form or *oin associations. a right co"prehends at least two )road notions, na"ely2 first , liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by lawJ and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, *oin or refrain from 8oining an association. ;t is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should *oin or not an associationJ and should he choose to *oin, he himself ma<es up his mind as to which association he would *oinJ and even after he has *oined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organiation at any time. ;t is clear, therefore, that the right to *oin a union includes the right to abstain from *oining any union. Inas"#ch as what )oth the onstit#tion and the Ind#strial 0eace Act ha*e recogni&ed, and g#aranteed to the e"ployee, is 0;) I29A;0I to *oin associations of his choice, it wo#ld )e a)s#rd to say that the law also i"poses, in the sa"e )reath, #pon the e"ployee the d#ty to -oin associations. $he right to refrain fro" -oining la)or orgs recogni&ed )y of the Ind#strial 0eace Act is li"ited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from *oining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop. 1y virtue, of a closed shop agreement, before ./ $$53, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to <eep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to *oin the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn. To that all7embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, /A ;;I0 introduced an exception ? -but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organiation-. It "erely e5cl#des ipso -#re fro" the application and co*erage of the closed shop agree"ent the e"ployees )elonging to any religio#s sects which prohi)it affiliation of their "e")ers with any la)or organi&ation. 8hat the e5ception pro*ides, therefore, is that "e")ers of said religio#s sects cannot )e co"pelled or coerced to -oin la)or #nions e*en when said #nions ha*e closed shop agree"ents with the e"ployersG that in spite of any closed shop agree"ent, "e")ers of said religio#s sects cannot )e ref#sed e"ploy"ent or dis"issed fro" their -o)s on the sole gro#nd that they are not "e")ers of the collecti*e )argaining #nion. ;t is clear, therefore, that the assailed /ct, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. ;t does not prohibit the members of said .6L;9;ACS S6,TS from affiliating with labor unions. ;t still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religio#s )eliefs, the "e")ers of said religio#s sects prefer to sign #p with the la)or #nion, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religio#s faith, they ref#se to sign #p, they can do soG the law does not coerce them to *oin J neither does the law prohibit them from *oining J and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to *oin. ./ $$53, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. I, 2)" I&P D)D8)2(;9E *1)( *).9,M1),/: +< A00: M'2/9'. E*9..9+, A.C 1928, A1A1(0 3 1978 FACTS" $he IB0 #nani"o#sly adopted a resol#tion co""ending to the ! to re"o*e Marcial .dillion, a d#ly licensed practising lawyer, fro" the roll of attorneys )eca#se of his st#))orn ref#sal to pay his "e")ership d#es despite d#e notice. .dillon ref#sed to pay )elie*ing it to )e an in*asion of his constit#tional rights as he was )eing co"pelled to )e a "e")er of the IB0 and to pay its d#es was a precondition to "aintaining his stat#s as a lawyer. ISSUE" Is co"pelling a lawyer to )e a "e")er of the IB0 *iolating oneKs constit#tional freedo" to associateC HELD" 3o. The S, maintains that the ;1# does not ma<e a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member of. 1y virtue of his passing the 1ar exams, 6dillon automatically becomes an ;1# member. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 94 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he first o)-ection posed )y the respondent is that the o#rt is witho#t power to co"pel hi" to )eco"e a "e")er of the Integrated Bar of the 0hilippines, hence, !ection 1 of the o#rt %#le is #nconstit#tional for it i"pinges on his constit#tional right of freedo" to associate @and not to associateA. Aur answer is+ To compel a lawyer to be a member of the ;ntegrated 1ar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. ;ntegration does not ma<e a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the 1ar when he passed the 1ar examinations. /ll that integration actually does is to provide an official national organiation for the well:defined but unorganied and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 1ar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his ;ntegrated 1ar ,hapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is sub*ected is the payment of annual dues. $he !#pre"e o#rt, in order to further the StateFs legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the sub*ects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program L the lawyers. Ass#"ing that the 6#estioned pro*ision does in a sense co"pel a lawyer to )e a "e")er of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is *ustified as an exercise of the police power of the state $he o#rt f#rther "aintains that said IB0 fees is a regulatory measure intended to raise f#nds for carrying o#t its o)-ecti*es and p#rposes of the integration. $he o#rt carries the constit#tional power and d#ty to pro"#lgate r#les that concern ad"issions and practice of law, incl#ding the integration of the 0hilippine Bar. Section 10 Non-Impairment Clause R100)2 >(. E(0)8', G.R. N+. L 3708 M': 18, 1953 FACTS" 'n 2? A#g#st 19B1, %oyal L. %#tter sold to 0lacido H. .ste)an two @2A parcels of land sit#ated in the ity of Manila. $o sec#re the pay"ent of said )alance of 0B,8??, a first "ortgage o*er the sa"e parcels of land was constit#ted in fa*or of %#tter. $he deed of sale ha*ing )een registered, a new title was iss#ed in fa*or of 0lacido H. .ste)an with the "ortgage d#ly annotated on the )ac: thereof. .ste)an failed to pay the two install"ents as agreed #pon, as well as the interest that had accr#ed thereon, and so on 2 A#g#st 19B9, %#tter instit#ted an action in the o#rt of (irst Instance @(IA Manila to reco*er the )alance d#e, the interest d#e thereon, and the attorneyKs fees stip#lated in the contract. $he co"plaint also contains a prayer for the sale of the properties "ortgaged in accordance with law. 1steban admitted averments of the complaint but set up defense on the moratorium clause embodied in /A ;C2 +approved 2= >ul$ 14C8,, allowing a war sufferer eight +8, $ears from the settlement of his claim b$ the 6hilippine -ar 8amage Commission. After a "otion for s#""ary -#dg"ent has )een presented )y .ste)an, and the re6#isite e*idence s#)"itted co*ering the rele*ant facts, the co#rt rendered -#dg"ent dis"issing the co"plaint holding that the o)ligation which %#tter see:s to enforce is not yet de"anda)le #nder the "oratori#" law. %#tter filed a "otion for reconsideration wherein he raised for the first ti"e the constit#tionality of the "oratori#" law, )#t the "otion was denied. %#tter appealed. ISSUE" 8hether %ep#)lic Act 4B2 is #nconstit#tional for )eing *iolati*e of the constit#tional pro*ision for)idding the i"pair"ent of the o)ligation of contractsC HELD" D.!. !tat#tes declaring a "oratori#" on the enforce"ent of "onetary o)ligations are not of recent enact"ent. Moratori#" laws ha*e )een adopted =d#ring ti"es of financial distress, especially when incident to, or ca#sed )y, a war.> The Doratorium Law is a valid exercise by the State of its police power, being an emergency measure. /lthough conceding that the obligations of the contract were impaired, the impairment was within the police power of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which the legislature had found to exist. The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies in the determination of TH6 #6.;A7 A> SCS#62S;A2 A> TH6 .6D67@. ;t is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution. 1erein, o)ligations had )een pending since 19B7 as a res#lt of the iss#ance of .5ec#ti*e 'rders 27 and 42 and at present their enforce"ent is still inhi)ited )eca#se of the enact"ent of %ep#)lic Act 4B2 and would continue to be unenforceable during the 87$ear period granted to prewar debtors to afford the" an opport#nity to reha)ilitate the"sel*es, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least %& years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far bac< as %("%. This period seems to be unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of ,ongress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded wor<s in*ustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. $heir hope to effect collection )eco"es e5tre"ely re"ote, "ore so if the credits are #nsec#red. /nd the in*ustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief. $h#s, the o#rt declared that the contin#ed operation and enforce"ent of %ep#)lic Act 4B2 at the present ti"e is #nreasona)le and oppressi*e, and sho#ld not )e prolonged a "in#te longer, and the sa"e sho#ld )e declared n#ll and *oid and witho#t effect. $his also holds tr#e as regards .5ec#ti*e 'rders 27 and 42, considering that said 'rders contain no li"itation whatsoe*er in point of ti"e as regards the s#spension of the enforce"ent and effecti*ity of "onetary o)ligations. $his prono#nce"ent is "ost especially needed in *iew of the re*i*al cla#se e")odied in said Act if and when it is declared #nconstit#tional or in*alid.
O209A'( ',* C+. L0*. P'20,)2(;9E >(. F)'09 &',G ',* T21(0 C+. GR 24%70, D)/. 14, 1979 FACTS" 0laintiff 'rtigas was engaged in the )#siness of de*eloping and selling residential lots in 1ighway 1ills !#)di*ision, Mandal#yong. It sold to *endees 0adilla and Angeles two lots @Lots 7 and +A in install"ents #nder separate agree"ents of sale. $he *endees transferred their rights to ha*e&. Jpon co"pletion of pay"ent, plaintiff e5ec#ted the deeds of sale which contained a restriction, inter alia, that the lots shall )e #sed )y the )#yer e5cl#si*ely for residential p#rposes. $he restriction was annotated in the titles of ha*e&. Defendant (eati )o#ght fro" her the lots and the )#ilding restrictions were also annotated in its titles. (eati "aintains that the area along the western part of .D!A fro" !haw Bl*d. to 0asig %i*er, where the lots were located, has )een declared a co""ercial and ind#strial &one per %esol#tion 27 of the M#nicipal o#ncil of Mandal#yong. !o, it started constr#cting a 8',G on the lots. 0laintiff de"anded that (eati stop its constr#ction. $he latter ref#sed, arg#ing that the )#ilding was in accordance with the &oning reg#lations and it had o)tained )#ilding and planning per"its. 6laintiff sought the help of the court to command Leati to compl$ with the restrictions annotated in its title. The trial court held that the restrictions were subordinate to the .esolution, which was a valid exercise of police power. ;t upheld the classification by the Dunicipal ,ouncil as having rendered ineffective the restrictions. B#t plaintiff, in a "otion for reconsideration which was s#)se6#ently denied, arg#ed that said o#ncil had no power to n#llify the contract#al o)ligations ass#"ed )y (eati. ISSUE" 8hether the M#nicipal %esol#tion, declaring the lots as part of the co""ercial and ind#strial &one of the "#nicipality, superseded the restrictions imposed by Artigas, which was a contract#al #nderta:ing )etween the parties to the sale HELD" D.!^ The Local /utonomy /ct empowers a Dunicipal ,ouncil to adopt oning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. ,ranting that the %esol#tion is not an ordinance, it is a reg#latory "eas#re. $he general welfare cla#se is li)erally interpreted in case of do#)t to gi*e "ore power to local go*ern"ents in pro"oting its econo"ic conditions, the social welfare and "aterial progress of the people in the co""#nity. The exceptions are =existing vested rights0 arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand and a $rd party on the other, in which case, the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. While non: impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. The exercise of this power may be *udicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, un*ust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or violation of applicable constitutional guarantees. $he %esol#tion was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. The lots in question not only front the highwayJ industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. 67S/ was a main traffic artery. The resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. $he right to e5ercise the police power is a contin#ing one and a )#siness lawf#l today "ay in the f#t#re, )eca#se of changed sit#ationR growth of pop#lation, )eco"e a "enace to the p#)lic health and welfare, and )e re6#ired to yield to the p#)lic good. The State, to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, property, business and occupations. $he %esol#tion was reasona)le, a legiti"ate response to a felt p#)lic need, not whi"sical or oppressi*e. The non:impairment of contracts clause will not bar a police power legislation, which is not li<ely to succumb to the challenge that because of it, contractual rights are rendered nugatory. .5isting laws are read into contracts agreed #pon )y the parties to fi5 o)ligations )etween the". $he reser*ation of essential attri)#tes of so*ereign power is also read intro contracts as a post#late of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government, which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. $he law for"s part of, and is read into e*ery contract #nless clearly e5cl#ded therefro" in those cases allowed. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 95 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 .6#ity will not enforce a restriction #pon the #se of property )y in-#nction where the property has so changed in character and en*iron"ent as to "a:e it #nfit or #nprofita)le for #se sho#ld the restriction )e enforced. "ince it is now unprofitable and a health7and7 comfort haEard to use lots I and = for strictl$ residential purposes, Leati should be permitted, on the strength of the /esolution, to use the same for commercial purposes. $here is no pro*iso in the %esol#tion e5pressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended to interfere with the agree"ent )etween the parties. Thus, even if the restrictions where assumed by >eati, the contractual underta<ing cannot be enforced as against the police power legislation. LO$ANO >(. THE HONORA&LE ANTONIO M. MARTINE$ G.R. N+. L%3419, D)/)D8)2 18, 198%, -AP, ! F'/0(" 9s#pra9 I((1)" 8hether or not B0 22 i"pairs freedo" of contractC H).*" 3o. $he gra*a"en of the offense p#nished )y B.0. 22 is the act of "a:ing and iss#ing a worthless chec: or a chec: that is dishonored #pon its presentation for pay"ent. ;t is not the non:payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of sanctions, the ma<ing of worthless chec<s and putting them is circulation. Beca#se of its deleterio#s effects on the p#)lic interest, the practice is proscri)ed )y the law. $he law p#nishes the act not as an offense against property, )#t an offense against p#)lic order. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into -lawful- contracts . ,ontracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind that chec<s can not be categoried as mere contracts. ;t is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has become a convenient substitute for moneyJ it form part of the ban<ing system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. RODOLFO T. GAN$ON >(. THE HONORA&LE SANCHO -. INSERTO G.R. N+. L5%450. !1.: 25, 1983, GUTIERRE$, !R., ! F'/0(" 0etitioner %odolfo ,an&on initiated proceedings to e5tra9-#dicially foreclose a real estate "ortgage e5ec#ted )y the pri*ate respondents in his fa*or. $he Deed of %eal .state Mortgage e5ec#ted )etween %andolph $a-anlangit and .ste)an $a-anlangit as "ortgagors on one hand and %odolfo ,an&on as "ortgagee on the other hand was to sec#re the pay"ent )y the $a-anlangits of a pro"issory note a"o#nting to 0B?,???.?? in fa*or of ,an&on. $hereafter, petitioner ,regorio Lira, in his capacity as e59oficio pro*incial sheriff of Iloilo ser*ed personal notice of the foreclos#re proceedings on the pri*ate respondents. A day )efore the sched#led p#)lic a#ction, the pri*ate respondents filed a ci*il action for specific perfor"ance, da"ages, and prohi)ition with preli"inary in-#nction against the petitioners with the respondent co#rt. $he action, so#ght to declare the e5tra-#dicial foreclos#re proceedings and all proceedings ta:en in connection therewith n#ll and *oid. $he trial co#rt iss#ed an order en-oining the pro*incial sheriff fro" proceeding with the sched#led a#ction sale. Before act#al trial, the pri*ate respondents filed a /Motion (or %elease 'f %eal .state And (or $he ler: 'f o#rt $o Accept Bond 'r ash In Lie# $hereof,/ to which the petitioners interposed an 'pposition. $he respondent co#rt granted the respondentsI "otion. I((1)" 8hether or not the trial co#rt ma$ order the cancellation of a mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the pa$ment of a promissor$ note and substitute such mortgage lien with a suret$ bond appro*ed )y the sa"e co#rt to sec#re the pay"ent of the pro"issory noteC H).*" 3o. $he 6#estioned co#rt orders violate the non7impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. !#)stit#tion of the "ortgage with a s#rely )ond to sec#re the pay"ent of the 0B?.???.?? note wo#ld in effect change the ter"s and conditions of the "ortgage contract. .*en )efore trial on the *ery iss#es affecting the contract, the respondent co#rt has directed a de*iation fro" its ter"s, di"inished its efficiency and dispensed with a pri"ary condition. / mortgage is but an accessory contract. The consideration of the mortgage is the same consideration of the principal contract without which it cannot exist as an independent contract. The mortgage lien in favor of petitioner .odolfo 9anon is inseparable from the mortgaged property. ;t is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage contract . Doreover, the questioned orders violate the non:impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under the ,onstitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the #"3,333.33 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. .*en )efore trial on the *ery iss#es affecting the contract, the respondent co#rt has directed a de*iation fro" its ter"s, di"inished its efficiency, and dispensed with a pri"ary condition %I!$'01.% ,AMB'A *s. 1'3. AL(%.D' %JX ,.%. 3o. L97+291. H#ne 27, 1988,0ADILLA, H (acts2 'n H#ly 19, 1979, he was arrested for *agrancy, witho#t a warrant of arrest, )y 0atrol"an Art#ro 0alencia. $hereafter, petitioner was )ro#ght to 0recinct 2, Manila, where he was )oo:ed for *agrancy and then detained therein together with se*eral others.$he following day, H#ly 2?,1979, d#ring the line#p of fi*e @7A detainees, incl#ding petitioner, co"plainant .rlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, /that one is a co"panion./ After the identification, the other detainees were )ro#ght )ac: to their cell )#t petitioner was ordered to stay on. 8hile the co"plainant was )eing interrogated )y the police in*estigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her. 'n H#ly 24, 1979, an infor"ation for ro))ery was filed against the petitioner. 'n A#g#st 22, 1979, petitioner was arraigned. $hereafter, hearings were held. 'n April 2, 198?, the prosec#tion for"ally offered its e*idence and then rested its case. 'n H#ly 1B, 198?, petitioner, )y co#nsel, instead of presenting his defense, "anifested in open co#rt that he was filing a Motion to Ac6#it or De"#rrer to .*idence. 'n A#g#st 14, 198?, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the gro#nd that the cond#ct of the line9#p, witho#t notice to, and in the a)sence of, his co#nsel *iolated his constit#tional rights to co#nsel and to d#e process. Iss#e2 8hether or not there was a *iolation of petitionerKs constit#tional right to co#nselC %#ling2 3o. $he right to co#nsel attaches #pon the start of an in*estigation, i.e. when the in*estigating officer starts to as: 6#estions to elicit infor"ation andRor confessions or ad"issions fro" the respondentRacc#sed. At s#ch point or stage, the person )eing interrogated "#st )e assisted )y co#nsel to a*oid the pernicio#s practice of e5torting false or coerced ad"issions or confessions fro" the lips of the person #ndergoing interrogation, for the co""ission of an offense. $he o#rt has consistently held that no c#stodial in*estigation shall )e cond#cted #nless it )e in the presence of co#nsel, engaged )y the person arrested, or )y any person in his )ehalf, or appointed )y the co#rt #pon petition either of the detainee hi"self or )y anyone in his )ehalf, and that, while the right "ay )e wai*ed, the wai*er shall not )e *alid #nless "ade in writing and in the presence of co#nsel. As aptly o)ser*ed, howe*er, )y the !olicitor ,eneral, the police line9#p was not part of the c#stodial in6#est, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at s#ch stage, to co#nsel. 8hen the process had not yet shifted fro" the in*estigatory to the acc#satory as when police in*estigation does not elicit a confession the acc#sed "ay not yet a*ail of the ser*ices of his lawyer. !ince petitioner in the co#rse of his identification in the police line9 #p had not yet )een held to answer for a cri"inal offense, he was, therefore, not depri*ed of his right to )e assisted )y co#nsel )eca#se the acc#satory process had not yet set in. $he police co#ld not ha*e *iolated petitionerIs right to co#nsel and d#e process as the confrontation )etween the !tate and hi" had not )eg#n. 0eople *s. Maca" 248 !%A 4?+,V#iason, H. (A$!2 $he acc#sed [appellant was charged with the cri"e of ro))ery with ho"icide. Acc#sed and his )rother was s#ddenly apprehended )y the sec#rity g#ards and )ro#ght to the police head6#arters in V#e&on ity. $hey were also forced to ad"it certain things, after which, he together with all the acc#sed were in handc#ffs )ore cont#sions ca#sed )y )lows indicted on their faces d#ring c#stodial in*estigation. $hereafter, they was )ro#ght to hospital )efore each s#r*i*ing *icti"s and "ade to line9#p for identification. I!!J.2 8hether or not the right to co#nsel has )een *iolated d#ring c#stodial in*estigation. %JLI3,2 Des. It is appropriate to e5tend the co#nsel g#arantee to critical stages of prosec#tion e*en )efore the trial. $he law enforce"ent "achinery at present in*ol*es critical confrontations of the acc#sed )y the prosec#tion at pre9trial proceedings /where the res#lt "ight well settle the acc#sedIs fate and red#ce the trial itself to a "ere for"ality./ A police line9 #p is considered a /critical/ stage of the proceedings. After the start of the c#stodial in*estigation, any identification of an #nco#nseled acc#sed "ade in a police line9#p is inad"issi)le. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 96 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 0eople *s. H#dge Ayson 177 !%A 21+, 3ar*asa, H. (acts2 (elipe %a"os was a tic:et freight cler: of the 0hilippines Airlines assigned at its Bag#io station. It was alleged that he was in*ol*ed in irreg#larities in the sales of a plane tic:ets, $he 0AL notified hi" of an in*estigation to )e cond#cted. $he in*estigation was sched#led in accordance with 0ALKs code of cond#ct. A letter was sent )y %a"os stating his willingness to settle the a"o#nt. $wo "onths after a cri"e of .stafa was charged against %a"os. .*idence was presented )y the prosec#tion containing %a"osK ad"ission and state"ent, to which defendantKs arg#ed that the confession was ta:en witho#t the acc#sed )eing represented )y a lawyer and right to re"ain silent. Iss#e2 8hether or not right to c#stodial in*estigation has )een *iolated. 1eld2 3'. $he rights a)o*e specified, to repeat, e5ist only in /c#stodial interrogations,/ or /in9c#stody interrogation of acc#sed persons./ As the o#rt has already stated, )y c#stodial interrogation is "eant /6#estioning initiated )y law enforce"ent officers after a person has )een ta:en into c#stody or otherwise depri*ed of his freedo" of action in any significant way./It is a*owedly deri*ed fro" the decision of the J.!. !#pre"e o#rt in Miranda *. Ari&ona, a decision descri)ed as an /earth6#a:e in the world of law enforce"ent./ !ection 2? states that whene*er any person is /#nder in*estigation for the co""ission of an offense/99 1A he shall ha*e the right to re"ain silent and to co#nsel, and to )e infor"ed of s#ch right, 2A nor force, *iolence, threat, inti"idation, or any other "eans which *itiates the free will shall )e #sed against hi"G and 4A any confession o)tained in *iolation of 5 5 @these rights shall )e inad"issi)le in e*idence. In Miranda, hief H#stice 8arren s#""ari&ed the proced#ral safeg#ards laid down for a person in police c#stody, /in9c#stody interrogation/ )eing regarded as the co""ence"ent of an ad*ersary proceeding against the s#spect. 0eople *s 0inlac 1+7 !%A +7B, 0A%A!, H. (acts2 Acc#sed %onilo 0inlac y Li)ao was charged in two @2A separate infor"ation. $he trial co#rt fo#nd the acc#sed g#ilty. 1ence the a#to"atic re*iew. According to 0inlac, at a)o#t 22?? 0.M., April 9, 198+, three @4A 0olice"en, ca"e to his ho#se in $ag#ig and arrested the acc#sed for ro))ing Mr. !ato and for :illing Mr. 'sa"#, witho#t any 8arrant of Arrest shown to hi" despite his de"and. Before he was )ro#ght first to the ho#ses of Mr. !ato and Mr. 'sa"#, they wal:ed hi" aro#nd and showed hi" the destroyed windowG and thereafter )ro#ght hi" inside the ho#se. In short, he was ordered to reenact according to what the police theori&ed how the cri"e was co""itted. It was at this "o"ent that the prints of the sole of acc#sedIs shoes were all o*er the pre"ises of 'sa"# and !atoIs ho#ses. $hat d#ring the in*estigation at the 0olice 1ead6#arters, he was tort#red and forced to ad"it the cri"es charged. Iss#e2Is the constit#tional right of the acc#sed 0inlac #nder c#stodial in*estigation to )e infor"ed of his right to re"ain silent and to co#nsel co"plied withC 1eld2 3'. $he right "#st )e pres#"ed to conte"plate the trans"ission of "eaningf#l infor"ation rather than -#st the cere"onial and perf#nctory recitation of an a)stract constit#tional principle. As a r#le, therefore, it wo#ld not )e s#fficient for a police officer -#st to repeat to the person #nder in*estigation the pro*isions of the onstit#tion. 1e is not only d#ty9)o#nd to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitledG he "#st also e5plain their effects in practical ter"s. $he right of a person #nder interrogation /to )e infor"ed/ i"plies a correlati*e o)ligation on the part of the police in*estigator to e5plain, and conte"plates an effecti*e co""#nication that res#lts in #nderstanding what is con*eyed. !hort of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot tr#ly )e said that the person has )een /infor"ed/ of his rights. (#rther"ore, the acc#sed was not assisted )y co#nsel and his alleged wai*er was "ade witho#t the assistance of co#nsel. $he record of the case is also replete with e*idence which was not satisfactorily re)#tted )y the prosec#tion, that the acc#sed was "altreated and tort#red for se*en @7A solid ho#rs )efore he signed the prepared e5tra9-#dicial confession. 0.'0L. '( $1. 01ILI00I3.! *s. B.33D DD ,.%. 3o. 7B717, (e)r#ary 24, 1988, M.L.3I'91.%%.%A, H. (acts2 (elled )y a g#nshot wo#nd on the nec:, which ca#sed his death appro5i"ately, was hristian Langel y 0hilippe, a !wiss to#rist who was *acationing on the Boracay Island together with his sister and so"e friends. A police report was entered in the police )lotter of the Malay 0olice !#)9station, Malay, A:lan. !#spect Benny Dy *ol#ntarily s#rrendered to the s#)9station co""ander with his cali)er 48. Acting on the report, hief of 0olice $a")ong prepared a o"plaint charging the Acc#sed, Benny Dy, the owner of /BennyIs Bar/ sit#ated on the Island, with the cri"e of M#rder 8ith the Jse of Jnlicensed firear"s. After trial, the lower o#rt find the acc#sed g#ilty of the cri"e of M#rder. 1ence, this appeal. Iss#e 8hether the trial co#rt erred in holding that co"pliance with the constit#tional proced#re on c#stodial interrogation is not applica)le in the case. 1eld2 3o. $he case history and the doc#"entary e*idence attest strongly to AppellantIs oral confession and *ol#ntary s#rrender. $he sworn o"plaint for /M#rder with Jse of Jnlicensed (irear"/ signed )y the hief of 0olice also attests to AppellantIs oral confession.$hat o"plaint for"s part of the record of the proceedings )efore the M#nicipal irc#it $rial o#rt of B#r#anga, A:lan, and is pri"a facie e*idence of the facts therein stated. $he fact of AppellantIs s#rrender is f#rther )orne o#t )y the 'rder of the M#nicipal irc#it $rial o#rt H#dge, categorically reciting that /no warrant of arrest is iss#ed for the apprehension of the acc#sed for the reason that he is already #nder police c#stody )efore the filing of the co"plaint./ ontrary to the defense contention, the oral confession "ade )y the acc#sed to 0at. 0adilla that he had shot a to#rist and that the g#n he had #sed in shooting the *icti" was in his )ar which he wanted s#rrendered to the hief of 0olice is co"petent e*idence against hi". $he declaration of an acc#sed ac:nowledging his g#ilt of the offense charged "ay )e gi*en in e*idence against hi" @!ee. 29, %#le 14?, %#les of o#rtA. It "ay in a sense )e also regarded as part of the res gestae. $he r#le is that, any person, otherwise co"petent as a witness, who heard the confession, is co"petent to testify as to the s#)stance of what he heard if he heard and #nderstood all of it. An oral confession need not )e repeated *er)ati", )#t in s#ch a case it "#st )e gi*en in s#)stance. 8hat was told )y the Acc#sed to 0at, 0adilla was a spontaneo#s state"ent not elicited thro#gh 6#estioning, )#t gi*en an ordinary "anner. 3o written confession was so#ght to )e presented in e*idence as a res#lt of for"al c#stodial in*estigation. 0.'0L. '( $1. 01ILI00I3.! *s. A%3.L ALIA3D' y B%I'3.! ,.%. 3o. 117B87, Dece")er 12, 1997, 0J3', H. (acts2 $he appelant Arnel Alicando was charged with the cri"e of rape with ho"icide against the person of a "inor Lha&ie Mae 0enecilla @fo#r years oldA. Alicando was arrested and interrogated )y 0'4 Danilo $an. 1e *er)ally confessed his g#ilt witho#t the assistance of co#nsel. 'n the )asis of his #nco#nselled *er)al confession and follow #p interrogations, the police ca"e to :now and reco*ered fro" appellantIs ho#se, Lha&ie MaeIs green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a )#ri "at, a stained pillow and a stained $9shirt all of which were presented as e*idence for the prosec#tion. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 97 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he appellant was arraigned and pleaded g#ilty. $he trial co#rt fo#nd appellant g#ilty and sentenced hi" to death. $he case is on a#to"atic re*iew considering the death penalty i"posed )y the trial co#rt. Iss#e2 8hether the trial co#rt erred in con*icting the acc#sed. 1eld2 Des. !o"e prosec#tion e*idence, offered independently of the plea of g#ilt of the appellant, were inad"issi)le, yet, were considered )y the trial co#rt in con*icting the appellant. It is now fa"iliar learning that the onstit#tion has stig"ati&ed as inad"issi)le e*idence #nco#nselled confession or ad"ission as pro*ided #nder !ection 12 paragraphs @1A and @4A of Article III of the onstit#tion. It is not only the #nco#nselled confession that is conde"ned as inad"issi)le, )#t also e*idence deri*ed therefro". $he pillow and the $9shirt with the alleged )loodstains were e*idence deri*ed fro" the #nco#nselled confession illegally e5tracted )y the police fro" the appellant. $he o#rt ha*e not only constit#tionali&ed the Miranda warnings in o#r -#risdiction. $hey ha*e also adopted the li)ertarian e5cl#sionary r#le :nown as the /fr#it of the poisono#s tree/. According to this r#le, once the pri"ary so#rce @the /tree/A is shown to ha*e )een #nlawf#lly o)tained, any secondary or deri*ati*e e*idence @the / fr#it / A deri*ed fro" it is also inad"issi)le. $he r#le is )ased on the principle that e*idence illegally o)tained )y the !tate sho#ld not )e #sed to gain other e*idence )eca#se the originally illegally o)tained e*idence taints all e*idence s#)se6#ently o)tained. $he )#rden to pro*e that an acc#sed wai*ed his right to re"ain silent and the right to co#nsel )efore "a:ing a confession #nder c#stodial interrogation rests with the prosec#tion. It is also the )#rden of the prosec#tion to show that the e*idence deri*ed fro" confession is not tainted as /fr#it of the poisono#s tree./ $he )#rden has to )e discharged )y clear and con*incing e*idence. Indeed, par. 1 of !ection 12 of Article III of the onstit#tion pro*ides only one "ode of wai*er E the wai*er "#st )e in writing and in the presence of co#nsel. In the case at )ar, the records show that the prosec#tion #tterly failed to discharge this )#rden. I3'.3I' BA!' *s. HJD,. L.' 1. %A0A$AL' A.M. 3o. %$H99+91447. March 7, 1997, %'M.%', H. !ince the deter"ination of whether or not the e*idence of g#ilt against the acc#sed is strong is a "atter of -#dicial discretion, the -#dge is "andated to cond#ct a hearing e*en in cases where the prosec#tion chooses to -#st file a co""ent or lea*e the application for )ail to the discretion of the co#rt. (acts2 $he co"plainant Inocencio Basco, father of the *icti", charged respondent H#dge Leo M. %apatalo of %$, Branch 42, Agoo, La Jnion with gross ignorance or willf#l disregard of esta)lished r#le of law for granting )ail to an acc#sed %oger Morente in a "#rder case witho#t recei*ing e*idence and cond#cting a hearing. In his co""ent, respondent H#dge alleged that he granted the petition )ased on the prosec#torIs option not to oppose the petition as well as the latterIs reco""endation setting the )ail)ond in the a"o#nt of 08?,???.??. 1e a*erred that when the prosec#tion chose not to oppose the petition for )ail, he had the discretion on whether to appro*e it or not. Iss#e2 8hether a petition for )ail can )e granted witho#t cond#cting a hearing. 1eld2 3o. 8hen the grant of )ail is discretionary, the prosec#tion has the )#rden of showing that the e*idence of g#ilt against the acc#sed is strong. 1owe*er, the deter"ination of whether or not the e*idence of g#ilt is strong, )eing a "atter of -#dicial discretion, re"ains with the -#dge. /$his discretion )y the *ery nat#re of things, "ay rightly )e e5ercised only after the e*idence is s#)"itted to the co#rt at the hearing. !ince the discretion is directed to the weight of the e*idence and since e*idence cannot properly )e weighed if not d#ly e5hi)ited or prod#ced )efore the co#rt, it is o)*io#s that a proper e5ercise of -#dicial discretion re6#ires that the e*idence of g#ilt )e s#)"itted to the co#rt, the petitioner ha*ing the right of cross e5a"ination and to introd#ce his own e*idence in re)#ttal./ onse6#ently, in the application for )ail of a person charged with a capital offense p#nisha)le )y death, recl#sion perpet#a or life i"prison"ent, a hearing, whether s#""ary or otherwise in the discretion of the co#rt, "#st act#ally )e cond#cted to deter"ine whether or not the e*idence of g#ilt against the acc#sed is strong. If a party is denied the opport#nity to )e heard, there wo#ld )e a *iolation of proced#ral d#e process. A hearing is li:ewise re6#ired if the prosec#tion ref#ses to add#ce e*idence in opposition to the application to grant and fi5 )ail. orollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for )ail is re6#ired is for the co#rt to ta:e into consideration the g#idelines set forth in !ection +, %#le 11B of the %#les of o#rt in fi5ing the a"o#nt of )ail. $he a)sence of o)-ection fro" the prosec#tion is ne*er a )asis for granting )ail to the acc#sed. It is the co#rtIs deter"ination after a hearing that the g#ilt of the acc#sed is not strong that for"s the )asis for granting )ail. 0eople *s. Donato ,.%. 3o. 792+9, H#ne 7, 1991,Da*ide, Hr., H. (acts2 In the cri"inal case filed with the %egional $rial o#rt of Manila, pri*ate respondent !alas and his co9acc#sed were charged for the cri"e of re)ellion #nder Article 14B, in relation to Article 147 of the %e*ised 0enal ode @%0A. At the ti"e the Infor"ation was filed, !alas and his co9 acc#sed were in "ilitary c#stody following their arrest. A day after the filing of the original infor"ation, a petition for ha)eas corp#s for !alas and his co9acc#sed was filed with the !#pre"e o#rt which was dis"issed in the o#rtKs %esol#tion on the )asis of the agree"ent of the parties #nder which !alas /will re"ain in legal c#stody and will face trial )efore the co#rt ha*ing c#stody o*er his person/ and the warrants for the arrest of his co9 acc#sed are dee"ed recalled and they shall )e i""ediately released )#t shall s#)"it the"sel*es to the co#rt ha*ing -#risdiction o*er their person.!alas filed with the trial co#rt a Motion to V#ash the Infor"ation. %espondent H#dge denied the "otion to 6#ash. !#)se6#ently, !alas filed a petition for )ail, which herein petitioner opposed on the gro#nd that since re)ellion )eca"e a capital offense #nder the pro*isions of 0residential Decrees @0DA, which a"ended Article 147 of the %0, )y i"posing the penalty of recl#sion perpet#a to death on those who pro"ote, "aintain, or head a re)ellion so the acc#sed is no longer entitled to )ail as e*idence of his g#ilt is strong. 'n 7 H#ne 1987, the 0resident iss#ed an .5ec#ti*e 'rder @.'A repealing, a"ong others, the 0Ds and restoring to f#ll force and effect Article 147 of the %0. $h#s, the original penalty for re)ellion, prision "ayor and a fine not to e5ceed 02?,???.??, was restored. Iss#e2 8hether or not the right to )ail "ay, #nder certain circ#"stances, )e denied to a person who is charged with a )aila)le offense 1eld2 Des. Bail cannot )e denied to !alas for he is charged with the cri"e of re)ellion as defined in Article 14B of the %e*ised 0enal ode to which is attached the penalty of prision "ayor and a fine not e5ceeding 02?,???.??. It is, therefore, a )aila)le offense #nder !ection 14 of Article III of the 1987 onstit#tion which pro*ides th#s2 All persons, e5cept those charged with offenses p#nisha)le )y recl#sion perpet#a when e*idence of g#ilt is strong, shall, )efore con*iction, )e )aila)le )y s#fficient s#reties, or )e released on recogni&ance as "ay )e prescri)ed )y law. $he right to )ail shall not )e i"paired e*en when the pri*ilege of the writ of ha)eas corp#s is s#spended. .5cessi*e )ail shall not )e re6#ired. !alas has, howe*er, wai*ed his right to )ail in the cri"inal case. In agreeing to re"ain in legal c#stody e*en d#ring the pendency of the trial of his cri"inal case, he has e5pressly wai*ed his right to )ail.$his o#rt has recogni&ed wai*ers of constit#tional rights s#ch as, for e5a"ple, the right against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#resG the right to co#nsel and to re"ain silentG and the right to )e heard. $he only li"itation to the wai*er of right to )ail is that pro*ide in Art. + of the i*il ode. %ights "ay )e wai*ed, #nless the wai*er is contrary to law, p#)lic order, p#)lic policy, "orals, or good c#sto"s, or pre-#dicial to a third person with a right recogni&ed )y law. 0eople *s. (ortes ,.%. 3o. 9?+B4, H#ne 27, 1994, Da*ide, H%., H. (acts2 $he con*iction of Ag#stin (ortes for the rape of a 149year old si5th grade p#pil and the denial )y the trial co#rt of his application for )ail pending his appeal fro" the -#dg"ent of con*iction are 6#estioned in these consolidated cases. In ,.%. 3o. 9?+B4, the acc#sed appeals fro" the decision of the %egional $rial o#rt. $he co#rt a 6#o, in its Decision, fo#nd the acc#sed g#ilty )eyond reasona)le do#)t of rape and sentenced hi" to s#ffer the penalty of recl#sion perpet#a and pay the *icti" the s#" of 02?,???.??. In ,.%. 3o. 91177, the s#)-ect "atter we are concerned with, the acc#sed see:s to ann#l and set aside two related orders of the said trial co#rt denying his application for )ail, filed after his con*iction, to sec#re his pro*isional li)erty pending the resol#tion of his appeal. Iss#e2 8hether or not )efore con*iction )y final -#dg"ent, the acc#sed en-oys the constit#tional pres#"ption of innocence, and is therefore entitled to )ail as a "atter of right %#ling2 3o. It is clear fro" !ection 14, Article III of the 1987 onstit#tion and !ection 4, %#le 11B of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt, as a"ended, that2 . . . )efore con*iction, )ail is either a "atter of right or of discretion. It is a "atter of right when the offense charged is p#nisha)le )y any penalty lower than recl#sion perpet#a. $o that e5tent the right is a)sol#te. 555 555 555 Jpon the other hand, if the offense charged is p#nisha)le )y recl#sion perpet#a, )ail )eco"es a "atter of discretion. It shall )e denied if the e*idence of g#ilt is strong. $he co#rtIs discretion is li"ited to deter"ining whether or not e*idence of g#ilt is strong. B#t once it is deter"ined that the e*idence of g#ilt is not strong, )ail also )eco"es a "atter of right. . . . $he clear i"plication, therefore is that if an acc#sed who is charged with a cri"e p#nisha)le )y recl#sion perpet#a is con*icted )y the trial co#rt and sentenced to s#ffer s#ch a penalty, )ail is neither a "atter of right on the part of the acc#sed nor of discretion on the part of the co#rt. In s#ch a sit#ation, the co#rt wo#ld not ha*e only deter"ined that the e*idence of g#ilt is strong which wo#ld ha*e )een s#fficient to deny )ail e*en )efore con*iction [ it wo#ld ha*e li:ewise r#led that the acc#sedIs g#ilt has )een pro*en )eyond reasona)le do#)t. Bail "#st not then )e granted to the acc#sed d#ring the pendency of his appeal fro" the -#dg"ent of con*iction. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 98 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 In the instant case, the rape for which the acc#sed was indicted is p#nisha)le )y recl#sion perpet#a p#rs#ant to Article 447 of the %e*ised 0enal odeG he was con*icted therefor and s#)se6#ently sentenced to ser*e that penalty. It is th#s e*ident that the trial co#rt correctly denied his application for )ail d#ring the pendency of the appeal. o"endador *s. De <illa ,.%. 3o. 94177, A#g#st 2, 1991, r#&, H. (acts2 $hese fo#r cases ha*e )een consolidated )eca#se they in*ol*e practically the sa"e parties and related iss#es arising fro" the sa"e incident. $he petitioners in ,.%. 3os. 94177 and 9+9B8 and the pri*ate respondents in ,.%. 3os. 97?2? and 97B7B are officers of the Ar"ed (orces of the 0hilippines facing prosec#tion for their alleged participation in the failed co#p dI etat that too: place on Dece")er 1 to 9, 1989. In ,.%. 3o. 94177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s, they are 6#estioning the cond#ct of the 0re9$rial In*estigation @0$IA 0anel constit#ted to in*estigate the charges against the" and the creation of the ,eneral o#rt Martial @,MA con*ened to try the". In ,.%. 3o. 9+9B8, the petitioners, )esides challenging the legality of ,M 3o. 1B, see: certiorari against its r#ling denying the" the right to pere"ptory challenge as granted )y Article 18 of o". Act 3o. B?8. In ,.%. 3o. 97?2?, the s#)-ect "atter we are concerned with, the orders of the respondent -#dge of the %egional $rial o#rt of V#e&on ity are assailed on certiorari on the gro#nd that he has no -#risdiction o*er ,M 3o. 1B and no a#thority either to set aside its r#ling denying )ail to the pri*ate respondents. Iss#e2 8hether or not the right to )ail in*o:ed )y the pri*ate respondents in ,.%. 3os. 97?2? has traditionally not )een recogni&ed and is not a*aila)le in the "ilitary, as an e5ception to the general r#le e")odied in the Bill of %ights 1eld2 Des. $he right to )ail in*o:ed )y the pri*ate respondents in ,.%. 3os. 97?2? has traditionally not )een recogni&ed and is not a*aila)le in the "ilitary, as an e5ception to the general r#le e")odied in the Bill of %ights. $he right to a speedy trial is gi*en "ore e"phasis in the "ilitary where the right to )ail does not e5ist. $he #ni6#e str#ct#re of the "ilitary sho#ld )e eno#gh reason to e5e"pt "ilitary "en fro" the constit#tional co*erage on the right to )ail. 3ational sec#rity considerations sho#ld also i"press #pon this 1onora)le o#rt that release on )ail of respondents constit#tes a da"aging precedent. $he arg#"ent that denial fro" the "ilitary of the right to )ail wo#ld *iolate the e6#al protection cla#se is not accepta)le. $his g#aranty re6#ires e6#al treat"ent only of persons or things si"ilarly sit#ated and does not apply where the s#)-ect of the treat"ent is s#)stantially different fro" others. $he acc#sed officers can co"plain if they are denied )ail and other "e")ers of the "ilitary are not. B#t they cannot say they ha*e )een discri"inated against )eca#se they are not allowed the sa"e right that is e5tended to ci*ilians. BADL'3 <. !I!'3 A.M. 3o. 929794+?9?, April +, 1997, %egalado, H. (acts2 $he 'ffice of the ity 0rosec#tor in Dag#pan ity filed an infor"ation for do#)le "#rder against se*eral acc#sed and thereafter raffled to respondent -#dge. $he acc#sed filed a petition for rein*estigation which was granted )y the trial co#rt. D#ring the rein*estigation, the acc#sed filed a petition for )ail on a !at#rday, and re6#ested that it )e set for hearing the i""ediately following Monday. 'n this latter date, the prosec#tion filed an opposition to the petition for )ail alleging, a"ong others, that the infor"ation was filed on the )ases of the sworn state"ents of se*eral eyewitnesses to the incident which constit#tes clear and strong e*idence of the g#ilt of all the acc#sed. 3e*ertheless, a hearing on the petition was p#rportedly held )y the trial co#rt and )ail was granted for the pro*isional li)erty of each of the acc#sed. A "otion for reconsideration was filed )y the prosec#tion )#t the sa"e was denied )y respondent -#dge. !ignificantly, the orders granting )ail, and that denying reconsideration thereof, )eca"e the s#)-ect of a petition for certiorari filed )y the prosec#tion and were s#)se6#ently ann#lled and set aside )y A. $he pri*ate co"plainant filed a "otion for respondent -#dge to inhi)it hi"self fro" the case. %espondent -#dge denied the "otion to inhi)it and later also denied the "otion for reconsideration. $o s#pport and -#stify his grant of )ail to the acc#sed, respondent -#dge a*ers that ti"e was of the essence, considering that the acc#sed had )een detained since 'cto)er 21, 1991 and that the prosec#tion failed to interpose an o)-ection to the granting of )ail and to as: for an opport#nity to pro*e the strength of the e*idence of g#ilt against the acc#sed. Iss#e2 8hether or not respondent -#dge was -#stified in his grant of )ail to the acc#sed. 1eld2 8hile the deter"ination of whether or not the e*idence of g#ilt is strong is a "atter of -#dicial discretion, this discretion "ay )e e5ercised only after e*idence is s#)"itted to the co#rt. $he prosec#tion "#st )e gi*en an opport#nity to present, within a reasona)le ti"e, all the e*idence that it "ay desire to introd#ce )efore the co#rt "ay resol*e the "otion for )ail. If the prosec#tion sho#ld )e denied s#ch an opport#nity, there wo#ld )e a *iolation of proced#ral d#e process, and the order of the co#rt granting )ail sho#ld )e considered *oid on that gro#nd. .*en if the prosec#tion ref#ses to add#ce e*idence or fails to interpose an o)-ection to the "otion for )ail, it is still "andatory for the co#rt to cond#ct a hearing or as: searching and clarificatory 6#estions fro" which it "ay infer the strength of the e*idence of g#ilt, or the lac: of it, against the acc#sed. $he o)stinate persistence of respondent -#dge in post#ring that he did cond#ct a hearing is )elied )y the fact that the order granting )ail lea*es "#ch to )e desired. It does not contain the re6#isite s#""ary of the e*idence presented )y the parties and necessary to s#pport the grant of )ail. SMA3'$' <. A ,.%. 3o. L9+21??, May 4?, 198+, (ernan, H. (acts2 0etitioner %icardo L. Manotoc, Hr., is one of the two principal stoc:holders of $rans9Ins#lar Manage"ent, Inc., where he acts as president and the Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc., a stoc: )ro:erage ho#se. $ogether with his co9stoc:holders, he filed a petition with the !ec#rities and .5change o""ission for the appoint"ent of a "anage"ent co""ittee for the aforesaid co"panies, which petition was granted. 0ending disposition of the !. case, !. re6#ested the then o""issioner of I""igration not to clear petitioner for depart#re and a "e"orand#" to this effect was iss#ed. 8hen a $orrens title s#)"itted to and accepted )y Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. was s#spected to )e fa:e, si5 of its clients filed si5 separate cri"inal co"plaints against petitioner and the *ice9president of Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. orresponding cri"inal charges for estafa were filed and in all cases, petitioner was ad"itted to )ail. 0etitioner filed )efore each of the trial co#rts a "otion entitled, /"otion for per"ission to lea*e the co#ntry,/ stating as gro#nd therefor his desire to go to the Jnited !tates, /relati*e to his )#siness transactions and opport#nities./ $he prosec#tion opposed said "otion and )oth trial -#dges denied the sa"e. 0etitioner li:ewise wrote the I""igration o""issioner re6#esting the withdrawal of the latterIs "e"orand#", )#t said re6#est was denied. 0etitioner filed a petition for certiorari and "anda"#s )efore the A see:ing to ann#l the orders of the trial co#rts. A denied the petition. 0etitioner filed the instant petition for re*iew on certiorari. 0etitioner filed a "otion for lea*e to go a)road pendente lite, )#t the o#rt denied said "otion. 0etitioner contends that ha*ing )een ad"itted to )ail as a "atter of right, neither the co#rts which granted hi" )ail nor the !ec#rities and .5change o""ission which has no -#risdiction o*er his li)erty, co#ld pre*ent hi" fro" e5ercising his constit#tional right to tra*el. Iss#e2 Does a person facing a cri"inal indict"ent and pro*isionally released on )ail ha*e an #nrestricted right to tra*elC 1eld2 3o. $he o)-ect of )ail is to relie*e the acc#sed of i"prison"ent and the state of the )#rden of :eeping hi", pending the trial, and at the sa"e ti"e, to p#t the acc#sed as "#ch #nder the power of the co#rt as if he were in c#stody of the proper officer, and to sec#re the appearance of the acc#sed so as to answer the call of the co#rt and do what the law "ay re6#ire of hi". $he condition i"posed #pon petitioner to "a:e hi"self a*aila)le at all ti"es whene*er the co#rt re6#ires his presence operates as a *alid restriction on his right to tra*el. $o allow the acc#sed fro" lea*ing the -#risdiction of the 0hilippines wo#ld render n#gatory the co#rtsI orders and processes and inas"#ch as the -#risdiction of the co#rts fro" which they iss#ed does not e5tend )eyond that of the 0hilippines they wo#ld ha*e no )inding force o#tside of said -#risdiction. Indeed, if the acc#sed were allowed to lea*e the 0hilippines witho#t s#fficient reason, he "ay )e placed )eyond the reach of the co#rts. $A$AD <. !A3DI,A3BADA3 ,.%. 3o. 72447949, March 21, 1988, Dap, H. (acts2 o"plainant, Antonio de los %eyes, originally filed what he ter"ed /a report/ with the Legal 0anel of 0! on 'cto)er 197B, containing charges of alleged *iolations of %A 3o. 4?19 against then !ecretary of 0#)lic Infor"ation (rancisco !. $atad. $he /report/ was "ade to /sleep/ in the office of the 0! #ntil Dece")er 1979, when the 197B co"plaint was res#rrected in the for" of a for"al co"plaint filed with the $anod)ayan. $he $anod)ayan acted on the co"plaint in April 198? )y referring the co"plaint to the I!, 0!, for in*estigation and report. In H#ne 198?, the I! report was s#)"itted to the $anod)ayan, reco""ending the filing of charges for graft and corr#pt practices against for"er Minister $atad and Antonio L. antero. By 'cto)er 1982, all affida*its and co#nter9affida*its were in the case was already for disposition )y the $anod)ayan. 1owe*er, it was only in H#ly 1987 that a resol#tion was appro*ed )y the $anod)ayan, reco""ending the filing of the corresponding cri"inal infor"ations against the acc#sed (rancisco $atad. (i*e @7A cri"inal infor"ations were filed with the !andigan)ayan in H#ne 1987, all against petitioner $atad. 0etitioner clai"s that the $anod)ayan c#lpa)ly *iolated the constit#tional "andate of /d#e process/ in #nd#ly prolonging the ter"ination of the preli"inary in*estigation and in filing the corresponding San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 99 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 infor"ations only after "ore than a decade fro" the alleged co""ission of the p#rported offenses. Iss#e2 8hether or not petitioner was depri*ed of his constit#tional right to d#e process. 1eld2 $he long delay in the ter"ination of the preli"inary in*estigation )y the $anod)ayan is *iolati*e of the constit#tional right of the acc#sed to d#e process. !#)stantial adherence to the re6#ire"ents of the law go*erning the cond#ct of preli"inary in*estigation, incl#ding s#)stantial co"pliance with the ti"e li"itation prescri)ed )y the law for the resol#tion of the case )y the prosec#tor, is part of the proced#ral d#e process constit#tionally g#aranteed )y the f#nda"ental law. It has )een s#ggested that the long delay in ter"inating the preli"inary in*estigation sho#ld not )e dee"ed fatal, for e*en the co"plete a)sence of a preli"inary in*estigation does not warrant dis"issal of the infor"ation. $r#e9)#t the a)sence of a preli"inary in*estigation can )e corrected )y gi*ing the acc#sed s#ch in*estigation. B#t an #nd#e delay in the cond#ct of a preli"inary in*estigation can not )e corrected, for #ntil now, "an has not yet in*ented a de*ice for setting )ac: ti"e. ,ALMA3 *s. !A3DI,A3BADA3 ,% 72+7?, !ept. 12, 198+ (acts2 'n 'cto)er 22, 1984, then 0resident Marcos created a (act9 (inding Board to in*estigate the assassination of 3inoy A6#ino. $he "inority and "a-ority reports of the Board )oth agreed that %olando ,al"an was not the assassin )#t was "erely a fall g#y of the "ilitary which plotted the assassination itself. $he "inority report tags 2+ persons, headed )y ,eneral <er, as respondents to the case. Marcos re-ected the reports of the Board and st#c: to his clai" that it was ,al"an who :illed A6#ino. $hereafter, !andigan)ayan and $anod)ayan ac6#itted the respondents of the cri"e charged, declaring the" innocent and totally a)sol*ing the" of any ci*il lia)ility. In this petition, 0etitioners !at#rnina ,al"an, wife of the late %olando ,al"an, and 29 others filed the present action alleging that respondent co#rts co""itted serio#s irreg#larities constit#ting "istrial and res#lting in "iscarriage of -#stice and gross *iolation of the constit#tional rights of the so*ereign people of the 0hilippines to d#e process of law. Allegedly, then 0resident Marcos had ordered the respondent co#rts to whitewash the cri"inal cases against the 2+ respondents acc#sed and prod#ce a *erdict of ac6#ittal. In his co""ent, the Dep#ty $anod)ayan Man#el 1errera, affir"ed the allegations and re*ealed that MalacaNang had planned the scenario of the trial. %espondents9acc#sed prayed for its denial. Iss#e2 8hether or not the trial was a "oc: trial and that the pre9 deter"ined -#dg"ent of ac6#ittal was #nlawf#l and *oid a) initio. 1eld2 Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt cannot per"it s#ch a sha" trial and *erdict and tra*esty of -#stice to stand #nrectified. $he co#rts of the land #nder its aegis are co#rts of law and -#stice and e6#ity. $hey wo#ld ha*e no reason to e5ist if they were allowed to )e #sed as "ere tools of in-#stice, deception and d#plicity to s#)*ert and s#ppress the tr#th, instead of repositories of -#dicial power whose -#dges are sworn and co""itted to render i"partial -#stice to all ali:e who see: the enforce"ent or protection of a right or the pre*ention or redress of a wrong, witho#t fear or fa*or and re"o*ed fro" the press#res of politics and pre-#dice. More so, in the case at )ar where the people and the world are entitled to :now the tr#th, and the integrity of o#r -#dicial syste" is at sta:e. In life, as an acc#sed )efore the "ilitary tri)#nal, 3inoy had pleaded in *ain that as a ci*ilian he was entitled to d#e process of law and trial in the reg#lar ci*il co#rts )efore an i"partial co#rt with an #n)iased prosec#tor. In death, 3inoy, as the *icti" of the /treachero#s and *icio#s assassination/ and the relati*es and so*ereign people as the aggrie*ed parties plead once "ore for d#e process of law and a retrial )efore an i"partial co#rt with an #n)iased prosec#tor. $he o#rt is constrained to declare the sha" trial a "oc: trial the non9trial of the cent#ry9and that the pre9deter"ined -#dg"ent of ac6#ittal was #nlawf#l and *oid a) initio. AL'3$. *s. !A<.LLA3' ,% 141+72, March 9, 1998 (acts2 H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan charged Bayani Alonte, the inc#")ent "ayor of BiNan, Lag#na, with the cri"e of rape. According to 0#nong)ayan, on or a)o#t !epte")er 12, 199+, Alonte offered her a drin:ing water which "ade her di&&y and wea:. $hereafter, Alonte #nlawf#lly and felonio#sly had carnal :nowledge with her against her will and consent. D#ring the pendency case, howe*er, H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan, assisted )y her parents and co#nsel, e5ec#ted an affida*it desisting her testi"onies against Alonte. 3onetheless, respondent H#dge !a*ellano fo#nd Alonte g#ilty )eyond reasona)le do#)t of the heino#s cri"e of rape. Accordingly, the acc#sed did not present any co#nter*ailing e*idence d#ring the trial. $hey did not ta:e the witness stand to ref#te or deny #nder oath the tr#th of the contents of the pri*ate co"plainantIs afore"entioned affida*it. $hey left e*erything to the so9called /desistance/ of the pri*ate co"plainant. In this petition, Alonte a*ers that respondent H#dge co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction when respondent H#dge rendered a decision in the case there)y depri*ing hi" of his onstit#tional right to )e pres#"ed innocent. Iss#e2 8hether or not the pres#"ption of innocence stands in fa*or of Alonte. 1eld2 3'. In the trial of cri"inal cases, the constit#tional pres#"ption of innocence in fa*or of an acc#sed re6#ires that an acc#sed )e gi*en s#fficient opport#nity to present his defense. !o, with the prosec#tion as to its e*idence. 1ence, any de*iation fro" the reg#lar co#rse of trial sho#ld always ta:e into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosec#tion or defense. $here can )e no short9c#t to the legal process, and there can )e no e5c#se for not affording an acc#sed his f#ll day in co#rt. D#e process, rightly occ#pying the first and fore"ost place of honor in o#r Bill of %ights, is an enshrined and in*al#a)le right that cannot )e denied e*en to the "ost #ndeser*ing. In the case at )ar, the affida*it of desistance of H#*ie9Lyn 0#nong)ayan does not contain any state"ent that disa*ows the *eracity of her co"plaint against petitioners )#t "erely see:s to /)e allowed to withdraw/ her co"plaint and to discontin#e with the case for *aried other reasons. In 0eople *s. Balla)are we ha*e said that any recantation "#st )e tested in a p#)lic trial with s#fficient opport#nity gi*en to the party ad*ersely affected )y it to cross9 e5a"ine the recanting witness. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. 1ence, when confronted with a sit#ation where a witness recants his testi"ony, co#rts "#st not a#to"atically e5cl#de the original testi"ony solely on the )asis of the recantation. $hey sho#ld deter"ine which testi"ony sho#ld )e gi*en credence thro#gh a co"parison of the original testi"ony and the new testi"ony, applying the general r#les of e*idence. 0.'0L. *s. D%AMAD' ,% 21427, 'ct. 29, 1971 (acts2 In a drin:ing session, 0a)leo Dra"ayo and 0aterno .c#)in )ro#ght #p the idea of :illing .stelito 3ogali&a so that he co#ld not testify in the ro))ery case which Dra"ayo and .c#)in was a pri"e s#spect thereof. $hat sa"e night, .c#)in hit .stelito with a piece of wood on the side of the head while Dra"ayo repeatedly sta))ed hi" with a short pointed )olo. $he ne5t "orning, Dra"ayo went to the ho#se of the deceased and infor"ed the latterIs widow ora&on that he had -#st seen the cada*er of .stelito. Jpon inter*iew, the hief of 0olice noticed )lood stains on the tro#sers of Dra"ayo and as:ed the latter to e5plain where he o)tained it. Dra"ayo answered that it was ca#sed )y his da#ghter who has a s:in ail"ent. It was on this )asis that Dra"ayo and .c#)in were charged of the cri"e of "#rder. Jpon trial, the lower co#rt fo#nd Dra"ayo and .c#)in g#ilty )eyond reasona)le do#)t )asing on the testi"onies offered )y the prosec#tion. In this appeal, Acc#sed9Appellants in*o:e their constit#tional right to )e declared pres#"pti*ely innocent. Iss#e2 8hether or not the Acc#ssed9Appellants constit#tional right to )e pres#"ed innocent can stand against -#dg"ent of con*iction against the". 1eld2 3'. $he pres#"ption of innocence co#ld not co"e to appellantsK resc#e as it was "ore than s#fficiently o*erco"e )y the proof that was offered )y the prosec#tion. Acc#sation is not, according to the f#nda"ental law, synony"o#s with g#ilt. It is inc#")ent on the prosec#tion to de"onstrate that c#lpa)ility lies. Appellants were not e*en called #pon then to offer e*idence on their )ehalf. $heir freedo" is forfeit only if the re6#isite 6#ant#" of proof necessary for con*iction )e in e5istence. $heir g#ilt "#st )e shown )eyond reasona)le do#)t. $o s#ch a standard, this o#rt has always )een co""itted. $here is need, therefore, for the "ost caref#l scr#tiny of the testi"ony of the state, )oth oral and doc#"entary, independently of whate*er defense is offered )y the acc#sed. 'nly if the -#dge )elow and the appellate tri)#nal co#ld arri*e at a concl#sion that the cri"e had )een co""itted precisely )y the person on trial #nder s#ch an e5acting test sho#ld the sentence )e one of con*iction. It is th#s re6#ired that e*ery circ#"stance fa*oring his innocence )e d#ly ta:en into acco#nt. $he proof against hi" "#st s#r*i*e the test of reasonG the strongest s#spicion "#st not )e per"itted to sway -#dg"ent. $he conscience "#st )e satisfied that on the defendant co#ld )e laid the responsi)ility for the offense chargedG that not only did he perpetrate the act that it a"o#nted to a cri"e. 8hat is re6#ired then is "oral certainty. 8ith the testi"ony of record pointing to no other concl#sion e5cept the perpetration of the :illing )y appellants, the effort of their co#nsel sho#ld not )e attended with s#ccess. By reasona)le do#)t is not "eant that which of possi)ility "ay arise, )#t it is that do#)t engendered )y an in*estigation of the whole proof and an ina)ility, after s#ch in*estigation, to let the "ind rest easy #pon the certainly of g#ilt. A)sol#te certainty of g#ilt is not de"anded )y the law to con*ict of any cri"inal charge )#t "oral certainty is re6#ired, and this certainty is re6#ired as to e*ery proposition of proof re6#isite to constit#te the offense. 0eople *. 1olgado ,% 28?9, March 22, 197? (acts2 Appellant (risco 1olgado was charged in the co#rt of (irst Instance of %o")lon with slight illegal detention )eca#se according to the infor"ation, )eing a pri*ate person, he did /felonio#sly and witho#t -#stifia)le "oti*e, :idnap and detain one Arte"ia (a)reag in the ho#se of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 100 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 Antero 1olgado for a)o#t eight ho#rs. 'n the day set for trial, he appeared alone witho#t the assistance of a lawyer. 1e was s#)se6#ently arraigned and pleaded g#ilty #pon the instr#ction of a certain Mr. 3#"eriano 'ca"po. .H#dge"ent was rendered con*icting hi" of the cri"e of :idnapping and serio#s illegal detention. Iss#e2 8hether the acc#sed was afforded of his right to )e heard )y hi"self and co#nselC 1eld2 3o. Jnder the circ#"stances, partic#larly the 6#alified plea gi*en )y the acc#sed who was #naided )y co#nsel, it was not pr#dent, to say the least, for the trial co#rt to render s#ch a serio#s -#dg"ent finding the acc#sed g#ilty of a capital offense, and i"posing #pon hi" s#ch a hea*y penalty as ten years and one day of prision "ayor to twenty years, witho#t a)sol#te any e*idence to deter"ine and clarify the tr#e facts of the case. $he proceedings in the trial co#rt are irreg#lar fro" the )eginning. It is e5pressly pro*ided in o#r r#les of o#rt, %#le 112, section 4, that2 If the defendant appears witho#t attorney, he "#st )e infor"ed )y the co#rt that it is his right to ha*e attorney )eing arraigned., and "#st )e as:ed if he desires the aid of attorney, the o#rt "#st assign attorney de oficio to defend hi". A reasona)le ti"e "#st )e allowed for proc#ring attorney. Jnder this pro*ision, when a defendant appears witho#t attorney, the co#rt has fo#r i"portant d#ties to co"ply with2 1 E It "#st infor" the defendant that it is his right to ha*e attorney )efore )eing arraignedG 2 E After gi*ing hi" s#ch infor"ation the co#rt "#st as: hi" if he desires the aid of an attorneyG 4 E If he desires and is #na)le to e"ploy attorney, the co#rt "#st assign attorney de oficio to defend hi"G and B E If the acc#sed desires to proc#re an attorney of his own the co#rt "#st grant hi" a reasona)le ti"e therefor. 3ot one of these d#ties had )een co"plied with )y the trial co#rt. $he record discloses that said co#rt did not infor" the acc#sed of his right to ha*e an attorney nor did it as: hi" if he desired the aid of one. $he trial co#rt failed to in6#ire whether or not the acc#sed was to e"ploy an attorney, to grant hi" reasona)le ti"e to proc#re or assign an attorney de oficio. $he 6#estion as:ed )y the co#rt to the acc#sed was /Do yo# ha*e an attorney or are yo# going to plead g#iltyC/ 3ot only did s#ch a 6#estion fail to infor" the acc#sed that it was his right to ha*e an attorney )efore arraign"ent, )#t, what is worse, the 6#estion was so fra"ed that it co#ld ha*e )een constr#ed )y the acc#sed as a s#ggestion fro" the co#rt that he plead g#ilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in *iolation of the d#e process cla#se contained in o#r onstit#tion. AMI'3 <. 1I'3,!'3 A.M. 3o. %$H9979147, Han#ary 22, 1999, Martine&, H. Doctrine2 $he acc#sedIs discretion in a cri"inal prosec#tion with respect to his choice of co#nsel is not so "#ch as to grant hi" a plenary prerogati*e which wo#ld precl#de other e6#ally co"petent and independent co#nsels fro" representing hi". (acts2 At the sched#led hearing of the cri"inal case against A"ion, trial was not held )eca#se on the day )efore the sched#led hearing, he was infor"ed that his retained co#nsel, Atty. Depas#cat, was ill. $he hearing was reset with a warning that no f#rther postpone"ent wo#ld )e entertained. 'n the date of re9sched#led hearing, Atty. Depas#cat again failed to appear. $o a*oid f#rther delay, the co#rt appointed Atty. Hacildo of 0A' as co#nsel de oficio who was howe*er, prohi)ited to represent a party who has retained the ser*ices of a co#nsel of his own choice. At the ne5t sched#led hearing Atty. Depas#cat still did not show #p in co#rt. In *iew of the fact that the *icti"Is wife, Mrs. <aflor and another go*ern"ent witness )oth reside a)o#t 7? to 8? :ilo"eters fro" Bacolod ity, and that the appearance of Atty. Depas#cat re"ained #ncertain, H#dge hiongson, appointed Atty. Lao9'ng fro" the (ree Legal Aid 'ffice to represent A"ion witho#t pre-#dice to the appearance of A"ionIs co#nsel de parte. A"ion filed a co"plaint charging respondent -#dge with Ignorance of the Law and 'ppression relati*e to the for"erIs cri"inal case. A"ion asserts that his right to d#e process was *iolated and that he was depri*ed of his constit#tional and stat#tory right to )e defended )y co#nsel of his own choice. Iss#e2 8hether or not respondent -#dgeIs appoint"ent of a co#nsel de oficio constit#tes a *iolation of acc#sed9co"plainantIs right to d#e process and a depri*ation of his constit#tional right to )e defended )y co#nsel of his own choice. 1eld2 $he concept of /preference in the choice of co#nsel/ pertains "ore aptly and specifically to a person #nder in*estigation. .*en if application wo#ld )e e5tended to an acc#sed in a cri"inal prosec#tion, s#ch preferential discretion cannot parta:e of one so a)sol#te and ar)itrary as wo#ld "a:e the choice of co#nsel refer e5cl#si*ely to the predilection of the acc#sed and th#s "a:e the pace of cri"inal prosec#tion entirely dictated )y the acc#sed to the detri"ent of the e*ent#al resol#tion of the case. Moreo*er, A"ion was not depri*ed of his s#)stanti*e and constit#tional right to d#e process as he was d#ly accorded all the opport#nities to )e heard and to present e*idence to s#)stantiate his defense )#t he forfeited this right, for not appearing in co#rt together with his co#nsel at the sched#led hearings. (inally, there is no denial of the right to co#nsel where a co#nsel de oficio was appointed d#ring the a)sence of the acc#sedIs co#nsel de parte p#rs#ant to the co#rtIs desire to finish the case as early as practica)le #nder the contin#o#s trial syste". $he ad"inistrati*e co"plaint is dis"issed. 0.1' <. 0.'0L. ,.%. 3o. 111499, !epte")er 27, 199+, Da*ide Hr., H (A$!2 0etitioner and his co9acc#sed Hoe atre were alleged to ha*e conspired in representing 0echo as a representati*e of .*erson o""ercial $rading of ota)ato ity, which t#rned o#t to )e not9e5istent. 0echo was then tried and con*icted )y the !andigan)ayan for *iolation of !ection 4@eA of %.A 3o. 4?19. $he ! "odified the !andigan)ayan decision, holding the petitioner g#ilty of the co"ple5 cri"e of atte"pted estafa thro#gh falsification of official and co""ercial doc#"ents. Altho#gh the petitioner co#ld not )e con*icted of the cri"e charged, *i&., *iolation of !ection 4@eA of %.A 3o. 4?19, as a"ended E )eca#se the said section penali&es only cons#""ated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not cons#""ated E he co#ld, ne*ertheless, )e con*icted of the co"ple5 cri"e of atte"pted estafa thro#gh falsification of official and co""ercial doc#"ents, which is necessarily incl#ded in the cri"e charged. 0etitioner filed a "otion for reconsideration as the con*iction for estafa after his ac6#ittal fro" *iolation of %.A. 4?19 constit#tes do#)le -eopardy. As s#ch, he co#ld not )e con*icted witho#t *iolating his right to )e infor"ed of the acc#sation against hi". I!!J.2 8hether or not the con*iction for estafa after ac6#ittal fro" the original cri"e charged *iolates his right to )e infor"ed of the nat#re of the acc#sation against hi"C 1.LD2 3'. Jnder the %#les of o#rt, when there is *ariance )etween the offense charged in the co"plaint of infor"ation, and that pro*ed or esta)lished )y the e*idence, and the offense as charged is incl#ded in or necessarily incl#des the offense pro*ed, the acc#sed shall )e con*icted of the offense pro*ed incl#ded in that which is charged, or of the offense charged incl#ded in that which is pro*ed. $he o#rt e5plained the o)-ecti*es of the right to )e infor"ed2 to f#rnish the acc#sed with s#ch a description of the charge against hi" as will ena)le hi" to "a:e his defenseG second, to a*ail hi"self of his con*iction or ac6#ittal for protection against a f#rther prosec#tion for the sa"e ca#seG and third, to infor" the co#rt of the facts alleged, so that it "ay decide whether they are s#fficient in law to s#pport a con*iction, if one sho#ld )e had. In order that this re6#ire"ent "ay )e satisfied facts "#st )e stated2 not concl#sions of law. 8hat deter"ines the real nat#re and ca#se of acc#sation against an acc#sed is the act#al recital of facts stated in the infor"ation or co"plaint and not the caption or prea")le of the infor"ation. It follows then that an acc#sed "ay )e con*icted of a cri"e which altho#gh not the one charged, is necessarily incl#ded in the latter. !'%IA3' <. !A3DI,A3BADA3 A3D 0.'0L. ,.%. 3o. L9+7972, H#ly 41, 198B, ABAD !A3$'!, H. (A$!2 $ho"as $an was acc#sed of 6#alified theft in a co"plaint lodged with the ity (iscal of V#e&on ity, assigned for in*estigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant ity (iscal. In the co#rse of the in*estigation the petitioner de"anded 0B,???.?? fro" $an as the price for dis"issing the case. $an reported the de"and to the 3ational B#rea# of In*estigation which set #p an entrap"ent. $he !andigan)ayan con*icted petitioner as g#ilty for *iolation of !ection 4, paragraph @)A of %.A. 4?19 which penali&es2 /Directly or indirectly re6#esting or recei*ing any gift, present, share, percentage, or )enefit, for hi"self or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction )etween the ,o*ern"ent and any other party, wherein the p#)lic officer in his official capacity has to inter*ene #nder the law./ 0etitioner contends that the preli"inary in*estigation of a co"plaint does not constit#te a /contract or transaction/ and th#s he cannot )e con*icted for *iolation of %.A. 4?19. And if ac6#itted, he cannot )e s#)se6#ently con*icted of direct )ri)ery )eca#se that wo#ld *iolate his right to )e infor"ed of the nat#re of the acc#sation against hi". I!!J.!2@1A 8hether or not preli"inary in*estigation constit#tes a /transaction or contract./ @2A 8hether or not, if pre*io#s con*iction for *iolation of %.A. 4?19 were wrong, he can now )e con*icted for direct )ri)ery witho#t *iolating his right to )e infor"ed. 1.LD2 @1A 3'. $he ter" ItransactionI as #sed thereof is not li"ited in its scope or "eaning to a co""ercial or )#siness transaction )#t incl#des all :inds of transaction, whether co""ercial, ci*il or ad"inistrati*e in nat#re, pending with the go*ern"ent. $his "#st )e so, otherwise, the Act wo#ld ha*e so stated in the /Definition of $er"s/, !ection 2 thereof. B#t it did not. $he in*estigation was also not a contract. 3either was it a transaction San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 101 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 )eca#se this ter" "#st )e constr#ed as analogo#s to the ter" which precedes it. A transaction, li:e a contract, is one which in*ol*es so"e consideration as in credit transactions and this ele"ent @considerationA is a)sent in the in*estigation cond#cted )y the petitioner. 8e agree with the petitioner that it was error for the !andigan)ayan to ha*e con*icted hi" of *iolating !ec. 4 @)A of %.A. 3o. 4?19. @2A D.!. $he petitioner also clai"s that he cannot )e con*icted of )ri)ery #nder the %e*ised 0enal ode )eca#se to do so wo#ld )e *iolati*e of as constit#tional right to )e infor"ed of the nat#re and ca#se of the acc#sation against hi". 8rong. A reading of the infor"ation which has )een reprod#ced herein clearly "a:es o#t a case of )ri)ery so that the petitioner cannot clai" depri*ation of the right to )e infor"ed. B'%HA <. M.3D'XA ,.%. 3o. L9B7++7, H#ne 2?, 1977, (.%3A3D', H. (A$!2 0etitioner Man#el Bor-a, acc#sed of slight physical in-#ries, was con*icted and sentenced to s#ffer i"prison"ent for a period of twenty days of arresto "enor )y respondent H#dge !enining, despite the a)sence of an arraign"ent.. $he -#dge proceeded with the trial in a)sentia and pro"#lgated the assailed decision. An appeal was d#ly ele*ated to the o#rt of (irst Instance of e)# presided )y respondent H#dge Mendo&a. 8itho#t any notice to petitioner and witho#t re6#iring hi" to s#)"it his "e"orand#", a decision on the appealed case was rendered against hi". I!!J.2 8hether or not the decision was *alidly rendered despite the a)sence of an arraign"ent. 1.LD2 3'. Arraign"ent is an indispensa)le re6#ire"ent in any cri"inal prosec#tion. $he onstit#tion re6#ires that the acc#sed )e arraigned so that he "ay )e infor"ed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face. $his d#ty is an affir"ati*e one which the co#rt, on its own "otion, "#st perfor", #nless wai*ed. $o e"phasi&e its i"portance, no s#ch d#ty is laid on the co#rt with regard to the rights of the acc#sed which he "ay )e entitled to e5ercise d#ring the trial. $hose are rights which he "#st assert hi"self and the )enefits of which he hi"self "#st de"and. In other words, in the arraign"ent the co#rt "#st act of its own *olition. It is i"perati*e that he is th#s "ade f#lly aware of possi)le loss of freedo", e*en of his life, depending on the nat#re of the cri"e i"p#ted to hi". At the *ery least then, he "#st )e f#lly infor"ed of why the prosec#ting ar" of the state is "o)ili&ed against hi". 1e is th#s in a position to enter his plea with f#ll :nowledge of the conse6#ences. 1e is not e*en re6#ired to do so i""ediately. 1e "ay "o*e to 6#ash. SEPARATION OF PO=ERS IN RE" MAN$ANO 1%% SCRA 24%, 1988 FACTS" H#dge Man&ano was designated "e")er of the Ilocos 3orte 0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice )y the 0ro*incial ,o*ernor. $he f#nction of the o""ittee is to recei*e co"plaints and "a:e reco""endations towards the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, partic#larly those who are poor. ISSUE" May the H#dge accept the designationC HELD" 3o. $he co""ittee perfor"s ad"inistrati*e f#nctions, that is, f#nctions which =in*ol*e the reg#lation and control o*er the cond#ct and affairs of indi*id#als for their own welfare and the pro"#lgation of r#les and reg#lations to )etter carry o#t the policy of the legislat#re or s#ch as are de*oted #pon the ad"inistrati*e agency )y the organic law of its e5istence. Jnder the onstit#tion, the "e")ers of the !#pre"e o#rt and other co#rts esta)lished )y law shall not )e designated to any agency perfor"ing 6#asi9-#dicial or ad"inistrati*e f#nctions @!ection 12, Art. <III, onstit#tionA. onsidering that "e")ership of H#dge Man&ano in the Ilocos 3orte 0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice, which discharges ad"inistrati*e f#nctions, will )e in *iolation of the onstit#tion. $his declaration does not "ean that %$ H#dges sho#ld adopt an attit#de of "onastic insensi)ility or #n)eco"ing indifference to 0ro*inceRity o""ittee on H#stice. As inc#")ent %$ H#dges, they for" part of the str#ct#re of go*ern"ent. $heir integrity and perfor"ance in the ad-#dication of cases contri)#te to the solidity of s#ch str#ct#re. As p#)lic officials, they are tr#stees of an orderly society. .*en as non9"e")ers of 0ro*incialRity o""ittees on H#stice, %$ -#dges sho#ld render assistance to said o""ittees to help pro"ote the landa)le p#rposes for which they e5ist, )#t only when s#ch assistance "ay )e reasona)ly incidental to the f#lfill"ent of their -#dicial d#ties. SEPARATION OF PO=ERS ANGARA VS. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. NO. 45081. !UL- 15, 193% LAUREL, !" FACTS" 0etitioner Hose Angara and respondents 0edro Dns#a, Mig#el astillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates *oted for the position of "e")er of the 3ational Asse")ly for the first district of the 0ro*ince of $aya)as in the !epte")er 17, 1497 election. 0etitioner was proclai"ed to )e a "e")er9elect of the 3ational Asse")ly )y the 0ro*incial Board of an*assers. $hereafter, petitioner too: his oath. $he 3ational Asse")ly passed a %esol#tion, confir"ing procla"ation of Angara. Dns#a filed )efore the respondent .lectoral o""ission a /Motion of 0rotest/ against the election of petitioner, and praying that said respondent )e declared elected "e")er, or that the election of said position )e n#llified. $he respondent denied petitionerIs /Motion to Dis"iss the 0rotest./ 0etitioner arg#es that2 the onstit#tion confers e5cl#si*e -#risdiction #pon the .lectoral o""ission solely as regards the "erits of contested elections to the 3ational Asse")ly, and that the onstit#tion e5cl#des fro" said -#risdiction the power to reg#late the proceedings of said election contests, which power has )een reser*ed to the Legislati*e Depart"ent of the ,o*ern"ent or the 3ational Asse")ly. $he !olicitor9,eneral appeared and filed an answer in )ehalf of the respondent, interposing the special defense that the o""ission has )een created )y the onstit#tion as an instr#"entality of the Legislati*e Depart"ent in*ested with the -#risdiction to decide /all contests relating to the election, ret#rns, and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly/G that in adopting its resol#tion of Dece")er 9, 1947, fi5ing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any "e")er of the 3ational Asse")ly, it acted within its -#risdiction and in the legiti"ate e5ercise of the i"plied powers granted it )y the onstit#tion to adopt the r#les and reg#lations essential to carry o#t the powers and f#nctions conferred #pon the sa"e )y the f#nda"ental lawG that in adopting its resol#tion of Han#ary 24, 194+, o*err#ling the "otion of the petitioner to dis"iss the election protest in 6#estion, and declaring itself with -#risdiction to ta:e cogni&ance of said protest, it acted in the legiti"ate e5ercise of its 6#asi9-#dicial f#nctions as an instr#"entality of the Legislati*e Depart"ent of the o""onwealth ,o*ern"ent, and hence said act is )eyond the -#dicial cogni&ance or control of the !#pre"e o#rt, a"ong others. 0etitioner prayed for the iss#ance of a preli"inary writ of in-#nction against the o""ission, which petition was denied /witho#t passing #pon the "erits of the case./ ISSUE" 8hether or not the .lectoral o""ission acted witho#t or in e5cess of its -#risdiction in ass#"ing to ta:e cogni&ance of the protest filed San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 102 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the pre*io#s confir"ation of s#ch election )y resol#tion of the 3ational Asse")ly. HELD" $he separation of powers is a f#nda"ental principle in o#r syste" of go*ern"ent. It o)tains not thro#gh e5press pro*ision )#t )y act#al di*ision in o#r onstit#tion. .ach depart"ent of the go*ern"ent has e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of "atters within its -#risdiction, and is s#pre"e within its own sphere. B#t it does not follow fro" the fact that the three powers are to )e :ept separate and distinct that the onstit#tion intended the" to )e a)sol#tely #nrestrained and independent of each other. $he onstit#tion has pro*ided for an ela)orate syste" of chec:s and )alances to sec#re coordination in the wor:ings of the *ario#s depart"ents of the go*ern"ent. $he iss#e hinges on the interpretation of section B of Article <I of the onstit#tion. $he nat#re of the present contro*ersy shows the necessity of a final constit#tional ar)iter to deter"ine the conflict of a#thority )etween two agencies created )y the onstit#tion. If the conflict were left #ndecided and #ndeter"ined, a *oid wo#ld )e created in o#r constit#tional syste", which "ay in the long r#n pro*e destr#cti*e of the entire fra"ewor:. Jpon principle, reason and a#thority, the !#pre"e o#rt has -#risdiction o*er the .lectoral o""ission and the s#)-ect "atter of the present contro*ersy for the p#rpose of deter"ining the character, scope and e5tent of the constit#tional grant to the .lectoral o""ission as /the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly./ $he transfer of the power of deter"ining the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the Legislat#re long lodged in the legislati*e )ody, to an independent, i"partial and non9partisan tri)#nal, is )y no "eans a "ere e5peri"ent in the science of go*ern"ent. $he "e")ers of the onstit#tional on*ention who fra"ed o#r f#nda"ental law were in their "a-ority "en "at#re in years and e5perience. $he creation of the .lectoral o""ission was designed to re"edy certain e*ils of which the fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion were cogni&ant. (ro" the deli)erations of o#r onstit#tional on*ention it is e*ident that the p#rpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers pre*io#sly e5ercised )y the Legislat#re in "atters pertaining to contested elections of its "e")ers, to an independent and i"partial tri)#nal. It was not so "#ch the :nowledge and appreciation of conte"porary constit#tional precedents, howe*er, as the long9felt need of deter"ining legislati*e contests de*oid of partisan considerations which pro"pted the people acting thro#gh their delegates to the on*ention to pro*ide for this )ody :nown as the .lectoral o""ission. 8ith this end in *iew, a co"posite )ody in which )oth the "a-ority and "inority parties are e6#ally represented to off9set partisan infl#ence in its deli)erations was created, and f#rther endowed with -#dicial te"per )y incl#ding in its "e")ership three -#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt. $he grant of power to the .lectoral o""ission to -#dge all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly, is intended to )e as co"plete and #ni"paired as if it had re"ained originally in the Legislat#re. $he e5press lodging of that power in the .lectoral o""ission is an i"plied denial of the e5ercise of that power )y the 3ational Asse")ly. If the power clai"ed for the 3ational Asse")ly to reg#late the proceedings of the .lectoral o""ission and c#t off the power of the .lectoral o""ission to lay down a period within which protest sho#ld )e filed were conceded, the grant of power to the co""ission wo#ld )e ineffecti*e. $he .lectoral o""ission in s#ch a case wo#ld )e in*ested with the power to deter"ine contested cases in*ol*ing the election, ret#rns, and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly )#t s#)-ect at all ti"es to the reg#lati*e power of the 3ational Asse")ly. 3ot only wo#ld the p#rpose of the fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion of totally transferring this a#thority fro" the legislati*e )ody )e fr#strated, )#t a d#al a#thority wo#ld )e created with the res#ltant ine*ita)le clash of powers fro" ti"e to ti"e. A sad spectacle wo#ld then )e presented of the .lectoral o""ission retaining the )are a#thority of ta:ing cogni&ance of cases referred to, )#t in reality witho#t the necessary "eans to render that a#thority effecti*e whene*er and where*er the 3ational Asse")ly has chosen to act, a sit#ation worse than that intended to )e re"edied )y the fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion. $he power to reg#late on the part of the 3ational Asse")ly in proced#ral "atters will ine*ita)ly lead to the #lti"ate control )y the Asse")ly of the entire proceedings of the .lectoral o""ission, and, )y indirection, to the entire a)rogation of the constit#tional grant. It is o)*io#s that this res#lt sho#ld not )e per"itted. SEPARATION OF PO=ERS EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. POEA G.R. NO. 7%%33, OCTO&ER 18, 1988 CRU$, !." FACTS" <italiano !aco was hief 'fficer of the MR< .astern 0olaris when he was :illed in an accident. 1is widow s#ed for da"ages #nder ..'. 797 and Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 of the 0'.A. $he petitioner, as the *essel owner, arg#ed that the co"plaint was cogni&a)le not )y the 0'.A )#t )y the !ocial !ec#rity !yste" and sho#ld ha*e )een filed against the !tate Ins#rance (#nd. $he 0'.A ne*ertheless ass#"ed -#risdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties r#led in fa*or of the co"plainant. 0etitioner ca"e to this o#rt, pro"pting the !olicitor ,eneral to "o*e for dis"issal on the gro#nd of non9e5ha#stion of ad"inistrati*e re"edies. 'rdinarily, the decisions of the 0'.A sho#ld first )e appealed to the 3ational La)or %elations o""ission, on the theory inter alia that the agency sho#ld )e gi*en an opport#nity to correct the errors, if any, of its s#)ordinates. $his case co"es #nder one of the e5ceptions, howe*er, as the 6#estions the petitioner is raising are essentially 6#estions of law. Moreo*er, the pri*ate respondent hi"self has not o)-ected to the petitionerIs direct resort to this o#rt, o)ser*ing that the #s#al proced#re wo#ld delay the disposition of the case to her pre-#dice. ISSUE" 8hether or not there had )een a *alid delegation of power. HELD" 8hat can )e delegated is the discretion to deter"ine how the law "ay )e enforced, not what the law shall )e. $he ascertain"ent of the latter s#)-ect is a prerogati*e of the legislat#re. $his prerogati*e cannot )e a)dicated or s#rrendered )y the legislat#re to the delegate. $here are two accepted tests to deter"ine whether or not there is a *alid delegation of legislati*e power, *i&, the co"pleteness test and the s#fficient standard test. Jnder the first test, the law "#st )e co"plete in all its ter"s and conditions when it lea*es the legislat#re s#ch that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will ha*e to do is enforce it. Jnder the s#fficient standard test, there "#st )e ade6#ate g#idelines or stations in the law to "ap o#t the )o#ndaries of the delegateIs a#thority and pre*ent the delegation fro" r#nning riot. Both tests are intended to pre*ent a total transference of legislati*e a#thority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislat#re and e5ercise a power essentially legislati*e. $he principle of non9delegation of powers is applica)le to all the three "a-or powers of the ,o*ern"ent )#t is especially i"portant in the case of the legislati*e power )eca#se of the "any instances when its delegation is per"itted. $he occasions are rare when e5ec#ti*e or -#dicial powers ha*e to )e delegated )y the a#thorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislati*e power, howe*er, s#ch occasions ha*e )eco"e "ore and "ore fre6#ent, if not necessary. $his had led to the o)ser*ation that the delegation of legislati*e power has )eco"e the r#le and its non9delegation the e5ception. $he reason is the increasing co"ple5ity of the tas: of go*ern"ent and the growing ina)ility of the legislat#re to cope directly with the "yriad pro)le"s de"anding its attention. $he growth of society has ra"ified its acti*ities and created pec#liar and sophisticated pro)le"s that the legislat#re cannot )e e5pected reasona)ly to co"prehend. !peciali&ation e*en in legislation has )eco"e necessary. $o "any of the pro)le"s attendant #pon present9day #nderta:ings, the legislat#re "ay not ha*e the co"petence to pro*ide the re6#ired direct and efficacio#s, not to say, specific sol#tions. $hese sol#tions "ay, howe*er, )e e5pected fro" its delegates, who are s#pposed to )e e5perts in the partic#lar fields assigned to the". $he reasons for the delegation of legislati*e powers in general are partic#larly applica)le to ad"inistrati*e )odies. 8ith the proliferation of speciali&ed acti*ities and their attendant pec#liar pro)le"s, the national legislat#re has fo#nd it "ore and "ore necessary to entr#st to ad"inistrati*e agencies the a#thority to iss#e r#les to carry o#t the general pro*isions of the stat#te. $his is called the /power of s#)ordinate legislation./ 8ith this power, ad"inistrati*e )odies "ay i"ple"ent the )road policies laid down in a stat#te )y /filling inI the details which the ongress "ay not ha*e the opport#nity or co"petence to pro*ide. $his is effected )y their pro"#lgation of what are :nown as s#pple"entary reg#lations, s#ch as the i"ple"enting r#les iss#ed )y the Depart"ent of La)or on the new La)or ode. $hese reg#lations ha*e the force and effect of law. Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 is one s#ch ad"inistrati*e reg#lation. $he "odel contract prescri)ed there)y has )een applied in a significant n#")er of the cases witho#t challenge )y the e"ployer. $he power of the 0'.A @and )efore it the 3ational !ea"en BoardA in re6#iring the "odel contract is not #nli"ited as there is a s#fficient standard g#iding the delegate in the e5ercise of the said a#thority. $hat standard is disco*era)le in the e5ec#ti*e order itself which, in creating the 0hilippine '*erseas ."ploy"ent Ad"inistration, "andated it to protect the rights of o*erseas (ilipino wor:ers to /fair and e6#ita)le e"ploy"ent practices./ SEPARATION OF PO=ERS CASI&ANG VS. AJUINO G.R. NO. L38025. AUGUST 20, 1979 MA7ASIAR, ! P" FACTS" %espondent %e"igio D# was proclai"ed as the elected Mayor of %osales, 0angasinan o*er his ri*al, petitioner, who seasona)ly filed a protest with the trial co#rt, presided )y respondent H#dge, who initially too: cogni&ance of the sa"e as it is #n6#estiona)ly a -#sticia)le contro*ersy. In the "eanti"e, 0resident Marcos iss#ed 0rocla"ation 3o. 1?81, placing the entire co#ntry #nder Martial LawG thereafter, a new onstit#tion was adopted. D# "o*ed to dis"iss the election protest on the gro#nd that the trial co#rt had lost -#risdiction o*er the sa"e in *iew of the effecti*ity of the 1974 onstit#tion )y reason of which E @principallyA !ection 9 of Article ;<II O$ransitory 0ro*isionsP and !ection 2 of Article ;I E a political 6#estion has inter*ened in the case. D# contended that /the pro*isions in the 1947 onstit#tion relati*e to all local go*ern"ents ha*e )een s#perseded )y the 1974 onstit#tion. %espondent H#dge s#stained the political 6#estion theory and ordered the dis"issal of the electoral protest. 1ence, this petition. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 103 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ISSUE" 8hether or not the electoral protest filed )y the petitioner re"ained a -#sticia)le 6#estion e*en after the 1974 onstit#tion was adopted, th#s re"ains to )e #nder the -#risdiction of the o#rt of (irst Instance. HELD" $he thr#st of the aforesaid political 6#estion theory of respondent D# is that the 1974 onstit#tion, thro#gh !ection 9 of Article ;<II thereof, protected only those inc#")ents, li:e hi", at the ti"e of its ratification and effecti*ity and are the only ones a#thori&ed to contin#e in office and their ter" of office as e5tended now depends on the pleas#re of, as the sa"e has )een entr#sted or co""itted to, the inc#")ent 0resident of the 0hilippines or the Legislati*e Depart"entG and that !ection 2 of Article ;I thereof entr#sted to the 3ational Asse")ly the re*a"p of the entire local go*ern"ent str#ct#re )y the enact"ent of a local go*ern"ent code, th#s presenting a 6#estion of policy, the necessity and e5pediency of which are o#tside the range of -#dicial re*iew. In short, for the respondent H#dge to still contin#e ass#"ing -#risdiction o*er the pending election protest of petitioner is for hi" to ta:e cogni&ance of a 6#estion or policy /in regard to which f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the Legislati*e or .5ec#ti*e )ranch of the go*ern"ent./ $he electoral protest case herein in*ol*ed has re"ained a -#sticia)le contro*ersy. 3o political 6#estion has e*er )een interwo*en into this case. 3or is there any act of the inc#")ent 0resident or the Legislati*e Depart"ent to )e indirectly re*iewed or interfered with if the respondent H#dge decides the election protest. $he ter" /political 6#estion/ connotes what it "eans in ordinary parlance, na"ely, a 6#estion of policy. It refers to those 6#estions which #nder the onstit#tion, are to )e decided )y the people in their so*ereign capacityG or in regard to which f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the go*ern"ent. It is concerned with iss#es dependent #pon the wisdo", not legality, of a partic#lar "eas#re/ @$aNada *s. #enco, L91?72, (e). 28, 1977A. SEPARATION OF PO=ERS TASADA VS. CUENCO G.R. NO. L10520, FE&RUAR- 28, 1957 CONCEPCION, !." FACTS" 0etitioners Loren&o M. $aNada and Diosdado Macapagal so#ght to o#st respondent senators fro" the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal. 0etitioners allege that the that the o""ittee on %#les for the !enate, in no"inating !enators #enco and Delgado, and the !enate, in choosing these respondents, as "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal, had /acted a)sol#tely witho#t power or color of a#thority and in clear *iolation .. of Article <I, !ection 11 of the onstit#tion/G that /in ass#"ing "e")ership in the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal, )y ta:ing the corresponding oath of office therefor/, said respondents had /acted a)sol#tely witho#t color of appoint"ent or a#thority and are #nlawf#lly, and in *iolation of the onstit#tion, #s#rping, intr#ding into and e5ercising the powers of "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal./ %espondents assail the co#rtKs -#risdiction to entertain the petition, #pon the gro#nd that the power to choose si5 @+A !enators as "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal has )een e5pressly conferred )y the onstit#tion #pon the !enate, despite the fact that the draft s#)"itted to the constit#tional con*ention ga*e to the respecti*e political parties the right to elect their respecti*e representati*es in the .lectoral o""ission pro*ided for in the original onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, and that the only re"edy a*aila)le to petitioners herein /is not in the -#dicial for#"/, )#t /to )ring the "atter to the )ar of p#)lic opinion./ ISSUE" 8hether or not the case at )ar raises "erely a political 6#estion. HELD" 8illo#gh)y l#cidly states2 /.lsewhere in this treatise the well9 :nown and well9esta)lished principle is considered that it is not within the pro*ince of the co#rts to pass -#dg"ent #pon the policy of legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e action. 8here, therefore, discretionary powers are granted )y the onstit#tion or )y stat#te, the "anner in which those powers are e5ercised is not s#)-ect to -#dicial re*iew. $he co#rts, therefore, concern the"sel*es only with the 6#estion as to the e5istence and e5tent of these discretionary powers. /As disting#ished fro" the -#dicial, the legislati*e and e5ec#ti*e depart"ents are spo:en of as the political depart"ents of go*ern"ent )eca#se in *ery "any cases their action is necessarily dictated )y considerations of p#)lic or political policy. $hese considerations of p#)lic or political policy of co#rse will not per"it the legislat#re to *iolate constit#tional pro*isions, or the e5ec#ti*e to e5ercise a#thority not granted hi" )y the onstit#tion or )y, stat#te, )#t, within these li"its, they do per"it the depart"ents, separately or together, to recogni&e that a certain set of facts e5ists or that a gi*en stat#s e5ists, and these deter"inations, together with the conse6#ences that flow therefro", "ay not )e tra*ersed in the co#rts./ @8illo#gh)y on the onstit#tion of the Jnited !tates, <ol. 4, p. 142+G e"phasis s#pplied.A. $o the sa"e effect is the lang#age #sed in orp#s H#ris !ec#nd#", fro" which we 6#ote2. /It is well9settled doctrine that political 6#estions are not within the pro*ince of the -#diciary, e5cept to the e5tent that power to deal with s#ch 6#estions has )een conferred #pon the co#rts )y e5press constit#tional or stat#tory pro*isions. /It is not easy, howe*er, to define the phrase Upolitical 6#estionI, nor to deter"ine what "atters, fall within its scope. It is fre6#ently #sed to designate all 6#estions that lie o#tside the scope of the -#dicial 6#estions, which #nder the constit#tion, are to )e decided )y the people in their so*ereign capacity, or in regard to which f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the go*ern"ent./ $h#s, it has )een repeatedly held that the 6#estion whether certain a"end"ents to the onstit#tion are in*alid for non9co"pliance with the proced#re therein prescri)ed, is not a political one and "ay )e settled )y the o#rts. $he ter" /political 6#estion/ connotes, in legal parlance, what it "eans in ordinary parlance, na"ely, a 6#estion of policy. In other words, in the lang#age of orp#s H#ris !ec#nd#" @s#praA, it refers to /those 6#estions which, #nder the onstit#tion, are to )e decided )y the people in their so*ereign capacity, or in regard to which f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the Legislat#re or e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the ,o*ern"ent./ It is concerned with iss#es dependent #pon the wisdo", not legality, of a partic#lar "eas#re. !#ch is not the nat#re of the 6#estion for deter"ination in the present case. 1ere, the co#rt is called #pon to decide whether the election of !enators #enco and Delgado, )y the !enate, as "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal, #pon no"ination )y !enator 0ri"icias9a "e")er and spo:es"an of the party ha*ing the largest n#")er of *otes in the !enate9on )ehalf of its o""ittee on %#les, contra*enes the constit#tional "andate that said "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal shall )e chosen /#pon no"ination .. of the party ha*ing the second largest n#")er of *otes/ in the !enate, and hence, is n#ll and *oid. $his is not a political 6#estion. $he !enate is not clothed with /f#ll discretionary a#thority/ in the choice of "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal. $he e5ercise of its power thereon is s#)-ect to constit#tional li"itations which are clai"ed to )e "andatory in nat#re. It is clearly within the legiti"ate pro*e of the -#dicial depart"ent to pass #pon the *alidity the proceedings in connection therewith. SEPARATION OF PO=ERS SANIDAD V. COMELEC G.R. NO. L44%40. OCTO&ER 12, 197% FACTS" 0a)lito !anidad, a newspaper col#"nist of ='*er*iew,> a wee:ly newspaper circ#lating in Bag#io and the ordilleras, assailed the onstit#tionality of !ec 19 of the o"elec %esol#tion 21+7 which pro*ides that d#ring the ple)iscite ca"paign period, on the day )efore and on ple)iscite day, no "ass "edia col#"nist, co""entator, anno#ncer or personality shall #se his col#"n or radio or tele*ision ti"e to ca"paign for or against the ple)iscite iss#e. 0etitioner contends that it *iolates the freedo" of e5pression and of the press. 1ence, constit#tes as a prior restraint in his constit#tional right. !olicitor ,eneral contends that it does not *iolate the onstit#tion for it is a *alid i"ple"entation of the power of o"elec to s#per*ise and reg#late "edia d#ring election or ple)iscite period and can e5press his news thro#gh the o"elec space Y airti"e. ISSUE" 8hether or not o"elec is granted the power to reg#late "ass "edia d#ring election or ple)iscite period #nder Article 9 of the 19987 onstit#tion. HELD" It is gi*en that what was granted to o"elec was the power to s#per*ise and reg#late the #se and en-oy"ent of franchises, per"its, or other grants iss#ed for the operation of transportation or other p#)lic #tilities, "edia co""#nication or infor"ation to the end that e6#al opport#nity, ti"e and space, and the right to reply, incl#ding reasona)le, e6#al rates therefore, for p#)lic infor"ation ca"paign and for#"s a"ong candidates are ens#red. $he e*il so#ght to )e pre*ented is the possi)ility that a franchise holder "ay fa*or or gi*e any #nd#e ad*antage to a candidate. 3either the onstit#tion nor %A ++B+ can )e constr#ed to "ean that the o"elec has also )een granted the right to s#per*ise and reg#late the e5ercise )y "edia practitioners the"sel*es of their right to e5pression d#ring ple)iscite periods. Media practitioners e5ercising their freedo" of e5pression d#ring ple)iscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in*ol*ed in a ple)iscite. o"elec %esol#tion 3o 21+7 has no stat#tory )asis. SEPARATION OF PO=ERS DA$A VS. SINGSON 180 SCRA 49%, 1989 FACTS" 0etitioner was a "e")er of the o""ission on Appoint"ents representing the Li)eral 0arty. 8ith the organi&ation of the LD0 @La)an ng De"o:rati:ong 0ilipinoA, so"e congressional "e")ers )elonging to the Li)eral 0arty resigned fro" said party to -oin the LD0. 8hen the o""ission on Appoint"ents were reorgani&ed, petitioner was replaced )y an LD0 representati*e. 0etitioner contends that the organi&ation of the LD0 cannot affect the co"position of the o""ission on Appoint"ents )eca#se LD0 is not a registered party and has not yet shown the sta)ility of a party. ISSUE" Does the sit#ation present a =political 6#estion>C HELD" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 104 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he 6#estion is -#sticia)le. $he iss#e is one of legality not of wisdo". $he ascertain"ent of the "anner of for"ing the o""ission on Appoint"ents is distinct fro" the discretion of the parties to designate there representati*es. And e*en if the 6#estion were political in nat#re, it wo#ld still co"e #nder the e5panded power of re*iew in Article <III, !ection 1. DELEGATION OF PO=ER GARCIA V. E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR- G.R. NO. 100883. DECEM&ER 2, 1991 CRU$, ! P" FACTS" $he petitioner challenges %A 7?B2 on the gro#nd that it defeats the constit#tional policy of de*eloping a self9reliant and independent national econo"y effecti*ely controlled )y (ilipinos and the protection of (ilipino enterprises against #nfair foreign co"petition and trade practices. 1e clai"s that the law a)dicates all reg#lation of foreign enterprises in this co#ntry and gi*es the" #nfair ad*antages o*er local in*est"ents which are practically el)owed o#t in their own land with the co"plicity of their own go*ern"ent. !pecifically, he arg#es that #nder !ection 7 of the said law a foreign in*estor "ay do )#siness in the 0hilippines or in*est in a do"estic enterprise #p to 1??M of its capital witho#t need of prior appro*al. $he said section "a:es certain that /the !. or B$%0, as the case "ay )e, shall not i"pose any li"itations on the e5tent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those pro*ided in this Act./ $he petitioner also attac:s !ection 9 )eca#se if a 0hilippine national )elie*es that an area of in*est"ent sho#ld )e incl#ded in List , the )#rden is on hi" to show that the criteria en#"erated in said section are "et. It is alleged that Articles 2, 42, Y 47 of the '"ni)#s In*est"ents ode of 1982 are done away with )y %A 7?B2. It is also arg#ed that )y repealing Articles B9, 7?, 7B and 7+ of the 1987 '"ni)#s In*est"ents ode, %A 3o. 7?B2 f#rther a)andons the reg#lation of foreign in*est"ents )y doing away with i"portant re6#ire"ents for doing )#siness in the 0hilippines. (inally, the petitioner clai"s that the transitory pro*isions of %A 7?B2, which allow practically #nli"ited entry of foreign in*est"ents for three years, s#)-ect only to a s#pposed $ransitory (oreign In*est"ent 3egati*e List, not only co"pletely dereg#lates foreign in*est"ents )#t wo#ld place (ilipino enterprises at a fatal disad*antage in their own co#ntry. ISSUE" 8hether or not there is a -#sticia)le 6#estion present in the case at )ar. HELD" 8hat is present in the case at )ar is not a de)ate on the wisdo" or the efficacy of the Act, )#t this is a "atter on which the o#rt is not co"petent to r#le. As ooley o)ser*ed2 /De)ata)le 6#estions are for the legislat#re to decide. $he co#rts do not sit to resol*e the "erits of conflicting iss#es./ In Angara *. .lectoral o""ission, H#stice La#rel "ade it clear that /the -#diciary does not pass #pon 6#estions of wisdo", -#stice or e5pediency of legislation./ And fittingly so for in the e5ercise of -#dicial power, we are allowed only /to settle act#al contro*ersies in*ol*ing rights which are legally de"anda)le and enforcea)le,/ and "ay not ann#l an act of the political depart"ents si"ply )eca#se we feel it is #nwise or i"practical. It is tr#e that, #nder the e5panded concept of the political 6#estion, we "ay now also /deter"ine whether or not there has )een a gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on the part of any )ranch or instr#"entality of the ,o*ern"ent./ $he o#rt, howe*er, did not find any irreg#larity that e5ist in the case at )ar. $he petitioner is co""ended for his high ci*ic spirit and his &eal in the protection of the (ilipino in*estors against #nfair foreign co"petition. 1is painsta:ing st#dy and analysis of the (oreign In*est"ents Act of 1991 re*eals not only his nationalistic fer*or )#t also an i"pressi*e grasp of this co"ple5 s#)-ect. B#t his *iews are e5pressed in the wrong for#". $he o#rt is not a political arena. 1is o)-ections to the law are )etter heard )y his colleag#es in the ongress of the 0hilippines, who ha*e the power to rewrite it, if they so please, in the fashion he s#ggests. DELEGATION OF EMERGENC- PO=ERS ARANETA V. DINGLASAN (G.R. NO. L2044 AUGUST 2%, 1949) TUASON, !." FACTS" $he petitions challenge the *alidity of e5ec#ti*e orders of the 0resident a*owedly iss#ed in *irt#e of o""onwealth Act 3o. +71. In*ol*ed in cases 3os. L92?BB and L9277+ is .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2, which reg#lates rentals for ho#ses and lots for residential )#ildings. oncerned in case L94?77 is .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 192, which ai"s to control e5ports fro" the 0hilippines. 'n the other hand, case 3o. L94?7B relates to .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 227, which appropriates f#nds for the operation of the ,o*ern"ent of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines d#ring the period fro" H#ly 1, 19B9 to H#ne 4?, 197?, and for other p#rposes. Affected in case 3o. L94?7+ is .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 22+, which appropriates 0+,???,??? to defray the e5penses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold l#g of the national elections to )e held in 3o*e")er, 19B9. 0etitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the ."ergency 0owers Act @o""onwealth Act 3o. +71A has ceased to ha*e any force and effect. ISSUE" 8hether or the ."ergency 0owers Act has ceased to ha*e any force and effect. HELD" Des. !ection 2+ of Article <I of the 1947 onstit#tion pro*ides2 =In ti"e of war or other national e"ergency, the ongress "ay )y law a#thori&e the 0resident, for a li"ited period and s#)-ect to s#ch restrictions as it "ay prescri)e, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations to carry o#t a declared national policy>. Article <I of the onstit#tion pro*ides that any law passed )y *irt#e thereof sho#ld )e /for a li"ited period./ /Li"ited/ has )een defined to "ean /restrictedG )o#ndedG prescri)edG confined within positi*e )o#ndsG restricti*e in d#ration, e5tent or scope./ $he words /li"ited period/ as #sed in the onstit#tion are )eyond 6#estion intended to "ean restricti*e in d#ration. ."ergency, in order to -#stify the delegation of e"ergency powers, /"#st )e te"porary or it can not )e said to )e an e"ergency./ It is to )e pres#"ed that o""onwealth Act 3o. +71 was appro*ed with this li"itation in *iew. $he opposite theory wo#ld "a:e the law rep#gnant to the onstit#tion, and is contrary to the principle that the legislat#re is dee"ed to ha*e f#ll :nowledge of the constit#tional scope of its powers. $he assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act wo#ld not )e in har"ony with the onstit#tion either. If a new and different law were necessary to ter"inate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has )een correctly pointed o#t, wo#ld )e #nli"ited, indefinite, negati*e and #ncertain. (#rther"ore, this wo#ld create the ano"aly that, while ongress "ight delegate its powers )y si"ple "a-ority, it "ight not )e a)le to recall the" e5cept )y a two9third *ote. In other words, it wo#ld )e easier for ongress to delegate its powers than to ta:e the" )ac:. !ection B of the Act goes far to settle the legislati*e intention of this phase of Act 3o. +71. !ection B stip#lates that /the r#les and reg#lations pro"#lgated there#nder shall )e in f#ll force and effect #ntil the ongress of the 0hilippines shall otherwise pro*ide./ $he silence of the law regarding the repeal of the a#thority itself, in the face of the e5press pro*ision for the repeal of the r#les and reg#lations iss#ed in p#rs#ance of it, a clear "anifestation of the )elief held )y the 3ational Asse")ly that there was no necessity to pro*ide for the for"er. It wo#ld )e strange if ha*ing no idea a)o#t the ti"e the ."ergency 0owers Act was to )e effecti*e the 3ational Asse")le failed to "a:e a pro*ision for this ter"ination in the sa"e way that it did for the ter"ination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. $here wo#ld )e no point in repealing or ann#lling the r#les and reg#lations pro"#lgated #nder a law if the law itself was to re"ain in force, since, in that case, the 0resident co#ld not only "a:e new r#les and reg#lations )#t he co#ld restore the ones already ann#lled )y the legislat#re. It is o#r considered opinion, and we so hold, that o""onwealth Act 3o. +71 )eca"e inoperati*e when ongress "et in reg#lar session on May 27, 19B+, and that .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. +2, 192, 227 and 22+ were iss#ed witho#t a#thority of law. In setting the session of ongress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of e5piration of the Act, we thin: gi*ing effect to the p#rpose and intention of the 3ational Asse")ly. In a special session, the ongress "ay /consider general legislation or only s#ch as he @0residentA "ay designate./ @!ection 9, Article <I of the onstit#tion.A In a reg#lar session, the power ongress to legislate is not circ#"scri)ed e5cept )y the li"itations i"posed )y the organic law. Jpon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will )e granted. DELEGATION OF EMERGENC- PO=ERS RODRIGUE$ V. GELLA (G.R. NO. L%2%% FE&RUAR- 2, 1953) PARAS, C.!. FACTS" 0etitioners herein see: to in*alidate .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 7B7 and 7B+ iss#ed on 3o*e")er 1?, 1972, the first appropriating the s#" of 047,87?,7?? for #rgent and essential p#)lic wor:s, and the second setting aside the s#" of 011,4+7,+?? for relief in the pro*inces and cities *isited )y typhoons, floods, dro#ghts, earth6#a:es, *olcanic action and other cala"ities. !#ch .5ec#ti*e 'rders were iss#ed in *irt#e of o""onwealth Act 3o. +71, also :nown as the ."ergency 0owers Act. 0etitionersK pri"ary contention rests on the fact that the 3ational Asse")ly intended s#ch powers to e5ist only for a li"ited period. ISSUE" 8hether or not .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 7B7 and 7B+ are *alid. HELD" 3o. !ection 2+ of Article <I of the onstit#tion pro*ides that /in ti"es of war or other national e"ergency, the ongress "ay )y law a#thori&e the 0resident, for a li"ited period and s#)-ect to s#ch restrictions as it "ay prescri)e, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations to carry o#t a declared national policy./ Accordingly the 3ational Asse")ly passed o""onwealth Act 3o. +71, declaring @in section 1A the national policy that /the e5istence of war )etween the Jnited !tates and other co#ntries of .#rope and Asia, which in*ol*es the 0hilippines "a:es it necessary to in*est the 0resident with e5traordinary powers in order to "eet the res#lting e"ergency,/ and @in section 2A a#thori&ing the 0resident, /d#ring the e5istence of the e"ergency, to pro"#lgate s#ch San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 105 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 r#les and reg#lations as he "ay dee" necessary to carry o#t the national policy declared in section 1./ Act 3o. +71 was e5pressly in p#rs#ance of the constit#tional pro*ision, it has to )e ass#"ed that the 3ational Asse")ly intended it to )e only for a li"ited period. If it )e contended that the Act has not yet )een d#ly repealed, and s#ch step is necessary to a cessation of the e"ergency powers delegated to the 0resident, the res#lt wo#ld )e o)*io#s #nconstit#tionality, since it "ay ne*er )e repealed )y the ongress, or if the latter e*er atte"pts to do so, the 0resident "ay wield his *eto. $his e*ent#ality has in fact ta:en place when the 0resident disappro*ed 1o#se Bill 3o. 727, repealing all ."ergency 0owers Acts. $he sit#ation will "a:e the ongress and the 0resident or either as the principal a#thority to deter"ine the indefinite d#ration of the delegation of legislati*e powers, E in palpa)le rep#gnance to the constit#tional pro*ision that any grant there#nder "#st )e for a li"ited period, necessarily to )e fi5ed in the law itself and not dependent #pon the ar)itrary or elastic will of either the ongress or the 0resident. $he logical *iew consistent with constit#tionality is to hold that the powers lasted only d#ring the e"ergency res#lting fro" the last world war which fact#ally in*ol*ed the 0hilippines when Act 3o. +71 was passed on Dece")er 1+, 19B1. $hat e"ergency, which nat#rally ter"inated #pon the ending of the last world war, was conte"plated )y the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly on the foresight that the act#al state of war co#ld pre*ent it fro" holding its ne5t reg#lar session Moreo*er, !ection 2+ of Article <I of the 1947 constit#tion, in *irt#e of which Act 3o. +71 was passed, a#thori&es the delegation of powers )y the ongress @1A in ti"es of war or @2A other national e"ergency. $he e"ergency e5pressly spo:en of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is one /in ti"e of war,/ as disting#ished fro" /other national e"ergency/ that "ay arise as an after9effect of war or fro" nat#ral ca#ses s#ch as widespread earth6#a:es, typhoons, floods, and the li:e. ertainly the typhoons that hit so"e pro*inces and cities in 1972 not only did not res#lt fro" the last world war )#t were and co#ld not ha*e )een conte"plated )y the legislators. At any rate, the ongress is a*aila)le for necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the people down witho#t so"ehow )eing answera)le thereo*er. .*en #nder the theory of so"e "e")ers of this co#rt that insofar as the ongress had shown its readiness or a)ility to act on a gi*en "atter, the e"ergency powers delegated to the 0resident had )een pro tanto withdrawn, .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 7B7 and 7B+ "#st )e declared as ha*ing no legal anchorage. 8e can ta:e -#dicial notice of the fact that the ongress has since li)eration repeatedly )een appro*ing acts appropriating f#nds for the operation of the ,o*ern"ent, p#)lic wor:s, and "any others p#rposes, with the res#lt that as to s#ch legislati*e tas: the ongress "#st )e dee"ed to ha*e long decided to ass#"e the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the sa"e fro" the 0resident. If the 0resident had ceased to ha*e powers with regards to general appropriations, none can re"ain in respect of special appropriationsG otherwise he "ay acco"plish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act 3o. +71 e5pressly li"ited the power of the 0resident to that contin#ing /in force/ appropriations which wo#ld lapse or otherwise )eco"e inoperati*e, so that, e*en ass#"ing that the Act is still effecti*e, it is do#)tf#l whether the 0resident can )y e5ec#ti*e orders "a:e new appropriations. $he specific power /to contin#e in force laws and appropriations which wo#ld lapse or otherwise )eco"e inoperati*e/ is a li"itation on the general power /to e5ercise s#ch other powers as he "ay dee" necessary to ena)le the ,o*ern"ent to f#lfill its responsi)ilities and to "aintain and enforce its a#thority./ Indeed, to hold that altho#gh the ongress has, for a)o#t se*en years since li)eration, )een nor"ally f#nctioning and legislating on e*ery concei*a)le field, the 0resident still has any resid#ary powers #nder the Act, wo#ld necessarily lead to conf#sion and o*erlapping, if not conflict. !helter "ay not )e so#ght in the proposition that the 0resident sho#ld )e allowed to e5ercise e"ergency powers for the sa:e of speed and e5pediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, )eca#se we ha*e the onstit#tion, designed to esta)lish a go*ern"ent #nder a regi"e of -#stice, li)erty and de"ocracy. In line with s#ch pri"ordial o)-ecti*e, o#r ,o*ern"ent is de"ocratic in for" and )ased on the syste" of separation of powers. Jnless and #ntil changed or a"ended, we shall ha*e to a)ide )y the letter and spirit of the onstit#tion and )e prepared to accept the conse6#ences res#lting fro" or inherent in disagree"ents )etween, inaction or e*en ref#sal of the legislati*e and e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. M#ch as it is i"perati*e in so"e cases to ha*e pro"pt official action, deadloc:s in and slowness of de"ocratic processes "#st )e preferred to concentration of powers in any one "an or gro#p of "en for o)*io#s reasons. $he fra"ers of the onstit#tion, howe*er, had the *ision of and were caref#l in allowing delegation of legislati*e powers to the 0resident for a li"ited period /in ti"es of war or other national e"ergency./ $hey had th#s entr#sted to the good -#dg"ent of the ongress the d#ty of coping with any national e"ergency )y a "ore efficient proced#reG )#t it alone "#st decide )eca#se e"ergency in itself cannot and sho#ld not create power. In o#r de"ocracy the hope and s#r*i*al of the nation lie in the wisdo" and #nselfish patriotis" of all officials and in their faithf#l adherence to the onstit#tion. 8herefore, .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 7B7 and 7B+ are here)y declared n#ll and *oid, and the respondents are ordered to desist fro" appropriating, releasing, allotting, and e5pending the p#)lic f#nds set aside therein. DELEGATION OF PO=ERS? PRO&ATION PEOPLE V. VERA (G.R. NO. L45%85 NOVEM&ER 1%, 1937) LAUREL, !. FACTS" 0etitioners, the 0eople of the 0hilippines and the 1ong:ong and !hanghai Ban:ing orporation, are respecti*ely the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano # Jn-ieng is one of the defendants, in a cri"inal case. %espondent Hose '. <era, is the H#dge ad interi" of the se*enth )ranch of the trial co#rt who heard the application of the defendant Mariano # Jn-ieng for pro)ation in the aforesaid cri"inal case. $he trial co#rt rendered -#dg"ent, con*icting Jn-ieng. Jpon appeal, the co#rt "odified the sentence to an indeter"inate penalty of fro" fi*e years and si5 "onths of prision correccional to se*en years, si5 "onths and twenty9se*en days of prision "ayor, )#t affir"ed the -#dg"ent in all other respects. $he instant proceedings ha*e to do with the application for pro)ation filed )y Jn-ieng )efore the trial co#rt, #nder the pro*isions of Act 3o. B221 of the def#nct 0hilippine Legislat#re. Jn-ieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the cri"e of which he was con*icted, that he has no cri"inal record and that he wo#ld o)ser*e good cond#ct in the f#t#re. 1owe*er, the (iscal of the ity of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of pro)ation to the Jn-ieng. $he pri*ate prosec#tion also filed an opposition, ela)orating on the #nconstit#tionality of Act 3o. B221, as an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power to the pro*incial )oards of se*eral pro*inces ISSUE" 8hether or not Act 3o. B221 constit#tes an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power. HELD" Des. Jnder the constit#tional syste", the powers of go*ern"ent are distri)#ted a"ong three coordinate and s#)stantially independent organs2 the legislati*e, the e5ec#ti*e and the -#dicial. .ach of these depart"ents of the go*ern"ent deri*es its a#thority fro" the onstit#tion which, in t#rn, is the highest e5pression of pop#lar will. .ach has e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of the "atters within its -#risdiction, and is s#pre"e within its own sphere. $he power to "a:e laws E the legislati*e power E is *ested in a )ica"eral Legislat#re )y the Hones Law @sec. 12A and in a #nica"eral 3ational Asse")ly )y the onstit#tion @Act. <I, sec. 1, onstit#tion of the 0hilippinesA. $he 0hilippine Legislat#re or the 3ational Asse")ly "ay not escape its d#ties and responsi)ilities )y delegating that power to any other )ody or a#thority. Any atte"pt to a)dicate the power is #nconstit#tional and *oid, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. /'ne of the settled "a5i"s in constit#tional law is that the power conferred #pon the legislat#re to "a:e laws cannot )e delegated )y that depart"ent to any other )ody or a#thority. 8here the so*ereign power of the state has located the a#thority, there it "#st re"ainG and )y the constit#tional agency alone the laws "#st )e "ade #ntil the onstit#tion itself is charged. $he power to whose -#dg"ent, wisdo", and patriotis" this high prerogati*e has )een entr#sted cannot relie*e itself of the responsi)ilities )y choosing other agencies #pon which the power shall )e de*ol*ed, nor can it s#)stit#te the -#dg"ent, wisdo", and patriotis" of any other )ody for those to which alone the people ha*e seen fit to confide this so*ereign tr#st./ $he r#le, howe*er, which for)ids the delegation of legislati*e power is not a)sol#te and infle5i)le. It ad"its of e5ceptions. An e5ceptions sanctioned )y i""e"orial practice per"its the central legislati*e )ody to delegate legislati*e powers to local a#thorities. /It is a cardinal principle of o#r syste" of go*ern"ent, that local affairs shall )e "anaged )y local a#thorities, and general affairs )y the central a#thoritiesG and hence while the r#le is also f#nda"ental that the power to "a:e laws cannot )e delegated, the creation of the "#nicipalities e5ercising local self go*ern"ent has ne*er )een held to trench #pon that r#le. !#ch legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislati*e power, )#t rather as the grant of the a#thority to prescri)ed local reg#lations, according to i""e"orial practice, s#)-ect of co#rse to the interposition of the s#perior in cases of necessity./ Do#)tless, also, legislati*e power "ay )e delegated )y the onstit#tion itself. !ection 1B, paragraph 2, of article <I of the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines pro*ides that /$he 3ational Asse")ly "ay )y law a#thori&e the 0resident, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations and restrictions as it "ay i"pose, to fi5 within specified li"its, tariff rates, i"port or e5port 6#otas, and tonnage and wharfage d#es./ And section 1+ of the sa"e article of the onstit#tion pro*ides that /In ti"es of war or other national e"ergency, the 3ational Asse")ly "ay )y law a#thori&e the 0resident, for a li"ited period and s#)-ect to s#ch restrictions as it "ay prescri)ed, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations to carry o#t a declared national policy./ It is )eyond the scope of this decision to deter"ine whether or not, in the a)sence of the foregoing constit#tional pro*isions, the 0resident co#ld )e a#thori&ed to e5ercise the powers there)y *ested in hi". Jpon the other hand, whate*er do#)t "ay ha*e e5isted has )een re"o*ed )y the onstit#tion itself. $he case )efore #s does not fall #nder any of the e5ceptions hereina)o*e "entioned. $he challenged section of Act 3o. B221 in section 11 which reads as follows2 $his Act shall apply only in those pro*inces in which the respecti*e pro*incial )oards ha*e pro*ided for the salary of a pro)ation officer at rates not lower than those now pro*ided for pro*incial fiscals. !aid pro)ation officer shall )e appointed )y the !ecretary of H#stice and shall )e s#)-ect to the direction of the 0ro)ation 'ffice. In testing whether a stat#te constit#te an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power or not, it is #s#al to in6#ire whether the stat#te was San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 106 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 co"plete in all its ter"s and pro*isions when it left the hands of the legislat#re so that nothing was left to the -#dg"ent of any other appointee or delegate of the legislat#re. In the Jnited !tates *s. Ang $ang 1o @O1922P, B4 0hil., 1A, this co#rt adhered to the foregoing r#le when it held an act of the legislat#re *oid in so far as it #ndertoo: to a#thori&e the ,o*ernor9,eneral, in his discretion, to iss#e a procla"ation fi5ing the price of rice and to "a:e the sale of it in *iolation of the procla"ation a cri"e. $he general r#le, howe*er, is li"ited )y another r#le that to a certain e5tent "atters of detail "ay )e left to )e filled in )y r#les and reg#lations to )e adopted or pro"#lgated )y e5ec#ti*e officers and ad"inistrati*e )oards. (or the p#rpose of 0ro)ation Act, the pro*incial )oards "ay )e regarded as ad"inistrati*e )odies endowed with power to deter"ine when the Act sho#ld ta:e effect in their respecti*e pro*inces. $hey are the agents or delegates of the legislat#re in this respect. $he r#les go*erning delegation of legislati*e power to ad"inistrati*e and e5ec#ti*e officers are applica)le or are at least indicati*e of the r#le which sho#ld )e here adopted. An e5a"ination of a *ariety of cases on delegation of power to ad"inistrati*e )odies will show that the ratio decidendi is at *ariance )#t, it can )e )roadly asserted that the rationale re*ol*es aro#nd the presence or a)sence of a standard or r#le of action E or the s#fficiency thereof E in the stat#te, to aid the delegate in e5ercising the granted discretion. In so"e cases, it is held that the standard is s#fficientG in others that is ins#fficientG and in still others that it is entirely lac:ing. As a r#le, an act of the legislat#re is inco"plete and hence in*alid if it does not lay down any r#le or definite standard )y which the ad"inistrati*e officer or )oard "ay )e g#ided in the e5ercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at )ar, what r#les are to g#ide the pro*incial )oards in the e5ercise of their discretionary power to deter"ine whether or not the 0ro)ation Act shall apply in their respecti*e pro*incesC 8hat standards are fi5ed )y the ActC 8e do not find any and none has )een pointed to #s )y the respondents. $he pro)ation Act does not, )y the force of any of its pro*isions, fi5 and i"pose #pon the pro*incial )oards any standard or g#ide in the e5ercise of their discretionary power. 8hat is granted, if we "ay #se the lang#age of H#stice ardo&o in the recent case of !checter, s#pra, is a /ro*ing co""ission/ which ena)les the pro*incial )oards to e5ercise ar)itrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislat#re does not see"ingly on its own a#thority e5tend the )enefits of the 0ro)ation Act to the pro*inces )#t in reality lea*es the entire "atter for the *ario#s pro*incial )oards to deter"ine. In other words, the pro*incial )oards of the *ario#s pro*inces are to deter"ine for the"sel*es, whether the 0ro)ation Law shall apply to their pro*inces or not at all. $he applica)ility and application of the 0ro)ation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the pro*incial )oards. If the pro*incial )oard does not wish to ha*e the Act applied in its pro*ince, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed a"o#nt for the salary of a pro)ation officer. $he plain lang#age of the Act is not s#scepti)le of any other interpretation. $his, to o#r "inds, is a *irt#al s#rrender of legislati*e power to the pro*incial )oards. It sho#ld )e o)ser*ed that in the case at )ar we are not concerned with the si"ple transference of details of e5ec#tion or the pro"#lgation )y e5ec#ti*e or ad"inistrati*e officials of r#les and reg#lations to carry into effect the pro*isions of a law. If we were, rec#rrence to o#r own decisions wo#ld )e s#fficient. 8e concl#de that section 11 of Act 3o. B221 constit#tes an i"proper and #nlawf#l delegation of legislati*e a#thority to the pro*incial )oards and is, for this reason, #nconstit#tional and *oid. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE PO=ER EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA (G.R. NO. 7%%33 OCTO&ER 18, 1988) CRU$, !." FACTS" $he pri*ate respondent in this case was awarded the s#" of 0192,???.?? )y the 0'.A for the death of her h#s)and. $he decision is challenged )y the petitioner on the principal gro#nd that the 0'.A had no -#risdiction o*er the case as the h#s)and was not an o*erseas wor:er. <italiano !aco was hief 'fficer of the MR< .astern 0olaris when he was :illed in an accident in $o:yo, Hapan on March 17, 1987. 1is widow s#ed for da"ages #nder .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 797 and Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 of the 0'.A. $he petitioner, as owner of the *essel, arg#ed that the co"plaint was cogni&a)le not )y the 0'.A )#t )y the !ocial !ec#rity !yste" and sho#ld ha*e )een filed against the !tate Ins#rance (#nd. $he 0'.A ne*ertheless ass#"ed -#risdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties r#led in fa*or of the co"plainant. $he award consisted of 018?,???.?? as death )enefits and 012,???.?? for )#rial e5penses. $he petitioner does not contend that !aco was not its e"ployee or that the clai" of his widow is not co"pensa)le. 8hat it does #rge is that he was not an o*erseas wor:er )#t a Ido"estic e"ployee and conse6#ently his widowIs clai" sho#ld ha*e )een filed with !ocial !ec#rity !yste", s#)-ect to appeal to the ."ployees o"pensation o""ission. (#rther"ore, the petitioner 6#estions the *alidity of Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 itself as *iolati*e of the principle of non9 delegation of legislati*e power. It contends that no a#thority had )een gi*en the 0'.A to pro"#lgate the said reg#lationG and e*en with s#ch a#thori&ation, the reg#lation represents an e5ercise of legislati*e discretion which, #nder the principle, is not s#)-ect to delegation. ISSUE" 8hether or not Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 is *iolati*e of the principle of non9delegation of legislati*e power. HELD" 3o. $he a#thority to iss#e the said reg#lation is clearly pro*ided in !ection B@aA of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 797, reading as follows2 =... $he go*erning Board of the Ad"inistration @0'.AA, as here#nder pro*ided shall pro"#lgate the necessary r#les and reg#lations to go*ern the e5ercise of the ad-#dicatory f#nctions of the Ad"inistration @0'.AA. = Legislati*e discretion as to the s#)stanti*e contents of the law cannot )e delegated. 8hat can )e delegated is the discretion to deter"ine how the law "ay )e enforced, not what the law shall )e. $he ascertain"ent of the latter s#)-ect is a prerogati*e of the legislat#re. $his prerogati*e cannot )e a)dicated or s#rrendered )y the legislat#re to the delegate. $here are two accepted tests to deter"ine whether or not there is a *alid delegation of legislati*e power, *i& , the co"pleteness test and the s#fficient standard test. Jnder the first test, the law "#st )e co"plete in all its ter"s and conditions when it lea*es the legislat#re s#ch that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will ha*e to do is enforce it. Jnder the s#fficient standard test, there "#st )e ade6#ate g#idelines or stations in the law to "ap o#t the )o#ndaries of the delegateIs a#thority and pre*ent the delegation fro" r#nning riot. Both tests are intended to pre*ent a total transference of legislati*e a#thority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislat#re and e5ercise a power essentially legislati*e. $he principle of non9delegation of powers is applica)le to all the three "a-or powers of the ,o*ern"ent )#t is especially i"portant in the case of the legislati*e power )eca#se of the "any instances when its delegation is per"itted. $he occasions are rare when e5ec#ti*e or -#dicial powers ha*e to )e delegated )y the a#thorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislati*e power, howe*er, s#ch occasions ha*e )eco"e "ore and "ore fre6#ent, if not necessary. $his had led to the o)ser*ation that the delegation of legislati*e power has )eco"e the r#le and its non9delegation the e5ception. $he reason is the increasing co"ple5ity of the tas: of go*ern"ent and the growing ina)ility of the legislat#re to cope directly with the "yriad pro)le"s de"anding its attention. $he growth of society has ra"ified its acti*ities and created pec#liar and sophisticated pro)le"s that the legislat#re cannot )e e5pected reasona)ly to co"prehend. !peciali&ation e*en in legislation has )eco"e necessary. $o "any of the pro)le"s attendant #pon present9day #nderta:ings, the legislat#re "ay not ha*e the co"petence to pro*ide the re6#ired direct and efficacio#s, not to say, specific sol#tions. $hese sol#tions "ay, howe*er, )e e5pected fro" its delegates, who are s#pposed to )e e5perts in the partic#lar fields assigned to the". $he reasons gi*en a)o*e for the delegation of legislati*e powers in general are partic#larly applica)le to ad"inistrati*e )odies. 8ith the proliferation of speciali&ed acti*ities and their attendant pec#liar pro)le"s, the national legislat#re has fo#nd it "ore and "ore necessary to entr#st to ad"inistrati*e agencies the a#thority to iss#e r#les to carry o#t the general pro*isions of the stat#te. $his is called the /power of s#)ordinate legislation./ 8ith this power, ad"inistrati*e )odies "ay i"ple"ent the )road policies laid down in a stat#te )y /filling inI the details which the ongress "ay not ha*e the opport#nity or co"petence to pro*ide. $his is effected )y their pro"#lgation of what are :nown as s#pple"entary reg#lations, s#ch as the i"ple"enting r#les iss#ed )y the Depart"ent of La)or on the new La)or ode. $hese reg#lations ha*e the force and effect of law. Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 is one s#ch ad"inistrati*e reg#lation. $he "odel contract prescri)ed there)y has )een applied in a significant n#")er of the cases witho#t challenge )y the e"ployer. $he power of the 0'.A @and )efore it the 3ational !ea"en BoardA in re6#iring the "odel contract is not #nli"ited as there is a s#fficient standard g#iding the delegate in the e5ercise of the said a#thority. $hat standard is disco*era)le in the e5ec#ti*e order itself which, in creating the 0hilippine '*erseas ."ploy"ent Ad"inistration, "andated it to protect the rights of o*erseas (ilipino wor:ers to /fair and e6#ita)le e"ploy"ent practices./ 81.%.('%., the petition is DI!MI!!.D, with costs against the petitioner. . DELEGATION OF PO=ER SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION UNITED STATES VS. ANG TANG HO G.R. NO. 17122, FE&RUAR- 27, 1922 !OHNS, !." FACTS" At its special session of 1919, the 0hilippine Legislat#re passed Act 3o. 28+8, entitled /An Act penali&ing the "onopoly and holding of, and spec#lation in, palay, rice, and corn #nder e5traordinary circ#"stances, reg#lating the distri)#tion and sale thereof, and a#thori&ing the ,o*ernor9,eneral, with the consent of the o#ncil of !tate, to iss#e the necessary r#les and reg#lations therefor, and "a:ing an appropriation for this p#rpose,/ the "aterial pro*isions of which are en#"erated. A#g#st 1, 1919, the ,o*ernor9,eneral iss#ed a procla"ation @.5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 74A fi5ing the price at which rice sho#ld )e sold. A#g#st 8, 1919, Ang $ang 1o charged with the sale of rice at an e5cessi*e price and was accordingly con*icted. $he 6#estion here in*ol*es an analysis and constr#ction of Act 3o. 28+8, in so far as it a#thori&es the ,o*ernor9,eneral to fi5 the price at which rice sho#ld )e sold. It will )e noted that section 1 a#thori&es the ,o*ernor9,eneral, with the consent of the o#ncil of !tate, for any ca#se res#lting in an e5traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 107 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 to iss#e and pro"#lgate te"porary r#les and e"ergency "eas#res for carrying o#t the p#rposes of the Act. By its *ery ter"s, the pro"#lgation of te"porary r#les and e"ergency "eas#res is left to the discretion of the ,o*ernor9,eneral. $he Legislat#re does not #nderta:e to specify or define #nder what conditions or for what reasons the ,o*ernor9,eneral shall iss#e the procla"ation, )#t says that it "ay )e iss#ed /for any ca#se,/ and lea*es the 6#estion as to what is /any ca#se/ to the discretion of the ,o*ernor9,eneral. $he Act also says2 /(or any ca#se, conditions arise res#lting in an e5traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn./ $he Legislat#re does not specify or define what is /an e5traordinary rise./ $hat is also left to the discretion of the ,o*ernor9,eneral. $he Act also says that the ,o*ernor9,eneral, /with the consent of the o#ncil of !tate,/ is a#thori&ed to iss#e and pro"#lgate /te"porary r#les and e"ergency "eas#res for carrying o#t the p#rposes of this Act./ It does not specify or define what is a te"porary r#le or an e"ergency "eas#re, or how long s#ch te"porary r#les or e"ergency "eas#res shall re"ain in force and effect, or when they shall ta:e effect. $hat is to say, the Legislat#re itself has not in any "anner specified or defined any )asis for the order, )#t has left it to the sole -#dg"ent and discretion of the ,o*ernor9,eneral to say what is or what is not /a ca#se,/ and what is or what is not /an e5traordinary rise in the price of rice,/ and as to what is a te"porary r#le or an e"ergency "eas#re for the carrying o#t the p#rposes of the Act. Jnder this state of facts, if the law is *alid and the ,o*ernor9,eneral iss#es a procla"ation fi5ing the "ini"#" price at which rice sho#ld )e sold, any dealer who, with or witho#t notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a cri"inal. $here "ay not ha*e )een any ca#se, and the price "ay not ha*e )een e5traordinary, and there "ay not ha*e )een an e"ergency, )#t, if the ,o*ernor9,eneral fo#nd the e5istence of s#ch facts and iss#ed a procla"ation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller co""its a cri"e. ISSUE" 8hether or not the legislat#re #nder Act 3o. 28+8 has delegated its power to the ,o*ernor9,eneral HELD" Des. $he law says that the ,o*ernor9,eneral "ay fi5 /the "a5i"#" sale price that the ind#strial or "erchant "ay de"and./ $he law is a general law and not a local or special law. $he procla"ation #nderta:es to fi5 one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different pro*inces in the 0hilippine Islands, and delegates the power to deter"ine the other and different prices to pro*incial treas#rers and their dep#ties. 1ere, then, yo# wo#ld ha*e a delegation of legislati*e power to the ,o*ernor9,eneral, and a delegation )y hi" of that power to pro*incial treas#rers and their dep#ties, who /are here)y directed to co""#nicate with, and e5ec#te all instr#ctions e"anating fro" the Director of o""erce and Ind#stry, for the "ost effecti*e and proper enforce"ent of the a)o*e reg#lations in their respecti*e localities./ $he iss#ance of the procla"ation )y the ,o*ernor9,eneral was the e5ercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was e*en a s#) delegation of that power. 8hen Act 3o. 28+8 is analy&ed, it is the *iolation of the procla"ation of the ,o*ernor9,eneral which constit#tes the cri"e. 8itho#t that procla"ation, it was no cri"e to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislat#re left it to the sole discretion of the ,o*ernor9,eneral to say what was and what was not /any ca#se/ for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not /an e5traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,/ and #nder certain #ndefined conditions to fi5 the price at which rice sho#ld )e sold, witho#t regard to grade or 6#ality, also to say whether a procla"ation sho#ld )e iss#ed, if so, when, and whether or not the law sho#ld )e enforced, how long it sho#ld )e enforced, and when the law sho#ld )e s#spended. $he Legislat#re did not specify or define what was /any ca#se,/ or what was /an e5traordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,/ 3either did it specify or define the conditions #pon which the procla"ation sho#ld )e iss#ed. In the a)sence of the procla"ation no cri"e was co""itted. $he alleged sale was "ade a cri"e, if at all, )eca#se the ,o*ernor9,eneral iss#ed the procla"ation. $he act or procla"ation does not say anything a)o#t the different grades or 6#alities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale /of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centa*os @0?.8?A which is a price greater than that fi5ed )y .5ec#ti*e order 3o. 74./ 8e are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act 3o. 28+8, in so far as it #nderta:es to a#thori&ed the ,o*ernor9,eneral in his discretion to iss#e a procla"ation, fi5ing the price of rice, and to "a:e the sale of rice in *iolation of the price of rice, and to "a:e the sale of rice in *iolation of the procla"ation a cri"e, is #nconstit#tional and *oid. DELEGATION OF PO=ERS -NOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 148 SCRA %59, NO. L 74457, MARCH 20, 1987 CRU$, !" FACTS" .5ec#ti*e 'rder +2+9A prohi)ited the transport of the cara)aos or cara)ao "eat across the pro*incial )o#ndaries witho#t go*ern"ent clearance, for the p#rpose of pre*enting the indiscri"inate sla#ghter of those ani"als. $he petitioner had transported si5 cara)aos in a p#"p )oat fro" Mas)ate to Iloilo when they were confiscated )y the police station co""ander for *iolation of .' +2+9A. $he e5ec#ti*e order defined the prohi)ition, con*icted the petitioner and i""ediately i"posed p#nish"ent, which was carried o#t forthright. $he petitioner clai"ed that the penalty is in*alid )eca#se it is i"posed witho#t according the owner a right to )e heard )efore a co"petent and i"partial co#t as g#aranteed )y d#e process. $he petitioner challenges the constit#tionality of the said order and the i"proper e5ercise of the legislati*e power )y the for"er 0resident #nder A"end"ent 3o. + of the 1974 onstit#tion. ISSUE" 8hether or not there is a *alid delegation of legislati*e power in relation to the disposal of the confiscated properties HELD" 3o. 8e also "ar:, on top of all this, the 6#estiona)le "anner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescri)ed in the 6#estioned e5ec#ti*e order. It is there a#thori&ed that the sei&ed property shall =)e distri)#ted to charita)le instit#tions and other si"ilar instit#tions as the hair"an of the 3ational Meat Inspection o""ission "ay see fit, in the case of cara)eef, and to deser*ing far"ers thro#gh dispersal ad the Director of the Ani"al Ind#stry "ay see fit, in the case of cara)aos.> $he phrase ="ay see fit> is an e5tre"ely genero#s and dangero#s condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilo#s opport#nities for partiality and a)#se and e*en corr#ption, 'ne searches in *ain for the #s#al standard and the reasona)le g#idelines, or )etter still, the li"itations that the said officers "#st o)ser*e when they "a:e their distri)#tion. $here is none. $heir options are apparently )o#ndless. 8ho shall )e the fort#nate )eneficiaries of their generosity and )y what criteria shall they )e chosenC 'nly the officers na"ed can s#pply the answer, they and they alone "ay choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own e5cl#si*e discretion. DELEGATION OF PO=ER SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION TA&LARIN >(. GUTIERRE$ G.R. N+. 781%4 !1.: 31, 1987 FELICIANO, ! ." FACTS" $he petitioners so#ght ad"ission into colleges or schools of "edicine for the school year 198791988. 1owe*er, the petitioners either did not ta:e or did not s#ccessf#lly ta:e the 3ational Medical Ad"ission $est @3MA$A re6#ired )y the Board of Medical .d#cation, one of the p#)lic respondents, and ad"inistered )y the pri*ate respondent, the enter for .d#cational Meas#re"ent @.MA. $he petitioners so#ght to en-oin the !ecretary of .d#cation, #lt#re and !ports, the Board of Medical .d#cation and the enter for .d#cational Meas#re"ent fro" enforcing !ection 7 @aA and @fA of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 2482, as a"ended, and M.! 'rder 3o. 72, series of 1987 and fro" re6#iring the ta:ing and passing of the 3MA$ as a condition for sec#ring certificates of eligi)ility for ad"ission and fro" ad"inistering the 3MA$. $he trial co#rt denied said petition. $he 3MA$ was cond#cted and ad"inistered as pre*io#sly sched#led. %ep#)lic Act 2482, as a"ended )y %ep#)lic Acts 3os. B22B and 79B+, :nown as the /Medical Act of 1979/ with one of its )asic o)-ecti*es was to pro*ide for the standardi&ation and reg#lation of "edical ed#cation. $he stat#te, a"ong other things, created a Board of Medical .d#cation with the f#nctions specified in !ection 7 of the stat#te incl#de the following2 @aA $o deter"ine and prescri)e re6#ire"ents for ad"ission into a recogni&ed college of "edicineG @fA $o accept applications for certification for ad"ission to a "edical school and :eep a register of those iss#ed said certificateG and to collect fro" said applicants the a"o#nt of twenty9fi*e pesos each which shall accr#e to the operating f#nd of the Board of Medical .d#cationG @hA $o pro"#lgate and prescri)e and enforce the necessary r#les and reg#lations for the proper i"ple"entation of the foregoing f#nctions. @."phasis s#ppliedA !ection 7 prescri)es certain "ini"#" re6#ire"ents for applicants to "edical schools and one of these is a certificate of eligi)ility for entrance to a "edical school fro" the Board of Medical .d#cation. M.! 'rder 3o. 72, iss#ed )y the then Minister of .d#cation, #lt#re and !ports esta)lished a #nifor" ad"ission test called the 3ational Medical Ad"ission $est @3MA$A as an additional re6#ire"ent for iss#ance of a certificate of eligi)ility for ad"ission into "edical schools of the 0hilippines, )eginning with the school year 198+91987. 0ri*ate respondent enter cond#cted 3MA$s for entrance to "edical colleges d#ring the school year 198+91987 and the year 1987.1988. $he f#nda"ental iss#e is of co#rse the constit#tionality of the stat#te or order assailed. 0etitioners had "ade the arg#"ent that !ection 7 @aA and @fA of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 2482, as a"ended, offend against the constit#tional principle which for)ids the #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power, )y failing to esta)lish the necessary standard to )e followed )y the delegate, the Board of Medical .d#cation. ISSUE" 8hether or not there e5ists a s#fficient standard to )e followed )y the Board
HELD" Des. $he standards set for s#)ordinate legislation in the e5ercise of r#le "a:ing a#thority )y an ad"inistrati*e agency li:e the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 108 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 Board of Medical .d#cation are necessarily )road and highly a)stract. As e5plained )y then Mr. H#stice (ernando in .d# *. .ricta E $he standard "ay )e either e5pressed or i"plied. If the for"er, the non9delegation o)-ection is easily "et. $he standard tho#gh does not ha*e to )e spelled o#t specifically. It co#ld )e i"plied fro" the policy and p#rpose of the act considered as a whole. In the %eflector Law, clearly the legislati*e o)-ecti*e is p#)lic safety. 8hat is so#ght to )e attained as in alalang *. 8illia"s is /safe transit #pon the roads . 8e )elie*e and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in !ection 1 of the 1979 Medical Act2 /the standardi&ation and reg#lation of "edical ed#cation/ and in !ection 7 @aA and 7 of the sa"e Act, the )ody of the stat#te itself, and that these considered together are s#fficient co"pliance with the re6#ire"ents of the non9delegation principle. DELEGATION OF PO=ERS SEC. 1, ARTICLE VI # SEC. 10 (1) OF ARTICLE VII, 1987 CONSTITUTION EMMANUEL PELAE$ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL G.R. NO. L23825, DECEM&ER 24, 19%5 CONCEPCION, !." FACTS" $he 0resident of the 0hilippines, p#rs#ant to !ection +8 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode, iss#ed .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 94 to 121, 12B and 12+ to 129G creating thirty9three @44A "#nicipalities. 0etitioner .""an#el 0elae&, as <ice 0resident of the 0hilippines and as ta5payer, instit#ted a special ci*il action, for a writ of prohi)ition with preli"inary in-#nction, against the A#ditor ,eneral, to restrain hi" and his representati*es and agents, fro" passing in a#dit any e5pendit#re of p#)lic f#nds in i"ple"entation of said e5ec#ti*e orders. 0etitioner alleges that said e5ec#ti*e orders are n#ll and *oid, on the gro#nd that !ection +8 has )een i"pliedly repealed )y %ep#)lic Act 3o. 247? and constit#tes an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power. 1ence, since Han#ary 1, 19+?, when %ep#)lic Act 3o. 247? )eca"e effecti*e, )arrios "ay /not )e created or their )o#ndaries altered nor their na"es changed/ e5cept )y Act of ongress or of the corresponding pro*incial )oard /#pon petition of a "a-ority of the *oters in the areas affected/ and the /reco""endation of the co#ncil of the "#nicipality or "#nicipalities in which the proposed )arrio is sit#ated./ ISSUE" 8hether or not there is an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power #pon the chief e5ec#ti*e HELD" Altho#gh ongress "ay delegate to another )ranch of the ,o*ern"ent the power to fill in the details in the e5ec#tion, enforce"ent or ad"inistration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a *iolation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law2 @aA )e co"plete in itself E it "#st set forth therein the policy to )e e5ec#ted, carried o#t or i"ple"ented )y the delegate E and @)A fi5 a standard E the li"its of which are s#fficiently deter"inate or deter"ina)le E to which the delegate "#st confor" in the perfor"ance of his f#nctions.
!ection +8 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode does not "eet these well9settled re6#ire"ents for a *alid delegation of the power to fi5 the details in the enforce"ent of a law. It does not en#nciate any policy to )e carried o#t or i"ple"ented )y the 0resident. 3either does it gi*e a standard s#fficiently precise to a*oid the e*il effects a)o*e referred to. In this connection, we do not o*erloo: the fact that, #nder the last cla#se of the first sentence of !ection +8, the 0resident2 ... "ay change the seat of the go*ern"ent within any s#)di*ision to s#ch place therein as the p#)lic welfare "ay re6#ire. It is apparent, howe*er, fro" the lang#age of this cla#se that the phrase /as the p#)lic welfare "ay re6#ire/ 6#alified, not the cla#ses preceding the one -#st 6#oted, )#t only the place to which the seat of the go*ern"ent "ay )e transferred. Again, !ection 1? @1A of Article <II of o#r f#nda"ental law ordains2 $he 0resident shall ha*e control of all the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s, or offices, e5ercise general s#per*ision o*er all local go*ern"ents as "ay )e pro*ided )y law, and ta:e care that the laws )e faithf#lly e5ec#ted. $he power of control #nder this pro*ision i"plies the right of the 0resident to interfere in the e5ercise of s#ch discretion as "ay )e *ested )y law in the officers of the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s, or offices of the national go*ern"ent, as well as to act in lie# of s#ch officers. $his power is denied )y the onstit#tion to the .5ec#ti*e, insofar as local go*ern"ents are concerned. 8ith respect to the latter, the f#nda"ental law per"its hi" to wield no "ore a#thority than that of chec:ing whether said local go*ern"ents or the officers thereof perfor" their d#ties as pro*ided )y stat#tory enact"ents. Jpon the other hand if the 0resident co#ld create a "#nicipality, he co#ld, in effect, re"o*e any of its officials, )y creating a new "#nicipality and incl#ding therein the )arrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office wo#ld there)y )eco"e *acant. $h#s, )y "erely )randishing the power to create a new "#nicipality @if he had itA, witho#t act#ally creating it, he co#ld co"pel local officials to s#)"it to his dictation, there)y, in effect, e5ercising o*er the" the power of control denied to hi" )y the onstit#tion. $hen, also, the power of control of the 0resident o*er e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s or offices i"plies no "ore than the a#thority to ass#"e directly the f#nctions thereof or to interfere in the e5ercise of discretion )y its officials. Manifestly, s#ch control does not incl#de the a#thority either to a)olish an e5ec#ti*e depart"ent or )#rea#, or to create a new one. As a conse6#ence, the alleged power of the 0resident to create "#nicipal corporations wo#ld necessarily connote the e5ercise )y hi" of an a#thority e*en greater than that of control, which he has o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s or offices. In other words, !ection +8 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode does not "erely fail to co"ply with the constit#tional "andate a)o*e 6#oted. Instead of gi*ing the 0resident less power o*er local go*ern"ents than that *ested in hi" o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s or offices, it re*erses the process and does the e5act opposite, )y conferring #pon hi" "ore power o*er "#nicipal corporations than that which he has o*er said e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s or offices. In short, e*en if it did entail an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e powers, as it certainly does, said !ection +8, as part of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode, appro*ed on March 1?, 1917, "#st )e dee"ed repealed )y the s#)se6#ent adoption of the onstit#tion, in 1947, which is #tterly inco"pati)le and inconsistent with said stat#tory enact"ent. $he .5ec#ti*e 'rders in 6#estion are here)y declared n#ll and *oid a) initio. 8e )elie*e and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in !ection 1 of the 1979 Medical Act2 /the standardi&ation and reg#lation of "edical ed#cation/ and in !ection 7 @aA and 7 of the sa"e Act, the )ody of the stat#te itself, and that these considered together are s#fficient co"pliance with the re6#ire"ents of the non9delegation principle. REPU&LIC ACT NO. %735 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A S-STEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR. I ,eneral 0ro*isions !ection 1. $itle. E $his Act shall )e :nown as /$he Initiati*e and %eferend#" Act./ !ec. 2. !tate"ent of 0olicy. E $he power of the people #nder a syste" of initiati*e and referend#" to directly propose, enact, appro*e or re-ect, in whole or in part, the onstit#tion, laws, ordinances, or resol#tions passed )y any legislati*e )ody #pon co"pliance with the re6#ire"ents of this Act is here)y affir"ed, recogni&ed and g#aranteed. !ec. 4. Definition of $er"s. E (or p#rposes of this Act, the following ter"s shall "ean2 @aA /Initiati*e/ is the power of the people to propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion or to propose and enact legislations thro#gh an election called for the p#rpose. $here are three @4A syste"s of initiati*e, na"ely2 a.1 Initiati*e on the onstit#tion which refers to a petition proposing a"end"ents to the onstit#tionG a.2. Initiati*e on stat#tes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislationG and a.4. Initiati*e on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, pro*incial, city, "#nicipal, or )arangay law, resol#tion or ordinance. @)A /Indirect initiati*e/ is e5ercise of initiati*e )y the people thro#gh a proposition sent to ongress or the local legislati*e )ody for action. @cA /%eferend#"/ is the power of the electorate to appro*e or re-ect a legislation thro#gh an election called for the p#rpose. It "ay )e of two classes, na"ely2 c.1. %eferend#" on stat#tes which refers to a petition to appro*e or re-ect an act or law, or part thereof, passed )y ongressG and c.2. %eferend#" on local law which refers to a petition to appro*e or re-ect a law, resol#tion or ordinance enacted )y regional asse")lies and local legislati*e )odies. @dA /0roposition/ is the "eas#re proposed )y the *oters. @eA /0le)iscite/ is the electoral process )y which an initiati*e on the onstit#tion is appro*ed or re-ected )y the people. @fA /0etition/ is the written instr#"ent containing the proposition and the re6#ired n#")er of signatories. It shall )e in a for" to )e deter"ined )y and s#)"itted to the o""ission on .lections, hereinafter referred to as the o""ission. @gA /Local go*ern"ent #nits/ refers to pro*inces , cities, "#nicipalities and )arangays. @hA /Local legislati*e )odies/ refers to the !angg#niang 0anlalawigan, !angg#niang 0anl#ngsod, !angg#niang Bayan, and !angg#niang 3ayon. @iA /Local e5ec#ti*es/ refers to the 0ro*incial ,o*ernors, ity or M#nicipal Mayors and 0#nong Barangay, as the case "ay )e. !ec. B. 8ho "ay e5ercise. E $he power of initiati*e and referend#" "ay )e e5ercised )y all registered *oters of the co#ntry, a#tono"o#s regions, pro*inces, cities, "#nicipalities and )arangays. !ec. 7. %e6#ire"ents. E @aA $o e5ercise the power of initiati*e or referend#", at least ten per cent#" @1?MA of the total n#")er of the registered *oters, of which e*ery legislati*e district is represented )y at least three per cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters thereof, shall sign a petition for the p#rpose and register the sa"e with the o""ission. @)A A petition for an initiati*e on the 1987 onstit#tion "#st ha*e at least twel*e per cent#" @12MA of the total n#")er of registered *oters as San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 109 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 signatories, of which e*ery legislati*e district "#st )e represented )y at least three per cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters therein. Initiati*e on the onstit#tion "ay )e e5ercised only after fi*e @7A years fro" the ratification of the 1987 onstit#tion and only once e*ery fi*e @7A years thereafter. @cA $he petition shall state the following2 c.1. contents or te5t of the proposed law so#ght to )e enacted, appro*ed or re-ected, a"ended or repealed, as the case "ay )eG c.2. the propositionG c.4. the reason or reasons thereforG c.B. that it is not one of the e5ceptions pro*ided hereinG c.7. signat#res of the petitioners or registered *otersG and c.+. an a)stract or s#""ary in not "ore than one h#ndred @1??A words which shall )e legi)ly written or printed at the top of e*ery page of the petition. @dA A referend#" or initiati*e affecting a law, resol#tion or ordinance passed )y the legislati*e asse")ly of an a#tono"o#s region, pro*ince or city is dee"ed *alidly initiated if the petition thereof is signed )y at least ten per cent#" @1?MA of the registered *oters in the pro*ince or city, of which e*ery legislati*e district "#st )e represented )y at least three per cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters thereinG 0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat if the pro*ince or city is co"posed only of one @1A legislati*e district, then at least each "#nicipality in a pro*ince or each )arangay in a city sho#ld )e represented )y at least three per cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters therein. @eA A referend#" of initiati*e on an ordinance passed in a "#nicipality shall )e dee"ed *alidly initiated if the petition therefor is signed )y at least tenper cent#" @1?MA of the registered *oters in the "#nicipality, of which e*ery )arangay is represented )y at least three per cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters therein. @fA A referend#" or initiati*e on a )arangay resol#tion or ordinance is dee"ed *alidly initiated if signed )y at least ten per cent#" @1?MA of the registered *oters in said )arangay. !ec. +. !pecial %egistration. E $he o""ission on .lection shall set a special registration day at least three @4A wee:s )efore a sched#led initiati*e or referend#". !ec. 7. <erification of !ignat#res. E $he .lection %egistrar shall *erify the signat#res on the )asis of the registry list of *oters, *otersI affida*its and *oters identification cards #sed in the i""ediately preceding election. II 3ational Initiati*e and %eferend#" !ec. 8. ond#ct and Date of Initiati*e or %eferend#". E $he o""ission shall call and s#per*ise the cond#ct of initiati*e or referend#". 8ithin a period of thirty @4?A days fro" receipt of the petition, the o""ission shall, #pon deter"ining the s#fficiency of the petition, p#)lish the sa"e in (ilipino and .nglish at least twice in newspapers of general and local circ#lation and set the date of the initiati*e or referend#" which shall not )e earlier than forty9fi*e @B7A days )#t not later than ninety @9?A days fro" the deter"ination )y the o""ission of the s#fficiency of the petition. !ec. 9. .ffecti*ity of Initiati*e or %eferend#" 0roposition. E @aA $he 0roposition of the enact"ent, appro*al, a"end"ent or re-ection of a national law shall )e s#)"itted to and appro*ed )y a "a-ority of the *otes cast )y all the registered *oters of the 0hilippines. If, as certified to )y the o""ission, the proposition is appro*ed )y a "a-ority of the *otes cast, the national law proposed for enact"ent, appro*al, or a"end"ent shall )eco"e effecti*e fifteen @17A days following co"pletion of its p#)lication in the 'fficial ,a&ette or in a newspaper of general circ#lation in the 0hilippines. If, as certified )y the o""ission, the proposition to re-ect a national law is appro*ed )y a "a-ority of the *otes cast, the said national law shall )e dee"ed repealed and the repeal shall )eco"e effecti*e fifteen @17A days following the co"pletion of p#)lication of the proposition and the certification )y the o""ission in the 'fficial ,a&ette or in a newspaper of general circ#lation in the 0hilippines. 1owe*er, if the "a-ority *ote is not o)tained, the national law so#ght to )e re-ected or a"ended shall re"ain in f#ll force and effect. @)A $he proposition in an initiati*e on the onstit#tion appro*ed )y a "a-ority of the *otes cast in the ple)iscite shall )eco"e effecti*e as to the day of the ple)iscite. @cA A national or local initiati*e proposition appro*ed )y "a-ority of the *otes cast in an election called for the p#rpose shall )eco"e effecti*e fifteen @17A days after certification and procla"ation )y the o""ission. !ec. 1?. 0rohi)ited Meas#res. E $he following cannot )e the s#)-ect of an initiati*e or referend#" petition2 @aA 3o petition e")racing "ore than one @1A s#)-ect shall )e s#)"itted to the electorateG and @)A !tat#tes in*ol*ing e"ergency "eas#res, the enact"ent of which are specifically *ested in ongress )y the onstit#tion, cannot )e s#)-ect to referend#" #ntil ninety @9?A days after its effecti*ity. !ec. 11. Indirect Initiati*e. E Any d#ly accredited peopleIs organi&ation, as defined )y law, "ay file a petition for indirect initiati*e with the 1o#se of %epresentati*es, and other legislati*e )odies. $he petition shall contain a s#""ary of the chief p#rposes and contents of the )ill that the organi&ation proposes to )e enacted into law )y the legislat#re. $he proced#re to )e followed on the initiati*e )ill shall )e the sa"e as the enact"ent of any legislati*e "eas#re )efore the 1o#se of %epresentati*es e5cept that the said initiati*e )ill shall ha*e precedence o*er the pending legislati*e "eas#res on the co""ittee. !ec. 12. Appeal. E $he decision of the o""ission on the findings of the s#fficiency or ins#fficiency of the petition for initiati*e or referend#" "ay )e appealed to the !#pre"e o#rt within thirty @4?A days fro" notice thereof. III Local Initiati*e and %eferend#" !ec. 14. 0roced#re in Local Initiati*e. E @aA 3ot less than two tho#sand @2,???A registered *oters in case of a#tono"o#s regions, one tho#sand @1,???A in case of pro*inces and cities, one h#ndred @1??A in case of "#nicipalities, and fifty @7?A in case of )arangays, "ay file a petition with the %egional Asse")ly or local legislati*e )ody, respecti*ely, proposing the adoption, enact"ent, repeal, or a"end"ent, of any law, ordinance or resol#tion. @)A If no fa*ora)le action thereon is "ade )y local legislati*e )ody within @4?A days fro" its presentation, the proponents thro#gh their d#ly a#thori&ed and registered representati*e "ay in*o:e their power of initiati*e, gi*ing notice thereof to the local legislati*e )ody concerned. @cA $he proposition shall )e n#")ered serially starting fro" one @1A. $he !ecretary of Local ,o*ern"ent or his designated representati*e shall e5tend assistance in the for"#lation of the proposition. @dA $wo or "ore propositions "ay )e s#)"itted in an initiati*e. @eA 0roponents shall ha*e one h#ndred twenty @12?A days in case of a#tono"o#s regions, ninety @9?A days in case of pro*inces and cities, si5ty @+?A days in case of "#nicipalities, and thirty @4?A days in case of )arangays, fro" notice "entioned in s#)section @)A hereof to collect the re6#ired n#")er of signat#res. @fA $he petition shall )e signed )efore the .lection %egistrar, or his designated representati*e, in the presence of a representati*e of the proponent, and a representati*e of the regional asse")lies and local legislati*e )odies concerned in a p#)lic place in the a#tono"o#s region or local go*ern"ent #nit, as the case "ay )e. !ignat#re stations "ay )e esta)lished in as "any places as "ay )e warranted. @gA Jpon the lapse of the period herein pro*ided, the o""ission on .lections, thro#gh its office in the local go*ern"ent #nit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the re6#ired n#")er of signat#res has )een o)tained. (ail#re to o)tain the re6#ired n#")er is a defeat of the proposition. @hA If the re6#ired n#")er of the signat#res is o)tained, the o""ission shall then set a date for the initiati*e at which the proposition shall )e s#)"itted to the registered *oters in the local go*ern"ent #nit concerned for their appro*al within ninety @9?A days fro" the date of certification )y the o""ission, as pro*ided in s#)section @gA hereof, in case of a#tono"o#s regions, si5ty @+?A days in case of the pro*inces and cities, forty9fi*e @B7A days in case of "#nicipalities, and thirty @4?A days in case of )arangays. $he initiati*e shall then )e held on the date set, after which the res#lts thereof shall )e certified and proclai"ed )y the o""ission on .lections. !ec. 1B. .ffecti*ity of Local 0ropositions. E If the proposition is appro*ed )y a "a-ority of the *otes cast, it shall ta:e effect fifteen @17A days after certification )y the o""ission as if affir"ati*e action thereon had )een "ade )y the local legislati*e )ody and local e5ec#ti*e concerned. If it fails to o)tain said n#")er of *otes, the proposition is considered defeated. !ec. 17. Li"itations on Local Initiati*es. E @aA $he power of local initiati*e shall not )e e5ercised "ore than once a year. @)A Initiati*e shall e5tend only to s#)-ects or "atters which are within the legal powers of the local legislati*e )odies to enact. @cA If at any ti"e )efore the initiati*e is held, the local legislati*e )ody shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiati*e shall )e cancelled. 1owe*er, those against s#ch action "ay, if they so desire, apply for initiati*e in the "anner herein pro*ided. !ec. 1+. Li"itations Jpon Local Legislati*e Bodies. E Any proposition or ordinance or resol#tion appro*ed thro#gh the syste" of initiati*e and referend#" as herein pro*ided shall not )e repealed, "odified or a"ended, )y the local legislati*e )ody concerned within si5 @+A "onths fro" the date therefro", and "ay )e a"ended, "odified or repealed )y the local legislati*e )ody within three @4A years thereafter )y a *ote of three9fo#rths @4RBA of all its "e")ers2 0ro*ided, howe*er, that in case of )arangays, the period shall )e one @1A year after the e5piration of the first si5 @+A "onths. !ec. 17. Local %eferend#". E 3otwithstanding the pro*isions of !ection B hereof, any local legislati*e )ody "ay s#)"it to the registered *oters of a#tono"o#s region, pro*inces, cities, "#nicipalities and )arangays for the appro*al or re-ection, any ordinance or resol#tion d#ly enacted or appro*ed. !aid referend#" shall )e held #nder the control and direction of the o""ission within si5ty @+?A days in case of pro*inces and cities, forty9 fi*e @B7A days in case of "#nicipalities and thirty @4?A days in case of )arangays. $he o""ission shall certify and proclai" the res#lts of the said referend#". !ec. 18. A#thority of o#rts. E 3othing in this Act shall pre*ent or precl#de the proper co#rts fro" declaring n#ll and *oid any proposition appro*ed p#rs#ant to this Act for *iolation of the onstit#tion or want of capacity of the local legislati*e )ody to enact the said "eas#re. I< (inal 0ro*isions !ec. 19. Applica)ility of the '"ni)#s .lection ode. E $he '"ni)#s .lection ode and other election laws, not inconsistent with the pro*isions of this Act, shall apply to all initiati*es and referenda. !ec. 2?. %#les and %eg#lations. E $he o""ission is here)y e"powered to pro"#lgate s#ch r#les and reg#lations as "ay )e necessary to carry o#t the p#rposes of this Act. !ec. 21. Appropriations. E $he a"o#nt necessary to defray the cost of the initial i"ple"entation of this Act shall )e charged against the ontingent (#nd in the ,eneral Appropriations Act of the c#rrent year. $hereafter, s#ch s#"s as "ay )e necessary for the f#ll i"ple"entation of this Act shall )e incl#ded in the ann#al ,eneral Appropriations Act. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 110 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 !ec. 22. !epara)ility la#se. E If any part or pro*ision of this Act is held in*alid or #nconstit#tional, the other parts or pro*isions thereof shall re"ain *alid and effecti*e. !ec. 24. .ffecti*ity. E $his Act shall ta:e effect fifteen @17A days after its p#)lication in a newspaper of general circ#lation.
Appro*ed2 A#g#st B, 1989 ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TO&IAS VS. A&ALOS 239 SCRA 10% FACTS" $he "#nicipality of Mandal#yong and !an H#an )elonged to only one legislati*e district. %.A. 7+77 ai"s to "a:e Mandal#yong into a city. $he petitioner contends that the said law ai"s to increase the "e")ership of the 1o#se as the con*ersion of Mandal#yong into a city will res#lt in the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandal#yong. ISSUE" 8hether or not the con*ersion of Ma:ati into a city is constit#tional. HELD" Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt held that the creation of a new congressional district for Mandal#yong was )#t a nat#ral conse6#ence of Mandal#yongKs con*ersion into a city. $he onstit#tion pro*ides that =a city sho#ld ha*e a pop#lation of at least 27?,???> and ha*ing "et this re6#ire"ent Mandal#yong is 6#alified to )e con*erted into a city and as pro*ided in the onstit#tion entitled to at least 1 representati*e. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MARIANO, !R. VS. COMELEC 242 SCRA 211, 1995 FACTS" %.A. 787B, which ai"s to con*ert Ma:ati into a city, is assailed as )eing #nconstit#tional on the gro#nds that %.A. 787B ai"s to increase "e")ership of the 1o#se which the onstit#tion fi5es and that %.A. 787B )eing a special law cannot change "e")ers of the 1o#ses. ISSUE" 8hether or not the con*ersion of Ma:ati into a city is constit#tional. HELD" Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt held that as was already decided )y the !#pre"e o#rt in $o)ias *s. A)alos, the onstit#tion pro*ides that the co"positions of the 1o#se sho#ld not )e "ore than 27? "e")ers, J3L.!! otherwise pro*ided )y law. $he nat#ral res#lt in the creation of a new legislati*e fro" a special law whose p#rpose is to con*ert a "#nicipality into a city is sanctioned )y the onstit#tion. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MONTE!O VS. COMELEC 242 SCRA 45 FACTS" Biliran, a s#)9pro*ince of Leyte was "ade into a pro*ince which ca#sed the red#ction of the M#nicipalities #nder the 4 rd district of Leyte. Beca#se of this ine6#ality the 'M.L. reapportioned so"e of the M#nicipalities fro" one district to another. Monte-o now wants to transfer a "#nicipality @$olosaA fro" his district to another district @4 rd A allegedly )eca#se of so"e ine6#ality in the n#")er of registered *oters. 'M.L. thro#gh resol#tion 274+ per"itted the transfer. ISSUE" 8hether or not the 'M.L. ha*e the power to reapportion districts. HELD" $he !#pre"e o#rt held that the 'M.L. does not ha*e the power to reapportion districts )#t only to "a:e "inor ad-#st"ents. $he o#rt added that the creation of a new pro*ince tho#gh res#lts in an i")alance and de*al#e a citi&enKs *ote in *iolation of the e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion the only re"edy is for ongress, to "a:e a reapportion"ent of the legislati*e districts. REPU&LIC ACT N+. 7941 A3 A$ 0%'<IDI3, ('% $1. .L.$I'3 '( 0A%$D9LI!$ %.0%.!.3$A$I<.! $1%'J,1 $1. 0A%$D9LI!$ !D!$.M, A3D A00%'0%IA$I3, (J3D! $1.%.('% !ection 1. $itle. $his Act shall )e :nown as the /0arty9List !yste" Act./ !ection 2. Declaration of part y. $he !tate shall pro"ote proportional representation in the election of representati*es to the 1o#se of %epresentati*es thro#gh a party9list syste" of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organi&ations or coalitions thereof, which will ena)le (ilipino citi&ens )elonging to "arginali&ed and #nder9represented sectors, organi&ations and parties, and who lac: well9defined political constit#encies )#t who co#ld contri)#te to the for"#lation and enact"ent of appropriate legislation that will )enefit the nation as a whole, to )eco"e "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. $owards this end, the !tate shall de*elop and g#arantee a f#ll, free and open party syste" in order to attain the )roadcast possi)le representation of party, sectoral or gro#p interests in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es )y enhancing their chances to co"pete for and win seats in the legislat#re, and shall pro*ide the si"plest sche"e possi)le. !ection 4. Definition of $er"s. @aA $he party9list syste" is a "echanis" of proportional representation in the election of representati*es to the 1o#se of %epresentati*es fro" national, regional and sectoral parties or organi&ations or coalitions thereof registered with the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A. o"ponent parties or organi&ations of a coalition "ay participate independently pro*ided the coalition of which they for" part does not participate in the party9list syste". @)A A party "eans either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. @cA A political party refers to an organi&ed gro#p of citi&ens ad*ocating an ideology or platfor", principles and policies for the general cond#ct of go*ern"ent and which, as the "ost i""ediate "eans of sec#ring their adoption, reg#larly no"inates and s#pports certain of its leaders and "e")ers as candidates for p#)lic office. It is a national party when its constit#ency is spread o*er the geographical territory of at least a "a-ority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constit#ency is spread o*er the geographical territory of at least a "a-ority of the cities and pro*inces co"prising the region. @dA A sectoral party refers to an organi&ed gro#p of citi&ens )elonging to any of the sectors en#"erated in !ection 7 hereof whose principal ad*ocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, @eA A sectoral organi&ation refers to a gro#p of citi&ens or a coalition of gro#ps of citi&ens who share si"ilar physical attri)#tes or characteristics, e"ploy"ent, interests or concerns. @fA A coalition refers to an aggr#pation of d#ly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organi&ations for political andRor election p#rposes. !ection B. Manifestation to 0articipate in the 0arty9List !yste". Any party, organi&ation, or coalition already registered with the o""ission need not register anew. 1owe*er, s#ch party, organi&ation, or coalition shall file with the o""ission, not later than ninety @9?A days )efore the election, a "anifestation of its desire to participate in the party9list syste". !ection 7. %egistration. Any organi&ed gro#p of persons "ay register as a party, organi&ation or coalition for p#rposes of the party9list syste" )y filing with the 'M.L. not later than ninety @9?A days )efore the election a petition *erified )y its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party9list syste" as a national, regional or sectoral party or organi&ation or a coalition of s#ch parties or organi&ations, attaching thereto its constit#tion, )y9laws, platfor" or progra" of go*ern"ent, list of officers, coalition agree"ent and other rele*ant infor"ation as the 'M.L. "ay re6#ire2 0ro*ided, $hat the sectors shall incl#de la)or, peasant, fisherfol:, #r)an poor, indigeno#s c#lt#ral co""#nities, elderly, handicapped, wo"en, yo#th, *eterans, o*erseas wor:ers, and professionals. $he 'M.L. shall p#)lish the petition in at least two @2A national newspapers of general circ#lation. $he 'M.L. shall, after d#e notice and hearing, resol*e the petition within fifteen @17A days fro" the date it was s#)"itted for decision )#t in no case not later than si5ty @+?A days )efore election. !ection +. %ef#sal andRor ancellation of %egistration. $he 'M.L. "ay, "ot# propio or #pon *erified co"plaint of any interested party, ref#se or cancel, after d#e notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organi&ation or coalition on any of the following gro#nds2 @1A It is a religio#s sect or deno"ination, organi&ation or association, organi&ed for religio#s p#rposesG @2A It ad*ocates *iolence or #nlawf#l "eans to see: its goalG @4A It is a foreign party or organi&ationG @BA It is recei*ing s#pport fro" any foreign go*ern"ent, foreign political party, fo#ndation, organi&ation, whether directly or thro#gh any of its officers or "e")ers or indirectly thro#gh third parties for partisan election p#rposesG @7A It *iolates or fails to co"ply with laws, r#les or reg#lations relating to electionsG @+A It declares #ntr#thf#l state"ents in its petitionG @7A It has ceased to e5ist for at least one @1A yearG or @8A It fails to participate in the last two @2A preceding elections or fails to o)tain at least two per cent#" @2MA of the *otes cast #nder the party9list syste" in the two @2A preceding elections for the constit#ency in which it has registered. !ection 7. ertified List of %egistered 0arties. $he 'M.L. shall, not later than si5ty @+?A days )efore election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organi&ations or coalitions which ha*e applied or who ha*e "anifested their desire to participate #nder the party9list syste" and distri)#te copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. $he na"es of the part y9list no"inees shall not )e shown on the certified list. !ection 8. 3o"ination of 0arty9List %epresentati*es. .ach registered party, organi&ation or coalition shall s#)"it to the 'M.L. not later San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 111 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 than forty9fi*e @B7A days )efore the election a list of na"es, not less than fi*e @7A, fro" which party9list representati*es shall )e chosen in case it o)tains the re6#ired n#")er of *otes. A person "ay )e no"inated in one @1A list only. 'nly persons who ha*e gi*en their consent in writing "ay )e na"ed in the list. $he list shall not incl#de any candidate for any electi*e office or a person who has lost his )id for an electi*e office in the i""ediately preceding election. 3o change of na"es or alteration of the order of no"inees shall )e allowed after the sa"e shall ha*e )een s#)"itted to the 'M.L. e5cept in cases where the no"inee dies, or withdraws in writing his no"ination, )eco"es incapacitated in which case the na"e of the s#)stit#te no"inee shall )e placed last in the list. Inc#")ent sectoral representati*es in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es who are no"inated in the party9list syste" shall not )e considered resigned. !ection 9. V#alifications of 0arty9List 3o"inees. 3o person shall )e no"inated as party9list representati*e #nless he is a nat#ral9)orn citi&en of the 0hilippines, a registered *oter, a resident of the 0hilippines for a period of not less than one @1Ayear i""ediately preceding the day of the election, a)le to read and write, a )ona fide "e")er of the party or organi&ation which he see:s to represent for at least ninety @9?A days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty9fi*e @27A years of age on the day of the election. In case of a no"inee of the yo#th sector, he "#st at least )e twenty9fi*e @27A )#t not "ore than thirty @4?A years of age on the day of the election. Any yo#th sectoral representati*e who attains the age of thirty @4?A d#ring his ter" shall )e allowed to contin#e in office #ntil the e5piration of his ter". !ection 1?. Manner of <oting. .*ery *oter shall )e entitled to two @2A *otes2 the first is a *ote for candidate for "e")er of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es in his legislati*e district, and the second, a *ote for the party, organi&ations, or coalition he wants represented in the ho#se of %epresentati*es2 0ro*ided, $hat a *ote cast for a party, sectoral organi&ation, or coalition not entitled to )e *oted for shall not )e co#nted2 0ro*ided, finally, $hat the first election #nder the party9list syste" shall )e held in May 1998. $he 'M.L. shall #nderta:e the necessary infor"ation ca"paign for p#rposes of ed#cating the electorate on the "atter of the party9list syste". !ection 11. 3#")er of 0arty9List %epresentati*es. $he party9list representati*es shall constit#te twenty per cent#" @2?MA of the total n#")er of the "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es incl#ding those #nder the party9list. (or p#rposes of the May 1998 elections, the first fi*e @7A "a-or political parties on the )asis of party representation in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es at the start of the $enth ongress of the 0hilippines shall not )e entitled to participate in the party9list syste". In deter"ining the allocation of seats for the second *ote, the following proced#re shall )e o)ser*ed2 @aA $he parties, organi&ations, and coalitions shall )e ran:ed fro" the highest to the lowest )ased on the n#")er of *otes they garnered d#ring the elections. @)A $he parties, organi&ations, and coalitions recei*ing at least two percent @2MA of the total *otes cast for the party9list syste" shall )e entitled to one seat each2 0ro*ided, $hat those garnering "ore than two percent @2MA of the *otes shall )e entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total n#")er of *otes 2 0ro*ided, finally, $hat each party, organi&ation, or coalition shall )e entitled to not "ore than three @4A seats. !ection 12. 0roced#re in Allocating !eats for 0arty9List %epresentati*es. $he 'M.L. shall tally all the *otes for the parties, organi&ations, or coalitions on a nationwide )asis, ran: the" according to the n#")er of *otes recei*ed and allocate party9list representati*es proportionately according to the percentage of *otes o)tained )y each party, organi&ation, or coalition as against the total nationwide *otes cast for the party9list syste". !ection 14. 1ow 0arty9List %epresentati*es are hosen. 0arty9list representati*es shall )e proclai"ed )y the 'M.L. )ased on the list of na"es s#)"itted )y the respecti*e parties, organi&ations, or coalitions to the 'M.L. according to their ran:ing in said list. !ection 1B. $er" of 'ffice. 0arty9list representati*es shall )e elected for a ter" of three @4A years which shall )egin, #nless otherwise pro*ided )y law, at noon on the thirtieth day of H#ne ne5t following their election. 3o party9list representati*es shall ser*e for "ore than three @4A consec#ti*e ter"s. <ol#ntary ren#nciation of the office for any length of ti"e shall not )e considered as an interr#ption in the contin#ity his ser*ice for the f#ll ter" for which he was elected. !ection 17. hange of AffiliationG .ffect. Any elected party9list representati*e who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation d#ring his ter" of office shall forfeit his seat2 0ro*ided, $hat if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within si5 @+A "onths )efore an election, he shall not )e eligi)le for no"ination as party9list representati*e #nder his new party or organi&ation. !ection 1+. <acancy. In case of *acancy in the seats reser*ed for party9 list representati*es, the *acancy shall )e a#to"atically filled )y the ne5t representati*e fro" the list of no"inees in the order s#)"itted to the 'M.L. )y the sa"e party, organi&ation, or coalition, who shall ser*e for the #ne5pired ter". If the list is e5ha#sted, the party, organi&ation coalition concerned shall s#)"it additional no"inees. !ection 17. %ights of 0arty9List %epresentati*es. 0arty9List %epresentati*es shall )e entitled to the sa"e salaries and e"ol#"ents as reg#lar "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. !ection 18. %#les and %eg#lations. $he 'M.L. shall pro"#lgate the necessary r#les and reg#lations as "ay )e necessary to carry o#t the p#rposes of this Act. !ection 19. Appropriations. $he a"o#nt necessary for the i"ple"entation of this Act shall )e pro*ided in the reg#lar appropriations for the o""ission on .lections starting fiscal year 199+ #nder the ,eneral Appropriations Act. !tarting 1997, the 'M.L. is here)y a#thori&ed to #tili&e sa*ings and other a*aila)le f#nds for p#rposes of its infor"ation ca"paign on the party9list syste". !ection 2?. !epara)ility la#se. If any part of this Act is held in*alid or #nconstit#tional, the other parts or pro*isions thereof shall re"ain *alid and effecti*e. !ection 21. %epealing la#se. All laws, decrees, e5ec#ti*e orders, r#les and reg#lations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the pro*isions of this Act are here)y repealed. !ection 22. .ffecti*ity. $his Act shall ta:e effect fifteen @17A days after its p#)lication in a newspaper of general circ#lation. Appro*ed, March 4, 1997. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ROMUALDE$MARCOS VS. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300, 1995 FACTS" Monte-o then inc#")ent congress"an of the first district of Leyte petitions for the dis6#alification of I"elda Marcos as a candidate for the sa"e position )eca#se the latter s#pposedly lac:s the residency re6#ire"ent of one9year. Marcos had only li*ed in $olosa recently and ha*e yet to =reside> in the first district for the re6#ired 1 year. $he petitioner is contending that I"elda had set #p residency in *ario#s places thro#gho#t her lifeti"e fro" teaching in $aclo)an #p to the ti"e she "arried where she stayed for years in !an H#an, Metro Manila. ISSUE" 8hether or not I"elda Marcos lac:s the residency re6#ire"ent in her candidacy. HELD" 3o. $he ! held that $olosa re"ains as his =do"icile of origin>. %esidence is to )e synony"o#s with do"icile partic#larly in election law. Marcos do"icile of origin was esta)lished in $olosa )eca#se she followed the do"icile of her parents. $his do"icile of origin was not lost )eca#se she got "arried as residence and do"icile ha*e different "eanings #nder ci*il law. $he ! e*en added that considering that her h#s)and died and she went free to choose her do"icile, her intentions were "anifest in her actions that $olosa was to )e her do"icile. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT AJUINO VS. COMELEC 248 SCRA 400, 1995 FACTS" B#t& A6#inoKs residence re6#ire"ent is )eing contended as he intends to r#n for congress in the newly created legislati*e district of Ma:ati. B#t& A6#ino was contending that his lease of a condo #nit in Ma:ati is indicati*e of the fact that he has chosen Ma:ati to )e his do"icile and not -#st residence. ISSUE" 8hether or not the act of A6#ino in leasing a condo #nit in Ma:ati is indicati*e of his desire to "a:e it his do"icile. HELD" 3o. $he o#rt r#led against A6#ino )eca#se his =leasing> of a condo #nit is )y no "eans indicati*e of his desire to "a:e Ma:ati his per"anent ho"e or do"icile, considering that he was still a :nown resident of oncepcion, $arlac for the past 72 years of which happens to )e his )irthplace. $he !#pre"e o#rt reiterated how to s#ccessf#lly effect a chage of do"icile2 Act#al re"o*alRact#al change of do"icile Intention to a)andon for"er do"icile and esta)lish a new one Definite act which correspond with the p#rpose ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CO VS. HRET 199 SCRA 293, 1991 FACTS" 'ng, a candidate for congressional elections in his local district is )eing assailed as to his 6#alifications that his )eing a nat#ral9 )orn citi&en is 6#estiona)le along with not ha*ing co"plied with the residency re6#ire"ent. ISSUE" 8hether or not 'ng "et the 6#alifications and the residency re6#ire"ent. HELD" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 112 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 Des. As to the "atter of citi&enship the o#rt r#led in 'ngKs fa*or citing the following reasons2 'ngKs father was already nat#rali&ed while he was -#st 9 years old 'ngKs "other was a (ilipina pl#s the fact that a lot of instances transpired after he reached the age of "a-ority than reinforces the fact that he elected (ilipino citi&enship. $hat the fact that his )rotherKs citi&enship was in fact already answered fa*ora)ly )y the onstit#tional o""ission itself. As to the iss#e of residence, again the co#rt r#led in 'ngKs fa*or holding that he ne*er had any intention to a)andon his do"icile of origin despite ha*ing stayed in Manila to st#dy or p#rs#e his personal career. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT DIMAPORO VS. MITRA 202 SCRA 779, 1991 FACTS" 0etitioner Moha""ad Ali Di"aporo was elected %epresentati*e for the !econd Legislati*e District of Lanao del !#r d#ring the 1987 congressional elections and too: his oath of office on Han#ary 9, 1987. 'n Han#ary 17, 199?, petitioner filed with the 'M.L. a ertificate of andidacy for the position of %egional ,o*ernor of the A#tono"o#s %egion in M#sli" Mindanao. $he election was sched#led for (e)r#ary 17, 199?. Jpon )eing infor"ed of this de*elop"ent )y the 'M.L., respondents !pea:er and !ecretary of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es e5cl#ded petitionerKs na"e fro" the %oll of Me")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es p#rs#ant to sec.+7, Art.I; of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, which states2 =Any electi*e official whether national or local r#nning for any office other than the one which he is holding in a per"anent capacity e5cept for 0resident and <ice 0resident shall )e considered ipso facto @)y the "ere actA resigned fro" his office #pon filing of his certificate of candidacy.> 0etitioner contends that he did not there)y lose his seat as congress"an )eca#se !ec.+7, Art.I; of the B.0. Blg.881 is not operati*e #nder the present onstit#tion, )eing contrary thereto, and therefore not applica)le to the present "e")ers of the ongress. ISSUE" 8hether or not petitioner forfeited his seat, #pon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. HELD" Des. (orfeit#re is a#to"atic and per"anently effecti*e #pon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. 'nce the certificate is filed, the seat is fore*er forfeited and nothing sa*e a new election or appoint"ent can restore the o#sted official. $he wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy sho#ld )e ta:en into acco#nt. $he law does not "a:e the forfeit#re dependent #pon the f#t#re contingencies, #nforeseen and #nforeseea)le, since the *acating is e5pressly "ade as of the "o"ent of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT !IMENE$ V. CA&ANG&ANG G.R. NO. L15905, AUGUST 3, 19%% FACTS" $his is an ordinary ci*il action, originally instit#ted in the o#rt of (irst instance of %i&al, for the reco*ery, )y plaintiffs 3icanor $. Hi"ine&, arlos H. Al)ert and Hose L. L#:)an, of se*eral s#"s of "oney, )y way of da"ages for the p#)lication of an allegedly li)elo#s letter of the defendant Bartolo"e a)ang)ang. Jpon )eing s#""oned, the letter "o*ed to dis"iss the co"plaint #pon the gro#nd that the letter in 6#estion is not li)elo#s, and that, e*en if were, said letter is a pri*ileged co""#nication. $his "otion ha*ing )een granted )y the lower co#rt, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal fro" the corresponding order of dis"issal. ISSUES" a. 8hether or not the p#)lication in 6#estion is a pri*ileged co""#nicationC ). 8hether or not it is li)elo#sC HELD" a. 3o. $he afore"entioned p#)lication does not fall within the p#r*iew of the phrase =speech and de)ate therein> [ that is to say in ongress [ #sed in Art.<I, sec.17 of the onstit#tion. !aid e5pression refers to #tterances "ade )y ongress"en in the perfor"ance of their official f#nctions, s#ch as speeches deli*ered, state"ents "ade, or *otes cast in the halls of ongress, while the sa"e is in session as well as )ills introd#ced in ongress, whether the sa"e is in session or not, and other acts perfor"ed )y ongress"en, either in ongress or o#tside the pre"ises ho#sing its offices, in the official discharge of their d#ties as "e")ers of ongress and of ongressional o""ittees d#ly a#thori&ed to perfor" its f#nctions as s#ch at the ti"e of the perfor"ance of the acts in 6#estion. $he p#)lication in*ol*ed in this case does not )elong to this category. According to the co"plaint herein, it was an open letter to the 0resident of the 0hilippines, dated 3o*e")er 1B, 1978, when ongress pres#"a)ly was not in session, and defendant ca#sed said letter to )e p#)lished in se*eral newspapers of general circ#lation in the 0hilippines, on or a)o#t said date. It is o)*io#s that, in th#s ca#sing the co""#nication to )e so p#)lished, he was not perfor"ing his official d#ty, either as a "e")er of ongress or as officer of any o""ittee thereof. 1ence, the said co""#nication is not a)sol#tely pri*ileged. ). 3o. $he letter in 6#estion is not s#fficient to s#pport plaintiffKs action for da"ages. It is tr#e that the co"plaint alleges that an open letter in 6#estion was written )y the defendant, :nowing that is false and with the intent to i"peach plaintiffKs rep#tation, to e5pose the" to p#)lic hatred, conte"pt, dishonor and ridic#le, and to alienate the" fro" their associates, )#t these allegations are "ere concl#sions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and cannot pre*ail o*er the sa"e, it )eing the *ery )asis of the co"plaint. $he *ery doc#"ent #pon which plaintiffsK action is )ased e5plicitly indicates that they "ight )e a)sol#tely #naware of the alleged operational plans, and that they "ay )e "erely #nwitting tools of the planners. $his state"ent is not derogatory to the plaintiffs to the point of entitling the" to reco*er da"ages. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OSMENA V. PENDATUN G.R. NO. L17144 OCTO&ER 28, 19%0 FACTS" ongress"an !ergio 's"ena, Hr., in a pri*ilege speech deli*ered )efore the 1o#se, "ade the serio#s i"p#tations of )ri)ery against the 0resident which are 6#oted in %esol#tion 3o. 79. ongress"an !alipada L. 0endat#n and fo#rteen other congress"en in their capacity as "e")ers of the !pecial o""ittee created )y 1o#se %esol#tion 3o. 79 fo#nd said congress"an g#ilty of serio#s disorderly )eha*iorG and acting on s#ch report, the 1o#se appro*ed on the sa"e day9)efore closing its session91o#se %esol#tion 3o. 177, declaring hi" g#ilty as reco""ended and s#spending hi" fro" office for fifteen "onths. ISSUES" a. 8hether or not deli*ery of speeches attac:ing the hief .5ec#ti*e constit#tes disorderly cond#ct for which 's"ena "ay )e disciplinedC ). 8hether or not the resol#tion *iolated his constit#tional a)sol#te parlia"entary i""#nity for speeches deli*ered in the 1o#seC HELD" a. Des. $here is no 6#estion that ongress"an 's"ena "ade a serio#s i"p#tation of )ri)ery against the 0resident. $he 1o#se is the -#dge of what constit#tes disorderly )eha*ior, not only )eca#se the onstit#tion has conferred -#risdiction #pon it, )#t also )eca#se the "atter depends "ainly on fact#al circ#"stances of which the 1o#se :nows )est )#t which can not )e depicted in )lac: and white for presentation to, and ad-#dication )y the o#rts. $he ho#se has e5cl#si*e powerG the co#rts ha*e no -#risdiction to interfere. $he theory of separation of powers fastidio#sly o)ser*ed )y this o#rt, de"ands in s#ch sit#ation a pr#dent ref#sal to interfere. ). 3o. $he resol#tion does not *iolate the constit#tional parlia"entary i""#nity for speeches deli*ered in the 1o#se. '#r onstit#tion enshrines parlia"entary i""#nity which is a f#nda"ental pri*ilege in e*ery legislati*e asse")ly of the de"ocratic world. B#t it does not protect hi" fro" responsi)ility )efore the legislati*e )ody itself whene*er his words and cond#ct are considered )y the latter disorderly or #n)eco"ing of a "e")er thereof. (or #nparlia"entary cond#ct, "e")ers of the parlia"ent or of ongress ha*e )ee, or co#ld )e cens#red, co""itted to prison, s#spended, e*en e5pelled )y the *otes of their colleag#es. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT $ANDUETA VS. DELA COSTA G.R. NO. L4%2%7, NOVEM&ER 28, 1938 FACTS" 8hile petitioner (rancis Xand#eta was presiding o*er the 7 th Branch of o#rts of (irst Instance of Manila, he recei*ed a new ad interi" appoint"ent, iss#ed in accordance with o""onwealth Act 3o. 1B7, to discharge the 'ffice of H#dge in the o#rt of (irst Instance of the B th H#dicial District with a#thority to preside o*er the (I of Manila and 0alawan. $he 3ational Asse")ly ad-o#rned witho#t its o""ission on Appoint"ents ha*ing acted on said ad interi" appoint"ent. $he o""ission on Appoint"ents of the 3ational Asse")ly disappro*ed the ad interi" appoint"ent of petitioner. !#)se6#ently, the 0resident of the 0hilippines appointed respondent !i5to de la osta, -#dge of first instance of the B th H#dicial District, with a#thority to preside o*er the (I of Manila and 0alawan, and his appoint"ent was appro*ed )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents of the 3ational Asse")ly. 0etitioner instit#ted 6#o warranto proceedings against respondent and also 6#estioned the *alidity of the appoint"ent alleging that .A. 3o. 1B7 is #nconstit#tional. ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitioner "ay proceed to 6#estion the constit#tionality of .A. 3o. 1B7 )y *irt#e of which the new ad interi" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 113 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 appoint"ent of -#dge of first instance of the B th H#dicial District, to preside o*er the (I of Manila and 0alawan, was iss#ed in his fa*orC HELD" 3o. 0etitioner is estopped )y his own act for" proceeding to 6#estion the constit#tionality of .A. 3o. 1B7. 1e li:ewise :new, or at least he sho#ld :now, that his ad interi" appoint"ent was s#)-ect to the appro*al of the o""ission on Appoint"ents of the 3ational Asse")ly and that if said o""ission were to disappro*e the sa"e, it wo#ld )eco"e ineffecti*e and he wo#ld cease discharging the office. $he petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interi" appoint"ent iss#ed )y the 0resident of the o""onwealth in his fa*or, in accordance with said .A. 3o. 1B7. 3othing or no)ody co"pelled hi" to do so. 8hen a p#)lic official *ol#ntarily accepts an appoint"ent to an office newly created or reorgani&ed )y law [ which new office is inco"pati)le with the one for"erly occ#pied )y hi" [ 6#alifies for the discharge of the f#nctions thereof )y ta:ing the necessary oath, and enters in the perfor"ance of his d#ties )y e5ec#ting acts inherent in said newly created or reorgani&ed office and recei*ing the corresponding salary, he will )e considered to ha*e a)andoned the office he was occ#pying )y *irt#e of his for"er appoint"ent, and he cannot 6#estion the constit#tionality of the law )y which he was last appointed. 1e was estopped for" 6#estioning the *alidity of said appoint"ent )y alleging that the law, )y *irt#e of which his appoint"ent was iss#ed, is #nconstit#tional. 1e is e5e"pted fro" said r#le only when his non9 acceptance of the new appoint"ent "ay affect p#)lic interest or when he is co"pelled to accept it )y reason of legal e5igencies. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 14 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION PU-AT VS. DE GU$MAN, !R. (G.R. NO. L51122, MARCH 25, 1982) MELENCIOHERRERA, !." FACTS" $his s#it for certiorari and 0rohi)ition with 0reli"inary In-#nction is poised against the 'rder of respondent Associate o""issioner of the !. granting Asse")ly"an .stanislao A. (ernande& lea*e to inter*ene in !. ase 3o. 17B7. Before he "o*ed to inter*ene he had signified his intention to appear as co#nsel for the respondent $.. Acero, )#t which was o)-ected to )y petitioners. Acero instit#ted at the !. 6#o warranto proceedings, 6#estioning the election for the 11 Directors of the International 0ipe Ind#stries orporation, a pri*ate corporation. Acero clai"ed that the stoc:holderKs *otes were not properly co#nted. H#stice .stanislao A. (ernande&, then "e")er of the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa, orally entered his appearance as co#nsel for respondent Acero to which petitioner .#genio 0#yat o)-ected on onstit#tional gro#nds !ec.11, Art.<III, of the 1974 onstit#tion, then in force, pro*ided that =no Asse")ly"an co#ld appear as co#nsel )eforeZ any ad"inistrati*e )ody,> and !. was an ad"inistrati*e )ody. $he cited constit#tional prohi)ition )eing clear, Asse")ly"an (ernande& did not contin#e his appearance for respondent Acero. ISSUE" 8hether or not, in inter*ening in the !. ase, Asse")ly"an (ernande& is, in effect, appearing as co#nsel, al)eit indirectly, )efore an ad"inistrati*e )ody in contra*ention of the onstit#tional pro*ision. HELD" Des. 'rdinarily, )y *irt#e of the Motion for Inter*ention, Asse")ly"an (ernande& cannot )e said to )e appearing as co#nsel. 'stensi)ly, he is not appearing on )ehalf of another, altho#gh he is -oining the ca#se of the pri*ate respondents. 1is appearance co#ld theoretically )e for the protection of his ownership of ten @1?A shares of I0I in respect of the "atter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who ha*e their respecti*e capa)le and respected co#nsel. 1owe*er, he later had ac6#ired a "ere 02??.?? worth of stoc: in I0I, representing ten shares o#t of 2+2,8B4 o#tstanding shares. 1e ac6#ired the" /after the fact/ that is, on May 4?, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 1B, 1979, after the 6#o warranto s#it had )een filed on May 27, 1979 )efore !. and one day )efore the sched#led hearing of the case )efore the !. on May 41, 1979. And what is "ore, )efore he "o*ed to inter*ene, he had signified his intention to appear as co#nsel for respondent .#sta6#io $. . Acero, )#t which was o)-ected to )y petitioners. %eali&ing, perhaps, the *alidity of the o)-ection, he decided, instead, to /inter*ene/ on the gro#nd of legal interest in the "atter #nder litigation. And it "ay)e noted that in the case filed )efore the %i&al o#rt of (irst Instance @L971928A, he appeared as co#nsel for defendant .5celsior, co9defendant of respondent Acero therein. Jnder those facts and circ#"stances, there has )een an indirect circ#"*ention of the constit#tional prohi)ition. An asse")ly"an cannot indirectly follow the constit#tional prohi)ition not to appear as co#nsel )efore an ad"inistrati*e tri)#nal li:e the !. )y )#ying no"inal a"o#nt of share of one of the stoc:holders after his appearance as co#nsel therein was contested. A r#ling #pholding the =inter*ention> wo#ld "a:e the constit#tional pro*ision ineffecti*e. All an Asse")ly"en need to do, if he wants to infl#ence an ad"inistrati*e )ody is to ac6#ire a "ini"al participation in the =interest> of the client and then =inter*ene> in the proceedings. $hat which the onstit#tion prohi)its "ay not )e done )y indirection or )y a general legislati*e act which is intended to acco"plish the o)-ects specifically or i"pliedly prohi)ited. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 1% ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, !R. (G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEM&ER 18, 1998) PANGANI&AN, !." FACTS" $he !enate of the 0hilippines, with !en. Hohn 1enry %. 's"eNa as presiding officer, con*ened on H#ly 27, 1998 the first reg#lar session of the ele*enth ongress. !enator $atad thereafter "anifested that, with the agree"ent of !enator !antiago, allegedly the only other "e")er of the "inority, he was ass#"ing the position of "inority leader. 1e e5plained that those who had *oted for !enator (ernan, as !enate 0resident, co"prised the /"a-ority,/ while only those who had *oted for hi", the losing no"inee, )elonged to the /"inority./ D#ring the disc#ssion on who sho#ld constit#te the !enate /"inority,/ !en. H#an M. (la*ier "anifested that the senators )elonging to the La:as93JD9JMD0 0arty E n#")ering se*en @7A and, th#s, also a "inority E had chosen !enator ,#ingona as the "inority leader. 3o consens#s on the "atter was arri*ed at. $he following session day, the de)ate on the 6#estion contin#ed, with !enators !antiago and $atad deli*ering pri*ilege speeches. Miria" Defensor !antiago and (rancisco !. $atad later instit#ted an original petition for 6#o warranto #nder %#le ++, !ection 7, %#les of o#rt, see:ing the o#ster of !enator $eofisto $. ,#ingona, Hr. as "inority leader of the !enate and the declaration of !enator $atad as the rightf#l "inority leader. ISSUES" 1. Does the o#rt ha*e -#risdiction to settle the contro*ersyC 2. In recogni&ing %espondent ,#ingona as the !enate "inority leader, did the !enate or its officials, partic#larly !enate 0resident (ernan, *iolate the onstit#tion or the lawsC HELD" 1. Des. $his o#rt has -#risdiction o*er the petition. It is well within the power and -#risdiction of the o#rt to in6#ire whether indeed the !enate or its officials co""itted a *iolation of the onstit#tion or gra*ely a)#sed their discretion in the e5ercise of their f#nctions and prerogati*es. 2. 3o. 8hile the onstit#tion "andates that the 0resident of the !enate "#st )e elected )y a n#")er constit#ting "ore than one half of all the "e")ers thereof, it does not pro*ide that the "e")ers who will not *ote for hi" shall ipso facto constit#te the /"inority,/ who co#ld there)y elect the "inority leader. <erily, no law or reg#lation states that the defeated candidate shall a#to"atically )eco"e the "inority leader. 8hile the onstit#tion is e5plicit on the "anner of electing a !enate 0resident and a 1o#se !pea:er, it is, howe*er, dead silent on the "anner of selecting the other officers in )oth cha")ers of ongress. All that the harter says is that /OePach 1o#se shall choose s#ch other officers as it "ay dee" necessary./ $he "ethod of choosing who will )e s#ch other officers is "erely a deri*ati*e of the e5ercise of the prerogati*e conferred )y the afore6#oted constit#tional pro*ision. $herefore, s#ch "ethod "#st )e prescri)ed )y the !enate itself, not )y this o#rt. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 1% ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION AVELINO VS. CUENCO (G.R. NO. L2821, MARCH 4, 1949) FACTS" !enator 0rospero !anidad filed with the !ecretary of the !enate a resol#tion en#"erating charges against the then !enate 0resident and ordering the in*estigation thereof. 8hen the "eeting was called to order, !enator !anidad "o*ed that the roll call )e dispensed with )#t !enator $irona opposed said "otion. $he roll was called. !enator !anidad ne5t "o*ed to dispense with the reading of the "in#tes, )#t this "otion was li:ewise opposed )y !enator $irona and Da*id. Before and after the roll call and )efore and after the reading of the "in#tes, !enator $aNada repeatedly stood #p to clai" his right to deli*er his one9ho#r pri*ilege speech )#t the petitioner, then presiding, contin#o#sly ignored hi"G and when after the reading of the "in#tes, !enator $aNada instead on )eing recogni&ed )y the hair, the petitioner anno#nced that he wo#ld order the arrest of any senator who wo#ld spea: witho#t )eing pre*io#sly recogni&ed )y hi", )#t all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, !enator $irona, who was contin#o#sly sho#ting at !enator !anidad /'#t of order^/ e*eryti"e the latter wo#ld as: for recognition of !enator $aNada. At this -#nct#re, so"e disorderly cond#ct )ro:e o#t in the !enate gallery. !enator 0a)lo Angeles Da*id, one of the petitionerIs followers, "o*ed for ad-o#rn"ent of session. !enator !anidad registered his opposition to the ad-o#rn"ent of the session and this opposition was seconded )y herein respondent who "o*ed that the "otion of ad-o#rn"ent )e s#)"itted to a *ote. Another co""otion ens#ed. !enator Da*id reiterated his "otion for ad-o#rn"ent and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the ad-o#rn"ent and again "o*ed that the "otion of !enator Da*id )e s#)"itted to a *ote. !#ddenly, the petitioner )anged the ga*el and a)andoning the hair h#rriedly wal:ed o#t of the session hall followed )y !enator Da*id, $irona, (rancisco, $orres, Magalona and larin, while the rest of the senators re"ained. 8here#pon !enator Melencio Arran&, !enate San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 114 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 0resident 0ro9te"pore, #rged )y those senators present too: the hair and proceeded with the session. !enator a)ili stood #p, and as:ed that it )e "ade of record E it was so "ade E that the deli)erate a)andon"ent of the hair )y the petitioner, "ade it inc#")ent #pon !enate 0resident 0ro9te"pore Arran& and the re"aining "e")ers of the !enate to contin#e the session in order not to paraly&e the f#nctions of the !enate. !enate 0resident 0ro9te"pore Arran& then s#ggested that respondent )e designated to preside o*er the session which s#ggestion was carried #nani"o#sly. $he respondent there#pon too: the hair. Jpon "otion of !enator Arran& which was appro*ed, ,regorio A)ad was appointed Acting !ecretary. !enator $aNada, after )eing recogni&ed )y the hair, was then finally a)le to deli*er his pri*ilege speech. $hereafter !enator !anidad read alo#d the co"plete te5t of said %esol#tion @3o. +8A, and s#)"itted his "otion for appro*al thereof and the sa"e was #nani"o#sly appro*ed. 8ith !enate 0resident 0ro9te"pore Arran& again occ#pying the hair, after the respondent had yielded it to hi", !enator !anidad introd#ced %esol#tion 3o. +7, entitled /%esol#tion declaring *acant the position of the 0resident of the !enate and designated the 1onora)le Mariano Hes#s #enco Acting 0resident of the !enate./ 0#t to a *ote, the said resol#tion was #nani"o#sly appro*ed. !enator #enco too: the oath. $he ne5t day the 0resident of the 0hilippines recogni&ed the respondent as acting president of the 0hilippines !enate. By his petition in this 6#o warranto proceeding petitioners as:ed the o#rt to declare hi" the rightf#l 0resident of the 0hilippines senate and o#st respondent. ISSUE" Does the o#rt ha*e -#risdiction o*er the petitionC HELD" 3one. $he constit#tional grant to the !enate of the power to elect its own president, which power sho#ld not )e interfered with, nor ta:en o*er, )y the -#diciary. $he o#rt will not sally into the legiti"ate do"ain of the !enate on the plea that o#r ref#sal to intercede "ight lead into a crisis, e*en a resol#tion. 3o state of things has )een pro*ed that "ight change the te"per of the (ilipino people as a peacef#l and law9a)iding citi&ens. And we sho#ld not allow o#rsel*es to )e sta"peded into a rash action inconsistent with the cal" that sho#ld characteri&ed -#dicial deli)erations. !#pposing that the o#rt has -#risdiction, there is #nani"ity in the *iew that the session #nder !enator Arran& was a contin#ation of the "orning session and that a "inority of ten senators "ay not, )y lea*ing the 1all, pre*ent the other twel*e senators fro" passing a resol#tion that "et with their #nani"o#s endorse"ent. $he answer "ight )e different had the resol#tion )een appro*ed only )y ten or less. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 1% ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION OSMESA VS. PENDATUN (G.R. NO. L17144, OCTO&ER 28, 19%0) &ENG$ON, !." FACTS" ongress"an !ergio 's"eNa, Hr., s#)"itted to this o#rt a *erified petition for /declaratory relief, certiorari and prohi)ition with preli"inary in-#nction/ against ongress"an !alapida L. 0endat#n and fo#rteen other congress"en in their capacity as "e")ers of the !pecial o""ittee created )y 1o#se %esol#tion 3o. 79. 1e as:ed for ann#l"ent of s#ch %esol#tion on the gro#nd of infringe"ent of his parlia"entary i""#nity. 1e also as:ed, principally, that said "e")ers of the special co""ittee )e en-oined fro" proceeding in accordance with it, partic#larly the portion a#thori&ing the" to re6#ire hi" to s#)stantiate his charges of )ri)ery against then 0resident ,arcia with the ad"onition that if he failed to do so, he "#st show ca#se why the 1o#se sho#ld not p#nish hi". ongress"an 's"eNa allegedG first, the %esol#tion *iolated his constit#tional a)sol#te parlia"entary i""#nity for speeches deli*ered in the 1o#seG second, his words constit#ted no actiona)le cond#ctG and third, after his allegedly o)-ectiona)le speech and words, the 1o#se too: #p other )#siness, and %#le ;<II, sec. 7 of the %#les of 1o#se pro*ides that if other )#siness has inter*ened after the "e")er had #ttered o)no5io#s words in de)ate, he shall not )e held to answer therefor nor )e s#)-ect to cens#re )y the 1o#se. $he !pecial o""ittee d#ring the pendency of his petition, fo#nd said congress"an g#ilty of serio#s disorderly )eha*ior. $he 1o#se appro*ed 1o#se %esol#tion 3o. 177 declaring hi" s#spended fro" office for 17 "onths. ISSUE" an the 1o#se of %epresentati*es discipline its "e")ers as in the case at )arC HELD" Des. $he 1o#se is the -#dge of what constit#tes disorderly )eha*io#r, not only )eca#se the onstit#tion has conferred -#risdiction #pon it, )#t also )eca#se the "atter depends "ainly on fact#al circ#"stances of which the 1o#se :nows )est )#t which can not )e depicted in )lac: and white for presentation to, and ad-#dication )y the o#rts. (or one thing, if this o#rt ass#"ed the power to deter"ine whether 's"eNa cond#ct constit#ted disorderly )eha*io#r, it wo#ld there)y ha*e ass#"ed appellate -#risdiction, which the onstit#tion ne*er intended to confer #pon a coordinate )ranch of the ,o*ern"ent. $he theory of separation of powers fastidio#sly o)ser*ed )y this o#rt, de"ands in s#ch sit#ation a pr#dent ref#sal to interfere. .ach depart"ent, it has )een said, had e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of "atters within its -#risdiction and is s#pre"e within its own sphere. @Angara *s. .lectoral o""ission, +4 0hil., 149.A Jnder o#r for" of go*ern"ent, the -#dicial depart"ent has no power to re*ise e*en the "ost ar)itrary and #nfair action of the legislati*e depart"ent, or of either ho#se thereof, ta:ing in p#rs#ance of the power co""itted e5cl#si*ely to that depart"ent )y the onstit#tion. It has )een held )y high a#thority that, e*en in the a)sence of an e5press pro*ision conferring the power, e*ery legislati*e )ody in which is *ested the general legislati*e power of the state has the i"plied power to e5pel a "e")er for any ca#se which it "ay dee" s#fficient. $he ongress has the inherent legislati*e prerogati*e of s#spension which the onstit#tion did not i"pair. In any e*ent, petitionerIs arg#"ent as to the depri*ation of the districtIs representation can not )e "ore weightly in the "atter of s#spension than in the case of i"prison"ent of a legislatorG yet deli)erati*e )odies ha*e the power in proper cases, to co""it one of their "e")ers to -ail. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT PAREDES, !R. VS. SANDIGAN&A-AN GR NO. 1183%4. !ANUAR- 28, 1997 FACTS" 8hile ongress"an was still 0ro*incial ,o*ernor, charges of *iolations of the Anti9,raft Law were filed against hi" )efore the !andigan)ayan. !#)se6#ently, he was elected to ongress. D#ring his second ter" in ongress, the !andigan)ayan i"posed a pre*enti*e s#spension on hi" p#rs#ant to the Anti9,raft Law. 0aredes challenged the a#thority of the !andigan)ayan to s#spend a district representati*e. ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitioner can )e s#spended. HELD" D.!. 0etitionerKs in*ocation of !ection 1+@4A, Article <I of the onstit#tion which deals with the power of each 1o#se of ongress inter alias to Sp#nish its "e")ers of ongress for disorderly )eha*ior S and s#spend or e5pel a "e")erK )y a *ote of two?thirds of the "e")ers s#)-ect to the 6#alification that the penalty of the s#spension spo:en of in !ec. 14 of %A 4?19 which is not penalty )y a preli"inary pre*enti*e "eas#re presenting fro" the fact that the latter is not )eing i"posed on the petitioner for "is)eha*ior as a Me")er of the 1o#se of %epresentati*e. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT US VS. PONS 34 PHIL 729. 191% FACTS" $he respondent, together with Beliso and Lasarte were charged with illegal i"portation of opi#". 0ons and Beliso were tried separately on "otion of co#nsel. Lasarte had not yet )een arrested. .ach was fo#nd g#ilty of the cri"e, charged and sentenced accordingly. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the -#dg"ent as to hi" has )eco"e final. %espondentKs "otion alleged to pro*e that the last day of the special session of the 0hilippine Legislat#re for 191B was the 28 th day of (e)r#ary, that Act 3o.2481 #nder which 0ons "#st )e p#nished if fo#nd g#ilty, was not passed nor appro*ed on the 28 th of (e)r#ary )#t on March 1 of that year. Also, co#nsel for 0ons alleged that the Asse")lyKs cloc: was stopped on (e)r#ary 18, 191B at "idnight and left so #ntil the deter"ination of the disc#ssion of all pending "atters a"ong which was Act 3'. 2481. to pro*e aid allegations, co#nsel arg#ed the co#rt to go )eyond the proceedings of the Legislat#re as recorded in the -o#rnals.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the co#rt "ay go )eyond the recitals of legislat#re -o#rnals or -#st ta:e -#dicial notice of said -o#rnals for the p#rpose of deter"ining the date of ad-o#rn"ent when s#ch -o#rnal are clear and e5plicitly. HELD" D.!. (ro" their *ery nat#re and o)-ect the records of the Legislat#re are as i"portant as those of the -#diciary. And to in6#ire into the *eracity of the -o#rnals of the 0hilippine Legislat#re when they are, as we ha*e said, clear and e5plicit, wo#ld )e to *iolate )oth the letter and the spirit of the organic laws )y which the 0hilippine go*ern"ent was )ro#ght into e5istence, to in*ade and coordinate and independent depart"ent of the ,o*ern"ent and to interfere with the legiti"ate powers and f#nctions of the Legislat#re. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., VS. GIMENE$ 7 SCRA 347 (19%3) FACTS" 0#rs#ant to the pro*isions of %A 7+?9 :nown as the (oreign .5change Margin (ee Law, the entral Ban: iss#ed irc#lar 3'. 97 fi5ing a #nified "argin fee of 27M on foreign e5change transaction and a "e"orand#" esta)lishing the proced#re for application for e5e"ption fro" pay"ent of said fee. In 3o*e")er and Dece")er 1979, and in May 19+?, asco 0hilippine he"ical o. Inc., )ro#ght foreign e5change for San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 115 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the i"portation of #rea and for"aldehyde and paid for the "argin fee therefore. $hen as petitioner, the entral Ban: declaring that separate i"portation of #rea and for"aldehyde is e5e"pt fro" said fee. 8hen the )ac: iss#e corresponding "argin fee *o#chers for the ref#nd, the a#ditor of the )ac: iss#e the said *o#chers #pon the gro#nd that the e5e"ption granted )y the Monetary Board is in *iolation of !ec. 2@18_ of %A 2+?9, according to the pertinent portion of the Act, =#rea for"aldehyde> is e5e"pted fro" the "argin fee. $he 3ational Instit#te of !cience and $echnology f#rther affir"s that =#rea for"aldehyde> is different fro" #rea and for"aldehyde. 1ence, the separate i"portations of these two raw "aterials are not e5cl#ded fro" "argin fee. ISSUE" 8hether or not the phrase =#rea for"aldehyde> as #sed in the stat#te sho#ld )e read as =#rea> and =for"aldehyde.> HELD" 3'. 1ence, =#rea for"aldehyde> is clearly a finished prod#ct which is patently distinct and different fro" =#rea> and =for"aldehyde> as #sed in the "an#fact#re of the synthetic resin :nown as =#rea for"aldehyde.> 0etitioner contends, howe*er, that the )ill appro*ed in ongress contained the cop#lati*e con-#nction =and> )etween the ter" =#rea> and =for"aldehyde>, not the latter as a finished prod#ct, citing in s#pport of this *iew the state"ents "ade on the floor of !enate, d#ring the consideration of the )ill )efore said 1o#se, )y "e")ers thereof. (#rther"ore, it is well settled that the enrolled )ill which #ses the ter" =#rea for"aldehyde> is a concl#si*e #pon the co#rts as regards the tenor of the "eas#re passed )y the ongress and appro*ed )y the 0resident. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT PHILIPPINE !UDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO 227 SCRA 703. 1993 FACTS" $he 0hilippine 0ostal orporation i"ple"ented %A 774B, a "eas#re withdrawing the fran:ing pri*ilege fro" the !, A, %$ and M$ along with certain other go*ern"ent offices. $he petitioners are "e")ers of the lower co#rts who feel that their official f#nctions as -#dges will )e pre-#diced )y the afore"entioned "eas#re. $he petitioners assail the constit#tionality of the "eas#re on the gro#nd inter alia that it is discri"inatory and encroached on the independence of the -#diciary. ISSUE" 8hether or not the contention of the petitioner is tena)le. HELD" D.!. Jnder the doctrine of separation of powers, the o#rt "ay not in6#ire )eyond the certification of the appro*al of a )ill fro" the presiding officers of ongress. $he afore"entioned "eas#re is declared #nconstit#tional insofar as it withdraws the fran:ing pri*ilege fro" the !, A, %$ and M$ and other go*ern"ent offices. It is alleged that %A 3o. 747B is discri"inatory )eca#se while withdrawing the fran:ing pri*ilege of the H#diciary, it retains the sa"e for the 0resident of the 0hilippines, the <ice90resident of the 0hilippines, !enators and "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es, the o""ission on .lections, for"er president of he 0hilippines, widows of for"er presidents of the 0hilippines, the national cens#s and statistics 'ffice and the general p#)lic in the filing of co"plaints against p#)lic offices or officers. $he e6#al protection of the laws is e")raced in the concept of the d#e process, as #nfair discri"ination offends the re6#ire"ent of -#stice and fair play. It has nonetheless )een e")odied in a separate cla#se in Article III, !ection I of the onstit#tion to pro*ide for a "ore specific g#aranty against any for" of #nd#e fa*oritis" or hostility fro" the go*ern"ent. Ar)itrariness in general "ay )e challenged on the )asis of the d#e process cla#se .)#t if the partic#lar act assailed parta:es of an #nwarranted partiality or pre-#dice the sharper weapon to c#t it down is the e6#al protection cla#se. SEPARATION OF PO=ERS? ENROLLED &ILL DOCTRINE ARRO-O VS. DE VENECIA (G.R. NO. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997) MENDO$A, !. FACTS" 0etitioners are "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. $hey )ro#ght this s#it against the respondents charging the" *iolation of the r#les of the 1o#se which petitioners clai" are /constit#tionally "andated/ so that their *iolation is tanta"o#nt to a *iolation of the onstit#tion. $he present petition also challenges the *alidity of %A 3o. 82B?, which a"ends certain pro*isions of the 3ational Internal %e*en#e ode )y i"posing so9called Wsin ta5es> @act#ally specific ta5esA on the "an#fact#re and sale of )eer and cigarettes. $he law originated in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es as 1. 3o. 7198. $his )ill was appro*ed on third reading on !epte")er 12, 199+ and trans"itted on !epte")er 1+, 199+ to the !enate which appro*ed it with certain a"end"ents on third reading on 3o*e")er 17, 199+. A )ica"eral conference co""ittee was for"ed to reconcile the disagreeing pro*isions of the 1o#se and !enate *ersions of the )ill. $he )ica"eral conference co""ittee s#)"itted its report to the 1o#se at 8 a.". on 3o*e")er 21, 199+. At 112B8 a."., after a recess, %ep. .5e6#iel Ha*ier proceeded to deli*er his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. %ep. %ogelio !ar"iento was first to interpellate. 1e was interr#pted when %ep. Arroyo "o*ed to ad-o#rn for lac: of 6#or#". %ep. Antonio #enco o)-ected to the "otion and as:ed for a head co#nt. After a roll call, the hair @Dep#ty !pea:er %a#l Da&aA declared the presence of a 6#or#".
%ep. Arroyo appealed the r#ling of the hair, )#t his "otion was defeated when p#t to a *ote. $he interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. 0etitioner %ep. Ho:er Arroyo registered to interpellate. 1e was fo#rth in the order. In the co#rse of his interpellation, %ep. Arroyo anno#nced that he was going to raise a 6#estion on the 6#or#", altho#gh #ntil the end of his interpellation he ne*er did. 'n the sa"e day, the )ill was signed )y the !pea:er of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es and the 0resident of the !enate and certified )y the respecti*e secretaries of )oth 1o#ses of ongress as ha*ing )een finally passed )y the 1o#se of %epresentati*es and )y the !enate on 3o*e")er 21, 199+. $he enrolled )ill was signed into law )y 0resident (idel <. %a"os on 3o*e")er 22, 199+. ISSUE" 8hether or not the passage of %A 3o. 82B? is in *iolation of the r#les of the 1o#se, hence "a:ing it n#ll and *oid. HELD" 3'. (irst, it is clear fro" the foregoing facts that what is alleged to ha*e )een *iolated in the enact"ent of %.A. 3o 82B? are "erely internal r#les of proced#re of the 1o#se rather than constit#tional re6#ire"ents for the enact"ent of a law, i.e. Article <I, !ecs. 2+927. $he onstit#tion pro*ides that =each 1o#se "ay deter"ine the r#les of its proceedings. $he pre*ailing *iew is that they are s#)-ect to re*ocation, "odification or wai*er at the pleas#re of the )ody adopting the" as they are pri"arily proced#ral. o#rts ordinary ha*e no concern with their o)ser*ance. $hey "ay )e wai*ed or disregarded )y the legislati*e )ody. onse6#ently, "ere fail#re to confor" to the" does not ha*e the effect of n#llifying the act ta:en if the re6#isite n#")er of "e")ers ha*e agreed to a partic#lar "eas#re. $he a)o*e principle is s#)-ect, howe*er, to this 6#alification. 8e ha*e no "ore power to loo: into the internal proceedings of a 1o#se than "e")ers of that 1o#se ha*e to loo: o*er o#r sho#lders, as long as no *iolation of constit#tional pro*isions is shown. !econd, #nder the enrolled )ill doctrine, the signing of 1. 3o. 7198 )y the !pea:er of the 1o#se and the 0resident of the !enate and the certification )y the secretaries of )oth 1o#ses of ongress that it was passed on 3o*e")er 21, 199+ are concl#si*e of its d#e enact"ent. 8here there is no e*idence to the contrary, the o#rt will respect the certification of the presiding officers of )oth 1o#ses that a )ill has )een d#ly passed. Jnder this r#le, this o#rt has ref#sed to deter"ine clai"s that the three9fo#rths *ote needed to pass a proposed a"end"ent to the onstit#tion had not )een o)tained, )eca#se /a d#ly a#thenticated )ill or resol#tion i"ports a)sol#te *erify and is )inding on the co#rts./ Moreo*er, as already noted, the d#e enact"ent of the law in 6#estion is confir"ed )y the Ho#rnal of the 1o#se of 3o*e")er 21, 199+ which shows that the conference co""ittee report on 1. 3o. 7198, which )eca"e %.A. 3o. 87B?, was appro*ed on that day. $he :eeping of the Ho#rnal is re6#ired )y the onstit#tion, Art. <I, \1+@BA. $he Ho#rnal is regarded as concl#si*e with respect to "atters that are re6#ired )y the onstit#tion to )e recorded therein. As already noted, the )ill which )eca"e %.A. 3o. 82B? is shown in the Ho#rnal. 1ence its d#e enact"ent has )een d#ly pro*en. 81.%.('%., the petition for certiorari and prohi)ition is DI!MI!!.D. !URISDICTION? !UDICIAL REVIE= OF HRET DECISIONS RO&LES >(. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRI&UNAL (HRET) (G.R. NO. 8%%47. FE&RUAR- 5, 1990) MEDIALDEA, !. FACTS" 0etitioner <irgilio %o)les and pri*ate respondent %o"eo !antos were candidates for the position of ongress"an of the 1 st district of aloocan ity in the May 1987 elections. 0etitioner %o)les was proclai"ed the winner. !antos filed an election protest with respondent 1%.$, alleging that the elections were characteri&ed )y the co""ission of electoral fra#ds and irreg#larities. 1e li:ewise prayed for the reco#nting of the gen#ine )allots in all the 42? contested precincts. 0etitioner alleged the late filing of the protest. $he 1%.$ iss#ed an order setting the co""ence"ent of the re*ision of contested )allots on !epte")er 1, 1988 and directed protestant !antos to identify 27M of the total contested precincts which he desires to )e re*ised first in accordance with !ection 18 of the %#les of the 1%.$. 'n !epte")er 7, 1988, the re*ision of the )allots for 77 precincts, representing the initial 27M of all the contested precincts, was ter"inated. %o)les filed an Jrgent Motion to !#spend %e*ision while !antos filed a Motion to 8ithdraw 0rotest on the #nre*ised precincts. B#t the 1%.$ did not act on the said "otions. !antos then filed an Jrgent Motion to %ecall and Disregard 8ithdrawal of 0rotest which was granted )y the 1%.$. 1ence the res#"ption of the re*ision of the )allots was ordered. %o)les filed a Motion for %econsideration, which was denied. 1ence, the instant petition. 0etitioner contends in the present petition that when pri*ate respondent filed the Motion to 8ithdraw 0rotest on Jnre*ised 0recincts and Motion to !et ase for 1earing, respondent 1%.$ lost its -#risdiction o*er the case, hence when respondent 1%.$ s#)se6#ently ordered the re*ision of the #nre*ised protested )allots, San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 116 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted witho#t -#risdiction or with gra*e a)#se of discretion. ISSUE" 8hether or not respondent 1%.$ has lost its -#risdiction o*er the case. HELD" 3'. It is noted that #pon !antosK filing of his Motion to 8ithdraw on Jnre*ised 0recincts on !epte")er 12, 1988, no action thereon was ta:en )y respondent 1%.$. $he "ere filing of the "otion to withdraw protest on the re"aining #ncontested precincts, witho#t any action on the part of respondent tri)#nal, does not )y itself di*est the tri)#nal of its -#risdiction o*er the case. H#risdiction, once ac6#ired, is not lost #pon the instance of the parties )#t contin#es #ntil the case is ter"inated. $he o#rt agrees with the 1%.$ when it held that =the $ri)#nal retains the a#thority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal )eco"es effecti*e only when the "otion is granted. $o hold otherwise wo#ld per"it a party to depri*e the $ri)#nal of -#risdiction already ac6#ired.> $he o#rt therefore holds that this $ri)#nal retains the power and the a#thority to grant or deny 0rotestantKs Motion to 8ithdraw, if only to ins#re that the $ri)#nal retains s#fficient a#thority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained. !ince 0rotestantIs /Motion to 8ithdraw 0rotest on the Jnre*ised 0recincts/ had not )een acted #pon )y this $ri)#nal )efore it was recalled )y the 0rotestant, it did not ha*e the effect of re"o*ing the precincts co*ered there)y fro" the protest. If these precincts were not withdrawn fro" the protest, then the granting of 0rotestantIs /Jrgent Motion to %ecall and Disregard 8ithdrawal of 0rotest/ did not a"o#nt to allowing the refiling of protest )eyond the regle"entary period. In the a)sence of any clear showing of a)#se of discretion on the part of respondent tri)#nal in pro"#lgating the assailed resol#tions, a writ of certiorari will not iss#e. 8here the co#rt has -#risdiction o*er the s#)-ect "atter, its orders #pon all 6#estions pertaining to the ca#se are orders within its -#risdiction, and howe*er erroneo#s they "ay )e, they cannot )e corrected )y certiorari. $his r#le "ore appropriately applies to respondent 1%.$ whose independence as a constit#tional )ody has ti"e and again )een #pheld )y the o#rt in "any cases. $h#s, =-#dicial re*iew of decisions or final resol#tions of the 1%.$ is @th#sA possi)le only in the e5ercise of this o#rtKs so9called e5traordinary -#risdiction, #pon a deter"ination that the tri)#nalKs decision or resol#tion was rendered witho#t or in e5cess of its -#risdiction, or with gra*e a)#se of discretion. A'%DI3,LD, finding no gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of respondent 1o#se of %epresentati*es .lectoral $ri)#nal in iss#ing the assailed resol#tions, the instant petition is DI!MI!!.D. SEPARATION OF PO=ERS? LEGISLATURE R ELECTORAL COMMISSION ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (G.R. NO. L45081. !UL- 15, 193%) LAUREL, !. FACTS" 0etitioner Hose Angara and the respondents, 0edro Dns#a, Mig#el astillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates for the position of "e")er of the 3ational Asse")ly for the first district of the 0ro*ince of $aya)as in the !epte")er 17, 1947 elections. 0etitioner was proclai"ed winner. $he 3ational Asse")ly passed %esol#tion 3o. 8 which effecti*ely confir"ed the election of petitioner to the said )ody. Dns#a filed )efore the .lectoral o""ission a =Motion of 0rotest> against the election of petitioner. Meanwhile, on Dece")er 9, 1947, the 3ational Asse")ly, in a resol#tion, fi5ed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly, notwithstanding the pre*io#s confir"ation "ade )y the". Angara then filed a petition praying for the dis"issal of Dns#aKs protest. 1e alleged that %esol#tion no. 8 was passed )y the 3ational Asse")ly in the e5ercise of its constit#tional prerogati*e to prescri)e the period d#ring which protests against the election of its "e")ers sho#ld )e presented. B#t said Motion to Dis"iss was denied )y the .lectoral o""ission. 1ence the present petition filed )y petitioner see:ing to restrain and prohi)it the .lectoral o""ission fro" ta:ing f#rther cogni&ance of the protest "ade )y Dns#a against the election of said petitioner. ISSUES" @1A 8hether or not the o#rt has -#risdiction o*er the .lectoral o""ission and the s#)-ect "atter of the contro*ersy. @2A 8hether or not the .lectoral o""ission acted witho#t or in e5cess of its -#risdiction in ass#"ing to the cogni&ance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the pre*io#s confir"ation of s#ch election )y resol#tion of the 3ational Asse")ly. HELD" @1A D.!. $he separation of powers is a f#nda"ental principle in o#r syste" of go*ern"ent. It o)tains not thro#gh e5press pro*ision )#t )y act#al di*ision in o#r onstit#tion. .ach depart"ent of the go*ern"ent has e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of "atters within its -#risdiction, and is s#pre"e within its own sphere. In the case at )ar, here then is presented an act#al contro*ersy in*ol*ing as it does a conflict of a gra*e constit#tional nat#re )etween the 3ational Asse")ly on the one hand, and the .lectoral o""ission on the other. $he .lectoral o""ission is a constit#tional organ created for a specific p#rpose, na"ely to deter"ine all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly. Altho#gh the .lectoral o""ission "ay not )e interfered with, when and while acting within the li"its of its a#thority, it does not follow that it is )eyond the reach of the constit#tional "echanis" adopted )y the people and that it is not s#)-ect to constit#tional restrictions. $he .lectoral o""ission is not a separate depart"ent of the go*ern"ent, and e*en if it were, conflicting clai"s of a#thority #nder the f#nda"ental law )etween depart"ent powers and agencies of the go*ern"ent are necessarily deter"ined )y the -#diciary in -#stifia)le and appropriate cases. Jpon principle, reason and a#thority, we are clearly of the opinion that #pon the ad"itted facts of the present case, this co#rt has -#risdiction o*er the .lectoral o""ission and the s#)-ect "ater of the present contro*ersy for the p#rpose of deter"ining the character, scope and e5tent of the constit#tional grant to the .lectoral o""ission as /the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly./ @2A 3'. $he iss#e hinges on the interpretation of section B of Article <I of the onstit#tion which pro*ides2 /!.. B. $here shall )e an .lectoral o""ission co"posed of three H#stice of the !#pre"e o#rt designated )y the hief H#stice, and of si5 Me")ers chosen )y the 3ational Asse")ly, three of who" shall )e no"inated )y the party ha*ing the largest n#")er of *otes, and three )y the party ha*ing the second largest n#")er of *otes therein. $he senior H#stice in the o""ission shall )e its hair"an. $he .lectoral o""ission shall )e the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly./ It is i"perati*e, therefore, that we del*e into the origin and history of this constit#tional pro*ision and in6#ire into the intention of its fra"ers and the people who adopted it so that we "ay properly appreciate its f#ll "eaning, i"port and significance. $he .lectoral o""ission is a constit#tional creation, in*ested with the necessary a#thority in the perfor"ance and e5ec#tion of the li"ited and specific f#nction assigned to it )y the onstit#tion. $he grant of power to the .lectoral o""ission to -#dge all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly, is intended to )e as co"plete and #ni"paired as if it had re"ained originally in the legislat#re. $he e5press lodging of that power in the .lectoral o""ission is an i"plied denial of the e5ercise of that power )y the 3ational Asse")ly. %esol#tion 3o. 8 of the 3ational Asse")ly confir"ing the election of "e")ers against who" no protests had )een filed at the ti"e of its passage on Dece")er 4, 1947, cannot )e constr#ed as a li"itation #pon the ti"e for the initiation of election contests. 8hile there "ight ha*e )een good reason for the legislati*e practice of confir"ation of the election of "e")ers of the legislat#re at the ti"e when the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislat#re, confir"ation alone )y the legislat#re cannot )e constr#ed as depri*ing the .lectoral o""ission of the a#thority incidental to its constit#tional power to )e /the sole -#dge of all contest relating to the election, ret#rns, and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly/, to fi5 the ti"e for the filing of said election protests. onfir"ation )y the 3ational Asse")ly of the ret#rns of its "e")ers against whose election no protests ha*e )een filed is, to all legal p#rposes, #nnecessary. As contended )y the .lectoral o""ission in its resol#tion of Han#ary 24, 194+, o*err#ling the "otion of the herein petitioner to dis"iss the protest filed )y the respondent 0edro Dns#a, confir"ation of the election of any "e")er is not re6#ired )y the onstit#tion )efore he can discharge his d#ties as s#ch "e")er. 8e hold, therefore, that the .lectoral o""ission was acting within the legiti"ate e5ercise of its constit#tional prerogati*e in ass#"ing to ta:e cogni&ance of the protest filed )y the respondent 0edro Dns#a against the election of the herein petitioner Hose A. Angara, and that the resol#tion of the 3ational Asse")ly of Dece")er 4, 1947 can not in any "anner toll the ti"e for filing protests against the elections, ret#rns and 6#alifications of "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly, nor pre*ent the filing of a protest within s#ch ti"e as the r#les of the .lectoral o""ission "ight prescri)e. $he petition for a writ of prohi)ition against the .lectoral o""ission is here)y denied. HRET LA$ATIN V. HRET (G.R. NO. 84297. DECEM&ER 8, 1988) CORTES, !. FACTS" 0etitioner ar"elo La&atin and pri*ate respondent Loren&o $i")ol were candidates for %epresentati*e of the first district of 0a"panga d#ring the May 11, 1987 elections. D#ring the can*assing of the *otes, $i")ol o)-ected to the incl#sion of certain election ret#rns. !ince the M#nicipal Board of an*assers did not r#le on his o)-ections, $i")ol )ro#ght the "atter to the 'M.L., which initially r#led the s#spension of the procla"ation of the winning candidate. It later ordered the 0ro*incial Board of an*assers to proceed with the can*assing of *otes and to proclai" the winner. 0etitioner was proclai"ed as ongress"an9elect. 0ri*ate respondent th#s filed in the 'M.L. a petition to declare petitionerKs procla"ation *oid a) initio and another petition to prohi)it petitioner fro" ass#"ing office. $he 'M.L. failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was a)le to ass#"e office. Later, the 'M.L. declared petitionerKs procla"ation *oid a) initio. 0etitioner challenged this San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 117 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 resol#tion )efore the o#rt, which s#stained the petitioner. $h#s, pri*ate respondent filed in the 1%.$ an election protest against petitioner. 0etitioner "o*ed to dis"iss the protest on the gro#nd that it had )een filed late. 1owe*er, the 1%.$ r#led that the protest had )een filed on ti"e. 0etitionerKs "otion for reconsideration was also denied. 1ence, this petition challenging the -#risdiction of the 1%.$ o*er the protest filed )y pri*ate respondent. $o s#pport his contention, he cited !ection 27? of the '"ni)#s .lection ode which pro*ides2 !ec. 27?. .lection contests for Batasang 0a")ansa, regional, pro*incial and city offices . E A sworn petition contesting the election of any Me")er of the Batasang 0a")ansa or any regional, pro*incial or city official shall )e filed with the o""ission )y any candidate who has d#ly filed a certificate of candidacy and has )een *oted for the sa"e office, within ten days after the procla"ation of the res#lts of the election. 'n the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on ti"e, the 1%.$ relied on !ec. 9 of its %#les, to wit2 .lection contests arising fro" the 1987 ongressional elections shall )e filed with the 'ffice of the !ecretary of the $ri)#nal or "ailed at the post office as registered "atter addressed to the !ecretary of the $ri)#nal, together with twel*e @12A legi)le copies thereof pl#s one @1A copy for each protestee, within fifteen @17A days fro" the effecti*ity of these %#les on 3o*e")er 22, 1987 where the procla"ation has )een "ade prior to the effecti*ity of these %#les, otherwise, the sa"e "ay )e filed within fifteen @17A days fro" the date of the procla"ation . .lection contests arising fro" the 1987 ongressional elections filed with the !ecretary of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es and trans"itted )y hi" to the hair"an of the $ri)#nal shall )e dee"ed filed with the tri)#nal as of the date of effecti*ity of these %#les, s#)-ect to pay"ent of filing fees as prescri)ed in !ection 17 hereof. ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not the 1%.$ has -#risdiction o*er the protest filed )y pri*ate respondent. 2. 8hat pro*ision of law go*erns the period for filing protests in the 1%.$. 4. 8hether or not pri*ate respondentKs protest had )een seasona)ly filed. HELD" $he o#rt is of the *iew that the protest had )een filed on ti"e and, hence, the 1%.$ ac6#ired -#risdiction o*er it. 0rotestant filed his protest on (e)r#ary 8, 1988, or ele*en @11A days after Han#ary 28. $he protest, therefore, was filed well within the regle"entary period pro*ided )y the %#les of the 1%.$. 0etitionerIs reliance on !ec. 27? of the '"ni)#s .lection ode is "isplaced. !ec. 27? is co#ched in #na")ig#o#s ter"s and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed )efore the 'M.L. contesting the election of any Me")er of the Batasang 0a")ansa , or any regional, pro*incial or city official. (#rther"ore, !ec. 27? sho#ld )e read together with !ec. 2B9 of the sa"e code which pro*ides that the 'M.L. /shall )e the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the elections, ret#rns and 6#alifications of all Me")ers of the Batasang 0a")ansa, electi*e regional, pro*incial and city officials,/ reiterating Art. ;II9, !ec. 2@2A of the 1974 onstit#tion. It "#st )e e"phasi&ed that #nder the 1974 onstit#tion there was no pro*ision for an .lectoral $ri)#nal, the -#risdiction o*er election contests in*ol*ing Me")ers of the Batasang 0a")ansa ha*ing )een *ested in the 'M.L.. $hat !ec. 27? of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, as far as contests regarding the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of Me")ers of the Batasang 0a")ansa is concerned, had ceased to )e effecti*e #nder the 1987 onstit#tion is readily apparent. $he onstit#tion now *ests e5cl#si*e -#risdiction o*er all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the Me")ers of the !enate and the 1o#se of %epresentati*es in the respecti*e .lectoral $ri)#nals OArt. <I, !ec. 171. $he e5cl#si*e original -#risdiction of the 'M.L. is li"ited )y constit#tional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, pro*incial and city offices and its appellate -#risdiction to those in*ol*ing "#nicipal and )arangay offices OArt. I;9, !ec. 2@2AP. $he power of the 1%.$, as the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the Me")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations relati*e to "atters within its -#risdiction, incl#ding the period for filing election protests )efore it, is )eyond disp#te. Its r#le9"a:ing power necessarily flows fro" the general power granted it )y the onstit#tion. $he inescapa)le concl#sion fro" the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the 1%.$ to prescri)e the period within which protests "ay )e filed )efore it. onse6#ently, pri*ate respondentIs election protest ha*ing )een filed within the period prescri)ed )y the 1%.$, the latter cannot )e charged with lac: of -#risdiction to hear the case. $he alleged in*alidity of the procla"ation @which had )een pre*io#sly ordered )y the 'M.L. itselfA despite alleged irreg#larities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the ri*al candidates, is a "atter that is also addressed, considering the pre"ises, to the so#nd -#dg"ent of the .lectoral $ri)#nal. B#t then again, so long as the onstit#tion grants the 1%.$ the power to )e the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of Me")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es, any final action ta:en )y the 1%.$ on a "atter within its -#risdiction shall, as a r#le, not )e re*iewed )y this o#rt. $h#s, only where s#ch gra*e a)#se of discretion is clearly shown shall the o#rt interfere with the 1%.$Is -#dg"ent. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the e5ercise of the o#rtIs collecti*e power, since no gra*e a)#se of discretion that wo#ld a"o#nt to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction and wo#ld warrant the iss#ance of the writs prayed for has )een clearly shown. 81.%.('%., the instant 0etition is here)y DI!MI!!.D. 0ri*ate respondentIs o#nterRross 0etition is li:ewise DI!MI!!.D. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT A&&AS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRI&UNAL 1%% SCRA %51. 1988 GANCA-CO, !" FACTS" 'n 'cto)er 1987, the petitioners filed )efore the respondent !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal an election protest against 22 candidates of the LABA3 coalition who were proclai"ed senators9elect. !#)se6#ently, the petitioners filed with the respondent $ri)#nal a Motion for Dis6#alification or Inhi)ition of the !enators9Me")ers thereof fro" the hearing and resol#tion of the afore"entioned case, as respondents therein. $he petitioners #rged the contest to )e decided )y only 4 "e")ers of the $ri)#nal. ISSUE" 8hether or not the !enators9Me")ers of the .lectoral $ri)#nal "ay )e co"pelled to inhi)it the"sel*es fro" hearing the contest. HELD" 3'. It see"s 6#ite clear to #s that in th#s pro*iding for a $ri)#nal to )e staffed )y )oth H#stices of the ! and Me")ers of the !enate, the onstit#tion intended that )oth those =H#dicial> and =Legislati*e> co"ponents co""only share the d#ty and a#thority of deciding all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of !enators. .*ery "e")er of the tri)#nal "ay, as his conscience dictates, refrain fro" participating in the resol#tion of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or )iases wo#ld stand in the way of an o)-ecti*e and i"partial -#dg"ent. 8hat we are "erely saying is that in the light of the onstit#tion, the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal cannot legally f#nction as s#ch, a)sent its entire "e")ership of !enators and that no a"end"ent of its r#les can confer on the 4 H#stice9Me")ers along the power of *alid ad-#dication of a senatorial election protest. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT &ONDOC VS. PINEDA 201 SCRA 792. 1991 GRISOAJUINO, !" FACTS" Marciano 0ineda of LD0 won against his ri*al Dr. ."igdio Bondoc of 30 ca#sing the latter to file a protest in the 1%.$. A decision had )een reached in which Bondoc won o*er 0ineda )y a "argin of 24 *otes. 1ence, the LD0 "e")ers in the tri)#nal insisterd on a re9 appreciation and reco#nt of the )allots cast in so"e precincts res#lting to the increase of BondocKs lead o*er 0ineda to 1?7 *otes. ongress"an a"as#ra coted with the ! H#stices and ongress"an erilles to proclai" Bondoc as the winner of the contest. a"as#ra later on re*ealed to his chief, notified the hair"an of the $ri)#nal to withdraw the no"ination and to rescind the election of a"as#ra to the 1%.$ and see:s to cancel the pro"#lgation of the tri)#nalKs decision in Bondoc *. 0ineda. ISSUE" 8hether or not the 1o#se of %epresentati*es co#ld change its representati*es in the 1%.$ at the re6#est of the do"inant party. HELD" 3'. If the 1%.$ wo#ld reser*e the interest of the party in power, the independence of the .lectoral $ri)#nal, as e")odied in the onstit#tion, will no longer )e protected. $he resol#tion of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es re"o*ing ongress"an a"as#ra fro" the 1%.$ for disloyalty to the LD0, )eca#se he cast his *ote in the fa*or of 30Ks candidate, is a clear i"pair"ent of the constit#tional prerogati*e of the 1%.$ to the sole -#dge of the election contest )etween 0ineda and Bondoc. $o sanction s#ch interference )y the 1o#se of %epresentati*es in the wor: of the 1%.$ wo#ld red#ce the $ri)#nal to a "ere tool for the aggrandi&e"ent of the party in power @LD0A which the 4 H#stices of the ! and the lone 30 "e")er wo#ld )e powerless to stop. A "inority party candidate "ay as well a)andon all hope at the threshold of the tri)#nal. As -#dges, the "e")ers of the $ri)#nal "#st )e nonpartisan. $hey "#st discharge their f#nctions with co"plete detach"ent, i"partiality and independence [ e*en independence fro" the political party to which they )elong. 1ence, =disloyalty to a party> and =)reach of party discipline> are not *alid gro#nds for the e5p#lsion of a "e")er of the $ri)#nal. In e5pelling ongress"an a"as#ra fro" the 1%.$ for ha*ing cast a =conscience *ote> in fa*or of Bondoc, )ased strictly on the res#lt of the e5a"ination and appreciation of the )allots and the reco#nt of the *otes )y the $ri)#nal, the 1o#se of %epresentati*es co""itted a gra*e a)#se of discretion, an in-#stice, and a *iolation of the onstit#tion. Its resol#tion of e5p#lsion against ongress"an a"as#ra is therefore n#ll and *oid. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 118 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CHAVE$ V. COMELEC (211 SCRA 315 519926) G.R. NO. 105323 !UL- 3, 1992 FACTS" 0etitioner (rancisco ha*e& prays in to this o#rt for the iss#ance of a te"porary restraining order en-oining respondent 'M.L. fro" proclai"ing the 2B th highest senatorial candidate. And he also prays that -#dg"ent )e rendered re6#iring the 'M.L. to re9open the )allot )o5es in 8?,4B8 precincts in 14 pro*inces therein en#"erated incl#ding Metro Manila, scan the )allots for =ha*e&> *otes which were in*alidated or declared stray and credit said scanned =ha*e&> *otes in fa*or of petitioner. ISSUE" 8hether or not, in the case at )ar, this o#rt has -#risdiction to resol*e iss#e regarding the instant reg#lar election protestC HELD" 3o. $he petitionerKs proper reco#rse is to file a reg#lar election protest which #nder the onstit#tion and the '"ni)#s .lection ode, e5cl#si*ely pertains to the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal. $h#s, sec.17, Art.<I of the onstit#tion pro*ides that =the !enate and the 1o#se of %epresentati*es shall each ha*e an .lectoral $ri)#nal which shall )e the sole -#dge of all contests relating to their respecti*e Me")ers.> $he word =sole> #nderscores the e5cl#si*ity of the $ri)#nalsK -#risdiction o*er the election contests relating to their respecti*e Me")ers. $his o#rt has no -#risdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal which has e5cl#si*e -#risdiction to act on the co"plaint of petitioner in*ol*ing as it does, contest relating to the election of a "e")er of the !enate. As aforesaid, petitionerKs proper reco#rse is to file a reg#lar election protest )efore the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal after the winning senatorial candidates ha*e )een proclai"ed. $he proper reco#rse is for petitioner to as: not this o#rt )#t the Legislat#re to enact re"edial "eas#res. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT DA$A V. SINGSON 180 SCRA 497, DECEM&ER 21, 1989 CRU$, !" FACTS" 1erein petitioner %a#l A. Da&a was chosen and listed as representati*e of the Li)eral 0arty in the o""ission on Appoint"ents @AA. 'n !epte")er 1+, 1988, the La)an ng De"o:rati:ong 0ilipino @LD0A was reorgani&ed. $wenty fo#r @2BA "e")ers of the Li)eral 0arty resigned and -oined the LD0. Based on this, the 1o#se of %epresentati*e re*ised its representation in the A )y withdrawing the seat occ#pied )y the petitioner and gi*ing this to the LD0 "e")er L#is . !ingson. $he petitioner arg#ed that he cannot )e re"o*ed fro" A )eca#se his election thereto is per"anent. 1e f#rther contended that LD0 is not a d#ly registered political party and has not yet attained political sta)ility )eca#se it was -#st esta)lished recently. ISSUE" 1. 8hether or not the 6#estion raised )y the petitioner is political in nat#re. 2. 8hether or not the LD0 is not entitled to a seat in the o""ission on Appoint"ents )eca#se it does not s#ffice the 6#alification of )eing a political party. HELD" 1. 3o. It is )eca#se what is in*ol*ed in the case at )ar is the legality, not the wisdo" of the act of the 1o#se of %epresentati*e in re"o*ing the petitioner fro" the A. .*en if the 6#estion were political in nat#re, it wo#ld still co"e within the o#rts power of re*iew #nder the e5panded -#risdiction conferred )y Article <III, !ection 1 of the onstit#tion which incl#des the a#thority to deter"ine whether gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to e5cess or lac: of -#risdiction has )een co""itted )y any )ranch or instr#"entality of the go*ern"ent. 2. 3o. In the first place, the o""ission on .lection has already appro*ed the petition of the LD0 for registration as political party. (#rther"ore, the petitionerKs contention that LD0 "#st pro*e its per"anence and "#st e5ist in a longer period of ti"e in not tena)le. It is )eca#se e*en the Li)eral 0arty in 19B+ election is only fo#r @BA "onths old, yet no 6#estion was raised as to its right to )e represented in the o""ission. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT COSETENG VS. MITRA 187 SCRA 377. 1990 FACTS" A)lan was elected as the 12 th "e")er of the o""ission on Appoint"ents on !epte")er 22, 1987. A year later, the LD0 was organi&ed as a political party. $he 1o#se o""ittee, incl#ding the 1o#se representation in the o""ission on Appoint"ents had to )e reorgani&ed )eca#se 178 o#t of 2?2 "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es are affiliated with the LD0. 0etitioner oseteng of LAIBA then wrote a letter to !pea:er Mitra re6#esting that she )e appointed as a "e")er of the o""ission and the 1o#se .lectoral $ri)#nal. 'n Dece")er 1988, the 1o#se of %epresentati*es on "otion of the Ma-ority (loor Leader and o*er the o)-ection of ongress"an Da&a, L0, re*ised the 1o#se Ma-ority "e")ership in the o""ission on Appoint"ents to confor" with the new political align"ents. 'n (e)r#ary 1989, oseteng filed a petition for 6#o warranto and in-#nction praying the o#rt to declare as n#ll and *oid the election of the respondent as "e")ers of the o""ission on Appoint"ents. ISSUE" 8hether or not the election of the respondents as "e")ers of the o""ission on Appoint"ents sho#ld )e en-oined for ha*ing *iolated the constit#tional "andate of proportional representation. HELD" 3'. After deli)erating on the petition and the co""ents of the respondents, we hold that the petition sho#ld )e dis"issed not )eca#se it raises a political 6#estion which does not, )#t )eca#se the re*ision of the 1o#se representation in the o""ission on Appoint"ents is )ased on proportional representation of the political parties therein as pro*ided in !ection 18, Article <I of the 1987 onstit#tion. $he co"position of the 1o#se "e")ership in the o""ission on Appoint"ents was )ased on a proportional representation of the political parties in the 1o#se. $here are 1+? "e")ers of the LD0 in the 1o#se. $hey represent 79M of the 1o#se "e")ership. 88M of 12 "e")ers in the o""ission wo#ld e6#al to 9 "e")ers, which "ay )e ro#nded off to 1? "e")ers fro" the LD0. .*en if LAIBA were to )e considered as an opposition party, its lone "e")er represents only BM of less than 1M of the 1o#se "e")ership. 1ence she is not entitled to one of the 12 1o#se seats in the o""ission on Appoint"ents. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT GUINGONA VS. GON$ALES 214 SCRA 789. 1992 FACTS" As a res#lt of the national elections held last May 1992, the !enate is co"posed of the following "e")ers representing the political affiliation2 LD0 [ 17 !enators, 30 97 senators, LALA!93JD [ 4 senators, L090D09LABA3 [ 1 senator. $he res#lting co"position of the !enate )ased on the r#le of proportional representation of each party is as follows. 0'LI$IAL 0A%$D M.MB.%!1I0 0%'0'%$I'3 M.MB.%!1I0 LD0 17 7.7 "e")ers 30 7 2.7 "e")ers LALA! 4 1.7 "e")ers L090D09LABA3 1 .7 "e")ers 'n !epte")er 24, 1992, !enator ,#ingona filed a petition to prohi)it respondents Al)erto %o"#lo and 8ig)erto $anada fro" sitting and ass#"ing the position of "e")ers of the o""ission on Appoint"ents and to prohi)it !enator 3eptali ,on&ales fro" allowing respondents to sit as "e")ers thereof on the gro#nd that the proposed co"pro"ise of !enator $olentino was *iolati*e of the r#le of proportional representation as en#nciated in !ec. 18, Art. <I of the 1987 onstit#tion. ISSUE" 8hether or not the !enate acted with or in e5cess of -#risdiction when it designated !enator %o"#lo as the 8 th "e")er of the A #pon no"ination )y the LD0 and respondent !enator $anada as L0 no"inee e*en if LD0 and L0 are entitled only to half a "e")er. HELD" $he pro)le" is what to do with the fraction of .7 or ` to which each of the parties is entitled. $he LD0 "a-ority in the !enate con*erted fractional half "e")ership into a whole "e")ership of one senator )y adding one9half to )e a)le to elect !enator %o"#lo as the 8 th "e")er. In so doing, the election of !enator %o"#lo ga*e "ore representation to the LD0 and red#ced the representation of one political party [ either the LALA!93JD or the 30. $his is clearly a *iolation of !ection 18 )eca#se it is no longer in co"pliance with the proportional representation of the political parties. $his pro*ision of !ection 18 on proportional representation is "andatory in character and does not lea*e any discretion to the "a-ority party in the !enate to diso)ey the r#le on proportional representation. 'therwise, the party with a "a-ority representation in the !enate or 1o#se of %epresentati*es can )e sheen force of "e")ers i"pose its will on the hapless "inority. $he ! laid down the following g#idelines accordingly2 1. In the !enate, a political party or coalition "#st ha*e at least 2 d#ly elected senators for e*ery seat in the !enate. 2. 8here there are "ore than 2 political parties represent in the !enate, a political party or coalition with a single senator in the !enate cannot constit#tionally clai" a seat in the co""ission. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 119 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 (#rther"ore, the ! said it is not "andatory to elect 12 senators and 12 "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es to the o""ission on Appoint"ents. 8hat the onstit#tion re6#ires is that there )e at least a "a-ority of the entire "e")ership. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT &ENG$ON VS. SENATE &LUE RI&&ON COMMITTEE 203 SCRA 7%7, 1991 FACTS" $he 0,, filed with the !andigan)ayan a ci*il case against Lo:oy %o"#alde&, et al., in connection with ill9gotten wealth. D#ring the pendency of the case, there were r#"ors that the properties in*ol*e in the case were already )eing disposed of )y %o"#alde&. !enator .nrile in his pri*ilege speech )efore the !enate called the attention of the !enate regarding the "atter. 'n "otion of !enator Mecado, the "atter was referred to the o""ittee on Aco#nta)ility of 0#)lic 'fficers @Bl#e %i))on o""itteeA. $he co""ittee s#)poenaed petitioner who was also one of the defendants in said case. 0etitioner declined to testify on the gro#nd that his testi"ony "ight #nd#ly pre-#dice the defendants. $he co""ittee contin#ed in its in6#iry, th#s the present petition for prohi)ition to restrain respondent fro" in*estigating. $he co""ittee co""ented that the o#rt cannot properly in6#ire into the "oti*es of the law"a:ers in cond#cting legislati*e in*estigations in aid of legislation #nder this doctrine of separation of power. 0etitioners contend that the !enate Bl#e %i))on o""itteeIs in6#iry has no *alid legislati*e p#rpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not the o#rt has -#risdiction to in6#ire into the "oti*es of the law"a:ers in cond#cting legislati*e in*estigations in aid of legislation #nder the doctrine of separation of power. 2. 8hether or not s#ch in6#iry is within the power of the ongress to cond#ct in*estigation. HELD" 1. D.!, the o#rt has -#risdiction o*er the present contro*ersy for the p#rpose of deter"ining the scope and e5tent of the power of the !enate Bl#e %i))on o""ittee to cond#ct in6#iries into pri*ate affairs in p#rported aid of legislation. $he separation of powers is a f#nda"ental principle in o#r syste" of go*ern"ent. .ach depart"ent of the go*ern"ent has e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of "atters within its -#risdiction, and is s#pre"e within its own sphere. B#t it does not follow fro" the fact that the three powers are to )e :ept separate and distinct that the onstit#tion intended the" to )e a)sol#tely #nrestrained and independent of each other. $he onstit#tion has pro*ided for an ela)orate syste" of chec:s and )alances to sec#re coordination in the wor:ings of the *ario#s depart"ents of the go*ern"ent. $he o*erlapping and interlacing of f#nctions and d#ties )etween the se*eral depart"ents, howe*er, so"eti"es "a:es it hard to say -#st where the one lea*es off and the other )egins. In cases of conflict, the -#dicial depart"ent is the only constit#tional organ which can )e called #pon to deter"ine the proper allocation of powers )etween the se*eral depart"ents and a"ong the integral or constit#ent #nits thereof. 8hen the -#diciary "ediates to allocate constit#tional )o#ndariesG it does not assert any s#periority o*er the other depart"entsG it does not in reality n#llify or in*alidate an act of the legislat#re, )#t only asserts the sole"n and sacred o)ligation assigned to it )y the onstit#tion to deter"ine conflicting clai"s of a#thority #nder the onstit#tion and to esta)lish for the parties in an act#al contro*ersy the rights which that instr#"ent sec#res and g#arantees to the". 2. 3', the 1987 onstit#tion e5pressly recogni&es the power of )oth ho#ses of ongress to cond#ct in6#iries in aid of legislationG )#t in the present case, no legislation was apparently )eing conte"plated in connection with the said in*estigation. $he conte"plated in6#iry )y respondent o""ittee is not really /in aid of legislation/ )eca#se it is not related to a p#rpose within the -#risdiction of ongress, since the ai" of the in*estigation is to find o#t whether or not the relati*es of the 0resident or Mr. %icardo Lopa had *iolated the /Anti9,raft and orr#pt 0ractices Act/, a "atter that appears "ore within the pro*ince of the co#rts rather than of the legislat#re. $he o#rt r#led that petitioners "ay not )e co"pelled )y the respondent o""ittee to appear, testify and prod#ce e*idence )efore it, it is only )eca#se ! hold that the 6#estioned in6#iry is not in aid of legislation and, if p#rs#ed, wo#ld )e *iolati*e of the principle of separation of powers )etween the legislati*e and the -#dicial depart"ents of go*ern"ent, ordained )y the onstit#tion. DISSENTING OPINION OF !USTICE CRU$" $he in6#iry deals with alleged "anip#lations of p#)lic f#nds and illicit ac6#isitions of properties now )eing clai"ed )y the 0,, for the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines. $he p#rpose of the o""ittee is to ascertain if and how s#ch ano"alies ha*e )een co""itted. It is settled that the legislat#re has a right to in*estigate the disposition of the p#)lic f#nds it has appropriatedG indeed, /an in6#iry into the e5pendit#re of all p#)lic "oney is an indispensa)le d#ty of the legislat#re./ Moreo*er, an in*estigation of a possi)le *iolation of a law "ay )e #sef#l in the drafting of a"endatory legislation to correct or strengthen that law. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARNAULT VS. NA$ARENO 87 PHIL. 29, 1950 FACTS" 'n (e)r#ary 27, 197?, the !enate adopted a resol#tion creating a special co""ittee to in*estigate on the p#rchase )y the go*ern"ent of the B#ena*ista and $a")o)ong .states owned )y .rnest B#rt as represented )y Hean Arna#lt. $he co""ittee so#ght to deter"ine who were responsi)le for and who )enefited fro" the transaction at the e5pense of the go*ern"ent. $he special co""ittee called and e5a"ined a"ong other witness, Hean Arna#lt. 1owe*er, for the latterKs ref#sal to answer so"e of the 6#estions propo#nded on hi", the na"e of the person to who" he ga*e the "oney as well as answer to other pertinent 6#estions in connection therewith, the !enate resol*ed to i"prison hi" #ntil s#ch ti"e as he decided to answer rele*ant 6#estions p#t to hi" in connection with the in*estigation of a go*ern"ent transaction. ISSUE" 8hether or not the !enate has a#thority to p#nish petitioner for conte"pt. HELD" $he !#pre"e o#rt said yes considering that he 6#estions were pertinent to the p#rs#ance of the !enate %esol#tion. $he !#pre"e o#rt also held that the offender co#ld )e i"prisoned indefinitely )y the !tate, it )eing a contin#ing )ody, pro*ided that the p#nish"ent did not )eco"e so long as to *iolate d#e process. SECTION 24 R SHALL ORIGINATE E3CLUSIVEL- IN HOR TOLENTINO VS. SECRETAR- OF FINANCE 235 SCRA %30, 1994 FACTS" $he *al#e9added ta5 @<A$A is le*ied on the sale, )arter or e5change of goods and properties as well as on the sale or e5change of ser*ices. It is e6#i*alent to 1?M of the gross selling price or gross *al#e in "oney of goods or properties sold, )artered or e5changed or of the gross receipts fro" the sale or e5change of ser*ices. %ep#)lic Act 3o. 771+ see:s to widen the ta5 )ase of the e5isting <A$ syste" and enhance its ad"inistration )y a"ending the 3ational Internal %e*en#e ode. It was challenged for alleged constit#tional infir"ities @defectsA, a"ong others2 Law did not originate e5cl#si*ely in the 1o#se of %epresentati*e as re6#ired )y !ection 2B, Article <I [ they contended that to )e considered as ha*ing originated in the 1'%, it sho#ld retain the essence of the 1o#se Bill. ISSUE" 8hether or not there are constit#tional defects in %A 771+, since it did not originate e5cl#si*ely in the 1o#se of %epresentati*e as re6#ired )y !ec. 2B, Article <I. HELD" 3o. $he !#pre"e o#rt held that the !enate is e"powered )y the onstit#tion to conc#r with a"end"ents and propose a"end"ents, e*en s#)stit#te the entire )ill as a whole. A )ill originating in the 1'% "ay #ndergo s#ch e5tensi*e changes in the !enate that the res#lt "ay)e rewriting of the wholeG As a res#lt of the !enate action, a distinct )ill "ay )e prod#ced A3D to insist that a re*en#e stat#te "#st s#)stantially )e the sa"e as the 1o#se )ill wo#ld )e to deny the !enateKs power not only to =conc#r with a"end"ents> )#t also to =propose a"end"ents.> ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ALVARE$, ET AL. VS. GUINGONA, ET AL. 252 SCRA %95, 199% FACTS" Law con*erting "#nicipality of !antiago, Isa)ela into a city is )eing assailed that the Bill did not originate e5cl#si*ely fro" 1'% as "andated )y !ection 2B, Article <I of the 1987 onstit#tion since it had a co#nterpart in the !enate. ISSUE" 8hether or not, considering that the !enate passed !B 3o. 12B4, its own *ersion of 1B 3o. 8817, %ep#)lic Act 3o. 772? can )e said to ha*e originated in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. HELD" A )ill of local application, s#ch as one as:ing for the con*ersion of a "#nicipality into a city, is dee"ed to ha*e originated fro" the 1o#se pro*ided that the )ill of the 1o#se was filed prior to the filing of the )ill in the !enate e*en if, in the end, the !enate appro*ed its own *ersion. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 120 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he filing in the !enate of a s#)stit#te )ill in anticipation of its receipt of the )ill fro" the 1o#se, does not contra*ene the constit#tional re6#ire"ent that a )ill of local application sho#ld originate in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es, for as long as the !enate does not act there#pon #ntil it recei*es the 1o#se )ill. SECTION 25 R APPROPRIATIONS GARCIA VS. MATA %5 SCRA 517, 1975 FACTS" 0etitioner was a reser*e officer on acti*e d#ty with the A(0 #ntil his re*ersion to inacti*e stat#s p#rs#ant to the pro*isions of %A 3o. 2442. 0etitioner filed a co"plaint for "anda"#s and reco*ery of a s#" of "oney, to co"pel the for"er to reinstate hi" in the acti*e co""issioned ser*ice of the A(0, to read-#st his ran:, and to pay all the e"ol#"ents and allowances d#e to hi" fro" the ti"e of his re*ersion to inacti*e stat#s. 0etitioner anchored his clai" to reinstate"ent at paragraph 11 of the !pecial 0ro*isions for the A(0 in %A 1+?? which was the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 197+977 as reads2 $1A$ %.!.%<. '((I.%! 8I$1 A$ L.A!$ 1? D.A%! '( AJMJLA$.D 'MMI!!I'3.D !.%<I. 81' A%. !$ILL '3 A$I<. DJ$D A$ $1. $IM. '( $1. A00%'<AL '( $1I! A$ !1ALL 3'$ B. %.<.%$.D $' I3A$I<. !$A$J! .;.0$ ('% AJ!. A($.% 0%'0.% 'J%$9MA%$IAL 0%'..DI3,! '% J0'3 $1.I% %.VJ.!$. %espondent, H#dge Mata, declared paragraph 11 of the !pecial 0ro*isions for the A(0 in %A 3o. 1+?? which was the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 197+977 #nconstit#tional and therefore in*alid and inoperati*e. 1ence, this petition for certiorari to re*iew the decision of the (I. ISSUE" Is the pro*ision *alidC HELD" $he ! held that the said pro*ision #sed )y the petitioner as a )asis was a %ID.% )eca#se the onstit#tion pro*ides that no pro*ision or enact"ent shall )e e")raced in the general appropriations )ill J3L.!! it relates specifically to so"e partic#lar appropriation therein @Art. <I, !ection 27@2AA. %A 1+?? appropriated "oney for the operation of the ,o*ern"ent for the fiscal year 197+91977, the said paragraph 11 refers to the f#nda"ental go*ern"ental policy "atters of the calling to acti*e d#ty and the re*ersion to inacti*e stat#s of reser*e officers in the A(0. It clearly shows that the paragraph in 6#estion does not relate to the appropriation. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT DEMETRIA VS. AL&A 148 SCRA 208, 1987 FACTS" 0aragraph 1 of !ection BB of 0D 3o. 1177 states that the 0resident shall ha*e the a#thority to transfer any f#nd, appropriated for the different depart"ents, )#rea#s, offices and agencies of the .5ec#ti*e depart"ent, which are incl#ded in the ,eneral Appropriations Act, to any progra", pro-ect or acti*ity of any depart"ent, )#rea# or office in the ,eneral Appropriations Act or appro*ed after its enact"ent. ISSUE" Is the pro*ision *alidC HELD" 3o. $he co#rt said that s#ch was #nconstit#tional as it e"powers the 0resident to indiscri"inately transfer f#nds fro" one depart"ent to any progra", pro-ect, or acti*ity of any depart"ents witho#t regard as to whether or not the f#nds to )e transferred are act#ally sa*ings in the ite" fro" which the sa"e are to )e ta:en. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIJUE$ 235 SCRA 50%. 1994 JUIASON, !." FACTS" $he ,eneral Appropriation Bill of 199B was passed and appro*ed )y )oth 1o#ses of ongress. It presented the )ill to the president for the e5ercise of his *eto power. 'ne of the special pro*isions *etoed )y the 0resident is with respect to the realign"ent of operating e5penses. 8hereas each "e")er of ongress is allotted for his own operating e5pendit#res, a proportionate share of the appropriation for the ho#se which he )elongs. If he does not spend for one ite" of e5pense, the 6#estioned pro*ision allows hi" to transfer his allocation in said ite" of e5pense. 0etitioners assail the special pro*ision allowing a "e")er of ongress to realign his allocations for operational e5penses to any other e5pense categorically clai"ing that this practice is prohi)ited )y !ection 27 @7A, Article <I of the onstit#tion. $hey arg#e that the !enate 0resident and !pea:er of the 1o#se, not the indi*id#al "e")er of ongress, are the ones a#thori&ed to realign the sa*ings as appropriated. Another special pro*ision *etoed )y the 0resident is on the appropriation for de)t ser*ice. It pro*ides =Jse of f#nds. $he appropriation a#thori&ed therein shall )e #sed for pay"ent of principal and interest of foregoing and do"estic inde)tednessG pro*ided, that any pay"ent in e5cess of the a"o#nt therein appropriated shall )e s#)-ect to the appro*al of the 0resident with the conc#rrence of the ongress of the 0hilippinesG pro*ided f#rther, that in no case shall this f#nd )e #sed to pay for the lia)ilities of the entral Ban: of Li6#idators.> 0etitioners clai" that the 0resident cannot *eto the special pro*ision on the appropriations for de)t ser*ice witho#t *etoing the entire a"o#nt of 08+B for said p#rpose. In the appropriation for the A(0 0ension and ,rat#ity (#nd, the 0resident *etoed the new pro*ision a#thori&ing the hief of !taff to #se sa*ings in the A(0 to a#g"ent pension and grat#ity f#nds. According to the 0resident, the grant retire"ent and separation )enefits sho#ld )e co*ered )y direct appropriation specially appro*ed for the p#rpose p#rs#ant to !ection 29 @1A of Article <I of the onstit#tion. Moreo*er, he stated that the a#thority to #se sa*ings is lodged in the officials en#"erated in !ection 27 of Article <I of the onstit#tion. 'n the contrary, petitioners clai" that said pro*ision is a condition or li"itation, which is intertwined with the ite" of appropriation that it co#ld not )e separated therefro". ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitionerKs contentions are tena)le. HELD" 0etitionerKs contentions are witho#t "erit. Jnder the special pro*isions applica)le to the ongress of the 0hilippines, the "e")ers of the ongress only deter"ine the necessity of the realign"ent of the sa*ings in the allot"ent for their operating e5penses. $hey are in the )est position to do so )eca#se they are the one who :now whether there are sa*ings a*aila)le in so"e ite"s and whether there are deficiencies in other ite"s of their operating e5penses that need a#g"entation. 1owe*er, it is the !enate 0resident and the !pea:er of the 1o#se as the case "ay )e who shall appro*e the realign"ent. Before gi*ing their sta"p of appro*al, those two officials will ha*e to see to it that2 @1A the f#nds to )e aligned or transferred are act#ally sa*ings in the ite"s of e5pendit#res fro" which the sa"e are to )e ta:en and to the transfer on realign"ent is for the p#rpose of a#g"enting the ite"s of e5pendit#re to which said transfer or realign"ent is to )e "ade. It is readily apparent that the special pro*ision applica)le to the appropriation for de)t ser*ice in so far as it refers to f#nds in e5cess of the appropriation for de)t ser*ice in so far as it refers to f#nds in e5cess of the a"o#nt appropriated in the )ill, is an =inappropriate pro*ision> referring to the f#nds other than 0+8B appropriated in the ,AAA of 199B. $he *eto power while e5ercised )y the 0resident is act#ally a part of the legislati*e process. 1ence, fo#nd in Article <I rather than Article <II. As the constit#tion is e5plicit that the pro*ision with the ongress can incl#de in an appropriate to which it relates, =it follows that any pro*ision which does not relate to any partic#lar ite" or which it e5tends in its operation )eyond an ite" of appropriation is considered an inappropriate pro*ision which )e *etoed separately fro" an ite". Also to )e incl#ded in the category of inappropriate pro*ision are #nconstit#tional pro*isions and pro*isions which are intended to a"end other laws )eca#se clearly those :inds of laws ha*e no place in an appropriation )ill. $he 0resident *etoed the entire paragraph, one of the special pro*ision of the ite" on de)t ser*ices incl#ding the pro*isos that the appropriation a#thori&ed in said ite" shall )e #sed for the pay"ent of one principal and interest of foreign and do"estic inde)tedness and that in no case shall this f#nd )e #sed to pay for the lia)ilities of the entral Ban: Board of Li6#idators. $hese pro*isos are ger"ane to and ha*e direct connection with the ite" of de)t ser*ice. Inherent in the power of the appropriation is the power to specify how the "oney shall )e spent. !aid pro*isos are appropriate pro*isions hence, cannot )e *etoed separately. $he ! is s#staining the *eto of the !pecial 0ro*ision of the ite" on de)t ser*ice can only )e with respect to the pro*iso therein re6#iring that any pay"ent in e5cess of the a"o#nt therein, appropriated shall )e the s#)-ect to the appro*al of the 0resident of the 0hilippines with the conc#rrence of the ongress of the 0hilippines. $he special pro*ision which allows the hief of !taff to #se sa*ings to a#g"ent the pension f#nd for the A(0 )eing "anaged )y the A(0 %etire"ent and !eparation Benefits !yste" is *iolati*e of !ection 27 and !ection 29 of Article <I of the onstit#tion. SECTION 2% R PASSING OF A &ILL PHILCONSA VS. GIMENE$ 15 SCRA 489, 19%5 FACTS" $he !#pre"e o#rt was called #pon in to decide the gra*e and f#nda"ental pro)le" of the constit#tionality of %A 484+ =insofar as the sa"e allows retire"ent grat#ity and co""#tation of *acation and sic: lea*e to !enators and %epresentati*es and to the electi*e officials of )oth ho#ses @of ongressA. $he constit#tionality of the law is assailed on the gro#nd that the pro*ision for the retire"ent of the "e")ers and certain officers of ongress is not e5pressed in the title of the )ill, in *iolation of the onstit#tion. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 121 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ISSUE" 8R3 %A 484+ *iolates the onstit#tional pro*ision that e*ery )ill passed )y the ongress shall e")race only one s#)-ect which shall )e e5pressed in the title thereof. HELD" D.!. Jnder %A 484+, a"ending A 18+, as a"ended )y %A 3os. ++? and 4?9+, the retire"ent )enefits are granted to "e")ers of the ,!I! who ha*e rendered at least twenty years of ser*ice regardless of age. $his pro*ision is related and ger"ane to the s#)-ect of A 18+. 'n the other hand, the s#cceeding paragraph of %A 484+ refers to "e")ers of ongress and to electi*e officers thereof who are not "e")ers of the ,!I!. $o pro*ide retire"ent )enefits, therefore, for these officials wo#ld relate to s#)-ect "atter, not ger"ane to A 18+. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATOR- &OARD 151 SCRA 204, 1987 FACTS" 0D 3' 1987 is entitled =An Act reating the <ideogra" %eg#latory Board.> !ection 1? thereof i"poses a 4?M ta5 on gross receipts on *ideo transactions. $he petitioner arg#ed that s#ch ta5 i"pose is a %ID.% and the sa"e is not ger"ane to the s#)-ect "atter thereof. ISSUE" Is section 1? a %ID.%C HELD" 3'. $he re6#ire"ent that e*ery )ill "#st only ha*e one s#)-ect e5pressed in the title is satisfied if the title is co"prehensi*e eno#gh to incl#de s#)-ects related to the general p#rpose which the stat#te see:s to achie*e. !#ch is the case here. $a5ation is s#fficiently related to the reg#lation of the *ideo ind#stry. $he pro*ision is allied and ger"ane to, and is reasona)ly necessary for the acco"plish"ent of, the general o)-ect of the D.%.., which is the reg#lation of the *ideo ind#stry thro#gh the <ideogra" %eg#latory Board as e5pressed in its title. $he !#pre"e o#rt th#s pro*ided the following standards whether or not a pro*ision is e")raced in the title2 $itle )e co"prehensi*e eno#gh to incl#de the general p#rpose which a stat#te see:s to achie*e. If all the parts of the stat#te are related and ger"ane to the s#)-ect "atter e5pressed in the title. !o long as they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general s#)-ect to the title. %egardless of how di*erse it is so long as it "ay)e considered in f#rtherance of s#ch s#)-ect )y pro*iding for the "ethod and "eans of carrying o#t the general o)-ect. !ho#ld not )e constr#ed as to cripple legislati*e power ,i*en a 0%A$IAL rather than a technical constr#ction ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT PHILIPPINE !UDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO 227 SCRA 703, 1993 FACTS" $he "ain target of this petition is !ection 47 of %.A. 3o. 747B as i"ple"ented )y the 0hilippine 0ostal orporation thro#gh its irc#lar 3o. 9228. $hese "eas#res withdraw the fran:ing pri*ilege fro" the !#pre"e o#rt, the o#rt of Appeals, the %egional $rial o#rts, the Metropolitan $rial o#rts, the M#nicipal $rial o#rts, and the Land %egistration o""ission and its %egister of Deeds, along with certain other go*ern"ent offices. $he petitioners are "e")ers of the lower co#rts who feel that their official f#nctions as -#dges will )e pre-#diced )y the a)o*e9 na"ed "eas#res. $he 3ational Land %egistration A#thority has ta:en co""on ca#se with the" insofar as its own acti*ities, s#ch as the sending of re6#isite notices in registration cases, affect -#dicial proceedings. 'n its "otion, it has )een allowed to inter*ene. $he petition assails the constit#tionality of %.A. 3o. 747B on the gro#nd that its title e")races "ore than one s#)-ect and does not e5press its p#rposes. ISSUE" 8hether or not %A 747B *iolates the onstit#tion for it was alleged to e")races "ore than one s#)-ect and does not e5press its p#rpose. HELD" 3'. $he fran:ing pri*ilege fro" so"e agencies is ger"ane to the acco"plish"ent of the principal o)-ecti*e of %.A. 3o. 747B, which is the creation of a "ore efficient and effecti*e postal ser*ice syste". o#rt r#led that, )y *irt#e of its nat#re as a repealing cla#se, !ection 47 did not ha*e to )e e5pressly incl#ded in the title of the said law. $he title of the )ill is not re6#ired to )e an inde5 to the )ody of the act, or to )e as co"prehensi*e as to co*er e*ery single detail of the "eas#re. It has )een held that if the title fairly indicates the general s#)-ect, and reasona)ly co*ers all the pro*isions of the act, and is not calc#lated to "islead the legislat#re or the people, there is s#fficient co"pliance with the constit#tional re6#ire"ent. $o re6#ire e*ery end and "eans necessary for the acco"plish"ent of the general o)-ecti*es of the stat#te to )e e5pressed in its title wo#ld not only )e #nreasona)le )#t wo#ld act#ally render legislation i"possi)le. SECTION 27 R METHODS &- =HICH A &ILL MA- &ECOME A LA= TOLENTINO VS. SECRETAR- OF FINANCE 235 SCRA %30, 1994 FACTS" $he *al#e9added ta5 @<A$A is le*ied on the sale, )arter or e5change of goods and properties as well as on the sale or e5change of ser*ices. It is e6#i*alent to 1?M of the gross selling price or gross *al#e in "oney of goods or properties sold, )artered or e5changed or of the gross receipts fro" the sale or e5change of ser*ices. %ep#)lic Act 3o. 771+ see:s to widen the ta5 )ase of the e5isting <A$ syste" and enhance its ad"inistration )y a"ending the 3ational Internal %e*en#e ode. It was challenged for alleged constit#tional infir"ities @defectsA, a"ong others2 It is clai"ed that the conference co""ittee incl#ded pro*isions not fo#nd in either the 1o#se Bill or the !enate Bill [ that these pro*isions were stealthily inserted )y the conference co""ittee. ISSUE" 8hether or not there are constit#tional defects in %A 771+, since the conference co""ittee incl#ded pro*isions not fo#nd in either the 1o#se Bill or the !enate Bill. HELD" A third *ersion of the )ill "ay res#lt fro" the conference co""ittee, which is considered "ay res#lt fro" the conference co""ittee, which is considered an =a"end"ent in the nat#re of a s#)stit#te> the only re6#ire"ent )eing that the third *ersion )e ger"ane to the s#)-ect of the 1o#se and !enate )ills. As to the possi)ility of an entirely new )ill e"ergency o#t of a onference o""ittee, it has )een e5plained2 Jnder congressional r#les of proced#re, conference co""ittees are not e5pected to "a:e any "aterial change in the "eas#re at iss#e, either )y deleting pro*isions to which )oth ho#ses ha*e already agreed or )y inserting new pro*isions. B#t this is a diffic#lt pro*ision to enforce. 3ote the pro)le" when one ho#se a"ends a proposal originating in either ho#se )y stri:ing o#t e*erything following the enacting cla#se and s#)stit#ting pro*isions which "a:e it an entirely new )ill. $he *ersions are now altogether different, per"itting a conference co""ittee to draft essentially a new )ill. $he res#lt is a third *ersion, which is considered an /a"end"ent in the nat#re of a s#)stit#te,/ the only re6#ire"ent for which )eing that the third *ersion )e ger"ane to the s#)-ect of the 1o#se and !enate )ills. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO (237 SCRA 324 519946) FACTS" 0etitioner contends that %ep#)lic Act 3o. 7B9+ is a "isno"er or, at least deficient f?r )eing "erely entitled /!i"plified 3et Inco"e $a5ation !che"e (or !elf ."ployed and 0rofessionals .ngaged in the practice of their 0rofession/. It is the petitionerIs *iew that the said law sho#ld )e considered as ha*ing now adopted a gross inco"e sche"e, instead of ha*ing still ded#ctions fro" gross inco"e of single proprietorships and professionals in the co"p#tation of their, ta5a)le net inco"e, petitioner arg#ed that this *iolated the re6#ire"ent for #nifor"ity in ta5ation and d#e process )eca#se single proprietorship and professional were ta5ed differently fro" corporations and partnerships. ISSUE" 8'3 %A 3o. 7B9+ is in *iolation of Art. <I !ec. 2+ and 28 of the 1987 onstit#tion. HELD" 'n the )asis of the lang#age of the said 6#estioned law, it wo#ld )e diffic#lt to accept the petitionerIs *iew that the a"endatory sho#ld )e considered as now ha*ing adopted a gross inco"e, instead of as ha*ing still retained the net inco"e, ta5ation sche"e. $he allowance of ded#cti)le ite"s "ay ha*e )een significantly red#ced )y the 6#estioned law in co"parison with that which has pre*ailed prior to the a"end"ent, li"iting, howe*er, allowa)le ded#ctions fro" gross inco"e is neither discordant with nor opposed to, the net inco"e ta5 concept. Art. <I !ec. 2+ @IA of the onstit#tion has )een en*isioned so as @aA to pre*ent logrolling legislation intended to #nite the "e")ers of the legislat#re who fa*or anyone of the #nrelated s#)-ects in s#pport of the whole actG @)A to a*oid s#rprise or e*en fra#d #pon the legislat#re and @cA to fairly apprise the people, thro#gh s#ch p#)lications of its proceedings are as #s#ally "ade, of the s#)-ects of legislations. $he a)o*e o)-ecti*e of the f#nda"ental law appears to ha*e s#fficiently "et. Anything else wo#ld )e to re6#ire a *irt#al co"pendi#" of the law which co#ld ha*e )een the intend"ent of the constit#tional "andate. $he contention of the petitioner that %A 3o. 7B9+ desecrates the constit#tional re6#ire"ent that ta5ation shall )e #nifor" and e6#ita)le is of no "erit. $he contention clearly forgets that s#ch a syste" of ta5ation has long )een the pre*ailing r#le e*en prior to %A 7B9+. Jnifor"ity of $a5ation "erely re6#ires that all s#)-ects or San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 122 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 o)-ects of ta5ation si"ilarly sit#ated are to )e treated )oth in pri*ileges and lia)ilities. Jnifor" does nor forefend classification as long as 1.A $he standards that are #sed therefore are s#)stantial and not ar)itrary. 2.A $he categori&ation is ger"ane to achie*e legislati*e p#rpose. 4.A $he law applies all things )eing e6#al, to )oth present and f#t#re conditions, and B.A $he classification applies e6#ally well to all those )elonging to the sa"e class. !hifting the inco"e ta5ation of indi*id#als to the sched#les syste", this "a:es the inco"e ta5 depend on the :ind of ta5a)le inco"e, and "aintaining for corporations the glo)al treat"ent which treats in co""on all :inds of ta5a)le inco"e of the ta5payer. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TO&IAS VS. A&ALOS (G.R. NO. L114783 DECEM&ER 8, 1994) &IDIN, !.? FACTS" 0rior to the enact"ent of the assailed stat#te %ep#)lic Act 3o. 7+77, the "#nicipalities of Mandal#yong and !an H#an )elonged to only one legislati*e district. 1on. %onaldo Xa"ora, the inc#")ent congressional representati*e of this legislati*e district, sponsored the )ill which e*ent#ally )eca"e %.A. 3o. 7+77. 0#rs#ant to the Local ,o*ern"ent ode of 1991, a ple)iscite was held to as:ed the people whether they appro*ed of the con*ersion of the M#nicipality of Mandal#yong into a highly #r)ani&ed city as pro*ided in the stat#te. $he t#rno#t at the ple)iscite was only 1B.B1M of the *oting pop#lation where 18,+21 *oted /yes/ whereas 7,911 *oted /no./ By *irt#e of these res#lts, %.A. 3o. 7+77 was dee"ed ratified and in effect. 0etitioners now co"e )efore this o#rt, contending that %.A. 3o. 7+77, specifically Article <III, !ection B9 thereof, is #nconstit#tional for )eing *iolati*e of three specific pro*isions of the onstit#tion. (irst, that it contra*enes the /one s#)-ect9one )ill/ r#le, as en#nciated in Article <I, !ection 2+@1A of the onstit#tion, to wit2 !ec. 2+@1A. .*ery )ill passed )y the ongress shall e")race only one s#)-ect which shall )e e5pressed in the title thereof. 0etitioners allege that the incl#sion of the assailed !ection B9 in the s#)-ect law res#lted in the latter e")racing two principal s#)-ects, na"ely2 @1A the con*ersion of Mandal#yong into a highly #r)ani&ed cityG and @2A the di*ision of the congressional district of !an H#anRMandal#yong into two separate districts. 0etitionersI second and third o)-ections in*ol*e Article <I, !ections 7@1A and @BA of the onstit#tion. 0etitioners arg#e that the di*ision of !an H#an and Mandal#yong into separate congressional districts #nder !ection B9 of the assailed law has res#lted in an increase in the co"position of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es )eyond that pro*ided in Article <I, !ec. 7@1A of the onstit#tion. (#rther"ore, petitioners contend that said di*ision was not "ade p#rs#ant to any cens#s showing that the s#)-ect "#nicipalities ha*e attained the "ini"#" pop#lation re6#ire"ents. And finally, petitioners assert that !ection B9 has the effect of pree"pting the right of ongress to reapportion legislati*e districts p#rs#ant to !ec. 7@BA as aforecited. ISSUE" 8hether or not %.A. 3o. 7+77 is #nconstit#tional. HELD" 3o.ontrary to petitionersI assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandal#yong is not a s#)-ect separate and distinct fro" the s#)-ect of its con*ersion into a highly #r)ani&ed city )#t is a nat#ral and logical conse6#ence of its con*ersion into a highly #r)ani&ed city. <erily, the title of %.A. 3o. 7+77, /An Act on*erting the M#nicipality of Mandal#yong Into a 1ighly Jr)ani&ed ity of Mandal#yong/ necessarily incl#des and conte"plates the s#)-ect treated #nder !ection B9 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandal#yong. Moreo*er, a li)eral constr#ction of the /one title9one s#)-ect/ r#le has )een in*aria)ly adopted )y this co#rt so as not to cripple or i"pede legislation. $h#s, in !#"#long *. o"elec @74 0hil. 288 O19B1PA, we r#led that the constit#tional re6#ire"ent as now e5pressed in Article <I, !ection 2+@1A /sho#ld )e gi*en a practical rather than a technical constr#ction. It sho#ld )e s#fficient co"pliance with s#ch re6#ire"ent if the title e5presses the general s#)-ect and all the pro*isions are ger"ane to that general s#)-ect./ $he li)eral constr#ction of the /one title9one s#)-ect/ r#le had )een f#rther el#cidated in Lidasan *. o"elec @21 !%A B9+ O19+7PA, to wit2 ='f co#rse, the onstit#tion does not re6#ire ongress to e"ploy in the title of an enact"ent, lang#age of s#ch precision as to "irror, f#lly inde5 or catalog#e all the contents and the "in#te details therein. It s#ffices if the title sho#ld ser*e the p#rpose of the constit#tional de"and that it infor" the legislators, the persons interested in the s#)-ect of the )ill and the p#)lic, of the nat#re, scope and conse6#ences of the proposed law and its operation/ @e"phasis s#ppliedA. 0roceeding now to the other constit#tional iss#es, alleging that there is no "ention in the assailed law of any cens#s to show that Mandal#yong and !an H#an had each attained the "ini"#" re6#ire"ent of 27?,??? inha)itants to -#stify their separation into two legislati*e districts, the sa"e does not s#ffice to stri:e down the *alidity of %.A. 3o. 7+77. $he said Act en-oys the pres#"ption of ha*ing passed thro#gh the reg#lar congressional processes, incl#ding d#e consideration )y the "e")ers of ongress of the "ini"#" re6#ire"ents for the esta)lish"ent of separate legislati*e districts. At any rate, it is not re6#ired that all laws e"anating fro" the legislat#re "#st contain all rele*ant data considered )y ongress in the enact"ent of said laws. As to the contention that the assailed law *iolates the present li"it on the n#")er of representati*es as set forth in the onstit#tion, a reading of the applica)le pro*ision, Article <I, !ection 7@1A, as afore6#oted, shows that the present li"it of 27? "e")ers is not a)sol#te. $he onstit#tion clearly pro*ides that the 1o#se of %epresentati*es shall )e co"posed of not "ore than 27? "e")ers, /#nless otherwise pro*ided )y law./ $he inescapa)le i"port of the latter cla#se is that the present co"position of ongress "ay )e increased, if ongress itself so "andates thro#gh a legislati*e enact"ent. As to the contention that !ection B9 of %.A. 3o. 7+77 in effect pree"pts the right of ongress to reapportion legislati*e districts, the said arg#"ent )orders on the a)s#rd since petitioners o*erloo: the glaring fact that it was ongress itself which drafted, deli)erated #pon and enacted the assailed law, incl#ding !ection B9 thereof. ongress cannot possi)ly pree"pt itself on a right which pertains to itself. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TOLENTINO VS. SECRETAR- OF FINANCE 235 SCRA %30, 1994 FACTS" $he *al#e9added ta5 @<A$A is le*ied on the sale, )arter or e5change of goods and properties as well as on the sale or e5change of ser*ices. It is e6#i*alent to 1?M of the gross selling price or gross *al#e in "oney of goods or properties sold, )artered or e5changed or of the gross receipts fro" the sale or e5change of ser*ices. %ep#)lic Act 3o. 771+ see:s to widen the ta5 )ase of the e5isting <A$ syste" and enhance its ad"inistration )y a"ending the 3ational Internal %e*en#e ode. It was challenged for alleged constit#tional infir"ities @defectsA, a"ong others2 It is clai"ed that the conference co""ittee incl#ded pro*isions not fo#nd in either the 1o#se Bill or the !enate Bill [ that these pro*isions were stealthily inserted )y the conference co""ittee. ISSUE" 8hether or not there are constit#tional defects in %A 771+, since the conference co""ittee incl#ded pro*isions not fo#nd in either the 1o#se Bill or the !enate Bill. HELD" A third *ersion of the )ill "ay res#lt fro" the conference co""ittee, which is considered "ay res#lt fro" the conference co""ittee, which is considered an =a"end"ent in the nat#re of a s#)stit#te> the only re6#ire"ent )eing that the third *ersion )e ger"ane to the s#)-ect of the 1o#se and !enate )ills. As to the possi)ility of an entirely new )ill e"ergency o#t of a onference o""ittee, it has )een e5plained2 Jnder congressional r#les of proced#re, conference co""ittees are not e5pected to "a:e any "aterial change in the "eas#re at iss#e, either )y deleting pro*isions to which )oth ho#ses ha*e already agreed or )y inserting new pro*isions. B#t this is a diffic#lt pro*ision to enforce. 3ote the pro)le" when one ho#se a"ends a proposal originating in either ho#se )y stri:ing o#t e*erything following the enacting cla#se and s#)stit#ting pro*isions which "a:e it an entirely new )ill. $he *ersions are now altogether different, per"itting a conference co""ittee to draft essentially a new )ill. $he res#lt is a third *ersion, which is considered an /a"end"ent in the nat#re of a s#)stit#te,/ the only re6#ire"ent for which )eing that the third *ersion )e ger"ane to the s#)-ect of the 1o#se and !enate )ills. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT GON$ALES VS. MACARAIG 191 SCRA 452 FACTS" $he *eto of a partic#lar section in the 1989 appropriations act was assailed for )eing #nconstit#tional on gro#nds that the president "ay not *eto pro*isions with regard to appropriation )ills and if the president *etoes a pro*ision in an appropriation )ill that the entire )ill sho#ld )e *etoed. (#rther, ite"9*eto power does not carry with it the power to stri:e o#t conditions. ISSUE" 8hether or not the 0resident has the power to *eto pro*isions with regard to appropriation )ills. HELD" Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt held the following2 $he 0resident can *eto an ite" or ite"s in an appropriations )ill BJ$ nothing less than an ite" or ite"s. o Ite" [ an indi*isi)le s#" of "oney dedicated to a stated p#rpose that a distinct and se*era)le part of a )ill "ay)e s#)-ect to a different *eto. $herefore, regard to the petitionerKs contention that if a pro*ision in an appropriations )ill is *etoed the entire )ill "#st )e *etoed cannot )e s#stained. $he said power to *eto pro*isions has )een carried o*er the pre*io#s constit#tions and has now )een #nderstood as )roadened to incl#de the ite" or ite"s to which the pro*ision relates. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 123 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 In relation still to *eto of pro*isions, the principle that distinct and se*era)le parts of a )ill "ay)e the s#)-ect to a different *eto is fo#nded on Art. +, !ection 27@2A wherein pro*isions are li"ited to its operation to the appropriation to which it relatesZa distinct and se*era)le part s#)-ect to a different *eto. $herefore it doesnKt "ean that if the president *etoes a pro*ision in an appropriations )ill heKll need to *eto the entire )ill. Besides, the said pro*isions are inappropriate in the first place )eca#se the pro*isions sho#ld relate to a partic#lar appropriation in the general appropriations )ill. $hat said sections of the appropriation )ill cannot )e s#)-ect to *eto if s#ch are "ade to )e conditions on the e5pendit#re of f#nds cannot )e s#stained )eca#se s#ch conditions =inappropriate.> %estrictions or conditions in an appropriation )ill "#st e5hi)it a connection with "oney ite"s in a )#dgetary sense in the sched#le of e5pendit#res. !aid sections were in fact general law "eas#res, there was no necessary connection with the sched#le of e5pendit#res. $hat in any case, the sections "entioned contra*ene the onstit#tion as it ta:es away the power of the 0resident to a#g"ent any ite" in the appropriations law of their respecti*e offices fro" sa*ings in other ite"s of their respecti*e appropriations, since a stat#te has already a#thori&ed s#ch power. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT &ENG$ON VS. DRILON 208 SCRA 133, 1992 FACTS" $he case in*ol*ed the ,eneral Appropriations Act of 1992. $he law appropriated 7??M 0esos =(or general f#nd ad-#st"ent for operational and special re6#ire"ents as indicated here#nder.> A"ong the se*eral a#thori&ed #ses of the f#nd was the ad-#st"ent of pension of -#stices as a#thori&ed )y an earlier law. $he 0resident *etoed the #se of s#ch f#nd for the ad-#st"ent of the pension of -#stices. $he f#nds pertaining to the pay"ent of the ad-#sted pensions of %etired H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt and A was *etoed and assailed as )eing #nconstit#tional. %A 1797 was the law granted these )enefits in 1977. !ection 49A of %A 1797 was repealed )y 0D +BB. ongress tho#ght to re*i*e %A 1797 thro#gh 1B 3o.1+297. B#t 0D +BB ne*er )eca"e a law^ @not p#)lishedA 0resident *etoed 1B 3o. 1+297. ISSUE" 8hether or not the *eto act of the 0resident the #se of s#ch f#nd for the ad-#st"ent of the pension of -#stices is *alid. HELD" $he !#pre"e o#rt r#led2 In declaring the *eto in*alid, the o#rt said that it was not the *eto of an ite". $he ite" was the entire 7??M peso allocation o#t of which #na*oida)le o)ligations not ade6#ately f#nded in separate ite"s co#ld )e "et. 8hat the 0resident had *etoed was the "ethod of "eeting #na*oida)le o)ligations or the "anner of #sing the 7??M 0esos. 8hen the 0resident *etoed certain pro*isions of the 1992 ,eneral Appropriations Act, she was act#ally *etoing %A 1797 since 0D +BB ne*er too: effect which is )eyond the power to acco"plish. $he ongress incl#ded in the ,eneral Appropriations Act of 1992, pro*isions identifying f#nds and sa*ings which "ay )e #sed to pay the ad-#sted pensions p#rs#ant to the !#pre"e o#rt %esol#tion. As long as retire"ent laws re"ain in the stat#te )oo:, there is an e5isting o)ligation on the part of the go*ern"ent to pay the ad-#sted pension rate p#rs#ant to %A 1797 and AM9919892279A. 3either "ay the *eto power of the 0resident )e e5ercised as a "eans of repealing %A 1797. $his is arrogating #nto the 0residency legislati*e powers which are )eyond its a#thority. $he 0resident has no power to enact or a"end stat#tes pro"#lgated )y her predecessors "#ch less to repeal e5isting laws. $he 0residentKs power is "erely to e5ec#te the laws passed )y ongress. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 1 ARTICLE 8, 1987 CONSTITUTION PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIJUE$ 235 SCRA 50%. 1994 JUIASON, !." FACTS" $he ,eneral Appropriation Bill of 199B was passed and appro*ed )y )oth 1o#ses of ongress. It presented the )ill to the president for the e5ercise of his *eto power. 'ne of the special pro*isions *etoed )y the 0resident is with respect to the realign"ent of operating e5penses. 8hereas each "e")er of ongress is allotted for his own operating e5pendit#res, a proportionate share of the appropriation for the ho#se which he )elongs. If he does not spend for one ite" of e5pense, the 6#estioned pro*ision allows hi" to transfer his allocation in said ite" of e5pense. 0etitioners assail the special pro*ision allowing a "e")er of ongress to realign his allocations for operational e5penses to any other e5pense categorically clai"ing that this practice is prohi)ited )y !ection 27 @7A, Article <I of the onstit#tion. $hey arg#e that the !enate 0resident and !pea:er of the 1o#se, not the indi*id#al "e")er of ongress, are the ones a#thori&ed to realign the sa*ings as appropriated. Another special pro*ision *etoed )y the 0resident is on the appropriation for de)t ser*ice. It pro*ides =Jse of f#nds. $he appropriation a#thori&ed therein shall )e #sed for pay"ent of principal and interest of foregoing and do"estic inde)tednessG pro*ided, that any pay"ent in e5cess of the a"o#nt therein appropriated shall )e s#)-ect to the appro*al of the 0resident with the conc#rrence of the ongress of the 0hilippinesG pro*ided f#rther, that in no case shall this f#nd )e #sed to pay for the lia)ilities of the entral Ban: of Li6#idators.> 0etitioners clai" that the 0resident cannot *eto the special pro*ision on the appropriations for de)t ser*ice witho#t *etoing the entire a"o#nt of 08+B for said p#rpose. In the appropriation for the A(0 0ension and ,rat#ity (#nd, the 0resident *etoed the new pro*ision a#thori&ing the hief of !taff to #se sa*ings in the A(0 to a#g"ent pension and grat#ity f#nds. According to the 0resident, the grant retire"ent and separation )enefits sho#ld )e co*ered )y direct appropriation specially appro*ed for the p#rpose p#rs#ant to !ection 29 @1A of Article <I of the onstit#tion. Moreo*er, he stated that the a#thority to #se sa*ings is lodged in the officials en#"erated in !ection 27 of Article <I of the onstit#tion. 'n the contrary, petitioners clai" that said pro*ision is a condition or li"itation, which is intertwined with the ite" of appropriation that it co#ld not )e separated therefro". ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitionerKs contentions are tena)le. HELD" 0etitionerKs contentions are witho#t "erit. Jnder the special pro*isions applica)le to the ongress of the 0hilippines, the "e")ers of the ongress only deter"ine the necessity of the realign"ent of the sa*ings in the allot"ent for their operating e5penses. $hey are in the )est position to do so )eca#se they are the one who :now whether there are sa*ings a*aila)le in so"e ite"s and whether there are deficiencies in other ite"s of their operating e5penses that need a#g"entation. 1owe*er, it is the !enate 0resident and the !pea:er of the 1o#se as the case "ay )e who shall appro*e the realign"ent. Before gi*ing their sta"p of appro*al, those two officials will ha*e to see to it that2 @1A the f#nds to )e aligned or transferred are act#ally sa*ings in the ite"s of e5pendit#res fro" which the sa"e are to )e ta:en and to the transfer on realign"ent is for the p#rpose of a#g"enting the ite"s of e5pendit#re to which said transfer or realign"ent is to )e "ade. It is readily apparent that the special pro*ision applica)le to the appropriation for de)t ser*ice in so far as it refers to f#nds in e5cess of the appropriation for de)t ser*ice in so far as it refers to f#nds in e5cess of the a"o#nt appropriated in the )ill, is an =inappropriate pro*ision> referring to the f#nds other than 0+8B appropriated in the ,AAA of 199B. $he *eto power while e5ercised )y the 0resident is act#ally a part of the legislati*e process. 1ence, fo#nd in Article <I rather than Article <II. As the constit#tion is e5plicit that the pro*ision with the ongress can incl#de in an appropriate to which it relates, =it follows that any pro*ision which does not relate to any partic#lar ite" or which it e5tends in its operation )eyond an ite" of appropriation is considered an inappropriate pro*ision which )e *etoed separately fro" an ite". Also to )e incl#ded in the category of inappropriate pro*ision are #nconstit#tional pro*isions and pro*isions which are intended to a"end other laws )eca#se clearly those :inds of laws ha*e no place in an appropriation )ill. $he 0resident *etoed the entire paragraph, one of the special pro*ision of the ite" on de)t ser*ices incl#ding the pro*isos that the appropriation a#thori&ed in said ite" shall )e #sed for the pay"ent of one principal and interest of foreign and do"estic inde)tedness and that in no case shall this f#nd )e #sed to pay for the lia)ilities of the entral Ban: Board of Li6#idators. $hese pro*isos are ger"ane to and ha*e direct connection with the ite" of de)t ser*ice. Inherent in the power of the appropriation is the power to specify how the "oney shall )e spent. !aid pro*isos are appropriate pro*isions hence, cannot )e *etoed separately. $he ! is s#staining the *eto of the !pecial 0ro*ision of the ite" on de)t ser*ice can only )e with respect to the pro*iso therein re6#iring that any pay"ent in e5cess of the a"o#nt therein, appropriated shall )e the s#)-ect to the appro*al of the 0resident of the 0hilippines with the conc#rrence of the ongress of the 0hilippines. $he special pro*ision which allows the hief of !taff to #se sa*ings to a#g"ent the pension f#nd for the A(0 )eing "anaged )y the A(0 %etire"ent and !eparation Benefits !yste" is *iolati*e of !ection 27 and !ection 29 of Article <I of the onstit#tion. SECTION 28 R RULE ON TA3ATION, TARIFF PO=ERS, E3EMPTIONS 7APATIRAN VS. TAN 1%3 SCRA 371, 1988 CASE" $he <A$ law or .' 274 is )eing assailed on gro#nds a"ong others that ta5ation shall )e #nifor" and e6#ita)le. $he o#rt o*err#led the contention holding that s#ch was #nifor" )eca#se it operates with the sa"e effect and force in e*ery place where the s#)-ect "ay )e fo#nd. It is also e6#ita)le since it is i"posed only on sales of goods or ser*ices )y persons engaged in )#siness with an aggregate gross ann#al sale e5ceeding 2??,???. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 124 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT A&RA VALLE- COLLEGE VS. AJUINO 1%2 SCRA 10%, 1988 FACTS" 0etitioner filed s#it to ann#l and declare *oid the /3otice of !ei&#re/ and the /3otice of !ale/ of its lot and )#ilding for non9pay"ent of real state ta5es and penalties. 0etitioner contends that the pri"ary #se of the lot and )#ilding for ed#cational p#rposes, and not the incidental #se thereof, deter"ines and e5e"ption fro" property ta5es #nder !ection 22 @4A, Article <I of the 1947 onstit#tion. 1ence, the sei&#re and sale of s#)-ect college lot and )#ilding, which are contrary 0ri*ate respondents co#nter that the college lot and )#ilding in 6#estion which were s#)-ected to sei&#re and sale to answer for the #npaid ta5 are #sed2 @IA for the ed#cational p#rposes of the r collegeG @2A per"anent residence of the 0resident and Director thereof, and his fa"ily incl#ding the in9laws and grandchildrenG and @4A for co""ercial p#rposes )eca#se the gro#nd floor of the college )#ilding is )eing #sed and rented )y a co""ercial esta)lish"ent, the 3orthern Mar:eting orporation ISSUE" 8hether or not the lot and )#ilding is 6#estion are #sed e5cl#si*ely for ed#cational p#rposes there)y e5e"pting petitioner fro" property ta5es. HELD" 3'. $he lot and )#ilding are not #sed e5cl#si*ely for ed#cational p#rposes. It "#st )e stressed howe*er, that while this o#rt allows a "ore li)eral and non9restricti*e interpretation of the phrase /e5cl#si*ely #sed for ed#cational p#rposes/ as pro*ided for in Article <I, !ection 22, paragraph 4 of the 1947 0hilippine onstit#tion, reasona)le e"phasis has always )een "ade that e5e"ptions e5tends to facilities which are incidental to and reasona)ly necessary for the acco"plish"ent of the "ain p#rposes. 'therwise stated, the #se of the school )#ilding or lot for co""ercial p#rposes is neither conte"plated )y law, nor )y -#rispr#dence. $h#s, while the #se of the second floor of the "ain )#ilding in the case at the )ar for residential p#rposes of the Director and his fa"ily, "ay find -#stification #nder the concept of incidental #se, which is co"pli"entary to the "ain or pri"ary p#rpose 9 ed#cational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the 3orthern Mar:eting orporation cannot )y any stretch of the i"agination )e considered incidental to the p#rpose of ed#cation. Jnder the 1947 onstit#tion, the trial co#rt correctly arri*ed at the concl#sion that the school )#ilding as well as the lot where it is )#ilt, sho#ld )e ta5ed, not )eca#se the, second floor of the sa"e is )eing #sed )y the Director and his fa"ily for residential p#rposes, )#t )eca#se the first floor thereof is )eing #sed for co""ercial p#rposes. 1owe*er, since only a portion is #sed for p#rposes of co""erce, it is only fair that half of the assessed ta5 )e ret#rned to the school in*ol*ed. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 29 R RULES ON PU&LIC MONE- PASCUAL VS. SECRETAR- OF PU&LIC =OR7S 110 PHIL. 331, 19%0 FACTS" $he s#" of 87,??? pesos was appropriated )y ongress for the constr#ction of a feeder road r#nning thro#gh a pri*ate s#)di*ision and o*er a property owned )y a pri*ate indi*id#al. !#)se6#ently, the feeder road is donated to the go*ern"ent. ISSUE" Is the appropriation *alidC HELD" $he !#pre"e o#rt ann#lled this ite", o)ser*ing that the property so#ght to )e i"pro*ed with p#)lic f#nds was pri*ate in nat#re at the ti"e the appropriation was "ade. $he circ#"stance that the roads were later donated to the go*ern"ent did not c#re the )asic defect of the appropriation as it was n#ll and *oid a) initio. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT AGLIPA- VS. RUI$ %4 PHIL. 201, 1937 FACTS" $he 0hilippine go*ern"ent a#thori&ed a special sta"p iss#e on occasion of the o)ser*ance in Manila of the 44 rd International .#charistic ongress #nder the sponsorship of the atholic h#rch. $he petitioner, as head of the 0hilippine Independent h#rch, assailed the "eas#re and contended that it *iolated the onstit#tion inas"#ch as it )enefited a partic#lar region. $he !#pre"e o#rt, on e5a"ining the facts, disco*ered that the original design of the sta"p feat#red a pict#re of a atholic chalice, )#t this was later re-ected in fa*or of a "ap of the 0hilippines #nder which appeared the caption =!eat, 44 rd International .#charistic ongress, (e). 497, 1947.> ISSUE" 8hether or not the sta"p iss#e was *alid. HELD" Des. As the p#rpose of the sta"p iss#e were not for the )enefit of the %o"an atholic h#rch, nor "oney was deri*ed fro" the sale of the sta"ps gi*en to that ch#rch )#t was e*idently to foc#s attention not on the .#charistic ongress )#t on its site, the idea )eing to attract to#rists to o#r co#ntry and not pri"arily the religio#s e*ent, it was held that the sta"p iss#e was not in*alid. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE 19% SCRA 221, 1991 FACTS" 0D 1177 is )eing assailed on its constit#tionality. It is arg#ed that the a#to"atic reappropriation law for ser*icing foreign de)ts is in*alid )eca#se it does not appropriate a fi5ed a"o#nt and is therefore an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power ISSUE" 8hether or not 0D 1177 is constit#tional. HELD" Des. $he a"o#nt is fi5ed )y the para"eters of the law itself which re6#ires the si"ple act of loo:ing into the )oo:s of the $reas#re. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OSMENA VS. OR&OS 220 SCRA 703, 1993 FACTS" $he 'il 0rice !ta)il&ation (#nd @'0!(A was created to "ini"i&e the fre6#ent price changes )ro#ght a)o#t )y e5change rate ad-#st"ents andRor changes )ro#ght a)o#t )y changes in world "ar:et prices of cr#de oil and i"ported petrole#" prod#cts. A $er"inal (#nd Balance deficit now ai"s to resol*e the deficit )y increasing petrole#" prices, contra*ening !ection 29@4A, Article <I where s#ch f#nd shall )e paid only for the p#rpose for which it was created. ISSUE" 8hether or not the increase of petrole#" prices to resol*e the $er"inal (#nd Balance deficit is *alid. HELD" Des. $he o#rt held that it was a *alid e5ercise of police power. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIJUE$ 235 SCRA 50%. 1994 JUIASON, !." FACTS" $he ,eneral Appropriation Bill of 199B was passed and appro*ed )y )oth 1o#ses of ongress. It presented the )ill to the president for the e5ercise of his *eto power. 'ne of the special pro*isions *etoed )y the 0resident is with respect to the realign"ent of operating e5penses. 8hereas each "e")er of ongress is allotted for his own operating e5pendit#res, a proportionate share of the appropriation for the ho#se which he )elongs. If he does not spend for one ite" of e5pense, the 6#estioned pro*ision allows hi" to transfer his allocation in said ite" of e5pense. 0etitioners assail the special pro*ision allowing a "e")er of ongress to realign his allocations for operational e5penses to any other e5pense categorically clai"ing that this practice is prohi)ited )y !ection 27 @7A, Article <I of the onstit#tion. $hey arg#e that the !enate 0resident and !pea:er of the 1o#se, not the indi*id#al "e")er of ongress, are the ones a#thori&ed to realign the sa*ings as appropriated. Another special pro*ision *etoed )y the 0resident is on the appropriation for de)t ser*ice. It pro*ides =Jse of f#nds. $he appropriation a#thori&ed therein shall )e #sed for pay"ent of principal and interest of foregoing and do"estic inde)tednessG pro*ided, that any pay"ent in e5cess of the a"o#nt therein appropriated shall )e s#)-ect to the appro*al of the 0resident with the conc#rrence of the ongress of the 0hilippinesG pro*ided f#rther, that in no case shall this f#nd )e #sed to pay for the lia)ilities of the entral Ban: of Li6#idators.> 0etitioners clai" that the 0resident cannot *eto the special pro*ision on the appropriations for de)t ser*ice witho#t *etoing the entire a"o#nt of 08+B for said p#rpose. In the appropriation for the A(0 0ension and ,rat#ity (#nd, the 0resident *etoed the new pro*ision a#thori&ing the hief of !taff to #se sa*ings in the A(0 to a#g"ent pension and grat#ity f#nds. According to the 0resident, the grant retire"ent and separation )enefits sho#ld )e co*ered )y direct appropriation specially appro*ed for the p#rpose p#rs#ant to !ection 29 @1A of Article <I of the onstit#tion. Moreo*er, he stated that the a#thority to #se sa*ings is lodged in the officials en#"erated in !ection 27 of Article <I of the onstit#tion. 'n the contrary, petitioners clai" that said pro*ision is a condition or li"itation, which is intertwined with the ite" of appropriation that it co#ld not )e separated therefro". ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitionerKs contentions are tena)le. HELD" 0etitionerKs contentions are witho#t "erit. Jnder the special pro*isions applica)le to the ongress of the 0hilippines, the "e")ers of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 125 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the ongress only deter"ine the necessity of the realign"ent of the sa*ings in the allot"ent for their operating e5penses. $hey are in the )est position to do so )eca#se they are the one who :now whether there are sa*ings a*aila)le in so"e ite"s and whether there are deficiencies in other ite"s of their operating e5penses that need a#g"entation. 1owe*er, it is the !enate 0resident and the !pea:er of the 1o#se as the case "ay )e who shall appro*e the realign"ent. Before gi*ing their sta"p of appro*al, those two officials will ha*e to see to it that2 @1A the f#nds to )e aligned or transferred are act#ally sa*ings in the ite"s of e5pendit#res fro" which the sa"e are to )e ta:en and to the transfer on realign"ent is for the p#rpose of a#g"enting the ite"s of e5pendit#re to which said transfer or realign"ent is to )e "ade. It is readily apparent that the special pro*ision applica)le to the appropriation for de)t ser*ice in so far as it refers to f#nds in e5cess of the appropriation for de)t ser*ice in so far as it refers to f#nds in e5cess of the a"o#nt appropriated in the )ill, is an =inappropriate pro*ision> referring to the f#nds other than 0+8B appropriated in the ,AAA of 199B. $he *eto power while e5ercised )y the 0resident is act#ally a part of the legislati*e process. 1ence, fo#nd in Article <I rather than Article <II. As the constit#tion is e5plicit that the pro*ision with the ongress can incl#de in an appropriate to which it relates, =it follows that any pro*ision which does not relate to any partic#lar ite" or which it e5tends in its operation )eyond an ite" of appropriation is considered an inappropriate pro*ision which )e *etoed separately fro" an ite". Also to )e incl#ded in the category of inappropriate pro*ision are #nconstit#tional pro*isions and pro*isions which are intended to a"end other laws )eca#se clearly those :inds of laws ha*e no place in an appropriation )ill. $he 0resident *etoed the entire paragraph, one of the special pro*ision of the ite" on de)t ser*ices incl#ding the pro*isos that the appropriation a#thori&ed in said ite" shall )e #sed for the pay"ent of one principal and interest of foreign and do"estic inde)tedness and that in no case shall this f#nd )e #sed to pay for the lia)ilities of the entral Ban: Board of Li6#idators. $hese pro*isos are ger"ane to and ha*e direct connection with the ite" of de)t ser*ice. Inherent in the power of the appropriation is the power to specify how the "oney shall )e spent. !aid pro*isos are appropriate pro*isions hence, cannot )e *etoed separately. $he ! is s#staining the *eto of the !pecial 0ro*ision of the ite" on de)t ser*ice can only )e with respect to the pro*iso therein re6#iring that any pay"ent in e5cess of the a"o#nt therein, appropriated shall )e the s#)-ect to the appro*al of the 0resident of the 0hilippines with the conc#rrence of the ongress of the 0hilippines. $he special pro*ision which allows the hief of !taff to #se sa*ings to a#g"ent the pension f#nd for the A(0 )eing "anaged )y the A(0 %etire"ent and !eparation Benefits !yste" is *iolati*e of !ection 27 and !ection 29 of Article <I of the onstit#tion. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT DIA$ VS.COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. L109%98 DECEM&ER 5, 1994) &ELLOSILLO, !." FACTS" 'n 24 Han#ary 1991, Da*ao Light and 0ower o"pany, Inc. @DL0A filed with the .nergy %eg#latory Board @.%BA an application for the appro*al of the so#nd *al#e appraisal of its property in ser*ice. $he Asian Appraisal o"pany *al#ed the property and e6#ip"ent of DL0 at 'ne Billion 'ne 1#ndred (orty 'ne Million !e*en 1#ndred !e*enty (o#r $ho#sand 0esos @01,1B1,77B,???.??A. 'n + Dece")er 1992, .%B appro*ed the application of DL0 after ded#cting (o#rteen Million .ight 1#ndred $ho#sand 0esos @01B,8??,???.??A worth of property and e6#ip"ent which were not #sed )y DL0 in its operation. 0etitioners filed a petition for re*iew on certiorari )efore this o#rt assailing the decision of .%B on the gro#nd of lac: of -#risdiction andRor gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: of -#risdiction. In !#pre"e o#rtKs resol#tion of 8 !epte")er 1992, it referred the case for proper disposition to the o#rt of Appeals which s#)se6#ently dis"issed the petition. A"ong the gro#nds gi*en was that the filing of the petition for re*iew with the !#pre"e o#rt was a wrong "ode of appeal. 0etitioners filed a "otion for reconsideration contending that the resol#tion of 8 !epte")er 1992 was a directi*e for the o#rt of Appeals to disregard the a)o*e circ#lar. $hey f#rther clai"ed that ..'. 3o. 172 creating the .nergy %eg#latory Board to replace the Board of .nergy pro*ides #nder !ec. 1? thereof that /OaP party ad*ersely affected )y a decision, order or r#ling of the Board . . . "ay file a petition to )e :nown as petition for re*iew with the !#pre"e o#rt./ ISSUE" 8hether or not, !ec. 1? of ..'. 3o.172 is constit#tional. HELD" 3o. $he predecessor of the .nergy %eg#latory Board was the Board of .nergy created #nder 0.D. 3o. 12?+. $here #nder, appeals fro" the decisions of the Board of .nergy were appeala)le to the 'ffice of the 0resident. 1owe*er, #nder the Interi" %#les I"ple"enting the H#diciary %eorgani&ation Act of 198?, final decisions, orders, awards or resol#tions of the Board of .nergy were "ade appeala)le to the Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt @!ec. 9A. (#rther"ore, the 1987 onstit#tion, !ec. 4?, Art <I pro*ides2 /3o law shall )e passed increasing the appellate -#risdiction of the !#pre"e o#rt as pro*ided in this onstit#tion witho#t its ad*ice and conc#rrence./ It is *ery patent that since !ec. 1? of ..'. 3o. 172 was enacted witho#t the ad*ice and conc#rrence of this o#rt, this pro*ision ne*er )eca"e effecti*e, with the res#lt that it cannot )e dee"ed to ha*e a"ended the H#diciary %eorgani&ation Act of 198?. onse6#ently, the a#thority of the o#rt of Appeals to decide cases fro" the Board of .nergy, now .%B, re"ains @f. (irst Lepanto era"ics, Inc. *. o#rt of Appeals, ,.%. 3o. 11?771, 7 'cto)er 199BA. 'n 27 (e)r#ary 1991, the !#pre"e o#rt pro"#lgated irc#lar 3o.1991, par. @1A of which specifically pro*ides that the proper "ode of appeal fro" any 6#asi9-#dicial agency, incl#ding .%B, is )y way of a petition for re*iew with the o#rt of Appeals. If the appeal is )ro#ght to either o#rt @!#pre"e o#rt or o#rt of AppealsA )y the wrong proced#re, the only co#rse of action open to it is to dis"iss the appeal. $here is no longer any -#stification for allowing transfers of erroneo#s appeals fro" one co#rt to another @V#esada *. o#rt of Appeals, ,.%. 3o. 948+9, 12 3o*e")er 199?A. 0rior to irc#lar 3o. 1991, the !#pre"e o#rt pro"#lgated irc#lar 3o. 299? dated 9 March 199?, Ite" 3o. B of which states that /OaPn appeal ta:en to either the !#pre"e o#rt or the o#rt of Appeals )y the wrong or inappropriate "ode shall )e dis"issed/. Also, paragraph @dA of said irc#lar 3o. 299? also pro*ides that /OnPo transfer of appeals erroneo#sly ta:en to the !#pre"e o#rt or to the o#rt of Appeals to whiche*er of these $ri)#nals has appropriate appellate -#risdiction will )e allowedG contin#ed ignorance or willf#l disregard of the law on appeals will not )e tolerated./ onse6#ently, the o#rt of Appeals was correct when it held E ontrary to petitionersI stand, the !#pre"e o#rtIs %esol#tion dated !epte")er 8, 1992, referring /this case to the o#rt of Appeals for f#rther disposition/ was not a directi*e for this co#rt to disregard the a)o*e circ#lars and precedents. %ather the said ! resol#tion co#ld "ean only that this co#rt sho#ld dispose of the s#)-ect petition in confor"ity with, and not in *iolation of, those circ#lars and precedents @%ollo, p. 2+A. 81.%.('%., the instant petition is DI!MI!!.D. ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SU&IC &A- METROPOLITAN AUTHORIT- VS. COMMISION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 12541% SEPTEM&ER 2%, 199% FACTS" $he !angg#niang Bayan of Morong, Bataan @!angg#niang BayanA passed 0a")ayang Lapasyahan Bilang 1?, !erye 1994, e5pressing therein its a)sol#te conc#rrence to -oin the !#)ic !pecial .cono"ic Xone. %espondents ,arcia, et al. filed a petition with the !angg#niang Bayan to ann#l 0a")ayang Lapasyahan Bilang 1?, !erye 1994. $he !angg#niang Bayan pro"#lgated 0a")ayang Lapasyahan Bilang 18, !erye 1994, re6#esting ongress to a"end certain pro*isions of %.A. 3o.7227, partic#larly those concerning the "atters cited in ite"s of pri*ate respondentsK petition. 3ot satisfied, pri*ate respondents resorted to their power of initiati*e. %espondent 'M.L. denied the petition for local initiati*e on the gro#nd that the s#)-ect thereof was "erely a resol#tion @pa")ayang :apasyahanA and not an ordinance. $hereafter, 'M.L. iss#ed a %esol#tion directing its 0ro*incial .lection !#per*isor to hold action on a#thentication of signat#res )eing solicited )y pri*ate respondent. 'M.L. also iss#ed %esol#tion 3o. 28B7, adopting a =alendar of Acti*ities for local referend#" on certain "#nicipal ordinance passed )y the !angg#niang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.> It then pro"#lgated said %esol#tion, pro*iding for =the r#les and g#idelines to go*ern the cond#ct of the referend#" proposing to ann#l or repeal Lapasyahan Blg. 1?, !erye 1994 of the !angg#niang Bayan of Morong, Bataan. ontesting the *alidity of %esol#tion 3o. 2B28, petitioner instit#ted a petition for certiorari and prohi)ition. ISSUE" 8hether or not the 'M.L. co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion in pro"#lgating and i"ple"enting its %esol#tion 3o. 28B8 which go*ern the cond#ct of the referend#" proposing to ann#l or repeal Lapasyahan Blg. 1?, !erye 1994 of the !angg#niang Bayan of Morong, BataanC
HELD" Des. 'M.L. co""it gra*e a)#se of discretion in pro"#lgating and i"ple"enting %esol#tion 3o. 28B8. $he process started )y pri*ate respondents was an I3I$IA$I<. )#t respondent 'M.L. "ade preparations for a %.(.%.3DJM only. Based on the definitions gi*en )y the Local ,o*ern"ent ode @%.A. 71+?A2 Local Initiati*e is the legal process where)y the registered *oters of a local go*ern"ent #nit "ay directly propose, enact, or a"end any ordinanceG while Local %eferend#" is the legal process where)y the registered *oters of the local go*ern"ent #nits "ay appro*e, a"end or re-ect any ordinance enacted )y the !angg#nian. In other words, while initiati*e is entirely the wor: of the electorate, referend#" is )eg#n and consented to )y the law9"a:ing )ody. Initiati*e is a process of law9"a:ing )y the people the"sel*es witho#t the participation and against the wishes of their elected representati*es, while referend#" consists "erely of the electorate appro*ing or re-ecting what has )een drawn #p or enacted )y a legislati*e )ody. 1ence, the process and the *oting in an initiati*e are #nderstanda)ly "ore co"ple5 than in a referend#" where e5pectedly the *oters will si"ply answer =yes> or =no> in the )allot. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 126 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 In the case at )ar, the e5ercise cond#cted is #n6#estiona)ly an Initiati*e. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA %%8) FACTS" In (e)r#ary 198+, (erdinand Marcos was deposed fro" the presidency *ia the non9*iolent =people power> re*ol#tion and forced into e5ile. ora&on . A6#ino was declared 0resident of the 0hilippines #nder a re*ol#tionary go*ern"ent. After three years, Mr. Marcos, in his death)ed, has signified his wish to ret#rn to the 0hilippines to die. B#t 0resident A6#ino has stood fir"ly in the decision to )ar the ret#rn of Mr. Marcos and his fa"ily 9 considering the dire conse6#ences to the nation of his ret#rn at a ti"e when the sta)ility of the go*ern"ent is threatened fro" *ario#s directions and the econo"y is -#st )eginning to rise and "o*e forward. ISSUE" 8hether or not in the e5ercise of the powers granted )y the onstit#tion, the 0resident "ay prohi)it the Marcoses fro" ret#rning to the 0hilippines. HELD" Des, the 0resident has the 0ower #nder the onstit#tion to )ar the Marcoses fro" ret#rning to o#r co#ntry. $he onstit#tion says that the e5ec#ti*e power shall )e *ested in the 0resident. It also en#"erates certain specific powers. $he en#"eration, howe*er, does not e5ha#st the totality of e5ec#ti*e powers. $radition recogni&es that the powers of the 0resident are "ore than the s#" of en#"erated e5ec#ti*e powers. $he d#ty of the go*ern"ent =to ser*e and protect the people> as well as to see to the ="aintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, li)erty, and property, and the pro"otion of the general welfare> arg#e towards the e5istence of =resid#al instated powers.> ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS (178 SCRA 7%0) FACTS" 'n 'cto)er 1989, "otion for reconsideration was filed )y petitioners raising the following "a-or arg#"ents a"ong others2 1. $he 0resident has no power to )ar a (ilipino fro" his own co#ntry. 2. $here is no )asis for )arring the ret#rn of the fa"ily of for"er 0resident Marcos. ISSUE" 8R3 the 0resident has the power to )ar the Marcoses fro" ret#rning to the 0hilippines. HELD" D.!. $he !#pre"e o#rt held that it cannot )e denied that the 0resident, #pon who" e5ec#ti*e power is *ested, has #nstated resid#al powers which are i"plied fro" the grant of e5ec#ti*e power and which are necessary for her to co"ply with her d#ties #nder the onstit#tion. $he powers of the 0resident are not li"ited to what are e5pressly en#"erated in the article on the .5ec#ti*e Depart"ent and in scattered pro*isions of the onstit#tion. $his is so, notwithstanding the a*owed intent of the "e")ers of the onstit#tional o""ission of 198+ to li"it the powers of the 0resident as a reaction to the a)#ses #nder the regi"e of Mr. Marcos, for the res#lt was a li"itation of specific powers of the 0resident, partic#larly those relating to the co""ander9in9chief cla#se, )#t not a di"in#tion of the general grant of e5ec#ti*e power. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 8 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO (G.R. NO. 14%71015, MARCH 2, 2001)
PUNO, !." FACTS" In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Hoseph .-ercito .strada was elected 0resident while respondent ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo was elected <ice90resident. Both petitioner and the respondent were to ser*e a si59year ter" co""encing on H#ne 4?, 1998.D#ring his ter", the petitioner e5perienced a sharp descent fro" power started on 'cto)er B, 2??? when Ilocos !#r ,o*ernor, L#is /ha*it/ !ingson, a longti"e friend of the petitioner, went on air and acc#sed the petitioner, his fa"ily and friends of recei*ing "illions of pesos fro" -#eteng lords. $he e5posa i""ediately ignited reactions of rage. 3#"ero#s in*estigations co""enced )oth fro" the !enate and the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. alls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air that on 'cto)er 11, Arch)ishop Hai"e ardinal !in iss#ed a pastoral letter as:ing the petitioner to step down fro" the presidency as he had lost the "oral a#thority to go*ern. 0olitical tensions contin#ed to heat #p as :ey econo"ic ad*isers and "e")ers of the ca)inet defected. 'n 3o*e")er 14, in a t#"#lt#o#s session, the ho#se of representati*es finally trans"itted the articles of i"peach"ent to the senate signed )y 117 represenatati*es or "ore than 1R4 of all the "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. 'n 3o*e")er 2?, the !enate for"ally opened the i"peach"ent trial of the petitioner. $wenty9one @21A senators too: their oath as -#dges with !#pre"e o#rt hief H#stice 1ilario ,. Da*ide, Hr., presiding. $he political tension rose d#ring the i"peach"ent trial partic#larly d#ring the Dece")er hearings when larissa 'ca"po, senior *ice president of .6#ita)le90I Ban: testified on the e5istence of the Hose <elarde acco#nt. $he i"peach"ent trial reached its t#rning point when on the fatef#l day of Han#ary 1+, )y a *ote of 1191?
the senator9-#dges r#led against the opening of the second en*elope which allegedly contained e*idence showing that petitioner held 04.4 )illion in a secret )an: acco#nt #nder the na"e /Hose <elarde./ $he non9opening of the second en*elope led to the resignation of the p#)lic and pri*ate prosec#tors and the spontaneo#s o#t)#rst of anger )y the people in .D!A which is now referred to as the .D!A dos. 0etitionerKs fall fro" power )eca"e "ore apparent starting Han#ary 19 when :ey officials fro" the ar"ed forces, the 030 and his other ca)inet "e")ers withdrew s#pport. At a)o#t 122?? noon of Han#ary 2? hief H#stice Da*ide ad"inistered the oath to respondent Arroyo as 0resident of the 0hilippines. At 224? p."., petitioner and his fa"ily h#rriedly left MalacaNang 0alace while lea*ing a press state"ent indicating his strong and serio#s do#)ts a)o#t the legality and constit#tionality of the procla"ation of the respondent as 0resident and that he is lea*ing the 0alace as he does not wish to =pre*ent the restoration of #nity and order in o#r ci*il society.> ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not the case at )ar is a political 6#estion and hence, are )eyond the -#risdiction of this o#rt to decide 2. 8hether or not petitioner .strada is a 0resident on lea*e while respondent Arroyo is an Acting 0resident. HELD" 1.A3o the case at )ar is not a political 6#estion. Accordingly, it is within the -#risdiction of the o#rt to decide. In the case of $anada *. #enco, the o#rt, thro#gh for"er hief H#stice %o)erto oncepcion, held that political 6#estions refer /to those 6#estions which, #nder the onstit#tion, are to )e decided )y the people in their so*ereign capacity, or in regard to which f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the go*ern"ent. It is concerned with iss#es dependent #pon the wisdo", not legality of a partic#lar "eas#re./ $o a great degree, the 1987 onstit#tion has narrowed the reach of the political 6#estion doctrine when it e5panded the power of -#dicial re*iew of this co#rt not only to settle act#al contro*ersies in*ol*ing rights which are legally de"anda)le and enforcea)le )#t also to deter"ine whether or not there has )een a gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on the part of any )ranch or instr#"entality of go*ern"ent. 1eretofore, the -#diciary has foc#sed on the /tho# shalt notIs/ of the onstit#tion directed against the e5ercise of its -#risdiction. 8ith the new pro*ision, howe*er, co#rts are gi*en a greater prerogati*e to deter"ine what it can do to pre*ent gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on the part of any )ranch or instr#"entality of go*ern"ent. learly, the new pro*ision did not -#st grant the o#rt power of doing nothing. In fine, the legal distinction )etween .D!A 0eople 0ower I .D!A 0eople 0ower II is clear. .D!A I in*ol*es the e5ercise of the people power of re*ol#tion which o*erthrew the whole go*ern"ent. .D!A II is an e5ercise of people power of freedo" of speech and freedo" of asse")ly to petition the go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances which only affected the office of the 0resident. .D!A I is e5tra constit#tional and the legiti"acy of the new go*ern"ent that res#lted fro" it cannot )e the s#)-ect of -#dicial re*iew, )#t .D!A II is intra constit#tional and the resignation of the sitting 0resident that it ca#sed and the s#ccession of the <ice 0resident as 0resident are s#)-ect to -#dicial re*iew. .D!A I presented a political 6#estionG .D!A II in*ol*es legal 6#estions. 2. A 3o. 0resident .strada is not on lea*e, he resigned fro" office. %esignation is not a high le*el legal a)straction. It is a fact#al 6#estion and its ele"ents are )eyond 6#i))le2 there "#st )e an intent to resign and the intent "#st )e co#pled )y acts of relin6#ish"ent.
$he *alidity of a resignation is not go*erned )y any for"al re6#ire"ent as to for". It can )e oral. It can )e written. It can )e e5press. It can )e i"plied. As long as the resignation is clear, it "#st )e gi*en legal effect. In the cases at )ar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any for"al letter of resignation )efore he e*ac#ated MalacaNang 0alace. onse6#ently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to )e deter"ined fro" his act and o"issions )efore, d#ring and after Han#ary 2?, 2??1 or )y the totality of prior, conte"poraneo#s and posterior facts and circ#"stantial e*idence )earing a "aterial rele*ance on the iss#e. Jsing this totality test, the o#rt holds that petitioner resigned as 0resident. $he petitionerKs resignation is shown in the following instances2 a. he left MalacaNang ). he ac:nowledged the oath9ta:ing of the respondent as 0resident of the %ep#)lic al)eit with reser*ation a)o#t its legality c. he e"phasi&ed he was lea*ing the 0alace, the seat of the presidency, for the sa:e of peace and in order to )egin the healing process of o#r nation. 1e did not say he was lea*ing the 0alace d#e to any :ind ina)ility and that he was going to re9ass#"e the presidency as soon as the disa)ility disappears d. he e5pressed his gratit#de to the people for the opport#nity to ser*e the". e. he ass#red that he will not shir: fro" any f#t#re challenge that "ay co"e ahead in the sa"e ser*ice of o#r co#ntry. 0etitionerIs reference San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 127 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 is to a f#t#re challenge after occ#pying the office of the president which he has gi*en #pG f. he called on his s#pporters to -oin hi" in the pro"otion of a constr#cti*e national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. ertainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity co#ld not )e attained if he did not gi*e #p the presidency.
ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 11 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO (G.R. NO. 14%71015, MARCH 2, 2001)
PUNO, !." FACTS" In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Hoseph .-ercito .strada was elected 0resident while respondent ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo was elected <ice90resident. Both petitioner and the respondent were to ser*e a si59year ter" co""encing on H#ne 4?, 1998.D#ring his ter", the petitioner e5perienced a sharp descent fro" power started on 'cto)er B, 2??? when Ilocos !#r ,o*ernor, L#is /ha*it/ !ingson, a longti"e friend of the petitioner, went on air and acc#sed the petitioner, his fa"ily and friends of recei*ing "illions of pesos fro" -#eteng lords. $he e5posa i""ediately ignited reactions of rage. 'n 3o*e")er 14, in a t#"#lt#o#s session, the ho#se of representati*es trans"itted the articles of i"peach"ent to the senate. 'n 3o*e")er 2?, the !enate for"ally opened the i"peach"ent trial of the petitioner. $he i"peach"ent trial reached its t#rning point when on the fatef#l day of Han#ary 1+, )y a *ote of 1191?
the senator9-#dges r#led against the opening of the second en*elope which allegedly contained e*idence showing that petitioner held 04.4 )illion in a secret )an: acco#nt #nder the na"e /Hose <elarde./ $he non9opening of the second en*elope led to the resignation of the p#)lic and pri*ate prosec#tors and the spontaneo#s o#t)#rst of anger )y the people in .D!A which is now referred to as the .D!A dos. 'n Han#ary 2?, 2??1, petitioner sent a letter to the !enate and the 1o#se of %epresentati*es clai"ing his ina)ility to perfor" his f#nctions as a president. Jnaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo too: her oath of office as 0resident on Han#ary 2?, 2??1 at a)o#t 1224? p.". Despite receipt of the letter, the 1o#se of %epresentati*es as well as the !enate iss#ed 1o#se %esol#tion 3os. 177, 17+ and 178 as well as !enate %esol#tion nos. 82, 84 and 8B recogni&ing and confir"ing the ass#"ption of the respondent of the presidency. After respondent has ta:en her oath of office, petitioner post#lated that respondent Arroyo as <ice 0resident has no power to ad-#dge the ina)ility of the petitioner to discharge the powers and d#ties of the presidency. 1is significant s#)"ittal is that /ongress has the #lti"ate a#thority #nder the onstit#tion to deter"ine whether the 0resident is incapa)le of perfor"ing his f#nctions in the "anner pro*ided for in section 11 of article <II./$his contention is the centerpiece of petitionerIs stance that he is a 0resident on lea*e and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting 0resident. ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not the petitioner Is only te"porarily #na)le to Act as 0resident 2. 8hether con*iction in the i"peach"ent proceedings is a condition precedent for the cri"inal prosec#tion of petitioner .strada 4. 8hether or not the petitioner is i""#ne fro" the charges filed against HELD" 1. 3o, petitioner is not only te"porarily #na)le to act as president. 1o#se %esol#tion 3os. 177,17+, and 178, as well as !enate %esol#tions 3o. 82, 84 and 8B show that )oth ho#ses of ongress ha*e recogni&ed respondent Arroyo as the 0resident. I"plicitly clear in that recognition is the pre"ise that the ina)ility of petitioner .strada is no longer te"porary. ongress has clearly re-ected petitionerIs clai" of ina)ility. 2.A 3o. on*iction in the i"peach"ent proceedings is not a condition precedent for the cri"inal prosec#tion of the petitioner. $he i"peach"ent trial of petitioner .strada was a)orted )y the wal:o#t of the prosec#tors and )y the e*ents that led to his loss of the presidency. !ince, the I"peach"ent o#rt is now f#nct#s officio, it is #ntena)le for petitioner to de"and that he sho#ld first )e i"peached and then con*icted )efore he can )e prosec#ted. $he plea if granted, wo#ld p#t a perpet#al )ar against his prosec#tion. !#ch a s#)"ission has nothing to co""end itself for it will place hi" in a )etter sit#ation than a non9sitting 0resident who has not )een s#)-ected to i"peach"ent proceedings and yet can )e the o)-ect of a cri"inal prosec#tion. $o )e s#re, the de)ates in the onstit#tional o""ission "a:e it clear that when i"peach"ent proceedings ha*e )eco"e "oot d#e to the resignation of the 0resident, the proper cri"inal and ci*il cases "ay already )e filed against hi" 4.A 3o. $he petitioner is not i""#ned fro" the cases filed against hi" )y *irt#e of hi" )eing an #nsitting president. $he cases filed against petitioner .strada are cri"inal in character. $hey in*ol*e pl#nder, )ri)ery and graft and corr#ption. By no stretch of the i"agination can these cri"es, especially pl#nder which carries the death penalty, )e co*ered )y the alleged "antle of i""#nity of a non9sitting president. 0etitioner cannot cite any decision of this o#rt licensing the 0resident to co""it cri"inal acts and wrapping hi" with post9ten#re i""#nity fro" lia)ility. It will )e ano"alo#s to hold that i""#nity is an inoc#lation fro" lia)ility for #nlawf#l acts and conditions. $he r#le is that #nlawf#l acts of p#)lic officials are not acts of the !tate and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as s#ch )#t stands in the sa"e footing as any trespasser.
ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DOROMAL VS. SANDIGAN&A-AN (177 SCRA 354) FACTS" $he special prosec#tor officer filed in the !andigan)ayan an infor"ation against petitioner Doro"al, alleging2 /$hat the a)o*e9na"ed acc#sed, a p#)lic officer, )eing then o""issioner of the 0residential o""ission on ,ood ,o*ern"ent, did then and there wilf#lly and #nlawf#lly ha*e direct or indirect financial interest in the Doro"al International $rading orporation, an entity which transacted or entered into a )#siness transaction or contract with the Depart"ent of .d#cation, #lt#re and !ports and the 3ational Manpower and Do#th o#ncil, )oth agencies of the go*ern"ent which )#siness, contracts or transactions he is prohi)ited )y law and the constit#tion fro" ha*ing any interest./ $he infor"ation was initially ann#lled for the reason that the =$anodBayan> has no right to file infor"ation witho#t the appro*al of the '")#ds"an. $he !pecial 0rosec#tor so#ght clearance fro" the '")#ds"an to refile it. $he '")#ds"an granted clearance )#t ad*ised that /so"e changes )e "ade in the infor"ation./ A new infor"ation, d#ly appro*ed )y the '")#ds"an, was filed, alleging that2 /. . . , the a)o*e9na"ed acc#sed @Doro"alA, a p#)lic officer, )eing then a o""issioner of the 0residential o""ission on ,ood ,o*ern"ent, did then and there willf#lly and #nlawf#lly, participate in a )#siness thro#gh the Doro"al International $rading orporation, a fa"ily corporation of which he is the 0resident, and which co"pany participated in the )iddings cond#cted )y the Depart"ent of .d#cation, #lt#re and !ports and the 3ational Manpower Y Do#th o#ncil, which act or participation is prohi)ited )y law and the constit#tion./ 0etitioner "o*ed to 6#ash the infor"ation on the gro#nd that he, a 0,, o""issioner, has not signed any doc#"ent, )id of the fa"ily corporation of which he is "e")er, s#)"itted to D.!. !andigan)ayn denied the "otion to 6#ash, hence this petition. ISSUE" 8R3 the prohi)ition #nder !ection 14 of Article <II of the onstit#tion sho#ld not apply if an acc#sed has not signed any doc#"ent of any )id of the fa"ily corporation of which he is "e")er, s#)"itted to any go*ern"ent depart"ents. HELD" 3o, the pro*ision shall still apply )eca#se the DI$ re"ained a fa"ily corporation in which Doro"al has at least an indirect interest. !ection 14, Article <II of the 1987 onstit#tion pro*ides that /the 0resident, <ice90resident, the "e")ers of the a)inet and their dep#ties or assistants shall not . . . d#ring @theirA ten#re, . . . directly or indirectly . . . participate in any )#siness./ $he constit#tional )an is si"ilar to the prohi)ition in the i*il !er*ice Law that /p#rs#it of pri*ate )#siness . . . witho#t the per"ission re6#ired )y i*il !er*ice %#les and %eg#lations/ shall )e a gro#nd for disciplinary action against any officer or e"ployee in the ci*il ser*ice. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CIVIL LI&ERTIES UNION VS. E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR- (194 SCRA 317) FACTS" 0resident A6#ino iss#ed .' 3o. 28B, which allows "e")ers of the a)inet, their #ndersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other go*ern"ent offices or positions in addition to their pri"ary positions. It was assailed for it *iolates the onstit#tion. 0etitioners challenge the constit#tionality of .' 3o. 28B on the principal s#)"ission that it adds e5ceptions to !ection 14, Article <II other than those pro*ided in the onstit#tion. According to petitioners, )y *irt#e of the phrase /#nless otherwise pro*ided in this onstit#tion,/ the only e5ceptions against holding any other office or e"ploy"ent in ,o*ern"ent are those pro*ided in the onstit#tion, na"ely2 @1A $he <ice9 0resident "ay )e appointed as a Me")er of the a)inet #nder !ection 4, par. @2A, Article <II thereofG and @2A the !ecretary of H#stice is an e59officio "e")er of the H#dicial and Bar o#ncil )y *irt#e of !ection 8 @1A, Article <III. ISSUE" 8hether or not an e5ec#ti*e order allowing "e")ers of the a)inet, their #ndersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other go*ern"ent offices in addition to their pri"ary positions is *alid. HELD" In*alid. In the light of the constr#ction gi*en to !ection 14, Article <II in relation to !ection 7, par. @2A, Article I;9B of the 1987 onstit#tion, .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 28B dated H#ly 24, 1987 is #nconstit#tional. 'stensi)ly restricting the n#")er of positions that a)inet "e")ers, #ndersecretaries or assistant secretaries "ay hold in addition to their pri"ary position to not "ore than two @2A positions in the go*ern"ent and go*ern"ent corporations, .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 28B act#ally allows the" to hold "#ltiple offices or e"ploy"ent in direct contra*ention of the e5press "andate of !ection 14, Article <II of the 1987 San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 128 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 onstit#tion prohi)iting the" fro" doing so, #nless otherwise pro*ided in the 1987 onstit#tion itself. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30,1998 OF HON. M. A. VALEN$UELA AND HON. P. &. VILLARTA AS RTC !UDGES (298 SCRA 408 5NOVEM&ER 9, 19986) NARVASA, C.!." FACTS" 1on. Mateo A. <alen&#ela and 1on. 0lacido B. <allarta were appointed )y the then 0resident on March 4?, 1998 as H#dges of the %$, Branch +2, Bago ity and of Branch 2B, a)anat#an ity, respecti*ely. 'n May 12, 1998, the hief H#stice recei*ed fro" Malacanang the appoint"ents of two @2A H#dge of the %$ "entioned a)o*e. $he appoint"ents were 6#estioned on the *iew that they were "ade d#ring the period of the )an on appoint"ents i"posed )y !ection 17, Article <II of the onstit#tion. $he iss#e was already *entilated at the "eeting of the H#dicial and Bar o#ncil on March 9, 1998 regarding the constit#tionality of appoint"ents of eight @8A Associate H#stices to the o#rt of Appeals, specifically, in light of the forthco"ing presidential elections. Attention was drawn to !ection 17, Article <II of the onstit#tion reading as follows2 !ec. 17. $wo "onths i""ediately )efore the ne5t presidential elections and #p to the end of his, ter", a 0resident or Acting 0resident shall not "a:e appoint"ents, e5cept te"porary appoint"ents to e5ec#ti*e positions when contin#ed *acancies therein will pre-#dice p#)lic ser*ice or endanger p#)lic safety. 'n the other hand, appoint"ents to fill *acancies in the !#pre"e o#rt d#ring the period "entioned in the pro*ision -#st 6#oted co#ld )e -#stified )y !ection B@1A of Article <II of the onstit#tion which states2 !ec. B @1A $he !#pre"e o#rt shall )e co"posed of a hief H#stice and fo#rteen Associate H#stices. WW WW. Any *acancy shall )e filled within ninety days fro" the occ#rrence thereof. Also pertinent altho#gh not specifically disc#ssed is !ection 9 of the sa"e Article <III which pro*ides that for the lower co#rts, the 0resident shall iss#e the appoint"ents E fro" a list of at least three no"inees prepared )y the o#ncil for e*ery *acancy E within ninety days fro" the s#)"ission of the list. $he o#rt iss#ed a %esol#tion which states that >pending the foregoing proceedings and the deli)eration )y the o#rt on the "ater, and #ntil f#rther orders, no action )e ta:en on the appoint"ents of 1on. <alen&#ela and 1on. <allarta which in the "eanti"e shall )e held in a)eyance. In co"pliance with the foregoing %esol#tion, 1on. <alen&#ela and 1on. <allarta filed )efore the o#rt the re6#ired pleadings and other doc#"ents. It is noted that 1on. <alen&#ela had already ta:en his 'ath of 'ffice a H#dge on May 1B, 1998 and e5plained that he did so )eca#se on May 7, 1998, he =recei*ed fro" Malacanang copy of his appoint"ent WWW which contained the following direction =By *irt#e hereof, yo# "ay 6#alify and enter #pon the perfor"ance of the d#ties of the office. $he o#rt then deli)erated on the pleadings and doc#"ents a)o*e "entioned, in relation to the facts and circ#"stances on record and thereafter resol*ed to pro"#lgate the following opinion. ISSUE" 8hether, d#ring the period of the )an on appoint"ents i"posed )y !ection 17, Article <II of the onstit#tion, the 0resident is nonetheless re6#ired to fill *acancies in the -#diciary, in *iew of !ections B@1A and 9 of Article <III. 8hether the 0resident can "a:e appoint"ents to the -#diciary d#ring the period of the )an in the interest of p#)lic ser*ice. HELD" 3'. $he o#rtIs *iew is that d#ring the period stated in !ection 17. Article <II of the onstit#tion E /@tAwo "onths i""ediatey )efore the ne5t presidential elections and #p to the end his ter"/ E the 0resident is neither re6#ired to "a:e appoint"ents to the co#rts nor allowed to do soG and that !ections B@1A and 9 of Article <III si"ply "ean that the 0resident is re6#ired to fill *acancies in the co#rts within the ti"e fra"es pro*ided therein #nless prohi)ited )y !ection 17 of Article <II. It is not noteworthy that the prohi)ition on appoint"ents co"es into effect only once e*ery si5 years. In this connection, it "ay )e pointed o#t that that instr#ction that any /*acany shall )e filled within ninety days/ @in the last sentence of !ection B @1A of Article <IIIA contrasts with the prohi)ition !ection 17, Article <II, which is co#ched in stronger negati*e lang#age E that /a 0resident or Acting 0resident shall not "a:e appoint"ents. . ./ 3ow, it appears that !ection 17, Article <I is directed against two types of appoint"ents2 @1A those "ade for )#ying *otes and @2A those "ade for partisan considerations. $he first refers to those appoint"ents "ade within the two "onths preceding a 0residential election and are si"ilar to those which are declared elections offenses in the '"ni)#s .lection ode. $he second type of appoint"ents prohi)ited )y !ection 17, Article <II consist of the so9called /"idnight/ appoint"ents. onsidering the respecti*e reasons for the ti"e fra"es for filling *acancies in the co#rts and the restriction on the 0residentIs power of appoint"ents, it is this o#rtIs *iew that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the for"er sho#ld yield to the latter. !#rely, the pre*ention of *ote9)#ying and si"ilar e*ils o#tweighs the need for a*oiding delays in filling #p of co#rt *acancies or the disposition of so"e cases. $e"porary *acancies can a)ide the period of the )an which, incidentally and as earlier pointed o#t, co"es to e5ist only once in e*ery si5 years. Moreo*er, those occ#rring in the lower co#rts can )e filled te"porarily )y designation. B#t prohi)ited appoint"ents are long9lasting and per"anent in their effects. $hey "ay, as earlier pointed o#t, their "a:ing is considered an election offense. $o )e s#re, instances "ay )e concei*ed of the i"perati*e need for an appoint"ent, d#ring the period of the )an, not only in the e5ec#ti*e )#t also in the !#pre"e o#rt. $his "ay )e the case sho#ld the "e")ership of the o#rt )e so red#ced that it will ha*e no 6#or#", or sho#ld the *oting on a partic#larly i"portant 6#estion re6#iring e5peditio#s resol#tion )e e*enly di*ided. !#ch a case, howe*er, is co*ered )y neither !ection 17 of Article <II nor !ections B @1A and 9 of Article <III. oncerning <alen&#elaKs oath9ta:ing and =reporting for d#ty> as 0residing H#dge of %$ Branch +2, Bago ity, on May 1B, 1998, it "#st )e noted that it is a standing practice on the appoint"ents to the H#diciary [ fro" the highest to the lowest co#rt [ to )e sent )y the 'ffice of the 0resident to the 'ffice of the hief H#stice, the appoint"ents )eing addressed to the appointees. It is the ler: of o#rt of the !#pre"e o#rt in the hiefKs H#stice )ehalf, who thereafter ad*ises the indi*id#al appointees of their appoint"ents and also the date co""ence"ent of the pre9re6#isite orientation se"inar to )e cond#cted )y the 0hilippine H#dicial Acade"y for new H#dges. $he proced#re ens#res the a#thenticity of the appoint"ents, ena)les the o#rt, partic#larly the 'ffice of the o#rt Ad"inistrator, to enter in the appropriate records all appoint"ents to the H#diciary a well as other rele*ant data s#ch as the dates of 6#alification, the co"pletion )y the appointees of their pre9re6#isite orientation se"inars, their ass#"ption of d#ty, etc. $he proced#re also precl#des the possi)ility, howe*er re"ote of H#dges acting on sp#rio#s or otherwise defecti*e appoint"ents. $he appoint"ents of Messrs. <alen&#ela and <allarta on March 4?, 1998 @trans"itted to the 'ffice of the hief H#stice on May 1B, 998A were #n6#estiona)ly "ade d#ring the period of the )an. onse6#ently, they co"e within the operation of the first prohi)ition relating to appoint"ents which are considered to )e for the p#rpose of )#ying *otes or infl#encing the election. 8hile the filling of *acancies in the -#diciary is #ndo#)tedly in the p#)lic interest, there is no showing in this case of any co"pelling reason to -#stify the "a:ing of the appoint"ents d#ring the period of the )an. 'n the other hand, as already disc#ssed, there is a strong p#)lic policy for the prohi)ition against appoint"ents "ade within the period of the )an. In *iew of the foregoing considerations, the o#rt %esol*ed to D.LA%. <'ID the appoint"ents signed )y 1is .5cellency the 0resident #nder date of March 4?, 1998 of 1on. Mateo A. <alen&#ela and 1on. 0lacido B. <allarta as H#dges of the %egional $rial o#rt of Branch +2, Bago ity and of Branch 2B, a)anat#an ity, respecti*ely and to order the", forthwith on )eing ser*ed with notice of this decision, to forthwith .A!. A3D D.!I!$ fro" discharging the office of H#dge of the o#rts to which they were respecti*ely appointed on March 4?, 1998. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT &INAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO (188 SCRA 154 519906) FACTS" $he petitioner, Bina"ira, was the for"er ,eneral Manager of the 0hilippine $o#ris" A#thority )y *irt#e of the designation of the Minister of $o#ris" with the appro*al of 0resident A6#ino. !#)se6#ently, ,arr#cho was delegated )y the 0resident as the new !ecretary of the Ministry. ,ar#cho then had ta:en o*er the position of Bina"ira as the ,eneral Manager of 0hilippine $o#ris" A#thority. 1ence, this petition. ISSUES" 1. 8R3 a person designated to a position )y a "e")er of the ca)inet sho#ld step down to a person newly designated )y the 0resident to that sa"e position. 2. Disting#ished designation fro" appoint"ent HELD" 1. D.!. $he designation of the petitioner cannot s#stain his clai" that he has )een illegally re"o*ed. $he reason is that the decree clearly pro*ides that the appoint"ent of the ,eneral Manager of the 0hilippine $o#ris" A#thority shall )e "ade )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines, not )y any other officer. Appoint"ent in*ol*es the e5ercise of discretion, which )eca#se of its nat#re cannot )e delegated. Legally spea:ing, it was not possi)le for Minister ,on&ales to ass#"e the e5ercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the 0resident. 1is designation )eing an #nlawf#l encroach"ent on a presidential prerogati*e, he did not ac6#ire *alid title there#nder to the position in 6#estion. .*en if it )e ass#"ed that it co#ld )e and was a#thori&ed, the designation signified "erely a te"porary or acting appoint"ent that co#ld )e legally withdrawn at pleas#re, as in fact it was @al)eit for a different reasonA. 2. Designation "ay also )e loosely defined as an appoint"ent )eca#se it li:ewise in*ol*es the na"ing of a partic#lar person to a specified p#)lic office. $hat is the co""on #nderstanding of the ter". 1owe*er, where the person is "erely designated and not appointed, the i"plication is that he shall hold the office only in a te"porary capacity and "ay )e San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 129 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 replaced at will )y the appointing a#thority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or te"porary appoint"ent, which does not confer sec#rity of ten#re on the person na"ed. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT SARMIENTO VS. MISON (15% SCRA 154, 1987) FACTS" $he petitioners, who are ta5payers, lawyers, "e")ers of the Integrated Bar of the 0hilippines and professors of onstit#tional Law, see: to en-oin the respondent !al*ador Mison fro" perfor"ing the f#nctions of the 'ffice of o""issioner of the B#rea# of #sto"s and the respondent ,#iller"o arag#e, as !ecretary of the Depart"ent of B#dget, fro" effecting dis)#rse"ents in pay"ent of MisonIs salaries and e"ol#"ents, on the gro#nd that MisonIs appoint"ent as o""issioner of the B#rea# of #sto"s is #nconstit#tional )y reason of its not ha*ing )een confir"ed )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents. $he respondents, on the other hand, "aintain the constit#tionality of respondent MisonIs appoint"ent witho#t the confir"ation of the o""ission on Appoint"ents. ISSUES" 1. 8hat are the gro#ps of officers who" the 0resident shall appointC 2. 8R3 confir"ation of the appoint"ents of o""issioners of the B#rea# of #sto"s )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents re6#ired. HELD" 1. Jnder the pro*isions of the 1987 onstit#tion, -#st 6#oted, there are fo#r @BA gro#ps of officers who" the 0resident shall appoint. $hese fo#r @BA gro#ps, to which we will hereafter refer fro" ti"e to ti"e, are2 (irst, the heads of the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, a")assadors, other p#)lic "inisters and cons#ls, officers of the ar"ed forces fro" the ran: of colonel or na*al captain, and other officers whose appoint"ents are *ested in hi" in this onstit#tionG !econd, all other officers of the ,o*ern"ent whose appoint"ents are not otherwise pro*ided for )y lawG $hird, those who" the 0resident "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law to appointG (o#rth, officers lower in ran: whose appoint"ents the ongress "ay )y law *est in the 0resident alone. $he first gro#p of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the o""ission on Appoint"ents. Appoint"ents of s#ch officers are initiated )y no"ination and, if the no"ination is confir"ed )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents, the 0resident appoints. $hose )elonging to second, third and fo#rth gro#ps "ay )e appointed )y the 0resident witho#t s#ch confir"ation with 'A. 2. 3'. It is e*ident that the position of o""issioner of the B#rea# of #sto"s @a )#rea# headA is not one of those within the first gro#p of appoint"ents where the consent of the o""ission on Appoint"ents is re6#ired. As a "atter of fact, as already pointed o#t, while the 1947 onstit#tion incl#des /heads of )#rea#s/ a"ong those officers whose appoint"ents need the consent of the o""ission on Appoint"ents, the 1987 onstit#tion, on the other hand, deli)erately e5cl#ded the position of /heads of )#rea#s/ fro" appoint"ents that need the consent @confir"ationA of the o""ission on Appoint"ents. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT &AUTISTA VS. SALONGA (172 SCRA 1%0, 1989) FACTS" 0resident A6#ino designated Mary Ba#tista as Acting hair"an of the 1%. Later on, the 0resident e5tended to Ba#tista a per"anent appoint"ent as hair"an of the o""ission. !he too: her oath of office )y *irt#e of her appoint"ent as hair"an of the 1%. Ba#tista recei*ed letters fro" the 'A !ecretary re6#esting her to s#)"it certain infor"ation and doc#"ents and to )e present at a "eeting of the 'A o""ittee on H#stice and H#dicial and Bar o#ncil and 1#"an %ights, in connection with her confir"ation as hair"an of 1%. 1owe*er, she ref#sed to s#)"it herself to the 'A arg#ing that the latter has no -#risdiction to re*iew her appoint"ent as 1% hair"an. $he 'AIs secretary sent a letter to the e5ec#ti*e secretary infor"ing the latter that 'A disappro*ed Ba#tistaIs /ad interi" appoint"ent/ as hair"an of the 1%, in *iew of her ref#sal to s#)"it to the -#risdiction of the 'A. It is the 'AIs s#)"ission that the 0resident decides to the e5tent another appoint"ent to Ba#tista, this ti"e, s#)"itting s#ch appoint"entRno"ination to the 'A for confir"ation. ISSUE" 8hether or not confir"ation of the appoint"ents of the hair"an of the o""ission on 1#"an %ights re6#ires the consent of the 'A. HELD" 3o, since the office is not one of those "entioned in the first sentence of Article <II, !ection 1+, nor is it specified elsewhere that s#ch appoint"ents needs consent of the o""ission, it follows that the appoint"ent )y the 0resident of the hair"an of the 1% is to )e "ade witho#t the re*iew or participation of the o""ission on Appoint"ents. $o )e "ore precise, the appoint"ent of the hair"an and Me")ers of the o""ission on 1#"an %ights is not specifically pro*ided for in the onstit#tion itself, #nli:e the hair"en and Me")ers of the i*il !er*ice o""ission, the o""ission on .lections and the o""ission on A#dit, whose appoint"ents are e5pressly *ested )y the onstit#tion in the 0resident with the consent of the o""ission on Appoint"ent. $he 0resident appoints the hair"an and Me")ers of the o""ission on 1#"an %ights p#rs#ant to the second sentence in !ection 1+, Art. <II, that is, witho#t the confir"ation of the o""ission on Appoint"ents )eca#se they are a"ong the officers of go*ern"ent /who" he @the 0residentA "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law to appoint./ And !ection 2@cA, .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 1+4, 7 May 1987, a#thori&es the 0resident to appoint the hair"an and Me")ers of the o""ission on 1#"an %ights. It pro*ides2 /@cA $he hair"an and the Me")ers of the o""ission on 1#"an %ights shall )e appointed )y the 0resident for a ter" of se*en years witho#t re9appoint"ent. Appoint"ent to any *acancy shall )e only for the #ne5pired ter" of the predecessor./ ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT JUINTOSDELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS (177 SCRA 259, 1989) FACTS" 0etitioner and three others were appointed !ectoral %epresentati*es )y the 0resident p#rs#ant to Article <II, !ection 1+, paragraph 2 and Article ;<III, !ection 7 of the onstit#tion. 1owe*er, the appointees were not a)le to ta:e their oaths and discharge their d#ties as "e")ers of ongress d#e to the opposition of so"e congress"en9 "e")ers of the o""ission on Appoint"ents, who insisted that sectoral representati*es "#st first )e confir"ed )y the respondent o""ission )efore they co#ld ta:e their oaths andRor ass#"e office as "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. ISSUE" 8R3 appoint"ent of !ectoral %epresentati*es re6#ires confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents. HELD" D.!. !ince the seats reser*ed for sectoral representati*es in paragraph 2, !ection 7, Art. <I "ay )e filled )y appoint"ent )y the 0resident )y e5press pro*ision of !ection 7, Art. ;<III of the onstit#tion, it is #nd#)ita)le that sectoral representati*es to the 1o#se of %epresentati*es are a"ong the /other officers whose appoint"ents are *ested in the 0resident in this onstit#tion,/ referred to in the first sentence of !ection 1+, Art. <II whose appoint"ents are9s#)-ect to confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents. $here are appoint"ents *ested in the 0resident in the onstit#tion which, )y e5press "andate of the onstit#tion, re6#ire no confir"ation s#ch as appoint"ents of "e")ers of the !#pre"e o#rt and -#dges of lower co#rts @!ec. 9, Art. <IIIA and the '")#ds"an and his dep#ties @!ec. 9, Art. ;IA. 3o s#ch e5e"ption fro" confir"ation had )een e5tended to appoint"ents of sectoral representati*es in the onstit#tion. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CALDERON VS. CARALE (208 SCRA 254, 1992) FACTS" !o"eti"e in March 1989, %A +717 a"ending the La)or ode was appro*ed. !ec 14 thereof pro*ides that the hair"an, the Di*ision 0residing o""issioners and other o""issioners shall all )e appointed )y the 0resident s#)-ect to the confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ent. 0#rs#ant to said law, 0resident A6#ino appointed the hair"an and o""issioners of the 3L% representing the p#)lic wor:ers and e"ployees sectors. $he appoint"ent stated that the appointees "ay 6#alify and enter #pon the perfor"ance of the d#ties of the office. $his petition for prohi)ition 6#estions the constit#tionality of the per"anent appoint"ent e5tended )y the 0resident witho#t s#)"itting the sa"e to the o""ission on Appoint"ent for confir"ation p#rs#ant to %A +717. $he !olicitor ,eneral contends that %A +717 transgresses !ec 1+ Art <II )y e5panding the confir"ation power of the o""ission on Appoint"ents witho#t onstit#tional )asis. ISSUES" 1. May the ongress e5pand the list of those whose appoint"ent needs confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"entsC 2. 8hen is confir"ation )y 'A can )e said to )e re6#ired and notC HELD" 1. 3', the o#rt held that the ongress "ay not e5pand the list of appoint"ents needing confir"ation. $he 3L% hair"an and o""issioners fall within the second sentence of !ection 1+, Article <II of the onstit#tion, "ore specifically #nder the /third gro#ps/ of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those who" the 0resident "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law to appoint. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 130 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 Jndenia)ly, the hair"an and Me")ers of the 3L% are not a"ong the officers "entioned in the first sentence of !ection 1+, Article <II whose appoint"ents re6#ires confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents. $o the e5tent that %A +717 re6#ires confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents of the appoint"ents of respondents hair"an and Me")ers of the 3ational La)or %elations o""ission, it is #nconstit#tional )eca#se2 a. it a"ends )y legislation, the first sentence of !ec. 1+, Art. <II of the onstit#tion )y adding thereto appoint"ents re6#iring confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"entsG and ). it a"ends )y legislation the second sentence of !ec. 1+, Art. <II of the onstit#tion, )y i"posing the confir"ation of the o""ission on Appoint"ents on appoint"ents which are otherwise entr#sted only with the 0resident 2. onfir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents is re6#ired only for presidential appointees "entioned in the first sentence of !ection 1+, Article <II, incl#ding, those officers whose appoint"ents are e5pressly *ested )y the onstit#tion itself in the president @li:e sectoral representati*es to ongress and "e")ers of the constit#tional co""issions of A#dit, i*il !er*ice and .lectionA. onfir"ation is not re6#ired when the 0resident appoints other go*ern"ent officers whose appoint"ents are not otherwise pro*ided for )y law or those officers who" he "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law to appoint @li:e the hair"an and Me")ers of the o""ission on 1#"an %ightsA. Also, as o)ser*ed in Mison, when ongress creates inferior offices )#t o"its to pro*ide for appoint"ent thereto, or pro*ides in an #nconstit#tional "anner for s#ch appoint"ents, the officers are considered as a"ong those whose appoint"ents are not otherwise pro*ided for )y law. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT TARROSA VS. SINGSON (232 SCRA 553, 1994) FACTS" 0resident %a"os appointed respondent !ingson as ,o*ernor of the Bang:o !entral. 0etitioner arg#es that this appoint"ent is n#ll and *oid since it was not s#)"itted for confir"ation to the 'A. $he petition is anchored on the pro*isions of !ection + of %.A. 3o. 7+74, which esta)lished the Bang:o !entral as the entral Monetary A#thority of the 0hilippines. !ection +, Article II of %.A. 3o. 7+74 pro*ides2 /!ec. +. o"position of the Monetary Board. $he powers and f#nctions of the Bang:o !entral shall )e e5ercised )y the Bang:o !entral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, co"posed of se*en @7A "e")ers appointed )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines for a ter" of si5 @+A years. $he se*en @7A "e")ers are2 @aA $he ,o*ernor of the Bang:o !entral, who shall )e the hair"an of the Monetary Board. $he ,o*ernor of the Bang:o !entral shall )e head of a depart"ent and his appoint"ent shall )e s#)-ect to confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents. 8hene*er the ,o*ernor is #na)le to attend a "eeting of the Board, he shall designate a Dep#ty ,o*ernor to act as his alternate2 0ro*ided, $hat in s#ch e*ent, the Monetary Board shall designate one of its "e")ers as acting hair"an . . ./ @Jnderlining s#ppliedA. In their co""ent, respondents clai" that ongress e5ceeded its legislati*e powers in re6#iring the confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents of the appoint"ent of the ,o*ernor of the Bang:o !entral. $hey contend that an appoint"ent to the said position is not a"ong the appoint"ents which ha*e to )e confir"ed )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents, citing !ection 1+ of Article <II of the onstit#tion. ISSUE" May the ongress e5pand the confir"ation powers of the o""ission on Appoint"ents and re6#ire appoint"ent of other go*ern"ent officials not e5pressly "entioned in the first sentence of !ec. 1+ of Article 7 of the onstit#tionC HELD" 3'. In this case the o#rt #sed the sa"e r#ling as what was held in the case of alderon *s. orale, where the r#led was that ongress cannot )y law e5pand the confir"ation powers of the 'A and re6#ire confir"ation of appoint"ents of other go*ern"ent officials not e5pressly "entioned in the first sentence of !ection 1+ of Article <II of the onstit#tion. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FLORES VS. DRILON (223 SCRA 5%8, 1993) FACTS" Mayor ,ordon of 'longapo ity was appointed hair"an of !BMA on acco#nt of %A 7227. Jnder said law, for the first year of its effecti*eness, the "ayor of 'longapo shall )e appointed as chair"an of the !BMA. It was arg#ed that said pro*ision *iolates !ec. 7 Art I;29B which pro*ides2 that no electi*e official shall )e eligi)le for appoint"ent in any capacity to any p#)lic officer or position d#ring his ten#re. It was contended that the prohi)ition cannot )e applied d#e to the presence of a law a#thori&ing the appoint"ent. $he Local ,o*ern"ent ode per"its the appoint"ent of local electi*e official to another position or post. ISSUE" 8hether the pro*iso in !ec. 14, par. @dA, of %.A. 7227 which states, /0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat for the first year of its operations fro" the effecti*ity of this Act, the "ayor of the ity of 'longapo shall )e appointed as the chair"an and chief e5ec#ti*e officer of the !#)ic A#thority,/ *iolates the constit#tional proscription against appoint"ent or designation of electi*e officials to other go*ern"ent posts. HELD" D.!. In the case )efore #s, the s#)-ect pro*iso directs the 0resident to appoint an electi*e official, i.e., the Mayor of 'longapo ity, to other go*ern"ent posts @as hair"an of the Board and hief .5ec#ti*e 'fficer of !BMAA. !ince this is precisely what the constit#tional proscription see:s to pre*ent, it needs no stretching of the i"agination to concl#de that the pro*iso contra*enes !ec. 7, first part., Art. I;9B, of the onstit#tion. 1ere, the fact that the e5pertise of an electi*e official "ay )e "ost )eneficial to the higher interest of the )ody politic is of no "o"ent. It is arg#ed that !ec. 9B of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode @L,A per"its the appoint"ent of a local electi*e official to another post if so allowed )y law or )y the pri"ary f#nctions of his office. 8 B#t, the contention is fallacio#s. !ection 9B of the L, is not deter"inati*e of the constit#tionality of !ec. 14, par. @dA, of %.A. 7227, for no legislati*e act can pre*ail o*er the f#nda"ental law of the land. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (143 SCRA 327, 198%) FACTS" $he petitioner was appointed Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer II )y the city "ayor, Mayor !olon. $he appoint"ent was descri)ed as =per"anent> )#t the i*il !er*ice !er*ice o""ission appro*ed it as =te"porary> s#)-ect to the o#tco"e of the protest of the respondent. $he i*il !er*ice o""ission decided that respondent was )etter 6#alified, re*o:ed the appoint"ent of petitioner and ordered the appoint"ent of respondent in his place. $he pri*ate responded was so appointed )y the new "ayor, Mayor D#terte. $he petitioner, in*o:ing his earlier =per"anent> appoint"ent, is now )efore the o#rt to 6#estion that order and the pri*ate respondentKs title. ISSUES" 1. Is the i*il !er*ice o""ission a#thori&ed to disappro*e a per"anent appoint"ent on the gro#nd that another person is )etter 6#alified than the appointee and, on the )asis of this finding, order his replace"ent )y the latterC 2. 8R3 the i*il !er*ice o""ission has the power to "a:e a per"anent appoint"ent into a te"porary one. HELD" 1. 3'. $he i*il !er*ice o""ission is witho#t a#thority to re*o:e an appoint"ent )eca#se of its )elief that another person was )etter 6#alified, which is an encroach"ent on the discretion *ested solely in the city "ayor. 2. 3'. 8hile the principle is correct, and we ha*e applied it "any ti"es, it is not correctly applied in this case. $he arg#"ent )egs the 6#estion. $he appoint"ent of the petitioner was not te"porary )#t per"anent and was therefore protected )y onstit#tion. $he appointing a#thority indicated that it was per"anent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent i*il !er*ice o""ission to re*erse hi" and call it te"porary. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT PO&RE VS. MENDIETA (224 SCRA 738, 1993) FACTS" $his contro*ersy )egan when the ter" of office of 1onora)le (rancia as 0% o""issionerRhair"an e5pired. At that ti"e, Mendieta was the senior associate o""issioner and 0o)re was the second associate o""issioner of the 0%. $hen the e5ec#ti*e secretary so#ght the opinion of acting secretary of -#stice on whether the 0resident "ay appoint as o""issionerRhair"an of the 0% any person other than the !enior Associate o""issioner. Acting secretary of -#stice answered that !ec. 2 of 0D 224 does not li"it or restrict the appointing power of the 0resident. 0resident A6#ino then appointed the petitioner, then an Associate o""issioner, as the 0% o""issionerRhair"an. Mendieta filed a petition for declaratory relief contesting 0o)reKs appoint"ent as hair"an of the 0% )eca#se he allegedly San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 131 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 s#cceeded (rancia as 0% hair"an )y operation of law. $he trial co#rt r#led in fa*or of Mendieta. 1ence, this petition. ISSUE" 8R3 the *acancy in the co""ission shall )e filled )y =s#ccession> or =operation of law. HELD" 3'. $he o#rt finds #naccepta)le the *iew that e*ery *acancy in the o""ission @e5cept the position of /-#nior/ Associate o""issionerA shall )e filled )y /s#ccession/ or )y /operation of law/ for that wo#ld depri*e the 0resident of his power to appoint a new 0% o""issioner and Associate o""issioners 99 /all to )e appointed )y the 0resident/ #nder 0.D. 3o. 224. $he a)s#rd res#lt wo#ld )e that the only occasion for the 0resident to e5ercise his appointing power wo#ld )e when the position of -#nior @or secondA Associate o""issioner )eco"es *acant. 8e "ay not pres#"e that when the 0resident iss#ed 0.D. 3o. 224, he deli)erately clipped his prerogati*e to choose and appoint the head of the 0% and li"ited hi"self to the selection and appoint"ent of only the associate co""issioner occ#pying the lowest r#ng of the ladder in that agency. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DRILON VS. LIM (235 SCRA 135, 1994) FACTS" 0#rs#ant to section 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode @0roced#re for appro*al and effecti*ity of $a5 'rdianance and %e*en#e Meas#resA, the !ecretary of H#stice had, on appeal to hi" of fo#r oil co"panies and ta5payer, declared Manila %e*en#e ode n#ll and *oid for non9co"pliance with the prescri)ed proced#re in the enact"ent of ta5 ordianance @there were no written notices of p#)lic hearings nor were copies of the proposed ordinance p#)lishedA. In a petition for certiorari, %$ re*o:ed !ecretaryKs resol#tion and s#stained ordinance holding that all the proced#ral re6#ire"ents had )een o)ser*ed in the enact"ent of the Manila %e*en#e ode and that the ity of Manila had not )een a)le to pro*e s#ch co"pliance )efore the !ecretary only )eca#se he had gi*en it only fi*e days within which to gather and present to hi" all the e*idence later s#)"itted to the trial co#rt. More i"portantly, it declared !ection 187 of the L, as #nconstit#tional insofar as it e"powered the !ecretary of H#stice to re*iew ta5 ordinance and inferentially to ann#l the". 1is concl#sion was that the challenged section ga*e the !ecretary the power of control and not of s#per*ision only. $he 1987 onstit#tion pro*ides that 0resident shall e5ercise general s#per*ision o*er local go*ern"ents. ISSUES" 1. Disting#ish control fro" s#per*ision. 2. 8R3 !ection 187 of the L, ga*e the !ecretary the power of control and not s#per*ision only. HELD" 1. An officer in control lays down the r#les in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he "ay, in his discretion, order the act #ndone or re9done )y his s#)ordinate or he "ay e*en decide to do it hi"self. !#per*ision does not co*er s#ch a#thority. $he s#per*isor or s#perintendent "erely sees to it that the r#les are followed, )#t he hi"self does not lay down s#ch r#les, nor does he ha*e the discretion to "odify or replace the". If the r#les are not o)ser*ed, he "ay order the wor: done or re9done )#t only to confor" to the prescri)ed r#les. 1e "ay not prescri)e his own "anner for the doing of the act. 1e has no -#dg"ent on this "atter e5cept to see to it that the r#les are followed. 2. 3'. In the opinion of the o#rt, !ecretary Drilon did precisely this @!ee 3o.1A, and no "ore nor less than this, and so perfor"ed an act not of control )#t of "ere s#per*ision. !ecretary Drilon did set aside the Manila %e*en#e ode, )#t he did not replace it with his own *ersion of what the ode sho#ld )e. 1e did not prono#nce the ordinance #nwise or #nreasona)le as a )asis for its ann#l"ent. 1e did not say that in his -#dg"ent it was a )ad law. 8hat he fo#nd only was that it was illegal. All he did in re*iewing the said "eas#re was deter"ine if the petitioners were perfor"ing their f#nctions is accordance with law, that is, with the prescri)ed proced#re for the enact"ent of ta5 ordinances and the grant of powers to the city go*ern"ent #nder the Local ,o*ern"ent ode. As we see it, that was an act not of control )#t of "ere s#per*ision 81.%.('%., the -#dg"ent is here)y rendered %.<.%!I3, the challenged decision of the %egional $rial o#rt insofar as it declared !ection 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode #nconstit#tional )#t A((I%MI3, its finding that the proced#ral re6#ire"ents in the enact"ent of the Manila %e*en#e ode ha*e )een o)ser*ed. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT REMEDIOS T. &LAJUERA, ET AL. VS. ANGEL C. ALCALA, ET AL. G.R. NO. 10940%, SEPTEM&ER 11, 1998 FACTS" 0etitioners were paid incenti*e )enefits for the year 1992, p#rs#ant to ..'. 292 and the '"ni)#s %#les I"ple"enting Boo: < of .' 292. 0resident %a"os iss#ed A.'. 29, a#thori&ing the grant of prod#cti*ity incenti*e )enefits for the year 1992 in the "a5i"#" a"o#nt of 01,???.?? and reiterating the prohi)ition B #nder !ection 7 7 of A.'. 2+8, en-oining the grant of prod#cti*ity incenti*e )enefits witho#t the 0residentKs prior appro*al. !ection B of A' 29 directed /all depart"ents, offices and agencies which a#thori&ed pay"ent of D 1992 0rod#cti*ity Incenti*e Bon#s in e5cess of the a"o#nt a#thori&ed #nder !ection 1 hereof Oare here)y directedP to i""ediately ca#se the ret#rnRref#nd of the e5cess within a period of si5 "onths to co""ence fifteen @17A days after the iss#ance of this 'rder./ In co"pliance therewith, the heads of the depart"ents or agencies of the go*ern"ent concerned, who are the herein respondents, ca#sed the ded#ction fro" petitionersI salaries or allowances of the a"o#nts needed to co*er the alleged o*erpay"ents. $h#s, petitioners see: relief fro" this. 0etitioners theori&e that A' 29 and A' 2+8 *iolate .' 292 and since the latter is a law, it pre*ails o*er e5ec#ti*e iss#ances. 0etitioners li:ewise assert that A' 29 and A' 2+8 encroach #pon the constit#tional a#thority of the i*il !er*ice o""ission to adopt "eas#res to strengthen the "erit and rewards syste" and to pro"#lgate r#les, reg#lations and standards go*erning the incenti*e awards syste" of the ci*il ser*ice. ISSUE" 8hether or not A' 29 and A' 2+8 were iss#ed in the *alid e5ercise of presidential control o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"entsC HELD" Des. A' 29 and A' 2+8 were iss#ed in the *alid e5ercise of presidential control o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. $he 0resident is the head of the go*ern"ent. ,o*ern"ental power and a#thority are e5ercised and i"ple"ented thro#gh hi". 1is power incl#des the control e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. ontrol "eans /the power of an officer to alter or "odify or set aside what a s#)ordinate officer had done in the perfor"ance of his d#ties and to s#)stit#te the -#dg"ent of the for"er for that of the latter./ It has )een held that /the 0resident can, )y *irt#e of his power of control, re*iew, "odify, alter or n#llify any action, or decision, of his s#)ordinate in the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s, or offices #nder hi". 1e can e5ercise this power "ot# proprio witho#t need of any appeal fro" any party./ 8hen the 0resident iss#ed A' 29 li"iting the a"o#nt of incenti*e )enefits, en-oining heads of go*ern"ent agencies fro" granting incenti*e )enefits witho#t prior appro*al fro" hi", and directing the ref#nd of the e5cess o*er the prescri)ed a"o#nt, the 0resident was -#st e5ercising his power of control o*er e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. $he 0resident iss#ed s#)-ect Ad"inistrati*e 'rders to reg#late the grant of prod#cti*ity incenti*e )enefits and to pre*ent discontent"ent, dissatisfaction and de"orali&ation a"ong go*ern"ent personnel )y co""itting li"ited reso#rces of go*ern"ent for the e6#al pay"ent of incenti*es and awards. $he 0resident was only e5ercising his power of control )y "odifying the acts of the respondents who granted incenti*e )enefits to their e"ployees witho#t appropriate clearance fro" the 'ffice of the 0resident, there)y res#lting in the #ne*en distri)#tion of go*ern"ent reso#rces. In the *iew of the 0resident, respondents did a "ista:e which had to )e corrected. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT VILLENA VS. SECRETAR- OF INTERIOR (%7 PHIL 451) FACTS" It appears that the Di*ision of In*estigation of the Depart"ent of H#stice, #pon the re6#est of the !ecretary of the Interior, cond#cted an in6#iry into the cond#ct of the petitioner, as a res#lt of which the latter was fo#nd to ha*e co""itted )ri)ery, e5tortion, "alicio#s a)#se of a#thority and #na#thori&ed practice of the law profession. $he respondent reco""ended to the 0resident of the 0hilippines the s#spension of the petitioner to pre*ent possi)le coercion of witnesses, which reco""endation was granted. $he !ecretary of the Interior s#spended the petitioner fro" office, and then and thereafter wired the 0ro*incial ,o*ernor of %i&al with instr#ction that the petitioner )e ad*ised accordingly. $he respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, specifying the "any charges against hi" and notifying hi" of the designation of a special in*estigator to in*estigate the charges. $he special in*estigator forthwith notified the petitioner that the for"al in*estigation wo#ld )e co""enced on March 28, 1949. 1ence, the petition for preli"inary in-#nction against the !ecretary of Interior to restrain hi" and his agents fro" preceding with the in*estigation of petitioner which was sched#led to ta:e place on March 28, 1949. ISSUES" 1. 8R3 the !ecretary of Interior has the power to order an in*estigation. 2. 8R3 the !ecretary of Interior has the power to s#spend. HELD" 1. D.!. !#per*ision is not a "eaningless thing. It is an acti*e power. It is certainly not witho#t li"itation, )#t it at least i"plies a#thority to in6#ire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effecti*e. If s#per*ision is to )e conscientio#s and rational, and not a#to"atic and )r#tal, it "#st )e fo#nded #pon :nowledge of act#al facts and conditions disclosed after caref#l st#dy and in*estigation. $he principle there en#nciated is applica)le with e6#al force to the present case. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 132 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he !ecretary of the Interior is in*ested with a#thority to order the in*estigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special in*estigator for that p#rpose. 2. D.!. $he !ecretary of Interior is e"powered to in*estigate the charges against the pwtitioner and to appoint a special in*estigator for that p#rpose, pre*enti*e s#spension "ay )e a "eans )y which to carry into effect a fair and i"partial in*estigation. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT LACSONMAGALLANES CO., INC. VS. PANO (21 SCRA 395, 19%7) FACTS" Hose Magallanes, a per"ittee and act#al occ#pant of a 1,1?49hectare past#re land, ceded his rights and interests to a portion thereof to plaintiff. !#)se6#ently, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released fro" the forest &one as past#re land and declared agric#lt#ral land. Hose 0aNo and nineteen other clai"ants applied for the p#rchase of 9? hectares of the released area. 0laintiff corporation in t#rn filed its own sales application co*ering the entire released area. $his was protested )y 0aNo and his co"panions, clai"ing that they are act#al occ#pants of the part thereof co*ered )y their own sales application. $he Director of Lands rendered -#dg"ent, gi*ing d#e co#rse to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dis"issing the clai" of Hose 0aNo and his co"panions. A "o*e to reconsider failed. An appeal was "ade )#t the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces dis"issed the sa"e. 8hen the case was ele*ated to the 0resident of the 0hilippines, .5ec#ti*e !ecretary H#an 0a-o, )y a#thority of the 0resident, "odified the decision of the Director of Lands as affir"ed )y the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces. 0laintiff corporation too: this decision to the trial co#rt, praying that -#dg"ent )e rendered declaring that the decision of the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces has f#ll force and effect. 0laintiffIs "ainstay is !ection B of o""onwealth Act 1B1. $he precept there is that decisions of the Director of Lands /as to 6#estions of fact shall )e concl#si*e when appro*ed/ )y the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces. 0laintiffIs trenchant clai" is that this stat#te is controlling not only #pon co#rts )#t also #pon the 0resident. ISSUE" May the 0resident thro#gh his e5ec#ti*e secretary #ndo an act of the Director of Lands, which a law pro*ides that s#ch act will )e concl#si*e when affir"ed )y the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces '% 8R3 the ad"inistrati*e decision co#ld still )e appealed to the 0residentC HELD" D.!. $he 0residentIs d#ty to e5ec#te the law is of constit#tional origin. !o, too, is his control of all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. $h#s it is, that depart"ent heads are "en of his confidence. 1is is the power to appoint the"G his, too, is the pri*ilege to dis"iss the" at pleas#re. 3at#rally, he controls and directs their acts. I"plicit then is his a#thority to go o*er, confir", "odify or re*erse the action ta:en )y his depart"ent secretaries. In this conte5t, it "ay not )e said that the 0resident cannot r#le on the correctness of a decision of a depart"ent secretary. It "ay )e stated that the right to appeal to the 0resident reposes #pon the 0residentIs power of control o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. And control si"ply "eans the power of an officer to alter or "odify or n#llify or set aside what a s#)ordinate officer had done in the perfor"ance of his d#ties and to s#)stit#te the -#dg"ent of the for"er for that of the latter. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT CIT- OF ILIGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS (158 SCRA 158 519886) FACTS" 0rocla"ation 3o. 447 was iss#ed, withdrawing fro" sale or settle"ent and reser*ed for the #se of the 30 certain parcels of the p#)lic do"ain. Meanwhile, the 30 constr#cted Maria ristina (ertili&er 0lant, which was sold, ceded, transferred and con*eyed to Marcelo $ire and %#))er orporation, incl#ding the right of occ#pancy and #se of the land descri)ed in 0rocla"ation 447, !eries of 1972. 0rocla"ation 3o. 2?, !eries of 19+2, and 0rocla"ation 198, !eries of 19+B, were s#)se6#ently iss#ed, e5cl#ding fro" the operation of 0rocla"ation 3o. 447, !eries of 1972, certain areas occ#pied )y the Maria ristina (ertili&er 0lant, and declaring the sa"e open to disposition #nder the pro*isions of 0#)lic Land. $he Marcelo !teel orporation andRor the Maria ristina (ertili&er 0lant, thro#gh the 0resident, Hose 0. Marcelo filed in the B#rea# of Lands a Miscellaneo#s !ales Application for tracts of lands for ind#strial p#rposes. Director of Lands ad*ised the p#)lic that the B#rea# of Lands will sell to the highest 6#alified )idder the tract of land co*ered )y Miscellaneo#s !ales application. 0rocla"ation 3o. B+9 was later iss#ed, which e5cl#de fro" the reser*ation "ade in fa*or of the 30, e5isting #nder 0rocla"ation 3o. 447, !eries of 1972, and 0rocla"ation 3o. 2?, !eries of 19+2, certain parcels of land e")raced therein./ Lots 1,19a, 4 and B, containing appro5i"ately an area of 29,+81 s6#are "eters are descri)ed therein. $he 0rocla"ation f#rther stated /that #pon the reco""endation of the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces and p#rs#ant to !ection +? of .A. 3o. 1B1, I do here)y grant, donate and transfer the afore"entioned parcels of land incl#ding the foreshores thereof, in fa*or of Iligan ity./ $he Mayor of Iligan ity wrote the Director of Lands to infor" hi" that the ity of Iligan is the owner in fee si"ple of Lots 1, 19a, 4 and B incl#ding the foreshores thereof )y *irt#e of 0rocla"ation 3o. B+9, !eries of 19+7, and re6#esting that the said property )e e5cl#ded fro" the proposed a#ction sale./ 3o action was ta:en on this re6#est for e5cl#sion. 1ence, the ity of Iligan filed a co"plaint for in-#nction with preli"inary in-#nction against the Director of Lands, District Land 'fficer of Lanao del 3orte and the Marcelo !teel orporation to en-oin and stop the sale andRor disposition of the afore descri)ed parcels of land. 0resident Marcos iss#ed 0rocla"ation 3o. 9B e5cl#ding fro" the operation of 0rocla"ation 3o. B+9 certain portions of the land e")raced therein, sit#ated in Iligan ity and declaring the sa"e open to disposition. !aid portions of land, as descri)ed therein are Lots 19a, 29a and 4 of the parcels of land in 6#estion. After the trial on the "erits, the co#rt dis"issed the co"plaint and dissol*ed the writ of preli"inary in-#nction. 'n appeal, the records of the case were certified to this o#rt as the iss#e of the *alidity of any e5ec#ti*e order and the errors or the 6#estions of the law raised are within the e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of this o#rt. ISSUE" 8hether or not the 0resident has the power to grant portions of p#)lic do"ain to any go*ern"ent entity li:e the city of Iligan. HELD" D.!. the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces is the e5ec#ti*e officer9in9charged with the d#ty of carrying o#t the pro*ision of the 0#)lic Land Act thr# the Director of Lands who acts #nder his i""ediate control. !ection B thereof, also pro*ides2 /!ec. B. !#)-ect to said control, the Director of Lands shall ha*e direct e5ec#ti*e control of the s#r*ey, classification, lease, sale or any other for" of concession or disposition and "anage"ent of the lands of the p#)lic do"ain, and his decisions as to 6#estions of fact shall )e concl#si*e when appro*ed )y the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces./ !ince it is the Director of Lands who has direct e5ec#ti*e control a"ong others in the lease, sale or any for" of concession or disposition of the land of the p#)lic do"ain s#)-ect to the i""ediate control of the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces, and considering that #nder the onstit#tion the 0resident of the 0hilippines has control o*er all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s, and offices, etc., 17 the 0resident of the 0hilippines has therefore the sa"e a#thority to dispose of portions of the p#)lic do"ain as his s#)ordinates, the Director of Lands, and his alter ego the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT GASCON VS. ARRO-O (178 SCRA 582, 1989) FACTS" $he Lope& fa"ily is the owner of two tele*ision stations, na"ely2 hannels 2 and B which they ha*e operated thro#gh the AB!9 B3 Broadcasting orporation. 8hen "artial law was declared, $< hannel B was closed )y the "ilitaryG thereafter, its facilities were ta:en o*er )y the Lanlaon Broadcasting !yste" which operated it as a co""ercial $< station. In 1978, the said $< station and its facilities were ta:en o*er )y the 3ational Media 0rod#ction enter @3M0A, which operated it as the Maharli:a Broadcasting !yste" $< B @MB!9BA. After the 198+ .D!A re*ol#tion, the 0,, se6#estered the afore"entioned $< !tations, and, thereafter, the 'ffice of Media Affairs too: o*er the operation of $< hannel B. $he Lope& fa"ily, thro#gh co#nsel, re6#ested 0resident A6#ino to order the ret#rn to the Lope& fa"ily of $< !tations 2 and B. $hey "ade a written re6#est to the 0,, for the ret#rn of $< !tation hannel 2. $he 0,, appro*ed the ret#rn of $< !tation hannel 2 to the Lope& fa"ily. $he ret#rn was "ade on 18 'cto)er 198+. $hereafter, the Lope& fa"ily re6#ested for the ret#rn of $< !tation hannel B. Acting #pon the re6#est, respondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary, )y a#thority of the 0resident, entered into with the AB!9B3 Broadcasting orporation, represented )y its 0resident, .#genio Lope&, Hr., an /Agree"ent to Ar)itrate/, 4 p#rs#ant to which an Ar)itration o""ittee was created, co"posed of Atty. atalino Macaraig, Hr., for the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, Atty. 0astor del %osario, for AB!9B3, and retired H#stice <icente A)ad !antos, as hair"an. $here#pon, petitioners, as ta5payers, filed the instant petition. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 133 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ISSUE" 8R3 the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary has the power and a#thority to enter into an Agree"ent to Ar)itrate. HELD" D.!. %espondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary has the power and a#thority to enter into the Agree"ent to ar)itrate with the AB!9B3 Broadcasting orporation as he acted for and in )ehalf of the 0resident when he signed it. Jnder the 0ro*isional onstit#tion of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines @also :nown as the (reedo" onstit#tionA, which was in force and effect when the /Agree"ent to Ar)itrate/ was signed )y the parties thereto on + Han#ary 1987, the 0resident e5ercised )oth the legislati*e and e5ec#ti*e powers of the ,o*ern"ent. As hief .5ec#ti*e, the 0resident was @and e*en nowA /assisted )y a a)inet/ co"posed of Ministers @now !ecretariesA, who were appointed )y and acco#nta)le to the 0resident. In other words, the Me")ers of the ca)inet, as heads of the *ario#s depart"ents, are the assistants and agents of the hief .5ec#ti*e, and, e5cept in cases where the hief .5ec#ti*e is re6#ired )y the onstit#tion or the law to act in person, or where the e5igencies of the sit#ation de"and that he act personally, the "#ltifario#s e5ec#ti*e and ad"inistrati*e f#nctions of the hief .5ec#ti*e are perfor"ed )y and thro#gh the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, and the acts of the heads of s#ch depart"ents, perfor"ed in the reg#lar co#rse of )#siness, are, #nless disappro*ed or repro)ated )y the hief .5ec#ti*e, pres#"pti*ely the acts of the hief .5ec#ti*e. %espondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary had, therefore, the power and a#thority to enter into the /Agree"ent to Ar)itrate/ with the AB!9B3 Broadcasting orporation, as he acted for and in )ehalf of the 0resident when he signed itG hence, the aforesaid agree"ent is *alid and )inding #pon the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, as a party thereto. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 7ILUSANG &A-AN VS. DOMINGUE$ (205 SCRA 92, 1992) FACTS" $he M#nicipal ,o*ern"ent of M#ntinl#pa entered into a contract with the Lil#sang Bayan sa 0agliling:od ng "ga 3agtitinda sa Bagong 0a"ilihang Bayan ng M#ntinl#pa @:il#sanA for the latterIs "anage"ent and operation of the M#ntinl#pa 0#)lic Mar:et. 8hen Ignacio B#nye @petitioner in ,% 91927A )eca"e Mayor of M#ntinl#pa, he directed a re*iew of s#ch contract, clai"ing that the *irt#al, 7?9year ter" agree"ent was contrary to !ec. 1B4 @4A of B0 447. 1e so#ght opinions fro" the 'A and the Metro Manila o""ission after which the latter granted the M#nicipality the a#thority to ta:e the necessary legal steps for the cancellation of the a)o*e contract. onse6#ently, #pon the presentation "ade )y B#nye with the M#nicipal o#ncil, the latter appro*ed %esol#tion 3o. B7 a)rogating the contract. B#nye, together with "en fro" the 0, proceeded to the p#)lic "ar:et and anno#nced to the general p#)lic that the M#nicipality was ta:ing o*er the "anage"ent and operation of the facility therein. $he officers of the Lil#san filed s#it for )reach of contract and da"ages, and contin#ed holding office in the LB B#ilding #nder their respecti*e official capacities. B#nye, together with so"e hea*ily ar"ed "en, forci)ly opened the doors of the offices of petitioners p#rportedly to ser*e the" the 'rder of then !ec. of Agric#lt#re arlos Do"ing#e&, ordering 1A the ta:e o*er )y the Depart"ent of Agric#lt#re of the "anage"ent o*er the p#)lic "ar:et p#rs#ant to the Depart"ent %eg#latory and !#per*isory 0ower #nder !ec. 8 of 0D 177 and !ec. B of .' 3o.4G 2A the creation of a Manage"ent o""ittee which shall ass#"e the "anage"ent of Lil#sanG and 4A the dis)and, of the Board of Directors and BA the t#rn o*er of all assets, properties and records to the Manage"ent o""ittee. 0etitioners filed this petition praying that the 'rder to )e declared n#ll and *oid as the respondent !ecretary acted witho#t or in e5cess of -#risdiction in iss#ing the order. ISSUE" 8R3 28 'cto)er 1988 'rder of respondent !ecretary of Agric#lt#re is witho#t or in e5cess of -#risdictionC HELD" D.!. 0.D. 3o. 177 and the )y9laws of the LBMB0M e5plicitly "andate the "anner )y which directors and officers are to )e re"o*ed. $he !ecretary sho#ld ha*e :nown )etter than to disregard these proced#res and rely on a "ere petition )y the general "e")ership of the LBMB0M and an on9going a#dit )y Depart"ent of Agric#lt#re a#ditors in e5ercising a power which he does not ha*e, e5pressly or i"pliedly. An ad"inistrati*e officer has only s#ch powers as are e5pressly granted to hi" and those necessarily i"plied in the e5ercise thereof. $hese powers sho#ld not )e e5tended )y i"plication )eyond what "ay )e necessary for their -#st and reasona)le e5ec#tion. !#per*ision and control incl#de only the a#thority to2 @aA act directly whene*er a specific f#nction is entr#sted )y law or reg#lation to a s#)ordinateG @)A direct the perfor"ance of d#tyG restrain the co""ission of actsG @cA re*iew, appro*e, re*erse or "odify acts and decisions of s#)ordinate officials or #nitsG @dA deter"ine priorities in the e5ec#tion of plans and progra"sG and @eA prescri)e standards, g#idelines, plans and progra"s. !pecifically, ad"inistrati*e s#per*ision is li"ited to the a#thority of the depart"ent or its e6#i*alent to2 @1A generally o*ersee the operations of s#ch agencies and ins#re that they are "anaged effecti*ely, efficiently and econo"ically )#t witho#t interference with day9to9day acti*itiesG @2A re6#ire the s#)"ission of reports and ca#se the cond#ct of "anage"ent a#dit, perfor"ance e*al#ation and inspection to deter"ine co"pliance with policies, standards and g#idelines of the depart"entG @4A ta:e s#ch action as "ay )e necessary for the proper perfor"ance of official f#nctions, incl#ding rectification of *iolations, a)#ses and other for"s of "al9ad"inistrationG @BA re*iew and pass #pon )#dget proposals of s#ch agencies )#t "ay not increase or add to the". ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ANGANGCO VS. CASTILLO 9 SCRA %19 519%36 FACTS" $he 0epsi9ola (ar .ast $rade re6#ested for special per"it to withdraw 0epsi ola concentrates fro" the c#sto"s ho#se. 0etitioner ollector of #sto"s Isidro Ang9angco ad*ised the co#nsel for 0epsi9ola to try to sec#re the necessary release certificate fro" the 3o9dollar I"port 'ffice. A6#iles Lope& of said office wrote petitioner, stating that it co#ld not ta:e action on the re6#est, as the sa"e is not within the -#risdiction of the 'ffice. (ollowing !ecretary of (inance 1ernande&Ks appro*al of the release, petitioner a#thori&ed release of the concentrates. 8hen #sto"s o""issioner Manahan learned of said release, he ordered the sei&#re of the goods )#t only a portion thereof re"ained in the wareho#se. $h#s, he filed an ad"inistrati*e s#it against petitioner. After an in*estigation, respondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary 3atalio astillo fo#nd petitioner g#ilty of cond#ct pre-#dicial to the )est interest of the ser*ice and considering hi" resigned, with pre-#dice to reinstate"ent in the B#rea# of #sto"s. 0etitioner wrote 0res. ,arcia, asserting that the action ta:en )y respondent had the effect of depri*ing hi" of his stat#tory right to ha*e his case originally decided )y the !, as well as of his right or appeal to the i*il !er*ice Board of Appeals, whose decision #nder %A 22+? is final. By a#thority of the 0resident, respondent denied reconsideration, as well as the appeal. 1ence, this present petition. ISSUE" 8hether the 0resident has the power to "a:e direct action on the case of petitioner e*en if he )elongs to the classified ser*ice in spite of the pro*ision now in the i*il !er*ice Act of 1979. HELD" $he action ta:en )y respondent e5ec#ti*e !ecretary, e*en with the a#thority of the 0resident in ta:ing direct action on the ad"inistrati*e case, petitioner, witho#t s#)"itting the sa"e to the o""ission of i*il !er*ice is contrary to law and sho#ld )e set aside. $he following are the reasons2 1. Jnder sec 1+ of the i*il !er*ice Act of 1979, it is the o""issioner of i*il !er*ice who has original and e5cl#si*e -#risdiction to decide ad"inistrati*e cases of all officers and e"ployees in the classified ser*ice. $he only li"itation to this power is the decision of the o""issioner "ay )e appealed to the i*il ser*ice Board of Appeals, in which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 9? days after the sa"e has )een s#)"itted for decision, whose decision in s#ch cases shall )e final. It is therefore clear that #nder the present pro*ision of the i*il !er*ice act of 1979, the case of petitioner co"es #nder the e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of the o""issioner of i*il !er*ice, and ha*ing )een depri*ed of the proced#re and down therein in connection with the in*estigation and disposition of this case, it "ay )e said that he has )een depri*ed of d#e process g#aranteed )y said law. 2. Let #s now ta:e #p the power of control gi*en to the 0resident )y the onstit#tion o*er all offices and e"ployees in the e5ec#ti*e depart"ent which is not in*o:ed )y respondents as -#stification to o*erride the specific pro*ision of the i*il !er*ice Act. $he power "erely applies to the e5ercise of control o*er the acts of the s#)ordinate and not o*er the actor or agent hi"self of the act. It only "eans that the 0resident "ay set aside the -#dg"ent of action ta:en )y the s#)ordinate in the perfor"ance of d#ties. 4. 3ot the strongest arg#"ent against the theory of respondents is that it wo#ld entirely n#llify and set aside at na#ght the )eneficent p#rpose of the whole i*il !er*ice syste" as i"planted in this -#risdiction which is to gi*e sta)ility to the ten#re of office of those who )elong to the classified ser*ice, in derogation of the pro*ision of o#r onstit#tion which pro*ides the =3o officer or e"ployee in the ci*il ser*ice shall )e re"o*ed or s#spended e5cept for ca#se as pro*ided )y law.> $he power of control of the 0resident "ay e5tend to the power to in*estigate, s#spend or re"o*e officers and e"ployees who )elong to the e5ec#ti*e depart"ent if they are presidential appointee or do not )elong to the classified ser*ice for to the" that inherent power cannot )e e5ercised. $his is in line with the pro*ision of o#r constit#tional which saysG =$he ongress "ay )y law *est the appoint"ent of the inferior officers in the 0resident alone in the co#rts or in the heads of depart"ent> and with regards to these officers pro*ided )y law for a proced#re for their re"o*al precisely in *iew of this constit#tional a#thority. 'ne s#ch law is the i*il !er*ice Act of 179. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT NATIONAL MAR7ET CORP. (NAMARCO) VS. ARCA (29 SCRA %48 5SEPTEM&ER 30, 19%96) FACTS" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 134 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 %espodent Ari*e was the Manager of the $raffic9!torage Depart"ent of the 3AMA%'. 0#rs#ant to the ,eneral ManagerKs Ad"inistrati*e 'rder, he was in*estigated )y a co""ittee for *iolating Manage"ent Me"orand#" 'rder [ declaring =that the allocation and deli*eries of "erchansdise i"ported to its designated )eneficiaries )e stopped> and ca#sing the i"proper release of ship"ents intended for deli*ery. After d#e hearing, the in*estigating co""ittee fo#nd Ari*e g#ilty of charges and he was dis"issed. Ari*e appealed fro" the decision of the 3AMA%' to the 0resident. $he 3AMA%' was ad*ised )y the 'ffice of the 0resident of the appeal, and was as:ed to forward the records of the Ad"inistrati*e case. $he .5ec#ti*e !ecretary, pres#"a)ly acting for the 0resident, handed down a decision setting aside the resol#tion of the )oard of directors and reinstating Ari*e. 3AMA%', thro#gh its ,eneral Manager, so#ght reconsideration, contended that the 'ffice of the 0resident had no -#risdiction to re*iew any decision of the 3AMA%' Board of Directors re"o*ing s#spending or otherwise disciplining any of its s#)ordinate e"ployees, )eca#se %A 14B7 @the 3AMA%' harterA, which grants that power to the ,eneral Manager and to the Board of Directors, does not pro*ide for an appeal to any go*ern"ental )ody. $his "otion for reconsideration was denied twice )y the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary on the gro#nd that the 0resident had -#risdiction #nder his constit#tional power of control o*er all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s and offices. $he 'ffice of the 0resident, acting on co"plaints of Ari*e that he had not )een reinstated in spite of the denial of the 3AMA%'Is two "otions for reconsideration, sent a telegra" to the ,eneral Manager re6#esting hi" to act on the case and to co""ent within forty9eight ho#rsG )#t the said ,eneral Manager neither acted on the case nor co""ented. %espondent H#an $. Ari*e filed against the 3AMA%' and the "e")ers of its Board of Directors an action for reinstate"ent. H#dge Arca r#led in his fa*or, ordering 3AMA%' to reinstate Ari*e. DefendantsK "otion for reconsideration was denied. 1ence, the present petition. ISSUE" 8.$1.% '% 3'$ the preident has the power to re*iew and re*erse decisions of go*ern"ent corporations. HELD" D.!. $he o#rt hold that the 0resident of the 0hilippinesI a#thority to re*iew and re*erse the decision of the 3AMA%' Board of Directors dis"issing H#an $. Ari*e fro" his position in the 3AMA%' and to order his reinstate"ent falls within the constit#tional power of the 0resident o*er all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s and offices. Jnder o#r go*ern"ental set#p, corporations owned or controlled )y the go*ern"ent, s#ch as the 3AMA%', parta:e of the nat#re of go*ern"ent )#rea#s or offices, which are ad"inistrati*ely s#per*ised )y the Ad"inistrator of the 'ffice of .cono"ic oordination, /whose co"pensation and ran: shall )e that of a head of an .5ec#ti*e Depart"ent/ and who /shall )e responsi)le to the 0resident of the 0hilippines #nder whose control his f#nctions . . . shall )e e5ercised./ ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT GUA$ON VS. DE VILLA (181 SCRA %23, 1990) FACTS" $his is a petition for prohi)ition with preli"inary in-#nction to prohi)it the "ilitary and police officers represented )y p#)lic respondents fro" cond#cting /Areal $arget Xonings/ or /!at#ration Dri*es/ in Metro Manila. $he petitioners co"plains that police and "ilitary #nits witho#t any search warrant or warrant of arrest goes to an area of "ore than one residence and so"eti"es whole )arangay or areas of )arangay in Metro Manila to search for e*idence of offenses that "ay ha*e )een co""itted. $he petitioners clai" that the sat#ration dri*es follow a co""on pattern of h#"an rights a)#ses. !olicitor ,eneral arg#es -#st the contrary, that it had )een cond#cted with d#e regard to h#"an rights. ISSUE" 8R3 the 0resident has the power to order sat#ration dri*es. HELD" D.!. $here is, of co#rse, nothing in the onstit#tion which denies the a#thority of the hief .5ec#ti*e, in*o:ed )y the !olicitor ,eneral, to order police actions to stop #na)ated cri"inality, rising lawlessness, and alar"ing co""#nist acti*ities. $he onstit#tion grants to ,o*ern"ent the power to see: and cripple s#)*ersi*e "o*e"ents which wo#ld )ring down constit#ted a#thority and s#)stit#te a regi"e where indi*id#al li)erties are s#ppressed as a "atter of policy in the na"e of sec#rity of the !tate. 1owe*er, all police actions are go*erned )y the li"itations of the Bill of %ights. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT RAMON RUFF- VS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARM- (G.R. NO. L533, AUGUST 20, 194%) TUASON !. FACTS" It appears that at the o#t)rea: of war in 19B1, %a"on %#ffy was the 0ro*incial o""ander, 0r#dente M. (rancisco, a -#nior officer, and Andres (ort#s, a corporal, all of the 0hilippine onsta)#lary garrison stationed in Mindoro. 8hen the Hapanese forces landed in Mindoro, Ma-or %#ffy retreated to the "o#ntains instead of s#rrendering to the ene"y, dis)anded his co"pany, and organi&ed and led a g#errilla o#tfit :nown as Bolo o")at tea" of Bolo Area. D#ring the occ#pation of the 0hilippines )y the Hapanese forces, the Bolo Area in Mindoro was a contingent of the +th Military District, which had )een recogni&ed )y and placed #nder the operational control of the J! Ar"y in the !o#thwest 0acific. A change in the co""and in the Bolo Area was effected )y ol. H#rado, the then o""anding 'fficer of the Bolo o")at $ea" in Mindoro. Ma-or %#ffy was relie*ed of his assign"ent as o""anding 'fficer of the Bolo Area. ol. H#rado was slain allegedly )y the petitioners. After the co""ission of this cri"e, it is alleged that the petitioners seceded fro" the +th Military District. It was this "#rder which ga*e rise to petitionerIs trial, the legality of which is now )eing contested. A trial )y the ,eneral o#rt Martial ens#ed and which res#lted to the ac6#ittal of %a"on %#ffy and dis"issal of the case as to <ictoriano Dinglasan and the con*iction of Hose ,arcia, 0r#dente (rancisco, Do"inador Ade*a and Andres (ort#s. $he petitioners who were con*icted filed s#it )efore this o#rt, assailing the constit#tionality of 94rd Article of 8ar. It ordains /that any person s#)-ect to "ilitary law who co""its "#rder in ti"e of war sho#ld s#ffer death or i"prison"ent for life, as the co#rt "artial "ay direct/ It is arg#ed that since /no re*iew is pro*ided )y that law to )e "ade )y the !#pre"e o#rt, irrespecti*e of whether the p#nish"ent is for life i"prison"ent or death/ it *iolated Art. <III !ee 2 par B of the onstit#tion. It pro*ides that /the 3ational Asse")ly "ay not depri*e the !#pre"e o#rt of its original -#risdiction o*er all cri"inal cases in which the penalty i"posed is death or life i"prison"ent. ISSUE" 8hether or not the 94rd of Article of 8ar #nconstit#tionalC HELD" 3'. $he petitioners are in error. $his error arose fro" fail#re to percei*e the nat#re of co#rts "artial and the so#rces of the a#thority for their creation. o#rt Martial are agencies of e5ec#ti*e character and one of the a#thorities for ordering of co#rt "artial has )een held to )e attached to the constit#tional f#nctions of the 0resident as o""ander in hief, independently of legislation. Jnli:e co#rt of law, they are not a portion of -#diciary. $hey are in fact si"ply instr#"entalities of the e5ec#ti*e power, pro*ided )y ongress for the 0resident as o""ander in chief to aid hi" in properly co""anding the ar"y and na*y and enforcing discipline therein and #tili&ed #nder his order 'r those of his a#thori&ed "ilitary representati*es. $he petition is therefore has no "erit and that it sho#ld )e dis"issed with costs. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OLAGUER VS. MILITAR- COMMISSION NO. 34 (150 SCRA 144, 1987) FACTS" $he petitioners were charged for s#)*ersion. $he respondent hief of !taff of the A(0 created the respondent Military o""ission 3o. 4B to try the cri"inal case filed against the petitioners. An a"ended charge sheet was filed for se*en offenses, na"ely2 @1A #nlawf#l possession of e5plosi*es and incendiary de*icesG @2A conspiracy to assassinate 0resident and Mrs. MarcosG @4A conspiracy to assassinate ca)inet "e")ers H#an 0once .nrile, (rancisco $atad and <icente 0aternoG @BA conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Art#ro $angco, Hose %oNo and 'nofre orp#sG @7A arson of nine )#ildingsG @+A atte"pted "#rder of Messrs. Leonardo 0ere&, $eodoro <alencia and ,enerals %o"eo .spino and (a)ian <erG and @7A conspiracy and proposal to co""it re)ellion, and inciting to re)ellion. !o"eti"e thereafter, trial ens#ed. In the co#rse of the proceedings the petitioners went to this o#rt and filed the instant 0etition for prohi)ition and ha)eas corp#s. $hey so#ght to en-oin the respondent Military o""ission 3o. 4B fro" proceeding with the trial of their case. $hey li:ewise so#ght their release fro" detention )y way of a writ of ha)eas corp#s. $he thr#st of their arg#"ents is that "ilitary co""issions ha*e no -#risdiction to try ci*ilians for offenses alleged to ha*e )een co""itted d#ring the period of "artial law. ISSUE" 8R3 "ilitary co""issions ha*e no -#risdiction to try ci*ilians for offenses alleged to ha*e )een co""itted d#ring the period of "artial law. HELD" Military co""ission has no -#risdiction to try ci*ilians when the ci*il co#rts are open. D#e process of law de"ands that in all cri"inal prosec#tions @where the acc#sed stands to lose either his life or his li)ertyA, the acc#sed shall )e entitled to, a"ong others, a trial. $he trial conte"plated )y the d#e process cla#se of the onstit#tion, in relation to the harter as a whole, is a trial )y -#dicial process, not )y e5ec#ti*e or "ilitary process. Military co""issions or tri)#nals, )y whate*er na"e they are called, are not co#rts within the 0hilippine -#dicial syste". ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT JUILONA VS. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL (20% SCRA 821, 1992) San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 135 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 FACTS" $he petitioner is a police"en assigned at the 80D. 1e was charged with "#rder )efore the respondent general co#rt "artial. At the sched#led arraign"ent on Dece")er 17, 199?, petitionerIs co#nsel "anifested to the ,eneral I o#rt Martial his clientIs desire to )e arraigned and to )e tried instead )y a ci*ilian co#rt. Arraign"ent was reset. At the ne5t arraign"ent on Dece")er 21, 199?, petitioner filed a "otion as:ing that the co#rt "al1ial inhi)it itself front p#rs#ing the arraign"ent of the acc#sed and to ha*e his case in*estigated )y the ci*ilian prosec#tor or at least tried )y a ci*ilian co#rt. Altho#gh set or oral arg#"ent of Han#ary 4, 1991, respondent co#rt decided to ha*e the "otion arg#ed on the day it was filed. $he "otion was denied, the sa"e with the "otion for reconsideration. 0etitioner ref#sed to enter a plea and said that he wo#ld ele*ate the case to the !. 3e*ertheless, a plea of not g#ilty was entered #pon co#rt order. 1ence, this petition for certiorari and prohi)ition. ISSUE" 8hether or not respondent co#rt "artial acted with gra*e a)#se of discretion. HELD" D.! the respondent co#rt "artial acted with gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction in proceeding with the arraign"ent of the petitioner. %ep#)lic Act 3o. +977, 1? creating the 0hilippine 3ational 0olice @030A, which too: effect on 1 Han#ary 1991, pro*ides2 /!.. B+. H#risdiction in ri"inal ases. Any pro*ision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, cri"inal cases in*ol*ing 030 "e")ers shall )e within the e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of the reg#lar co#rts2 5 5 5. 0ro*ided, f#rther, that cri"inal cases against 09I30 "e")ers who "ay ha*e not yet )een arraigned #pon the effecti*ity of this it shall )e transferred to the proper city or pro*incial prosec#tor or "#nicipal trial co#rt -#dge./ Altho#gh %ep#)lic Act 3o. +977 was not yet in effect when petitioner was arraigned on 28 Dece")er 199?, ne*ertheless, respondent co#rt "artial :new or sho#ld ha*e :nown that the said Act had already )een signed or appro*ed )y the 0resident on 14 Dece")er 199? and that the sa"e was p#)lished in two @2A national newspapers of general circ#lation on 17 Dece")er 199? and that it wo#ld ta:e effect on 1 Han#ary 1991. It is precisely for this reason that respondent co#rt "artial decided to ha*e the petitionerIs "otion to inhi)it arg#ed on 28 Dece")er 199? and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the sa"e day despite his *ehe"ent ref#sal to enter a plea. learly, #nder the circ#"stances o)taining in the present case, respondent co#rt "artial acted with gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction in proceeding with the arraign"ent of the petitioner. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT TORRES VS. GON$ALES (152 SCRA 272, 1987) FACTS" 0etitioner was con*icted )y the trial co#rt of the cri"e of estafa and was sentenced to prison ter". 0etitioner was later granted a conditional pardon on condition that petitioner wo#ld /not again *iolate any of the penal laws of the 0hilippines. !ho#ld this condition )e *iolated, he will )e proceeded against in the "anner prescri)ed )y law./ 0etitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was conse6#ently released fro" confine"ent. $he Board of 0ardons and 0arole @the /Board/A resol*ed to reco""end to the 0resident the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. $he e*idence )efore the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and 2B H#ne 1982, petitioner had )een charged with twenty co#nts of estafa, which cases were then pending trial )efore the %egional $rial o#rt of %i&al. $he record also showed that petitioner had )een con*icted )y the trial co#rt of the cri"e of sedition2 this con*iction was then pending appeal )efore the Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt. %espondent Minister of H#stice wrote to the 0resident of the 0hilippines infor"ing her of the %esol#tion of the Board reco""ending cancellation of the conditional pardon pre*io#sly granted to petitioner. $hereafter, the 0resident cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. %espondent Minister iss#ed /)y a#thority of the 0resident/ an 'rder of Arrest and %eco""it"ent against petitioner. $he petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in M#ntinl#pa to ser*e the #ne5pired portion of his sentence. 0etitioner now i"p#gns the *alidity of the 'rder of Arrest and %eco""it"ent. 1e clai"s that he did not *iolate his conditional pardon since he has not )een con*icted )y final -#dg"ent of the estafa nor of the cri"e of sedition. ISSUE" 8hether or not con*iction of a cri"e )y final -#dg"ent of a co#rt is necessary )efore the petitioner can )e *alidly rearrested and reco""itted for *iolation of the ter"s of his conditional pardon. HELD" It depends. $he deter"ination of the occ#rrence of a )reach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper conse6#ences of s#ch )reach, "ay )e either a p#rely e5ec#ti*e act, not s#)-ect to -#dicial scr#tiny #nder !ection +B @iA of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e odeG or it "ay )e a -#dicial act consisting of trial for and con*iction of *iolation of a conditional pardon #nder Article 179 of the %e*ised 0enal ode. 8here the 0resident opts to proceed #nder !ection +B @iA of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode, no -#dicial prono#nce"ent of g#ilt of a s#)se6#ent cri"e is necessary, "#ch less con*iction therefor )y final -#dg"ent of a co#rt, in order that a con*ict "ay )e reco""ended for the *iolation of his conditional pardon. 1ere, the 0resident has chosen to proceed against the petitioner #nder !ection +B @iA of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode. $hat choice is an e5ercise of the 0residentIs e5ec#ti*e prerogati*e and is not s#)-ect to -#dicial scr#tiny. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN, !R. (170 SCRA 190, 1989) FACTS" $he !andigan)ayan con*icted petitioner Monsanto and three acc#sed of the co"ple5 cri"e of estafa thr# falsification of p#)lic doc#"ents. 0etitioner Monsanto appealed her con*iction to this o#rt which s#)se6#ently affir"ed the sa"e. !he then filed a "otion for reconsideration )#t while said "otion was pending, she was e5tended )y then 0residen Marcos a)sol#te pardon which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the al)ayog ity $reas#rer re6#esting that she )e restored to her for"er post as assistant city treas#rer since the sa"e was still *acant. 0etitionerKs letter9re6#est was referred to the Ministry of (inance for resol#tion. $he (inance Ministry r#led that petitioner "ay )e reinstated to her position witho#t the necessity of a new appoint"ent not earlier than the date she was e5tended the a)sol#te pardon. It also directed the city treas#rer to see to it that the a"o#nt of 0B,892.7? which the !andigan)ayan had re6#ired to )e inde"nified in fa*or of the go*ern"ent. !ee:ing reconsideration of the foregoing r#ling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the f#ll pardon )estowed on her has wiped p#t the cri"e which i"plies that her ser*ice in the go*ern"ent has ne*er )een interr#pted and therefore the date of reinstate"ent sho#ld correspond to the date of her pre*enti*e s#spensionG that she is entitled to )ac:pay for the entire period of her s#spensionG and that she sho#ld not )e re6#ired to pay the proportionate share of the a"o#nt of 0B892.7?. $he Ministry of (inance referred petitionerKs letter to the 'ffice of the 0resident for f#rther re*iew and action. $he respondent Dep#ty .5ec#ti*e !ecretary (actoran denied the petitionerKs re6#est and holds that Monsanto is not entitled to an a#to"atic reinstate"ent on the )asis of the a)sol#te pardon granted her, )#t "#st sec#re an appoint"ent to her for"er position and that she is lia)le for the ci*il lia)ility to her pre*io#s con*iction. 0etitioner filed a "otion for reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE" 8R3 a p#)lic officer who had )een granted an a)sol#te pardon )y the hief .5ec#ti*e is entitled to reinstate"ent to her for"er position witho#t need of a new appoint"ent. HELD" 3'. 1a*ing accepted the pardon, petitioner is dee"ed to ha*e a)andoned her appeal and her con*iction )y the !andigan)ayan and has ass#"ed the character of finality. $he essence of pardon is the re"ission of g#ilt. $h#s pardon i"plies g#ilt. 0ardon does not ipso facto reinstate a con*icted felon to p#)lic office which was forfeited )y reason of the con*iction. It sho#ld )e noted that p#)lic office is intended pri"arily for collecti*e protection, safety and )enefit of the co""on good. $h#s, it cannot )e co"pro"ised to fa*or pri*ate interests. A pardon does not *irt#ally ac6#it the acc#sed of the offense charged. B#t the pardon restores the petitioner eligi)ility for appoint"ent to the said office. $h#s, to regain her for"er post, she "#st reapply and #ndergo the #s#al proced#re re6#ired for a new appoint"ent. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT PEOPLE VS. SALLE (250 SCRA 581, 1995) FACTS" Acc#sed9appellants (rancisco !alle, Hr. and %ic:ey Mengote were fo#nd g#ilty )eyond reasona)le, do#)t as co9principals of the co"po#nd cri"e of "#rder and destr#cti*e arson. Appellants seasona)ly filed their notice of appeal. 1owe*er, !alle filed an #rgent "otion to withdraw his appeal in *iew of his acceptance of the grant of conditional pardon )y the 0resident. Mengote was also granted a conditional pardon and was released fro" confine"ent, )#t the latter did not file a "otion to withdraw his appeal. $he co#rt granted !alleIs "otion to withdraw his appeal and his case is considered closed and ter"inated, insofar as he is concerned. Mengote, on the other hand, has not filed any "otion to withdraw his appeal. ISSUE" 8R3 appeal of the case "#st )e withdrawn for the effecti*ity of a pardon San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 136 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 granted. HELD" D.!. $he /con*iction )y final -#dg"ent/ li"itation #nder !ection 19 of Art.<II of the present constit#tion prohi)its the grant of pardon, whether f#ll or conditional, to an acc#sed d#ring the pending of his appeal fro" his con*iction )y the trial co#rt. Any application therefore, if one is "ade, sho#ld no )e acted #pon or the process towards its grant sho#ld no )eg#n #nless the appeal is withdrawn or the con*iction is final. A -#dg"ent of con*iction )eco"e final @aA when no appeal is seasona)ly perfected/ @)A when the acc#se co""ences to ser*e the sentence, @cA when the right to appeal is e5pressly wai*ed in writing, e5cept where the death penalty was i"posed )y the trial co#rt, and @dA then the acc#sed applies for pro)ation, there)y wai*ing his right to appeal. $h#s, where the -#dg"ent of con*iction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality as in the case of Mengote, e5ec#ti*e cle"ency "ay not )e granted to appellant $he reason is that, the doctrine of separation of powers of de"ands that s#ch e5cl#si*e a#thority of the appellate co#rt )e f#lly respected and :ept #ni"paired. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT GARCIA VS. COA (22% SCRA 35%, 1993) FACTS" 0etitioner <icente ,arcia was a s#per*ising line"an of the B#rea# of $eleco""#nication in L#cena ity )efore he was s#""arily dis"issed on April I, 1977 on the gro#nd of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the Ministry of 0#)lic 8or:s in Ad"inistrati*e ase 3o. 977 for the loss of se*eral telegraphs poles. 0etitioner did not appeal the decision. Based on the sa"e facts, a cri"inal case for 6#alified theft was filed against petitioner, which was resol*ed ac6#itting petitioner. In *iew of his ac6#ittal ,arcia so#ght reinstate"ent to his for"er position which was denied )y the B#rea# of $eleco""#nications. 0etitioner pleaded to the 0resident of the 0hilippines for e5ec#ti*e cle"ency which was granted. $hereafter, ,arcia filed with the respondent 'A a clai" for pay"ent of )ac: salaries effecti*e April 1977. $his was denied )y 'A on the gro#nd that the e5ec#ti*e cle"ency granted to hi" did not pro*ide for the pay"ent of )ac: salaries and that he had not )een reinstated in the ser*ice. 0etitioner then appealed the 'A decision to the 'ffice of the 0resident. Based on the reco""endation of the Dep#ty !ecretary (actoran, petitioner filed this petition for re*iew on certiorari. ISSUE" 8R3 petitioner is entitled to pay"ent of )ac: wages after ha*ing )een reinstated p#rs#ant to the grant of e5ec#ti*e cle"ency. HELD" D.!. 0etitionerIs a#to"atic reinstate"ent to the go*ern"ent ser*ice entitles hi" to )ac: wages. $his is "eant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent fro" the start and to "a:e reparation for what he has s#ffered as a res#lt of his #n-#st dis"issal fro" the ser*ice. $o r#le otherwise wo#ld defeat the *ery intention of the e5ec#ti*e cle"ency, i.e., to gi*e -#stice to petitioner. Moreo*er, the right to )ac: wages is afforded to those who ha*e )een illegally dis"issed and were th#s ordered reinstated or to those otherwise ac6#itted of the charges against the". $here is no do#)t that petitionerIs case falls within the sit#ations afore"entioned to entitle hi" to )ac: wages. $he )estowal of e5ec#ti*e cle"ency on petitioner in effect co"pletely o)literated the ad*erse effects of the ad"inistrati*e decision which fo#nd hi" g#ilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation fro" the ser*ice. $his can )e inferred fro" the e5ec#ti*e cle"ency itself e5c#lpating petitioner fro" the ad"inistrati*e charge and there)y directing his reinstate"ent, which is rendered a#to"atic )y the grant of the pardon. $his signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to )e reinstated to his for"er e"ploy"entG he is restored to his office ipso facto #pon the iss#ance of the cle"ency. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ISA&ELO T. SA&ELLO, VS. DECS (G.R. NO. 87%87, DECEM&ER 2%, 1989) GANCA-CO, !. FACTS" 0etitioner, was the .le"entary !chool 0rincipal of $alisay and also the Assistant 0rincipal of the $alisay Barangay 1igh !chool of the Di*ision of ,ingoog ity. $he )arangay high school was in deficit at that ti"e. !ince at that ti"e also, the 0resident of the 0hilippines who was earnestly ca"paigning was gi*ing aid in the a"o#nt of 02,???.?? for each )arrio, the )arrio co#ncil thro#gh proper resol#tions allotted the a"o#nt of 08B?.?? to co*er #p for the salaries of the high school teachers, with the honest tho#ght in "ind that the )arrio high school was a )arrio pro-ect and as s#ch therefore, was entitled to its share of the %ID f#nd in 6#estion. $he only part that the petitioner played was his )eing a#thori&ed )y the said )arrio co#ncil to withdraw the a)o*e a"o#nt and which was s#)se6#ently deposited in the ity $reas#rerIs 'ffice in the na"e of the $alisay Barrio 1igh !chool. $h#s, petitioner, together with the )arrio captain, were charged with the *iolation of %A 4?19, and )oth were con*icted. 'n appeal, the appellate co#rt "odified the decision )y eli"inating the s#)sidiary i"prison"ent in case of insol*ency in the pay"ent of one9half of the a"o#nt )eing in*ol*ed. (inally, petitioner was granted an AB!'LJ$. 0A%D'3 )y the 0resident, restoring hi" to If#ll ci*il and political rights.I 8ith this instr#"ent on hand, petitioner applied for reinstate"ent to the go*ern"ent ser*ice, only to )e reinstated to the wrong position of a "ere classroo" teacher and not to his for"er position as .le"entary !chool 0rincipal I. 0etitioner now prays to this o#rt for the following relief2 1. @that he )eA %einstated to his for"er position as .le"entary !chool 0rincipal IG 2. 1is go*ern"ent ser*ices )e "ade contin#o#s since !epte")er 1?, 19B8 which is his original appoint"ent #ntil the present ti"eG 4. @that he )eA ,i*en his )ac: salaries corresponding to the period fro" !epte")er 1, 1971 to 3o*e")er 24,1982G B. $hat all his ser*ice credits d#ly earned )e restoredG 7. And, that all other rights and pri*ileges not "entioned herein shall also )e granted. $he !olicitor ,eneral co""ents that there is no -#sticia)le contro*ersy in this case )eca#se the iss#e in*ol*ed is whether or not petitioner "erits reappoint"ent to the position he held prior to his con*iction. ISSUE" Is there a -#stifia)le contro*ersy in this case where the petitioner so#ght his reinstate"ent to his for"er position after gi*en a pardon )y the 0residentC HELD" Des. $here is here a -#sticia)le contro*ersy. 0etitioner clai"s he "#st )e restored to the sa"e position he was in )efore he was con*icted on a "ere technical error and for which he was gi*en an a)sol#te pardon. $his is not a hypothetical or a)stract disp#te. It is not acade"ic or "oot for, to o#r "ind, there is a definite and concrete contro*ersy to#ching the legal relations of parties ha*ing ad*erse legal relations. $his is a real and s#)stantial contro*ersy ad"itting of specific relief thro#gh a co#rt decree that is concl#si*e in character. $he case does not call for a "ere opinion or ad*ise, )#t for affir"ati*e relief. $his o#rt held that the a)sol#te dis6#alification fro" office or ineligi)ility fro" p#)lic office for"s part of the p#nish"ent prescri)ed #nder the penal code and that pardon frees the indi*id#al fro" all the penalties and legal disa)ilities and restores hi" to all his ci*il rights. Altho#gh s#ch pardon restores his eligi)ility to a p#)lic office it does not entitle hi" to a#to"atic reinstate"ent. 1e sho#ld apply for reappoint"ent to said office. 1owe*er, the o#rt cannot grant his prayer for )ac:wages fro" !epte")er 1, 1971 to 3o*e")er 24, 1982 for he is not entitled to a#to"atic reinstate"ent. 0etitioner was lawf#lly separated fro" the go*ern"ent ser*ice #pon his con*iction for an offense. $h#s, altho#gh his reinstate"ent had )een d#ly a#thori&ed, it did not there)y entitle hi" to )ac:wages. !#ch right is afforded only to those who ha*e )een illegally dis"issed and were th#s ordered reinstated or to those otherwise ac6#itted of the charge against the". In the sa"e light, the o#rt cannot decree that his go*ern"ent ser*ice )e "ade contin#o#s fro" !epte")er 1?, 19B8 to the present when it is not. At any rate when he reaches the co"p#lsory age of retire"ent, he shall get the appropriate retire"ent )enefits as an .le"entary !chool 0rincipal I and not as a "ere classroo" teacher. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT LLAMAS VS. OR&OS (202 SCRA 844, 1991) FACTS" 0etitioner %odolfo Lla"as is the inc#")ent <ice ,o*ernor of the 0ro*ince of $arlac. 1e ass#"ed the position )y *irt#e of a decision of the office of the 0resident, the go*ernorship. 0ri*ate respondent Mariano 'ca"po III is the inc#")ent ,o*ernor of the 0ro*ince of $arlac and was s#spended fro" office for a period of 9? days d#e to a *erified co"plaint filed )y petitioner against respondent ,o*ernor )efore the Depart"ent of Local ,o*ern"ent charging hi" with the alleged *iolation of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode and the Anti9graft and orr#pt 0ractices Law. 0#)lic respondent 'scar 'r)os was the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary at the ti"e of the filing of this petition and is )eing i"pleaded herein in that official capacity for ha*ing iss#ed, )y a#thority of the 0resident, the assailed %esol#tion granting e5ec#ti*e cle"ency to respondent go*ernor. 0etitionerIs "ain arg#"ent is that the 0resident "ay grant e5ec#ti*e cle"ency only in cri"inal cases )ased on Art. <II, !ec. 19 of the onstit#tion. According to the petitioner, the 6#alifying phrase /after con*iction )y final -#dg"ent applies solely to cri"inal cases and no other law allows the grant of e5ec#ti*e cle"ency or pardon to anyone who has )een con*icted in an ad"inistrati*e case./ ISSUE" 8hether or not the 0resident of the 0hilippines has the power to grant e5ec#ti*e cle"ency in ad"inistrati*e cases. HELD" D.!. $he 0resident has the power to grant e5ec#ti*e cle"ency in ad"inistrati*e case )eca#se the onstit#tion does not disting#ish )etween which cases e5ec#ti*e cle"ency "ay )e e5ercised )y the 0resident, with the sole e5cl#sion of i"peach"ent cases. ! also San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 137 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 held that there are no *alid and con*incing reasons why the 0resident cannot grant e5ec#ti*e cle"ency in ad"inistrati*e cases, which are clearly less serio#s than cri"inal offense. ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN SEA TRADING 3 SCRA 351519%16 FACTS" $he respondent was the consignee of se*eral ship"ents of onion and garlic. !ince none of the ship"ents had the re6#ired certificate )y the entral Ban: irc#lar 3os. BB and B7 for the release of goods th#s i"ported were sei&ed and s#)-ected to forfeit#re proceedings. $he ollector of #sto"s of Manila ha*ing )een in the "eanti"e released to the consignees on s#rety )onds directed the sa"e and its s#rety that the a"o#nt of the )onds )e paid, -ointly and se*erally to the B#rea# of #sto"s. $he onsignee thereafter so#ght a re*iew with the o#rt of $a5 Appeal which re*ersed the decision and ordered that the )ond )e withdrawn and cancelled. 1ence, the present petition. $he petition is )ased #pon the facts that insofar as the license and a certificate a#thori&ing the i"portation release of the goods #nder the consideration are re6#ired )y the entral Ban: irc#lars 3os. BB and B7, the latter are n#ll and *oid and the sei&#re and the forfeit#re of the goods i"ported fro" Hapan cannot i"ple"ent an e5ec#ti*e agree"ent9e5tending the effecti*ity of o#r $rade and (inancial agree"ent with Hapan9which is d#)io#s *alidity, )eca#se there is no go*ern"ent agency a#thori&ed to iss#e the i"port license re6#ired )y the afore"entioned e5ec#ti*e order. ISSUE" 8hether the e5ec#ti*e agree"ent is *alid e*en witho#t the 2R4 conc#rrence of the !enate. HELD" D.!. $he conc#rrence of the 1o#se of ongress is re6#ired )y o#r f#nda"ental law in the "a:ing of treaties which are howe*er distinct and different fro" e5ec#ti*e agree"ents which "ay *alidly entered into witho#t s#ch occ#rrence. $he *alidity of the e5ec#ti*e agree"ent in 6#estion is th#s present. In fact, the so9called parity right pro*ided for in the ordinance appended to o#r onstit#tion were prior thereto, the s#)-ect of an e5ec#ti*e agree"ent, "ade witho#t the conc#rrence of2R4s of the !enate of the Jnited !tates. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT DA$A VS. SINGSON (G.R. NO. 8%344, DECEM&ER 21, 1989) CRU$, !." FACTS" After the May 11, 1987 congressional elections, the 1o#se of %epresentati*es proportionally apportioned its twel*e seats in the 'A a"ong the se*eral political parties represented in that cha")er. 0etitioner %a#l A. Da&a was a"ong those chosen and was listed as a representati*e of the Li)eral 0arty. $he La)an ng De"o:rati:ong 0ilipino was reorgani&ed, res#lting in a political realign"ent in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. $wenty fo#r "e")ers of the Li)eral 0arty for"ally resigned and -oined the LD0, there)y swelling its n#")er to 179 and correspondingly red#cing their for"er party to only 17 "e")ers. 'n the )asis of this de*elop"ent, the 1o#se of %epresentati*es re*ised its representation in the 'A )y withdrawing the seat occ#pied )y the petitioner and gi*ing this to the newly9for"ed LD0. $he cha")er elected a new set of representati*es consisting of the original "e")ers e5cept the petitioner and incl#ding therein respondent L#is . !ingson as the additional "e")er fro" the LD0. 0etitioner ca"e to this o#rt to challenge his re"o*al fro" the 'A and the ass#"ption of his seat )y the respondent. %espondent co#nters that the 6#estion raised )y the petitioner is political in nat#re and so )eyond the -#risdiction of this o#rt. ISSUE" Does the instant case fall on the -#risdiction of the o#rtC HELD" Des. ontrary to the respondentIs assertion, the o#rt has the co"petence to act on the "atter at )ar. 8hat is )efore #s is not a discretionary act of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es that "ay not )e re*iewed )y the o#rt )eca#se it is political in nat#re. 8hat is in*ol*ed here is the legality, not the wisdo", of the act of that cha")er in re"o*ing the petitioner fro" the o""ission on Appoint"ents. $hat is not a political 6#estion )eca#se, as hief H#stice oncepcion e5plained in $anada *. #enco. ... the ter" /political 6#estion/ connotes, in legal parlance, what it "eans in ordinary parlance, na"ely, a 6#estion of policy. In other words, ... it refers /to those 6#estions which, #nder the onstit#tion, are to )e decided )y the people in their so*ereign capacity, or in regard to which f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the Legislat#re or e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the ,o*ern"ent./ It is concerned with iss#es dependent #pon the wisdo", not legality, of a partic#lar "eas#re. In the case now )efore #s, the -#risdictional o)-ection )eco"es e*en less tena)le and decisi*e. $he reason is that, e*en if we were to ass#"e that the iss#e presented )efore #s was political in nat#re, we wo#ld still not )e precl#ded fro" resol*ing it #nder the e5panded -#risdiction conferred #pon #s that now co*ers, in proper cases, e*en the political 6#estion. Article <II, !ection 1, of the onstit#tion clearly pro*ides2 !ection 1. $he -#dicial power shall )e *ested in one !#pre"e o#rt and in s#ch lower co#rts as "ay )e esta)lished )y law. H#dicial power incl#des the d#ty of the co#rts of -#stice to settle act#al contro*ersies in*ol*ing rights which are legally de"anda)le and enforcea)le, and to deter"ine whether or not there has )een a gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on the part of any )ranch or instr#"entality of the ,o*ern"ent. Lastly, we resol*e that iss#e in fa*or of the a#thority of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es to change its representation in the o""ission on Appoint"ents to reflect at any ti"e the changes that "ay transpire in the political align"ents of its "e")ership. It is #nderstood that s#ch changes "#st )e per"anent and do not incl#de the te"porary alliances or factional di*isions not in*ol*ing se*erance of political loyalties or for"al disaffiliation and per"anent shifts of allegiance fro" one political party to another. $he instant petition is therefore dis"issed. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT MANTRUSTE S-STEMS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NOS. 8%54041, NOVEM&ER %, 1989) GRISOAJUINO, !." FACTS" $he 0resident in the e5ercise of her legislati*e power #nder the (reedo" onstit#tion iss#ed 0rocla"ation 3o. 7'9A prohi)iting the co#rts fro" iss#ing restraining orders and writ of in-#nction against Asset 0ri*ati&ation $r#st @A0$A and the p#rchases of any assets sold )y it, to pre*ent co#rts fro" interfering in the discharge, )y this instr#"entality of the e5ec#ti*e )ranch of go*ern"ent, of its tas: of carrying o#t the e5peditio#s dispositions and pri*ati&ation of certain go*ern"ent corporations and or the assets thereof. $he enforce"ent of s#ch 0rocla"ation was 6#estioned )y the petitioner arg#ing that the o#rt was depri*ed of its -#risdiction to hear the cases in*ol*ed therein.
ISSUE" 8hether 0rocla"ation 3o. 7?9A i"pair the inherent power of co#rts as defined in !ee I Art <III of the onstit#tion. HELD" 3o. !ection 41 of 0rocla"ation 3o. 7?9A does not infringe any pro*ision of the onstit#tion. It does not i"pair the inherent power of co#rts /to settle act#al contro*ersies which are legally de"anda)le and enforcea)le and to deter"ine whether or not there has )een a gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on the part of any )ranch or instr#"entality of the go*ern"ent/ @!ec. 1, Art. <III, 1987 onstit#tionA. $he power to define, prescri)e and apportion the -#risdiction of the *ario#s co#rts )elongs to the legislat#re, e5cept that it "ay not depri*e the !#pre"e o#rt of its -#risdiction o*er cases en#"erated in !ection 7, Article <III of the onstit#tion @!ec. 2, Art. <III, 1987 onstit#tionA. 8hile the -#dicial power "ay appear to )e per*asi*e, the tr#th is that #nder the syste" of separation of powers set #p in the onstit#tion, the power of the co#rts o*er the other )ranches and instr#"entalities of the ,o*ern"ent is li"ited only to the deter"ination of /whether or not there has )een a gra*e a)#se of discretion @)y the"A a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction/ in the e5ercise of their a#thority and in the perfor"ance of their assigned tas:s @!ec. 1, Art. <III, 1987 onstit#tionA. o#rts "ay not s#)stit#te their -#dg"ent for that of the A0$, nor )loc:, )y any in-#nction, the discharge of its f#nction and the i"ple"entation of its decision in connection with the ac6#isition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. $here can )e no -#stification for -#dicial interference in the )#siness of an ad"inistrati*e agency e5cept when it *iolated a citi&enIs rights, or co""it a gra*e a)#se of discretion, or acts in e5cess of, or witho#t -#risdiction. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT PACU VS. SECRETAR- OF EDUCATION 97 PH1LS 80% 519556 FACTS" $he petitioning colleges and #ni*ersities re6#est that Act 3o. 27?+ as a"ended, )e declared #nconstit#tional. $his act is entitled /An Act Ma:ing the Inspection and %ecognition of 0ri*ate !chools and olleges ')ligatory for the !ecretary of 0#)lic Instr#ction./ 0etitioners contend that the right of a citi&en to own and operate a school is g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion, and any law re6#iring to own and operate a school is g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion, and any law re6#iring pre*io#s go*ern"ental appro*al or per"it )efore s#ch person co#ld e5ercise said right, a"o#nts to censorship, a practice a)horrent to o#r syste" of laws and go*ern"ent. 0etitioners, o)*io#sly refer !ec. 4e of the Act which pro*ides that )efore a pri*ate school "ay)e opened to the p#)lic it "#st first o)tain a per"it fro" the !ecretary of .d#cation. $he !olicitor ,eneral on the other hand pints o#t that none of petitioners has ca#sed to present this iss#e )eca#se all of the" ha*e per"its to operate and are act#ally operating )y *irt#e of their per"its. And they do not assert the !ecretary has threatened to re*o:e their per"its. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 138 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ISSUE" 8hether there e5ists an act#al case or contro*ersy. HELD" $here is no act#al case or contro*ersy. Mere apprehension that the !ecretary of .d#cation "ight #nder the law withdraw per"it of one the petitioners does not constit#te a -#dicial contro*ersy. /o#rts will not pass #pon the constit#tionality of a law #pon the co"plaint of one who fails to show that he is in-#red )y its operation./ /$he power of the co#rts to declare a law #nconstit#tional arises only when the interest of litigants the #se of that -#dicial a#thority for their protection against act#al interference, a hypothetical threat )eing ins#fficient/. An action, li:e this, is )ro#ght for a positi*e p#rpose, nay, to o)tain act#al and positi*e relief. o#rts do not sit to ad-#dicate "ere acade"ic 6#estions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, howe*er, intellect#ally solid the pro)le" "ay)e. $his is especially tr#e when the iss#es reach constit#tional di"ensions, for the" co"es into play regard for the co#rts d#ty to a*oid decision of constit#tional iss#es #nless a*oidance )eco"es e*asion. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT !O-A VS. PCGG 225 SCRA 58%, 1993 FACTS" $he 0residential o""ission on ,ood ,o*ern"ent @0,,A ordered the sale at p#)lic a#ction of paintings )y old "asters and sil*erware alleged to )e ill9gotten wealth of 0resident Marcos, his relati*es and cronies. 0etitioners, as citi&ens and ta5payers, filed a petition to stop the a#ction fro" proceeding. ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitioners are the proper party to file the instant case. HELD" 3o. 0etitioners failed to show ownership of the artwor:s, they are not proper parties to en-oin the 0,, for" proceeding with the a#ction sale. $hey do not stand to )e in-#red )y the action of the 0,,. $he o#rt will e5ercise its power of -#dicial re*iew only if the case is )ro#ght )efore it )y a prty who has the legal standing to raise the constit#tional or legal 6#estion. =Legal standing> "eans a personal and s#)stantial interest in the case s#ch that the party has s#stained or will s#stain direct in-#ry as a res#lt of the go*ern"ental act that is )eing challenged. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT TELE&AP VS. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337, 1998 FACTS" 0etitioner $eleco""#nications and Broadcast Attorneys of the 0hilippines, Inc. is an organi&ation of lawyers of radio and tele*ision )roadcasting co"panies. $hey are s#ing as citi&ens, ta5payers, and registered *oters. $he other petitioner, ,MA 3etwor:, Inc., operates radio and tele*ision )roadcasting stations thro#gho#t the 0hilippines #nder a franchise granted )y ongress. 0etitioners assail the *alidity of !ection 92 of B.0. Blg. 3o. 881 against clai"s that the re6#ire"ent that radio and tele*ision ti"e )e gi*en free ta:es property witho#t d#e process of lawG that it *iolates the e"inent do"ain cla#se of the onstit#tion which pro*ides for the pay"ent of -#st co"pensationG that it denies )roadcast "edia the e6#al protection of the lawsG and that, in any e*ent, it *iolates the ter"s of the franchise of petitioner ,MA 3etwor:, Inc. ISSUE" 8hether or not petitioners ha*e legal standing. HELD" 0etitioner $.L.BA0 is witho#t legal standing. In cases in which citi&ens were a#thori&ed to s#e, this o#rt #pheld their standing in *iew of the /transcendental i"portance/ of the constit#tional 6#estion raised which -#stified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at )ar, as will presently )e shown, petitionersI s#)stanti*e clai" is witho#t "erit. $o the e5tent, therefore, that a partyIs standing is deter"ined )y the s#)stanti*e "erit of his case or a preli"inary esti"ate thereof, petitioner $.L.BA0 "#st )e held to )e witho#t standing. Indeed, a citi&en will )e allowed to raise a constit#tional 6#estion only when he can show that he has personally s#ffered so"e act#al or threatened in-#ry as a res#lt of the allegedly illegal cond#ct of the go*ern"entG the in-#ry is fairly tracea)le to the challenged actionG and the in-#ry is li:ely to )e redressed )y a fa*ora)le action. Me")ers of petitioner ha*e not shown that they ha*e s#ffered har" as a res#lt of the operation of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881. 3or do "e")ers of petitioner $.L.BA0 ha*e an interest as registered *oters since this case does not concern their right of s#ffrage. $heir interest in \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 sho#ld )e precisely in #pholding its *alidity. M#ch less do they ha*e an interest as ta5payers since this case does not in*ol*e the e5ercise )y ongress of its ta5ing or spending power. A party s#ing as a ta5payer "#st specifically show that he has a s#fficient interest in pre*enting the illegal e5pendit#re of "oney raised )y ta5ation and that he will s#stain a direct in-#ry as a res#lt of the enforce"ent of the 6#estioned stat#te. $he other petitioner, ,MA 3etwor:, Inc., appears to ha*e the re6#isite standing to )ring this constit#tional challenge. 0etitioner operates radio and tele*ision )roadcast stations in the 0hilippines affected )y the enforce"ent of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 re6#iring radio and tele*ision )roadcast co"panies to pro*ide free air ti"e to the 'M.L. for the #se of candidates for ca"paign and other political p#rposes. 0etitioner clai"s that it s#ffered losses r#nning to se*eral "illion pesos in pro*iding 'M.L. $i"e in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1997 senatorial election and that it stands to s#ffer e*en "ore sho#ld it )e re6#ired to do so again this year. 0etitionerIs allegation that it will s#ffer losses again )eca#se it is re6#ired to pro*ide free air ti"e is s#fficient to gi*e it standing to 6#estion the *alidity of \92. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. NO. L72119. MA- 29, 1987 CORTES, !. FACTS" $he f#nda"ental right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern is in*o:ed in this special ci*il action for "anda"#s instit#ted )y petitioner <alentin L. Legaspi against the i*il !er*ice o""ission. $he respondent had earlier denied LegaspiIs re6#est for infor"ation on the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ilities of certain persons e"ployed as sanitarians in the 1ealth Depart"ent of e)# ity. $hese go*ern"ent e"ployees, H#lian !i)onghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented the"sel*es as ci*il ser*ice eligi)les who passed the ci*il ser*ice e5a"inations for sanitarians. !olicitor ,eneral challenges the petitionerIs standing to s#e #pon the gro#nd that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to )e infor"ed of the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ilities of the go*ern"ent e"ployees concerned. 1e calls attention to the alleged fail#re of the petitioner to show his =act#al interest> in sec#ring this partic#lar infor"ation. 1e f#rther arg#es that there is no "inisterial d#ty on the part of the o""ission to f#rnish the petitioner with the infor"ation he see:s. ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not petitioner possesses the legal standing to )ring the present s#it. 2. 8hether or not the infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner is within the a")it of the constit#tional g#arantee of the right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern. HELD" 1. D.!. 8hen a "anda"#s proceeding in*ol*es the assertion of a p#)lic right, the re6#ire"ent of personal interest is satisfied )y the "ere fact that the petitioner is a citi&en, and therefore, part of the general /p#)lic/ which possesses the right. $he petitioner, )eing a citi&en who, as s#ch is clothed with personality to see: redress for the alleged o)str#ction of the e5ercise of the p#)lic right. 8e find no cogent reason to deny his standing to )ring the present s#it. 2. D.!. Article III, !ec. 7 of the 1987 onstit#tion reads2 $he right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern shall )e recogni&ed. Access to official records, and to doc#"ents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to go*ern"ent research data #sed as )asis. for policy de*elop"ent, shall )e afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch stations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law. B#t the constit#tional g#arantee to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern is not a)sol#te. It does not open e*ery door to any and all infor"ation. Jnder the onstit#tion, access to official records, papers, etc., are /s#)-ect to li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law/ @Art. III, !ec. 7, second sentenceA. $he law "ay therefore e5e"pt certain types of infor"ation fro" p#)lic scr#tiny, s#ch as those affecting national sec#rity. $he threshold 6#estion is, therefore, whether or not the infor"ation so#ght is of p#)lic interest or p#)lic concern. B#t then, it is not eno#gh that the infor"ation so#ght is of p#)lic interest. (or "anda"#s to lie in a gi*en case, the infor"ation "#st not )e a"ong the species e5e"pted )y law fro" the operation of the constit#tional g#arantee. $he ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility of a sanitarian )eing of p#)lic concern, and in the a)sence of e5press li"itations #nder the law #pon access to the register of ci*il ser*ice eligi)les for said position, the d#ty of the respondent o""ission to confir" or deny the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility of any person occ#pying the position )eco"es i"perati*e. Manda"#s, therefore lies. 81.%.('%., the i*il !er*ice o""ission is ordered to open its register of eligi)les for the position of sanitarian, and to confir" or deny, the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility of H#lian !i)onghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the 1ealth Depart"ent of e)# ity, as re6#ested )y the petitioner <alentin L. Legaspi. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT DUMLAO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. L52245. !ANUAR- 22, 1980 MELENCIOHERRERA, !" FACTS" 0etitioners 6#estion the constit#tionality of section B of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 72 as discri"inatory and contrary to the e6#al protection and d#e process g#arantees of the onstit#tion. !aid !ection B pro*ides2 !.. B. !pecial dis6#alification. E In addition to *iolation of !ection 1? of Article ;II@A of the onstit#tion and dis6#alifications "entioned in e5isting laws which are San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 139 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 here)y declared as dis6#alification for any of the electi*e officials en#"erated in !ection 1 hereof, any retired electi*e pro*incial, city or "#nicipal official, who has recei*ed pay"ent of the retire"ent )enefits to which he is entitled #nder the law and who shall ha*e )een +7 years of age at the co""ence"ent of the ter" of office to which he see:s to )e elected, shall not )e 6#alified to r#n for the sa"e electi*e local office fro" which he has retired. 2A /... the filing of charges for the co""ission of s#ch cri"es )efore a ci*il co#rt or "ilitary tri)#nal after preli"inary in*estigation shall )e pri"a facie e*idence of s#ch fact/. ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not the first paragraph of !ection B, B0 Blg. 72 is *alid. 2. 8hether or not the second paragraph of !ection B, B0 Blg. 72 is *alid. HELD" 1. D.!. %etire"ent fro" go*ern"ent ser*ice "ay or "ay not )e a reasona)le dis6#alification for electi*e local officials. (or one thing, there can also )e retirees fro" go*ern"ent ser*ice at ages, say )elow +7. It "ay neither )e reasona)le to dis6#alify retirees, aged +7, for a +7 year old retiree co#ld )e a good local official -#st li:e one, aged +7, who is not a retiree. B#t, in the case of a +79year old electi*e local official, who has retired fro" a pro*incial, city or "#nicipal office, there is reason to dis6#alify hi" fro" r#nning for the sa"e office fro" which he had retired, as pro*ided for in the challenged pro*ision. $he need for new )lood ass#"es rele*ance. $he tiredness of the retiree for go*ern"ent wor: is present, and what is e"phatically significant is that the retired e"ployee has already declared hi"self tired and #na*aila)le for the sa"e go*ern"ent wor:, )#t, which, )y *irt#e of a change of "ind, he wo#ld li:e to ass#"e again. It is for this *ery reason that ine6#ality will neither res#lt fro" the application of the challenged pro*ision. H#st as that pro*ision does not deny e6#al protection neither does it per"it of s#ch denial @see 0eople *s. <era, +7 0hil. 7+ O1944PA. 0ersons si"ilarly sit#ated are si"ilarly treated. In fine, it )ears reiteration that the e6#al protection cla#se does not for)id all legal classification. 8hat is proscri)es is a classification which is ar)itrary and #nreasona)le. $hat constit#tional g#arantee is not *iolated )y a reasona)le classification )ased #pon s#)stantial distinctions, where the classification is ger"ane to the p#rpose of the law and applies to all hose )elonging to the sa"e class @0eralta *s. o"elec, 82 !%A 4? O1978P citing (elwa *s. !alas, 18 !%A +?+ O19++PG %afael *. .")roidery and Apparel ontrol and Inspection Board, 21 !%A 44+ O19+7PG Inchong etc., et al. *s. 1ernande& 1?1 0hil. 1177 O1977PA. $he p#rpose of the law is to allow the e"ergence of yo#nger )lood in local go*ern"ents. $he classification in 6#estion )eing p#rs#ant to that p#rpose, it cannot )e considered in*alid /e*en it at ti"es, it "ay )e s#scepti)le to the o)-ection that it is "arred )y theoretical inconsistencies/ @hief H#stice (ernando, $he onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, 1977 ed., p. 7B7A. 2. 3'. .5plicit is the constit#tional pro*ision that, in all cri"inal prosec#tions, the acc#sed shall )e pres#"ed innocent #ntil the contrary is pro*ed, and shall en-oy the right to )e heard )y hi"self and co#nsel @Article I<, section 19, 1974 onstit#tionA. An acc#sation, according to the f#nda"ental law, is not synony"o#s with g#ilt. $he challenged pro*iso contra*enes the constit#tional pres#"ption of innocence, as a candidate is dis6#alified fro" r#nning for p#)lic office on the gro#nd alone that charges ha*e )een filed against hi" )efore a ci*il or "ilitary tri)#nal. It conde"ns )efore one is f#lly heard. In #lti"ate effect, e5cept as to the degree of proof, no distinction is "ade )etween a person con*icted of acts of disloyalty and one against who" charges ha*e )een filed for s#ch acts, as )oth of the" wo#ld )e ineligi)le to r#n for p#)lic office. A person dis6#alified to r#n for p#)lic office on the gro#nd that charges ha*e )een filed against hi" is *irt#ally placed in the sa"e category as a person already con*icted of a cri"e with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of s#spension of the right to hold office d#ring the ter" of the sentence @Art. BB, %e*ised 0enal odeA. And altho#gh the filing of charges is considered as )#t pri"a facie e*idence, and therefore, "ay )e re)#tted, yet. there is /clear and present danger/ that )eca#se of the pro5i"ity of the elections, ti"e constraints will pre*ent one charged with acts of disloyalty fro" offering contrary proof to o*erco"e the pri"a facie e*idence against hi". Additionally, it is )est that e*idence pro and con of acts of disloyalty )e aired )efore the o#rts rather than )efore an ad"inistrati*e )ody s#ch as the 'M.L.. A highly possi)le conflict of findings )etween two go*ern"ent )odies, to the e5tre"e detri"ent of a person charged, will there)y )e a*oided. (#rther"ore, a legislati*eRad"inistrati*e deter"ination of g#ilt sho#ld not )e allowed to )e s#)stit#ted for a -#dicial deter"ination. 8herefore, paragraph 1 )eing consistent with the e6#al protection cla#se is declared *alidG while paragraph 2 is declared n#ll and *oid for )eing *iolati*e of the constit#tional pres#"ption of innocence g#aranteed to an acc#sed. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT 7ILOS&A-AN VS. GUINGONA, !R. G.R. NO. 113375, 5 MA- 1994 DAVIDE, !R., !. FACTS" $his is a special ci*il action for prohi)ition and in-#nction, with a prayer for a te"porary restraining order and preli"inary in-#nction, which see:s to prohi)it and restrain the i"ple"entation of the /ontract of Lease/ e5ec#ted )y the 0hilippine harity !weepsta:es 'ffice @0!'A and the 0hilippine ,a"ing Manage"ent orporation @0,MA in connection with the on9 line lottery syste", also :nown as /lotto./ 0#rs#ant to !ection 1 of its charter, the 0!' decided to esta)lish an on9 line lottery syste" for the p#rpose of increasing its re*en#e )ase and di*ersifying its so#rces of f#nds. $he 'ffice of the 0resident appro*ed the award of the contract to, and entered into the so9 called /ontract 'f Lease/ with, respondent 0,M for the installation, esta)lish"ent and operation of the on9line lottery and teleco""#nication syste"s re6#ired andRor a#thori&ed #nder the said contract. 0etitioners, 6#estion the legality and *alidity of the ontract of Lease in the light of !ection 1 of %.A. 3o. 11+9, as a"ended )y B.0. Blg. B2, which prohi)its the 0!' fro" holding and cond#cting lotteries /in colla)oration, association or -oint *ent#re with any person, association, co"pany or entity, whether do"estic or foreign./ $he petitioners also point o#t that paragraph 1? of the ontract of Lease re6#ires or a#thori&es 0,M to esta)lish a teleco""#nications networ: that will connect all the "#nicipalities and cities in the territory. 1owe*er, 0,M cannot do that )eca#se it has no franchise fro" ongress to constr#ct, install, esta)lish, or operate the networ: p#rs#ant to !ection 1 of Act 3o. 48B+, as a"ended. Moreo*er, 0,M is a 77M foreign9owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, )e granted a franchise for that p#rpose )eca#se of !ection 11, Article ;II of the 1987 onstit#tion, which re6#ires that for a corporation to operate a p#)lic #tility, at least +?M of its capital "#st )e owned )y (ilipino citi&ens. (#rther"ore, since /the s#)scri)ed foreign capital/ of the 0,M /co"es to a)o#t 77M, as shown )y paragraph .I,1$ of its Articles of Incorporation,/ it cannot lawf#lly enter into the contract in 6#estion )eca#se all for"s of ga")ling E and lottery is one of the" E are incl#ded in the so9called foreign in*est"ents negati*e list #nder the (oreign In*est"ents Act @%.A. 3o. 7?B2A where only #p to B?M foreign capital is allowed. ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not petitioners ha*e the Loc#s standi to file the petition at )ench. 2. 8hether or not the challenged ontract of Lease *iolates or contra*enes the e5ception in !ection 1 of %.A. 3o. 11+9, as a"ended )y B.0. Blg. B2, which prohi)its the 0!' fro" holding and cond#cting lotteries /in colla)oration, association or -oint *ent#re with/ another. HELD" 1. D.!. In line with the li)eral policy of this o#rt on loc#s standi, ordinary ta5payers, "e")ers of ongress, and e*en association of planters, and non9profit ci*ic organi&ations were allowed to initiate and prosec#te actions )efore this o#rt to 6#estion the constit#tionality or *alidity of laws, acts, decisions, r#lings, or orders of *ario#s go*ern"ent agencies or instr#"entalities. 8e find the instant petition to )e of transcendental i"portance to the p#)lic. $he iss#es it raised are of para"o#nt p#)lic interest and of a category e*en higher than those in*ol*ed in "any of the aforecited cases. 2.D.!. A caref#l analysis and e*al#ation of the pro*isions of the contract and a consideration of the conte"poraneo#s acts of the 0!' and 0,M ind#)ita)ly disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease #nder which the 0,M is "erely an independent contractor for a piece of wor:, )#t one where the stat#torily proscri)ed colla)oration or association , in the least, or -oint *ent#re , at the "ost, e5ists )etween the contracting parties. $he only contri)#tion the 0!' wo#ld ha*e is its franchise or a#thority to operate the on9line lottery syste"G with the rest, incl#ding the ris:s of the )#siness, )eing )orne )y the proponent or )idder 0,M @which represents and warrants that it has access to =all "anagerial and technical e5pertise> to pro"ptly and effecti*ely carry o#t the ter"s of the contract.. ertain pro*isions of the contract confir" the indispensa)le role of the 0,M in the p#rs#it, operation, cond#ct, and "anage"ent of the 'n9Line Lottery !yste". $hey e5hi)it and de"onstrate the partiesI indi*isi)le co""#nity of interest in the conception, )irth and growth of the on9line lottery, and, a)o*e all, in its profits, with each ha*ing a right in the for"#lation and i"ple"entation of policies related to the )#siness and sharing, as well, in the losses E with the 0,M )earing the greatest )#rden )eca#se of its ass#"ption of e5penses and ris:s, and the 0!' the least, )eca#se of its confessed #nwillingness to )ear e5penses and ris:s. In a "anner of spea:ing, each is wed to the other for )etter or for worse. In the final analysis, howe*er, in the light of the 0!'Is %(0 and the a)o*e highlighted pro*isions, as well as the /1old 1ar"less la#se/ of the ontract of Lease, it is e*en safe to concl#de that the act#al lessor in this case is the 0!' and the s#)-ect "atter thereof is its franchise to hold and cond#ct lotteries since it is, in reality, the 0,M which operates and "anages the on9line lottery syste" for a period of eight years. @In effect, the 0!' leased o#t its franchise to 0,M which act#ally operated and "anaged the sa"e.A 81.%.('%., the instant petition is here)y ,%A3$.D and the challenged ontract of Lease is here)y D.LA%.D contrary to law and in*alid. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 140 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 3ote2 $he separate opinions of H#stices foc#sed on the iss#e of Loc#s standi of herein petitioners, in relation to the fo#r @BA re6#ire"ents that "#st )e satisfied )efore one can co"e to co#rt to litigate a constit#tional iss#e, na"ely2 @1A there "#st )e an act#al case or contro*ersyG @2A the 6#estion of constit#tionality "#st )e raised )y the proper partyG @4A the constit#tional 6#estion "#st )e raised at the earliest possi)le opport#nityG and @BA the decision of the constit#tional 6#estion "#st )e necessary to the deter"ination of the case itself. $he o#rt did not resol*e the iss#e on whether or not the ontract of Lease is in *iolation of section 11, Article ;II of the onstit#tion. 1owe*er, in the dissenting opinion penned )y H#stice 0#no, he e5plained that2 =(or e*en ass#"ing arg#endo that 0,M is a p#)lic #tility, still, the records do not at the "o"ent )ear o#t the clai" of petitioners that 0,M is a foreign owned and controlled corporation. $his fact#al iss#e re"ains #nsettled and is still the s#)-ect of litigation )y the parties in the !ec#rities and .5change o""ission>. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT PHILCONSA VS. ENRIJUE$ (GR. NO. 113105 AUGUST 19, 1994) JUIASON, !." FACTS" 1o#se Bill 3o. 1?9??, the ,eneral Appropriation Bill of 199B @,AB of 199BA, was passed and appro*ed )y )oth ho#ses of ongress on Dece")er 17, 1994. As passed, it i"posed conditions and li"itations on certain ite"s of appropriations in the proposed )#dget pre*io#sly s#)"itted )y the 0resident. It also a#thori&ed "e")ers of ongress to propose and identify pro-ects in the /por: )arrels/ allotted to the" and to realign their respecti*e operating )#dgets. 0#rs#ant to the proced#re on the passage and enact"ent of )ills as prescri)ed )y the onstit#tion, ongress presented the said )ill to the 0resident for consideration and appro*al. 'n Dece")er 4?, 1994, the 0resident signed the )ill into law, and declared the sa"e to ha*e )eco"e %ep#)lic Act 3o. 7++4. 'n the sa"e day, the 0resident deli*ered his 0residential <eto Message, specifying the pro*isions of the )ill he *etoed and on which he i"posed certain conditions. !i5teen "e")ers of the !enate led )y !enate 0resident .dgardo H. Angara, !enator 3eptali A. ,on&ales, the hair"an of the o""ittee on (inance, and !enator %a#l !. %oco, so#ght the iss#ance of the writs of certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s against the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary, the !ecretary of the Depart"ent of B#dget and Manage"ent, and the 3ational $reas#rer. !#ing as "e")ers of the !enate and ta5payers, petitioners 6#estion2 @1A the constit#tionality of the conditions i"posed )y the 0resident in the ite"s of the ,AA of 199B2 @aA for the !#pre"e o#rt, @)A o""ission on A#dit @'AA, @cA '")#ds"an, @dA o""ission on 1#"an %ights @1%A, @eA iti&en Ar"ed (orces ,eographical Jnits @A(,JI!A and @fA !tate Jni*ersities and olleges @!JIsAG and @2A the constit#tionality of the *eto of the special pro*ision in the appropriation for de)t ser*ice. $he !olicitor ,eneral clai"ed that the re"edy of the !enators is political @i.e., to o*erride the *etoesA in effect saying that they do not ha*e the re6#isite legal standing to )ring the s#its. ISSUE" Do petitioner9senators ha*e legal standing to assail the constit#tionality of conditions i"posed )y the 0resident in the ite"s of the ,AA of 199BC HELD" D.! a "e")er of the !enate, and of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es for that "atter, has the legal standing to 6#estion the *alidity of a presidential *eto or a condition i"posed on an ite" in an appropriation )ill. 8here the *eto is clai"ed to ha*e )een "ade witho#t or in e5cess of the a#thority *ested on the 0resident )y the onstit#tion, the iss#e of an i"per"issi)le intr#sion of the .5ec#ti*e into the do"ain of the Legislat#re arises. $o the e5tent the power of ongress are i"paired, so is the power of each "e")er thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the e5ercise of the powers of that instit#tion An act of the .5ec#ti*e which in-#res the instit#tion of ongress ca#ses a deri*ati*e )#t nonetheless s#)stantial in-#ry, which can )e 6#estioned )y a "e")er of ongress. In s#ch a case, any "e")er of ongress can ha*e a resort to the co#rts. (or"er hief H#stice .nri6#e M. (ernando, as A"ic#s #riae, noted2 $his is, then, the clearest case of the !enate as a whole or indi*id#al !enators as s#ch ha*ing a s#)stantial interest in the 6#estion at iss#e. It co#ld li:ewise )e said that there was the re6#isite in-#ry to their rights as !enators. It wo#ld then )e f#tile to raise any loc#s standi iss#e. Any intr#sion into the do"ain appertaining to the !enate is to )e resisted. !i"ilarly, if the sit#ation were re*ersed, and it is the .5ec#ti*e Branch that co#ld allege a transgression, its officials co#ld li:ewise file the corresponding action. 8hat cannot )e denied is that a !enator has standing to "aintain in*iolate the prerogati*es, powers and pri*ileges *ested )y the onstit#tion in his office It is tr#e that the onstit#tion pro*ides a "echanis" for o*erriding a *eto @Art. <I, !ec. 27 O1PA. !aid re"edy, howe*er, is a*aila)le only when the presidential *eto is )ased on policy or political considerations )#t not when the *eto is clai"ed to )e #ltra *ires. In the latter case, it )eco"es the d#ty of the o#rt to draw the di*iding line where the e5ercise of e5ec#ti*e power ends and the )o#nds of legislati*e -#risdiction )egin. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT TATAD VS GARCIA, !R (GR NO. 114222, APRIL %,1995) JUIASON, !. FACTS" $he D'$ planned to constr#ct the .D!A L%$ III. %A +977 was enacted, pro*iding for two sche"es for the financing, constr#ction and operation of go*ern"ent pro-ects thro#gh pri*ate initiati*e and in*est"ent2 B#ild9'perate9$ransfer @B'$A or B#ild9$ransfer @B$A. $he notice, ad*ertising the pre6#alification of )idders, was thereafter p#)lished. (i*e gro#ps responded to the in*itation na"ely, ABB $ra&ione of Italy, 1opewell 1oldings Ltd. of 1ong:ong, Mansteel International of Manda#e, e)#, Mits#i Y o., Ltd. of Hapan, and .D!A L%$ onsorti#". After e*al#ating the pre6#alification )ids, the 0BA declared that only the .D!A L%$ onsorti#" /"et the re6#ire"ents of garnering at least 21 points per criteria, e5cept for Legal Aspects, and o)taining an o*er9all passing "ar: of at least 82 points/. $he .D!A L%$ onsorti#" s#)"itted its )id proposal to D'$. (inding this proposal to )e in co"pliance with the )id re6#ire"ents, D'$ and respondent .D!A L%$ orporation, Ltd., in s#)stit#tion of the .D!A L%$ onsorti#", entered into an /Agree"ent to B#ild, Lease and $ransfer a Light %ail $ransit !yste" for .D!A/ #nder the ter"s of the B'$ Law. !ecretary 0rado, thereafter, re6#ested presidential appro*al of the contract. .5ec#ti*e !ecretary (ran:lin Drilon, 'r)osK replace"ent, infor"ed !ecretary 0rado that the 0resident co#ld not grant the re6#ested appro*al for the following reasons2 @1A that D'$ failed to cond#ct act#al p#)lic )idding in co"pliance with !ection 7 of the B'$ LawG @2A that the law a#thori&ed p#)lic )idding as the only "ode to award B'$ pro-ects, and the pre6#alification proceedings was not the p#)lic )idding conte"plated #nder the lawG @4A that Ite" 1B of the I"ple"enting %#les and %eg#lations of the B'$ Law which a#thori&ed negotiated award of contract in addition to p#)lic )idding was of do#)tf#l legalityG and @BA that congressional appro*al of the list of priority pro-ects #nder the B'$ or B$ !che"e pro*ided in the law had not yet )een granted at the ti"e the contract was awarded. In *iew of the co""ents of .5ec#ti*e !ecretary Drilon, the D'$ and pri*ate respondents re9negotiated the agree"ent. $he parties entered into a /%e*ised and %estated Agree"ent to B#ild, Lease and $ransfer a Light %ail $ransit !yste" for .D!A/ inas"#ch as /the parties OareP cogni&ant of the fact the D'$ has f#ll a#thority to sign the Agree"ent witho#t need of appro*al )y the 0resident p#rs#ant to the pro*isions of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 48? and that certain e*ents OhadP s#per*ened since 3o*e")er 7, 1991 which necessitateOdP the re*ision of the Agree"ent/. $he D'$, represented )y !ecretary Hes#s ,arcia *ice !ecretary 0rado, and pri*ate respondent entered into a /!#pple"ental Agree"ent to the 22 April 1992 %e*ised and %estated Agree"ent to B#ild, Lease and $ransfer a Light %ail $ransit !yste" for .D!A/ so as to /clarify their respecti*e rights and responsi)ilities/ and to s#)"it OtheP !#pple"ental Agree"ent to the 0resident, of the 0hilippines for his appro*al/. !ecretary ,arcia s#)"itted to 0resident %a"os the two agree"ents, which were appro*ed. According to the agree"ents, the .D!A L%$ III will #se light rail *ehicles fro" the &ech and !lo*a: (ederal %ep#)lics and will ha*e a "a5i"#" carrying capacity of B7?,??? passengers a day, or 17?M a year to )e achie*ed9 thro#gh 7B s#ch *ehicles operating si"#ltaneo#sly. $he .D!A L%$ III will r#n at grade, or street le*el, on the "id9section of .D!A for a distance of 17.8 :ilo"eters fro" (.B. 1arrison, 0asay ity to 3orth A*en#e, V#e&on ity. $he syste" will ha*e its own power facility. It will also ha*e 14 passenger stations and one depot in 1+9hectare go*ern"ent property at 3orth A*en#e. 0ri*ate respondents shall #nderta:e and finance the entire pro-ect re6#ired for a co"plete operational light rail transit syste". $arget co"pletion date is 1,?8? days or appro5i"ately three years fro" the i"ple"entation date of the contract incl#si*e of "o)ili&ation, site wor:s, initial and final testing of the syste". Jpon f#ll or partial co"pletion and *ia)ility thereof, pri*ate respondent shall deli*er the #se and possession of the co"pleted portion to D'$ which shall operate the sa"e. D'$ shall pay pri*ate respondent rentals on a "onthly )asis thro#gh an Irre*oca)le Letter of redit. $he rentals shall )e deter"ined )y an independent and internationally accredited inspection fir" to )e appointed )y the parties. As agreed #pon, pri*ate respondentIs capital shall )e reco*ered fro" the rentals to )e paid )y the D'$ which, in t#rn, shall co"e fro" the earnings of the .D!A L%$ III. After 27 years and D'$ shall ha*e co"pleted pay"ent of the rentals, ownership of the pro-ect shall )e transferred to the latter for a consideration of only J.!. Q1.??. %.A. 3o. 7718, an /Act A"ending ertain !ections of %ep#)lic Act 3o. +977, .ntitled /An Act A#thori&ing the (inancing, onstr#ction, 'peration and Maintenance of Infrastr#ct#re 0ro-ects )y the 0ri*ate !ector, and for 'ther 0#rposes/ was signed into law )y the 0resident. $he law e5pressly recogni&es BL$ sche"e and allows direct negotiation of BL$ contracts. ISSUES" @1A 8hether or not petitionersK as ta5payers ha*e the legal standing to instit#te the action. @2A 8hether or not .D!A L%$ orp, a foreign corporation own .D!A L%$ III, a p#)lic #tility. HELD" @1A D.!. $he petitioners ha*e the legal standing to instit#te the action. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 141 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 %espondents clai"ed that petitioners had no legal standing to initiate the instant action. 0etitioners, howe*er, co#ntered that the action was filed )y the" in their capacity as !enators and as ta5payers. $he pre*ailing doctrines in ta5payerIs s#its are to allow ta5payers to 6#estion contracts entered into )y the national go*ern"ent or go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contra*ention of the law @Lilos)ayan, Inc. *. ,#ingona, 242 !%A 11? O199BPA and to disallow the sa"e when only "#nicipal contracts are in*ol*ed @B#gnay onstr#ction and De*elop"ent orporation *. Laron, 17+ !%A. 2B? O1989PA. (or as long as the r#ling in Lilos)ayan on loc#s standi is not re*ersed, we ha*e no choice )#t to follow it and #phold the legal standing of petitioners as ta5payers to instit#te the present action. @2A $he onstit#tion, in no #ncertain ter"s, re6#ires a franchise for the operation of a p#)lic #tility. 1owe*er, it does not re6#ire a franchise )efore one can own the facilities needed to operate a p#)lic #tility so long as it does not operate the" to ser*e the p#)lic. $he right to operate a p#)lic #tility "ay e5ist independently and separately fro" the ownership of the facilities thereof. 'ne can own said facilities witho#t operating the" as a p#)lic #tility, or con*ersely, one "ay operate a p#)lic #tility witho#t owning the facilities #sed to ser*e the p#)lic. $he de*otion of property to ser*e the p#)lic "ay )e done )y the owner or )y the person in control thereof who "ay not necessarily )e the owner thereof. 8hile pri*ate respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the .D!A. L%$ III, it ad"its that it is not enfranchised to operate a p#)lic #tility. In s#", pri*ate respondent will not r#n the light rail *ehicles and collect fees fro" the riding p#)lic. It will ha*e no dealings with the p#)lic and the p#)lic will ha*e no right to de"and any ser*ices fro" it. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT OPOSA VS FACTORAN, !R (GR NO 101083, !UL- 30,1993) DAVIDE, !R., !. FACTS" 0etitioners instit#ted a ta5payersK class s#it against the 1onora)le (#lgencio !. (actoran, Hr., then D.3% !ecretary, alleging that as citi&ens and ta5payers of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, they are =entitled to the f#ll )enefit, #se and en-oy"ent of the nat#ral reso#rce treas#re that is the co#ntryIs *irgin tropical forests./ $he co"plaint starts off with the general a*er"ents that the 0hilippine archipelago of 7,1?? islands has a land area of 4?M hectares and is endowed with rich, l#sh and *erdant rainforests in which *aried, rare and #ni6#e species of flora and fa#na "ay )e fo#ndG these rainforests contain a genetic, )iological and che"ical pool which is irreplacea)leG they are also the ha)itat of indigeno#s 0hilippine c#lt#res which ha*e e5isted, end#red and flo#rished since ti"e i""e"orialG scientific e*idence re*eals that in order to "aintain a )alanced and healthf#l ecology, the co#ntryIs land area sho#ld )e #tili&ed on the )asis of a ratio of 7BM for forest co*er and B+M for agric#lt#ral, residential, ind#strial, co""ercial and other #sesG the distortion and dist#r)ance of this )alance as a conse6#ence of deforestation ha*e res#lted in a host of en*iron"ental tragedies. (actoran "o*ed to Dis"iss the co"plaint )ased on two gro#nds, na"ely2 @1A the plaintiffs ha*e no ca#se of action against hi" and @2A the iss#e raised )y the plaintiffs is a political 6#estion which properly pertains to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranches of ,o*ern"ent. %espondent granted the "otion. 1ence, the instant petition. ISSUES" @1A 8hether or not the petitioners ha*e a ca#se of action against the respondentG and @2A 8hether or not the iss#e raised is a political 6#estion which properly pertains to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranches of ,o*ern"ent. HELD" @1A 0etitioners "inors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet #n)orn. 8e find no diffic#lty in r#ling that they can, for the"sel*es, for others of their generation and for the s#cceeding generations, file a class s#it. $heir personality to s#e in )ehalf of the s#cceeding generations can only )e )ased on the concept of intergenerational responsi)ility insofar as the right to a )alanced and healthf#l ecology is concerned. !#ch a right, as hereinafter e5po#nded, considers the /rhyth" and har"ony of nat#re./ 3at#re "eans the created world in its entirety.
!#ch rhyth" and har"ony indispensa)ly incl#de, inter alia, the -#dicio#s disposition, #tili&ation, "anage"ent, renewal and conser*ation of the co#ntryIs forest, "ineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off9shore areas and other nat#ral reso#rces to the end that their e5ploration, de*elop"ent and #tili&ation )e e6#ita)ly accessi)le to the present as well as f#t#re generations. 3eedless to say, e*ery generation has a responsi)ility to the ne5t to preser*e that rhyth" and har"ony for the f#ll en-oy"ent of a )alanced and healthf#l ecology. 0#t a little differently, the "inorsI assertion of their right to a so#nd en*iron"ent constit#tes, at the sa"e ti"e, the perfor"ance of their o)ligation to ens#re the protection of that right for the generations to co"e. @2A After caref#l e5a"ination of the petitionersI co"plaint, 8e find the state"ents #nder the introd#ctory affir"ati*e allegations, as well as the specific a*er"ents #nder the s#)9heading AJ!. '( A$I'3, to )e ade6#ate eno#gh to show, pri"a facie, the clai"ed *iolation of their rights. 'n the )asis thereof, they "ay th#s )e granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It )ears stressing, howe*er, that insofar as the cancellation of the $LAs is concerned, there is the need to i"plead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensa)le parties. $he foregoing considered, i*il ase 3o. 9?9777 )e said to raise a political 6#estion. 0olicy for"#lation or deter"ination )y the e5ec#ti*e or legislati*e )ranches of ,o*ern"ent is not s6#arely p#t in iss#e. 8hat is principally in*ol*ed is the enforce"ent of a right *is9a9*is policies already for"#lated and e5pressed in legislation. It "#st, nonetheless, )e e"phasi&ed that the political 6#estion doctrine is no longer, the ins#r"o#nta)le o)stacle to the e5ercise of -#dicial power or the i"penetra)le shield that protects e5ec#ti*e and legislati*e actions fro" -#dicial in6#iry or re*iew. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT 7ILOS&A-AN, INC VS MORATO (GR NO 118910, !UL- 17,1995) MENDO$A,!. FACTS" As a res#lt of o#r decision in ,.%. 3o. 114477 @Lilos)ayan, Incorporated *. ,#ingona, 242 !%A 11? @199BAA in*alidating the ontract of Lease )etween the 0!' and the 0hilippine ,a"ing Manage"ent orp. @0,MA on the gro#nd that it had )een "ade in *iolation of 0!'Ks charter, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agree"ent. $he parties signed an .6#ip"ent Lease Agree"ent @.LAA where)y the 0,M leased on9line lottery e6#ip"ent and accessories to the 0!' in consideration of a rental e6#i*alent to B.4M of the gross a"o#nt of tic:et sales deri*ed )y the 0!' fro" the operation of the lottery which in no case shall )e less than an ann#al rental co"p#ted at 047,???.?? per ter"inal in co""ercial operation. $he rental is to )e co"p#ted and paid )i9wee:ly. In the e*ent the )i9wee:ly rentals in any year fall short of the ann#al "ini"#" fi5ed rental th#s co"p#ted, the 0!' agrees to pay the deficiency o#t of the proceeds of its c#rrent tic:et sales. Jnder the law, 4?M of the net receipts fro" the sale of tic:ets is allotted to charity. $he ter" of the lease is 8 years, co""encing fro" the start of co""ercial operation of the lottery e6#ip"ent first deli*ered to the lessee p#rs#ant to the agreed sched#le. In the operation of the lottery, the 0!' is to e"ploy its own personnel. It is responsi)le for the loss of, or da"age to, the e6#ip"ent arising fro" any ca#se and for the cost of their "aintenance and repair. Jpon the e5piration of the lease, the 0!' has the option to p#rchase the e6#ip"ent for the s#" of 027M. A copy of the .LA was s#)"itted to the o#rt )y the 0,M in accordance with its "anifestation in the prior case. $his s#it was filed see:ing to declare the .LA in*alid on the gro#nd that it is s#)stantially the sa"e as the ontract of Lease n#llified in the first case. ISSUE" 8hether or not petitioners ha*e a legal right which has )een *iolated. HELD" In actions for the ann#l"ent of contracts, s#ch as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the agree"ent or are )o#nd either principally or s#)sidiarily or are pre-#diced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detri"ent which wo#ld positi*ely res#lt to the" fro" the contract e*en tho#gh they did not inter*ene in it, or who clai" a right to ta:e part in a p#)lic )idding )#t ha*e )een illegally e5cl#ded fro" it. $hese are parties with /a present s#)stantial interest, as disting#ished fro" a "ere e5pectancy or f#t#re, contingent, s#)ordinate, or conse6#ential interest. . . . $he phrase Ipresent s#)stantial interestI "ore concretely is "eant s#ch interest of a party in the s#)-ect "atter of action as will entitle hi", #nder the s#)stanti*e law, to reco*er if the e*idence is s#fficient, or that he has the legal title to de"and and the defendant will )e protected in a pay"ent to or reco*ery )y hi". B#t petitioners do not ha*e s#ch present s#)stantial interest in the .LA as wo#ld entitle the" to )ring this s#it. Denying to the" the right to inter*ene will not lea*e witho#t re"edy any percei*ed illegality in the e5ec#tion of go*ern"ent contracts. V#estions as to the nat#re or *alidity of p#)lic contracts or the necessity for a p#)lic )idding )efore they "ay )e "ade can )e raised in an appropriate case )efore the o""ission on A#dit or )efore the '")#ds"an. $he onstit#tion re6#ires that the '")#ds"an and his dep#ties, /as protectors of the people shall act pro"ptly on co"plaints filed in any for" or "anner against p#)lic officials or e"ployees of the go*ern"ent, or any s#)di*ision, agency or instr#"entality thereof incl#ding go*ern"ent9 owned or controlled corporations./ @Art. ;I, \12A In addition, the !olicitor ,eneral is a#thori&ed to )ring an action for 6#o warranto if it sho#ld )e tho#ght that a go*ern"ent corporation, li:e the 0!', has offended against its corporate charter or "is#sed its franchise. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT &ENG$ON VS DRILON (GR NO 103524, APRIL 15,1992) GUTIERRE$, !R., !. FACTS" San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 142 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 %A 91? was enacted to pro*ide the retire"ent pensions of H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt and of the o#rt of Appeals who ha*e rendered at least 2? years ser*ice either in the H#diciary or in any other )ranch of the ,o*ern"ent or in )oth, ha*ing attained the age of 7? years or who resign )y reason of incapacity to discharge the d#ties of the office. $he retired H#stice shall recei*e d#ring the resid#e of his nat#ral life the salary which he was recei*ing at the ti"e of his retire"ent or resignation. Identical retire"ent )enefits were also gi*en to the "e")ers of the onstit#tional o""issions #nder %A. 17+8, as a"ended )y %A 4797. !#)se6#ently, 0resident Marcos signed 0D 778 which e5tended si"ilar retire"ent )enefits to the "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces gi*ing the" also the a#to"atic read-#st"ent feat#res of %A 1797 and %A 4797. 1owe*er, 0D +BB was iss#ed, repealing !ection 49A of %A 1797 and %A 4797 @a"ending %A 17+8 and 0D 778A which a#thori&ed the ad-#st"ent of the pension of the retired H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt, o#rt of Appeals, hair"an and "e")ers of the onstit#tional o""issions and the officers and enlisted "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces to the pre*ailing rates of salaries. !ignificantly, #nder 0D 1+48 the a#to"atic read-#st"ent of the retire"ent pension of officers and enlisted "en was s#)se6#ently restored )y 0resident Marcos. A later decree 0D 19?9 was also iss#ed pro*iding for the a#to"atic read-#st"ent of the pensions of "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces who ha*e retired prior to !epte")er 1?, 1979. 8hile the ad-#st"ent of the retire"ent pensions for "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces who n#")er in the tens of tho#sands was restored, that of the retired H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt and o#rt of Appeals who are only a handf#l and fairly ad*anced in years, was not. %eali&ing the #nfairness of the discri"ination against the "e")ers of the H#diciary and the onstit#tional o""issions, ongress appro*ed in 199? a )ill for the reenact"ent of the repealed pro*isions of %A 1797 and %A 4797. ongress was #nder the i"pression that 0D +BB )eca"e law after it was p#)lished in the 'fficial ,a&ette on April 7, 1977. In the e5planatory note of 1o#se Bill 3o. 1+297 and !enate Bill 3o. 7B?, the legislat#re saw the need to reenact %A 1797 and 4797 to restore said retire"ent pensions and pri*ileges of the retired H#stices and "e")ers of the onstit#tional o""issions, in order to ass#re those ser*ing in the !#pre"e o#rt, o#rt of Appeals and onstit#tional o""issions ade6#ate old age pensions e*en d#ring the ti"e when the p#rchasing power of the peso has )een di"inished s#)stantially )y worldwide recession or inflation. 0resident A6#ino, howe*er *etoed 1o#se Bill 3o. 1+297 on H#ly 11, 199? on the gro#nd that according to her /it wo#ld erode the *ery fo#ndation of the ,o*ern"entIs collecti*e effort to adhere faithf#lly to and enforce strictly the policy on standardi&ation of co"pensation as artic#lated in %A +778 :nown as o"pensation and 0osition lassification Act of 1989./ !he f#rther said that /the ,o*ern"ent sho#ld not grant distinct pri*ileges to select gro#p of officials whose retire"ent )enefits #nder e5isting laws already en-oy preferential treat"ent o*er those of the *ast "a-ority of o#r ci*il ser*ice ser*ants./ 0rior to the instant petition, howe*er, %etired o#rt of Appeals H#stices Man#el 0. Barcelona, H#an 0. .nri6#e&, H#an '. %eyes, Hr. and ,#ardson %. Lood filed a letterRpetition as:ing this o#rt far a read-#st"ent of their "onthly pensions in accordance with %A. 1797. $hey reasoned o#t that 0D +BB repealing %ep#)lic Act 3o. 1797 did not )eco"e law as there was no *alid p#)lication. 0D +BB appeared for the first ti"e only in the s#pple"ental iss#e of the 'fficial ,a&ette, @<ol. 7B, 3o. 1BA p#rportedly dated April B, 1977 )#t p#)lished only on !epte")er 7, 1984. !ince 0D +BB has no )inding force and effect of law, it therefore did not repeal %A 1797. $he o#rt acted fa*ora)ly on the re6#est. 0#rs#ant to the a)o*e resol#tion, ongress incl#ded in the ,eneral Appropriations Bill for (iscal Dear 1992 certain appropriations for the H#diciary intended for the pay"ent of the ad-#sted pension rates d#e the retired H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt and o#rt of Appeals. ISSUE" 8hether or not the atte"pt of the 0resident to #se the *eto power to set aside a %esol#tion of this o#rt and to depri*e retirees of )enefits gi*en the" )y %ep. Act 3o. 1797 trenches #pon the constit#tional grant of fiscal a#tono"y to the H#diciary. HELD" D.!. $he H#diciary, the onstit#tional o""issions, and the '")#ds"an "#st ha*e the independence end fle5i)ility needed in the discharge of their constit#tional d#ties. $he i"position of restrictions and constraints on the "anner the independent constit#tional offices allocate and #tili&e the f#nds appropriated for their operations is anathe"a to fiscal a#tono"y and *iolati*e not only of the e5press "andate of the onstit#tion )#t especially as regards the !#pre"e o#rt, of the independence and separation of powers #pon which the entire fa)ric of o#r constit#tional syste" is )ased. In the interest of co"ity and cooperation, the !#pre"e o#rt, onstit#tional o""issions, and the '")#ds"an ha*e so far li"ited their o)-ections to constant re"inders. 8e now agree with the petitioners that this grant of a#tono"y sho#ld cease to )e a "eaningless pro*ision. In the case at )ar, the *eto of these specific pro*isions in the ,eneral Appropriations Act is tanta"o#nt to dictating to the H#diciary how its f#nds sho#ld )e #tili&ed, which is clearly rep#gnant to fiscal a#tono"y. $he freedo" of the hief H#stice to "a:e ad-#st"ents in the #tili&ation of the f#nds appropriated for the e5pendit#res of the -#diciary, incl#ding the #se of any sa*ings fro" any partic#lar ite" to co*er deficits or shortages in other ite"s of the H#diciary is withheld. 0#rs#ant to the onstit#tional "andate, the H#diciary "#st en-oy freedo" in the disposition of the f#nds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It :nows its priorities -#st as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. $he hief H#stice "#st )e gi*en a free hand on how to a#g"ent appropriations where a#g"entation is needed. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT LIM7ET7AI SONS MILLING, INC. >(. COURT OF APPEALS (GR. NO. 118509 S)E0)D8)2 5, 199%) FRANCISCO, !." FACTS" In*ol*ed in the instant case is the Motion of petitioner Li":et:ai !ons Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the o#rtIs resol#tion of March 29, 199+, which set aside the o#rtIs Dece")er 1, 1997 decision and affir"ed in toto the o#rt of AppealsI decision dated A#g#st 12, 199B. It is arg#ed, al)eit erroneo#sly, that the case sho#ld )e referred to the o#rt .n Banc as the doctrines laid down in A)renica *. ,onda and De ,arcia, 4B 0hil. 749, $alosig *. <da. de 3ie)a, B4 !%A B74, and <illonco %ealty o. *. Bor"aheco, Inc., et al., +7 !%A 472, ha*e )een "odified or re*ersed. A "ore circ#"spect analysis of these cases *is9a9*is the case at )ench wo#ld ine*ita)ly lead petitioner to the concl#sion that there was neither re*ersal nor "odification of the doctrines laid down in the A)renica, $alosig and <illonco cases. 8hat petitioner )ewails the "ost is the present co"position of the $hird Di*ision which deli)erated on pri*ate respondentsI "otions for reconsideration and )y a "a-ority *ote re*ersed the #nani"o#s decision of Dece")er 1, 1997. More specifically, petitioner 6#estions the ass#"ption of hief H#stice 3ar*asa of the chair"anship of the $hird Di*ision and arrogantly ra"s its idea on how each Di*ision sho#ld )e chaired, i.e., the (irst Di*ision sho#ld ha*e )een chaired )y hief H#stice 3ar*asa, the !econd Di*ision )y Mr. H#stice 0adilla, the ne5t senior H#stice, and the $hird Di*ision )y Mr. H#stice %egalado, the third in line. ISSUE" 8hether or not the contention of petitioner as to the co"position of the third di*ision "eritorio#s. HELD" 3'. 8e need only to stress that the change in the "e")ership of the three di*isions of the o#rt was ine*ita)le )y reason of Mr. H#stice (elicianoIs retire"ent. !#ch reorgani&ation is p#rely an internal "atter of the o#rt to which petitioner certainly has no )#siness at all. In fact, the c#rrent /staggered/ set9#p in the chair"anships of the Di*isions is si"ilar to that adopted in 1988. In that year, the o#rtIs $hird Di*ision was li:ewise chaired )y then hief H#stice (ernan, while the (irst and !econd Di*isions were headed )y the ne5t senior H#stices E H#stices 3ar*asa and Melencio91errera, respecti*ely. !#ffice it to say that the o#rt with its new "e")ership is not o)liged to follow )lindly a decision #pholding a partyIs case when, after its re9e5a"ination, the sa"e calls for a rectification. /Indeed/, said the o#rt in Lilos)ayan, Inc. *s. Morato, et al., 27? !%A 14?, 14+, /a change in the co"position of the o#rt co#ld pro*e the "eans of #ndoing an erroneo#s decision/. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT DRILON VS. LIM (GR. NO. 112497 AUGUST 4, 1994) CRU$, !." FACTS" $he principal iss#e in this case is the constit#tionality of !ection 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode reading as follows2 0roced#re (or Appro*al And .ffecti*ity 'f $a5 'rdinances And %e*en#e Meas#resG Mandatory 0#)lic 1earings. E $he proced#re for appro*al of local ta5 ordinances and re*en#e "eas#res shall )e in accordance with the pro*isions of this ode2 0ro*ided, $hat p#)lic hearings shall )e cond#cted for the p#rpose prior to the enact"ent thereofG 0ro*ided, f#rther, $hat any 6#estion on the constit#tionality or legality of ta5 ordinances or re*en#e "eas#res "ay )e raised on appeal within thirty @4?A days fro" the effecti*ity thereof to the !ecretary of H#stice who shall render a decision within si5ty @+?A days fro" the date of receipt of the appeal2 0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat s#ch appeal shall not ha*e the effect of s#spending the effecti*ity of the ordinance and the accr#al and pay"ent of the ta5, fee, or charge le*ied therein2 0ro*ided, finally, $hat within thirty @4?A days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the si5ty9day period witho#t the !ecretary of H#stice acting #pon the appeal, the aggrie*ed party "ay file appropriate proceedings with a co#rt of co"petent -#risdiction. 0#rs#ant thereto, the !ecretary of H#stice had, on appeal to hi" of fo#r oil co"panies and a ta5payer, declared 'rdinance 3o. 779B, otherwise :nown as the Manila %e*en#e ode, n#ll and *oid for non9 co"pliance with the prescri)ed proced#re in the enact"ent of ta5 ordinances and for containing certain pro*isions contrary to law and p#)lic policy. In a petition for certiorari filed )y the ity of Manila, the %egional $rial o#rt of Manila re*o:ed the !ecretaryIs resol#tion and s#stained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the proced#ral re6#ire"ents had )een o)ser*ed. More i"portantly, it declared !ection 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode as #nconstit#tional )eca#se of its *est#re in the !ecretary of H#stice of the power of control o*er local go*ern"ents in *iolation of the policy of local a#tono"y "andated in the onstit#tion and of the specific pro*ision therein conferring on the 0resident of the 0hilippines only the power of s#per*ision o*er local go*ern"ents. $he !ecretary arg#es that the ann#lled !ection 187 is San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 143 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 constit#tional and that the proced#ral re6#ire"ents for the enact"ent of ta5 ordinances as specified in the Local ,o*ern"ent ode had indeed not )een o)ser*ed. 0arenthetically, this petition was originally dis"issed )y the o#rt for non9co"pliance with irc#lar 1988, the !olicitor ,eneral ha*ing failed to s#)"it a certified tr#e copy of the challenged decision. 1owe*er, on "otion for reconsideration with the re6#ired certified tr#e copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in *iew of the i"portance of the iss#es raised therein. ISSUES" @1A 8hether or not the %$ of Manila has -#risdiction to consider the constit#tionality of !ection 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode. @2A 8hether or not the !#pre"e o#rt has appellate -#risdiction o*er final -#dg"ents and orders of lower co#rts. HELD" Des to )oth. 8e stress at the o#tset that the lower co#rt had -#risdiction to consider the constit#tionality of !ection 187, this a#thority )eing e")raced in the general definition of the -#dicial power to deter"ine what are the *alid and )inding laws )y the criterion of their confor"ity to the f#nda"ental law. !pecifically, B0 129 *ests in the regional trial co#rts -#risdiction o*er all ci*il cases in which the s#)-ect of the litigation is incapa)le of pec#niary esti"ation, e*en as the acc#sed in a cri"inal action has the right to 6#estion in his defense the constit#tionality of a law he is charged with *iolating and of the proceedings ta:en against hi", partic#larly as they contra*ene the Bill of %ights. Moreo*er, Article <III, !ection 7@2A, of the onstit#tion *ests in the !#pre"e o#rt appellate -#risdiction o*er final -#dg"ents and orders of lower co#rts in all cases in which the constit#tionality or *alidity of any treaty, international or e5ec#ti*e agree"ent, law, presidential decree, procla"ation, order, instr#ction, ordinance, or reg#lation is in 6#estion. In the e5ercise of this -#risdiction, lower co#rts are ad*ised to act with the #t"ost circ#"spection, )earing in "ind the conse6#ences of a declaration of #nconstit#tionality #pon the sta)ility of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the 6#estioned act is #s#ally the handiwor: of the legislati*e or the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, or )oth, it will )e pr#dent for s#ch co#rts, if only o#t of a )eco"ing "odesty, to defer to the higher -#dg"ent of this o#rt in the consideration of its *alidity, which is )etter deter"ined after a thoro#gh deli)eration )y a collegiate )ody and with the conc#rrence of the "a-ority of those who participated in its disc#ssion. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT &USTOS VS. LUCERO (GR. NO. L20%8, M'2/; 8, 1949) TUASON, !." FACTS" 0etitioner, an acc#sed in a cri"inal case, filed a "otion with trial co#rt, praying that the record of the case )e re"anded to the -#stice of the peace co#rt of Masantol, the co#rt of origin, in order that he "ight cross9e5a"ine the co"plainant and her witnesses in connection with their testi"ony, on the strength of which warrant was iss#ed for the arrest of the acc#sed. $he "otion was denied. According to the "e"orand#" s#)"itted )y the petitionerIs co#nsel in s#pport of his "otion, the acc#sed, assisted )y co#nsel, appeared at the preli"inary in*estigation. $he -#stice of the peace infor"ed hi" of the charges and as:ed hi" if he pleaded g#ilty or not g#ilty, #pon which he entered the plea of not g#ilty. /$hen his co#nsel "o*ed that the co"plainant present her e*idence so that she and her witnesses co#ld )e e5a"ined and cross9e5a"ined in the "anner and for" pro*ided )y law./ $he fiscal and the pri*ate prosec#tor o)-ected, in*o:ing section 11 of r#le 1?8, and the o)-ection was s#stained. /In *iew thereof, the acc#sedIs co#nsel anno#nced his intention to reno#nce his right to present e*idence,/ and the -#stice of the peace forwarded the case to the trial co#rt. $he !#pre"e o#rt #pheld the assailed denial, saying that respondent -#dge did not act in e5cess of his -#risdiction or in a)#se of discretion in ref#sing to grant the acc#sedIs "otion to ret#rn the record for the p#rpose set o#t therein. 1ence, the "otion for reconsideration. ISSUES" 8hether or not !ection 11 of %#le 1?8 of the %#les of o#rt infringes section 14, Article <III of the 1947 onstit#tion. @ now !ection 7@7A, Article 8, 1987 onstit#tionA HELD" 3o. $he !#pre"e o#rt, in its %esol#tion dated March 8, 19B9 opined that !ection 11 of %#le 1?8, li:e its predecessors, is an ad-ecti*e law and not a s#)stanti*e law or s#)stanti*e right. !#)stanti*e law creates s#)stanti*e rights and the two ter"s in this respect "ay )e said to )e synony"o#s. !#)stanti*e rights is a ter" which incl#des those rights which one en-oys #nder the legal syste" prior to the dist#r)ance of nor"al relations. @+? .H., 98?.A !#)stanti*e law is that part of the law which creates, defines and reg#lates rights, or which reg#lates the rights and d#ties which gi*e rise to a ca#se of actionG that part of the law which co#rts are esta)lished to ad"inisterG as opposed to ad-ecti*e or re"edial law, which prescri)es the "ethod of enforcing rights or o)tains redress for their in*asion. @4+ . H., 27G 72 . H. !., 1?2+.A 8hile section 11 of %#le 1?8 denies to the defendant the right to cross9e5a"ine witnesses in a preli"inary in*estigation, his right to present his witnesses re"ains #naffected, and his constit#tional right to )e infor"ed of the charges against hi" )oth at s#ch in*estigation and at the trial is #nchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the g#aranty of d#e process co"es into play, he still en-oys to the f#ll e5tent the right to )e confronted )y and to cross9e5a"ine the witnesses against hi". $he degree of i"portance of a preli"inary in*estigation to an acc#sed "ay )e ga#ged )y the fact that this for"ality is fre6#ently wai*ed. $he distinction )etween /re"edy/ and /s#)stanti*e right/ is incapa)le of e5act definition. $he difference is so"ewhat a 6#estion of degree. @De5ter *s. .d"ands, 89 (., B+7G Bea&ell *s. 'hio, s#pra.A It is diffic#lt to draw a line in any partic#lar case )eyond which legislati*e power o*er re"edy and proced#re can pass witho#t to#ching #pon the s#)stanti*e rights of parties affected, as it is i"possi)le to fi5 that )o#ndary )y general condition. @!tate *s. 0a*elic:, 279 0., 11?2.A $his )eing so, it is ine*ita)le that the !#pre"e o#rt in "a:ing r#les sho#ld step on s#)stanti*e rights, and the onstit#tion "#st )e pres#"ed to tolerate if not to e5pect s#ch inc#rsion as does not affect the acc#sed in a harsh and ar)itrary "anner or depri*e hi" of a defense, )#t operates only in a li"ited and #ns#)stantial "anner to his disad*antage. (or the o#rtIs power is not "erely to co"pile, re*ise or codify the r#les of proced#re e5isting at the ti"e of the onstit#tionIs appro*al. $his power is /to pro"#lgate r#les concerning pleading, practice, and proced#re in all co#rts,/ which is a power to adopt a general, co"plete and co"prehensi*e syste" of proced#re, adding new and different r#les witho#t regard to their so#rce and discarding old ones. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT &P 129 (SECTION 9(3)), EO22% (ART. 82), AND SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR 191 FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS (GR. NO. 110571 MARCH 10, 1994) NOCON, !." FACTS" B'I granted petitioner (irst Lepanto era"ics, Inc.Is application to a"end its B'I certificate of registration )y changing the scope of its registered prod#ct fro" /gla&ed floor tiles/ to /cera"ic tiles./ 'positor Mariwasa "o*ed for reconsideration of said B'I decision. $his "otion ha*ing )een denied, Mariwasa filed a petition for re*iew with respondent co#rt. $he A te"porarily restrained the B'I fro" i"ple"enting its decision. $his $%' lapsed )y its own ter"s 2? days after its iss#ance, witho#t respondent co#rt iss#ing any preli"inary in-#nction. 0etitioner filed a /Motion to Dis"iss 0etition and to Lift %estraining 'rder/ on the gro#nd that the A has no appellate -#risdiction o*er B'I ase 3o. 929??7, the sa"e )eing e5cl#si*ely *ested with the !#pre"e o#rt p#rs#ant to Article 82 of the '"ni)#s In*est"ents ode of 1987. $he appellate co#rt denied the "otion to dis"iss. $h#s, a petition for certiorari and prohi)ition was filed )efore this o#rt. 0etitioner clai"s that the A acted witho#t or in e5cess of its -#risdiction in iss#ing the 6#estioned resol#tion. 0etitioner arg#es that the H#diciary %eorgani&ation Act of 198? or Batas 0a")ansa Bilang 129 and irc#lar 1991, /0rescri)ing the %#les ,o*erning Appeals to the o#rt of Appeals fro" a (inal 'rder or Decision of the o#rt of $a5 Appeals and V#asi9H#dicial Agencies/ cannot )e the )asis of MariwasaIs appeal to respondent co#rt )eca#se the proced#re for appeal laid down therein r#ns contrary to Article 82 of ..'. 22+, which pro*ides that appeals fro" decisions or orders of the B'I shall )e filed directly with this o#rt. Mariwasa co#nters that whate*er /o)*io#s inconsistency/ or /irreconcila)le rep#gnancy/ there "ay ha*e )een )etween B.0. 129 and Article 82 of ..'. 22+ on the 6#estion of *en#e for appeal has already )een resol*ed )y irc#lar 1991 of the !#pre"e o#rt, which was pro"#lgated fo#r years after ..'. 22+ was enacted. ISSUE" 8hether or not the !#pre"e o#rt has the power to prescri)e r#les to eli"inate #nnecessary contradictions and conf#sing r#les of proced#re. HELD" Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt, p#rs#ant to its onstit#tional power #nder !ection 7@7A, Article <III of the 1987 onstit#tion to pro"#lgate r#les concerning pleading, practice and proced#re in all co#rts, and )y way of i"ple"entation of B.0. 129, iss#ed irc#lar 1991 prescri)ing the r#les go*erning appeals to the o#rt of Appeals fro" final orders or decisions of the o#rt of $a5 Appeals and 6#asi9-#dicial agencies to eli"inate #nnecessary contradictions and conf#sing r#les of proced#re. ontrary to petitionerIs contention, altho#gh a circ#lar is not strictly a stat#te or law, it has, howe*er, the force and effect of law according to settled -#rispr#dence.
In Inciong *. de ,#ia,
a circ#lar of this o#rt was treated as law. In adopting the reco""endation of the In*estigating H#dge to i"pose a sanction on a -#dge who *iolated irc#lar 3o. 7 of this o#rt dated !epte")er 24, 197B, as a"ended )y irc#lar 3o. 4 dated April 2B, 1977 and irc#lar 3o. 2? dated 'cto)er B, 1979, re6#iring raffling of cases, this o#rt 6#oted the ratiocination of the In*estigating H#dge, )r#shing aside the contention of respondent -#dge that assigning cases instead of raffling is a co""on practice and holding that respondent co#ld not go against the circ#lar of this o#rt #ntil it is repealed or otherwise "odified, as /Laws are repealed only )y s#)se6#ent ones, and their *iolation or non9o)ser*ance shall not )e e5c#sed )y dis#se, or c#sto"s or practice to the contrary./
San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 144 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $he arg#"ent that Article 82 of ..'. 22+ cannot )e *alidly repealed )y irc#lar 1991 )eca#se the for"er grants a s#)stanti*e right which, #nder the onstit#tion cannot )e "odified, di"inished or increased )y this o#rt in the e5ercise of its r#le9"a:ing powers is not entirely defensi)le as it see"s. %espondent correctly arg#ed that Article 82 of ..'. 22+ grants the right of appeal fro" decisions or final orders of the B'I and in granting s#ch right, it also pro*ided where and in what "anner s#ch appeal can )e )ro#ght. $hese latter portions si"ply deal with proced#ral aspects which this o#rt has the power to reg#late )y *irt#e of its constit#tional r#le9"a:ing powers. learly, irc#lar 1991 effecti*ely repealed or s#perseded Article 82 of ..'. 22+ insofar as the "anner and "ethod of enforcing the right to appeal fro" decisions of the B'I are concerned. Appeals fro" decisions of the B'I, which )y stat#te was pre*io#sly allowed to )e filed directly with the !#pre"e o#rt, sho#ld now )e )ro#ght to the o#rt of Appeal. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT ARUELO VS. CA GR NO. 107852. OCTO&ER 20, 1993 FACTS" Ar#elo and ,atchalian were <ice9Mayoralty candidates in Balagtas, B#lacan in the May 1992 elections. ,atchalian was proclai"ed as the d#ly elected *ice9"ayor. Ar#elo filed with the 'M.L. a petition see:ing to ann#l ,atchalianIs procla"ation on the gro#nd of /fra#d#lent alteration and ta"pering/ of *otes. Ar#elo also filed with the %$ a petition protesting the sa"e election. ,atchalian "o*ed to dis"iss, clai"ing that2 @aA the petition was filed o#t of ti"eG @)A there was a pending protest case )efore the 'M.L.G and @)A Ar#elo failed to pay the prescri)ed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition. $he 'M.L. denied Ar#eloIs petition. 1owe*er, the trial co#rt denied ,atchalianIs Motion to Dis"iss and ordered hi" to file his answer to the petition. Ar#elo prayed )efore the A for the iss#ance of a te"porary restraining order or a writ of preli"inary in-#nction to restrain the trial co#rt fro" i"ple"enting the 'rder of A#g#st 11 1992, regarding the re*ision of )allots. $he A )elatedly iss#ed a te"porary restraining order. Meanwhile, ,atchalian filed with the A another petition for certiorari @A9 ,.%. !0 3o. 28977A, again alleging gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the trial co#rt in iss#ing the 'rder, which denied his Motion for Bill of 0artic#lars. $he A dis"issed this petition for lac: of "erit. $he A rendered -#dg"ent, denying ,atchalianIs petition, )#t declaring, at the sa"e ti"e, that ,atchalianIs Answer 8ith o#nter9 0rotest and o#nterclai" was ti"ely filed. $he appellate co#rt also lifted the te"porary restraining order and ordered the trial co#rt to /proceed with dispatch in the proceedings )elow. 1ence this petition. ISSUE" 8hether or not the filing of "otions to dis"iss and "otions for )ill of partic#lars is prohi)ited )y !ection 1, %#le 14, 0art III of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#reG hence, the filing of said pleadings did not s#spend the r#nning of the fi*e9day period, or gi*e ,atchalian a new fi*e9day period to file his answer. HELD" 3'. 0etitioner filed the election protest @i*il ase 3o. 4B49 M992A with the %$, whose proceedings are go*erned )y the %e*ised %#les of o#rt. !ection 1, %#le 14, 0art III of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is not applica)le to proceedings )efore the reg#lar co#rts. As e5pressly "andated )y !ection 2, %#le 1, 0art I of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re, the filing of "otions to dis"iss and )ill of 0artic#lars, shall apply only to proceedings )ro#ght )efore the 'M.L.. !ection 2, %#le 1, 0art I pro*ides2 /!.. 2. Applica)ility. $hese r#les, e5cept 0art <I, shall apply to all actions and proceedings )ro#ght )efore the o""ission. 0art <I shall apply to election contests and 6#o warranto cases cogni&a)le )y co#rts of general or li"ited -#risdiction It "#st )e noted that nowhere in 0art <I of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is it pro*ided that "otions to dis"iss and )ill of partic#lars are not allowed in election protest or 6#o warranto cases pending )efore the reg#lar co#rts. onstit#tionally spea:ing, the 'M.L. cannot adopt a r#le prohi)iting the filing of certain pleadings in the reg#lar co#rts. $he power to pro"#lgate r#les concerning pleadings, practice and proced#re in all co#rts is *ested on the !#pre"e o#rt @onstit#tion, Art <III, !ec. + O7PA. 0ri*ate respondent recei*ed a copy of the order of the %$ denying his "otion for a )ill of partic#lars on A#g#st +, 1992. Jnder !ection l@)A, %#le 12 of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt, a party has at least fi*e days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his "otion for a )ill of partic#lars. 0ri*ate respondent, therefore, had #ntil A#g#st 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. $he Answer with o#nter90rotest and o#nterclai" filed )y hi" on A#g#st 11, 1992 was filed ti"ely. $he instant case is different fro" a pre9procla"ation contro*ersy which the law e5pressly "andates to )e resol*ed in a s#""ary proceeding @B.0. Blg. 881, Art. ;;, !ec. 2B+G 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re, 0art <, %#le 27, !ec. 2A. 0re9procla"ation contro*ersies sho#ld )e s#""arily decided, consistent with the legislatorsI desire that the can*ass of the *otes and the procla"ation of the winning candidate )e done with dispatch and witho#t #nnecessary delay. An election protest does not "erely concern the personal interests of ri*al candidates for an office. '*er and, a)o*e the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep p#)lic interest to deter"ine the tr#e choice of he people. (or this reason, it is a well9esta)lished principle that laws go*erning election protests "#st )e li)erally constr#ed to the end that the pop#lar will e5pressed in the election or p#)lic officers, will not, )y p#rely technical reasons, )e defeated 8e find no gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the o#rt of Appeals. 81.%.('%., the petition is here)y DI!MI!!.D. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT !AVELLANA VS. DILG GRN 102549, AUGUST 10, 1992
FACTS" 0etitioner Atty. .rwin B. Ha*ellana was an elected ity o#ncilor of Bago ity, 3egros 'ccidental. In 1989, ity .ngineer .rnesto . Di*inagracia s#ed Ha*ellana for2 @1A *iolation of Depart"ent of Local ,o*ern"ent @DL,A Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 8?948 in relation to DL, Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 7B978 and of !ection 7, paragraph ), 3o. 2 of %ep#)lic Act 3o. +714,/ and @2A for oppression, "iscond#ct and a)#se of a#thority. Di*inagraciaIs co"plaint alleged that Ha*ellana has contin#o#sly engaged in the practice of law witho#t sec#ring a#thority for that p#rpose, as re6#iredG that petitioner, as co#nsel for Antonio Ha*iero and %olando atapang, s#ed Di*inagracia for /Illegal Dis"issal and %einstate"ent with Da"ages/ p#tting hi" in p#)lic ridic#leG and that Ha*ellana also appeared as co#nsel in se*eral cases witho#t prior a#thority of the DL, %egional Director. 0etitioner filed this petition for certiorari praying that DL, Me"ora"d#" irc#lars 3os. 8?948 and 9?981 and !ection 9? of the new Local ,o*ern"ent ode @%A 71+?A )e declared #nconstit#tional and n#ll and *oid )eca#se2 @1A they *iolate Article <III, !ection 7 of the 1987 onstit#tion and @2A $hey constit#te class legislation, )eing discri"inatory against the legal and "edical professions for only sangg#nian "e")ers who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the e5ercise of their profession while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, "orticians and others are not so restricted @%A 71+?, !ec. 9? @)9lPA. ISSUE" 8hether or not the 6#estioned "e"orand#" circ#lars and !ection 9? of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode #nconstit#tional. HELD" 3'. As a "atter of policy, this o#rt accords great respect to the decisions andRor actions of ad"inistrati*e a#thorities not only )eca#se of the doctrine of separation of powers )#t also for their pres#"ed :nowledgea)ility and e5pertise in the enforce"ent of laws and reg#lations entr#sted to their -#risdiction 8ith respect to the present case, we find no gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the respondent, Depart"ent of Interior and Local ,o*ern"ent @DIL,A, in iss#ing the 6#estioned DL, irc#lars 3os. 8?948 and 9?981 and in denying petitionerIs "otion to dis"iss the ad"inistrati*e charge against hi". In the first place, co"plaints against p#)lic officers and e"ployees relating or incidental to the perfor"ance of their d#ties are necessarily i"pressed with p#)lic interest for )y e5press constit#tional "andate, a p#)lic office is a p#)lic tr#st. $he co"plaint for illegal dis"issal filed )y Ha*iero and atapang against ity .ngineer Di*inagracia is in effect a co"plaint against the ity ,o*ern"ent of Bago ity, their real e"ployer, of which petitioner Ha*ellana is a co#ncil"an. 1ence, -#dg"ent against ity .ngineer Di*inagracia wo#ld act#ally )e a -#dg"ent against the ity ,o*ern"ent. By ser*ing as co#nsel for the co"plaining e"ployees and assisting the" to prosec#te their clai"s against ity .ngineer Di*inagracia, the petitioner *iolated Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 7B978 @in relation to .lection 7O)92A of %A +714A prohi)iting a go*ern"ent official fro" engaging in the pri*ate practice of his profession, if s#ch practice wo#ld represent interests ad*erse to the go*ern"ent. 0etitionerIs contention that !ection 9? of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode of 1991 and DL, Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 9?981 *iolate Article <III, !ection 7 of the onstit#tion is co"pletely off tangent. 3either the stat#te nor the circ#lar trenches #pon the !#pre"e o#rtIs power and a#thority to prescri)e r#les on the practice of law. $he Local ,o*ern"ent ode and DL, Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 9?981 si"ply prescri)e r#les of cond#ct for p#)lic officials to a*oid conflicts of interest )etween the discharge of their p#)lic d#ties and the pri*ate practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it. !ection 9? of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode does not discri"inate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all pro*incial and "#nicipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occ#pation. !ection 9? e5plicitly pro*ides that sangg#nian "e")ers ."ay practice their professions, engage in any occ#pation, or teach in schools e5cept d#ring session ho#rs. / If there are so"e prohi)itions that apply partic#larly to lawyers, it is )eca#se of all the professions, the practice of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 145 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 law is "ore li:ely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of p#)lic ser*ice. 81.%.('%., the petition is D.3I.D for lac: of "erit. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT MACEDA VS. VASJUE$ 221 SCRA 4%4 519936 FACTS" 0etitioner H#dge Bonifacio !an& Maceda see:s the re*iew of the following orders of the office of the '")#ds"an2 1.A $he order dated !epte")er 18, 1991 denying e5 parte "otion refer to the ! filed )y the 0etitioner and 2.A $he order dated 3o*e")er 22, 1971 denying the petitionerIs "otion for reconsideration and directing petitioners to file his co#nter affida*it and other contro*erting e*idences. In his affida*it9co"plaint, respondent 3apoleon A)iera asserts that petitioner falsely certified that all ci*il and cri"inal cases which ha*e )een s#)"itted for decision or deter"ination for a period of 9? days ha*e )een deter"ined and decided on or )efore Han#ary 41, 1998 where in tr#th and in fact, petitioner :new that no decision had )een rendered in the cases that ha*e )een s#)"itted for decision. %espondent A)iera f#rther alleged that petitioner si"ilarly falsified his certificate of ser*ice. 0etitioner co#nters that he had )een granted )y this co#rt an e5tension of 9? days to decide said cases, and that the '")#ds"an has no -#risdiction o*er the case since the offense charged arose fro" the -#dgeIs perfor"ance of his official d#ties, which is #nder control of this o#rt. ISSUE" 8hether the 'ffice of the '")#ds"an co#ld entertain cri"inal co"plaints for the alleged falsification of a -#dgeIs certification s#)"itted to the s#pre"e co#rt to the !, and ass#"ing that it can, whether a referral sho#ld )e "ade first to the !. HELD" $he o#rt disagrees with the first part if the petitioners )asic arg#"ent, there is nothing in the decision in 'rap that wo#ld restrict it only to offenses co""itted )y a -#dge #nrelated to his official d#ties. A -#dge who falsifies his certificate is ad"inistrati*ely lia)le to the ! for serio#s "iscond#ct and inefficiency #nder !ec. 1 %#le 1B? of the r#les of o#rt and cri"inally lia)le to the state #nder the re*ised 0enal ode for his felonio#s Act. 1owe*er, we agree with petitioner that in the a)sence of any ad"inistrati*e action ta:en against hi" )y this o#rt with regard to his certificate of ser*ice, the in*estigation )eing cond#cted )y the '")#ds"an o*er all co#rts and its personnel, in *iolation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Articles <III, !ec. + of the 1987 onstit#tion e5cl#si*ely *ests in the ! ad"inistrati*e s#per*ision o*er all co#rts and co#rt personnel, fro" the presiding H#stice of the A that can o*ersee the -#dgeIs and co#rt personnelIs co"pliance co""it any *iolation thereof. 3o other )ranch of go*ern"ent "ay intr#de into this power, witho#t r#nning afo#l of the doctrine separation of power. $he '")#ds"an cannot -#stify itIs in*estigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it )y onstit#tion, for s#ch a -#stification not only r#ns co#nter to the specific "andate of the constit#tion grating s#per*isory powers to ! o*erall co#rts and their personnel, )#t li:ewise #nder"ines the independence of the -#diciary. $h#s, the '")#ds"an sho#ld first refer the "atter of petitionerIs certificate of ser*ice to this co#rt for deter"ination of whether said certificate reflected the tr#e stat#s of his pending case load, as the o#rt has the necessary records to "a:e s#ch deter"ination. $he '")#ds"an cannot co"pel this co#rt, as one of the three )ranches of go*ern"ent, to s#)"it its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this "atter, as s#ggested )y p#)lic respondent A)iera in his affida*it9 co"plaint. $he rationale for the foregoing prono#nce"ent is e*ident in this case. Ad"inistrati*ely, the 6#estion )efore #s is this, sho#ld a -#dge, ha*ing )een granted )y this co#rt an e5tension of ti"e to decide )efore hi", report these cases in his certificate of ser*ice. As this 6#estion had not yet )een raised these cases less resol*ed )y, this o#rt how co#ld )e the '")#ds"an resol*e the present cri"inal co"plaint that re6#ires the resol#tion of this 6#estion. In fine, where the cri"inal co"plaint against a -#dge or other co#rt e"ployees arises fro" their ad"inistrati*e d#ties, the o")#ds"an "#st defer action on said co"plaints and refer the sa"e to this o#rt for deter"ination whether said -#dge or co#rt e"ployee had acted within the scope of their ad"inistrati*e d#ties. 8herefore, the instant petition is here)y granted. $he '")#ds"an is here)y directed to dis"iss the co"plaint filed )y the p#)lic respondent Atty. 3apoleon A)iera and to refer the sa"e to this co#rt for appropriate action. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT NITAFAN VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE 152 SCRA 284 519876 FACTS" 0etitioners Da*id 3itafan 8enceslao 0olo and Ma5i"o !a*ellano are d#ly appointed and 6#alified H#dges of the %$, 3% Manila. $hey so#ght to prohi)it andRor perpet#ally en-oin respondent o""ission of Internal %e*en#e and (inance 'ffice of the ! fro" "a:ing any ded#ctions of withholding ta5es fro" their salaries. $hey s#)"it that a ta5 withheld fro" their co"pensation as -#dicial officers constit#te a decrease or di"in#tion of their salaries contrary to the pro*ision of !ec.1? of Art.<III of the onstit#tion "andating that /d#ring their contin#ance in office, their salary shall not )e decreased. ISSUE" Is the ded#ction in the said salaries in *iolation of !ec.1? of Art.<IIIC HELD" D.!. $he draft proposal of !ec 1? Art <III reads as /their salary shall not )e decreased/ and the words /not s#)-ected to inco"e ta5/ was deleted so as to gi*e s#)stance to e6#ality a"ong the three )ranches of go*ern"ent. $h#s, the clear intent of the onstit#tional o""ission was to delete the proposed e5press grant of e5e"ption fro" pay"ent of inco"e ta5 to "e")ers of the H#diciary. In the co#rse of deli)erations, it was "ade clear that the salaries of "e")ers of the H#diciary wo#ld )e s#)-ect to general inco"e ta5 does not fall within their contin#ance in office. $he co#rt disregarded the r#ling in 0erfecto *s. Meer that declared the salaries of "e")ers of the H#diciary e5e"pt fro" pay"ent of inco"e ta5 and considered s#ch pay"ent as di"in#tion of their salaries d#ring their contin#ance in office. (#rther"ore, in constr#cting !ec 1? Art <III of the 1987 onstit#tion, it is plain that the onstit#tion a#thori&es ongress to pass a law fi5ing another rate of co"pensation of H#stice and H#dges )#t s#ch rate "#st )e higher than that which they are recei*ing at the ti"e of the enact"ent, of if lower, it wo#ld )e applica)le only to the appointed after its appro*al. It wo#ld )e strained constr#ction to read into the pro*ision an e5e"ption fro" ta5ation when the tr#e intent of the fra"ers was to "a:e the salaries of the H#diciary ta5a)le. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT DE LA LLANA >(. AL&A (G.R. N+. L57883 M'2/; 12, 1982) FERNANDO, C.!." FACTS" 0etitioners assailed the constit#tionality of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 129 entitled /An Act %eorgani&ing the H#diciary, Appropriating (#nds $herefore and for other 0#rposes,/ the sa"e )eing contrary to the sec#rity of ten#re pro*ision of the onstit#tion as it separates fro" the -#diciary H#stices and -#dges of inferior co#rts fro" the o#rt of Appeals to "#nicipal circ#it co#rts e5cept the occ#pants of the !andigan)ayan and the o#rt of $a5 Appeals, #nless appointed to the inferior co#rts esta)lished )y s#ch Act. $hey li:ewise i"p#te lac: of good faith in its enact"ent and characteri&e as #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power to the 0resident his a#thority to fi5 the co"pensation and allowances of the H#stices and -#dges thereafter appointed and the deter"ination of the date when the reorgani&ation shall )e dee"ed co"pleted. $he !olicitor ,eneral "aintains that there is no *alid -#stification for the attac: on the constit#tionality of the stat#te, it )eing a legiti"ate e5ercise of the power *ested in the Batasang 0a")ansa to reorgani&e the -#diciary, the allegations of a)sence of good faith as well as the attac: on the independence of the -#diciary )eing #nwarranted and de*oid of any s#pport in law. ISSUE" 8hether or not B0 Blg. 129 is #nconstit#tional. HELD" Des. It is constit#tional. After an intensi*e and rigoro#s st#dy of all the legal aspects of the case, the !#pre"e o#rt dis"issed the petition, the #nconstit#tionality of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 129 not ha*ing )een shown. It held that the enact"ent thereof was in answer to a pressing and #rgent need for a "a-or reorgani&ation of the -#diciaryG that the attendant a)olition of the inferior co#rts which shall ca#se their inc#")ents to cease fro" holding office does not i"pair the independence of the -#diciary and the sec#rity of ten#re g#arantee as inc#")ent -#stices and -#dges with good perfor"ance and clean records can )e na"ed anew in legal conte"plation witho#t interr#ption in the contin#ity of their ser*iceG that the pro*ision granting the 0resident a#thority to fi5 the co"pensation and allowances of the H#stices and -#dges s#r*i*es the test of #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power, a standard ha*ing )een clearly adopted thereforG that the reorgani&ation pro*ided )y the challenged Act will )e carried o#t in accordance with the 0residentIs constit#tional d#ty to ta:e care that the laws )e faithf#lly e5ec#ted, and the -#diciaryIs co""it"ent to g#ard constit#tional rights. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT PEOPLE VS. HON. ESTAJUIO GACOTT (G.R. N+. 11%049 M'2/; 20, 1995) &IDIN, !." FACTS" %espondents !tro" and %eyes were charged with *iolation of the Anti9D#""y Law. $he acc#sed filed a Motion to V#ashRDis"iss, arg#ing that since the power to prosec#te is *ested e5cl#si*ely in the Anti9 D#""y Board #nder %A 114?, the ity 0rosec#tor of 0#erto 0rincesa has San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 146 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 no power or a#thority to file the sa"e. $he prosec#tion filed an opposition pointing o#t that the Anti9D#""y Board has already )een a)olished )y Letter of I"ple"entation 3o. 2, !eries of 1972. %espondent -#dge granted the "otion. $he prosec#tion "o*ed for reconsideration )#t respondent -#dge denied the sa"e in an order, the pertinent portions of which are 6#oted here#nder2 =. . . . It "ay )e ignorance of the law to insist that the law, %ep#)lic Act 114? was repealed or a"ended )y Letter of Instr#ction @sicA 3o. 2, !eries of 1972 as what the ity 0rosec#tor has harped all along. A Letter of Instr#ction @sicA is not law )y any standard and neither has it the force and effect of law. A contrary contention wo#ld )e *iolati*e of Article 7 of the 3ew i*il ode which pro*ides that laws are repealed only )y s#)se6#ent ones and of the %#les of !tat#tory onstr#ction. Besides, penal stat#tes are strictly constr#ed against the !tate and li)erally in fa*or of the acc#sed. $he r#les in all cri"inal prosec#tions is that all co#nts are resol*ed in fa*or of the acc#sed. In the case at )ar, the co#rt serio#sly do#)ts that the ity 0rosec#tor has the power or the a#thority to in*estigate *iolations of the Anti9D#""y Law and to file and to prosec#te cases of this :ind )efore o#r co#rts, as that is lodged with the Anti9D#""y Board #nder %. A. 114?.> ISSUE" 8hether or not respondent -#dge in granting the Motion to V#ash gra*ely a)#sed his discretion as to warrant the iss#ance of a writ of certiorari. HELD" ')*io#sly, respondent -#dge did not e*en )other to read the te5t of the cited L'IG otherwise, he wo#ld ha*e readily ac:nowledged the *alidity of the arg#"ent ad*anced )y the prosec#tion. As correctly o)ser*ed )y the !olicitor ,eneral, 0residential Decrees, s#ch as 0.D 3o. 1, iss#ed )y the for"er 0resident Marcos #nder his "artial law powers ha*e the sa"e force and effect as the laws enacted )y ongress. As held )y the !#pre"e o#rt in the case of A6#ino *s. o"elec, @+2 !%A 277 O1977PA, all procla"ations, orders, decrees, instr#ctions and acts pro"#lgated, iss#ed, or done )y the for"er 0resident are part of the law of the land, and shall re"ain *alid, legal, )inding, and effecti*e, #nless "odified, re*o:ed or s#perseded )y s#)se6#ent procla"ations, orders, decrees, instr#ctions, or other acts of the 0resident. L'I 3o. 2 is one s#ch legal order iss#ed )y for"er 0resident Marcos in the e5ercise of his "artial law powers to i"ple"ent 0.D. 3o. 1. Inas"#ch as neither 0.D. 3o. 1 nor L'I 3o. 2 has )een e5pressly i"pliedly re*ised, re*o:ed, or repealed, )oth contin#e to ha*e the force and effect of law. @%ollo, pp. 79 8A. Indeed, !ection 4, Article ;<II of the onstit#tion e5plicitly ordains2 !ec. 4. All e5isting laws, decrees, e5ec#ti*e orders, procla"ations, letters of instr#ctions, and other e5ec#ti*e iss#ances not inconsistent with this onstit#tion shall re"ain operati*e #ntil a"ended, repealed, or re*o:ed. B#t e*en "ore glaring than respondent -#dgeIs #tter ine5c#sa)le neglect to chec: the citations of the prosec#tion is the "ista:en )elief that the d#ty to infor" the co#rt on the applica)le law to a partic#lar case de*ol*es solely #pon the 0rosec#tion or whoe*er "ay )e the ad*ocate )efore the co#rt. %espondent -#dge sho#ld )e re"inded that co#rts are d#ty )o#nd to ta:e -#dicial notice of all the laws of the 1 and @!ec. 1, %#le 129 %#les of o#rtA. Being the trier of facts, -#dges are pres#"ed to )e well9infor"ed of the e5isting laws, recent enact"ents and -#rispr#dence, in :eeping with their sworn d#ty as "e")ers of the )ar @and )enchA to :eep a)reast of legal de*elop"ents $he o#rt is f#lly aware that not e*ery error or "ista:e of a -#dge in the perfor"ance of his d#ties is s#)-ect to cens#re. B#t where, as in the present case, the error co#ld ha*e )een entirely a*oided were it not for p#)lic respondentIs irresponsi)ility in the perfor"ance of his d#ties, it is )#t proper that respondent -#dge )e repri"anded and his order of dis"issal set aside for gra*e ignorance of the law. (or, respondent -#dgeIs error is not a si"ple error in -#dg"ent )#t one a"o#nting to gross ignorance of the law which co#ld easily #nder"ine the p#)licIs perception of the co#rtIs co"petence. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RE" MAN$ANO 5A.M. NO. 88718%1RTC. OCTO&ER 5, 1988.6 PADILLA, !" FACTS" 'n B H#ly 1988, H#dge %odolfo J. Man&ano, .5ec#ti*e H#dge, %$, Bang#i, Ilocos 3orte, Branch 19, sent this o#rt a letter which reads2 =By .5ec#ti*e 'rder %(+9?B iss#ed on H#ne 21, 1988 )y the 1onora)le 0ro*incial ,o*ernor of Ilocos 3orte, 1on. %odolfo . (ariNas, I was designated as a "e")er of the Ilocos 3orte 0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice created p#rs#ant to 0residential .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 87+ of 12 Dece")er 198+, as a"ended )y .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 42+ of H#ne 1, 1988. In consonance with .5ec#ti*e 'rder %(+9?B, the 1onora)le 0ro*incial ,o*ernor of Ilocos 3orte iss#ed "y appoint"ent as a "e")er of the o""ittee. (or yo#r ready reference, I a" enclosing herewith "achine copies of .5ec#ti*e 'rder %(+9?B and the appoint"ent. Before I "ay accept the appoint"ent and enter in the discharge of the powers and d#ties of the position as "e")er of the Ilocos @3orteA 0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice, "ay I ha*e the honor to re6#est for the iss#ance )y the 1onora)le !#pre"e o#rt of a %esol#tion, as follows2 @1A A#thori&ing "e to accept the appoint"ent and to ass#"e and discharge the powers and d#ties attached to the said positionG @2A onsidering "y "e")ership in the o""ittee as neither *iolati*e of the Independence of the H#diciary nor a *iolation of !ection 12, Article <III, or of the second paragraph of !ection 7, Article I; @BA, )oth of the onstit#tion, and will not in any way a"o#nt to an a)andon"ent of "y present position as .5ec#ti*e H#dge of Branch ;I;, %egional $rial o#rt, (irst H#dicial %egion, and as a "e")er of the H#diciaryG 5 5 5> ISSUE" 8hether or not the designation of H#dge Man&ano as "e")er of the 0ro*incial o""itteee on H#stice *iolates the onstit#tion. HELD" Des. Jnder the onstit#tion, the "e")ers of the !#pre"e o#rt and other co#rts esta)lished )y law shall not )e designated to any agency perfor"ing 6#asi9-#dicial or ad"inistrati*e f#nctions @!ection 12, Art. <III, onstit#tionA. onsidering that "e")ership of H#dge Man&ano in the Ilocos 3orte 0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice, which discharges ad"inistrati*e f#nctions, will )e in *iolation of the onstit#tion, the o#rt is constrained to deny his re6#est. (or"er hief H#stice .nri6#e M. (ernando in his conc#rring opinion in the case of ,arcia *s. Macaraig @49 !%A 1?+A a)ly sets forth2 =8hile the doctrine of separation of powers is a relati*e theory not to )e enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical de"ands of go*ern"ent precl#ding its doctrinaire application, it cannot -#stify a "e")er of the -#diciary )eing re6#ired to ass#"e a position or perfor" a d#ty non9-#dicial in character. $hat is i"plicit in the principle. 'therwise there is a plain depart#re fro" its co""and. $he essence of the tr#st reposed in hi" is to decide. 'nly a higher co#rt, as was e"phasi&ed )y H#stice Barredo, can pass on his act#ation. 1e is not a s#)ordinate of an e5ec#ti*e or legislati*e official, howe*er e"inent. It is indispensa)le that there )e no e5ception to the rigidity of s#ch a nor" if he is, as e5pected, to )e confined to the tas: of ad-#dication. (idelity to his sworn responsi)ility no leas than the "aintenance of respect for the -#diciary can )e satisfied with nothing less./ $his declaration does not "ean that %$ H#dges sho#ld adopt an attit#de of "onastic insensi)ility or #n)eco"ing indifference to 0ro*inceRity o""ittee on H#stice. As inc#")ent %$ H#dges, they for" part of the str#ct#re of go*ern"ent. $heir integrity and perfor"ance in the ad-#dication of cases contri)#te to the solidity of s#ch str#ct#re. As p#)lic officials, they are tr#stees of an orderly society. .*en as non9"e")ers of 0ro*incialRity o""ittees on H#stice, %$ -#dges sho#ld render assistance to said o""ittees to help pro"ote the landa)le p#rposes for which they e5ist, )#t only when s#ch assistance "ay )e reasona)ly incidental to the f#lfill"ent of their -#dicial d#ties. A'%DI3,LD, the aforesaid re6#est of H#dge %odolfo J. Man&ano is D.3I.D. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 88709, FE&RUAR- 11, 1992) CRU$, !." FACTS" In its co"plaint, petitioners alleged that on Han#ary 2B, 198?, 3I'! Ind#strial orporation o)tained a 02M loan fro" pri*ate respondent Jnited ocon#t 0lanters Ban: @J0BA and to sec#re pay"ent thereof, e5ec#ted a real estate "ortgage on two parcels of land. $he "ortgage was foreclosed for alleged non9pay"ent of the loan, and the sheriffIs sale was held witho#t re9p#)lication of the re6#ired notices after the original date for the a#ction was changed witho#t the :nowledge or consent of the "ortgagor. J0B was the highest and lone )idder and the "ortgaged lands were sold to it. J0B sold all its rights to the properties to pri*ate respondent Man#el o, who transferred the" to ,olden !tar Ind#strial orporation, another pri*ate respondent, #pon whose petition a writ of possession was iss#ed to it. 3I'! and the other petitioners filed s#it for /ann#l"ent of sheriffIs sale, reco*ery of possession, and da"ages, with prayer for the iss#ance of a preli"inary prohi)itory and "andatory in-#nction./ ,olden !tar and .*angelista filed a 79page de"#rrer to the e*idence where they arg#ed that the action was a deri*ati*e s#it that ca"e #nder the -#risdiction of the !ec#rities and .5change o""issionG that the "ortgage had )een *alidly foreclosedG that the sheriffIs sale had )een held in accordance with Act 4147G that the notices had )een d#ly p#)lished in a newspaper of general circ#lationG and that the opposition to the writ of possession had not )een filed on ti"e. 3o opposition to the de"#rrer ha*ing )een s#)"itted despite notice thereof to the parties, H#dge 3estor (. Dantes considered it s#)"itted for resol#tion and on H#ne +, 198+, iss#ed the following E ' % D . % Acting on the /De"#rrer to .*idence/ dated April 4?, 198+ filed )y defendants <ictorino 0. .*angelista and ,olden !tar Ind#strial orporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their co""entRopposition and it appearing fro" the *ery e*idence add#ced )y the plaintiff that the !heriffIs A#ction !ale cond#cted on H#ly 11, 1984 was San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 147 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 in co"plete accord with the re6#ire"ents of !ection 4, Act 4147 #nder which the a#ction sale was appropriately held and cond#cted and it appearing fro" the allegations in paragraph 14 of the plaintiffIs pleading and li:ewise fro" plaintiff arlos o6#incoIs own testi"ony that his ca#se is act#ally9against the other officers and stoc:holders of the plaintiff 3icos Ind#strial orporation /. . . for the p#rpose of protecting the corporation and its stoc:holders, as well as their own rights and interests in the corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fra#d#lent ants and de*ices of the responsi)le officials of the corporation, in )reach of the tr#st reposed #pon the" )y the stoc:holders . . ./ a s#)-ect "atter not within the co"petent -#risdiction of the o#rt, the co#rt finds the sa"e to )e i"pressed with "erit. 81.%.('%., plaintiffIs co"plaint is here)y dis"issed. $he DefendantsI respecti*e co#nterclai"s are li:ewise dis"issed. $he 8rit of 0reli"inary In-#nction heretofore iss#ed is dissol*ed and set aside. It is this order that is now assailed )y the petitioners on the principal gro#nd that it *iolates the afore"entioned constit#tional re6#ire"ent. $he petitioners clai" that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly e5plain how it was reached )y the trial co#rt. ISSUE" 8hether or not there is a fail#re to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law in which the order of dis"issal is )ased. HELD" Des.$he 6#estioned order is an o*er9si"plification of the iss#es, and *iolates )oth the letter and spirit of Article <III, !ection 1B, of the onstit#tion.It is a re6#ire"ent of d#e process that the parties to a litigation )e infor"ed of how it was decided, with an e5planation of the fact#al and legal reasons that led to the concl#sions of the co#rt. $he co#rt cannot si"ply say that -#dg"ent is rendered in fa*or of ; and against D and -#st lea*e it at that witho#t any -#stification whatsoe*er for its action. $he losing party is entitled to :now why he lost, so he "ay appeal to a higher co#rt, if per"itted, sho#ld he )elie*e that the decision sho#ld )e re*ersed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is )ased lea*es the parties in the dar: as to how it was reached and is especially pre-#dicial to the losing party, who is #na)le to pinpoint the possi)le errors of the co#rt for re*iew )y a higher tri)#nal. It is i"portant to o)ser*e at this point that the constit#tional pro*ision does not apply to interloc#tory orders, s#ch as one granting a "otion for postpone"ent or 6#ashing a s#)poena, )eca#se it /refers only to decisions on the "erits and not to orders of the trial co#rt resol*ing incidental "atters./ As for the "in#te resol#tions of this o#rt, we ha*e already o)ser*ed in Borro"eo *. o#rt of Appeals that E $he !#pre"e o#rt disposes of the )#l: of its cases )y "in#te resol#tions and decrees the" as final and e5ec#tory, as where a case is patently witho#t "erit, where the iss#es raised are fact#al in nat#re, where the decision appealed fro" is s#pported )y s#)stantial e*idence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applica)le laws, where it is clear fro" the records that the petitions were filed "erely to forestall the early e5ec#tion of -#dg"ent and for non9co"pliance with the r#les. $he resol#tion denying d#e co#rse or dis"issing a petition always gi*es the legal )asis. 555 555 555 $he o#rt is not d#ty )o#nd to render signed decisions all the ti"e. It has a"ple discretion to for"#late decisions andRor "in#te resol#tions, pro*ided a legal )asis is gi*en, depending on its e*al#ation of a case. $he order in the case at )ar does not co"e #nder either of the a)o*e e5ceptions. As it is settled that an order dis"issing a case for ins#fficient e*idence is a -#dg"ent on the "erits, it is i"perati*e that it )e a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is )ased. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT MENDO$A VS. CFI G.R. NO. L35%1214 !UNE 27, 1973 FERNANDO, !. FACTS" 0etitioner filed a petition for ha)eas corp#s, certiorari and "anda"#s. !aid petitions were dis"issed )y the co#rt for lac: of "erit d#e to the fact that petitioner failed to s#stain the )#rden of showing that his confine"ent was "ar:ed )y illegality or that the order cancelling the )ail pre*io#sly iss#ed was tainted with gra*e a)#se of discretion. 1ence, this petition for reconsideration. ISSUES" 8'3 the petitioner can in*o:e the ha)eas corp#s r#le. ,ranted that petitioner "ay not )e released on a ha)eas corp#s proceeding, is he, howe*er, entitled to )ailC HELD" 1. 3'. 1a)eas corp#s co#ld )e in*o:ed )y petitioner if he were a)le to show the illegality of his detention. $here is aptness and acc#racy in the characteri&ation of the writ of ha)eas corp#s as the writ of li)erty. %ightf#lly it is latit#dinarian in scope. It is wide9ranging and all e")racing in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to ass#re that there )e no toleration of illegal restraint. Detention "#st )e for a ca#se recogni&ed )y law. $he writ i"poses on the -#diciary the gra*e responsi)ility of ascertaining whether a depri*ation of physical freedo" is warranted. $his it has to discharge witho#t loss of ti"e. $he party who is :eeping a person in c#stody has to prod#ce hi" in co#rt as soon as possi)le. 8hat is "ore, he "#st -#stify the action ta:en. 'nly if it can )e de"onstrated that there has )een no *iolation of oneIs right to li)erty will he )e a)sol*ed fro" responsi)ility. Jnless there )e s#ch a showing, the confine"ent "#st there)y cease. $he a)o*e for"#lation of what is settled law finds no application to the present sit#ation. 0etitionerIs depri*ation of li)erty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly iss#ed after a deter"ination )y the -#dge in co"pliance with the constit#tional pro*ision re6#iring the e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witnesses prod#ced. 3o allegation to the contrary "ay )e entertained. $here was no 6#estion, howe*er, as to the legality of the warrants of arrest pre*io#sly iss#ed to petitioner. 1a)eas corp#s, #nder the circ#"stances, wo#ld not therefore lie. 2. 3'. BAIL is the re"edy )y which, notwithstanding the a)sence of any flaw in oneIs confine"ent, pro*isional li)erty "ay still )e had. !#ch a re"edy, as a "atter of fact, was granted hi" in accordance with an order of the "#nicipal co#rt of M#lanay. $hereafter, howe*er, the )ail was re*o:ed )y the o#rt of (irst Instance in the order now challenged. !#ch act#ation he wo#ld now conde"n as a gra*e a)#se of discretion. Before con*iction, e*ery person is )aila)le e5cept if charged with capital offense when the e*idence of g#ilt is strong. !#ch a right flows fro" the pres#"ption of innocence in fa*or of e*ery acc#sed who sho#ld not )e s#)-ected to the loss of freedo" as thereafter he wo#ld )e entitled to ac6#ittal, #nless his g#ilt )e pro*ed )eyond reasona)le do#)t. $here)y a regi"e of li)erty is honored in the o)ser*ance and not in the )reach. It is not )eyond the real" of pro)a)ility, howe*er, that a person charged with a cri"e, especially so where his defense is wea:, wo#ld -#st si"ply "a:e hi"self scarce and th#s fr#strate the hearing of his cage. A )ail is intended as a g#arantee that s#ch an intent wo#ld )e thwarted. It is, in the lang#age of ooley, a "ode short of confine"ent which wo#ld, with reasona)le certainty, ins#re the attendance of the acc#sed for the s#)se6#ent trial. 3or is there anything #nreasona)le in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when e*idence of g#ilt is strong, as the li:elihood is, rather than await the o#tco"e of the proceeding against hi" with a death sentence, an e*er9present threat, te"ptation to flee the -#risdiction wo#ld )e too great to )e resisted. $he precise 6#estion howe*er, is whether once the pro*isional li)erty has )een th#s o)tained, it co#ld )e ter"inated )y the cancellation of the )ail. $he two )asic o)-ections are2 'ne was that petitioner, when the )ail was granted, was still at large. $he "#nicipal co#rt, therefore, co#ld not ha*e granted )ail in accordance with o#r r#ling in (eliciano *. 0asicolan. $h#s2 /I$he constit#tional "andate that all persons shall )efore con*iction )e )aila)le e5cept those charged with capital offenses when e*idence of g#ilt is strong, is s#)-ect to the li"itation that the person applying for )ail sho#ld )e in c#stody of the law, or otherwise depri*ed of his li)erty. $he p#rpose of )ail is to sec#re oneIs release and it wo#ld )e incongr#o#s as to grant )ail to one who is free.I/ !econdly, and what is worse, the prosec#tion was ne*er gi*en a chance to present its e*idence. $he a#thoritati*e doctrine in 0eople *. !an Diego is th#s s6#arely in point2 /8hether the "otion for )ail of a defendant who is in c#stody for a capital offense )e resol*ed in s#""ary proceeding or in the co#rse of a reg#lar trial, the prosec#tion "#st )e gi*en an opport#nity to present, within a reasona)le ti"e, all the e*idence that it "ay desire to introd#ce )efore the o#rt sho#ld resol*e the "otion for )ail. If, as in the cri"inal case in*ol*ed in the instant special ci*il action, the prosec#tion sho#ld )e denied s#ch an opport#nity, there wo#ld )e a *iolation of proced#ral d#e process, and order of the o#rt granting )ail sho#ld )e considered *oid./ 3o gra*e a)#se of discretion to -#stify the grant of the writ certiorari prayed for has )een shown. $hat is why o#r resol#tion so#ght to )e reconsidered sho#ld stand. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT &ORROMEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. L82273, !UNE 1, 1990) PER CURIAM FACTS" 0etitioner Hoa6#in $. Borro"eo charges Attys. H#lieta D. arreon and Alfredo 0. Marasigan, Di*ision ler: of o#rt and Asst. Di*ision ler: of o#rt, respecti*ely, of the $hird Di*ision, and Atty. Hose I. Il#stre, hief of the H#dicial %ecords 'ffice of this o#rt, with #s#rpation of -#dicial f#nctions, for allegedly /"alicio#sly and de*io#sly iss#ing )iased, fa:e, )aseless and #nconstit#tional I%esol#tionI and I.ntry of H#dg"entI in ,.%. 3o. 82274. $his is not the first ti"e that Mr. Borro"eo has filed chargesRco"plaints against officials of the o#rt. In se*eral letter9 co"plaints filed with the co#rts and the '")#ds"an Borro"eo had repeatedly alleged that he /s#ffered in-#stices,/ )eca#se of the disposition of the fo#r @BA cases he separately appealed to this o#rt which were resol*ed )y "in#te resol#tions, allegedly in *iolation of !ections B @4A,14 and 1B of Article <III of the 1987 onstit#tion. 1is in*aria)le co"plaint is that the resol#tions which disposed of his cases do not )ear the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 148 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 signat#res of the H#stices who participated in the deli)erations and resol#tions and do not show that they *oted therein. 1e li:ewise co"plained that the resol#tions )ear no certification of the hief H#stice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were )ased and were signed only )y the ler:s of o#rt and therefore /#nconstit#tional, n#ll and *oid./ $he !#pre"e o#rt thro#gh its $hird Di*ision disposed of Borro"eoIs petition in a fo#r9page resol#tion which "ore than ade6#ately co"plies with the constit#tional re6#ire"ents go*erning resol#tions ref#sing to gi*e d#e co#rse to petitions for re*iew. $he petition and its incidents were disc#ssed and deli)erated #pon )y the H#stices of the $hird Di*ision. $he o#rt re"inds all lower co#rts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the )#l: of its cases )y "in#te resol#tions and decrees the" as final and e5ec#tory, as where a case is patently witho#t "erits where the iss#es raised are fact#al in nat#re, where the decision appealed fro" is s#pported )y2 s#)stantial e*idence and, is in accord with the facts of the case and the applica)le laws, where it is clear fro" the records that the petition is filed "erely to forestall the early e5ec#tion of -#dg"ent and for non9co"pliance with the r#les. ISSUES" 1. 8'3 the certification of the hief H#stice is i"perati*e in "in#te resol#tions. 2. 8'3 the resol#tion in 6#estion lac:ed necessary facts and law on which they are )ased. HELD" 1. 3'. Min#te resol#tions need not )e signed )y the "e")ers of the o#rt who too: part in the deli)erations of a case nor do they re6#ire the certification of the hief H#stice. (or to re6#ire "e")ers of the co#rt to sign all resol#tions iss#ed wo#ld not only #nd#ly delay the iss#ance of its resol#tions )#t a great a"o#nt of their ti"e wo#ld )e spent on f#nctions "ore properly perfor"ed )y the ler: of co#rt and which ti"e co#ld )e "ore profita)ly #sed in the analysis of cases and the for"#lation of decisions and orders of i"portant nat#re and character. .*en with the #se of this proced#re, the o#rt is still str#ggling to wipe o#t the )ac:logs acc#"#lated o*er the years and "eet the e*er increasing n#")er of cases co"ing to it. %e"edial9legislation to "eet this pro)le" is also pending in ongress. In discharging its constit#tional d#ties, the o#rt needs the f#n ti"e and attention of its ler:s of o#rt and other :ey officials. Its officers do not ha*e the ti"e to answer fri*olo#s co"plaints filed )y disgr#ntled litigants 6#estioning decisions and resol#tions of the o#rt and in*ol*ing cases deli)erated #pon and resol*ed )y the o#rt itself. As earlier stated, all resol#tions and decisions are actions of the o#rt, not its s#)ordinate personnel. $he o#rt ass#"es f#ll responsi)ility2 for all its acts. Its personnel cannot answer and sho#ld not )e "ade to answer for acts of the o#rt. 2. 3'. In Macario $aya"#ra, et al. *. Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt, et al. @May 21, 1987A, the o#rt clarified the constit#tional re6#ire"ent that a decision "#st e5press clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is )ased as referring only to decisions. %esol#tions disposing of petitions fall #nder the constit#tional pro*ision which states that, /3o petition for re*iew ... shall )e ref#sed d#e co#rse ...witho#t stating the legal )asis therefor/ @!ection 1B, Article <III, onstit#tionA. 8hen the o#rt, after deli)erating on a petition and any s#)se6#ent pleadings, "anifestations, co""ents, or "otions decides to deny d#e co#rse to the petition and states that the 6#estions raised are fact#al or no re*ersi)le error in the respondent co#rtIs decision is shown or for so"e other legal )asis stated in the resol#tion, there is s#fficient co"pliance with the constit#tional re6#ire"ent. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT 7OMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 127%82, APRIL 4, 1998) REGALADO, !. FACTS" 3ID granted petitioner LI0I a direct loan of 08M and a 02M g#arantee to sec#re 03B. As sec#rity thereof, LI0I e5ec#ted in fa*or of 3ID a Deed of %eal .state Mortgage, co*ering, a"ong others, a parcel of land with all its i"pro*e"ents. Jpon f#ll pay"ent of LI0IIs acco#nt with 3ID and the 02.? M redit Line with %espondent 03B, 3ID e5ec#ted a Deed of %elease and ancellation of Mortgage, which pro*ided that2 /8hereas, the credit acco""odations had )een f#lly paid )y the Borrower to the 0hilippine 3ational Ban: @03BA and 3ID which s#)se6#ently ret#rned the ownerIs copy of the $$ 3o. B+9747 of the petitioner and accordingly the Deed of %elease and ancellation of Mortgage was registered with the %egistry of Deed. 1owe*er, it appeared that there were so"e acco#nts chargea)le to LI0I on deferred letters of credit opened which ca"e to the :nowledge of 03B only in 1981 and 1982. 1ence, 03B re6#ested for the ret#rn of the ownerIs copy of $$ 3o. B+9747 and the said title was ret#rned to 03B. 03B filed a /0etition for orrection of .ntry and Ad*erse lai"/ with the office of the %egistry of Deeds of Ma:ati, and was a)le to ha*e the sa"e annotated. It then filed a 0etition of !ale to e5tra9-#dicially foreclose *ario#s properties )elonging to LI0I. LI0I recei*ed an #ndated 3otice of !heriffIs !ale to the effect that the land co*ered )y $$ 3o. B+9747 wo#ld )e foreclosed e5tra9-#dicially on Dece")er 19, 1984 at 92?? a.". 0etitioner challenged the foreclos#re sale saying that it was n#ll and *oid )eca#se the Deed of %elease necessarily incl#des the "ortgage to the 03B. $he o#rt did not agree that the e5tra-#dicial foreclos#re of the "ortgage on the whole property is n#ll and *oid. And d#e to the #nfa*ora)le decision 0etitioner filed a pleading deno"inated as a Motion for Lea*e to file Incorporated !econd Motion for %econsideration of the %esol#tion sayi)g that the /"in#te resol#tions/ it assails are s#pposedly in *iolation of !ection 1B, Article <III of the present onstit#tion. It insin#ates that s#ch proced#re adopted )y this o#rt is a c#lpa)le constit#tional *iolation and can )e s#)-ect of i"peach"ent proceedings. ISSUE" 8'3 the "in#te resol#tions of the co#rt are in *iolation of !ection 1B, Article <III of the onstit#tion. HELD" 3'. It has )een stressed that these /resol#tions/ are not /decisions/ within the a)o*e constit#tional re6#ire"entsG they "erely hold that the petition for re*iew sho#ld not )e entertained and e*en ordinary lawyers ha*e all this ti"e so #nderstood itG and the petition to re*iew the decision of the o#rt of Appeals is not a "atter of right )#t of so#nd -#dicial discretion, hence there is no need to f#lly e5plain the o#rtIs denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already "entioned in the o#rt of AppealsI decision. $he constit#tional "andate is applica)le only in cases /s#)"itted for decision,/ i.e., gi*en d#e co#rse and after the filing of )riefs or "e"oranda andRor other pleadings, )#t not where the petition is ref#sed d#e co#rse, with the resol#tion therefor stating the legal )asis thereof. $h#s, when the o#rt, after deli)erating on a petition and s#)se6#ent pleadings, decides to deny d#e co#rse to the petition and states that the 6#estions raised are fact#al or there is no re*ersi)le error in the respondent co#rtIs decision, there is s#fficient co"pliance with the constit#tional re6#ire"ent. $he o#rt re"inds all lower co#rts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the )#l: of its cases )y "in#te resol#tions and decrees the" as final and e5ec#tory, as where a case is patently witho#t "erit, where the iss#es raised are fact#al in nat#re, where the decision appealed fro" is s#pported )y s#)stantial e*idence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applica)le laws, where it is clear fro" the records that the petition is filed "erely to forestall the early e5ec#tion of -#dg"ent and for non9co"pliance with the r#les. $he resol#tion denying d#e co#rse or dis"issing the petition always gi*es the legal )asis. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT PRUDENTIAL &AN7 VS. CASTRO (A.M. NO. 275%, MARCH 15, 1988) PER CURIAM FACTS" %espondent ,recia filed a /0etition for %edress and .5oneration and for <ol#ntary Inhi)ition/, praying that the decision of 3o*e")er 12,1987, and the resol#tion of the denial of the "otion for reconsideration of the said decision )e set aside and a new one entered )y this o#rt dis"issing the ad"inistrati*e co"plaint and e5onerating the respondent. %espondentKs ire res#lts fro" an ad"inistrati*e case filed against hi" and the s#)se6#ent collecti*e decision of the o#rt to dis)ar hi". %espondent 6#estions the *alidity of o#rtKs decision d#e to the fact that the said decision is *iolati*e of the 1987 onstit#tion d#e to lac: of certification )y the hief H#stice and that the concl#sions of the o#rt were reached in cons#ltation )efore the case was assigned to a "e")er for the writing of the opinion of the o#rt. ISSUE" 8'3 the certification of the hief H#stice is re6#ired for the *alidity of the assailed decision. HELD" 3'. $he certification re6#ire"ent refers to decisions in -#dicial, not ad"inistrati*e cases. (ro" the *ery )eginning, resol#tionsRdecisions of the o#rt in ad"inistrati*e cases ha*e not )een acco"panied )y any for"al certification. In fact, s#ch a certification wo#ld )e a s#perfl#ity in ad"inistrati*e cases, which )y their *ery nat#re, ha*e to )e deli)erated #pon considering the collegiate co"position of this o#rt. B#t e*en if s#ch a certification were re6#ired, it is )eyond do#)t that the concl#sions of the o#rt in its decision were arri*ed at after cons#ltation and deli)eration. $he signat#res of the "e")ers who act#ally too: part in the deli)erations and *oted attest to that. Besides, )eing a per c#ria" decision, or an opinion of the o#rt as a whole, there is no ponente altho#gh any "e")er of the o#rt "ay )e assigned to write the draft. In s#ch cases, a for"al certification is o)*io#sly not re6#ired. ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION >(. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. N+. 114323. !1.: 23, 1998 MARTINE$, !." San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 149 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 FACTS" $he disp#te )etween the parties had its origin in the non9 deli*ery of the B,4?? "etric tons of oil well ce"ent to the petitioner. $he petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled )y the ,o*ern"ent of India while the pri*ate respondent is a pri*ate corporation d#ly organi&ed and e5isting #nder the laws of the 0hilippines. A contract was entered into )etween the two parties where)y the pri*ate respondent #ndertoo: to s#pply the petitioner B,4?? "etric tons of oil well ce"ent for a consideration of J!QB77,4??.??. 3otwithstanding the fact that the pri*ate respondent had already recei*ed pay"ent and despite se*eral de"ands "ade )y the petitioner, the pri*ate respondent failed to deli*er the oil well ce"ent. $hereafter, negotiations ens#ed )etween the parties and they agreed that the pri*ate respondent will replace the entire B,4?? "etric tons of oil well ce"ent with lass /,/ ce"ent cost free at the petitionerIs designated port. 1owe*er, #pon inspection, the lass /,/ ce"ent did not confor" to the petitionerIs specifications. $he petitioner then infor"ed the pri*ate respondent that it was referring its clai" to an ar)itrator p#rs#ant to la#se 1+ of their contract. $he chosen ar)itrator, one !hri 3.3. Malhotra, resol*ed the disp#te in petitionerIs fa*or. $o ena)le the petitioner to e5ec#te the award in its fa*or, it filed a 0etition )efore the o#rt of the i*il H#dge in Dehra D#n. India @foreign co#rtA, praying that the decision of the ar)itrator )e "ade /the %#le of o#rt/ in India. $he foreign co#rt ref#sed to ad"it the pri*ate respondentKs o)-ections for fail#re to pay the re6#ired filing fees. $h#s, an order was iss#ed ordering pri*are respondent to pay petitioner. Despite notice sent to the pri*ate respondent of the foregoing order and se*eral de"ands )y the petitioner for co"pliance therewith, the pri*ate respondent ref#sed to pay the a"o#nt ad-#dged )y the foreign co#rt as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a co"plaint with Branch 4? of the %egional $rial o#rt @%$A of !#rigao ity for the enforce"ent of the afore"entioned -#dg"ent of the foreign co#rt. $he pri*ate respondent "o*ed to dis"iss the co"plaint on the following gro#nds2 @1A plaintiffs lac: of legal capacity to s#eG @2A lac: of ca#se of actionG and @4A plaintiffs clai" or de"and has )een wai*ed, a)andoned, or otherwise e5ting#ished. $he %$ dis"issed pri*ate respondentKs co"plaint for lac: of a *alid ca#se of action. Anent the iss#e of the s#fficiency of the petitionerIs ca#se of action, howe*er, the %$ fo#nd the referral of the disp#te )etween the parties to the ar)itrator #nder la#se 1+ of their contract erroneo#s. $he %$ characteri&ed the erroneo#s s#)"ission of the disp#te to the ar)itrator as a ="ista:e of law or fact a"o#nting to want of -#risdiction>. onse6#ently, the proceedings had )efore the ar)itrator were n#ll and *oid and the foreign co#rt had therefore, adopted no legal award which co#ld )e the so#rce of an enforcea)le right. $he petitioner then appealed to the respondent o#rt of Appeals which affir"ed the dis"issal of the co"plaint. In its decision, the appellate co#rt conc#rred with the %$Is r#ling that the ar)itrator did not ha*e -#risdiction o*er the disp#te )etween the parties, th#s, the foreign co#rt co#ld not *alidly adopt the ar)itratorIs award. In addition, the appellate co#rt o)ser*ed that the f#ll te5t of the -#dg"ent of the foreign co#rt contains the dispositi*e portion only and indicates no findings of fact and law as )asis for the award. 1ence, the said -#dg"ent cannot )e enforced )y any 0hilippine co#rt as it wo#ld *iolate the constit#tional pro*ision that no decision shall )e rendered )y any co#rt witho#t e5pressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is )ased. Jpon denial of the "otion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the present petition. ISSUES" @1A 8hether or not the ar)itrator had -#risdiction o*er the disp#te )etween the petitioner and the pri*ate respondent #nder la#se 1+ of the contract. @2A 8hether or not the -#dg"ent of the foreign co#rt is enforcea)le in this -#risdiction in *iew of the pri*ate respondentIs allegation that it is )ereft of any state"ent of facts and law #pon which the award in fa*or of the petitioner was )ased. HELD" 1. It is noted that the non9deli*ery of the oil well ce"ent is not in the nat#re of a disp#te arising fro" the fail#re to e5ec#te the s#pply orderRcontract design, drawing, instr#ctions, specifications or 6#ality of the "aterials as pro*ided for in the la#se 1+ of their ontract. $hat la#se 1+ sho#ld pertain only to "atters in*ol*ing the technical aspects of the contract is )#t a logical inference considering that the #nderlying p#rpose of a referral to ar)itration is for s#ch technical "atters to )e deli)erated #pon )y a person possessed with the re6#ired s:ill and e5pertise which "ay )e otherwise a)sent in the reg#lar co#rts. $his o#rt agrees with the appellate co#rt in its r#ling that the non9deli*ery of the oil well ce"ent is a "atter properly cogni&a)le )y the reg#lar co#rts as stip#lated )y the parties in la#se 17 of their contract2 All 6#estions, disp#tes and differences, arising #nder o#t of or in connection with this s#pply order, shall )e s#)-ect to the e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of the co#rt, within the local li"its of whose -#risdiction and the place fro" which this s#pply order is sit#ated. 8e )elie*e that the correct interpretation to gi*e effect to )oth stip#lations in the contract is for la#se 1+ to )e confined to all clai"s or disp#tes arising fro" or relating to the design, drawing, instr#ctions, specifications or 6#ality of the "aterials of the s#pply orderRcontract, and for la#se 17 to co*er all other clai"s or disp#tes. B#t the o#rt finds "erit on the contention that the fail#re of the replace"ent ce"ent to confor" to the specifications of the contract is a "atter clearly falling within the a")it of la#se 1+. Jndo#)tedly, what was referred to ar)itration was no longer the "ere non9deli*ery of the cargo at the first instance )#t also the fail#re of the replace"ent cargo to confor" to the specifications of the contract, a "atter clearly within the co*erage of la#se 1+. 2. As specified in the order of the i*il H#dge of Dehra D#n, /Award 0aper 3o. 4RB91 shall )e a part of the decree/. $his is a categorical declaration that the foreign co#rt adopted the findings of facts and law of the ar)itrator as contained in the latterIs Award 0aper. Award 0aper 3o. 4RB91, contains an e5ha#sti*e disc#ssion of the respecti*e clai"s and defenses of the parties, and the ar)itratorIs e*al#ation of the sa"e. Inas"#ch as the foregoing is dee"ed to ha*e )een incorporated into the foreign co#rtIs -#dg"ent the appellate co#rt was in error when it descri)ed the latter to )e a /si"plistic decision containing literally, only the dispositi*e portion/. $he constit#tional "andate that no decision shall )e rendered )y any co#rt witho#t e5pressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is )ased does not precl#de the *alidity of /"e"orand#" decisions/ which adopt )y reference the findings of fact and concl#sions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tri)#nals. 1ence, e*en in this -#risdiction, incorporation )y reference is allowed if only to a*oid the c#")erso"e reprod#ction of the decision of the lower co#rts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher co#rt. $his is partic#larly tr#e when the decision so#ght to )e incorporated is a lengthy and thoro#gh disc#ssion of the facts and concl#sions arri*ed at, as in this case, where Award 0aper 3o. 4RB91 consists of eighteen @18A single spaced pages. (#rther"ore, the recognition to )e accorded a foreign -#dg"ent is not necessarily affected )y the fact that the proced#re in the co#rts of the co#ntry in which s#ch -#dg"ent was rendered differs fro" that of the co#rts of the co#ntry in which the -#dg"ent is relied on. $h#s, if #nder the proced#ral r#les of the i*il o#rt of Dehra D#n, India, a *alid -#dg"ent "ay )e rendered )y adopting the ar)itratorIs findings, then the sa"e "#st )e accorded respect. In the sa"e *ein, if the proced#re in the foreign co#rt "andates that an 'rder of the o#rt )eco"es final and e5ec#tory #pon fail#re to pay the necessary doc:et fees, then the co#rts in this -#risdiction cannot in*alidate the order of the foreign co#rt si"ply )eca#se o#r r#les pro*ide otherwise. $he foreign -#dg"ent )eing *alid, there is nothing else left to )e done than to order its enforce"ent, despite the fact that the petitioner "erely prays for the re"and of the case to the %$ for f#rther proceedings. As this o#rt has r#led on the *alidity and enforcea)ility of the said foreign -#dg"ent in this -#risdiction, f#rther proceedings in the %$ for the reception of e*idence to pro*e otherwise are no longer necessary. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. COMMON PROVISIONS ARULEO VS. CA 227 SCRA 311 519936 FACTS" Ar#elo and ,atchalian were <ice9Mayoralty candidates in Batangas, B#laean. ,atchalian was declared the winner. $here#pon, Ar#elo filed with the %$ a ci*il case protest in the sa"e elections. Ar#elo clai"s that in elections contests, the 'M.L. %#les gi*e the respondent only 7 days fro" s#""ons to file his answer and that this 79 day period has lapsed. According to hi", the tiling of Motions to Dis"iss and Motion to Bill of partic#lars is prohi)ited )y !ec. 1 %#le 14 of 'M.L.. %#les of 0roced#res, hence, the filling )y ,atchalian of said pleadings did not s#spend the r#nning of the 79day period. ISSUE" Is Ar#eloKs contention correctC HELD" 3'. 0art <I of the o"e lee %#les does not pro*ide that M$D. and Bill of partic#lars are not allowed in election contest pending )efore the reg#lar co#rts constit#tionally spea:ing. o"elec cannot adopt a r#le prohi)iting the filing of certain pleadings in the reg#lar co#rts. $he power to pro"#lgate r#les concerning pleadings, practice and proced#re in all co#rts is *ested on the !. ,atchalian recei*ed a copy of the %$ order denying his "otion for Bill of 0artic#lars on A#g#st +, 1992. Jnder !ec.1 @)A %#le 12 of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt, a party has at least fi*e days to file his answer I after receipt of the order denying his "otion for a )ill of partic#lars. 1is answer was filed right on ti"e. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. COMMON PROVISIONS CUA VS. COMELEC 15% SCRA 582 519876 FACTS" $he 'M.L. (irst Di*ision rendered a 227 decision on A#g#st 1?, 1987 fa*oring #a as winner in the lone ongressional scat of V#irino )#t his procla"ation was s#spended d#e to lac: of #nani"o#s *ote re6#ired )y the proced#ral r#les in o"elec %esol#tion 3o.1++9 regarding transaction of official )#siness of a Di*ision. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 150 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 0#rs#ant to said r#le, pri*ate respondent 0#&on filed a "otion for reconsideration with the o"elec en )anc. 'n 'cto)er 28, 1987, three "e")ers *oted to s#stain the (irst Decision, with 2 dissenting and one a)staining @one died earlierA. B#t respondent insists that no *alid decision was reached )y the 'M.L. en )anc )eca#se only three *otes were reached in fa*or of #a and theses did not constit#te a "a-ority of the )ody. ISSUE" Is the #aKs contention correctC HELD" Des. $he 291 decision rendered )y the (irst Di*ision was *alid decision #nder Art.I;9A !ec.7 of the onstit#tion. (#rther"ore, the three "e")ers who *oted to affir" the (irst di*ision constit#ted a "a-ority of the fi*e "e")ers who deli)erated and *oted thereon en )ane. $heir decision is also *alid #nder the aforesaid onstit#tional pro*ision. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. COMMON PROVISIONS ACENA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 193 SCRA %23 519916 FACTS" 0etitioner Acena was appointed as an Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer of %i&al $echnological olleges @%$A, a state college. 1e was appro*ed as per"anent )y the !. Dr. 0rofets later e5tended to Acena a pro"otional appoint"ent as Associate 0rofessor and at the sa"e ti"e designated the latter as Acting Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer, despite the pro"otional appoint"ent. Dr. .stolas replaced Dr. 0rofets as %$ '$. In a "e"orand#" Dr. .stolas re*o:ed the designation of Acena as Acting Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer. !#)se6#ently, petitioner Acena filed s#it with the Merit !yste"s 0rotection Board @M!0BA against Ds. .stolas for illegal ter"ination. M!0B initially dis"issed the co"plaint, )#t it s#)se6#ently re*ersed itself after ha*ing )een infor"ed of the opinion of the ! hair"an ,otdalera to the effect that Acena is still Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer of the %$ )eca#se his appoint"ent as Associate 0rofessor had )een withdrawn. Dr. .stolas and !al*ador @the one to replace AcenaA filed a petition for re*iew with the 'ffice of the 0resident, which refered said petition to the !. $he ! r#led in fa*or of !r. .stolas and !al*ador. 1ence, this petition. ISSUE" 8hether or not esc acted witho#t in e5cess of -#risdiction or with gra*e a)#se of discretion when it set the order of M!0B. HELD" It is settled r#le, that a respondent tri)#nal e5ercising -#dicial f#nction acts witho#t -#risdiction if does not ha*e the a#thority )y law to hear and decide the case. $here is e5cess of -#risdiction where the respondent has the legal power to decide the case )#t o*ersteps his a#thority. And there is ga*e a)#se of discretion where the respondent acts in capricio#s, whi"sical, ar)itrary or despotic "anner in the e5ercise of his -#dg"ent a"o#nting to lac: of -#risdiction. Jnder 0D 1B?9 the ! has the -#risdiction to re*iew the decision of the MA0B. 1owe*er, said the a#thority to re*iew can only )e e5ercised if the party ad*ersely affected )y the decision of the M A0B had filed an appeal with the o""ission within the I79day regle"entary period. 1ere, it is ad"itted )y ! and not disp#ted )y the pri*ate respondent .stolas that the petitioner for re*iew was filed o#tside the regle"entary period. $his )eing so, the p#)lic respondents e5ceeded its -#risdiction when it entertained the petition that was erroneo#sly filed with the 'ffice of the 0resident. 1a*ing e5ceeded its -#risdiction the ! co""itted a re*ersi)le error when it set aside the order the M!0B which had long )eco"e @final and e5ec#tory. (inal decision or order can no longer )e s#)-ect to re*iew. Moreo*er, .stolas has not e*en )othered to offer an e5planation why she inc#rred delay and why she filed a petition with the 'ffice of the 0resident. !#ch )eing the case, the p#)lic respondent ! cannot legally in*o:e and -#stify the ass#"ption of -#risdiction on gro#nds of e6#ality and s#)stantial -#stice. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. COMMON PROVISIONS VITALGO$ON VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 101428, AUGUST 5, 1992 NARVASA, C.!." FACTS" 0resident A6#ino reorgani&ed the *ario#s offices of the Ministry of 1ealth. Dr. de la (#ente was de"oted )#t the ! declared the transfer fro" hief of linics to Medical !pecialists II as illegal. $hree "onths elapsed witho#t any word fro" Dr. <ital9 ,o&on or anyone in her )ehalf, or any indication whate*er that the ! %esol#tion wo#ld )e o)eyed. Dr. de la (#ente, apprehensi*e that the f#nds to co*er the salaries and allowances otherwise d#e hi" wo#ld re*ert to the ,eneral (#nd, as:ed the ! to enforce its -#dg"ent. 1e was howe*er /told to file in co#rt a petition for "anda"#s )eca#se of the )elief that the o""ission had no coerci*e powers E #nli:e a co#rt E to enforce its final decisionsRresol#tions. %espondent co#rt denied it on the gro#nd that the /petitions @for "anda"#sA are not the *ehicle nor is the o#rt the for#" for . . . @saidA clai" of da"ages./ De la (#ente so#ght reconsideration, contending that the Appellate o#rt had co"petence to award da"ages in a "anda"#s action. 1e arg#ed that while s#ch a clai" for da"ages "ight not ha*e )een proper in a "anda"#s proceeding in the Appellate o#rt /)efore the enact"ent of B.0. Blg. 129 )eca#se the A had a#thority to iss#e s#ch writs only Iin aid of its appellate -#risdiction,I/ the sit#ation was changed )y said B0 129 in *irt#e of which three le*els of co#rts E the !#pre"e o#rt, the %egional $rial o#rt, and the o#rt of Appeals E were conferred conc#rrent original -#risdiction to iss#e said writs, and the A was gi*en power to cond#ct hearings and recei*e e*idence to resol*e fact#al iss#es. $o re6#ire hi" to separately litigate the "atter of da"ages he contin#ed, wo#ld lead to that "#ltiplicity of s#its which is a)horred )y the law. 'n the other hand, in an atte"pt to n#llify the ad*erse dispositions of the o#rt of Appeals E and o)tain /the #lti"ate and corollary relief of dis"issing respondent de la (#enteIs clai" for da"ages/ E the !olicitor ,eneralIs 'ffice had instit#ted the special ci*il action of certiorari at )ar. It contends that the A is not legally co"petent to ta:e cogni&ance of and decide the 6#estion of da"ages in a "anda"#s s#it. ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not the o#rt of Appeals has -#risdiction, in a special ci*il action of "anda"#s against a p#)lic officer, to ta:e cogni&ance of the "atter of da"ages so#ght to )e reco*ered fro" the defendant officer. 2. 8hether or not the !olicitor ,eneral "ay represent the defendant p#)lic officer in the "anda"#s s#it, in so far as the clai" for da"ages is concerned. HELD" 1. 3o. $he !olicitor ,eneralIs 'ffice correctly identifies !ection 9, B.0. 129 as the legal pro*ision specifying the original and appellate -#risdiction of the o#rt of Appeals. $he section pertinently declares that the /Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt @now the o#rt of AppealsA shall e5ercise . .,/ a"ong others2 'riginal -#risdiction to iss#e writs of "anda"#s, prohi)ition, certiorari, ha)eas corp#s, and 6#o warranto, and a#5iliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate -#risdiction . !ection 19, go*erning the e5cl#si*e original -#risdiction of %egional $rial o#rts in ci*il cases, contains no reference whate*er to clai"s /for "oral and e5e"plary da"ages,/ and indeed does not #se the word /da"ages/ at allG yet it is indisp#ta)le that said co#rts ha*e power to try and decide clai"s for "oral, e5e"plary and other classes of da"ages acco"panying any of the types or :inds of cases falling within their specified -#risdiction. 2. 3o. As laid down in the Jr)ano and o cases2 @$Ahe 'ffice of the !olicitor ,eneral is not a#thori&ed to represent a p#)lic official at any stage of a cri"inal case. $his o)ser*ation sho#ld apply as well to a p#)lic official who is haled to co#rt on a ci*il s#it for da"ages arising fro" a felony allegedly co""itted )y hi" @Article 1??, %e*ised 0enal odeA. Any pec#niary lia)ility he "ay )e held to acco#nt for on the occasion of s#ch ci*il s#it is for his own acco#nt. $he !tate is not lia)le for the sa"e. A fortiori, the 'ffice of the !olicitor ,eneral li:ewise has no a#thority to represent hi" in s#ch a ci*il s#it for da"ages. It )eing 6#ite e*ident that Dr. <ital9,o&on is not here charged with a cri"e, or ci*illy prosec#ted for da"ages arising fro" a cri"e, there is no legal o)stacle to her )eing represented )y the 'ffice of the !olicitor ,eneral. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. COMMON PROVISIONS FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP VS. !AIME N. FERRER G.R. NO. L31455, FE&RUAR- 28, 1985 CUEVAS, !." FACTS" In a )id for the "an#fact#re and deli*ery of *oting )ooths for 'M.L., respondent 'M.L. Bidding o""ittee hair"an and Me")ers re-ected Ac"e o"panyKs )id and instead awarded it to petitioner (ilipinas. After an oc#lar inspection of all the sa"ples s#)"itted was cond#cted and after the o""issioners noted that Ac"e s#)"itted the lowest )id, the 'M.L. iss#ed a %esol#tion awarding the contract @for *oting )oothsA to Ac"e. (ilipinas filed an In-#nction s#it with the then (I of Manila against herein p#)lic respondents 'M.L. o""issioners, chair"an and "e")ers of the o"elec Bidding o""ittee, and pri*ate respondent Ac"e. (ilipinas also applied for a writ of preli"inary in-#nction. After hearing petitionerIs said application, the respondent H#dge denied the writ prayed for. $hereafter the p#)lic respondents filed a "otion to Dis"iss on the gro#nds that the lower co#rt has no -#risdiction o*er the nat#re of s#it, and that the co"plaint states no ca#se of action.
Acting on the "otion @to dis"issA, the respondent H#dge iss#ed the 6#estioned 'rder dis"issing i*il ase 3o. 77972. (ilipinasI "otion for reconsideration was denied for lac: of "erit. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 151 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 1ence, the instant appeal. ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not the lower co#rt has -#risdiction to ta:e cogni&ance of a s#it in*ol*ing an order of the 'M.L. dealing with an award of contract arising fro" its in*itation to )idG 2. 8hether or not (ilipinas, the losing )idder, has a ca#se of action #nder the pre"ises against the 'M.L. and Ac"e, the winning )idder, to en-oin the" fro" co"plying with their contract. HELD" 1. Des. $he o""ission on .lections shall ha*e e5cl#si*e charge of the enforce"ent and ad"inistration of all laws relati*e to the cond#ct of elections and shall e5ercise all other f#nctions which "ay )e conferred #pon it )y law. It shall decide, sa*e those in*ol*ing the right to *ote, all ad"inistrati*e 6#estions affecting elections, incl#ding the deter"ination of the n#")er of location of 0olling places, and the appoint"ent of election inspectors and of other election officials. ... $he decisions, orders and r#lings of the o""ission shall )e s#)-ect to re*iew )y the !#pre"e o#rt. @!ection 2, Article ;, 1947 0hilippine onstit#tion, which was then in forceA It has )een consistently held that it is the !#pre"e o#rt, not the o#rt of (irst Instance, which has e5cl#si*e -#risdiction to re*iew on certiorari final decisions, orders or r#lings of the 'M.L. relati*e to the cond#ct of elections and enforce"ent of election laws. 8e are howe*er, far fro" con*ince that an order of the 'M.L. awarding a contract to a pri*ate party, as a res#lt of its choice a"ong *ario#s proposals s#)"itted in response to its in*itation to )id co"es within the p#r*iew of a /final order/ which is e5cl#si*ely and directly appeala)le to this co#rt on certiorari. 8hat is conte"plated )y the ter" /final orders, r#lings and decisions/ of the 'M.L. re*iewa)le )y certiorari )y the !#pre"e o#rt as pro*ided )y law are those rendered in actions or proceedings )efore the 'M.L. and ta:en cogni&ance of )y the said )ody in the e5ercise of its ad-#dicatory or 6#asi9-#dicial powers. It cannot )e gainsaid that the powers *ested )y the onstit#tion and the law on the o""ission on .lections "ay either )e classified as those pertaining to its ad-#dicatory or 6#asi9-#dicial f#nctions, or those which are inherently ad"inistrati*e and so"eti"es "inisterial in character. 8e agree with petitionerIs contention that the order of the o""ission granting the award to a )idder is not an order rendered in a legal contro*ersy )efore it wherein the parties filed their respecti*e pleadings and presented e*idence after which the 6#estioned order was iss#edG and that this order of the co""ission was iss#ed p#rs#ant to its a#thority to enter into contracts in relation to election p#rposes. In short, the 'M.L. resol#tion awarding the contract in fa*or of Ac"e was not iss#ed p#rs#ant to its 6#asi9-#dicial f#nctions )#t "erely as an incident of its inherent ad"inistrati*e f#nctions o*er the cond#ct of elections, and hence, the said resol#tion "ay not )e dee"ed as a /final order/ re*iewa)le )y certiorari )y the !#pre"e o#rt. Being non9-#dicial in character, no conte"pt "ay )e i"posed )y the 'M.L. fro" said order, and no direct and e5cl#si*e appeal )y certiorari to this $ri)#nal lie fro" s#ch order. Any 6#estion arising fro" said order "ay )e well ta:en in an ordinary ci*il action )efore the trial co#rts. 2. 3o. (ilipinas, the losing )idder, has no ca#se of action #nder the pre"ises to en-oin the 'M.L. fro" p#rs#ing its contract with Ac"e, the winning )idder. 8hile it "ay )e tr#e that the lower co#rt has the -#risdiction o*er contro*ersies dealing with the 'M.L.Is award of contracts, the sa"e )eing p#rely ad"inistrati*e and ci*il in nat#re, ne*ertheless, herein petitioner has no ca#se of action on the )asis of the allegations of its co"plaint. Indeed, while the law re6#ires the e5ercise of so#nd discretion on the part of proc#re"ent a#thorities,
and that the reser*ation to re-ect any or all )ids "ay not )e #sed as a shield to a fra#d#lent award, petitioner has "isera)ly failed to pro*e or s#)stantiate the e5istence of "alice or fra#d on the part of the p#)lic respondents in the challenged award. 0#rs#ant to 'M.L.Is In*itation to Bid 3o. 127, a )idder "ay ha*e the right to de"and da"ages, or #nreali&ed or e5pected profits, only when his )id was accepted )y resol#tion of the 'M.L.. (ilipinasI )id, altho#gh reco""ended for award of contract )y the )idding co""ittee, was not the winning )id. 3o resol#tion to that effect appeared to ha*e )een iss#ed )y the 'M.L.. Decidedly then, (ilipinas has no ca#se of action. In iss#ing the resol#tion awarding the contract for *oting )ooths in Ac"eIs fa*or, the o""issioners of the 'M.L. had ta:en into acco#nt that Ac"eIs )id was the lowestG that Ac"e was a responsi)le "an#fact#rerG and that #pon an oc#lar inspection of the sa"ples s#)"itted )y the )idders, Ac"eIs sa"ple was fa*ora)le chosen s#)-ect to certain conditions cited in the resol#tion. In fine, the p#)lic respondents properly e5ercised its so#nd discretion in "a:ing the award. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS A. COMMON PROVISIONS MATEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. N+. 113219. A1A1(0 14, 1995) PUNO, !." FACTS" Jpon co"plaint of so"e Morong 8ater District @M8DA e"ployees, petitioners M8D Board Me")ers cond#cted an in*estigation on pri*ate respondent .dgar !ta. Maria, then ,en. Manager. 1e was placed #nder pre*enti*e s#spension and Ma5i"o !an Diego was designated in his place as Acting ,en. Manager. 1e was later dis"issed. hallenging his dis"issal, pri*ate respondent filed for V#o 8arranto and Manda"#s with 0reli"inary In-#nction )efore the trial co#rt. 0etitioners "o*ed to dis"iss on the gro#nd that the co#rt had no -#risdiction o*er the disciplinary actions of go*ern"ent e"ployees which is *ested e5cl#si*ely in the !. %espondent H#dge denied the "otion to dis"iss and the "otion for reconsideration. 0etitioner filed a petition for certiorari )efore this co#rt, which referred the case to respondent co#rt. $he A dis"issed the petition and denied the "otion for reconsideration. 1ence, the petition. ISSUE" 8hether or not the trial co#rt has -#risdiction o*er a case in*ol*ing dis"issal of an e"ployee of 6#asi9p#)lic corporationC HELD" 3o. $here is no 6#estion that M8D is a 6#asi9p#)lic corporation. Indeed, the esta)lished r#le is that the hiring and firing of e"ployees of go*ern"ent9owned and controlled corporations are go*erned )y the pro*isions of the i*il !er*ice Law and %#les and %eg#lations. !o 8e held in Mancita *. Barcinas, no appeal lies fro" the decision of the !er*ice o""ission, and that parties aggrie*ed there)y "ay proceed to this o#rt alone on certiorari #nder %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt, within 4? days fro" receipt of a copy thereof, p#rs#ant to section 7, Article I; of the 1987 onstit#tion. Mancita, howe*er, no longer go*erns for #nder the present r#les, %e*ised irc#lar 3o. 1991 as a"ended )y %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e irc#lar 3o. 1997 which too: effect on H#ne 1, 1997, final resol#tions of the i*il !er*ice o""ission shall )e appeala)le to the o#rt of Appeals. In any e*ent, whether #nder the old r#le or present r#le, %$s ha*e no -#risdiction to entertain cases in*ol*ing dis"issal of officers and e"ployees co*ered )y the i*il !er*ice Law. 0etition granted. Decision and resol#tion ann#lled and set aside. REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 195 M': 1%, 1995 (REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 191) $'2 'J%$ '( A00.AL!, 'J%$ '( $A; A00.AL!, $1. !'LII$'% ,.3.%AL, $1. ,'<.%3M.3$ '%0'%A$. 'J3!.L, ALL M.MB.%! '( $1. ,'<.%3M.3$ 0%'!.J$I'3 !.%<I., A3D ALL M.MB.%! '( $1. I3$.,%A$.D BA% '( $1. 01ILI00I3.!. !JBH.$2 %#les ,o*erning appeals to the o#rt of Appeals fro" H#dg"ent or (inal 'rders of the o#rt of $a5 Appeals and V#asi9H#dicial Agencies. 1. !'0.. E $hese r#les shall apply to appeals fro" -#dg"ents or final orders of the o#rt of $a5 Appeals and fro" awards, -#dg"ents, final orders or resol#tions of or a#thori&ed )y any 6#asi9-#dicial agency in the e5ercise of its 6#asi9-#dicial f#nctions. A"ong these agencies are the i*il !er*ice o""ission, entral Board of Assess"ent Appeals, !ec#rities and .5change o""ission, Land %egistration A#thority, !ocial !ec#rity o""ission, 'ffice of the 0resident, i*il Aerona#tics Board, B#rea# of 0atents, $rade"ar:s and $echnology $ransfer, 3ational .lectrification Ad"inistration, .nergy %eg#latory Board, 3ational $eleco""#nications o""ission, Depart"ent of Agrarian %efor" #nder %ep#)lic Act ++77, ,o*ern"ent !er*ice Ins#rance !yste", ."ployees o"pensation o""ission, Agric#lt#ral In*entions Board, Ins#rance o""ission, 0hilippine Ato"ic .nergy o""ission, Board of In*est"ents, and onstr#ction Ind#stry Ar)itration o""ission. 2. A!.! 3'$ '<.%.D. E $hese r#les shall not apply to -#dg"ents or final orders iss#ed #nder the La)or ode of the 0hilippines. 4. 81.%. $' A00.AL. E An appeal #nder these r#les "ay )e ta:en to the o#rt of Appeals within the period and in the "anner herein pro*ided, whether the appeal in*ol*es 6#estions of fact, of law, or "i5ed 6#estions of fact and law. B. 0.%I'D '( A00.AL. E $he appeal shall )e ta:en within fifteen @17A days fro" notice of the award, -#dg"ent, final order or resol#tion or fro" the date of its last p#)lication, if p#)lication is re6#ired )y law for its effecti*ity, or of the denial of petitionerIs "otion for new trial or reconsideration filed in accordance with the go*erning law of the co#rt or agency a 6#o. 'nly one @1A "otion for reconsideration shall )e allowed. Jpon proper "otion and the pay"ent of the f#ll a "o#nt of the doc:et fee )efore the e5piration of the regle"entary period, the o#rt of Appeals "ay grant an additional period of fifteen @17A days only within which to file the petition for re*iew. 3o f#rther e5tension shall )e granted e5cept for the "ost co"pelling reason and in no case to e5ceed another period of fifteen @17A days. 7. 1'8 A00.AL $AL.3. E Appeal shall )e ta:en )y filing a *erified petition for re*iew in se*en @7A legi)le copies with the o#rt of Appeals, with proof of ser*ice of a copy thereof on the ad*erse party and on the co#rt or agency a 6#o. $he original copy of the petition intended for the o#rt of Appeals shall )e indicated as s#ch )y the petitioner. Jpon filing the petition for re*iew, the petitioner shall pay to the ler: of o#rt of the o#rt of Appeals the doc:eting and other lawf#l fees and deposit the s#" of 07??.?? for costs. .5e"ption fro" pay"ent of San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 152 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 doc:eting and other lawf#l fees and the deposit for costs "ay )e granted )y the o#rt of Appeals #pon *erified "otion setting forth the gro#nds relied #pon. If the o#rt of Appeals denies the "otion, the petitioner shall pay the doc:eting and other lawf#l fees and deposit for costs within fifteen @17A days fro" notice of the denial. +. '3$.3$! '( $1. 0.$I$I'3. E $he petition for re*iew shall @aA state the f#ll na"es of the parties to the case, witho#t i"pleading the co#rts or agencies either as petitioners or respondentsG @)A contain a concise state"ent of the facts and iss#es in*ol*ed and the gro#nds relied #pon for the re*iewG @cA )e acco"panied )y a clearly legi)le d#plicate original or certified tr#e copy of the award, -#dg"ent, final order or resol#tion appealed fro", together with certified tr#e copies of s#ch "aterial portions of the record as are referred to therein and other s#pporting papersG and @dA state all the specific "aterial dates showing that it was filed within the regle"entary period pro*ided hereinG and @eA contain a sworn certification against for#" shopping as re6#ired in %e*ised irc#lar 3o. 28991. 7. .((.$ '( (AILJ%. $' 'M0LD 8I$1 %.VJI%.M.3$!. E $he fail#re of the petitioner to co"ply with the foregoing re6#ire"ents regarding the pay"ent of the doc:et and other lawf#l fees, the deposit for costs, proof of ser*ice of the petition, and the contents of and the doc#"ents which sho#ld acco"pany the petition shall )e s#fficient gro#nds for the dis"issal thereof. 8. A$I'3 '3 $1. 0.$I$I'3. E $he o#rt of Appeals "ay re6#ire the respondent to file a co""ent on the petition, not a "otion to dis"iss, within ten @1?A days fro" notice. $he o#rt, howe*er, "ay dis"iss the petition if it finds the sa"e to )e patently witho#t "erit, prosec#ted "anifestly for delay, or that the 6#estions raised therein are too #ns#)stantial to re6#ire consideration. 9. '3$.3$! '( 'MM.3$. E $he co""ent shall )e filed within ten @1?A days fro" notice in se*en @7A legi)le copies and acco"panied )y clearly legi)le certified tr#e copies of s#ch "aterial portions of the record referred to therein together with other s#pporting papers. It shall point o#t ins#fficiencies or inacc#racies in petitionerIs state"ent of facts and iss#es, and state the reasons why the petition sho#ld )e denied or dis"issed. A copy thereof shall )e ser*ed on the petitioner, and proof of s#ch ser*ice shall )e filed with the o#rt of Appeals. 1?. DJ. 'J%!.. E If #pon the filing of the co""ent or s#ch other pleadings or doc#"ents as "ay )e re6#ired or allowed )y the o#rt of Appeals or #pon the e5piration of period for the filing thereof, and on the )ases of the petition or the record the o#rt of Appeals finds pri"a facie that the co#rt or agencies concerned has co""itted errors of fact or law that wo#ld warrant re*ersal or "odification of the award, -#dg"ent, final order or resol#tion so#ght to )e re*iewed, it "ay gi*e d#e co#rse to the petitionG otherwise, it shall dis"iss the sa"e. $he findings of fact of the co#rt or agency concerned, when s#pported )y s#)stantial e*idence, shall )e )inding on the o#rt of Appeals. 11. $%A3!MI$$AL '( %.'%D. E 8ithin fifteen @17A days fro" notice that the petition has )een gi*en d#e co#rse, the o#rt of Appeals "ay re9 6#ire the co#rt or agency concerned to trans"it the original or a legi)le certified tr#e copy of the entire record of the proceeding #nder re*iew. $he record to )e trans"itted "ay )e a)ridged )y agree"ent of all parties to the proceeding. $he o#rt of Appeals "ay re6#ire or per"it s#)se6#ent correction of or addition to the record. 12. .((.$ '( A00.AL. E $he appeal shall not stay the award, -#dg"ent, final order or resol#tion so#ght to )e re*iewed #nless the o#rt of Appeals shall direct otherwise #pon s#ch ter"s as it "ay dee" -#st. 14. !JBMI!!I'3 ('% D.I!I'3. E If the petition is gi*en d#e co#rse, the o#rt of Appeals "ay set the case for oral arg#"ent or re6#ire the parties to s#)"it "e"oranda within a period of fifteen @17A days fro" notice. $he case shall )e dee"ed s#)"itted for decision #pon the filing of the last pleading or "e"orand#" re6#ired )y these r#les or )y the o#rt itself. 1B. $%A3!I$'%D 0%'<I!I'3!. E All petitions for certiorari against the i*il !er*ice o""ission and $he entral Board of Assess"ent Appeals filed and pending in the !#pre"e o#rt prior to the effecti*ity of this %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e irc#lar shall )e treated as petitions for re*iew here#nder and shall )e transferred to the o#rt of Appeals for appropriate disposition. 0etitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which "ay )e filed after the effecti*ity hereof and #p to H#ne 4?, 1997 shall li:ewise )e considered as petitions for re*iew and shall )e referred to the o#rt of Appeals for the sa"e p#rpose. In )oth instances, for p#rposes of the period of appeal conte"plated in !ection B hereof, the date of receipt )y the o#rt of Appeals of the petitions th#s transferred or referred to it shall )e considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for re*iew, and the o#rt of Appeals "ay re6#ire the filing of a"ended or s#pple"ental pleadings and the s#)"ission of s#ch f#rther doc#"ents or records as it "ay dee" necessary in *iew of and conse6#ent to the change in the "ode of appellate re*iew. 17. %.0.ALI3, LAJ!.. E %#les B4 and BB of the %#les of o#rt are here)y repealed and s#perseded )y this irc#lar. 1+. .((.$I<I$D. E $his irc#lar shall )e p#)lished in two @2A newspapers of general circ#lation and shall ta:e effect on H#ne 1, 1997. May 1+, 1997. @!gd.A A3D%.! %. 3A%<A!A hief H#stice ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION TUPAS V. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION (G.R. NO. 49%77, MA- 4, 1989) REGALADO, !." FACTS" 0etitioner $J0A! filed a petition for the cond#ct of a certification election in order to deter"ine the e5cl#si*e )argaining representati*e of the wor:ers in 31. $he petition was dis"issed. 'n appeal to the B#rea# of La)or %elations, the order of dis"issal was re*ersed and the holding of the election was ordered. Jpon a "otion for reconsideration, this order was set aside. 1ence, the instant petition for certiorari. ISSUE" 8'3 petitioner organi&ation can )e allowed to hold a certification election. HELD" Des. $he ci*il ser*ice now co*ers only go*ern"ent owned or controlled corporations with original or legislati*e charters, that is those created )y an act of ongress or )y special law, and not those incorporated #nder and p#rs#ant to a general legislation. $he wor:ers or e"ployees of 31 #ndo#)tedly ha*e the right to for" #nions or e"ployeesK organi&ations. $he right to #nioni&e or to for" organi&ations is now e5plicitly recogni&ed and granted to e"ployees in )oth the go*ern"ental and the pri*ate sectors. $here is, therefore, no i"pedi"ent to the holding of a certification election a"ong the wor:ers of 31 for it is clear that they are co*ered )y the La)or ode, the 31 )eing a go*ern"ent9owned andRor controlled corporation witho#t an original charter. It is "eet, howe*er, to also call attention to the fact that, insofar as certification elections are concerned, s#)se6#ent stat#tory de*elop"ents ha*e rendered acade"ic e*en the distinction )etween the two types of go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporations and the laws go*erning e"ploy"ent relations therein, as herein)efore disc#ssed. (or, whether the e"ployees of 31 are co*ered )y the La)or ode or )y the ci*il ser*ice laws, a certification election "ay )e cond#cted. %esol#tion ann#lled and set aside. ond#ct of a certification election granted. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE 97 PHIL 289 519506 FACTS" .d#ardo de los !antos, the petitioner was appointed ity .ngineer of Bag#io on H#ly 1+, 19B+ )y the 0resident, appoint"ent which was confir"ed )y the A on A#g#st +. 'n H#ne I, 1?7?, ,il Mall#re was e5tended an /ad interi"/ appoint"ent )y the 0resident to the sa"e position, after which, on H#ne 4, the #ndersecretary of the Depart"ent of the 0#)lic wor:s directed !antos to report to the B#rea# of 0#)lic 8or:s for another assign"ent. !antos ref#sed to *acate the office. $he petitioner rests his case on the onstit#tion which reads, II3o officer or e"ployee in the i*il !er*ice shall )e re"o*ed or s#spend e5cept for ca#se as pro*ided )y law./ ISSUE" 8hether or not the re"o*al of the petitioner was constit#tional. HELD" 3'. $here are three classes of positions9policy9deter"ining, pri"arily confidential and highly technical 9 as e5cl#ded fro" the "erit syste" and dis"issal at pleas#re of officers and e"ployees appointed herein is allowed )y the onstit#tion. $hese positions in*ol*e the highest degree of confidence, or are, closely )o#nd with the dependent ?11 other positions to which they are s#)ordinates or are te"porary in nat#re. 1owe*er, the office of the ity .ngineer is neither pri"arily confidential, policy deter"ining nor highly technical. $h#s, the constit#tional pro*ision is *ery "#ch applica)le in his case wherein he is protected fro" re"o*al witho#t ca#se. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SALA$AR VS. MATHA- 73 SCRA 285 5197%6 FACTS" 0etitioner !ala&ar was appointed )y the A#ditor ,eneral onfidential agent in the 'ffice of the A#ditor ,eneral, ,!I!. 1er appoint"ent was noted )y the o""ission of i*il !er*ice. After si5 years, petitioner recei*ed a notice fro" the A#ditor ,eneral that her ser*ice as confidential in the office of the A#ditor '!I! has )een ter"inated. $hereafter, the A#ditor ,eneral iss#ed an appoint"ent to the petition as H#nior .5a"iner recei*ing a lower co"pensation. 'n the day of the appoint"ent petitioner ass#"ed the position. 0etitioner wrote the o""ission of i*il !er*ice that she )e reinstated to her for"er position as confidential agent in the office of the a#ditor, ,!I!. 1owe*er, no action was ta:en. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 153 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ISSUE" 8hether or not the ser*ice of petitioner as confidential agent was *alidly ter"inated on the alleged gro#nd of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she co#ld still )e reinstated to said position after accepting the position of H#nior .5a"iner in the sa"e office. HELD" $he ten#re of officials holding pri"arily confidential ends #pon loss of confidence )eca#se their ter" of office lasts only as long as confidence in the" end#res. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CORPU$ VS. CUADERNO 13 SCRA 591 519%56 FACTS" 0etitioner orp#&, then holding the position of !pecial Assistant to the ,o*ernor in charge of the .5port Depart"ent in the entral Ban:, a position declared )y the 0resident as highly technical in nat#re, was ad"inistrati*ely charged )y se*eral co 9 e"ployees in the e5port depart"ent with dishonesty, inco"petence, neglect of d#ty and a)#se of a#thority, oppression, cond#ct #n)eco"ing of a p#)lic official and of *iolation of the internal reg#lations of the entral Ban:. $he Monetary Board s#spended the petitioner. After which he filed an action for certiorari, "anda"#s, 6#o warranto and da"ages with preli"inary in-#nction with the (I of the Manila. $he (I declared the Board %esol#tion n#ll and *oid and ordered the reinstate"ent of the petitioner. As aforesaid, )oth the petitioner and respondent appealed the -#dg"ent. $he appeal of the entral Band and Monetary Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions "ay at anyti"e for lac: of confidence )y the appointing power )e re"o*ed. It arg#ed that for the three classes of positions @policy9 deter"ining. pri"arily confidential and highly technicalA lac: of confidence of the one "a:ing the appoint"ent constit#te s#fficient and legiti"ate ca#se of re"o*al. ISSUE" 8hether or not highly technical e"ployees "ay )e re"o*ed )y reason of lac: of confidence )y the one "a:ing the appoint"ent. HELD" $he ten#re of official holding pri"arily confidential positions ends #pon 19s7 of confidence, )eca#se their ter"s of office lasts only as long as confidence in the" end#resG and th#s their cessation in*ol*es no re"o*al. B#t the sit#ation is different for those holding technical posts, re6#iring special s:ills and 6#alifications. $he onstit#tion clearly disting#ished the pri"arily confidential fro" highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence to the latter inc#")ents is to ignore and erase the differentiation e5pressly "ade )y o#r f#nda"ental charter. Moreo*er, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say cler:, stenographer, en-oys sec#rity of ten#re and "ay not )e re"o*ed at any pleas#re, a highly technical officers s#ch as an econo"ist or a scientist of a a*owed ti"e, witho#t right to a hearing or chance to defend hi"self. 3o technical "en worthy wo#ld )e willing to accept wor: #nder s#ch condition. Jlti"ately, the r#leI ad*ocated )y the )an: wo#ld de"and that highly technical positions )e filed )y persons who "#st la)or always with an eye coc:ed at the h#"or of the s#periors. It wo#ld signify that the so9called highly technical positions will ha*e to )e filed with inco"petents and yes9"en. 8ho "#st rely not on their own 6#alifications and s:ill )#t on their a)ility to carry fa*or with the powerf#l. $he entire o)-ecti*e of the constit#tion in esta)lishing and dignifying the ci*il ser*ice on the )asis on "erit sho#ld )e th#s negated. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (G.R. NO. L%9137. AUGUST 5, 198%) CRU$, !." FACTS" 0etitioner (eli"on L#ego was appointed Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer 11, 'ffice of the ity Mayor, e)# ity, )y Mayor (lorentino !olon on (e)r#ary 18, 1984. $he appoint"ent was descri)ed as per"anent/ )#t the i*il !er*ice o""ission @!A appro*ed it as /te"porary,/ s#)-ect to the final action ta:en in the protest filed )y the pri*ate respondent and another e"ployee, and pro*ided /there @wasA no pending ad"inistrati*e case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appoint"ent nor any decision )y co"petent a#thority that will ad*ersely affect the appro*al of the appoint"ent./ $he ! then fo#nd the pri*ate respondent )etter 6#alified than the petitioner for the contested position, and accordingly, appointed $#o&o as ad"inistrati*e officer and re*o:ed the appoint"ent of L#ego. $he pri*ate respondent was so appointed on H#ne 28, 198B, )y the new "ayor, Mayor %onald D#terte. $he petitioner, in the present petition 6#estions the order and the pri*ate respondentKs title. ISSUE" Is the ! a#thori&ed to disappro*e a per"anent appoint"ent on the gro#nd that another person is )etter 6#alified than the appointee and, on the )asis of this finding, order his replace"ent )y the latterC HELD" 3'. It is noted that the appoint"ent of the petitioner was not te"porary )#t per"anent and was therefore protected )y onstit#tion. $he appointing a#thority indicated that it was per"anent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent ! to re*erse hi" and call it te"porary. $he sta"ping of the words /A00%'<.D as $.M0'%A%D/ did not change the character of the appoint"ent, which was clearly descri)ed as /0er"anent/ in the space pro*ided for in i*il !er*ice (or" 3o. 44, dated (e)r#ary 18, 1984. 8hat was te"porary was the appro*al of the appoint"ent, not the appoint"ent itself and what "ade the appro*al te"porary was the fact that it was "ade to depend on the condition specified therein and on the *erification of the 6#alifications of the appointee to the position. $he i*il !er*ice o""ission is not e"powered to deter"ine the :ind or nat#re of the appoint"ent e5tended )y the appointing officer, its a#thority )eing li"ited to appro*ing or re*iewing the appoint"ent in the light of the re6#ire"ents of the i*il !er*ice Law. 8hen the appointee is 6#alified and a#thori&ing the other legal re6#ire"ents are satisfied, the o""ission has no choice )#t to attest to the appoint"ent in accordance with the i*il !er*ice Laws. Indeed, the appro*al is "ore appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is 6#alified for the position to which he has )een na"ed. Appoint"ent is an essentially discretionary power and "#st )e perfor"ed )y the officer in which it is *ested according to his )est lights, the only condition )eing that the appointee sho#ld possess the 6#alifications re6#ired )y law. If he does, then the appoint"ent cannot )e fa#lted on the gro#nd that there are others )etter 6#alified who sho#ld ha*e )een preferred. It is different where the onstit#tion or the law s#)-ects the appoint"ent to the appro*al of another officer or )ody, li:e the o""ission on Appoint"ents #nder 1947 onstit#tion. Appoint"ents "ade )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines had to )e confir"ed )y that )ody and co#ld not )e iss#ed or were in*alidated witho#t s#ch confir"ation. In fact, confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents was then considered part of the appointing process, which was held co"plete only after s#ch confir"ation. !ignificantly, the ! ac:nowledged that )oth the petitioner and the pri*ate respondent were 6#alified for the position in contro*ersy. $hat recognition alone rendered it f#nct#s officio in the case and pre*ented it fro" acting f#rther thereon e5cept to affir" the *alidity of the petitionerIs appoint"ent. $o )e s#re, it had no a#thority to re*o:e the said appoint"ent si"ply )eca#se it )elie*ed that the pri*ate respondent was )etter 6#alified for that wo#ld ha*e constit#ted an encroach"ent on the discretion *ested solely in the city "ayor. 81.%.('%., the resol#tion of the respondent o""ission on i*il !er*ice dated March 22, 198B, is set aside, and the petitioner is here)y declared to )e entitled to the office in disp#te )y *irt#e of his per"anent appoint"ent thereto dated (e)r#ary 18, 1984. 3o costs. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. CA GR NO. 104%39. !UL- 14, 1995 FACTS" 0ri*ate respondent $ito Dato was appointed Assistant 0ro*incial 8arden )y then ,o*. (eli5 Alfelor, !r. !ince he had no ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility for the position he was appointed to, what was e5tended to hi" was a te"porary appoint"ent which was renewed ann#ally. ,o*. Alfelor appro*ed the change in DatoKs e"ploy"ent stat#s fro" te"porary to per"anent #pon the latterKs representation that he passed the necessary ci*il ser*ice e5a". 1owe*er, the ! did not fa*ora)ly act #pon this change of stat#s. After cri"inal charges were filed against hi" and a prison g#ard, Dato was indefinitely s#spended. Lope %a"a, head of the a"arines !#r Jnit of the !, wrote the ,o*ernor of a"arines !#r, infor"ing hi" that the stat#s of Dato has )een changed fro" te"porary to per"anent, the latter ha*ing passed the re6#ired e5a"ination. $he change of stat#s was to )e "ade retroacti*e to H#ne 11, 197B, the date of release of said e5a"ination. Dato was ac6#itted of the charges. $h#s, he as:ed for reinstate"ent and )ac:wages. 8hen his re6#est was not heeded, Dato s#ed for "anda"#s )efore the %$ which r#led in his fa*or. 'n appeal, the A affir"ed the assailed decision. 1ence this present petition. ISSUE" 8hether or not pri*ate respondent $ito Dato was a per"anent e"ployee of petitioner 0ro*ince of a"arines !#r at the ti"e he was s#spended. HELD" 3'. 0ri*ate respondent does not disp#te the fact that at the ti"e he was appointed Assistant 0ro*incial 8asrden in 197B, he had not 6#alified in an appropriate e5a"ination for the afore"entioned position. !#ch lac: of a ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility "ade his appoint"ent te"porary and witho#t a fi5ed and definite ter" and is dependent entirely #pon the pleas#re of the appointing power. $he fact that pri*ate respondent o)tained ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility later on is of no "o"ent as his ha*ing passed the s#per*ising sec#rity g#ard e5a"ination, did not ipso facto con*ert his te"porary appoint"ent into a per"anent one. In cases s#ch as the one at )ench, what is re6#ired is a new appoint"ent since a per"anent appoint"ent is not a contin#ation of the te"porary appoint"ent [ these are two distinct acts of the appointing a#thority. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 154 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 It is worthy to note that pri*ate respondent rests his case entirely on the letter dated March 19, 197+ co""#nicated )y Mr. %a"a to the ,o*ernor of a"arines !#r. $he foregoing is a clear arrogation of power properly )elonging to the appointing a#thority. It was already held )efore @L#ego *. !A that the ! has the power to appro*e or disappro*e an appoint"ent set )efore it. It does not ha*e the power to "a:e the appoint"ent itself or to direct the appointing a#thority to change the e"ploy"ent stat#s of an e"ployee. $he ! can only in6#ire into the eligi)ility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person 6#alified it "#st attest. If not, the appoint"ent "#st )e disappro*ed. $he d#ty of the ! is to attest appoint"ents and after that f#nction is discharged, its participation in the appoint"ent process ceases. In the case at )ench, ! sho#ld ha*e ended its participation in the appoint"ent of pri*ate respondent on Han#ary 1, 197B when it confir"ed the te"porary stat#s of the latter who lac:ed the proper ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility. Moreo*er, the o#rt is not prepared to accord said letter any pro)ati*e *al#e the sa"e )eing "erely a p#rported photocopy of the alleged letter, initialed and not e*en signed )y the proper officer of the !. Based on the foregoing, pri*ate respondent $ito Dato, )eing "erely a te"porary e"ployee, is not entitled to the relief he see:s, incl#ding his clai" for )ac:wages for the entire period of his s#spension. 8herefore, pre"ises considered, the appealed decision is here)y %.<.%!.D and the petition for "anda"#s instit#ted )y herein pri*ate respondent $ito Dato is here)y DI!MI!!.D. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DE LOS SANTOS V. -ATCO GR NO. L13932. DECEM&ER 24, 1959 FACTS" A co"pro"ise agree"ent was s#)"itted referring to the sale )y install"ent of a parcel of land "ade )y plaintiffs therein 0acita de los !antos and Hose de los !antos to (ranicsco Mendone&. $he agree"ent was s#)se6#ently appro*ed. 0laintiffs "o*ed for e5ec#tion )eca#se defendant had allegedly neglected to pay "onthly install"ents since Han#ary 1978. Defendant so#ght postpone"ent of the hearing for the "otion which was granted )y respondent H#dge. %espondent then iss#ed a "otion for e5ec#tion )#t the defendant "o*ed to 6#ash the writ of e5ec#tion. $he parties were heard and in *iew of a possi)le a"ica)le settle"ent, the "otion to 6#ash was held in a)eyance for two wee:s d#ring which period they can settle the case. After the pre9trial conferences, respondent 6#ashed the writ of e5ec#tion. 1ence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE" 8hether or not there was gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the respondent H#dge. HELD" 3'. In the first place, there )eing opposition on the part of the defendant, who alleged and pro*ed a s#)se6#ent *er)al agree"ent a"ending the co"pro"ise, e5ec#tion co#ld not *alidly )e decreed witho#t a hearing. In the second place, the allegations pro*ed )y Mendone& a)o#t their *er)al agree"ent, his ha*ing sec#red a loan fro" the ,!I! and his conse6#ent a)ility to discharge his o)ligation see"ingly -#stified the co#rtKs ref#sal to e-ect defendant fro" the pre"ises @on e5ec#tionA with the conse6#ent forfeit#re in fa*or of the plaintiffs of "ore than 12,??? already paid )y defendant as pre*io#s install"ents of the p#rchase price not to "ention the loss of defendantKs #se of the ho#se and theater erected on that parcel of land. Jpon the other hand, the respondent -#dgeKs action ca#sed no irrepara)le or #nd#e har" to plaintiffs, )eca#se the latter still ha*e the -#dg"ent that "ay )e enforced #pon any f#rther defa#lt of defendant Mendone&. 8herefore, as the co#rt had -#risdiction and has co""itted no gra*e a)#se of discretion, the writ of certiorari "ay not )e iss#ed. 0etition denied, with costs against petitioners. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SSS EMPLO-EES ASSOCIATION VS. CA 175 SCRA %8% 519896 FACTS" 8hen the !!! failed to act on the !!.AIs de"ands, the latter went to stri:e. $he !!! filed with the %$ co"plaint for da"ages and as:ed for a writ of preli"inary in-#nctions to stop the stri:e. $he trial o#rt iss#ed a $%' while the Jnion filed a Motion of Dis"iss alleging the trial co#rtIs lac: of -#risdiction o*er the s#)-ect "atter. $he position of the #nion is that the %$ had no -#risdiction to hear the case initiated )y the !!! and to iss#e the restraining order and the writ of preli"inary in-#nction, as -#risdiction lay with the D'L. of the 3L%, since the case in*ol*es a la)or disp#te ISSUE" 8hether or not the !!! ."ployees ha*e the right to stri:e
HELD" $here is no 6#estion that the constit#tion recogni&es the right of go*ern"ent e"ployees to organi&e as shown in the following articles2 ;III !ec. 4, Art.;I @BA !ec. 2 @1A and @7A Art. III !ec. 8. 1owe*er, those articles are silent as to whether s#ch recognition also incl#des the right to stri:e. %esort of the intent of the fra"ers of the organic law )eco"es helpf#l in #nderstanding the "eaning of these pro*isions. A reading of the proceedings of the onstit#tion o""ission that drafted the 1987 onstit#tion wo#ld show that in recogni&ing the right go*ern"ent e"ployees to organi&e, the associations only, witho#t incl#ding the right to stri:e. $he La)or ode is silent as to whether or not go*ern"ent e"ployees "ay stri:e, for s#ch are e5cl#ded fro" its co*erage, )#t then the i*il !er*ice Decree is e6#ally silent on the "atter. 'n H#ly 1, 1987, to i"ple"ent the constit#tion g#arantee of the rights of go*ern"ent e"ployees to organi&e, the 0resident iss#ed .' 3o. t 8? which pro*ides g#idelines for the e5ercise of the right to organi&e go*ern"ent e"ployees. In !ec. B thereof, it is pro*ided that /the i*il !er*ice law and %#les go*erning concerted acti*ities and stri:es in the go*ern"ent ser*ices shall )e o)ser*ed, s#)-ect to "any legislation that "ay )e enacted )y congress )y ongress./ $he 0resident was apparently referring to Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. + of the i*il !er*ice o""ission which /prior to the enact"ent )y ongress of applica)le laws concerning stri:e )y go*ern"ent e"ployees en-oying #nder pain of ad"inistrati*e sanctions all go*ern"ent de"onstration, "ass lea*es, wal:o#ts and other for"s of "ass action which will res#lt in te"porary stoppage or disr#ption of p#)lic ser*ice/ the air was th#s cleared Iof the conf#sion. At present, in the a)sence of any legislation allowing go*ern"ent e"ployees to stri:e recogni&e their right to do so, or reg#lating the e5ercise of the right, they are prohi)ited fro" stri:ing. $his )eing the case, the stri:e staged )y e"ployees of the !!! was illegal. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CIVIL LI&ERTIES UNION VS. E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR- 194 SCRA 317 519916
FACTS" 0etitioner contends that !ection 14 r#n co#nter to !ee 14 Art. <II of the 1987 onstit#tion 9$he 0resident, <ice9" 0resident and the "e")ers of the a)inet and their dep#ties or assistants shall not, #nless otherwise pro*ided in this constit#tion, hold any office of e"ploy"ent d#ring their ten#re. By *irt#e of the opinion rendered )y then !ecretary of H#stice !edfrey 'rdone&, constr#ing !ection 14 Art. <II in relation to !ection 7, par.2 Art.I;9B that ca)inet "e")ers, their dep#ties and assistants "ay hold other office incl#ding "e")ership in the )oard of ,'Is when aA directly pro*ided )y the constit#tion as in case of !ec of H#stice which is "ade an e59officio "e")er of the H#dicial and Bar o#ncilG )A if allowed )y lawG cA if allowed )y the pri"ary f#nctions of their respecti*e positions, the 0resident of the 0hilippines iss#ed .' 28B two days )efore ongress con*ened. 0etitioners arg#e that the e5ception to the prohi)ition in !ee 7 0ar 2 Art I; applies to the officers and e"ployees of the i*il !er*ice o""ission in general and do not or cannot )e e5tended to !ec.14 Art.<II which applies specifically to 0resident, <ice9 0resiednt and "e")ers of the a)inet, their dep#ties and assistants. $he difference in the contention of the parties therefore lies in the interpretation of the phrase I#nless otherwise pro*ided in the onstit#tionI #sed in !ec.14 of Art.<II which has petitioner clai"s to refer only to those e5pressly pro*ided )y the onstit#tion s#ch as the <ice 0resident )eing allowed to )eco"e "e")er of the a)inet or !ecretary of H#stice to )eco"e an e59officio "e")er of the H#diciary and Bar o#ncil, while respondents insists it "a:e reference to !ec 7 of Art I;9B in so far as the appointi*e official "entioned therein is concerned. ISSUE" Does the prohi)ition in !ec.14 Art.<II insofar as ca)inet "e")ers, their dep#ties and assistants are concerned ad"it of the )road e5ceptions "ade for appointi*e officials in general #nder !ec 7 par 2 Art I;B #nless otherwise allowed )y law or the pri"ary f#nctions of his position, no appointi*e officials shall hold any other office or e"ploy"ent in the go*ern"ent. HELD" 8e r#le in the negati*e. In constr#ing the onstit#tion, it sho#ld )e )orne in "ind the o)-ects it so#ght to acco"plish )y its adoption, and the e*ils if any, it so#ght to pre*ent or re"edy. $he practice of holding "#ltiple offices or positions in the go*ern"ent led to a)#ses )y #nscr#p#lo#s p#)lic officials who too: ad*antage of this sche"e for the p#rposes of self9enrich"ent. $he )latant )etrayal of p#)lic tr#st e*ol*ed into one of the serio#s ca#ses of discontent with the Marcos regi"e. A co"parison of !ec 14 Art <II with other pro*isions of the onstit#tion on the dis6#alification of the p#)lic official s#ch as !ec. 14 Art <I on "e")ers of ongress, !ec 7 par B Art ;<I on "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces and e*en !ec I7 pro*isions on dis6#alification pertains to an office or position in the go*ern"ent and ,'Is. Jnli:e !ec 14 Art. <I San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 155 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 the prohi)ition is all9e")racing and co*ers )oth p#)lic and pri*ate office and position in the go*ern"ent. $h#s, while all the other appointi*e officials in the ci*il ser*ice are allowed to hold other office or e"ploy"ent in the go*ern"ent d#ring their ten#re when s#ch is allowed )y law and the pri"ary f#nction of their office, "e")ers of the ca)inet, their dep#ties and assistants "ay do so only when e5pressly a#thori&ed )y the onstit#tion itself. In other words, !ec., Art I;9 B is "eant to officials while sec 14 Art <II is "eant to the e5ception applica)le only to the 0resident, <ice90resident, "e")ers of the ca)inet and their dep#ties and assistants. $his )eing the case, the 6#alifying phrase I#nless otherwise pro*ided in this onstit#tionI in see 14 Art <II cannot possi)ly refers to the )road e5ceptions pro*ided #nder !ec.7 Art.I;9B of the 1987 onstit#tion. $he position #nder !ee 14 Art <II is not to )e interpreted as co*ering positions held witho#t co"pensation in e59officio capacities as pro*ided )y law or as re6#ires )y the pri"ary f#nctions of their office. Mandating additional d#ties and f#nctions of the 0resident, <ice90resident, a)inet "e")ers and their dep#ties and assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescri)ed )y their offices or e"ploy"ent )y *irt#e of their special :nowledge, e5pertise and s:ill in their respecti*e offices is a practice long9recogni&ed in "any -#risdictions. It )ears repeating thro#gh that s#ch additional d#ties or f#nctions "ay not transgress the prohi)ition "#st )e re6#ired )y the pri"ary f#nctions of the official co*ered, who is to perfor" the sa"e in an e5 officio capacity as pro*ided )y law, witho#t recei*ing any additional co"pensation therefore. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FLORES VS. DRILON (G.R. NO. 104732, !UNE 22, 1993) &ELLOSILLO, !." FACTS" $he constit#tionality of !ec. 14, par. @dA, of %.A. 7227, 1 otherwise :nown as the /Bases on*ersion and De*elop"ent Act of 1992,/ #nder which respondent Mayor %ichard H. ,ordon of 'longapo ity was appointed hair"an and hief .5ec#ti*e 'fficer of the !#)ic Bay Metropolitan A#thority @!BMAA, is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohi)ition, preli"inary in-#nction and te"porary restraining order /to pre*ent #seless and #nnecessary e5pendit#res of p#)lic f#nds )y way of salaries and other operational e5penses attached to the office . . . ./ 0etitioners, who clai" to )e ta5payers, e"ployees of the J.!. (acility at the !#)ic, Xa")ales, and officers and "e")ers of the (ilipino i*ilian ."ployees Association in J.!. (acilities in the 0hilippines, "aintain that the pro*iso in par. @dA of !ec. 14 of the said law infringes the constit#tional pro*ision set forth in !ec. 7, first par., Art. I;9B, of the onstit#tion, which states that /OnPo electi*e official shall )e eligi)le for appoint"ent or designation in any capacity to any p#)lic officer or position d#ring his ten#re,/ )eca#se the ity Mayor of 'longapo ity is an electi*e official and the s#)-ect posts are p#)lic offices. ISSUE" Does the pro*iso in !ec.14, par. @dA of %.A. 7227 which states, /0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat for the first year of its operations fro" the effecti*ity of this Act, the "ayor of the ity of 'longapo shall )e appointed as the chair"an and chief e5ec#ti*e officer of the !#)ic A#thority,/ *iolate the constit#tional proscription against appoint"ent or designation of electi*e officials to other go*ern"ent postsC HELD" D.!. $he s#)-ect pro*iso directs the 0resident to appoint an electi*e official, i.e., the Mayor of 'longapo ity, to other go*ern"ent posts @as hair"an of the Board and hief .5ec#ti*e 'fficer of !BMAA. !ince this is precisely what the constit#tional proscription see:s to pre*ent, it needs no stretching of the i"agination to concl#de that the pro*iso contra*enes !ec. 7, first par., Art. I;9B, of the onstit#tion. 1ere, the fact that the e5pertise of an electi*e official "ay )e "ost )eneficial to the higher interest of the )ody politic is of no "o"ent. It is arg#ed that !ec. 9B of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode @L,A per"its the appoint"ent of a local electi*e official to another post if so allowed )y law or )y the pri"ary f#nctions of his office. 8 B#t, the contention is fallacio#s. !ection 9B of the L, is not deter"inati*e of the constit#tionality of !ec. 14, par. @dA, of %.A. 7227, for no legislati*e act can pre*ail o*er the f#nda"ental law of the land. Moreo*er, since the constit#tionality of !ec. 9B of L, is not the iss#e here nor is that section so#ght to )e declared #nconstit#tional, we need not r#le on its *alidity. 3either can we in*o:e a practice otherwise #nconstit#tional as a#thority for its *alidity. In any case, the *iew that an electi*e official "ay )e appointed to another post if allowed )y law or )y the pri"ary f#nctions of his office, ignores the clear9c#t difference in the wording of the two @2A paragraphs of !ec. 7, Art. I;9B, of the onstit#tion. 8hile the second paragraph a#thori&es holding of "#ltiple offices )y an appointi*e official when allowed )y law or )y the pri"ary f#nctions of his position, the first paragraph appears to )e "ore stringent )y not pro*iding any e5ception to the r#le against appoint"ent or designation of an electi*e official to the go*ern"ent post, e5cept as are partic#larly recogni&ed in the onstit#tion itself, e.g., the 0resident as head of the econo"ic and planning agencyG the <ice90resident, who "ay )e appointed Me")er of the a)inetG and, a "e")er of ongress who "ay )e designated e5 officio "e")er of the H#dicial and Bar o#ncil. $he distinction )eing clear, the e5e"ption allowed to appointi*e officials in the second paragraph cannot )e e5tended to electi*e officials who are go*erned )y the first paragraph. 81.%.('%., the pro*iso in par. @dA, !ec. 14, of %.A. 7227, which states2 /. . . 0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat for the first year of its operations fro" the effecti*ity of this Act, the Mayor of the ity of 'longapo shall )e appointed as the chair"an and chief e5ec#ti*e officer of the !#)ic A#thority,/ is declared #nconstit#tionalG conse6#ently, the appoint"ent p#rs#ant thereto of the Mayor of 'longapo ity, respondent %ichard H. ,ordon, is I3<ALID, hence 3JLL and <'ID. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS &. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION JUINTOS VS. O$AETA 98 PHIL 705 5195%6 FACTS" Appellants Bra#lio V#i"son was a dep#ty 0ro*incial $reas#rer and M#nicipal $reas#rer of aloocan, %i&al. In addition fro" )eing treas#rer, he was appointed as Agent ollector of %#ral 0rogress Ad"inistration, a p#)lic corporation. 1e ass#"ed the office witho#t waiting for the appro*al of the 0resident. ISSUE" 8hether the appoint"ent as agent is constit#tional and if it is, whether he is entitled to additional co"pensation. HELD" D.!. $he e"ploy"ent of appellant as agent collector is not in itself #nlawf#l )eca#se there is no inco"pati)ility )etween said appoint"ent and his e"ploy"ent as Dep#ty 0ro*incial $reas#rer and M#nicipal $reas#rer. $here is no legal o)-ection to go*ern"ent official occ#pying two go*ern"ent offices and perfor"ing f#nctions to )oth as long as there is no inco"pati)ility. $he onstit#tional prohi)ition refers to do#)le appoint"ents and perfor"ance of f#nctions of "ore than one office. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CA-ETANO VS. MONSOD (G.R. NO. 100113 SEPTEM&ER 3, 1991) PARAS, !." FACTS" %espondent hristian Monsod was no"inated )y 0resident A6#ino to the position of hair"an of the 'M.L.. 0etitioner opposed the no"ination )eca#se allegedly Monsod does not possess the re6#ired 6#alification of ha*ing )een engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years p#rs#ant to Article I;9, !ection 1 @1A of the 1987 onstit#tion. $he o""ission on Appoint"ents confir"ed the no"ination. !#)se6#ently, respondent too: his oath and ass#"ed office as hair"an of the 'M.L.. hallenging the *alidity of the confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents of MonsodIs no"ination, petitioner, as a citi&en and ta5payer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and 0rohi)ition praying that said confir"ation and the conse6#ent appoint"ent of Monsod as hair"an of the o""ission on .lections )e declared n#ll and *oid. I!!J.2 8hether or not hristian Monsod has )een engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years as re6#ired )y the onstit#tionC HELD" D.!. =0ractice of law "eans any acti*ity, in or o#t of co#rt, which re6#ires the application of law, legal proced#re, :nowledge, training and e5perience. $o engage in the practice of law is to perfor" those acts which are characteristics of the profession. ,enerally, to practice law is to gi*e notice or render any :ind of ser*ice which de*ice or ser*ice re6#ires the #se in any degree of legal :nowledge or s:ill @III AL% 24A.> Interpreted in the light of the *ario#s definitions of the ter" =practice of law,/ partic#larly the "odern concept of law practice, and ta:ing into consideration the li)eral constr#ction intended )y the fra"ers of the onstit#tion, Atty. MonsodIs past wor: e5periences as a lawyer9 econo"ist, a lawyer9"anager, a lawyer9entreprene#r of ind#stry, a lawyer9 negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer9legislator of )oth the rich and the poor E *erily "ore than satisfy the constit#tional re6#ire"ent E that he has )een engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. $he o""ission on the )asis of e*idence s#)"itted doling the p#)lic hearings on MonsodIs confir"ation, i"plicitly deter"ined that he possessed the necessary 6#alifications as re6#ired )y law. $he -#dg"ent rendered )y the o""ission in the e5ercise of s#ch an ac:nowledged power is )eyond -#dicial interference e5cept only #pon a clear showing of a gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction. @Art. <III, !ec. 1 onstit#tionA. $h#s, only where s#ch gra*e a)#se of discretion is clearly shown shall the o#rt interfere with the o""issionIs -#dg"ent. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the e5ercise of the o#rtIs correcti*e power, since no a)#se, "#ch less a gra*e a)#se of discretion, that wo#ld a"o#nt to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction and wo#ld warrant the iss#ance of the writs prayed, for has )een clearly shown. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 156 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS &RILLANTES VS. -ORAC 192 SCRA 358519906 FACTS" 0resident A6#ino designated Associate o""issioner 1aydee B. Dorac as Acting hair"an of the 'M.L., in place of hair"an 1ilario B. Da*ide, who had )een na"ed chair"an of the fact9 finding co""ission to in*estigate the Dece")er 1989 co#p dIetat atte"pt. 0etitioner challenged the designation contending that the 0resident has no power to "a:e s#ch designation in *iew of the following reasons2 1. $he stat#s of the o""ission on .lections as an independent constit#tional )ody, andG 2. $he specific pro*ision of Art I;9 !ection 1@2A of the onstit#tion that @1A no case shall any "e")er of the 'M.L. )e appointed or designated in a te"porary or acting capacity. 0etitioner in*o:es 3acionalista 0arty *. Ba#tista, where 0resident V#irino designated the !olicitor ,eneral as acting "e")er of the 'M.L. and the o#rt re*o:ed the designation as contrary to the onstit#tion. It is also alleged that the respondent is not e*en the senior "e")er of the 'M.L., )eing o#tran:ed )y Associate o""issioner Alfredo .. A)#eg, Hr. $he !olicitor ,eneral co#nters that the designation sho#ld )e s#stained for reasons of Iad"inistrati*ely e5pediency,I to pre*ent disr#ption of the f#nctions of the 'M.L. in the a)sence of legal pro*isions for te"porary s#ccession si"ilar to the !#pre"e o#rtIs @!ec 12 H#diciary Act of 19B8A as well as the A @!ec 7 B0 129A. ISSUE" Does the 0resident of the 0hilippines ha*e the power to "a:e designation of a 'M.L. hair"an in an acting apacityC HELD" 3o. 0resident has no s#ch a#thority and e5pediency is a d#)io#s -#stification. Art I;9A. !ec.1 of the onstit#tion e5pressly descri)es all the onstit#tional o""issions as Iindependent.I Altho#gh essentially e5ec#ti*e in nat#re, they are not #nder the control of the 0resident in the discharge of their respecti*e f#nctions. .ach of these o""issions cond#cts in own proceedings #nder the applica)le laws and its own r#les and the e5ercise of its discretion. $he choice of a te"porary chair"an in the a)sence of the reg#lar chair"an co"es #nder that discretion. $hat discretion cannot )e e5ercised for it, e*en with its consent, )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines. A designation as Acting hair"an is )y its *ery ter"s essentially te"porary and therefore re*oca)le at will. 3o ca#se need )e esta)lished to -#stify its re*ocation. Ass#"ing its *alidity, the designation of the respondent as Acting hair"an of the o""ission on .lections "ay )e withdrawn )y the 0resident at any ti"e and for whate*er reason she sees fit and the respondent, ha*ing accepted s#ch designation, will )e stopped fro" challenging its withdrawal. @3ote2 $his ill#strates how the independence pf the onstit#tional o""issions "ay )e #nder"ined.A $he lac: of a stat#tory r#le co*ering the sit#ation at )ar is no -#stification for the 0resident of the 0hilippines to fill the *oid )y e5tending the te"porary designation in fa*or of the respondent. $he "e")ers of the 'M.L. co#ld ha*e handled the sit#ation the"sel*es witho#t the participation of the 0resident, howe*er well9"eaning. In the choice of the Acting hair"an, the "e")ers of the o""ission on .lections wo#ld "ost li:ely ha*e )een g#ided )y the seniority r#le as they the"sel*es wo#ld ha*e appreciated it. In any e*ent, that choice and the )asis thereof were for the" and not the 0resident to "a:e. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS LINDO VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 127311 !UNE 19, 1997 PUNO, !. FACTS" 0etitioner onrado Lindo and pri*ate respondent %osario <elasco @inc#")ent "ayor of $ernate, a*iteA were "ayoralty candidates. 8hen petitioner was declared as the winner, <elasco filed an election protest with the trial co#rt. %espondent H#dge 3apoleon Dilag too: o*er the protest case. <elasco "o*ed for e5ec#tion pending appeal, which "otion was granted. Dilag th#s iss#ed the writ of e5ec#tion. 0etitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohi)ition with the 'M.L., with prayer for the iss#ance of a preli"inary in-#nction to pre*ent the i"ple"entation of the 'rder and writ of e5ec#tion. 'M.L. denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the preli"inary in-#nction. It r#led that the trial co#rt did not co""it gra*e a)#se of discretion in granting the "otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal since on the )asis alone of the physical co#nt of )allots, pri*ate respondent wo#ld still )e ahead of petitioner )y 9? *otes. It also held that the e5a"ination of original )allots shall )e "ade at the appeal proper to dispose of all the iss#es relati*e to the "erits of the case. 1ence, the petition for certiorari and prohi)ition. ISSUE" Is the petition properC HELD" 3'. 'M.L.Is state"ent that fa:e and sp#rio#s )allots "ay ha*e )een introd#ced to increase the *otes of protestant was ta:en o#t of conte5t. $h#s, it cannot )e "ade as )asis for denying the e5ec#tion pending appeal. $o )e precise, the 'M.L. "erely said that there is a possi)ility that fa:e sp#rio#s )allots were placed in the )allot )o5 to increase pri*ate respondentIs *otes, )#t the 'M.L. correctly r#led that an e5a"ination of the )allots to resol*e that petition for certiorari is not proper at said ti"e for the only iss#e it resol*ed was whether there was a gra*e a)#se of discretion in granting the e5ec#tion pending appeal. In his petition for certiorari )efore the 'M.L., petitioner "ainly anchored his opposition to the order of e5ec#tion pending appeal on his allegation that the trial -#dge did not e5a"ine the original )allots, )#t relied only on the 5ero5 copy of the )allots in deciding the protest case. 1owe*er, this contention raises a fact#al iss#e and its deter"ination in )est left in the appeal pending )efore the 'M.L.. Its resol#tion will in*ol*e the "erit of the case. 8e are only concerned with the iss#e of whether gra*e a)#se of discretion was co""itted in ordering e5ec#tion pending appeal. And there was a good reason for ordering e5ec#tion pending appeal. $h#s, petitionerIs reco#rse wo#ld )e to p#rs#e his appeal with the 'M.L., where the opening of the )allot )o5es and the e5a"ination of original )allots "ay )e "ade so that the tr#e will of the electorate can )e finally ascertained. It also )ears e"phasis that %#le 1B4 of the %#les of o#rt allows e5ec#tion pending appeal in election cases #pon good reasons stated in the special order.In its 'rder of e5ec#tion, respondent %$ H#dge Dilag cited two reasons to -#stify e5ec#tion of his decision pending appeal, *i&2 @1A the grant of e5ec#tion wo#ld gi*e s#)stance and "eaning to the peopleIs "andate, especially since the %$ has esta)lished pri*ate respondentIs right to office, andG @2A )arely 18 "onths is left on the ten#re of the $ernate "ayor and the people ha*e the right to )e go*erned )y their chosen official. In the recent case of ,#tierre& *. 'M.L., the sa"e gro#nds for e5ec#tion pending appeal of the decision in the protest case were relied #pon )y the trial co#rt and we fo#nd the" to )e *alid reasons for e5ec#tion. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GALLARDO V. !UDGE TA&AMO (G.R. NO. 104848, !ANUAR- 29, 1993) DAVIDE, !R., !. FACTS" 0etitioners see: to prohi)it the enforce"ent of the $%' iss#ed )y respondent H#dge on 1? April 1992, on the gro#nd that the latter acted whi"sically, capricio#sly and witho#t -#risdiction when he too: cogni&ance of the case and iss#ed the said order. It is the petitionersI thesis that the said caseEthe hiring of h#ndreds of la)orers in the different pro-ects contin#es #na)ated in flagrant *iolation of paragraphs @aA, @)A, @*A and @wA, !ection 2+1 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, a"ong othersEprincipally in*ol*es an alleged *iolation of the pro*isions of the '"ni)#s .lection ode the -#risdiction o*er which is e5cl#si*ely *ested in the 'M.L.. ISSUE" Does respondent -#dge ha*e -#risdiction to ta:e cogni&ance of the co"plaint or petition )ased on election offenses prior to the cond#ct of preli"inary in*estigation )y the o""ission on .lections. HELD" 3o. $he "aterial operati*e facts alleged in the petition therein ine5ora)ly lin: the pri*ate respondentIs principal grie*ance to alleged *iolations of paragraphs @aA, @)A, @*A and @wA, !ection 2+1 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode @Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 881A. $here is partic#lar e"phasis on the last two @2A paragraphs which read2 !ec. 2+1. 0rohi)ited Acts. E $he following shall )e g#ilty of an election offense2 @*A 0rohi)ition against release, dis)#rse"ent or e5pendit#re of p#)lic f#nds. Any p#)lic official or e"ployee incl#ding )arangay officials and those of go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporations and their s#)sidiaries, who, d#ring forty9fi*e days )efore a reg#lar election and thirty days )efore a special election, releases, dis)#rses or e5pends any p#)lic f#nds for2 @1A Any and all :inds of p#)lic wor:s, e5cept the following2 555 555 555 @wA 0rohi)ition against constr#ction of p#)lic wor:s, deli*ery of "aterials for p#)lic wor:s and iss#ance of treas#ry warrants and si"ilar de*ices. E D#ring the period of forty9fi*e days preceding a reg#lar election and thirty days )efore a special election, any person who @aA #nderta:es the constr#ction of any p#)lic wor:s, e5cept for pro-ects or wor:s e5e"pted in the preceding paragraphG or @)A iss#es, #ses or a*ails of treas#ry warrants or any de*ice #nderta:ing f#t#re deli*ery of "oney, goods or other things of *al#e chargea)le against p#)lic f#nds. .ssentially, therefore, i*il ase 3o. B+7 )efore the trial co#rt is for the enforce"ent of laws in*ol*ing the cond#ct of elections the present onstit#tion #pgraded to a constit#tional stat#s the aforesaid stat#tory a#thority to grant the o""ission )roader and "ore fle5i)le powers to effecti*ely perfor" its d#ties and to ins#late it f#rther fro" legislati*e intr#sions. Do#)tless, if its r#le9"a:ing power is "ade to depend on stat#tes, ongress "ay withdraw the sa"e at any ti"e. Indeed, the present onstit#tion en*isions a tr#ly independent o""ission on .lections co""itted to ens#re free, orderly, honest, San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 157 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 peacef#l and credi)le elections,
and to ser*e as the g#ardian of the peopleIs sacred right of s#ffrage E the citi&enryIs *ital weapon in effecting a peacef#l change of go*ern"ent and in achie*ing and pro"oting political sta)ility. $he present onstit#tion, howe*er, i"plicitly grants the o""ission the power to pro"#lgate s#ch r#les and reg#lations. $he pertinent portion of !ection 2 of Article I;9 thereof reads as follows2 !ec. 2. $he o""ission on .lections shall e5ercise the following powers and f#nctions2 @1A .nforce and ad"inister all laws and reg#lations relati*e to the cond#ct of an election, ple)iscite, initiati*e, referend#", and recall. @."phasis s#ppliedA. $he word reg#lations is not fo#nd in either the 1947 or 1974 onstit#tions. It is th#s clear that its incorporation into the present onstit#tion too: into acco#nt the o""issionIs power #nder the '"ni)#s .lection ode @Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 881A, which was already in force when the said onstit#tion was drafted and ratified, to2 555 555 555 0ro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations i"ple"enting the pro*isions of this ode or other laws which the o""ission is re6#ired to enforce and ad"inister, . . . . 1+ 3eedless to say, the acts so#ght to )e restrained in !pecial i*il Action 3o. B+7 )efore the co#rt a 6#o are "atters falling within the e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of the o""ission. It is not tr#e that, as contended )y the petitioners, the -#risdiction of the %egional $rial o#rt #nder the election laws is li"ited to cri"inal actions for *iolations of the '"ni)#s .lection ode. $he onstit#tion itself grants to it e5cl#si*e original -#risdiction o*er contests in*ol*ing electi*e "#nicipal officials. 27 3either it is tena)le that the petitionersI assertion that the !pecial i*il Action filed in the co#rt )elow in*ol*es the prosec#tion of election offensesG the said action see:s so"e reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offensesG specifically, what is so#ght is the pre*ention of the f#rther co""ission of these offenses which, )y their alleged nat#re, are contin#ing. $he petition is granted. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS RELAMPAGOS V. CUM&A (G.R. NO. 1188%1, APRIL 27, 1995) DAVIDE, !R., !. FACTS" 0etitioner and pri*ate respondent %osita #")a were candidates for the position of Mayor in the "#nicipality of Magallanes, Ag#san del 3orte. 8hen #")a was proclai"ed the winner, petitioner filed an election protest with the trial co#rt, which fo#nd the latter to ha*e won with a "argin of si5 *otes o*er the pri*ate respondent. #")a appealed to the 'M.L.. $he trial co#rt ga*e d#e co#rse to the appeal. 0etitioner "o*ed for e5ec#tion pending appeal, which was granted. $he corresponding writ of e5ec#tion was th#s iss#ed. !ince her "otion for reconsideration was denied, #")a filed with the 'M.L. a petition for certiorari to ann#l the assailed order of the trial co#rt. 'M.L. pro"#lgated its resol#tion, declaring n#ll and *oid the order and the writ of e5ec#tion iss#ed )y the lower co#rt. Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as M#nicipality Mayor. %espondents contend that !ec. 7? of B0 Blg. +97 was repealed )y the '"ni)#s .lection ode @B0 Blg. 881A, citing -#rispr#dent where it was declared that, indeed, the 'M.L. has no -#risdiction to iss#e special writs of certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s in aid of its appellate -#risdiction. ISSUE" 8hether the o""ission has the a#thority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari in election cases. HELD" Des. !ince the 'M.L., in discharging its appellate -#risdiction p#rs#ant to !ec. 2 @2A, Art. I;9, acts as a co#rt of -#stice perfor"ing -#dicial power and said power incl#des the deter"ination of whether or not there has )een gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction, it necessarily follows that the o"elec, )y constit#tional "andate, is *ested with -#risdiction to iss#e writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate -#risdiction. In a)andoning the r#ling in the ,arcia and Jy and <eloria cases, the o#rt held that the last paragraph of !ection 7? of B.0. Blg. +97 pro*iding as follows2 $he o""ission is here)y *ested with e5cl#si*e a#thority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s in*ol*ing election cases, re"ains in f#ll force and effect )#t only in s#ch cases where, #nder paragraph @2A, !ection 1, Article I;9 of the onstit#tion, it has e5cl#si*e appellate -#risdiction. !i"ply p#t, the 'M.L. has the a#thority to iss#e the e5traordinary writs of certiorari, prohi)ition, and "anda"#s only in aid of its appellate -#risdiction. $hat the trial co#rt acted with palpa)le and whi"sical a)#se of discretion in granting the petitionerIs "otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal and in iss#ing the writ of e5ec#tion is all too o)*io#s. !ince )oth the petitioner and the pri*ate respondent recei*ed copies of the decision on 1 H#ly 199B, an appeal therefro" "ay )e filed within fi*e days fro" 1 H#ly 199B, or on or )efore + H#ly 199B. Any "otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal "#st )e filed )efore the period for the perfection of the appeal. 0#rs#ant to !ection 24 of the Interi" %#les I"ple"enting B.0. Blg. 129, which is dee"ed to ha*e s#pple"entary effect to the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#res p#rs#ant to %#le B4 of the latter, an appeal wo#ld )e dee"ed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal,
or on + H#ly 199B. 'n B H#ly 199B, the pri*ate respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. 'n 8 H#ly 199B, the trial co#rt ga*e d#e co#rse to the appeal and ordered the ele*ation of the records of the case to the 'M.L.. Jpon the perfection of the appeal, the trial co#rt was di*ested of its -#risdiction o*er the case. !ince the "otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal was filed only on 12 H#ly 199B, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial co#rt co#ld no longer *alidly act thereon. It co#ld ha*e )een otherwise if the "otion was filed )efore the perfection of the appeal. Accordingly, since the respondent 'M.L. has the -#risdiction to iss#e the e5traordinary writs of certiorari, prohi)ition, and "anda"#s, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the "otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal and writ of e5ec#tion iss#ed )y the trial co#rt. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EDDING V. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 1120%0 !UL- 17, 1995) FRANCISCO, !. FACTS" D#ring the May 1992 elections, petitioner 3or)i 1. .dding and respondent 0a)lo !. Bernardo were a"ong the candidates for the office of the "#nicipal "ayor of !i)#co Xa")oanga del 3orte. 8hen respondent was declared the winner, petitioner filed an election protest with the trial co#rt, which proclai"ed the latter as the winner and declared n#ll and *oid the election of respondent. %espondent appealed while petitioner "o*ed for the i""ediate e5ec#tion of the decision.
Bernardo opposed .ddingIs "otion, clai"ing that the %$ has no -#risdiction to order e5ec#tion pending appeal, and in*o:ed !ection 17 of %#le 47 of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re which allows e5ec#tion only if the -#dg"ent has )eco"e final.
$he %$ appro*ed BernardoIs 3otice of Appeal )#t later granted .ddingIs Motion, and ordered the records of the case to )e forwarded to the 'M.L.. $hereafter, .dding replaced Bernardo and ass#"ed office. Bernardo filed with the 'M.L. a 0etition for ertiorari with Application for 0reli"inary In-#nction and for Iss#ance of a $e"porary %estraining 'rder, see:ing to en-oin the 'rder of the %$ granting e5ec#tion pending appeal. $he 'M.L. ga*e d#e co#rse to the petition, and iss#ed a te"porary restraining order. (inally, the 'M.L. iss#ed the assailed 'rder, ordering respondent H#dge to cease and desist fro" enforcing the assailed %esol#tion. 0etitioner arg#es that the 'M.L. lac:s -#risdiction to iss#e writs of certiorariG and that the power of the %$ to grant e5ec#tion pending appeal in election cases has already )een confir"ed in the case of $o)on9Jy *s. 'M.L. where it was held that /the 'M.L. is )ereft of a#thority to depri*e %egional $rial o#rts of the co"petence to order e5ec#tion pending appeal./ %espondents co#nter that the 'M.L. has the power to iss#e writs of certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s, in*o:ing !ections 2@2A and 4 of Article I; of the 1987 onstit#tion, which pro*ides in part2 !ec. 2. $he o""ission on .lections shall e5ercise the following powers and f#nctions2 @2A ZAppellate -#risdiction o*er all contests in*ol*ing electi*e "#nicipal officials decided )y trial co#rts of general -#risdiction, or in*ol*ing electi*e )arangay officials decided )y trial co#rts of li"ited -#risdiction. !ec. 4. $he o""ission on .lections "ay sit en )anc or in two di*isions, and shall pro"#lgate its r#le of proced#re in order to e5pedite disposition of election case, incl#ding pre9procla"ation contro*ersiesZ ISSUE" 8hether the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A has -#risdiction to iss#e 8rits of ertiorari against the interloc#tory order of the %egional $rial o#rt @%$A in election cases. HELD" 3one. $he co#rt decided to a)andon the r#le laid down in the aforecited cases. In %ela"pagos *s. #")a and the 'M.L.,
the o#rt #pheld the -#risdiction of the 'M.L. to iss#e writs of certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s o*er election cases where it has appellate -#risdiction )y *irt#e of !ection 7? of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. +97, which pro*ides as follows2 !ec. 7?. Definition. E $he co""ission is here)y *ested with the e5cl#si*e a#thority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s in*ol*ing election cases. B#t notwithstanding the decision in %ela"pagos *s. #")a, the 'M.L. co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion in the instant case when it en-oined the order of the %$, dated H#ly 14, 1994, granting petitionerIs "otion for i""ediate e5ec#tion. 0ri*ate respondentIs petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preli"inary in-#nction )efore the 'M.L. is anchored on the for"erIs clai" that the trial co#rt acted witho#t or in e5cess of -#risdiction and with gra*e a)#se of discretion in granting e5ec#tion despite the filling of a notice of appeal )y pri*ate respondent within the regle"entary period.
It appears howe*er that on H#ly 8, 1994, the sa"e day when pri*ate respondent filed his notice of appeal with the %$, petitioner in t#rn filed his "otion for i""ediate e5ec#tion. Both actions were therefore seasona)ly filed within the fi*e9day San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 158 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 regle"entary period for filling an appeal since the decision of the %$ was pro"#lgated in open co#rt on H#ly 8, 1994. $he settled r#le is that the "ere filing of a notice of appeal does not di*est the trial co#rt of its -#risdiction o*er a case and resol*e pending incidents.
8here the "otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal was filed within the regle"entary period for perfecting an appeal, as in the case at )ench, the filing of a notice of appeal )y the opposing party is of no "o"ent and does not di*est the trial co#rt of its -#risdiction to resol*e the "otion for i""ediate e5ec#tion of the -#dg"ent pending appeal )eca#se the co#rt "#st hear and resol*e it for it wo#ld )eco"e part of the records to )e ele*ated on appeal. !ince the co#rt has -#risdiction to act on the "otion at the ti"e it was filed, that -#risdiction contin#ed #ntil the "atter was resol*ed and was not lost )y the s#)se6#ent action of the opposing party.
onsidering howe*er that the ter" of office for the disp#ted "ayoralty seat will already e5pire on H#ne 4?, 1997, in addition to the fact that the election for the ne5t ter" of office for the contested post has recently )een concl#ded, the instant petition has therefore )eco"e "oot. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GAUDO VS COMELEC 193 SCRA 78 519916 FACTS" 0etitioner and pri*ate respondent were candidates for the position of "ayor in the ,arcia 1erna.nde&, Bohol. 0etitioner was proclai"ed d#ly9elected Mayor. In an election protest )y pri*ate respondent )efore the %$, the co#rt #pheld the procla"ation of petitioner as the d#ly9elected Mayor of ,arcia91ernande&, )y a "a-ority of ele*en @11A *otes. 0ri*ate respondent appealed the %$ decision to the 'M.L.. $hro#gh its (irst Di*ision, affir"ed )y 'M.L. en )ane, re*ersed the trial co#rtIs decision and declared pri*ate respondent the d#ly9e-ected "ayor )y a pl#rality of fi*e @7A *otes. $he 'M.L. held that the fifteen @17A )allots in the sa"e precinct containing the initial // after the na"e /,alido/ @petitioner hereinA were "ar:ed )allots and, therefore in*alid. 0etitioner filed )efore the !#pre"e co#rt a petition for certiorari and in-#nction. 0ri*ate respondent "o*es for the dis"issal of the petition contending the following2 1. (inal decisions, orders or r#ling of the 'M.L. in election contests in*ol*ing electi*e "#nicipal offices are final and e5ec#tory and not appeala)le citing Art:le I; @A, !ection 2 @2A, paragraph 2 of the 1987 onstit#tion, which is i"ple"ented in the %#les of 0roced#re pro"#lgated )y the 'M.L. , partic#larly 0art <II, %#le 49, !ection 2 thereof, which reads2 /!ection 2 3on9re*iewa)le decisions9Decisions in appeals fro" co#rts of general or li"ited -#risdiction in election cases relating to the e-ections, ret#rns, and 6#alifications of "#nicipal and )arangay officials are not appeala)le./ 2. $he petition in*ol*es p#re 6#estions of fat as they relate to appreciation of e*idence @)allotsA which is )eyond the power of re*iew of this o#rt. $he 'M.L. fo#nd that the writing of the letter // after the word /,alido/ in the fifteen @17A )allots of 0recinct 1B is a clear and con*incing proof of a pattern or design to identify the )allots andRor *oters. $his finding sho#ld )y concl#si*e on the o#rt. 0etitioner, on the other hand, cites Article I; @AA, !ection 7 of the onstit#tion, to s#pport his petition. It states2 /Jnless otherwise pro*ided )y this onstit#tion or )y law, any decision, order, or r#ling of each @onstit#tionalA o""ission "ay )e )ro#ght to the !#pre"e o#rt on certiorari )y the aggrie*ed party within thirty days fro" receipt of a copy thereof./ ISSUE" May the decision )y the 'M.L. in election contest in*ol*ing "#nicipal officials )e )ro#ght to the !#pre"e o#rt )y a petition for certiorari )y the petitionerC HELD" D.!. $he fact that decision, final orders or r#ling of the o""ission on .lections in contests in*ol*ing electi*e "#nicipal and )arangay offices are final, e5ec#tory and not appeala)le, does not precl#de a reco#rse to this o#rt )y way of a special ci*il action of certiorari. $he proceedings in the onstit#tional o""ission on this "atter are enlightening. $h#s9 /M%. %.,ALAD'2 It is #nderstood, howe*er, that while these decisions with respect to )arangay and "#nicipal officials are final and i""ediately e5ec#tory and therefore not appeala)le, that does not r#le o#t the possi)ility of an original special ci*il action for certiorari, prohi)ition, or "anda"#s, as the case "ay )e, #nder %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt/ 8e do not, howe*er, )elie*e that the respondent 'M.L. co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction in rendering the 6#estioned decision. It is settled that the f#nction f a writ of certiorari is toe :eep an inferior co#rt or tri)#nal within the )o#nds of its -#risdiction or to pre*ent it fro" co""itting a gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction. 'M.L. has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical e*idence, e6#ity, law and -#stice, and apply esta)lished -#rispr#dence in s#pport of its findings and concl#sionG and that the e5tent to which s#ch precedents apply rests on its discretion, the e5ercise of which sho#ld not )e controlled #nless s#ch discretion has )een a)#sed to the pre-#dice of either party. 0etition is therefore dis"issed. O3ote2 A short lesson in %e"edial Law. Do# "#st disting#ish the nat#re of the special ci*il action of certiorari #nder %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt, which is not a "ode of appeal, )#t rather an original action.P ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PEOPLE VS !UDGE INTING 187 SCRA 788 519906 FACTS" Mrs. .ditha Bar)a filed letter9co"plaint against 'I Mayor Do"inador %egalado of $an-ay, 3egros 'riental with the 'M.L., for allegedly transferring her, a per"anent 3#rsing Attendant, ,rade I, in the office of the M#nicipal Mayor to a *ery re"ote )arangay and witho#t o)taining prior pennission or clearance fro" 'M.L. as re6#ired )y law. Acting on the co"plaint, 'M.L. directed Atty. ,erardo Lit#anas, 0ro*incial .lection !#per*ision of D#"ag#ete ity to cond#ct the preli"inary in*estigation of the case to file the necessary infor"ation in co#rt and prosec#te, if warranted. After a preli"inary in*estigation, Atty. Lit#anas filed a cri"inal case with the respondent trial co#rt which in t#rn iss#ed a warrant of arrest against the 'le9Mayor. !#)se6#ently, howe*er, the trial co#rt set aside its order of arrest on the gro#nd that Atty. Lit#anas is not a#thori&ed to deter"ine pro)a)le ca#se p#rs#ant to !ec 2, Art. III of the 1987 onstit#tion and f#rther re6#ired Atty. Lit#anas to sec#re the written appro*al of the pro*incial (iscal after which the prosec#tion of the case shall )e #nder the s#per*ision and control of the latter. Atty. Lit#anas failed to co"ply so the case was dis"issed. ISSUE" Does a preli"inary in*estigation cond#cted )y a 0ro*incial .lection !#per*isor in*ol*ing election offenses ha*e to )e co#rsed thro#gh the 0ro*incial (iscal, )efore the %egional $rial o#rt "ay ta:e cogni&ance of the in*estigation and deter"ine whether or not pro)a)le ca#se e5istsC HELD" 3'. $he 0ro*incial (iscal, as s#ch, ass#"es no role in the prosec#tion of election offenses. If e*er the (iscal or 0rosec#tor files infor"ation charging an election offense or prosec#tes a *iolation or election law, it is )eca#se he has )een dep#ti&ed )y the 'M.L.. 1e does not do so #nder the sole a#thority of his office @0eople *s. Basilla, et al ,.%. 3os. 849489B?, 3o*e")er +, P 989A. In the instant case, there is no a*er"ent or allegation that the respondent H#dge is )ringing in the 0ro*incial (iscal as a dep#ty of 'M.L.. 1e wants the (iscal to /appro*e/ the 'M.L.Is preli"inary in*estigation, which is not proper. Article I; !ection 2 of the onstit#tion pro*ides2 /!ec. 2 $he o""ission on .lection shall e5ercise the following powers and f#nctions2 1. .nforce and ad"inister all laws and reg#lations relati*e to the cond#ct of an election, ple)iscite, initiati*e. referend#", and recall. 555 555 555 2. (ile #pon a *erified co"plaint, or on its own initiati*e, petitions in co#rt for incl#sion or e5cl#sion of *otes, in*estigate and, where appropriate, prosec#te cases of *iolation of election laws, incl#ding acts or o"ission constit#ting election fra#ds. offenses, and "alpractices/ @."phasis s#ppliedA In effect, the 1987 onstit#tion "andates the 'M.L. not only to in*estigate )#t also to prosec#te cases of *iolation of election laws. $his "eans that the 'M.L. is e"powered to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigations in cases in*ol*ing election offenses for the p#rpose of helping the H#dge deter"ine pro)a)le ca#se and for filing infor"ation in co#rt. $his power is e5cl#si*e with 'M.L.. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. &ASILLA (G.R. NOS. 8393840, NOVEM&ER %, 1989) FELICIANO, !." FACTS" As an after"ath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Mas)ate, co"plaints for *iolations of !ection 2+1, par.a91 @*ote )#yingA and par. p @carrying of deadly weaponA of the '"ni)#s .lection ode @B0 Blg. 881A were filed with the 'ffice of the 0ro*incial (iscal of Mas)ate against the pri*ate respondents. After preli"inary in*estigation of the foregoing co"plaints, the 0ro*incial (iscal of Mas)ate filed in the %egional $rial o#rt of Mas)ate the said cri"inal co"plaints. In three @4A separate San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 159 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 orders, acc#sed respondent H#dge 1enry Basilla "ot# proprio dis"issed the three @4A infor"ations gi*ing the following -#stification2 =Z.. $he record shows that the co"plainant filed the co"plaint with the fiscal and not with the 'M.L.. $he 'M.L. did not in*estigate the case.> $he 0etition arg#es principally that the o""ission on .lections @/o"elec/A has a#thority to dep#ti&e the chief state prosec#tors, pro*incial and city fiscals and their assistants, #nder !ections 2 @BA and @8A, Article I;9 of the 1987 onstit#tion, and that the o"elec did dep#ti&e s#ch prosec#tion officers to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigation of co"plaints for alleged *iolation of election laws and to instit#te cri"inal infor"ation therefore. $he respondent -#dge therefore co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: of -#risdiction in dis"issing the case. ISSUE" 8hether or not the respondent -#dge erred in deciding that 'M.L. in the case at )ar failed to perfor" its f#nction as pro*ided in the 1987 onstit#tion. HELD" Des. $here is no disp#te that the o"elec is *ested with power and a#thority to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigation of all election offenses p#nisha)le #nder the '"ni)#s .lection ode and to prosec#te s#ch offenses in co#rt. !ec. 2@+A of Art. I; @A of 1987 onstit#tion pro*idesZ>in*estigate and, when appropriate prosec#te cases of *iolation of election laws, incl#ding acts or o"issions, constit#ting election fra#ds offenses, "alpractices./ It "#st )e noted that while !ection 2+7 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode *ests /e5cl#si*e power/ to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigation of election offenses and to prosec#te the sa"e #pon the o"elec, it at the sa"e ti"e a#thori&es the o"elec to a*ail itself of the assistance of other prosec#ting ar"s of the ,o*ern"ent. !ection 2 of Article I;9 of the 1987 onstit#tion clearly en*isage that the o"elec wo#ld not )e co"pelled to carry o#t all its f#nctions directly and )y itself alone2 !ection 2. $he o""ission on .lections shall e5ercise the following powers and f#nctions2 @1A .nforce and ad"inister all laws and reg#lations relati*e to the cond#ct of an election, ple)iscite, initiati*e, referend#", and recall. 555 555 555 @BA Dep#ti&e, with the conc#rrence of the 0resident, law enforce"enti agencies and instr#"antalities of the ,o*ern"ent, incl#ding the Ar"ed (orces of the 0hilippines, for the e5cl#si*e p#rpose of ens#ring free orderly, honest, peacef#l, and credi)le elections. 555 555 555 @+A (ile, #pon a *erified co"plaint, or on its own initiati*e, petitions in co#rt for incl#sion or e5cl#sion of *otersG in*estigate and, where appropriate, prosec#te cases of *iolation of election laws, incl#ding acts or o"issions constit#ting election fra#ds, offenses, and "alpractices. 555 555 555 @8A %eco""end to the 0resident the re"o*al of any officer or e"ployee it has dep#ti&ed, or the i"position of any other disciplinary action, for *iolation or disregard of, or diso)edience to its directi*e, order, or decision. 555 555 555 $he contention of pri*ate respondents that the dep#tation )y the o"elec of the prosec#ting ar"s of the ,o*ern"ent wo#ld )e warranted only )efore the elections and only to ens#re tree, honest, orderly, peacef#l and credi)le elections, that is, to perfor" the peace9 :eeping f#nctions of police"en, lac: s#)stance. $here is nothing in !ection 2 @BA of Article I;9 of the onstit#tion which re6#ires s#ch a pinched niggardly interpretation of the a#thority of the o"elec to appoint as its dep#ties, officials or e"ployees of other agencies and instr#"entalities of the go*ern"ent. $he pro"pt in*estigation and prosec#tion and disposition of election offenses constit#te an indispensa)le part of the tas: of sec#ring free, orderly, honest, peacef#l and credi)le elections. $he in*estigation and prosec#tion of election offenses are, in an i"portant sense, "ore i"portant than the "aintenance of physical order in election precinct. I All this the respondent H#dge disregarded when he "ot# proprio dis"issed the cri"inal infor"ations filed in this case. $he cases he cited in his identical orders can offer hi" no co"fort at allG for these cases do not relate to the a#thority of the o"elec to dep#ti&e the reg#lar prosec#tion ar"s of the ,o*ern"ent for the in*estigation and prosec#tion of election offenses and those cases are not in conflict with o#r r#ling here. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PEOPLE VS. DELGADO (GR. NO. 9341932, SEPTEM&ER 18, 1990) GANCA-CO, !." FACTS" o"elec filed an infor"ation against each of the pri*ate respondents for *iolation of !ection 2+1 @yA @2A and @7A of the '"ni)#s .lection ode. In three separate "anifestations, the %egional .lection Director of %egion <II was designated )y the 'M.L. to handle the prosec#tion with the a#thority to assign another 'M.L. prosec#tor. 0ri*ate respondents, thro#gh co#nsels, then filed "otions for reconsiderations and the s#spension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent co#rt on the gro#nd that no preli"inary in*estigation was cond#cted. An order was then iss#ed )y respondent co#rt directing the 'M.L. thro#gh the %egional .lection Director of %egion <II to cond#ct a rein*estigation of said cases and to s#)"it his report within ten @1?A days after ter"ination thereof. In its petition, the 'M.L. contends that as an independent constit#tional )ody, its actions on election "atters "ay )e re*iewed only on certiorari )y the !#pre"e o#rt. 'n the other hand, the respondents contend that since the cases were filed in co#rt )y the 'M.L. as a p#)lic prosec#tor, and not in the e5ercise of its power to decide election contests, the trial co#rt has a#thority to order a rein*estigation. ISSUE" 8hether or not the respondent o#rt has the power or a#thority to order the o""ission on .lections thro#gh its %egional .lection Director of %egion <II or its Law Depart"ent to cond#ct a rein*estigation HELD" D.!. $he ref#sal of the 'M.L. or its agents to co"ply with the order of the trial co#rt re6#iring the" to cond#ct a rein*estigation in this case and to s#)"it to the co#rt the record of the preli"inary in*estigation on the gro#nd that only this o#rt "ay re*iew its actions is certainly #ntena)le. It is clear that aside fro" the ad-#dicatory or 6#asi9-#dicial power of the 'M.L. to decide election contests and ad"inistrati*e 6#estions, it is also *ested the power of a p#)lic prosec#tor with the e5cl#si*e a#thority to cond#ct the preli"inary in*estigation and the prosec#tion of election offenses p#nisha)le #nder the ode )efore the co"petent co#rt. $h#s, when the 'M.L., thro#gh its d#ly a#thori&ed law officer, cond#cts the preli"inary in*estigation of an election offense and #pon a pri"a facie finding of a pro)a)le ca#se, files the infor"ation in the proper co#rt, said co#rt there)y ac6#ires -#risdiction o*er the case. onse6#ently, all the s#)se6#ent disposition of said case "#st )e s#)-ect to the appro*al of the co#rt. $he 'M.L. cannot cond#ct a rein*estigation of the case witho#t the a#thority of the co#rt or #nless so ordered )y the co#rt. $he records of the preli"inary in*estigation re6#ired to )e prod#ced )y the co#rt "#st )e s#)"itted )y the 'M.L.. $he trial co#rt "ay rely on the resol#tion of the 'M.L. to file the infor"ation, )y the sa"e to:en that it "ay rely on the certification "ade )y the prosec#tor who cond#cted the preli"inary in*estigation, in the iss#ance of the warrant of arrest. 3e*ertheless the co#rt "ay re6#ire that the record of the preli"inary in*estigation )e s#)"itted to it to satisfy itself that there is pro)a)le ca#se which will warrant the iss#ance of a warrant of arrest. . $he petition is )ro#ght in the na"e of the 0eople of the 0hilippines. 'nly the !olicitor ,eneral can represent the 0eople of the 0hilippines in this proceeding. In the least, the consent of the 'ffice of the !olicitor ,eneral sho#ld ha*e )een sec#red )y the 'M.L. )efore the filing of this petition. 'n this acco#nt alone, the petition sho#ld )e dis"issed. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VS. SILVA, !R (GR. NO. 129417 FE&RUAR- 10, 1998) MENDO$A, !." FACTS" $he 'M.L. charged pri*ate respondents .rasto $anciongco and 3or"a astillo with *iolations of \27 of %.A. 3o. ++B+, together with Xenon Jy, in twel*e separate infor"ations filed with the %egional $rial o#rt of Bataan. $anciongco and astillo then filed a -oint /'"ni)#s Motion for .5a"ination of .*idence to Deter"ine the .5istence of 0ro)a)le a#seG !#spension of Iss#ance of 8arrant of ArrestG and Dis"issal of the ases./ hief !tate 0rosec#tor Ho*encito X#No, who had )een designated )y the o""ission on .lections to prosec#te the cases, filed a co""ent -oining in pri*ate respondentsI re6#est. In *iew thereof, respondent -#dges !il*a and <ian&on s#""arily dis"issed the cases against pri*ate respondents. $he 'M.L. so#ght to appeal the dis"issal of the cases to the o#rt of Appeals,
)#t the respondent -#dges denied d#e co#rse to its appeal. $he sole )asis for the denial was the fact that the prosec#tor, who" the 'M.L. had dep#ti&ed to prosec#te the cases, had earlier ta:en a contrary stand against the 'M.L.. !aid prosec#tor stated that he cannot gi*e his confor"ity to the 3otice of Appeal filed )y the o"elec as it wo#ld not )e consistent with his position that he wo#ld a)ide )y whate*er finding the co#rt "ay co"e #p with on the e5istence of pro)a)le ca#se as against the acc#sed .rasto $anciongco and 3or"a astillo. ISSUES" @1A Is the order denying d#e co#rse to the 3otice of Appeal of the 'M.L. correctC @2A 8ho has a#thority to decide whether or not to appeal fro" the orders of dis"issal E the 'M.L. or its designated prosec#torC HELD" 3'. $her order of the respondent -#dges denying d#e co#rse to the 3otice of Appeal of the 'M.L. is not correct. . $he a#thority to decide whether or not to appeal the dis"issal )elongs to the 'M.L.. Art. I;9, \ 2@+A of the onstit#tion e5pressly *ests in it the power and f#nction to /in*estigate and, where appropriate, prosec#te cases of *iolations of election laws, incl#ding acts or o"issions constit#ting election fra#ds, offenses, and "alpractices./ As this o#rt has held2 In effect the 1987 onstit#tion "andates the 'M.L. not only to in*estigate )#t also to prosec#te cases of *iolation of election laws. $his "eans that the 'M.L. is e"powered to cond#ct preli"inary San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 160 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 in*estigations in cases in*ol*ing election offenses for the p#rpose of helping the H#dge deter"ine pro)a)le ca#se and for filing an infor"ation in co#rt. $his power is e5cl#si*e with 'M.L..
Indeed, e*en )efore the present onstit#tion, the '"ni)#s .lection ode @B.0. Blg. 881A and, )efore it, the 1971 .lection ode @%.A. 3o. +488A and the 1978 .lection ode @0.D. 3o. 129+A already ga*e the 'M.L. the e5cl#si*e power to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigation of all election offenses and to prosec#te the" in co#rt.
$he p#rpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosec#tor the in*estigation and prosec#tion of election offenses.
0rosec#tors designated )y the 'M.L. to prosec#te the cases act as its dep#ties. $hey deri*e their a#thority fro" it and not fro" their offices.
onse6#ently, it was )eyond the power of hief !tate 0rosec#tor X#No to oppose the appeal of the 'M.L.. (or that "atter, it was )eyond his power, as 'M.L.9designated prosec#tor, to lea*e to the trial co#rts the deter"ination of whether there was pro)a)le ca#se for the filing of the cases and, if it fo#nd none, whether the cases sho#ld )e dis"issed. $hose cases were filed )y the 'M.L. after appropriate preli"inary in*estigation. If the hief !tate 0rosec#tor tho#ght there was no pro)a)le ca#se for proceeding against pri*ate respondents, he sho#ld ha*e disc#ssed the "atter with the 'M.L. and awaited its instr#ction. If he disagreed with the 'M.L.Is findings, he sho#ld ha*e so#ght per"ission to withdraw fro" the cases. B#t he co#ld not lea*e the deter"ination of pro)a)le ca#se to the co#rts and agree in ad*ance to the dis"issal of the cases sho#ld the co#rts find no pro)a)le ca#se for proceeding with the trial of the acc#sed. It was, therefore, gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the respondent -#dges to rely on the "anifestation of hief !tate 0rosec#tor X#No as )asis for denying d#e co#rse to the notices of appeal filed )y the 'M.L.. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ARUELO VS. CA GR NO. 107852. OCTO&ER 20, 1993 FACTS" Ar#elo and ,atchalian were <ice9Mayoralty candidates in Balagtas, B#lacan in the May 1992 elections. ,atchalian was proclai"ed as the d#ly elected *ice9"ayor. Ar#elo filed with the 'M.L. a petition see:ing to ann#l ,atchalianIs procla"ation on the gro#nd of /fra#d#lent alteration and ta"pering/ of *otes. Ar#elo also filed with the %$ a petition protesting the sa"e election. ,atchalian "o*ed to dis"iss, clai"ing that2 @aA the petition was filed o#t of ti"eG @)A there was a pending protest case )efore the 'M.L.G and @)A Ar#elo failed to pay the prescri)ed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition. $he 'M.L. denied Ar#eloIs petition. 1owe*er, the trial co#rt denied ,atchalianIs Motion to Dis"iss and ordered hi" to file his answer to the petition. Ar#elo prayed )efore the A for the iss#ance of a te"porary restraining order or a writ of preli"inary in-#nction to restrain the trial co#rt fro" i"ple"enting the 'rder of A#g#st 11 1992, regarding the re*ision of )allots. $he A )elatedly iss#ed a te"porary restraining order. Meanwhile, ,atchalian filed with the A another petition for certiorari @A9 ,.%. !0 3o. 28977A, again alleging gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the trial co#rt in iss#ing the 'rder, which denied his Motion for Bill of 0artic#lars. $he A dis"issed this petition for lac: of "erit. $he A rendered -#dg"ent, denying ,atchalianIs petition, )#t declaring, at the sa"e ti"e, that ,atchalianIs Answer 8ith o#nter9 0rotest and o#nterclai" was ti"ely filed. $he appellate co#rt also lifted the te"porary restraining order and ordered the trial co#rt to /proceed with dispatch in the proceedings )elow. 1ence this petition. ISSUE" 8hether or not the filing of "otions to dis"iss and "otions for )ill of partic#lars is prohi)ited )y !ection 1, %#le 14, 0art III of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#reG hence, the filing of said pleadings did not s#spend the r#nning of the fi*e9day period, or gi*e ,atchalian a new fi*e9day period to file his answer. HELD" 3'. 0etitioner filed the election protest @i*il ase 3o. 4B49 M992A with the %$, whose proceedings are go*erned )y the %e*ised %#les of o#rt. !ection 1, %#le 14, 0art III of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is not applica)le to proceedings )efore the reg#lar co#rts. As e5pressly "andated )y !ection 2, %#le 1, 0art I of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re, the filing of "otions to dis"iss and )ill of 0artic#lars, shall apply only to proceedings )ro#ght )efore the 'M.L.. !ection 2, %#le 1, 0art I pro*ides2 /!.. 2. Applica)ility. $hese r#les, e5cept 0art <I, shall apply to all actions and proceedings )ro#ght )efore the o""ission. 0art <I shall apply to election contests and 6#o warranto cases cogni&a)le )y co#rts of general or li"ited -#risdiction It "#st )e noted that nowhere in 0art <I of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is it pro*ided that "otions to dis"iss and )ill of partic#lars are not allowed in election protest or 6#o warranto cases pending )efore the reg#lar co#rts. onstit#tionally spea:ing, the 'M.L. cannot adopt a r#le prohi)iting the filing of certain pleadings in the reg#lar co#rts. $he power to pro"#lgate r#les concerning pleadings, practice and proced#re in all co#rts is *ested on the !#pre"e o#rt @onstit#tion, Art <III, !ec. + O7PA. 0ri*ate respondent recei*ed a copy of the order of the %$ denying his "otion for a )ill of partic#lars on A#g#st +, 1992. Jnder !ection l@)A, %#le 12 of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt, a party has at least fi*e days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his "otion for a )ill of partic#lars. 0ri*ate respondent, therefore, had #ntil A#g#st 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. $he Answer with o#nter90rotest and o#nterclai" filed )y hi" on A#g#st 11, 1992 was filed ti"ely. $he instant case is different fro" a pre9procla"ation contro*ersy which the law e5pressly "andates to )e resol*ed in a s#""ary proceeding @B.0. Blg. 881, Art. ;;, !ec. 2B+G 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re, 0art <, %#le 27, !ec. 2A. 0re9procla"ation contro*ersies sho#ld )e s#""arily decided, consistent with the legislatorsI desire that the can*ass of the *otes and the procla"ation of the winning candidate )e done with dispatch and witho#t #nnecessary delay. An election protest does not "erely concern the personal interests of ri*al candidates for an office. '*er and, a)o*e the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep p#)lic interest to deter"ine the tr#e choice of he people. (or this reason, it is a well9esta)lished principle that laws go*erning election protests "#st )e li)erally constr#ed to the end that the pop#lar will e5pressed in the election or p#)lic officers, will not, )y p#rely technical reasons, )e defeated 8e find no gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the o#rt of Appeals. 81.%.('%., the petition is here)y DI!MI!!.D. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ANTONIO VS. COMELEC GR NO. 1358%9, SEPTEM&ER 22, 1999 FACTS" $he parties in this case were ri*al candidates for the 0#nong Barangay of Barangay Ilaya, Las 0iNas ity, Metro Manila. 0rotestee %#stico Antonio was proclai"ed as the winner. 0rotestant <icente Miranda, Hr. then filed an election protest )efore the Las 0iNas Me$, which declared Miranda as the d#ly elected Barangay hair"an. Antonio appealed fro" this -#dg"ent. Meanwhile, Miranda "o*ed to e5ec#te the co#rtIs decision )#t s#ch was denied and records were forwarded to the 'M.L. !econd Di*ision. $he 'M.L. dis"issed the appeal for lac: of -#risdiction. It was stated therein that petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the prescri)ed period. $he 0eriod aforestated is -#risdictional and fail#re of the protestee to perfect his appeal within the said period depri*es the o""ission of its appellate -#risdiction. 1ence, this "otion for reconsideration. ISSUE" Is the period to appeal a decision of a "#nicipal trial co#rt to the 'M.L. in an election protest in*ol*ing a )arangay position fi*e @7A days per 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re or ten @1?A days as pro*ided for in %ep#)lic Act ++791 and the '"ni)#s .lection odeC HELD" In dis"issing the appeal, the 'M.L. relied on !ection 21, %#le 47 of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re which reads2 /!.. 21. Appeal 9 (ro" any decision rendered )y the co#rt, the aggrie*ed party "ay appeal to the o""ission on .lections within fi*e @7A days after the pro"#lgation of the decision./ 'n the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal fro" decisions of the M#nicipal $rial o#rts or Metropolitan $rial o#rts in*ol*ing )arangay officials is go*erned )y !ection 9 of %ep#)lic Act ++79 and !ection 272 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode. !ection 9 of %ep#)lic Act ++79 reads2 /!.. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a )arangay official "ay )e filed with the proper "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt )y any candidate who has d#ly filed a certificate of candidacy and has )een *oted for a )arangay office within ten @1?A days after the procla"ation of the res#lts of the election. $he trial co#rt shall decide the election protest within thirty @4?A days after the filing thereof. $he decision of the "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt "ay )e appealed within ten @1?A days fro" receipt of a copy thereof )y the aggrie*ed party to the regional trial co#rt which shall decide the iss#e within thirty @4?A days fro" receipt of the appeal and whose decision on 6#estions of fact shall )e final and non9appeala)le. (or p#rposes of the )arangay elections, no pre9 procla"ation cases shall )e allowed./ !i"ilarly, !ection 272 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode pro*ides2 /!.. 272. .lection contest for )arangay offices. 9 A sworn petition contesting the election of a )arangay officer shall )e filed with the proper "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt )y any candidate who has d#ly filed a certificate of candidacy and has )een *oted for the sa"e office within ten days after the procla"ation of the res#lts of the election. $he trial co#rt shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. $he decision of the "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt "ay )e appealed within ten days fro" receipt of a copy thereof )y the aggrie*ed party to the regional trial co#rt which shall decide the case within thirty days fro" its s#)"ission, and whose decisions shall )e final./ 3o less than the 1987 onstit#tion @Article I;9A, !ection + and Article I;9, !ection 4A grants and a#thori&es this o""ission to pro"#lgate its own r#les of proced#re as long as s#ch r#les concerning pleadings and practice do not di"inish, increase or "odify s#)stanti*e rights. 1ence, the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re pro"#lgated in 1994 as San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 161 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 a"ended in 199B is no ordinary interpretati*e or ad"inistrati*e r#ling. It is pro"#lgated )y this o""ission p#rs#ant to a constit#tionally "andated a#thority which no legislati*e enact"ent can a"end, re*ise or repeal. $he 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re @%#le 47 !ection 21A pro*ides that fro" the decision rendered )y the co#rt, the aggrie*ed party "ay appeal to the o""ission on .lections within fi*e @7A days after the pro"#lgation of the decision. %#le 22 !ection 9 @dA of '#r %#les of 0roced#re f#rther pro*ides that an appeal fro" decisions of co#rts in election protest cases "ay )e dis"issed at the instance of the o""ission for fail#re to file the re6#ired notice of appeal within the prescri)ed period. In case at )ar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal )efore the trial co#rt on the ninth @9A day fro" receipt of the decision appealed fro" or fo#r @BA days after the fi*e9day prescri)ed period to appeal lapsed. $herefore, the present appeal "#st )e dis"issed. (or it is a5io"atic that the perfection of an appeal in the "anner and within the period laid down )y the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is not only "andatory )#t also -#risdictional. As a conse6#ence, the fail#re to perfect an appeal within the prescri)ed period as re6#ired )y the %#les has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precl#ding the appellate co#rt fro" ac6#iring -#risdiction o*er the case. 0etitionerIs arg#"ent raises the pres#"ption that the period to appeal can )e se*ered fro" the re"edy or the appeal itself which is pro*ided in !ection 9, %ep#)lic Act ++79 and s#r*i*e on its own. $he pres#"ption cannot )e s#stained )eca#se the period to appeal is an essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the re"edy. 0etitioner also cites the case of (lores *. 'M.L.. 1owe*er, when this o#rt stated in the afore"entioned case that /!ection 9 of %ep. Act 3o. ++79 is declared #nconstit#tional insofar as it pro*ides that )arangay election contests decided )y the "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt shall )e appeala)le to the regional trial co#rt/, it "eant to preser*e the first two sentences on the original -#risdiction of "#nicipal and "etropolitan trial co#rts to try )arangay election protests cases )#t not, as ad*anced )y the petitioner, the ten9day period to appeal to the %egional $rial o#rt. $his is the logical and so#nd interpretation of s#)-ect portion of the (lores case. 8e cannot ind#lge in the ass#"ption that ongress still intended, )y the said laws, to "aintain the ten @1?A day period to appeal despite the declaration of #nconstit#tionality of the appellate -#risdiction of the regional trial co#rt, %ep#)lic Act 3o. 71++ a"ending the '"ni)#s .lection ode, e*inces the intent of o#r law"a:ers to e5pedite the re"edial aspect of election contro*ersies. $he law was appro*ed on 3o*e")er 2+, 1991, after the (lores case which was pro"#lgated on April 2?,199?, and pres#"a)ly, the legislat#re in enacting the sa"e was cogni&ant of the r#ling in (lores. !aid law pro*ides the sa"e fi*e @7A day period to appeal decisions of the trial co#rt in election contests for "#nicipal officers to the 'M.L.. !ection 22 thereof reads2 /!ec. 22. .lection ontests for M#nicipal 'fficers. 9All election contests in*ol*ing "#nicipal offices filed with the %egional $rial o#rt shall )e decided e5peditio#sly. $he decision "ay )e appealed to the o""ission within fi*e @7A days fro" pro"#lgation or receipt of a copy thereof )y the aggrie*ed party. $he o""ission shall decide the appeal within si5ty @+?A days after it is s#)"itted for decision, )#t not later than si5 @+A "onths after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall )e final, #nappeala)le and e5ec#tory./ $here wo#ld )e no logic nor reason in r#ling that a longer period to appeal to the 'M.L. sho#ld apply to election contests for )arangay officials. And since the whole re"edy was in*alidated, a *oid was created. $h#s, the 'M.L. had to co"e in and pro*ide for a new appeal in accordance with the "andate of the onstit#tion. As correctly pointed o#t )y the 'M.L., !ection +, Article I;9A1B of the 1987 onstit#tion grants and a#thori&es the 'M.L. to pro"#lgate its own r#les of proced#re. $he 1994 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re ha*e pro*ided a #nifor" fi*e @7A day period for ta:ing an appeal consistent with the e5peditio#s resol#tion of election9related cases. It wo#ld )e a)s#rd and therefore not clearly intended, to "aintain the 1?9day period for )arangay election contests. 1ence, !ection 4, %#le 22 of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is not in conflict with any e5isting law. $o adopt a contrary *iew wo#ld defeat the la#da)le o)-ecti*e of pro*iding a #nifor" period of appeal and defy the 'M.L.Is constit#tional "andate to enact r#les of proced#re to e5pedite disposition of election cases. $he 'M.L., therefore, did not co""it an a)#se of discretion in dis"issing the appeal. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC 212 SCRA 519926 FACTS" 0etitioner i"p#gn the resol#tion of the o"elec as ha*ing )een iss#ed with gra*e a)#se of discretion in the, inter alias, the o""ission sitting en )ane, too: cogni&ance and decided the appeals witho#t first referring the" to any of its di*ision. ISSUE" 8hether or not the o"elec en )anc has the -#risdiction o*er the said resol#tion. HELD" !ec. 4 Art I;9 of the 1987 onstit#tion e5pressly pro*ides2 I$he o"elec "ay sit en )anc or in two di*isions, and shall pro"#lgate its r#le of proced#re in order to e5pedite disposition of election cases, incl#ding pre procla"ation contro*ersies. All s#ch election cases shall )e heard and decided in di*ision, pro*ided that the "otions for reconsideration of decisions shall )e decided )y the o""ission en )ane.I It is clear that election cases incl#de pre procla"ation contro*ersies and all. s#ch cases "#st first )e heard and decided )y a Di*ision of the o""ission. $he o""ission sitting en )ane does not ha*e the a#thority to hear and decide the sa"e at the first instance. In the o"elec %#les of 0roced#res, pre procla"ations are classified as special cases and in co"pliance with the pro*ision of the constit#tion, the two di*isions of the o""issions are *ested with the a#thority to hear and decide these special cases. %#le 127 thereof go*erns special cases, especially !ee 9 of the said %#le pro*ides that appeals fro" r#ling of the assigned and not )y the o""ission en )ane. Indisp#ta)ly then, the o"elec en )anc acted witho#t -#risdiction or with gra*e a)#se of discretion, when it resol*ed the appeals of petitioners ion the special cases witho#t first referring the" to any of its di*isions. Accordingly, the instant petitions are dis"issed witho#t pre-#dice to the filing )y petitioners of reg#lar election protests. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS RE-ES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO (G.R. NO. 10888%, MA- 5, 1995) MENDO$A, !." FACTS" 0etitioner A6#iles %eyes and pri*ate respondent Adolfo o"ia were candidates for the position of "e")er of the !angg#niang Bayan of 3a#-an, 'riental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 synchroni&ed elections. 'n May 14, 1992, d#ring the proceedings of the M#nicipal Board of an*assers, pri*ate respondent "o*ed for the e5cl#sion of certain election ret#rns, on the gro#nd of serio#s irreg#larity in co#nting in fa*or of petitioner A6#iles %eyes *otes cast for /%eyes/ only, considering that there was another candidate @.pitacio %eyesA )earing the sa"e s#rna"e. 1owe*er, witho#t resol*ing his petition, the M#nicipal Board of an*assers proclai"ed on the sa"e day petitioner as the eighth winning candidate with 7,2?7 *otes. 'n May 27, 1992 petitioner too: his oath of office. 0ri*ate respondent later filed an election protest )efore the trial co#rt. 1e alleged that /a *ital "ista:e Ohad )eenP co""itted )y the Board of an*assers in the "athe"atical co"p#tation of the total n#")er of *otes garnered )y petitioner Onow pri*ate respondentP. 0etitioner filed a "otion to dis"iss pri*ate respondentIs petition on the gro#nd that it was filed )eyond the regle"entary period of ten days fro" procla"ation, which petition was denied )y the trial co#rt. 'n H#ne 24, 1992, the trial co#rt rendered its decision ann#ling the procla"ation of petitioner and declaring pri*ate respondent as the eighth winning candidate for the position of co#ncilor of the !angg#niang Bayan of 3a#-an, 'riental Mindoro. A copy of the decision was ser*ed on petitioner on H#ne 2+, 1992. 0etitioner filed a notice of appeal to the 'M.L.. In addition, he filed a petition for "anda"#s and prohi)ition in the o#rt of Appeals, to co"pel the !angg#niang Bayan to recogni&e hi" as the d#ly proclai"ed "e")er of that )ody and prohi)it it fro" f#rther recogni&ing pri*ate respondent. $he o#rt of Appeals dis"issed the petition )eca#se of petitionerIs pending appeal in the 'M.L.. $he appellate co#rt cited !#pre"e o#rt irc#lar 28991 which prohi)its the filing of "#ltiple petitions in*ol*ing the sa"e iss#es. 0etitioner filed a "otion for reconsideration )#t his "otion was denied. $he appellate co#rtIs decision )eca"e final and e5ec#tory on Dece")er 1?, 1992. Meanwhile, the !angg#niang Bayan "et in ina#g#ral session on H#ly 4, 1992, d#ring which pri*ate respondent was recogni&ed as the eighth "e")er of the )ody and thereafter allowed to ass#"e office and discharge its f#nctions. 'n the other hand, the 'M.L.Is (irst Di*ision dis"issed on Han#ary 22, 1994 petitionerIs appeal on the gro#nd that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescri)ed period. 0etitioner then )ro#ght the present action. 0etitioner contends that )oth the trial co#rt and the 'M.L.Is (irst Di*ision co""itted a gra*e a)#se of discretion, the first, )y ass#"ing -#risdiction o*er the election contest filed )y pri*ate respondent despite the fact that the case was filed "ore than ten days after petitionerIs procla"ation, and the second i.e., the 'M.L.Is (irst Di*ision, )y dis"issing petitionerIs appeal fro" the decision of the trial co#rt for late pay"ent of the appeal fee. ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitioner *iolated Article I; A of the onstit#tion. HELD" Des, petitioner *iolated Article I; A of the onstit#tion which pro*ides that only decisions of the 'M.L. en )anc "ay )e )ro#ght to the !#pre"e o#rt on certiorari. In the present case, he filed the present petition witho#t first filing a "otion for reconsideration )efore the 'M.L. en )anc. It is now settled that in pro*iding that the decisions, orders and r#lings of 'M.L. /"ay )e )ro#ght to the !#pre"e o#rt on certiorari/ the onstit#tion in its Art. I;, A, \7 "eans the special ci*il action of certiorari #nder %#le +7, \1. !ince a )asic condition for )ringing s#ch action is that the petitioner first file a "otion for reconsideration, it follows San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 162 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 that petitionerIs fail#re to file a "otion for reconsideration of the decision of the (irst Di*ision of the 'M.L. is fatal to his present action. 0etitioner arg#es that this re6#ire"ent "ay )e dispensed with )eca#se the only 6#estion raised in his petition is a 6#estion of law. $his is not correct. $he 6#estions raised )y petitioner in*ol*e the interpretation of constit#tional and stat#tory pro*isions in light of the facts of this case. $he 6#estions tendered are, therefore, not p#re 6#estions of law. Moreo*er, that a "otion for reconsideration )efore the 'M.L. en )anc is re6#ired for the filing of a petition for certiorari is clear fro" Article 9 pars. 2 Y 4 of the onstit#tion2 onfor"a)ly to these pro*isions of the onstit#tion all election cases, incl#ding pre9procla"ation contro*ersies, "#st )e decided )y the 'M.L. in di*ision. !ho#ld a party )e dissatisfied with the decision, he "ay file a "otion for reconsideration )efore the 'M.L. en )anc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or r#ling of the 'M.L. en )anc that, in accordance with Art. I;, A, \7, /"ay )e )ro#ght to the !#pre"e o#rt on certiorari./ ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS NATIONAL PRESS CLU& VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (G.R. NO. 102925 MARCH 5, 1992) FELICIANO, !." FACTS" $his is a consolidation of three cases filed )efore the !#pre"e o#rt which in*ol*es the sa"e iss#e. 0etitioners in these cases consist of representati*es of the "ass "edia which are pre*ented fro" selling or donating space and ti"e for political ad*ertise"entsG two @2A indi*id#als who are candidates for office @one for national and the other for pro*incial officeA in the May 1992 electionsG and ta5payers and *oters who clai" that their right to )e infor"ed of election iss#es and of credentials of the candidates is )eing c#rtailed. It is principally arg#ed )y petitioners that !ection 11 @)A of %ep#)lic Act 3o. ++B+ in*ades and *iolates the constit#tional g#arantees co"prising freedo" of e5pression. 0etitioners "aintain that the prohi)ition i"posed )y !ection 11 @)A a"o#nts to censorship, )eca#se it selects and singles o#t for s#ppression and repression with cri"inal sanctions, only p#)lications of a partic#lar content, na"ely, "edia9)ased election or political propaganda d#ring the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohi)ition is in derogation of "ediaIs role, f#nction and d#ty to pro*ide ade6#ate channels of p#)lic infor"ation and p#)lic opinion rele*ant to election iss#es. (#rther, petitioners contend that !ection 11 @)A a)ridges the freedo" of speech of candidates, and that the s#ppression of "edia9)ased ca"paign or political propaganda e5cept those appearing in the o"elec space of the newspapers and on o"elec ti"e of radio and tele*ision )roadcasts, wo#ld )ring a)o#t a s#)stantial red#ction in the 6#antity or *ol#"e of infor"ation concerning candidates and iss#es in the election there)y c#rtailing and li"iting the right of *oters to infor"ation and opinion. ISSUE" 8hether or not !ection 11@)A of %ep#)lic Act 3o. ++B+ r#ns contradictory to Articles III OBP and I; @A @BA of the onstit#tion. HELD" $he o)-ecti*e which ani"ates !ection 11 @)A is the e6#ali&ing, as far as practica)le, the sit#ations of rich and poor candidates )y pre*enting the for"er fro" en-oying the #nd#e ad*antage offered )y h#ge ca"paign /war chests./ !ection 11 @)A prohi)its the sale or donation of print space and air ti"e /for ca"paign or other political p#rposes/ e5cept to the o""ission on .lections @/o"elec/A. Jpon the other hand, !ections 9? and 92 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode re6#ire the o"elec to proc#re /o"elec space/ in newspapers of general circ#lation in e*ery pro*ince or city and /o"elec ti"e/ on radio and tele*ision stations. (#rther, the o"elec is stat#torily co""anded to allocate /o"elec space/ and /o"elec ti"e/ on a free of charge, e6#al and i"partial )asis a"ong all candidates within the area ser*ed )y the newspaper or radio and tele*ision station in*ol*ed. It see"s a "odest proposition that the pro*ision of the Bill of %ights which enshrines freedo" of speech, freedo" of e5pression and freedo" of the press @Article III OBP, onstit#tionA has to )e ta:en in con-#nction with Article I; @A @BA which "ay )e seen to )e a special pro*ision applica)le d#ring a specific li"ited period E i.e., /d#ring the election period./ It is i"portant to note that the restricti*e i"pact #pon freedo" of speech and freedo" of the press of !ection 11 @)A is circ#"scri)ed )y certain i"portant li"itations2 O1P !ection 11 @)A is li"ited in the d#ration of its applica)ility and enforcea)ility. By *irt#e of the operation of Article I; @A @BA of the onstit#tion, !ection 11 @)A is li"ited in its applica)ility in ti"e to election periods. By its %esol#tion 3o. 2428 dated 2 Han#ary 1992, the o"elec, acting #nder another specific grant of a#thority )y the onstit#tion @Article I; OP O9PA, has defined the period fro" 12 Han#ary 1992 #ntil 1? H#ne 1992 as the rele*ant election periodG O2P !ection 11 @)A is li"ited in its scope of application. Analysis of !ection 11 @)A shows that it p#rports to apply only to the p#rchase and sale, incl#ding p#rchase and sale disg#ised as a donation, B of print space and air ti"e for /ca"paign or other political p#rposes./ !ection 11 @)A does not p#rport in any way to restrict the reporting )y newspapers or radio or tele*ision stations of news or news9worthy e*ents relating to candidates, their 6#alifications, political parties and progra"s of go*ern"entG O4P !ection 11 @)A e5e"pts fro" its prohi)ition the p#rchase )y or donation to the o"elec of print space or air ti"e, which space and ti"e o"elec is then affir"ati*ely re6#ired to allocate on a fair and e6#al )asis, free of charge, a"ong the indi*id#al candidates for electi*e p#)lic offices in the pro*ince or city ser*ed )y the newspaper or radio or tele*ision station. !o"e of the petitioners are apparently apprehensi*e that o"elec "ight not allocate /o"elec ti"e/ or /o"elec space/ on a fair and e6#al )asis a"ong the se*eral candidates. !ho#ld s#ch apprehensions "ateriali&e, candidates who are in fact pre-#diced )y #ne6#al or #nfair allocations effected )y o"elec will ha*e appropriate -#dicial re"edies a*aila)le, so long at least as this o#rt sits. Jntil s#ch ti"e, howe*er, the o"elec is entitled to the )enefit of the pres#"ption that official d#ty will )e or is )eing reg#larly carried o#t. It see"s appropriate here to recall what H#stice La#rel ta#ght in Angara *. .lectoral o""ission 7 that the possi)ility of a)#se is no arg#"ent against the concession of the power or a#thority in*ol*ed, for there is no power or a#thority in h#"an society that is not s#scepti)le of )eing a)#sed. !ho#ld it )e o)-ected that the o"elec "ight refrain fro" proc#ring /o"elec ti"e/ and /o"elec space,/ "#ch the sa"e considerations sho#ld )e )orne in "ind. As earlier noted, the o"elec is co""anded )y stat#te to )#y or /proc#re/ /o"elec ti"e/ and /o"elec space/ in "ass "edia, and it "#st )e pres#"ed that o"elec will carry o#t that stat#tory d#ty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrie*ed ha*e -#dicial re"edies at their disposal. $he technical effect of Article I; @A @BA of the onstit#tion "ay )e seen to )e that no pres#"ption of in*alidity arises in respect of e5ercises of s#per*isory or reg#latory a#thority on the part of the o"elec for the p#rpose of sec#ring e6#al opport#nity a"ong candidates for political office, altho#gh s#ch s#per*ision or reg#lation "ay res#lt in so"e li"itation of the rights of free speech and free press. (or s#per*ision or reg#lation of the operations of "edia enterprises is scarcely concei*a)le witho#t s#ch acco"panying li"itation. $h#s, the applica)le r#le is the general, ti"e9honored one E that a stat#te is pres#"ed to )e constit#tional and that the party asserting its #nconstit#tionality "#st discharge the )#rden of clearly and con*incingly pro*ing that assertion. 0etition denied for lac: of "erit. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND &ROADCAST ATTORNE-S OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.. VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 132922. APRIL 21, 1998) MENDO$A, !." FACTS" 0etitioner $eleco""#nications and Broadcast Attorneys of the 0hilippines, Inc. @$.L.BA0A is an organi&ation of lawyers of radio and tele*ision )roadcasting co"panies. $hey are s#ing as citi&ens, ta5payers, and registered *oters. $he other petitioner, ,MA 3etwor:, Inc., operates radio and tele*ision )roadcasting stations thro#gho#t the 0hilippines #nder a franchise granted )y ongress. $he !#pre"e o#rt e5plained that $.L.BA0 has no legal standing to file the case. A citi&en will )e allowed to raise a constit#tional 6#estion only when he can show that he has personally s#ffered so"e act#al or threatened in-#ry as a res#lt of the allegedly illegal cond#ct of the go*ern"entG the in-#ry is fairly tracea)le to the challenged actionG and the in-#ry is li:ely to )e redressed )y a fa*ora)le action. Me")ers of petitioner ha*e not shown that they ha*e s#ffered har" as a res#lt of the operation of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881. $he 1igh o#rt, howe*er, recogni&ed the legal standing of 0etitioner ,MA to )ring the constit#tional challenge. ,MA clai"s that it s#ffered losses r#nning to se*eral "illion pesos in pro*iding 'M.L. $i"e in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1997 senatorial election and that it stands to s#ffer e*en "ore sho#ld it )e re6#ired to do so. 0etitionerKs allegation that it will s#ffer losses again )eca#se it is re6#ired to pro*ide free air ti"e is s#fficient to gi*e it standing to 6#estion the *alidity of \92 of B0 881 @'"ni)#s .lection odeA. As pointed o#t in 's"eNa *. 'M.L., \11@)A of %.A. 3o. ++B+ and \9? and \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a reg#latory sche"e designed to e6#ali&e the opport#nity of candidates in an election in regard to the #se of "ass "edia for political ca"paigns. $hese stat#tory pro*isions state in rele*ant parts2 B.0. Blg. 881, @'"ni)#s .lection odeA !.. 9?. o"elec space. 9 $he o""ission shall proc#re space in at least one newspaper of general circ#lation in e*ery pro*ince or city2 0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat in the a)sence of said newspaper, p#)lication shall )e done in any other "aga&ine or periodical in said pro*ince or city, which shall )e :nown as =o"elec !pace> wherein candidates can anno#nce their candidacy. !aid space shall )e allocated, free of charge, e6#ally and i"partially )y the o""ission a"ong all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circ#lated. @!ec. B7, 1978 .A. !.. 92. o"elec ti"e. 9 $he o""ission shall proc#re radio and tele*ision ti"e to )e :nown as =o"elec $i"e> which shall )e allocated e6#ally and i"partially a"ong the candidates within the area of co*erage of all radio and tele*ision stations. (or this p#rpose, the franchise of all radio )roadcasting and tele*ision stations are here)y a"ended so as to pro*ide radio or tele*ision ti"e, free of charge, d#ring the period of the ca"paign. @!ec. B+, 1978 .A San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 163 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 $h#s, the law prohi)its "ass "edia fro" selling or donating print space and air ti"e to the candidates and re6#ires the 'M.L. instead to proc#re print space and air ti"e for allocation to the candidates. It will )e noted that while \9? of B.0. Blg. 881 re6#ires the 'M.L. to proc#re print space which, as we ha*e held, sho#ld )e paid for, \92 states that air ti"e shall )e proc#red )y the 'M.L. free of charge. 0etitioners contend that \92 of B0 Blg. 881 *iolates the d#e process cla#se and the e"inent do"ain pro*ision of the onstit#tion )y ta:ing air ti"e fro" radio and tele*ision )roadcasting stations witho#t pay"ent of -#st co"pensation. 0etitioners clai" that the pri"ary so#rce of re*en#e of the radio and tele*ision stations is the sale of air ti"e to ad*ertisers and that to re6#ire these stations to pro*ide free air ti"e is to a#thori&e a ta:ing which is not =a de "ini"is te"porary li"itation or restraint #pon the #se of pri*ate property.> According to petitioners, in 1992, the ,MA 3etwor:, Inc. lost 022,B98,7+?.?? in pro*iding free air ti"e of one @1A ho#r e*ery "orning fro" Mondays to (ridays and one @1A ho#r on $#esdays and $h#rsdays fro" 72?? to 82?? p.". @pri"e ti"eA and, f#rther, it stands to lose in the 1998 .lections, 078,98?,87?.?? in *iew of 'M.L.Ks re6#ire"ent that radio and tele*ision stations pro*ide at least 4? "in#tes of pri"e ti"e daily for the 'M.L. $i"e. ISSUE" 8hether or not !ection 92 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode is *alid. HELD" Des, !ection 92 of B0 881 is *alid. All )roadcasting, whether )y radio or )y tele*ision stations, is licensed )y the go*ern"ent. Airwa*e fre6#encies ha*e to )e allocated as there are "ore indi*id#als who want to )roadcast than there are fre6#encies to assign. A franchise is th#s a pri*ilege s#)-ect, a"ong other things, to a"end"ent )y ongress in accordance with the constit#tional pro*ision that =any s#ch franchise or right granted . . . shall )e s#)-ect to a"end"ent, alteration or repeal )y the ongress when the co""on good so re6#ires.> Indeed, pro*isions for 'M.L. $i"e ha*e )een "ade )y a"end"ent of the franchises of radio and tele*ision )roadcast stations and, #ntil the present case was )ro#ght, s#ch pro*isions had not )een tho#ght of as ta:ing property witho#t -#st co"pensation. Art. ;II, \11 of the onstit#tion a#thori&es the a"end"ent of franchises for =the co""on good.> In tr#th, radio and tele*ision )roadcasting co"panies, which are gi*en franchises, do not own the airwa*es and fre6#encies thro#gh which they trans"it )roadcast signals and i"ages. $hey are "erely gi*en the te"porary pri*ilege of #sing the". !ince a franchise is a "ere pri*ilege, the e5ercise of the pri*ilege "ay reasona)ly )e )#rdened with the perfor"ance )y the grantee of so"e for" of p#)lic ser*ice. $h#s, in De <illata *. !tanley, a reg#lation re6#iring interisland *essels licensed to engage in the interisland trade to carry "ail and, for this p#rpose, to gi*e ad*ance notice to postal a#thorities of date and ho#r of sailings of *essels and of changes of sailing ho#rs to ena)le the" to tender "ail for transportation at the last practica)le ho#r prior to the *esselKs depart#re, was held to )e a reasona)le condition for the state grant of license. Altho#gh the 6#estion of co"pensation for the carriage of "ail was not in iss#e, the o#rt strongly i"plied that s#ch ser*ice co#ld )e witho#t co"pensation, as in fact #nder !panish so*ereignty the "ail was carried free.
In the granting of the pri*ilege to operate )roadcast stations and thereafter s#per*ising radio and tele*ision stations, the state spends considera)le p#)lic f#nds in licensing and s#per*ising s#ch stations. It wo#ld )e strange if it cannot e*en re6#ire the licensees to render p#)lic ser*ice )y gi*ing free air ti"e. 0etitioners clai" that \92 is an in*alid a"end"ent of %.A. 3o. 7272 which granted ,MA 3etwor:, Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and tele*ision )roadcasting stations. $hey arg#e that altho#gh \7 of %.A. 3o. 7272 gi*es the go*ern"ent the power to te"porarily #se and operate the stations of petitioner ,MA 3etwor: or to a#thori&e s#ch #se and operation, the e5ercise of this right "#st )e co"pensated. $he )asic flaw in petitionerKs arg#"ent is that it ass#"es that the pro*ision for 'M.L. $i"e constit#tes the #se and operation of the stations of the ,MA 3etwor:, Inc. $his is not so. Jnder \92 of B.0. Blg. 881, the 'M.L. does not ta:e o*er the operation of radio and tele*ision stations )#t only the allocation of air ti"e to the candidates for the p#rpose of ens#ring, a"ong other things, e6#al opport#nity, ti"e, and the right to reply as "andated )y the onstit#tion. Indeed, it is wrong to clai" an a"end"ent of petitionerKs franchise for the reason that B.0. Blg. 881, which is said to ha*e a"ended %.A. 3o. 7272, act#ally antedated it. $he pro*ision of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 "#st )e dee"ed instead to )e incorporated in %.A. 3o. 7272. And, indeed, \B of the latter stat#te does. (or the fact is that the d#ty i"posed on the ,MA 3etwor:, Inc. )y its franchise to render =ade6#ate p#)lic ser*ice ti"e> i"ple"ents \92 of B.0. Blg. 881. Jndo#)tedly, its p#rpose is to ena)le the go*ern"ent to co""#nicate with the people on "atters of p#)lic interest. 0etitioners co"plain that B.0. Blg. 881, \92 singles o#t radio and tele*ision stations to pro*ide free air ti"e. $hey contend that newspapers and "aga&ines are not si"ilarly re6#ired as, in fact, in 0hilippine 0ress Instit#te *. 'M.L. we #pheld their right to the pay"ent of -#st co"pensation for the print space they "ay pro*ide #nder \9?. In the allocation of li"ited reso#rces, rele*ant conditions "ay *alidly )e i"posed on the grantees or licensees. $he reason for this is that, as already noted, the go*ern"ent spends p#)lic f#nds for the allocation and reg#lation of the )roadcast ind#stry, which it does not do in the case of the print "edia. $o re6#ire the radio and tele*ision )roadcast ind#stry to pro*ide free air ti"e for the 'M.L. $i"e is a fair e5change for what the ind#stry gets. (ro" another point of *iew, this o#rt has also held that )eca#se of the #ni6#e and per*asi*e infl#ence of the )roadcast "edia, =OnPecessarily . . . the freedo" of tele*ision and radio )roadcasting is so"ewhat lesser in scope than the freedo" accorded to newspaper and print "edia.> $o affir" the *alidity of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 is to hold p#)lic )roadcasters to their o)ligation to see to it that the *ariety and *igor of p#)lic de)ate on iss#es in an election is "aintained. (or while )roadcast "edia are not "ere co""on carriers )#t entities with free speech rights, they are also p#)lic tr#stees charged with the d#ty of ens#ring that the people ha*e access to the di*ersity of *iews on political iss#es. $his right of the people is para"o#nt to the a#tono"y of )roadcast "edia. $o affir" the *alidity of \92, therefore, is li:ewise to #phold the peopleKs right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern. $he #se of property )ears a social f#nction and is s#)-ect to the stateKs d#ty to inter*ene for the co""on good. Broadcast "edia can find their -#st and highest reward in the fact that whate*er altr#istic ser*ice they "ay render in connection with the holding of elections is for that co""on good. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS &LO UMPAR ADIONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (G.R. NO. 10395% MARCH 31, 1992) GUTIERRE$, !R., !." FACTS" 'n Han#ary 14, 1992, the 'M.L. pro"#lgated %esol#tion 3o. 24B7 p#rs#ant to its powers granted )y the onstit#tion, the '"ni)#s .lection ode, %ep#)lic Acts 3os. ++B+ and 71++ and other election laws. !ection 17 of the said %esol#tion pro*ides for lawf#l election propaganda while !ection 21@fA thereof pro*ides for what is #nlawf#l. It states2 @fA $o draw, paint, inscri)e, post, display or p#)licly e5hi)it any election propaganda in any place, whether p#)lic or pri*ate, "o)ile or stationary, e5cept in the 'M.L. co""on posted areas andRor )ill)oards, at the ca"paign head6#arters of the candidate or political party, organi&ation or coalition, or at the candidateIs own residential ho#se or one of his residential ho#ses, if he has "ore than one2 0ro*ided, that s#ch posters or election propaganda shall not e5ceed two @2A feet )y three @4A feet in si&e. @."phasis s#ppliedA $he stat#tory pro*isions so#ght to )e enforced )y 'M.L. are !ection 82 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode on lawf#l election propaganda and !ection 11@aA of %ep#)lic Act 3o. ++B+ on prohi)ited for"s of election propaganda. 0etitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the 1992 elections assails the 'M.L.Is %esol#tion insofar as it prohi)its the posting of decals and stic:ers in /"o)ile/ places li:e cars and other "o*ing *ehicles. According to hi" s#ch prohi)ition is *iolati*e of !ection 82 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode and !ection 11@aA of %ep#)lic Act 3o. ++B+. In addition, the petitioner )elie*es that with the )an on radio, tele*ision and print political ad*ertise"ents, he, )eing a neophyte in the field of politics stands to s#ffer gra*e and irrepara)le in-#ry with this prohi)ition. $he posting of decals and stic:ers on cars and other "o*ing *ehicles wo#ld )e his last "edi#" to infor" the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. (inally, the petitioner states that as of (e)r#ary 22, 1992 @the date of the petitionA he has not recei*ed any notice fro" any of the .lection %egistrars in the entire co#ntry as to the location of the s#pposed /o"elec 0oster Areas./ ISSUE" 8hether or not the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A "ay prohi)it the posting of decals and stic:ers on /"o)ile/ places, p#)lic or pri*ate, and li"it their location or p#)lication to the a#thori&ed posting areas that it fi5es. HELD" 3o. $he 'M.L.Is prohi)ition on posting of decals and stic:ers on /"o)ile/ places whether p#)lic or pri*ate e5cept in designated areas pro*ided for )y the 'M.L. itself is n#ll and *oid on constit#tional gro#nds. $he constit#tional o)-ecti*e to gi*e a rich candidate and a poor candidate e6#al opport#nity to infor" the electorate as regards their candidacies, "andated )y Article II, !ection 2+ and Article ;III, section 1 in relation to Article I; @cA !ection B of the onstit#tion, is not i"paired )y posting decals and stic:ers on cars and other pri*ate *ehicles. o"pared to the para"o#nt interest of the !tate in g#aranteeing freedo" of e5pression, any financial considerations )ehind the reg#lation are of "arginal significance. It is to )e reiterated that the posting of decals and stic:ers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedica)s and other "o*ing *ehicles needs the consent of the owner of the *ehicle. 1ence, the preference of the citi&en )eco"es cr#cial in this :ind of election propaganda not the financial reso#rces of the candidate. 8hether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleo#t "ore decals and stic:ers or poor and witho#t the "eans to spread o#t the sa"e n#")er of decals and stic:ers is not as i"portant as the right of the owner to freely e5press his choice and e5ercise his right of free speech. $he owner can e*en prepare his own decals or stic:ers for posting on his personal property. $o stri:e down this right and en-oin it is i"per"issi)le encroach"ent of his li)erties. In s#", the prohi)ition on posting of decals and stic:ers on /"o)ile/ places whether p#)lic or pri*ate e5cept in the a#thori&ed areas designated )y the 'M.L. )eco"es censorship which cannot )e -#stified )y the onstit#tion2 . . . $he concept of the onstit#tion as the f#nda"ental law, setting forth the criterion for the *alidity of any p#)lic act whether San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 164 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 proceeding fro" the highest official or the lowest f#nctionary, is a post#late of o#r syste" of go*ern"ent. $hat is to "anifest fealty to the r#le of law, with priority accorded to that which occ#pies the top"ost r#ng in the legal hierarchy. $he three depart"ents of go*ern"ent in the discharge of the f#nctions with which it is entr#sted ha*e no choice )#t to yield o)edience to its co""ands. 8hate*er li"its it i"poses "#st )e o)ser*ed. ongress in the enact"ent of stat#tes "#st e*er )e on g#ard lest the restrictions on its a#thority, either s#)stanti*e or for"al, )e transcended. $he 0residency in the e5ec#tion of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its tas: of applying the law to the facts as fo#nd in deciding cases, the -#diciary is called #pon to "aintain in*iolate what is decreed )y the f#nda"ental law. .*en its power of -#dicial re*iew to pass #pon the *alidity of the acts of the coordinate )ranches in the co#rse of ad-#dication is a logical. corollary of this )asic principle that the onstit#tion is para"o#nt. It o*errides any go*ern"ental "eas#re that fails to li*e #p to its "andates. $here)y there is a recognition of its )eing the s#pre"e law. @M#t#c *. o""ission on .lections, s#praA 0etition is granted. $he portion of !ection 17 @aA of %esol#tion 3o. 24B7 of the o""ission on .lections pro*iding that /decals and stic:ers "ay )e posted only in any of the a#thori&ed posting areas pro*ided in paragraph @fA of !ection 21 hereof/ is D.LA%.D 3JLL and <'ID. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (G.R. NO. 90878 !ANUAR- 29, 1990) MEDIALDEA, !." FACTS" %A +7++, entitled /A3 A$ 0%'<IDI3, ('% A3 '%,A3I A$ ('% $1. '%DILL.%A AJ$'3'M'J! %.,I'3/ was enacted into law, p#rs#ant to which pro*inces incl#ded therein shall ta:e part in a ple)iscite for the ratification of said 'rganic Act. $he 'M.L. pro"#lgated %esol#tion 3o. 21+7, to go*ern the cond#ct of the ple)iscite on the said 'rganic Act for the ordillera A#tono"o#s %egion. 0etitioner 0a)lito <. !anidad, a newspaper col#"nist of the /'<.%<I.8/ for the BA,JI' MIDLA3D 'J%I.%, assailed the constit#tionality of !ection 19 of o"elec %esol#tion 3o. 21+7, which pro*ides2 !ection 19. 0rohi)ition on col#"nists, co""entators or anno#ncers. E D#ring the ple)iscite ca"paign period, on the day )efore and on the ple)iscite day, no "ass "edia col#"nist, co""entator, anno#ncer or personality shall #se his col#"n or radio or tele*ision ti"e to ca"paign for or against the ple)iscite iss#es. 0etitioner "aintains that if "edia practitioners were to e5press their *iews, )eliefs and opinions on the iss#e s#)"itted to a ple)iscite, it wo#ld in fact help in the go*ern"ent dri*e and desire to disse"inate infor"ation, and hear, as well as *entilate, all sides of the iss#e. 'M.L. co#nters that the %eso#ltion is not *iolati*e of the constit#tion and it is a *alid i"ple"entation of its power to s#per*ise and reg#late "edia d#ring election or ple)iscite periods as en#nciated in the onstit#tion. It stated that it does not a)sol#tely )ar petitioner fro" e5pressing his *iews andRor fro" ca"paigning for or against the 'rganic Act. 1e "ay still e5press his *iews or ca"paign for or against the act thro#gh the o"elec space and airti"e. ISSUE" $he constit#tionality of !ection 19 of o"elec %esol#tion 3o. 21+7 on the gro#nd that it *iolates the constit#tional g#arantees of the freedo" of e5pression and of the press d#ring the cond#ct of a ple)iscite. HELD" !ection 19 of o"elec %esol#tion 3o. 21+7 is declared n#ll and *oid and #nconstit#tional. It is clear in the onstit#tion that what was granted to the o"elec was the power to s#per*ise and reg#late the #se and en-oy"ent of franchises, per"its or other grants iss#ed for the operation of transportation or other p#)lic #tilities, "edia of co""#nication or infor"ation to the end that e6#al opport#nity, ti"e and space, and the right to reply, incl#ding reasona)le, e6#al rates therefore, for p#)lic infor"ation ca"paigns and for#"s a"ong candidates are ens#red. 1owe*er, neither Article I;9 of the onstit#tion nor !ection 11 @)A, 2nd par. of %.A. ++B+ can )e constr#ed to "ean that the o"elec has also )een granted the right to s#per*ise and reg#late the e5ercise )y "edia practitioners the"sel*es of their right to e5pression d#ring ple)iscite periods. Media practitioners e5ercising their freedo" of e5pression d#ring ple)iscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in*ol*ed in a ple)iscite. $herefore, !ection 19 of o"elec %esol#tion 3o. 21+7 has no stat#tory )asis. 8hile the li"itation does not a)sol#tely )ar petitionerIs freedo" of e5pression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the for#" where he "ay e5press his *iew. 0le)iscite iss#es are "atters of p#)lic concern and i"portance. $he peopleIs right to )e infor"ed and to )e a)le to freely and intelligently "a:e a decision wo#ld )e )etter ser*ed )y access to an #na)ridged disc#ssion of the iss#es, incl#ding the for#". $he people affected )y the iss#es presented in a ple)iscite sho#ld not )e #nd#ly )#rdened )y restrictions on the for#" where the right to e5pression "ay )e e5ercised. o"elec spaces and o"elec radio ti"e "ay pro*ide a for#" for e5pression )#t they do not g#arantee f#ll disse"ination of infor"ation to the p#)lic concerned )eca#se they are li"ited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or tele*ision ti"es. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT GUEVARA VS. GIMENE$ (G.R. NO. L17115, NOVEM&ER 30, 19%2) CONCEPCION, !." FACTS" Mig#el #aderno, the then ,o*ernor of the entral Ban: of the 0hilippines, acting for and in )ehalf thereof, as:ed petitioner to cooperate with the legal co#nsel of the entral Ban: in defending the sa"e and its Monetary Board in a ci*il case. Accordingly petitioner entered his appearance as co#nsel for the respondents in said case and arg#ed therein, *er)ally and in writing. $he ,o*ernor presented to the Board and the latter appro*ed )y #nani"o#s *ote, the designation of H#dge ,#iller"o ,#e*ara as co#nsel to colla)orate with the Legal o#nsel of the entral Ban:. $he Board also a#thori&ed the ,o*ernor to arrange with H#dge ,#e*era the a"o#nt of fee which the latter will charge the entral Ban: for handling the said cases. 0rior thereto the latter had sent to the entral Ban: his )ill for the retainerIs fee of 01?, ???. $he Ban: A#ditor so#ght ad*ice thereon fro" the A#ditor ,eneral, who stated that he wo#ld not o)-ect to the retainerIs fees, pro*ided that its pay"ent was "ade in install"ents. 8ith the #nderstanding that, /in case there is no appeal fro" the (I decision, the )alance will )e paid in f#ll/, once, pres#"a)ly, the decision has )eco"e final. As regards the 04?? per die", the A#ditor ,eneral e5press howe*er, the )elief that it is /e5cessi*e and "ay )e allowed in a#dit/. 1ence, the present action for "anda"#s to co"pel respondent to appro*e pay"ent of petitionerIs retainer fee and his per die" aggregating 04,4??, for the 11 hearings attended )y hi". I!!J.2 8hether or not the A#ditor ,eneral has the a#thority to disappro*e the e5pendit#res he dee"ed #nwise or that the a"o#nt stip#lated thereon is #nreasona)leC HELD" $he A#ditor ,eneral has no "andate to disappro*e e5pendit#res which in his opinion e5cessi*e and e5tra*agant. Jnder o#r onstit#tion, the a#thority of the A#ditor ,eneral, in connection with e5pendit#res of the ,o*ern"ent is li"ited to the a#diting of e5pendit#res of f#nds or property pertaining to, or held in tr#st )y the ,o*ern"ent or the pro*inces or "#nicipalities thereof @Article ;I, section 2, of the onstit#tionA. !#ch f#nction is li"ited to a deter"ination of whether there is a law appropriating f#nds for a gi*en p#rposeG whether a contract, "ade )y the proper officer, has )een entered into in confor"ity with said appropriation lawG whether the goods or ser*ices co*ered )y said contract ha*e )een deli*ered or rendered in p#rs#ance of the pro*isions thereof, as attested to )y the proper officerG and whether pay"ent therefore has )een a#thori&ed )y the officials of the corresponding depart"ent or )#rea#. If these re6#ire"ents ha*e )een f#lfilled, it is the "inisterial d#ty of the A#ditor ,eneral to appro*e and pass in a#dit the *o#cher and treas#ry warrant for said pay"ent. 1e has no discretion or a#thority to disappro*e said pay"ent #pon the gro#nd that the afore"entioned contract was #nwise or that the a"o#nt stip#lated thereon is #nreasona)le. If he entertains s#ch )elief, he "ay do so "ore than discharge the d#ty i"posed #pon hi" )y the onstit#tion @Article ;I, section 2A, /to )ring to the attention of the proper ad"inistrati*e officer e5pendit#res of f#nds or 0roperty which, in his opinion, are irreg#lar, #nnecessary, e5cessi*e or e5tra*agant/. $his d#ty i"plies a negation of the power to ref#se and disappro*e pay"ent of s#ch e5pendit#res, for its disappro*al, if he had a#thority therefore, wo#ld )ring to the attention of the afore"entioned ad"inistrati*e officer the reasons for the ad*erse action th#s ta:en )y the ,eneral A#diting office, and, hence, render the i"position of said d#ty #nnecessary. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT OROCIO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (G.R. NO. 75959 AUGUST 31, 1992) FACTS" An accident occ#rred at the Malaya $her"al 0lant of the 3ational 0ower orporation @30A, when the pl#g fro" the lea:ing t#)e ga*e way, there)y releasing stea" and hot water which hit two of the e"ployees wor:ing on the t#)e lea:. $he 30 initially ad*anced this a"o#nt )y setting it #p as an acco#nt recei*a)le fro" '0L,! @e"ployeesK agencyA and ded#cted on a staggered )asis fro" the latterIs )illings against 30 #ntil the sa"e was f#lly satisfied. '0L,! re6#ested for a ref#nd of the total a"o#nt ded#cted fro" their )illings representing pay"ent of the ad*ances "ade )y the 30. 0etitioner, as officer9in9charge, reco""ended fa*ora)le action on '0L,!I re6#est. $h#s, the a"o#nt for the hospitali&ation e5penses was ref#nded to the contractor '0L,!. In ertificate of !ettle"ent and Balances @!BA 3o. ?19?B984 prepared )y respondent Hose M. Ag#stin, Jnit A#ditor of the 'A assigned to the 309M%%, the ref#nd of the hospitali&ation e5penses was disallowed for /O#Pnder the 309'.0. Landrito contract, there is no e"ployer9e"ployee relationship )etween the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 165 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 orporation and the latterIs e"ployees./ 1ence, the 30 is not answera)le for s#ch e5penses. A De)it Me"orand#" was iss#ed in petitionerIs na"e de)iting his acco#nt with the 30 for the a"o#nt of the hospitali&ation e5penses. 0etitioner clai"s that he prepared the 6#estioned legal opinion in the perfor"ance of his official f#nctions as "andated )y law. At the ti"e he rendered it, he was the officer9in9charge of the 30Is 'ffice of the ,eneral o#nsel. !ection 179A of its charter pro*ides that all legal "atters shall )e handled )y the ,eneral o#nsel of the orporation. As s#ch, he pro*ides legal ad*ice andRor renders legal opinions on legal "atters in*ol*ing the 30. !ince this f#nction is 6#asi9-#dicial in nat#re, the discretion e5ercised in the discharge thereof is not s#)-ect to re9 e5a"ination or contro*ersion )y the respondentsG when the latter did what was proscri)ed, they in effect #s#rped the stat#tory f#nction of the ,eneral o#nsel of the 30. $here is no law which e5pressly a#thori&es the respondents to re9e5a"ine or contro*ert the ,eneral o#nselIs opinion. 0etitioner additionally stresses that he is not personally lia)le for the a"o#nt disallowed as he was "erely perfor"ing his official f#nctions. Besides, his 6#estioned opinion is not alleged to ha*e )een rendered with "alice and )ad faith. ISSUES" @1A Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied #pon for the dis)#rse"ent in 6#estion, precl#de or )ar the 'A fro" disallowing in post9a#dit s#ch dis)#rse"entC @2A 1as the ,eneral o#nsel of the 'A the a#thority to decide a "otion to reconsider the disallowance in 6#estionC @4A Is the petitioner personally lia)le for the disallowance on the theory that the dis)#rse"ent was "ade on the )asis thereofC HELD" 1. Both the 1974 and 1987 onstit#tions conferred #pon the 'A a "ore acti*e role and in*ested it with )roader and "ore e5tensi*e powers. $hese were not "eant to "a:e it a toothless tiger, )#t a dyna"ic, effecti*e, efficient and independent watchdog of the ,o*ern"ent. In deter"ining whether an e5pendit#re of a ,o*ern"ent agency or instr#"entality s#ch as the 30 is irreg#lar, #nnecessary, e5cessi*e, e5tra*agant or #nconsciona)le, the 'A sho#ld not )e )o#nd )y the opinion of the legal co#nsel of said agency or instr#"entality which "ay ha*e )een the )asis for the 6#estioned dis)#rse"entG otherwise, it wo#ld indeed )eco"e a toothless tiger and its a#diting f#nction wo#ld )e a "eaningless and f#tile e5ercise. Its )eacon lights then sho#ld )e nothing "ore than the pertinent laws and its r#les and reg#lations. 2. 3o. $he ,eneral o#nsel of the 'A does not ha*e the a#thority to decide a "otion to reconsider the disallowance in 6#estion $he 'A, )oth #nder the 1974 and 1987 onstit#tion, is a collegial )ody. It "#st resol*e cases presented to it as s#ch. Its ,eneral o#nsel cannot act for the o""ission for he is not e*en a o""issioner thereof. 1e can only offer legal ad*ice or render an opinion in order to aid the 'A in the resol#tion of a case or a legal 6#estion. 4. .*en if we ass#"e that the disallowance was proper, there wo#ld still )e no )asis for directly holding petitioner lia)le. If he rendered the opinion in the -#st perfor"ance of his official d#ties and within the scope of his assigned tas:s, he wo#ld not )e personally lia)le for any in-#ry that "ay res#lt therefro". o"pro"ise Agree"ent )etween the ity of e)# and !po#ses de la erna which in*ol*es "onetary consideration was #pheld constit#tional. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT OSMESA VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (G.R. NO. 110045 NOVEM&ER 29, 1994) FACTS" %eynaldo de la erna, the son of the de la erna !po#ses was sta))ed )y an #n:nown assailant. 1e was r#shed to the e)# ity Medical enter )#t later died d#e to se*ere loss of )lood. 1is parents clai"ed that %eynaldo wo#ld not ha*e died were it not for the /ineptit#de, gross negligence, irresponsi)ility, st#pidity and inco"petence of the "edical staff/ of the hospital. $he !po#ses th#s filed s#it for da"ages against the city of e)#, the !angg#niang 0anl#ngsod, and fi*e physicians of the e)# ity Medical enter.
$he parties entered into a co"pro"ise agree"ent, which incl#ded a pro*ision for the pay"ent of the s#" of 04?, ???.?? to the plaintiffs )y defendant ity of e)#. $he agree"ent was s#)"itted to the !angg#niang 0anl#ngsod of the ity, which ratified the sa"e. $he sangg#nian a#thori&ed /the ity B#dget 'fficer, e)# ity, to incl#de in !#pple"ental B#dget 3o. I< of the ity . . . for the year 1989 the a"o#nt of $1I%$D $1'J!A3D @04?, ???.??A 0.!'! for financial assistance to the parents of the late %eynaldo de la erna, all of e)# ity. %espondent 'A disallowed the /financial assistance/ th#s granted to the !po#ses, a*erring that it is not within the powers of the !angg#niang 0anl#ngsod of e)# to pro*ide, either #nder the general welfare cla#se or e*en on h#"anitarian gro#nds, "onetary assistance that wo#ld pro"ote the econo"ic condition and pri*ate interests of certain indi*id#als only. ISSUE" 8hether or not the o"pro"ise Agree"ent )etween the ity of e)# and !po#ses de la erna which in*ol*es "onetary consideration constit#tionalC HELD" Des. $he o"pro"ise Agree"ent entered )etween the ity of e)# and !ps. De la erna was constit#tional. $he participation )y the ity in negotiations for an a"ica)le settle"ent of a pending litigation and its e*ent#al e5ec#tion of a co"pro"ise relati*e thereto, are ind#)ita)ly within its a#thority and capacity as a p#)lic corporationG and a co"pro"ise of a ci*il s#it in which it is in*ol*ed as a party, is a perfectly legiti"ate transaction, not only recogni&ed )#t e*en enco#raged )y law. $hat the ity of e)# co"plied with the rele*ant for"alities conte"plated )y law can hardly )e do#)ted. $he co"pro"ise agree"ent was s#)"itted to its legislati*e co#ncil, the !angg#niang 0anl#ngsod, which appro*ed it confor"a)ly with its esta)lished r#les and proced#re, partic#larly the stip#lation for the pay"ent of 04?, ???.?? to the de la erna fa"ily. 3either "ay it )e disp#ted that since, as a "#nicipal corporation, e)# ity has the power to s#e and )e s#ed, it has the a#thority to settle or co"pro"ise s#its, as well as the o)ligation to pay -#st and *alid clai"s against it. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT SAM&ELI V. PROVINCE OF ISA&ELA G.R. NO. 92279 !UNE 18, 1992 FACTS" An agree"ent was entered into )y and )etween the 0ro*ince of Isa)ela and .! .nterprises for the p#rchase of 4?? #nits of wheel)arrows, 847 pieces of sho*els and 1 set of radio co""#nication e6#ip"ent. '#t of the ite"s deli*ered, a partial deli*ery was "ade. $he 0ro*incial A#ditor allowed the pay"ent of only 7?M =pending receipt of reply to the 6#ery to 0rice .*al#ation Di*ision of 'A.> A second deli*ery was "ade and pay"ent of 7?M was allowed )y the 0ro*incial A#ditor. Based on the findings of the 0rice .*al#ation Di*ision of 'A, there has )een an o*erpricing. $he 0residentR,M of .! .nterprises "ade no co""ent on the o*erpricing )#t instead proposed a 1?M ded#ction on the #npaid )alance. $he 0ro*incial A#ditor forwarded the "atter to the 'A %egional Director who for"ally endorsed the stand of the 0ro*incial A#ditor. .! .nterprises appealed to 'A, which denied the appeal. 1ence the present petition.
ISSUE" Did the 'A co""it gra*e a)#se of discretion in affir"ing the decision of the 0ro*incial A#ditor and the %egional DirectorC
HELD" 3o. In the e5ercise of its reg#latory power *ested #pon it )y the onstit#tion, 'A adheres to the policy that go*ern"ent f#nds and property sho#ld )e f#ll protected and conser*ed and that irreg#lar, #nnecessary, e5cessi*e or e5tra*agant e5pendit#res or #ses of f#nds owned )y, or pertaining to, the ,o*ern"ent or any of its s#)di*isions, agencies and instr#"entalities @Article I; @D91A !ection 2@1A, 1987 onstit#tionA . $hat a#thority e5tends to the acco#nts of all persons respecting f#nds or properties recei*ed or held )y the" in any acco#nta)le capacity. @!ection 2+, 0.D. 3o. 1BB7A. In the e5ercise of its -#risdiction, it deter"ines whether or not the fiscal responsi)ility that rests directly with the head and whether or not there has )een loss or wastage of go*ern"ent reso#rces. 8herefore, for lac: of "erit, the petition is dis"issed.
ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT &USTAMANTE VS. COMMISSIONER ON AUDIT (G.R. NO. 103309, NOVEM&ER 27, 1992) CAMPOS, !R. !." FACTS" 0etitioner is the %egional Legal o#nsel of the 3ational 0ower orporation @30A for the 3orthern L#&on %egional enter co*ering the pro*inces of %i&al #p to Batanes. As s#ch he was iss#ed a go*ern"ent *ehicle. 0#rs#ant to 30 policy as reflected in the Board %esol#tion 3o. 81997 a#thori&ing the "onthly dis)#rse"ent of transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the #se of go*ern"ent *ehicle, clai"ed his transportation allowance for the "onth of Han#ary 1989. 0petitioner recei*ed an A#ditorIs 3otice to 0erson Lia)le fro" respondent %egional A#ditor Martha %o5ana a)#rian disallowing 01,27?.?? representing aforesaid transportation allowance. 0etitioner "o*ed for reconsideration, which the %egional A#ditor denied. 0etitioner appealed to 'A, which denied the appeal. 1ence, this petition.
ISSUE" Did the 'A gra*e a)#se of discretion in its denial to gi*e d#e co#rse to the petitionerKs appealC Did the 'A, in the e5ercise of its constit#tional powers, #s#rp the stat#tory f#nctions of the 30 Board of DirectorsC
HELD" 3o. It is )eyond disp#te that the discretion e5ercised in the denial of the appeal is within the power of the o""ission on A#dit as it is pro*ided in the onstit#tion2 San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 166 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 !ec. 2. $he o""ission on A#dit shall ha*e the following powers and f#nctions2 @1A .5a"ine, a#dit, and settle, in accordance with law and reg#lations, and receipts of, and e5pendit#res or #ses of f#nds and property, owned or held in tr#st )y, or pertaining to, the ,o*ern"ent, or any of its s#)di*isions, agencies, or instr#"entalities, incl#ding go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporationsG :eep the general acco#nts of the ,o*ern"ent and, for s#ch period *o#chers pertaining theretoG and pro"#lgate acco#nting and a#diting r#les and reg#lations incl#ding those for the pre*ention of irreg#lar, #nnecessary, e5cessi*e, or e5tra*agant e5pendit#res or #ses of f#nds and property. . . . @Article ;II9D, 1974 onstit#tionA
8e li:ewise cannot s#stain petitionerIs contention that the o""ission, in the e5ercise of its power granted )y the onstit#tion, #s#rped the stat#tory f#nctions of the 30 Board of Directors for its leads to the a)s#rd concl#sion that a "ere Board of Directors of a go*ern"ent9 owned and controlled corporation, )y iss#ing a resol#tion, can p#t to na#ght a constit#tional pro*ision which has )een ratified )y the "a-ority of the (ilipino people. If 8e will not s#stain the o""issionIs power and d#ty to e5a"ine, a#dit and settle acco#nts pertaining to this partic#lar e5pendit#res or #se of f#nds and property, owned or held in tr#st )y this go*ern"ent9owned and controlled corporation, the 30, 8e will )e rendering in#tile this onstit#tional Body which has )een tas:ed to )e *igilant and conscientio#s in safeg#arding the proper #se of the go*ern"entIs, and #lti"ately, the peopleIs property. 81.%.'(, the instant petition is here)y DI!MI!!.D for lac: of "erit. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT SALIGUM&A VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (G.R. NO. L%1%7%, OCTO&ER 18, 1982) A&AD SANTOS, !." FACTS" 'n the )asis of the sworn co"plaint of .ditha !alig#")a, the 'A instit#ted the ad"inistrati*e case against Leonardo .stella, A#diting .5a"iner III, in the A#ditorIs 'ffice of Misa"is 'ccidental. $he charge was that the respondent raped .ditha !alig#")a on se*eral occasions. 'n April 12, 1982, the 'A rendered a decision with the following -#dg"ent2 8herefore, for ins#fficiency of e*idence, the instant charge is here)y dropped. %espondent is, howe*er, warned to co"port hi"self henceforth in s#ch a "anner as wo#ld forestall the filing of si"ilar co"plaints in the f#t#re. .ditha !alig#")a now wants $he o#rt to re*iew the 'A decision. !he insists that the decision of the 'A is contrary to the e*idence. ISSUE" an the !#pre"e o#rt re*iew 'A decisions on ad"inistrati*e "attersC HELD" 3o. $he petition has to )e dis"issed for the following reasons2 1. '#r power to re*iew 'A decisions refers to "oney "atters and not to ad"inistrati*e cases in*ol*ing the discipline of its personnel. 2. .*en ass#"ing that 8e ha*e -#risdiction to re*iew decisions on ad"inistrati*e "atters as "entioned a)o*e, 8e can not do so on fact#al iss#esG '#r power to re*iew is li"ited to legal iss#es. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT PHILIPPINE AIRLINESVS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (G.R. NO. 91890 !UNE 9, 1995) ROMERO, !." FACTS" At the ti"e of the filing of the petition, "a-ority of 0ALKs shares of stoc: was owned )y the ,!I!. $o ass#re itself of contin#o#s, relia)le and cost9efficient s#pply of f#el, 0AL adopted a syste" of )idding o#t its f#el re6#ire"ents #nder a "#ltiple s#pplier set9#p where)y 0AL awarded to the lowest )idder +?M of its f#el re6#ire"ents and to the second lowest )idder the re"aining B?M, pro*ided it "atched the price of the lowest )idder. 'A wrote 0AL a letter stating2 It has co"e to o#r attention that 0AL international f#el s#pply contracts are e5piring this A#g#st 41, 1989. In this connection, yo# are ad*ised to desist fro" )idding the co"panyIs f#el s#pply contracts, considering that e5isting reg#lations re6#ire go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporations and other agencies of go*ern"ent to proc#re their petrole#" prod#ct re6#ire"ents fro" 0.$%'3 orporation. 0AL so#ght reconsideration )#t was denied )y 'A. A final appeal for reconsideration was also denied in the now assailed 'A Decision 3o. 1127. ISSUE" Did respondent co""it gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction in ordering 0AL to desist fro" )idding the co"panyKs f#el s#pply contractsC HELD" 3o. $he 'A is clothed #nder !ection 2@2A, Article I;9D of the 1987 onstit#tion with the /e5cl#si*e a#thority, s#)-ect to the li"itations in this Article, to define the scope of its a#dit and e5a"ination, esta)lish the techni6#es and "ethods re6#ired therefor, and pro"#lgate acco#nting and a#diting r#les, and reg#lations incl#ding those for the pre*ention and disallowance of irreg#lar, #nnecessary, e5cessi*e, e5tra*agant or #nconsciona)le e5pendit#res, or #ses of go*ern"ent f#nds and properties./ $he a#thority granted #nder this constit#tional pro*ision, )eing )road and co"prehensi*e eno#gh, ena)les 'A to adopt as its own, si"ply )y reiteration or )y reference, witho#t the necessity of repro"#lgation, already e5isting r#les and reg#lations. It "ay also e5pand the co*erage thereof to agencies or instr#"entalities #nder its a#dit -#risdiction. It is in this light that we *iew 'A Me"orand#" 3o. 8897+7 iss#ed on A#g#st 1, 1988. 81.%.('%., the petition is here)y DI!MI!!.D for )eing "oot and acade"ic. ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT &AGATSING VS. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATI$ATION (G.R. NO. 112399 !UL- 14, 1995) JUIASON, !." FACTS" 0etron is a go*ern"ent ac6#ired co"pany ai"ed to pro*ide for a )#ffer against the *agaries of oil prices in the international "ar:et )y ser*ing as a co#nterfoil against price "anip#lation that "ay go #nchec: if all oil co"panies were foreign9owned. It owns the largest, "ost "odern co"ple5 refinery in the 0hilippines and is also the co#ntryIs )iggest co")ined retail and wholesale "ar:et of refined petrole#" prod#cts. (ollowing 0resident ora&on A6#inoKs desire to raise re*en#e for the go*ern"ent and the ideal of lea*ing )#siness to pri*ate sector, the pri*ati&ation of 0etron was initiated. $his pri*ati&ation was s#)se6#ently appro*ed )y 0resident (idel <. %a"os as reco""ended )y 03' and the o""ittee on 0ri*ati&ation. B? M was to )e sold to a strategic partner, B?M was to )e retained )y the go*ern"ent and the re"aining 2?M was to )e offered to the p#)lic. $he floor )id price was finally set at #sQBB? "illion $he )idding for the B?M )loc: share was participated )y 0.$%'3A!, A%AM' and 8.!$M'3$. 8.!$M'3$Ks proposal was re-ected for not ha*ing "et the pre96#alification criteria of financial capa)ility and lac: of technical and "anage"ent e5pertise. $he )id of A%AM' was for J!Q7?2 "illion while the )id of 0.$%'3A! was for J!QB21 "illion. A%AM' was declared the winning )idder. 0etitioner arg#es that there was a failed )idding as pro*ided for in 'A circ#lar 3o. 89929+. It pro*ides that there is a fail#re of p#)lic a#ction when2 1A there is only one offerorG or @2A when all the offers are non9co"plying or #naccepta)le. ISSUE" 8hether or not the p#)lic )idding was tainted with haste and ar)itrariness )eca#se there was a failed )idding for ha*ing only one offerorC HELD" 3o. 8hile two offerors were dis6#alified, 0.$%'3A! for s#)"itting a )id )elow the floor price and 8.!$M'3$ for technical reasons, not all the offerors were dis6#alified. $o constit#te a failed )idding #nder the 'A irc#lar, all the offerors "#st )e dis6#alified. 0etitioners #rge that in effect there was only one )idder and that it can not )e said that there was a co"petition on /an e6#al footing. B#t the 'A irc#lar does not spea: of accepted )ids )#t of offerors, witho#t distinction as to whether they were dis6#alified. $he 'A itself, the agency that adopted the r#les on )idding proced#re to )e followed )y go*ern"ent offices and corporations, had #pheld the *alidity and legality of the 6#estioned )idding. $he interpretation of an agency of its own r#les sho#ld )e gi*en "ore weight than the interpretation )y that agency of the law it is "erely tas:ed to ad"inister. ARTICLE 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT &OR!A VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (G.R. NO. 133495 SEPTEM&ER 3, 1998) MENDO$A, !. FACTS" 0ri*ate respondent Hose $. apco, Hr. was elected *ice9 "ayor of 0ateros on Han#ary 18, 1988 for a ter" ending H#ne 4?, 1992. In 1989, he )eca"e "ayor, )y operation of law, #pon the death of the inc#")ent. In 1992, he ran and was elected "ayor for a 49year ter". 'n May 8, 1997, he was reelected "ayor for another ter". apco filed a certificate of candidacy for "ayor of 0ateros relati*e to the May 11, 1998 elections. 0etitioner Ben-a"in J. Bor-a Hr., also a "ayoralty candidate, so#ght apcoIs dis6#alification, arg#ing that the latter wo#ld ha*e already ser*ed as "ayor for three consec#ti*e ter"s )y H#ne 4?, 1998 and wo#ld therefore )e ineligi)le to ser*e for another ter" after that. $he 'M.L. r#led petitionerKs fa*or and declared apcoKs dis6#alification. 1owe*er, on "otion of pri*ate respondent, the San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 167 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 'M.L. re*ersed the decision and declared apco eligi)le to r#n for "ayor. ISSUE" 8hether or not a *ice9"ayor who s#cceeds to the office of "ayor )y operation of law and ser*es the re"ainder of the ter" is considered to ha*e ser*ed a ter" in that office for the p#rpose of the three9ter" li"itC HELD" 3o. Article ;, \8 of the onstit#tion pro*ides, that the ter" of office of electi*e local officials, e5cept )arangay officials, which shall )e deter"ined )y law, shall )e three years and no s#ch official shall ser*e for "ore than three consec#ti*e ter"s. <ol#ntary ren#nciation of the office for any length of ti"e shall not )e considered as an interr#ption in the contin#ity of his ser*ice for the f#ll ter" for which he was elected. $he ter" li"it for electi*e local officials "#st )e ta:en to refer to the right to )e elected as well as the right to ser*e in the sa"e electi*e position. onse6#ently, it is not eno#gh that an indi*id#al has ser*ed three consec#ti*e ter"s in an electi*e local office, he "#st also ha*e )een elected to the sa"e position for the sa"e n#")er of ti"es )efore the dis6#alification can apply. $his point can )e "ade clearer )y considering the following cases or sit#ations2 ase 3o. 1. !#ppose A is a *ice9"ayor who )eco"es "ayor )y reason of the death of the inc#")ent. !i5 "onths )efore the ne5t election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. an he r#n again for "ayor in the ne5t electionC Des, )eca#se altho#gh he has already first ser*ed as "ayor )y s#ccession and s#)se6#ently resigned fro" office )efore the f#ll ter" e5pired, he has not act#ally ser*ed three f#ll ter"s in all for the p#rpose of applying the ter" li"it. Jnder Art. ;, \8, *ol#ntary ren#nciation of the office is not considered as an interr#ption in the contin#ity of his ser*ice for the f#ll ter" only if the ter" is one /for which he was elected./ !ince A is only co"pleting the ser*ice of the ter" for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot )e considered to ha*e co"pleted one ter". 1is resignation constit#tes an interr#ption of the f#ll ter". ase 3o. 2. !#ppose B is elected "ayor and, d#ring his first ter", he is twice s#spended for "iscond#ct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he r#n for one "ore ter" in the ne5t electionC Des, )eca#se he has ser*ed only two f#ll ter"s s#ccessi*ely. In )oth cases, the "ayor is entitled to r#n for reelection )eca#se the two conditions for the application of the dis6#alification pro*isions ha*e not conc#rred, na"ely, that the local official concerned has )een elected three consec#ti*e ti"es and that he has f#lly ser*ed three consec#ti*e ter"s. In the first case, e*en if the local official is considered to ha*e ser*ed three f#ll ter"s notwithstanding his resignation )efore the end of the first ter", the fact re"ains that he has not )een elected three ti"es. In the second case, the local official has )een elected three consec#ti*e ti"es, )#t he has not f#lly ser*ed three consec#ti*e ter"s. ase 3o. 4. $he case of *ice9"ayor who )eco"es "ayor )y s#ccession in*ol*es a total fail#re of the two conditions to conc#r for the p#rpose of applying Art. ;, \8. !#ppose he is twice elected after that ter", is he 6#alified to r#n again in the ne5t electionC Des, )eca#se he was not elected to the office of "ayor in the first ter" )#t si"ply fo#nd hi"self thr#st into it )y operation of law. 3either had he ser*ed the f#ll ter" )eca#se he only contin#ed the ser*ice, interr#pted )y the death, of the deceased "ayor. $o consider in the third case to ha*e ser*ed the first ter" in f#ll and therefore ineligi)le to r#n a third ti"e for reelection wo#ld )e not only to falsify reality )#t also to #nd#ly restrict the right of the people to choose who" they wish to go*ern the". If the *ice9"ayor t#rns o#t to )e a )ad "ayor, the people can re"edy the sit#ation )y si"ply not reelecting hi" for another ter". B#t if, on the other hand, he pro*es to )e a good "ayor, there will )e no way the people can ret#rn hi" to office @e*en if it is -#st the third ti"e he is standing for reelectionA if his ser*ice of the first ter" is co#nted as one for the p#rpose of applying the ter" li"it. $o consider as eligi)le for reelection wo#ld )e in accord with the #nderstanding of the onstit#tional o""ission that while the people sho#ld )e protected fro" the e*ils that a "onopoly of political power "ay )ring a)o#t, care sho#ld )e ta:en that their freedo" of choice is not #nd#ly c#rtailed. (#rther, resort to historical e5a"ination wo#ld show adherence to the f#nda"ental tenet of representati*e de"ocracy wherein the people sho#ld )e allowed to choose those who" they please to go*ern the". $o )ar the election of a local official )eca#se he has already ser*ed three ter"s, altho#gh the first as a res#lt of s#ccession )y operation of law rather than election, wo#ld therefore )e to *iolate this principle. 200% CASES 5G.R. NO. 1%7798. APRIL 19, 200%.6 7ILUSANG MA-O UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LA&OR UNIONS7ILUSANG MA-O UNO (NAFLU7MU), !OSELITO V. USTARE$, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRAN$A, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, !R. ',* ROJUE M. TAN, E)0909+,)2(, >(. THE DIRECTORGENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIT-, ',* THE SECRETAR-, DEPARTMENT OF &UDGET ',* MANAGEMENT, 2)(E+,*),0(. 5G.R. NO. 1%7930. APRIL 19, 200%.6 &A-AN MUNA R)E2)(),0'09>)( SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASISO, ',* !OEL G. VIRADOR, GA&RIELA =OMENQS PART- R)E2)(),0'09>) LI$A L. MA$A, ANA7PA=IS R)E2)(),0'09>)( RAFAEL V. MARIANO ',* CRISPIN &. &ELTRAN, R)E. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, R)E. EDUARDO C. $IALCITA, R)E. LOREN$O R. TASADA III, DR. CAROL PAGADUANARAULLO ',* RENATO M. RE-ES, !R. +< &A-AN, MARIE HILAOENRIJUE$ +< 7ARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO +< ACT, FERDINAND GAITE +< COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG +< AGHAM, =ILFREDO MAR&ELLA +< 7MP, LANA LINA&AN +< GA&RIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO CONSTANTINO, !R., DEAN PACIFICO H. AGA&IN, SHARON R. DUREMDES +< 0;) NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES, ',* &RO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDE$ (FSC) +< 0;) ASSOCIATION OF MA!OR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), E)0909+,)2(, >(. EDUARDO ERMITA, 9, ;9( /'E'/90: '( EC)/109>) S)/2)0'2:, ROMULO NERI, 9, ;9( /'E'/90: '( D92)/0+2G),)2'. +< 0;) NATIONAL ECONOMIC ',* DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIT- (NEDA) ',* 0;) A*D9,9(02'0+2 +< 0;) NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), 2)(E+,*),0(. FACTS" $his case in*ol*es two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohi)ition, and "anda"#s #nder %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt, see:ing the n#llification of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. B2? @.' B2?A on the gro#nd that it is #nconstit#tional. .' B2?, iss#ed )y 0resident ,loria Macapagal9 Arroyo on 14 April 2??7, reads2 %.VJI%I3, ALL ,'<.%3M.3$ A,.3I.! A3D ,'<.%3M.3$9'83.D A3D '3$%'LL.D '%0'%A$I'3! $' !$%.AMLI3. A3D 1A%M'3IX. $1.I% ID.3$I(IA$I'3 @IDA !D!$.M!, A3D AJ$1'%IXI3, ('% !J1 0J%0'!. $1. DI%.$'%9,.3.%AL, 3A$I'3AL .'3'MI A3D D.<.L'0M.3$ AJ$1'%I$D $' IM0L.M.3$ $1. !AM., A3D ('% '$1.% 0J%0'!.! Jnder .' B2?, the 0resident directs all go*ern"ent agencies and go*ern"ent9owned and controlled corporations to adopt a #nifor" data collection and for"at for their e5isting identification @IDA syste"s. $he p#rposes of the #nifor" ID data collection and ID for"at are to red#ce costs, achie*e efficiency and relia)ility, ins#re co"pati)ility, and pro*ide con*enience to the people ser*ed )y go*ern"ent entities. !ection 4 of .' B2? li"its the data to )e collected and recorded #nder the #nifor" ID syste" to only 1B specific ite"s, na"ely2 @1A 3a"eG @2A 1o"e AddressG @4A !e5G @BA 0ict#reG @7A !ignat#reG @+A Date of BirthG @7A 0lace of BirthG @8A Marital !tat#sG @9A 3a"e of 0arentsG @1?A 1eightG @11A 8eightG @12A $wo inde5 fingers and two th#")"ar:sG @14A Any pro"inent disting#ishing feat#res li:e "oles or othersG and @1BA $a5 Identification 3#")er. !ection 7 of .' B2? prescri)es the safeg#ards on the collection, recording, and disclos#re of personal identification data to protect the right to pri*acy. $he following safeg#ards are instit#ted2 a. $he data to )e recorded and stored, which shall )e #sed only for p#rposes of esta)lishing the identity of a person, shall )e li"ited to those specified in !ection 4 of this e5ec#ti*e orderG a.AID1 ). In no case shall the collection or co"pilation of other data in *iolation of a personIs right to pri*acy )e allowed or tolerated #nder this orderG c. !tringent syste"s of access control to data in the identification syste" shall )e instit#tedG d. Data collected and stored for this p#rpose shall )e :ept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written a#thori&ation of the 'wner shall )e re6#ired for access and disclos#re of dataG e. $he identification card to )e iss#ed shall )e protected )y ad*anced sec#rity feat#res and cryptographic technologyG f. A written re6#est )y the 'wner of the identification card shall )e re6#ired for any correction or re*ision of rele*ant data, or #nder s#ch conditions as the participating agency iss#ing the identification card shall prescri)e. ISSUES" @1A 8hether or not .' B2? is a #s#rpation of legislati*e power )y the 0resident. @2A 8hether or not .' B2? infringes on the citi&enIs right to pri*acy. HELD" @1A 3o, .' B2? is not a #s#rpation of legislati*e power )y the 0resident. !ection 2 of .' B2? pro*ides, /o*erage. E All go*ern"ent agencies and go*ern"ent9owned and controlled corporations iss#ing ID cards to their "e")ers or constit#ents shall )e co*ered )y this e5ec#ti*e order./ .' B2? applies only to go*ern"ent entities that iss#e ID cards as part of their f#nctions #nder e5isting laws. $hese go*ern"ent entities ha*e already )een iss#ing ID cards e*en prior to .' B2?. .5a"ples of these go*ern"ent entities are the ,!I!, !!!, 0hilhealth, MayorIs 'ffice, L$', 0% and si"ilar go*ern"ent entities. !ection 1 of .' B2? directs these go*ern"ent entities to /adopt a #nified "#lti9p#rpose ID syste"./ $h#s, all go*ern"ent entities that iss#e IDs as part of their f#nctions #nder e5isting laws are re6#ired to adopt a #nifor" data collection and for"at for their IDs. !econd, the 0resident "ay )y e5ec#ti*e or ad"inistrati*e order direct the go*ern"ent entities #nder the .5ec#ti*e depart"ent to adopt a #nifor" ID data collection and for"at. !ection 17, Article <II of the 1987 onstit#tion pro*ides that the /0resident shall ha*e control of all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s and offices./ $he sa"e !ection also "andates the 0resident to /ens#re that the laws )e faithf#lly e5ec#ted./ ertainly, #nder this constit#tional power of control the 0resident can direct all go*ern"ent entities, in the e5ercise of their San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 168 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 f#nctions #nder e5isting laws, to adopt a #nifor" ID data collection and ID for"at to achie*e sa*ings, efficiency, relia)ility, co"pati)ility, and con*enience to the p#)lic. $he 0residentIs constit#tional power of control is self9e5ec#ting and does not need any i"ple"enting legislation. 'f co#rse, the 0residentIs power of control is li"ited to the .5ec#ti*e )ranch of go*ern"ent and does not e5tend to the H#diciary or to the independent constit#tional co""issions. $h#s, .' B2? does not apply to the H#diciary, or to the 'M.L. which #nder e5isting laws is also a#thori&ed to iss#e *oterIs ID cards. $his only shows that .' B2? does not esta)lish a national ID syste" )eca#se legislation is needed to esta)lish a single ID syste" that is co"p#lsory for all )ranches of go*ern"ent. onstit#tion also "andates the 0resident to ens#re that the laws are faithf#lly e5ec#ted. $here are se*eral laws "andating go*ern"ent entities to red#ce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, i"pro*e p#)lic ser*ices. $he adoption of a #nifor" ID data collection and for"at #nder .' B2? is designed to red#ce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, i"pro*e p#)lic ser*ices. $h#s, in iss#ing .' B2?, the 0resident is si"ply perfor"ing the constit#tional d#ty to ens#re that the laws are faithf#lly e5ec#ted. @2A 3o, .' B2? does not infringe on the citi&enKs right to pri*acy. !ection 4 of .' B2? li"its the data to )e collected and recorded #nder the #nifor" ID syste" to only 1B specific ite"s, na"ely2 @1A 3a"eG @2A 1o"e AddressG @4A !e5G @BA 0ict#reG @7A !ignat#reG @+A Date of BirthG @7A 0lace of BirthG @8A Marital !tat#sG @9A 3a"e of 0arentsG @1?A 1eightG @11A 8eightG @12A $wo inde5 fingers and two th#")"ar:sG @14A Any pro"inent disting#ishing feat#res li:e "oles or othersG and @1BA $a5 Identification 3#")er. $hese li"ited and specific data are the #s#al data re6#ired for personal identification )y go*ern"ent entities, and e*en )y the pri*ate sector. Any one who applies for or renews a dri*erIs license pro*ides to the L$' all these 1B specific data. $he data collected and stored for the #nified ID syste" #nder .' B2? will )e li"ited to only 1B specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. $he data collection, recording and ID card syste" #nder .' B2? will e*en re6#ire less data collected, stored and re*ealed than #nder the disparate syste"s prior to .' B2?. 0rior to .' B2?, go*ern"ent entities had a free hand in deter"ining the :ind, nat#re and e5tent of data to )e collected and stored for their ID syste"s. Jnder .' B2?, go*ern"ent entities can collect and record only the 1B specific data "entioned in !ection 4 of .' B2?. In addition, go*ern"ent entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, se*en less data than what the !#pre"e o#rtIs ID shows. Also, prior to .' B2?, there was no e5ec#ti*e iss#ance to go*ern"ent entities prescri)ing safeg#ards on the collection, recording, and disclos#re of personal identification data to protect the right to pri*acy. 3ow, #nder !ection 7 of .' B2?, the following safeg#ards are instit#ted2 a. $he data to )e recorded and stored, which shall )e #sed only for p#rposes of esta)lishing the identity of a person, shall )e li"ited to those specified in !ection 4 of this e5ec#ti*e orderG ). In no case shall the collection or co"pilation of other data in *iolation of a personIs right to pri*acy )e allowed or tolerated #nder this orderG c. !tringent syste"s of access control to data in the identification syste" shall )e instit#tedG d. Data collected and stored for this p#rpose shall )e :ept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written a#thori&ation of the 'wner shall )e re6#ired for access and disclos#re of dataG e. $he identification card to )e iss#ed shall )e protected )y ad*anced sec#rity feat#res and cryptographic technologyG f. A written re6#est )y the 'wner of the identification card shall )e re6#ired for any correction or re*ision of rele*ant data, or #nder s#ch conditions as the participating agency iss#ing the identification card shall prescri)e. In the present case, .' B2? does not esta)lish a national ID syste" )#t "a:es the e5isting sectoral card syste"s of go*ern"ent entities li:e ,!I!, !!!, 0hilhealth and L$' less costly, "ore efficient, relia)le and #ser9friendly to the p#)lic. 1ence, .' B2? is a proper s#)-ect of e5ec#ti*e iss#ance #nder the 0residentIs constit#tional power of control o*er go*ern"ent entities in the .5ec#ti*e depart"ent, as well as #nder the 0residentIs constit#tional d#ty to ens#re that laws are faithf#lly e5ec#ted. 81.%.('%., the petitions are DI!MI!!.D. .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. B2? is declared <ALID. 5G.R. NO. 1423%2. MA- 3, 200%.6 PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. ',* MICHAEL C. U. DE GU$MAN, /+DE.'9,',0(, >(. !OSEFINA TRINIDADLICHAUCO U,*)2()/2)0'2: <+2 C+DD1,9/'09+,(, D)E'20D),0 +< T2',(E+20'09+, ',* C+DD1,9/'09+, (DOTC), 2)(E+,*),0. FACTS" 0etitioner 0hilippine Agila !atellite Inc. @0A!IA is a d#ly organi&ed corporation, whose 0resident and hief .5ec#ti*e 'fficer is co9 petitioner Michael .J. De ,#&"an. 0A!I was esta)lished )y a consorti#" of pri*ate teleco""#nications carriers which in 199B had entered into a Me"orand#" of Jnderstanding @M'JA with the D'$, thro#gh its then !ecretary Hes#s ,arcia, concerning the planned la#nch of a 0hilippine9owned satellite into o#ter space. Jnder the M'J, the la#nch of the satellite was to )e an endea*or of the pri*ate sector, and the satellite itself to )e owned )y the (ilipino9owned consorti#" @s#)se6#ently organi&ed as 0A!IA. $he consorti#" was to grant the 0hilippine go*ern"ent one @1A transponder free of charge for the go*ern"entIs e5cl#si*e #se for non9co""ercial p#rpose, as well as the right of first ref#sal to another one @1A transponder in the 0hilippine satellite, if a*aila)le. B $he 0hilippine go*ern"ent, thro#gh the D'$, was tas:ed #nder the M'J to sec#re fro" the International$eleco""#nication Jnion the re6#ired or)ital slot@sA and fre6#ency assign"ent@sA for the 0hilippine satellite. 0A!I itself was organi&ed )y the consorti#" in 199+. $he go*ern"ent, together with 0A!I, coordinated thro#gh the International $eleco""#nication Jnion two @2A or)ital slots, designated as 1+1b .ast Longit#de and 174b .ast Longit#de, for 0hilippine satellites. 'n 28 H#ne 199+, 0A!I wrote then D'$ !ecretary A"ado !. Lagda"eo, Hr., see:ing for official 0hilippine go*ern"ent confir"ation on the assign"ent of the two afore"entioned 0hilippine or)ital slots to 0A!I for its satellites, which 0A!I had designated as the Agila satellites. !ecretary Lagda"eo, Hr. replied in a letter dated 4 H#ly 199+, confir"ing /the 0hilippine ,o*ern"entIs assign"ent of 0hilippine or)ital slots 1+1. and 174. to O0A!IP for its OAgilaP satellites./ 0A!I a*ers that after ha*ing sec#red the confir"ation fro" the 0hilippine go*ern"ent, it proceeded with preparations for the la#nching, operation and "anage"ent of its satellites, incl#ding the a*ail"ent of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with )#siness partners, and an initial pay"ent of J!Q4.7 Million to the (rench satellite "an#fact#rer. 1owe*er, respondent Licha#co, then D'$ Jndersecretary for o""#nications, allegedly /e")ar:ed on a cr#sade to "align the na"e of Michael de ,#&"an and sa)otage the )#siness of 0A!I./ Licha#coIs p#rported efforts against 0A!I c#l"inated allegedly in her offering or)ital slot 174b .ast Longit#de for )idding to other parties so"eti"e in Dece")er 1997, despite the prior assign"ent to 0A!I of the said slot. It was later clai"ed )y 0A!I that Licha#co s#)se6#ently awarded the or)ital slot to an entity whose indentity was #n:nown to 0A!I. $h#s, a co"plaint was filed against Licha#co for da"ages. A Motion to Dis"iss was then filed )y Licha#co. !he rooted her prayer for the dis"issal of the co"plaint pri"arily on the gro#nds that the s#it is a s#it against the !tate which "ay not )e s#ed witho#t its consentG that the co"plaint stated no ca#se of actionG and that the petitioners had failed to e5ha#st ad"inistrati*e re"edies )y failing to see: reco#rse with the 'ffice of the 0resident. In an order 14 dated 1B A#g#st 1998, the %$ denied the "otion to dis"iss. Licha#co assailed the %$ order thro#gh a 0etition for ertiorari #nder %#le +7 )efore the o#rt of Appeals, which s#)se6#ently n#llified the %$ order. ISSUE" 8hether or not the s#it against Licha#co, the #ndersecretary of D'$, is a s#it against the !tate. HELD" As was clearly set forth )y H#stice Xaldi*ar in Director of the B#rea# of $eleco""#nications, et al. *s. Aligaen, etc., et al. IInas"#ch as the !tate a#thori&es only legal acts )y its officers, #na#thori&ed acts of go*ern"ent officials or officers are not acts of the !tate, and an action against the officials or officers )y one whose rights ha*e )een in*aded or *iolated )y s#ch acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a s#it against the !tate within the r#le of i""#nity of the !tate fro" s#it. In the sa"e tenor, it has )een said that an action at law or s#it in e6#ity against a !tate officer or the director of a !tate depart"ent on the gro#nd that, while clai"ing to act for the !tate, he *iolates or in*ades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, #nder an #nconstit#tional act or #nder an ass#"ption of a#thority which he does not ha*e, is not a s#it against the !tate within the constit#tional pro*ision that the !tate "ay not )e s#ed witho#t its consent.I $he rationale for this r#ling is that the doctrine of state i""#nity cannot )e #sed as an instr#"ent for perpetrating an in-#stice. $h#s, Licha#co, in alleging in her Motion to Dis"iss that she is shielded )y the !tateIs i""#nity fro" s#it, to hypothetically ad"itted the tr#th of the allegations in the co"plaint. !#ch hypothetical ad"ission has to )e dee"ed a concession on her part that she had perfor"ed the tortio#s or da"aging acts against the petitioners, which if tr#e, wo#ld hold her lia)le for da"ages. $he decision of the o#rt of Appeals is set aside and the %$ is ordered to try the case on its "erits. 5G.R. NO. 17139%. MA- 3, 200%.6 PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LOREN$O TASADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARR- L. ROJUE, !R., !OEL RUI$ &UTU-AN, ROGER R. RA-EL, GAR- S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO &AGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. &OLASTIG, E)0909+,)2(, >(. GLORIA MACAPAGALARRO-O, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDERIN CHIEF, E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR- EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRU$ II, SECRETAR- OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMI&AO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, 2)(E+,*),0(. 5G.R. NO. 171409. MA- 3, 200%.6 NISE$ CACHOOLIVARES AND TRI&UNE PU&LISHING CO., INC., E)0909+,)2(, >(. HONORA&LE SECRETAR- EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORA&LE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMI&AO, 2)(E+,*),0(. 5G.R. NO. 171485. MA- 3, 200%.6 FRANCIS !OSEPH G. ESCUDERO, !OSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AJUINO, MARIO !. AGU!A, San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 169 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 SATUR C. OCAMPO, MU!IV S. HATAMAN, !UAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL !OSEL !. VILLANUEVA, LI$A L. MA$A, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO &. MAGTU&O, !USTIN MARC S&. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLE$, DARLENE ANTONINOCUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, !OSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GIL&ERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS&ARAJUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI !AVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITI$ENS FOR CIVIL LI&ERTIES REPRESENTED &- AMADO GAT INCIONG, E)0909+,)2(, >(. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR-, AVELINO !. CRU$, !R., SECRETAR-, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETAR-, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMI&AO, CHIEF PNP, 2)(E+,*),0(. 5G.R. NO. 171483. MA- 3, 200%.6 7ILUSANG MA-O UNO, REPRESENTED &- ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LA&OG AND SECRETAR- GENERAL !OEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LA&OR UNIONS7ILUSANG MA-O UNO (NAFLU7MU), REPRESENTED &- ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, !OSELITO V. USTARE$, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRAN$A, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, !R., AND ROJUE M. TAN, E)0909+,)2(, >(. HER E3CELLENC-, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGALARRO-O, THE HONORA&LE E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR-, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMI&AO, 2)(E+,*),0(. 5G.R. NO. 171400. MA- 3, 200%.6 ALTERNATIVE LA= GROUPS, INC. (ALG), E)0909+,)2, >(. E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR- EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMI&AO, 2)(E+,*),0(. 5G.R. NO. 171489. MA- 3, 200%.6 !OSE ANSELMO I. CADI$, FELICIANO M. &AUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, !OSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOSVIDAL, FELIMON C. A&ELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, !.&. !OV- C. &ERNA&E, &ERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED &AR OF THE PHILIPPINES (I&P), E)0909+,)2(, >(. HON. E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR- EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMI&AO, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS PNP CHIEF, 2)(E+,*),0(. 5G.R. NO. 171424. MA- 3, 200%.6 LOREN &. LEGARDA, E)0909+,)2, >(. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARRO-O, IN HER CAPACIT- AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDERIN CHIEF? ARTURO LOMI&AO, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP)? GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP)? AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR-, 2)(E+,*),0(. FACTS" 'n (e)r#ary 2B, 2??+, as the nation cele)rated the 2?th Anni*ersary of the .dsa 0eople 0ower I, 0resident Arroyo iss#ed 00 1?17 declaring a state of national e"ergency, th#s2 3'8, $1.%.('%., I, ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo, 0resident of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and o""ander9in9hief of the Ar"ed (orces of the 0hilippines, )y *irt#e of the powers *ested #pon "e )y !ection 18, Article 7 of the 0hilippine onstit#tion which states that2 /$he 0resident. . . whene*er it )eco"es necessary, . . . "ay call o#t @theA ar"ed forces to pre*ent or s#ppress . . . re)ellion. . . ,/ and in "y capacity as their o""ander9in9hief, do here)y co""and the Ar"ed (orces of the 0hilippines, to "aintain law and order thro#gho#t the 0hilippines, pre*ent or s#ppress all for"s of lawless *iolence as well as any act of ins#rrection or re)ellion and to enforce o)edience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and reg#lations pro"#lgated )y "e personally or #pon "y directionG and as pro*ided in !ection 17, Article 12 of the onstit#tion do here)y declare a !tate of 3ational ."ergency. $hereafter, the 0resident iss#ed ,.'. 3o. 7 i"ple"enting 001?17. It called #pon the hief of !taff of the A(0 and the hief of the 030, as well as the officers and "en of the A(0 and 030, to i""ediately carry o#t the necessary and appropriate actions and "eas#res to s#ppress and pre*ent acts of terroris" and lawless *iolence. I""ediately after the iss#ance of 001?17 and ,.'. 3o. 7, the 'ffice of the 0resident anno#nced the cancellation of all progra"s and acti*ities related to the 2?th anni*ersary cele)ration of .dsa 0eople 0ower IG and re*o:ed the per"its to hold rallies iss#ed earlier )y the local go*ern"ents. H#stice !ecretary %a#l ,on&ales stated that political rallies, which to the 0residentIs "ind were organi&ed for p#rposes of desta)ili&ation, are cancelled. 0residential hief of !taff Michael Defensor anno#nced that /warrantless arrests and ta:e9o*er of facilities, incl#ding "edia, can already )e i"ple"ented>. $hose who staged rallies and p#)lic asse")lies were *iolently dispersed )y h#ge cl#sters of anti9riot police. $he well9trained police"en #sed tr#ncheons, )ig fi)er glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and )rea: #p the "arching gro#ps, and scatter the "assed participants. 'n the )asis of 00 1?17 and ,.'. 3o. 7, operati*es of the ID, and 030 raided the Daily $ri)#ne offices in Manila. $he raiding tea" confiscated news stories )y reporters, doc#"ents, pict#res, and "oc:9#ps of the !at#rday iss#e. 0olice"en fro" a"p ra"e in V#e&on ity were stationed inside the editorial and )#siness offices of the newspaperG while police"en fro" the Manila 0olice District were stationed o#tside the )#ilding. A few "in#tes after the search and sei&#re at the Daily $ri)#ne offices, the police s#rro#nded the pre"ises of another pro9 opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister p#)lication, the ta)loid A)ante. ISSUE" 8hether or not 001?17 and ,.'. 7 are constit#tional. HELD" $he o#rt finds and so holds that 00 1?17 is constit#tional insofar as it constit#tes a call )y the 0resident for the A(0 to pre*ent or s#ppress lawless *iolence. $he procla"ation is s#stained )y !ection 18, Article <II of the onstit#tion and the rele*ant -#rispr#dence disc#ssed earlier. 1owe*er, 00 1?17Is e5traneo#s pro*isions gi*ing the 0resident e5press or i"plied power @1A to iss#e decreesG @2A to direct the A(0 to enforce o)edience to all laws e*en those not related to lawless *iolence as well as decrees pro"#lgated )y the 0residentG and @4A to i"pose standards on "edia or any for" of prior restraint on the press, are #ltra *ires and #nconstit#tional. $he o#rt also r#les that #nder !ection 17, Article ;II of the onstit#tion, the 0resident, in the a)sence of a legislation, cannot ta:e o*er pri*ately9owned p#)lic #tility and pri*ate )#siness affected with p#)lic interest. In the sa"e *ein, the o#rt finds ,.'. 3o. 7 *alid. It is an 'rder iss#ed )y the 0resident E acting as o""ander9in9hief E addressed to s#)alterns in the A(0 to carry o#t the pro*isions of 00 1?17. !ignificantly, it also pro*ides a *alid standard E that the "ilitary and the police sho#ld ta:e only the /necessary and appropriate actions and "eas#res to s#ppress and pre*ent acts of lawless *iolence./ B#t the words /acts of terroris"/ fo#nd in ,.'. 3o. 7 ha*e not )een legally defined and "ade p#nisha)le )y ongress and sho#ld th#s )e dee"ed deleted fro" the said ,.'. 8hile /terroris"/ has )een deno#nced generally in "edia, no law has )een enacted to g#ide the "ilitary, and e*ent#ally the co#rts, to deter"ine the li"its of the A(0Is a#thority in carrying o#t this portion of ,.'. 3o. 7. REASONS FOR THE RULING (IMPORTANT POINTS TO REMEM&ER)" 1A $he 0resident is granted an 'rdinance 0ower #nder hapter 2, Boo: III of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 292 @Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987A. !he "ay iss#e any of the following2 !ec. 2. .5ec#ti*e 'rders. E Acts of the 0resident pro*iding for r#les of a general or per"anent character in i"ple"entation or e5ec#tion of constit#tional or stat#tory powers shall )e pro"#lgated in e5ec#ti*e orders. !ec. 4. Ad"inistrati*e 'rders. E Acts of the 0resident which relate to partic#lar aspect of go*ern"ental operations in p#rs#ance of his d#ties as ad"inistrati*e head shall )e pro"#lgated in ad"inistrati*e orders. !ec. B. 0rocla"ations. E Acts of the 0resident fi5ing a date or declaring a stat#s or condition of p#)lic "o"ent or interest, #pon the e5istence of which the operation of a specific law or reg#lation is "ade to depend, shall )e pro"#lgated in procla"ations which shall ha*e the force of an e5ec#ti*e order. !ec. 7. Me"orand#" 'rders. E Acts of the 0resident on "atters of ad"inistrati*e detail or of s#)ordinate or te"porary interest which only concern a partic#lar officer or office of the ,o*ern"ent shall )e e")odied in "e"orand#" orders. !ec. +. Me"orand#" irc#lars. E Acts of the 0resident on "atters relating to internal ad"inistration, which the 0resident desires to )ring to the attention of all or so"e of the depart"ents, agencies, )#rea#s or offices of the ,o*ern"ent, for infor"ation or co"pliance, shall )e e")odied in "e"orand#" circ#lars. !ec. 7. ,eneral or !pecial 'rders. E Acts and co""ands of the 0resident in his capacity as o""ander9in9hief of the Ar"ed (orces of the 0hilippines shall )e iss#ed as general or special orders. 0resident ArroyoIs ordinance power is li"ited to the foregoing iss#ances. !he cannot iss#e decrees si"ilar to those iss#ed )y (or"er 0resident Marcos #nder 00 1?81. 0residential Decrees are laws which are of the sa"e category and )inding force as stat#tes )eca#se they were iss#ed )y the 0resident in the e5ercise of his legislati*e power d#ring the period of Martial Law #nder the 1974 onstit#tion. $his o#rt r#les that the assailed 00 1?17 is #nconstit#tional insofar as it grants 0resident Arroyo the a#thority to pro"#lgate /decrees./ Legislati*e power is pec#liarly within the pro*ince of the Legislat#re. !ection 1, Article <I categorically states that /OtPhe legislati*e power shall )e *ested in the ongress of the 0hilippines which shall consist of a !enate and a 1o#se of %epresentati*es./ $o )e s#re, neither Martial Law nor a state of re)ellion nor a state of e"ergency can -#stify 0resident ArroyoIs e5ercise of legislati*e power )y iss#ing decrees. 0resident Arroyo has no a#thority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are *oid and, therefore, cannot )e enforced. 8ith respect to /laws,/ she cannot call the "ilitary to enforce or i"ple"ent certain laws, s#ch as c#sto"s laws, laws go*erning fa"ily and property relations, laws on o)ligations and contracts and the li:e. !he can only order the "ilitary, #nder 00 1?17, to enforce laws pertinent to its d#ty to s#ppress lawless *iolence. 2A A distinction "#st )e drawn )etween the 0residentIs a#thority to declare /a state of national e"ergency/ and to e5ercise e"ergency powers. $o the first, as el#cidated )y the o#rt, !ection 18, Article <II grants the 0resident s#ch power, hence, no legiti"ate constit#tional o)-ection can )e raised. B#t to the second, "anifold constit#tional iss#es arise. !ection 24, Article <I of the onstit#tion reads2 San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 170 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 !.. 24. @1A $he ongress, )y a *ote of two9thirds of )oth 1o#ses in -oint session asse")led, *oting separately, shall ha*e the sole power to declare the e5istence of a state of war. @2A In ti"es of war or other national e"ergency, the ongress "ay, )y law, a#thori&e the 0resident, for a li"ited period and s#)-ect to s#ch restrictions as it "ay prescri)e, to e5ercise powers necessary and proper to carry o#t a declared national policy. Jnless sooner withdrawn )y resol#tion of the ongress, s#ch powers shall cease #pon the ne5t ad-o#rn"ent thereof. It "ay )e pointed o#t that the second paragraph of the a)o*e pro*ision refers not only to war )#t also to /other national e"ergency./ If the intention of the (ra"ers of o#r onstit#tion was to withhold fro" the 0resident the a#thority to declare a /state of national e"ergency/ p#rs#ant to !ection 18, Article <II @calling9o#t powerA and grant it to ongress @li:e the declaration of the e5istence of a state of warA, then the (ra"ers co#ld ha*e pro*ided so. learly, they did not intend that ongress sho#ld first a#thori&e the 0resident )efore he can declare a /state of national e"ergency./ $he logical concl#sion then is that 0resident Arroyo co#ld *alidly declare the e5istence of a state of national e"ergency e*en in the a)sence of a ongressional enact"ent. B#t the e5ercise of e"ergency powers, s#ch as the ta:ing o*er of pri*ately owned p#)lic #tility or )#siness affected with p#)lic interest, is a different "atter. $his re6#ires a delegation fro" ongress. o#rts ha*e often said that constit#tional pro*isions in pari "ateria are to )e constr#ed together. 'therwise stated, different cla#ses, sections, and pro*isions of a constit#tion which relate to the sa"e s#)-ect "atter will )e constr#ed together and considered in the light of each other. onsidering that !ection 17 of Article ;II and !ection 24 of Article <I, pre*io#sly 6#oted, relate to national e"ergencies, they "#st )e read together to deter"ine the li"itation of the e5ercise of e"ergency powers. ,enerally, ongress is the repository of e"ergency powers. $his is e*ident in the tenor of !ection 24 @2A, Article <I a#thori&ing it to delegate s#ch powers to the 0resident. ertainly, a )ody cannot delegate a power not reposed #pon it. 1owe*er, :nowing that d#ring gra*e e"ergencies, it "ay not )e possi)le or practica)le for ongress to "eet and e5ercise its powers, the (ra"ers of o#r onstit#tion dee"ed it wise to allow ongress to grant e"ergency powers to the 0resident, s#)-ect to certain conditions, th#s2 @1A $here "#st )e a war or other e"ergency. @2A $he delegation "#st )e for a li"ited period only. @4A $he delegation "#st )e s#)-ect to s#ch restrictions as the ongress "ay prescri)e. @BA $he e"ergency powers "#st )e e5ercised to carry o#t a national policy declared )y ongress. 12B !ection 17, Article ;II "#st )e #nderstood as an aspect of the e"ergency powers cla#se. $he ta:ing o*er of pri*ate )#siness affected with p#)lic interest is -#st another facet of the e"ergency powers generally reposed #pon ongress. $h#s, when !ection 17 states that the /the !tate "ay, d#ring the e"ergency and #nder reasona)le ter"s prescri)ed )y it, te"porarily ta:e o*er or direct the operation of any pri*ately owned p#)lic #tility or )#siness affected with p#)lic interest,/ it refers to ongress, not the 0resident. 3ow, whether or not the 0resident "ay e5ercise s#ch power is dependent on whether ongress "ay delegate it to hi" p#rs#ant to a law prescri)ing the reasona)le ter"s thereof. It is clear that if the 0resident had a#thority to iss#e the order he did, it "#st )e fo#nd in so"e pro*ision of the onstit#tion. And it is not clai"ed that e5press constit#tional lang#age grants this power to the 0resident. $he contention is that presidential power sho#ld )e i"plied fro" the aggregate of his powers #nder the onstit#tion. 0artic#lar reliance is placed on pro*isions in Article II which say that /$he e5ec#ti*e 0ower shall )e *ested in a 0resident . . . . G/ that /he shall ta:e are that the Laws )e faithf#lly e5ec#tedG/ and that he /shall )e o""ander9in9 hief of the Ar"y and 3a*y of the Jnited !tates. 4A !ince there is no law defining /acts of terroris",/ it is 0resident Arroyo alone, #nder ,.'. 3o. 7, who has the discretion to deter"ine what acts constit#te terroris". 1er -#dg"ent on this aspect is a)sol#te, witho#t restrictions. onse6#ently, there can )e indiscri"inate arrest witho#t warrants, )rea:ing into offices and residences, ta:ing o*er the "edia enterprises, prohi)ition and dispersal of all asse")lies and gatherings #nfriendly to the ad"inistration. All these can )e effected in the na"e of ,.'. 3o. 7. $hese acts go far )eyond the calling9o#t power of the 0resident. ertainly, they *iolate the d#e process cla#se of the onstit#tion. $h#s, this o#rt declares that the /acts of terroris"/ portion of ,.'. 3o. 7 is #nconstit#tional. !ignificantly, there is nothing in ,.'. 3o. 7 a#thori&ing the "ilitary or police to co""it acts )eyond what are necessary and appropriate to s#ppress and pre*ent lawless *iolence, the li"itation of their a#thority in p#rs#ing the 'rder. 'therwise, s#ch acts are considered illegal. 5G.R. NO. 1398%8. !UNE 8, 200%.6 ALON$O J. ANCHETA, E)0909+,)2, >(. CANDELARIA GUERSE- DALA-GON, 2)(E+,*),0. FACTS" !po#ses A#drey 'K3eill and 8. %ichard ,#ersey were A"erican citi&ens. $hey resided in the 0hilippines for thirty years. $hey adopted Lyle ,#ersey. 8hen A#drey died she left a will. 1er estate consisted of a real estate property in Ma:ati ity, a )an: acco#nt and shares of stoc:s in AR, Interiors. !he left her entire estate to %ichard. 1er will was ad"itted to pro)ate in Maryland, J.!.A and in the 0hilippines. $hereafter, %ichard "arried the respondent, andelaria ,#ersey9Dalaygon, a (ilipino citi&en. $hey had two children Li")erly and Le*in. 1e died with a will. 1e left his entire estate to his second wife, andelaria, e5cept his shares of stoc:s with AR, Interiors. $he latter was )e6#eathed to Lyle ,#ersey. 1is will was also pro)ated in the J.!.A and in the 0hilippines. $he ancilliary ad"inistrator in the pro)ate of the will of %ichard here in the 0hilippines filed a pro-ect of partition with the pro)ate co#rt wherein 2R7 of %ichardIs 4RB #ndi*ided interest in the Ma:ati property was allocated to respondent, while 4R7 thereof were allocated to %ichardIs three children. $his was opposed )y respondent on the gro#nd that #nder the law of the !tate of Maryland, /a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property s#)-ect of the legacy./ !ince %ichard left his entire estate to respondent, e5cept for his rights and interests o*er the AR, Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire 4RB #ndi*ided interest in the Ma:ati property sho#ld )e gi*en to respondent. $he respondentKs opposition was s#stained )y the pro)ate co#rt. $he respondent also filed with the o#rt of Appeals a petition for the ann#l"ent of the -#dg"ent of the pro)ate co#rt with regards to the pro)ate of the will of A#drey here in the 0hilippines. %espondent contended that petitioner willf#lly )reached his fid#ciary d#ty when he disregarded the laws of the !tate of Maryland on the distri)#tion of A#dreyIs estate in accordance with her will. %espondent arg#ed that since A#drey de*ised her entire estate to %ichard, then the Ma:ati property sho#ld )e wholly ad-#dicated to hi", and not "erely 4RB thereof, and since %ichard left his entire estate, e5cept for his rights and interests o*er the AR, Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Ma:ati property sho#ld now pertain to respondent. $he o#rt of Appeals s#stained the respondent and ordered the ann#l"ent of the decisions of the pro)ate co#rt. ISSUE" 8hether or not the passing of the land to respondent is *alid despite the fact that records do not show when and how the ,#erseys ac6#ired the Ma:ati property. HELD" Des, the passing of the land to respondent is *alid. $he o#rt notes the fact that A#drey and %ichard ,#ersey were A"erican citi&ens who owned real property in the 0hilippines, altho#gh records do not show when and how the ,#erseys ac6#ired the Ma:ati property. Jnder Article ;III, !ections 1 and B of the 1947 onstit#tion, the pri*ilege to ac6#ire and e5ploit lands of the p#)lic do"ain, and other nat#ral reso#rces of the 0hilippines, and to operate p#)lic #tilities, were reser*ed to (ilipinos and entities owned or controlled )y the". In %ep#)lic *. V#asha, the o#rt clarified that the 0arity %ights A"end"ent of 19B+, which re9opened to A"erican citi&ens and )#siness enterprises the right in the ac6#isition of lands of the p#)lic do"ain, the disposition, e5ploitation, de*elop"ent and #tili&ation of nat#ral reso#rces of the 0hilippines, does not incl#de the ac6#isition or e5ploitation of pri*ate agric#lt#ral lands. $he prohi)ition against ac6#isition of pri*ate lands )y aliens was carried on to the 1974 onstit#tion #nder Article ;I<, !ection 1B, with the e5ception of pri*ate lands ac6#ired )y hereditary s#ccession and when the transfer was "ade to a for"er nat#ral9)orn citi&en, as pro*ided in !ection 17, Article ;I<. As it now stands, Article ;II, !ections 7 and 8 of the 198+ onstit#tion e5plicitly prohi)its non9(ilipinos fro" ac6#iring or holding title to pri*ate lands or to lands of the p#)lic do"ain, e5cept only )y way of legal s#ccession or if the ac6#isition was "ade )y a for"er nat#ral9)orn citi&en. In any case, the o#rt has also r#led that if land is in*alidly transferred to an alien who s#)se6#ently )eco"es a citi&en or transfers it to a citi&en, the flaw in the original transaction is considered c#red and the title of the transferee is rendered *alid. In this case, since the Ma:ati property had already passed on to respondent who is a (ilipino, then whate*er flaw, if any, that attended the ac6#isition )y the ,#erseys of the Ma:ati property is now inconse6#ential, as the o)-ecti*e of the constit#tional pro*ision to :eep o#r lands in (ilipino hands has )een achie*ed. 5G.R. NO. 14%459. !UNE 8, 200%.6 HEIRS OF DICMAN, ,'D).:" ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN, FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO TORRES, EMIL- TORRES, TOMASITO TORRES ',* HEIRS OF CRISTINA ALA=AS ',* &A&ING COSIL, E)0909+,)2(, >(. !OSE CARISO ',* COURT OF APPEALS, 2)(E+,*),0(. FACTS" 'n ad*ice of his lawyer and )eca#se there were already "any parcels of land recorded in his na"e, !ioco ariNo ca#sed the s#r*ey of the land in contro*ersy in the na"e of $ing9el Dic"an. $he latter e5ec#ted a p#)lic instr#"ent entitled Deed of on*eyance of 0art %ights and Interests in Agric#lt#ral Land with !ioco ariNo. It stated that he is an applicant for a patent o*er a parcel of land. $hat Mr. !ioco ariNo has ad*anced all e5penses for said s#r*ey for "e and in "y na"e, and also all other e5penses for the i"pro*e"ent of said land, to dateG that for and in consideration of said ad*ance e5penses, to "e "ade and deli*ered )y said Mr. !ioco ariNo, I here)y pledge and pro"ise to con*ey, deli*er and transfer #nto said !ioco ariNo, of legal age, "arried to ,#ilata Acop, and resident of Bag#io, 0.I., his heirs and assigns, one half @1R2A of "y title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of landG sa"e to )e deli*ered, con*eyed and transferred in a final for", according to law, to hi", his heirs and assigns, )y "e, "y heirs, and San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 171 Alliance for Alternative Action THE ADONIS CASES 2011 assigns, as soon as title for the sa"e is iss#ed to "e )y proper a#thorities. $hereafter, !ico ariNo sold the said land to his son ,#&"an ariNo thro#gh an A)sol#te Deed of !ale. $hereafter, ,#&"an perfor"ed all acts of ownership o*er the land. 1e filed an opposition to the petition of the heirs of $ing9el Dic"an esta)lishing ownership o*er the 6#estioned land. It was fo#nd )y the co#rt that Lot 7+9A )elongs to the Dic"ans. B#t there are still ad*erse clai"s o*er Lot 7+9B. $h#s, hearings sho#ld still )e held. Meanwhile, on Han#ary 8, 19+?, while the foregoing petition was pending in the trial co#rt, 0resident arlos 0. ,arcia iss#ed 0rocla"ation 3o. +28 /e5cl#ding fro" the operation of the Bag#io $ownsite %eser*ation certain parcels of p#)lic land :nown as IIgorot lai"sI sit#ated in the ity of Bag#io and declaring the sa"e open to disposition #nder the pro*isions of hapter <II of the 0#)lic Land Act./ $he 0rocla"ation f#rther pro*ided that the /Igorot lai"s/ en#"erated therein shall )e /s#)-ect to the condition that e5cept in fa*or of the go*ern"ent or any of its )ranches, #nits, or instit#tions, lands ac6#ired )y *irt#e of this procla"ation shall not )e enc#")ered or alienated within a period of fifteen years fro" and after the date of iss#ance of patent./ 'ne s#ch clai" pertained to the /1eirs of Dic"an,/ Before the trial co#rt co#ld dispose of the case, the !#pre"e o#rt pro"#lgated %ep#)lic *. Marcos which held that o#rts of (irst Instance of Bag#io ha*e no -#risdiction to reopen -#dicial proceedings on the )asis of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 941. As a conse6#ence, on H#ly 28, 1978, the trial co#rt dis"issed the petition to reopen i*il %eser*ation ase 3o. 1, ,.L.%.'. 211 insofar as Lot 7+9B was concerned, and the certificate of title iss#ed p#rs#ant to the partial decision in*ol*ing Lot 7+9A was in*alidated. $he trial co#rt stated that the re"edy for those who were iss#ed titles was to file a petition for re*alidation #nder 0residential Decree 3o. 1271, as a"ended )y 0residential Decrees 3o. 1411 and 2?4B. After the dis"issal of the case, ,#&"an ariNo was left #ndist#r)ed in his possession of the s#)-ect property #ntil his death on A#g#st 19, 1982. 'n April 2?, 1984, petitioners, s#ing as co"p#lsory heirs of $ing9el Dic"an, re*i*ed the foregoing case )y filing a co"plaint for reco*ery of possession with da"ages in*ol*ing the s#)-ect property with the %$, doc:eted as i*il ase 3o. 799%. $he %$ rendered a decision in fa*or of the pri*ate respondent. $he %$Ks decision was appealed to the A. $he latter affir"ed in toto the %$Ks decision. ISSUE" 8hether or not the Dic"ans as indigeno#s people are entitled to the land in contro*ersy. HELD" 3o, the Dic"ans as indigeno#s people are entitled to the land in contro*ersy. 0etitioners arg#e that 0rocla"ation 3o. +28 iss#ed )y then 0resident arlos 0. ,arcia on Han#ary 8, 19+? had the effect of /segregating/ and /reser*ing/ certain Igorot clai"s identified therein, incl#ding one p#rportedly )elonging to the /1eirs of Dic"an,/ and prohi)iting any enc#")rance or alienation of these clai"s for a period of 17 years fro" ac6#isition of patent. B#t )y the ti"e the 0rocla"ation had )een iss#ed, all rights o*er the property in 6#estion had already )een *ested in pri*ate respondent. $he e5ec#ti*e iss#ance can only go so far as to classify p#)lic land, )#t it cannot )e constr#ed as to pre-#dice *ested rights. Moreo*er, property rights "ay not )e altered or depri*ed )y e5ec#ti*e fiat alone witho#t contra*ening the d#e process g#arantees of the onstit#tion and "ay a"o#nt to #nlawf#l ta:ing of pri*ate property to )e redistri)#ted for p#)lic #se witho#t -#st co"pensation. $he recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of indigeno#s peoples to preser*e and de*elop their c#lt#res, traditions, and instit#tions are *ital concerns of the !tate and constit#te i"portant p#)lic policies which )ear #pon this case. $o gi*e life and "eaning #nto these policies the legislat#re saw it fit to enact %ep#)lic Act 3o. 8471, otherwise :nown as $he Indigeno#s 0eoples %ights Act of 1997, as a c#l"inating "eas#re to affir" the *iews and opinions of indigeno#s peoples and ethnic "inorities on "atters that affect their life and c#lt#re. $he pro*isions of that law #nify an otherwise frag"ented acco#nt of constit#tional, -#rispr#dential and stat#tory doctrine which en-oins the organs of go*ern"ent to )e *igilant for the protection of indigeno#s c#lt#ral co""#nities as a "arginali&ed sector, to protect their ancestral do"ain and ancestral lands and ens#re their econo"ic, social, and c#lt#ral well9 )eing, and to g#ard their patri"ony fro" those inclined to prey #pon their ignorance or d#ctility. As the final ar)iter of disp#tes and the last )#lwar: of the %#le of Law this o#rt has always )een "indf#l of the highest edicts of social -#stice especially where do#)ts arise in the interpretation and application of the law. B#t when in the p#rs#it of the loftiest ends ordained )y the onstit#tion this o#rt finds that the law is clear and lea*es no roo" for do#)t, it shall decide according to the principles of right and -#stice as all people concei*e the" to )e, and with d#e appreciation of the rights of all persons concerned. San Beda College of Law &'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)( 172