AMERICANS FOR FACT SHEET

CAMPAIGN REFORM

Executive Summary: Does Money Buy Elections?

The Americans for Campaign Reform report, “Does Money Figure 1: House challenger share of general election votes by
Buy Elections?” (January 2008), analyzes the relationship millions
80 spent [1992-2006]
between campaign spending and election outcomes for
70
incumbent, challenger, and open seat candidates for U.S.
House from 1992-2006. It finds a competitive spending 60

threshold below which previously unknown candidates are

unable to effectively compete and beyond which additional 50

spending produces diminishing marginal returns. The 40

Series1
Poly. (Serie
report’s key findings are summarized below; full report at
youstreet.org/press/policy-papers. 30

20

Major Findings
10

1. Threshold E!ects of Campaign Spending 0

Non-incumbent candidates require a spending $0 $1 $2 $3
Millions
threshold of between $0.7-$1 million in order to
credibly compete. Incumbents enjoy an inherently
competitive position and choose a similar minimum Figure 2: Share of general election votes by millions
spending level when faced with a serious challenger. spent, House open seat candidates [1992-2006]
90

• Less than 1% of challengers and 5% of open seat

candidates spending $700,000 or less won election. 80

• More than 45% of non-incumbents with spending of 70

$700,000 or more won election.
• 75% of non-incumbents spent $700,000 or less. 60

Series1
50
2. Diminishing Marginal Returns Poly. (Series1)

Once candidates exceed the competitive spending 40

threshold and voters learn who they are, more spend- 30

ing does not measurably increase the share of votes.
• 47% of challengers spending $700,000 or more won 20

office. The rate did not measurably improve as 10

spending rose to $1.5 million, and just 31% of top- $0 $1 $2 $3
Millions
spending challengers over $1.5m won office.
• 60% of open seat-candidates spending $700,000 or
more won office. As with challengers, the rate did not Figure 3: Incumbent votes against competitively
improve as spending rose to $1.5 million and it financed challengers by millions spent* [1992-2006]
2

*Competitive
90 challengers defined as those spending $500,000 or more
remained constant at 61% thereafter.
• The average House incumbent facing an adequately- 80

financed challenger received 55% of the vote, regard-

70
less of the level of incumbent or challenger spending.
60

3. Policy Implications Series1

50
Poly. (Series1)
The report concludes that robust electoral competition
is achieved when qualified candidates have access to 40

sufficient spending to become known to the voters. It 30

recommends that sufficiency, rather than parity, of
spending by highly qualified candidates be the primary 20

objective of campaign finance reforms aimed at 10

boosting competition and accountability. $0 $1 $2 $3
Millions

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