AUG

3
Constitutional Law 1 (Principles and State Policies)
*sources are linked
If you want the Principles only of the following cases, I suggest you read
this http://www.scribd.com/doc/21492680/Constitutional-Law-1-File-No-3 <--- this site is where I got
the salient points of the cases :)
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Preamble
Republicanism
Manifestations
1. Nemo est supra leges
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police ofcer, took custody of 170 women at the
night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to
Davao City where they were signed as laborers.
A writ of habeas corpus was fled against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted
the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated
date.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.
Held:
The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was
commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force flipino women to change their
domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of
society" were still flipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all
other flipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its
suppression could considered tantamount to slavery.
The supreme court upheld the right of flipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty
of abode."Ours is a government of laws and not of men."
Salient Points:
Nemo est supra leges is a Latin maxim which means "no one is above the law". The law is
supreme in a state. All the authorities and diplomats are subservient to law. The law considers every
citizen equally. No one can take law into their hands supposing themselves above law.
Government of Law and not of Men
Signifcance of the principle- It is basic that laws must be obeyed by all and applied to everyone - rich
or poor, lowly or powerful - without fear or favor. The observance of the supremacy of the rule of law
by ofcials, individuals, and the people as a whole is what will sustain our democracy and assure the
existence of a truly free, orderly and equitable society.
Sources:
Full text of case
Case digest
http://defnitions.uslegal.com/n/nemo-est-supra-leges/
"Tectbook on the Phillippine Constitution" (Hector De Leon) pg. 44
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2. Rule of majority
3. Accountability of Public Ofcials
4. Bill of Rights
5. Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws
6. Separation of Powers Principle
of Blending of Powers
Principle of Checks and Balances
The Steel Seizure case, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153
Synopsis of the case
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), also commonly referred to as The
Steel Seizure Case, was a United States Supreme Court decision that limited the power of the
President of the United States to seize private property in the absence of either specifcally
enumerated authority under Article Two of the United States Constitution or statutory authority
conferred on him by Congress. It was a "stinging rebuf" to President Harry Truman.
Justice Hugo Black's majority decision was, however, qualifed by the separate concurring opinions
of fve other members of the Court, making it difcult to determine the details and limits of the
President's power to seize private property in emergencies. While a concurrence, Justice Jackson's
opinion is used by most legal scholars and Members of Congress to assess Executive power.
Background
The United States was in the Korean War in 1950 when troops from North Korea invaded the
Republic of Korea. President Harry Truman sent troops to South Korea without asking for a
Congressional declaration of war on North Korea albeit with a United Nations resolution.
President Truman chose not to impose price controls, as the federal government had done during
World War II. Instead, the administration attempted to avoid infationary pressures through creation
of a Wage Stabilization Board that sought to keep down the infation of consumer prices and wages
while avoiding labor disputes whenever possible. Those eforts failed, however, to avoid a
threatened strike of all of the major steel producers by the United Steel Workers of America when
the steel industry rejected the board's proposed wage increases unless they were allowed greater
price increases than the government was prepared to approve.
The Truman administration believed that a strike of any length would cause severe dislocations for
defense contractors and for the domestic economy as a whole. Unable to mediate the diferences
between the union and the industry, Truman decided to seize their production facilities, while he kept
the current operating management of the companies in place to run the plants under federal
direction.
Truman might have, rather than seizing the plants, invoked the national emergency provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act to prevent the union from striking. The administration rejected that option, however,
both from a distaste for the Act, which had been passed over Truman's veto fve years earlier, and
because the administration saw the industry, rather than the union, as the cause of the crisis.
The administration also rejected use of the statutory procedure provided under Section 18 of the
Selective Service Act of 1948 that might have permitted seizure of the industry's steel plants on the
ground that compliance with this procedure was too time-consuming and the outcome of compliance
too uncertain. Truman chose not to go to Congress to obtain additional statutory authorization for a
seizure of the steel industry for the same reasons. That left invocation of the President's inherent
authority to act in response to a national emergency.
The Steelworkers favored government seizure of the plants under any available theory to a Taft-
Hartley injunction against it; Arthur Goldberg, General Counsel for the Steelworkers and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, argued that the President had the inherent power to seize the
plants, as well as the statutory authority under the Selective Service Act and the Defense Production
Act.
The steel industry, on the other hand, appears to have been taken by surprise, as it had apparently
assumed until shortly before Truman made his April 8, 1952 announcement that he would take the
less risky step of seeking a national emergency injunction under the Taft-Hartley Act instead.
However, the industry was, as events showed, ready to act once he announced the seizure by a
national television and radio broadcast.
Prior history
The steel companies reacted immediately, sending attorneys to the home of United States District
Judge Walter Bastian within a half hour of the end of the President's speech to ask for issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Judge Bastian scheduled a hearing for 11:30 the next day to hear
arguments on the motion.
Because hearings on emergency motions came before a randomly chosen judge, the hearing the
next day was before Judge Alexander Holtzof, a Truman appointee. Judge Holtzof denied the
motion on the ground that the balance of equities favored the government.
The case was then assigned to Judge David Andrew Pine, who heard the steel companies' motions
for a preliminary injunction. From a tactical perspective, both sides focused on the wrong issues: the
government stressed the ultimate constitutional issue of whether the President had the power to
seize the mills in its papers, while the steel companies appeared to be shying away from that issue
by focusing on the equities and asking the Court merely to enjoin the federal government from
entering into a collective bargaining agreement with the Steelworkers.
Judge Pine indicated, however, that he was interested in the fundamental issue of Presidential
power; even so, the steel companies' attorneys continued to steer the discussion back to the equities
and the President's statutory power under the Taft-Hartley Act. After the attorney for one of the
smaller producers, Armco Steel Corporation, fnally challenged the government's right to seize its
property without Congressional authorization, Judge Pine then asked the attorney for the
government to respond.
The assistant Attorney General may have done more harm to the government's case than the steel
companies had. Asked by Judge Pine for the source of the President's authority, he ofered
"Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article II of the Constitution and whatever inherent, implied or residual
powers may fow therefrom". When the Court asked if the government took the position that "when
the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, . . . it limited the powers of the Congress and limited
the powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the Executive", he assured Judge Pine
that this was the case. He was, however, unable to name any cases that had held that the President
had this power.
His presentation committed the Truman administration to an absolutist version of Presidential power
that went beyond the administration's own position. Truman's supporters in Congress frst distanced
themselves from the argument, then spread the message that Truman disavowed it as well. Finally,
Truman issued a statement responding to a constituent's letter in which he acknowledged in very
general terms the limitations that the Constitution imposed on his power to respond in a national
emergency.
Two days later, Judge Pine issued an injunction barring the government from continuing to hold the
steel plants it had seized. The Steelworkers began their strike within minutes of the announcement
of the injunction. The government promptly appealed.
It frst, however, formally requested that Judge Pine stay his order, and permit the government to
resume control of the plants, ending the strike by the Steelworkers. He declined to do so. The
government then applied for a stay in the D.C. Circuit. The Court, sitting en banc, granted the
government's request for a stay by a fve to four vote on April 30, then denied a motion for
reconsideration by the steel companies that sought to amend the stay order to bar the government
from increasing wages by the same margin the following day. The stay granted by the Court of
Appeals was conditioned, however, on the government's fling of a petition for certiorari by May 2,
1952 and only lasted until the Supreme Court acted on that petition.
The government fled its petition for certiorari on May 2, only to discover that the steel companies
had already fled one of their own. The government renewed its request for a stay.
In the meantime, the White House convened a meeting between the Steelworkers and the major
steel companies on May 3. Those talks made rapid progress and might have produced an
agreement, if the announcement that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari and issued a stay
allowing the government to maintain possession of the steel mills but coupled with an order
barring any increase in wages during the pendency of the appeal had not removed any incentive
the steel companies had to reach agreement on a new contract with the union.
Proceedings before the Court
The Court set the matter for oral argument on May 12, 1952, less than ten days later. The
government's brief opened with an attack on Judge Pine's application of equitable principles to the
facts before him, but devoted much of its 175 pages to the historical records of governmental seizure
of private property during wartime, from the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 through
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and seizure of telegraph and railroad lines to the government's
seizure of industrial properties in the First and Second World Wars.
The steel industry's brief focused instead on the lack of statutory authority for this seizure,
emphasizing Congress' decision when enacting the Taft-Hartley Act to give the President the power
to seek an injunction against strikes that might afect the national economy instead. It denied that the
President had any power to seize private property without express legislative authorization, noting
that Truman himself had asked for such legislative authority when the United Mine Workers of
America went out on strike in 1950.
The Court set aside fve hours for oral argument by the parties, while allowing the Steelworkers and
the railroad unions to speak as amicus curiae. Before an overfow crowd, John W. Davis argued for
the steel companies that the President had no powers to make laws or, more particularly, to seize
property without Congressional authorization. He explained away his own actions when he had
defended the government's seizure of property while he had been Solicitor General in the Wilson
administration and urged the justices to look beyond the transitory labor dispute before them to the
constitutional principles at stake, closing with Thomas Jeferson's words, slightly misquoted, "In
questions of power let no more be said of confdence in man but bind him down from mischief by the
chains of the Constitution". Justice Frankfurter was the only Justice to interrupt Davis with a
question, and only one, during his argument.
Truman's Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman had a rockier argument, as the Justices pressed him
with questions on many of the points he made. Justice Jackson took pains to distinguish the facts
concerning the seizure of the North American Aviation Company in 1941 which he had overseen as
Attorney General at the time. Justice Douglas commented that if Perlman were correct as to the
scope of the President's powers, then there was no need for Congress. When Perlman attempted to
close on a rousing note, reminding the Justices that this was wartime, Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter immediately contradicted him, noting that Congress had not declared war.
Goldberg, speaking for the Steelworkers, addressed whether the Taft-Hartley Act would have
allowed for injunctive relief in these circumstances. The attorneys for the railroad brotherhoods, who
were parties to a similar action coming up for review, addressed the President's inherent powers.
Davis then gave his rebuttal, using only a few minutes of the hour he had reserved.
Even despite the Court's evident lack of sympathy for the broad claims of inherent power made by
the government, Truman and many other observers expected the Court to uphold his authority to act
in the absence of express statutory authorization. Many commentators predicted that the Court
would avoid the constitutional question, while others stressed the background that all of the Justices
had in the New Deal and Fair Deal, when the powers of the Presidency had expanded greatly, and
the past support of Justices such as Black, Reed, Frankfurter, and Douglas for the expansive
application of the President's war powers.
As it turns out, most of those predictions were wrong. While Justice Burton harbored fears at one
point that he might be the only Justice to vote against the government's position, he was encouraged
by his private conversations with other Justices. In the end, the Court voted by six to three to afrm
the District Court's injunction barring the President from seizing the steel plants.
Majority opinion
Justice Black wrote for the majority, although the number of divergent concurring opinions made it
clear that he did not necessarily speak for it. Black took, as he often did, an absolutist view, holding
that the President had no power to act except in those cases expressly or implicitly authorized by the
Constitution or an act of Congress. The Korean War efort increased the demand for steel. Disputes
arose between steel industry management and labor that culminated in an announcement of a strike
by the union. President Truman authorized Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to take possession of
the steel industry and keep the mills operating. The Attorney General also took the position that
"when the sovereign people adopted the Constitution, it limited the powers of the Congress and
limited the powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the Executive." Goldberg,
speaking for the Steelworkers, addressed whether the Taft-Hartley Act would have allowed for
injunctive relief in these circumstances. The attorneys for the railroad brotherhoods addressed the
President's inherent powers. The Government's position is that the order was made on fndings of
the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe, which would inevitably
result from a stoppage of steel production.
Concurring opinions
William O. Douglas
Douglas took a similarly absolutist approach to the President's assertion of inherent power to cope
with a national emergency.
Felix Frankfurter
Frankfurter avoided the sweeping condemnation of the administration's claims that Black and
Douglas had ofered. While he would not rule out the possibility that the President might acquire the
power to take certain actions by a long course of conduct unobjected to by Congress, he found the
statutory history persuasive evidence that Congress had not acquiesced, much less authorized
seizure of private property in the absence of a formal declaration of war.
Robert Jackson
Jackson's opinion took a similarly fexible approach to the issue, eschewing any fxed boundaries
between Congress' and the President's power. Jackson divided Presidential authority vis a vis
Congress into three categories, ranked in descending order of legitimacy: (1) those cases in which
the President was acting with express or implied authority from Congress, (2) cases in which
Congress had thus far been silent, and (3) cases in which the President was defying congressional
orders. He classifed this case as falling within the third category.
Harold Hitz Burton
Burton likewise held that Congress, not the President, possessed the power to act in emergencies
because it had exclusive power to pass legislation. He relied on the language and legislative history
of the Taft-Hartley Act to fnd that Congress had not authorized seizure of plants involved in a labor
dispute without express legislative authorization. He hedged, however, on whether the President
might, in more extreme circumstances, have authority to act.
Tom Campbell Clark
Justice Clark, who had been Truman's Attorney General for four years before Truman appointed him
to the Court, rejected Black's and Douglas' absolutist approach, holding that the President did have
some inherent power to act in the case of grave and imperative national emergencies. Clark refused,
however, to defne the boundaries of that power; in his view the fact that Congress had provided in
the Taft-Hartley Act, the Selective Service Act or the Defense Production Act for procedures that the
executive could have used, ended the discussion by barring the President from relying on any
inherent powers he might otherwise have to choose a solution other than the ones that Congress
had allowed.
Dissenting opinion
Chief Justice Vinson dissented; Justices Reed and Minton joined him. His opinion dealt at some
length with the history of presidential seizures; in the oral presentation of his opinion he went out of
his way to make a sarcastic reference to the contrary positions that Jackson and Clark had taken
when they were the Attorneys General for Roosevelt and Truman, respectively. Rejecting the view
that Congress had limited the executive's authority to seize property in this case by providing for
diferent procedures in the legislation it had enacted, Vinson's opinion nonetheless appeared to
recognize Congress' primacy in enacting legislation, justifying the seizure in this case as necessary
to preserve the status quo so that Congress could act in the future, but mocking arguments based
on the Constitution's provision allowing the President to recommend legislation, rather than to make
it himself, as "the messenger-boy concept of the Ofce".
Efects of the decision
Within minutes of the Court's ruling, Truman ordered Commerce Secretary Charles Sawyer to return
the steel mills to their owners. Sawyer did so immediately. The Steelworkers went out on strike again
shortly thereafter. The strike lasted for more than ffty days until the President threatened to use the
somewhat cumbersome procedures under the Selective Service Act to seize the mills.
Truman was stunned by the decision, which he continued to attack years later in his Memoirs.
Justice Black was concerned enough that Truman would take the decision personally that he invited
Truman and his fellow Justices to a party at his home. Truman, still smarting from the defeat, was
mollifed somewhat by Black's hospitality; as he told Black, "Hugo, I don't much care for your law,
but, by golly, this bourbon is good".
The multiplicity of opinions made it difcult to determine just what the Court had decided as to
whether and when the President had authority to act without Congressional authorization. In large
part this was the result of the fact that the administration had made a weak case the evidence of
an actual emergency was tenuous, given the substantial stockpiles of steel products in many sectors
of the economy at the time even weaker by overstating its position and ofering incoherent
arguments in the early phases of the litigation that turned public opinion against it, while framing the
public debate in the most simplistic terms.
The decision nonetheless has had a broad impact. It represented a check on the most extreme
claims of executive power at the time. It also represented the Court's assertion of its own role in
intervening in political questions, as the Court later did in Baker v. Carr and Powell v. McCormack.
The Court also applied the Frankfurter-Jackson approach to analyzing Congress' legislative
authorization of Presidential action in invalidating eforts by the Nixon administration to plant
wiretaps without prior judicial approval, while citing it more generally in support of its decision to
permit litigation against the President to proceed in Clinton v. Jones. The high court also relied on
Youngstown in Medelln v. Texas, 06-984 (2008). In that case, President Bush had pressured the
state of Texas to review the murder conviction of a Mexican citizen who had tortured and raped two
teenage girls in 1993, arguing that a 2004 decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
required law enforcement authorities to tell the accused of his right under the Vienna Convention to
notify Mexican diplomats of his detention. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that ICJ rulings were
not enforceable in the United States, and Bush's actions were unconstitutional. Quoting Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, Chief Justice John Roberts concluded, "The president's authority to act, as with the
exercise of any governmental power, 'must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself.'"[2]
But the Court drew back from some of the implications of its decision, refusing to rely on
Youngstown as authority to review the failed challenges brought against the War in Vietnam and
deferring to the Executive's authority over foreign policy in cases such as Zemel v. Rusk. The Court
cited Youngstown in the 2006 decision Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
Additional read: http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=kl79-
WaRCnoC&pg=PA317&lpg=PA317&dq=The+Steel+Seizure+case,+343+US+579,+96+L.Ed.+1153&
source=bl&ots=rw9MfWVMJG&sig=tdgQj_DJfsT8MD1C1XmFRunPPg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Z4gaUJf-
C62ziQeC1IDADA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=The%20Steel%20Seizure%20case%2C%20343%2 0US
%20579%2C%2096%20L.Ed.%201153&f=false
Salient Points:
Principle of Blending of Powers
Instance when powers are not confned exclusively within onedepartment but are assigned to or
shared by shared by severaldepartments.
Principle of Checks and Balances
Allows one department to resist encroachments upon itsprerogatives or to rectify mistakes or
excesses committed by the otherdepartments.
Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youngstown_Sheet_
%26_Tube_Co._v._Sawyer#Background
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21492680/Constitutional-Law-1-File-No-3
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Bowsher v. Synar, 478 US 714
Facts
Under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, allowable defcit levels were calculated with an eye to
eliminating the federal defcit. If the budget exceeded the allowable defcit, across-the-board cuts
were required. Directors of the Ofce of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional
Budget Ofce (CBO) were required to report to the Comptroller General regarding their
recommendations for how much must be cut. The Comptroller General then evaluated these reports,
made his own conclusion, and made a recommendation to the President, who was then required to
issue an order efecting the reductions required by the Comptroller General unless Congress made
the required cuts in other ways within a specifed amount of time. The Comptroller General is
nominated by the President from a list of three people recommended by the presiding ofcers of the
House and Senate. He is removable only by impeachment or a joint resolution of Congress, which
requires majority votes in both houses and is subject to a Presidential veto. Congress can give a
number of reasons for this removal, including "inefciency," "neglect of duty," or "malfeasance."
Holding
The Congress cannot control how its laws are executed. Since it doesn't possess this power, it can't
delegate it to its agents. The Comptroller General is an agent of Congress because it can remove
him by a process other than impeachment. The Comptroller General exercises executive power and
therefore, the Act is unconstitutional.
Reasoning
(1) Defnition of "executive power." The Comptroller General's function under the Act is the "very
essence" of execution of the laws since (1) it entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what
kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the Comptroller General commands the
President to carry out, without variation, his directive regarding the budget resolutions. Once
Congress passes legislation, it can only infuence its execution by passing new laws or through
impeachment.
(2) Impeachment. The Constitution only provides Congress the power to remove executive ofcers by
impeachment. Also, the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would have
permitted impeachment for "maladministration," with Madison arguing that "so vague a term will be
equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate." Thus, Congress can only remove a member of
the executive branch through impeachment.
White's Dissent
Justice White's dissent argued that the act should have been upheld. Determining the level of
spending by the federal government is a legislative function, not an executive one, he argued. Even
if the power were executive, White did not see anything wrong with delegating that power to an
agent as long as Congress can only infuence him by a means that is subject to the Presentment
and Bicameralism Clause requirements, which the act satisfed, since the Comptroller General can
only be 'infuenced' by Congress through a joint resolution.
Additional Read: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/478/714/
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Because [the legislativeranchintheformof]bCongress retained
removal authority, he may not be entrusted with executive powers.
Sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bowsher_v._Synar
http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/administrative-law/administrative-law-keyed-to-strauss/agencies-
and-the-structural-constitution/bowsher-v-synar/
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Senate v. Ermita (E.O.464), G.R. No. 169777
-Requisites of Judicial Review -Legislative
Inquiry vs. Executive Privilege -Executive
Privilege, defned
-Kinds of Executive Privilege
-Executive Privilege as applied to an ofcial
-Constitutionality of EO 464
FACTS:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the
Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various ofcials of the Executive Department and AFP
ofcials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive
Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on
Sept. 29 in order to aford said ofcials amplepreparetimefor theand opportuni various issues so that they may
better enlighten the Senate Committe refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, efective immediately, which, among others,
mandated that allofdepartmentheads of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of C
Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP ofcials
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite
the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP ofcials invited,
attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES:
Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented EO
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation
RULING:
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised as the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Salient Points:
LEGAL STANDING
Standing of the Senate
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public
decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed.
EO 464, however, allegedly stifes the ability of the members of Congress to access information that
is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and
direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the
constitutionality of EO 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their ofce and are allowed to sue to question
the validity of any ofcial action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
Standing of an ordinary citizen
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders and other regulations must be direct and
personal. In Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfes the requirement of
personal interest.
Requisites for transcendental importance: Establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or
other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3)
the lack of any party with a more direct and specifc interest in raising the questions being raised.
ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY
The Court fnds respondents assertion that the President has not wi the appearance of the ofcials concerned
immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case
or controversy insofar as EO 464 is concerned. For EO 464 does not require either a deliberative
withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar ofcials
from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of ofcials invited
to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further
event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer
abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of EO 464.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21, Art. VI. But as early as 1950 (the
1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision) in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Court already
recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. xxx
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover ofcials of the executive branch may be deduced
from the same case. The power of inquiry...is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters
which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of
investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
xxx the power of inquiry, with process tothe necessitynforceoftheit,informationis grounded in the legislative
process. If the information possessed by executive ofcials on the operation of their
ofces is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the
right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
The power of inquiry is subject to judicial review
xxx the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to
abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the
Courts certiorari powers under Sec. 1, Art. VIII.
For one...the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the
constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically,
one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result...is to indicate in its invitations to the public
ofcials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its investigations, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room
for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Sec. 21, Art. VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry.
The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with t published rules of procedure, necessarily
implying the constitutional infrmity of an inquiry conducted
without duly published rules of procedure. Sec. 21 also mandates that the rights of persons
appearing in or afected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to
adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
Exemption to power of inquiry
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions falls under the rubric of executive privilege.
Executive privilege, defned
Schwartz defnes executive privilege as the power of the Government
the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly,PresidentRozell defnes and high-level executive branch ofcers
to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately the public.
Kinds of executive privilege
One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets privilege...on the ground that the information is of
such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety
is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not who furnish information of violations of law to
ofcers charged with the enforcement of that law.
Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental
documents refecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of
a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would
be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the
question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the
traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
The principle of executive privilege
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only
in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a
constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify
it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive ofcials are
exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive ofcials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
xxx
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive ofcial may be exempted from this power the President
on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest ofcial of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is
exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary.
Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464
Section 1, in view of its specifc reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to
inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI xxx
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to
appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states that executive privilege
actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege...is properly invoked in
relation to specifc categories of information and not to categories of persons.
The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specifc allegation of basis thereof
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not sufce to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of ofce,
has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such
declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classifed as
privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on frst impression, do not seem like a claim
of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the
question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must,
therefore, be clearly asserted xxx
Absent then a statement of the specifc basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected xxx
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A
useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-
incrimination xxx
The claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it
merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent. It is woefully insufcient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is
justifed under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress.
In fne, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated.
EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of ofces in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain
information as privileged
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of ofce determines that a
certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to and has the efect of prohibiting the ofcial from
appearing before Congress, subject only to the
express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such ofcial. These
provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege...is recognized with respect to information the confdential nature of which is
crucial to the fulfllment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important
executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain
informations (sic) must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confdential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by defnition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court fnds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to
invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is By order of the President, which means that he person privilege being an extraordinary power, it must
be wielded only by the highest ofcial in the executive
hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
How executive privilege should be applied in the case of an ofcial
xxx when an ofcial is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might
be covered by executive privilege, he must be aforded reasonable time to inform the President or
the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter
indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, afer the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect
the failure of the ofcial to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal
means to compel his appearance.
Right to Information
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information
does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government ofcials.
These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualifed sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive assistance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information
which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions
which they can then communicate to their representatives and other governmental ofcials through
various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression xxx
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464 is, therefore, in
the sense explained above, just as direct as powerits ofviolationinquiry. of the le
Implementation of EO 464 prior to its publication
While EO 464 applies only to ofcials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not
directly apply to people in genera, Tanada v. Tuvera states: The te and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not afect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of the law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper
party, even in courts of justice.
Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged
order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, EO 464 has a direct
efect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter
of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process
thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.
Sources: http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/11/senate-vs-
ermita.html Full text of case
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7. Non-delegation of powers
Phil. Interisland Shipping Ass'n. v. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22, 1997
FACTS
On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive Order
No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES
RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS.
The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fxed by
the PPA.
However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn
hastily and without prior consultation: that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the
operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its implementation; and
that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations. 4
The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 efective November 16, 1986.
This in turn drew a warning from the PPA that disciplinary sanctions would be applied to those who
would charge rates under E.O. No. 1088. The PPA instead issued Memorandum Circular No. 43-86,
fxing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
Consequently, the UHPAP fled on January 7, 1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, against the then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Hernando Perez,
and PPA General Manager, Primitivo S. Soils, Jr. It sought a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
for the immediate implementation of E.O. No. 1088, as well as a temporary restraining order to stop
PPA ofcials from imposing disciplinary sanctions against UHPAP members charging rates in
accordance with E.O. No. 1088.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-38913, was rafed to Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila which issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the PPA from threatening the
UHPAP, its ofcers and its members with suspension and other disciplinary action for collecting
pilotage fees pursuant to E.O. No. 1088.
On March 16, 1987, the Chamber of Maritime Industries of the Philippines, William Lines, Inc.,
Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. and Delsen Transport Lines, Inc., after obtaining leave, fled a joint
answer in intervention.
On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88,
entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA announced in its
order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines and the pilots, the fxing of
mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fxed by it (PPA) under
Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CHALLENGED DECISION OF RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 41, WHICH RULED THAT:
(1) CIVIL CASE NO. 87-38913 HAS NOT BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WITH THE
ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 02-88; AND
(2) HEREIN PETITIONERS ARE BOUND TO COMPLY WITH E.O. NO. 1088;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DISMISSING CA G.R. SP. NO. 19570 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION?
III. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE NAPOLEON FLOJO COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS FOR
CONTEMPT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF A.O.
NO. 05-92?
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the several petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.
Salient Points:
The fxing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When heissued E.O. No. 1088, President
Marcos was authorized underAmendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise
legislativepower, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, whenhe issued P.D. NO. 857
which created the PPA, endowing it with thepower to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports.
Although thepower to fx rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, itbecame necessary to
rationalize the rates of charges fxed by itthrough the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the
Presidentdid in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegatethe ratemaking power
to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specifcinstances without thereby withdrawing the power
vested by P.D.No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fx, prescribe,increase or decrease
such rates, charges or fees... for the servicesrendered by the Authority or by any private
organization within aPort District
(Philippine Interisland Shipping Ass'n vs. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22,1997)
General Rule: Potestas delegate non potest delegare
Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes notonly a right but also a duty to
be performed by the delegate throughthe instrumentality of his own judgment and not through
theintervening mind of another
Sources:
Full text of case
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21492680/Constitutional-Law-1-File-No-3
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Permissible Delegation
1. Tarif Powers to the President
2. Emergency Powers to the President
First Emergency Powers cases, 84 Phil. 368
Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan
FACTS:
Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit
Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue
of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is
an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is fled by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from
disbursing funds-50][frompursuant49 to-3056EO is225fled.by LBarredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is
appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT
DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the
petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and efect hence all EOs passed pursuant to
it had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law.
In setting the frst regular session of Congress instead of the frst special session which preceded it
as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving efect to the purpose and intention of the
National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider such subjects as he (President) may
designate. Such acts were to be good only corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the
amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues
must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or
upon early repeal.
Second Emergency Powers cases, 92 Phil. 603
ARTICLE VII DELEGATION OF POWERS
Eulogio Rodriguez, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners
v.
Vicente
Gella , ETC., ET AL., respondents
(92 PHIL. 603 [Feb. 2, 1953])
Ponente: Paras, C.J
Facts:Petitioners herein seek to invalidate E.O. Nos. 545 and 546issued on November 10, 1952, the
frst appropriating the sumof P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and thesecond
setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, foods,
drought,earthquakes and other calamities. E.O.s were issued by virt Emergency Powers Act.
Issue:WON E.O.s Nos. 545 and 546 are valid?
Held: NO. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides thatin emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, x x x to prescribe/promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out a declared national policy. The said powers are limited in the prescribed
period. It cannot be exercised at any time as the President may want to be.
Salient points:
Permissible Delegation
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a system of probation for persons eighteen
years of age or over who areconvicted of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1)
Thatsaid Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2)that it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (3)that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning powerexclusively in the Chief Executive. But,
probation and pardon arenot coterminous; nor are they the same. In probation, theprobationer is in
no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is notfnally and completely exonerated. He is not
exempt from the entirepunishment which the law inficts. The Court held that theProbation Act does
not confict with the pardoning power of theExecutive. The pardoning power, in respect to those
serving theirprobationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if theProbation Law had never
been enacted. The President may yetpardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of
thecourt to order his rearrest and imprisonment.
The power to make laws or the legislative power is vested in abicameral Legislature by the Jones
Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiralNational Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1,
Constitutionof the Philippines. The Philippine Legislature or the NationalAssembly may not escape
its duties and responsibilities bydelegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attemptto
abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestasdelegata non delegare
potest no delegated powers can be further delegated.
The rule, however,which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute andinfexible. It
admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned byimmemorial practice permits the central legislative
body todelegate legislative powers to local authorities. In testing whether astatute constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power or not, itis usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in
all its termsand provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so thatnothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegateof the legislature (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56)
(A) Tarif Powers to the President (Sec.28 (2), Art. VI;(2)
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fxwithin specifed limits, and subject to such
limitations andrestrictions as it may impose, tarif rates, import and exportquotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
(B) Emergency Powers to the President(Section 23 (2), Art VI)(2)
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limitedperiod and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out adeclared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn byresolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease uponthe next adjournment thereof.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fx the duration of itsefectiveness. The intention of the
Act has to be sought for in itsnature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved,and
its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the Constitutionprovides that any law passed by virtue
thereof should be "for alimited period." "Limited" has been defned to mean "restricted;bounded;
prescribed; confned within positive bounds; restrictive induration, extent or scope." The words
"limited period" as used inthe Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictivein
duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or
it can not be said to bean emergency." The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act
wouldnot be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new anddiferent law were necessary to
terminate the delegation, theperiod for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, wouldbe
unlimited, indefnite, negative and uncertain; "that which wasintended to meet a temporary
emergency may become permanentlaw,"; for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it
would,the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and theCongress might not be able to
override the veto. Furthermore, thiswould create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate
itspowers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall themexcept by a two-third vote. In other
words, it would be easier forCongress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is notright
and is not, and ought not to be, the law.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by theExecutive when Congress is in the
unobstructed exercise of itsauthority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodiesoperating
over the same feld, legislating concurrently andsimultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's
actions. Even if theemergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspendedwhile Congress
was in session and be revived after eachadjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress
by atwo-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by thePresident during congressional
recess, and the President in turncould treat in the same manner, between sessions of
Congress,laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; intwo instances it
materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired onlyby the best interests of the country as they saw
them, a formerPresident promulgated an executive order regulating house rentalsafter he had vetoed
a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, andthe present Chief Executive issued an executive order
on exportcontrol after Congress had refused to approve the measure.What then was the
contemplated period? President Quezon in thesame paragraph of his autobiography furnished part
of the answer.He said he issued the call for a special session of the NationalAssembly "when it
became evident that we were completelyhelpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It
is our considered opinion, and weso hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative
when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued withoutauthority of law. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive
has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended,and may act on the strength of his opinion and
fndings inc ontravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legalprinciple can be found to
support the proposition. There is nopretense that the President has independent or inherent power
toissue such executive orders as those under review.
First EmergencyPowers Cases, 84 Phil 368
After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the
emergency powers, or some of them, wasdesired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the
approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a
result of war" envisaged in the preamblereferred to the impending invasion and occupation of
thePhilippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganizationof the Government, principally
the impossibility for the NationalAssembly to act. The state of afairs was one which called for
immediate action and with which the National Assembly wouldwould not be able to cope. The war
itself and its attendant chaosand calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had
theNational Assembly been in a position to operate.
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutionalprovision, it has to be assumed that the
National Assemblyintended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended thatthe Act has not yet
been duly repealed, and such step is necessaryto a cessation of the emergency powers delegated
to the President,the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may neverbe repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so,the President may wield his veto. This eventuality
has in fact takenplace when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealingall Emergency
Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congressand the President or either as the principal
authority to determinethe indefnite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, ? inpalpable
repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grantthereunder must be for a limited period,
necessarily to be fxed inthe law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either
the Congress or the President.Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President
anddid not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least beconsidered as a concurrent resolution
of the Congress formallydeclaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contendthat the Bill
needed presidential acquiescence to produce efect,would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd,
situation that, "whileCongress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it mightnot be able to
recall them except by two-third vote. In other words,it would be easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to takethem back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be thelaw."Insofar as the
Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act ona given matter, the emergency powers
delegated to the Presidenthad been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546must
be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress
has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the
Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task
theCongress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to
withdraw the same from thePresident. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the
2nd Emergency Powers Cases, 92 Phil 603
President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for thesake of speed and expediency in the
interest and for the welfare of the people, because we have the Constitution, designed toestablish a
government under a regime of justice, liberty anddemocracy. In line with such primordial objective, our
Governmentis democratic in form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless and until
changed or amended, we shall have toabide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared
toaccept the consequences resulting from or inherent indisagreements between, inaction or even refusal
of the legislativeand executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some casesto have prompt ofcial
action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of
powersin any one man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framersof the Constitution, however,
had the vision of and were careful inallowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for alimited
period "in times of war or other national emergency." Theyhad thus entrusted to the good judgment of the
Congress the dutyof coping with any national emergency by a more efcientprocedure; but it alone must
decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hopeand
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfsh patriotismof all ofcials and in their faithful
adherence to the Constitution
Sources:
First Emergency power cases, 84 Phil 368
Second Emergency power cases, 92 phil 603
Salient points
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3. Delegation to the People
4. Delegation to Local Government Units
5. Delegation to the Administrative Bodies
Power of Subordinate Legislation
Principle of Subdelegation of Powers
Doctrine of Qualifed Political Agency
G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and
JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents.
Facts :
Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude
joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development,
and utilization of mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the efectivity of the 1987
Constitutionshall ntobeproductionconverted-sharing agreementsi within one (1) year from
the efectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 8 submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-
Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the efectivity
of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry,
and sand and gravel claims, after their respective efectivity dates compelled the Miners Association
of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
holders, to fle the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.
Issue :
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?
Ruling :
Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the
old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license,
concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order
No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession
or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing
mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other
words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of
Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and
their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and efect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or
agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211
referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power
of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No.
279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to
carry into efect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Salient points:
Delegation to the People (Sec. 32,Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art X; Sec. 2, Art.XVII; RA 6735);Section 32.
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enactlaws or approve or reject
any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registrationof
a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislativedistrict must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
thereof.Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may becreated, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundarysubstantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly afected.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within fve years following the
ratifcation of thisConstitution nor oftener than once every fve years thereafter.The Congress shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
Delegation to Local Government Units (Art. X; RA 7160);
ARTICLE X
The Administrator
Section 480. Qualifcations, Terms, Powers and Duties.
(a) No person shall be appointed administrator unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of
the local government unit concerned, of good moral character, a holder of a college degree
preferably in public administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized college or
university, and a frst grade civil service eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience
in management and administration work for at least fve (5) years in the case of the provincial or city
administrator, and three (3) years in the case of the municipal administrator.
The term of administrator is coterminous with that of his appointing authority.
The appointment of an administrator shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments, and
optional for the municipal government.
(b) The administrator shall take charge of the ofce of the administrator and shall:
(1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case
may be, implement the same particularly those which have to do with the management and
administration-related programs and projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to
implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this Code;
(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the administrator shall:
(i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the ofcials of the local government unit, under the
supervision, direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene
the chiefs of ofces and other ofcials of the local government unit;
(2)Establish and maintain a sound personnel program for the local government unit designed to
promote career development and uphold the merit principle in the local government service;
(3) Conduct a continuing organizational development of the local government unit with the end in
view of the instituting efective administrative reforms;
(3) Be in the frontline of the delivery of administrative support services, particularly those related
to the situations during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;
(4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor, as the case may be, on all
other matters relative to the management and administration of the local government unit; and
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed
by law or by ordinance.
Delegation to the Administrative Bodies1.1.1Power of Subordinate Legislation
The power of administrative ofcials to promulgate rules andregulations in the implementation of a
statute is necessarily limitedonly to carrying into efect what is provided in the legislativeenactment.
The questioned administrative orders are reasonablydirected to the accomplishment of the purposes
of the law underwhich they were issued and were intended to secure theparamount interest of the
public, their economic growth andwelfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative
OrderNos. 57 and 82 are sustained, and their force and efect upheld (Miners Assn vs. Factoran, GR
98332, Jan. 16, 1995)
.
Principle of Sub-delegation of Powers1.1.3
delegatus non potest delegare, one to whom power is delegated cannot himself that power.
Doctrine of Qualifed Political Agency or Alter Ego Principle
Acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments whenperformed and promulgated in the regular
course of business orunless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive arepresumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v. Secy of Interior, 67 Phil 451).
Sources:
Full text of case
Case digest
RA 7160 (Art. X)
Salient points
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tests for valid delegation
1. Completeness Test
2. Sufcient Standard Test
G.R. No. 74457 March 20,
1987 RESTITUTO YNOT,
petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confscated for violation of Executive Order No
626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No.
626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still ft for farm
work or breeding.
Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process.
Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difcult to see how prohibiting the
transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing.
Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer
of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo,
ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C.
ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO
AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on
Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.
FACTS In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing thesThereforJudiciary, Ap and for Other Purposes, was
passed. De la Llana was assailing its v would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the
reorganization and second, he
said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of
judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute
(BP 129).
HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight members, order thei competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was
vested with
such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the ofce. There can be no tenure to a non-existent ofce. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an ofce with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
efect is one of separation. As to its efect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
the ofce. Realistically, it is devoid of signifcance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not
render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court
could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could
do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there
any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That
remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore
from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power
of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this
Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional
taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover,
such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be
preferred.
---
Legislative standard need not be expressed
---
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943
Facts
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, American public opinion initially stood by the large population
of Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast, and believed that their loyalty to the United States
was unquestionable.[1] Six weeks later, though, public opinion turned against Japanese Americans
living in on the West Coast, as the press and other Americans became nervous about the potential
for ffth column activity. Though the administration (including the President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover) dismissed all rumors of Japanese-American espionage on behalf of
the Japanese War efort, pressure mounted upon the Administration as the tide of public opinion
turned against Japanese-Americans.
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an Executive Order 9066 which
permitted the Lieutenant General DeWitt (as head of the military for most of the Western United
States) to confne and exclude certain persons from "military areas," regardless of their ancestry or
country of citizenship. Over the course of several weeks, LTG DeWitt imposed several public
proclamations, which frst imposed a curfew upon resident aliens of Japanese descent and upon
Japanese-Americans. Then, later orders confned Japanese and Japanese-Americans to Military
Area No. 1, where Hirabayashi lived. Then, on May 3, 1942, DeWitt issued an order requiring
Japanese and Japanese-Americans to report to ofces, where they would be taken to relocation
centers. (At the time, the terms "relocation centers," "internment camps," and "concentration camps"
were used interchangeably.)
The defendant, Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, was a University of Washington student, who was
accused of violating the curfew order, a misdemeanor based upon Executive Order 9066 and a
subsequent Congressional statute designation the violation of military orders in Military Area Nos. 1
and 2 a misdemeanor. The Justice Department knew that someone would challenge all of the three
substantive elements of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's orders afecting Japanese-Americans:
curfew, exclusion, and internment. The FDR administration, and particularly the Department of
Justice and Francis Biddle sought out test cases it could use to establish favorable precedent and
prepare itself for a case that could challenge the entire internment policy.
Hirabayashi was convicted of violating a curfew and relocation order, and his appeal of this
conviction reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court heard both the Hirabayashi case
and Yasui v. United States during the 1942-1943 term, and released the opinions as companion
cases on June 21, 1943. The Court upheld the curfew order in both the Hirabayashi and Yasui
cases, and the defendants were sent to internment camps.
Later developments
This case has been largely overshadowed by Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
which the U.S. Supreme Court decided the following term. But, though the Korematsu case
challenging the exclusion and internment portions of Executive Order 9066 overshadowed the
Hirabayashi case challenging the curfew portion of the order, the Court's opinion in Korematsu cited
its Hirabayashi opinion, upholding the curfew order.
In 1986 and 1987, Hirabayashi's convictions on both charges were overturned by the U.S. District
Court in Seattle and the Federal Appeals Court, because evidence arose that the Solicitor General's
ofce had argued Japanese American attempts to aid the enemy in its 1943-44 Supreme Court
presentations despite having researched and debunked all the rumored incidents. In 2011, the
Acting Solicitor General ofcially confessed error in that regard.
In May 2012, President Obama awarded Gordon Hirabayashi posthumously the Presidential Medal
of Freedom, America's highest civilian honor.
Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253
Facts
In 1990, President Aquino issued E. O. No. 439 wherein she picked certain provinces and cities,
some of which did not participate in the inclusion to the ARMM, to the reorganized to new regions
(e.g. Misamis Occidental, whichdid not participate in the ARMM plebiscite, was transferred from
Region X to Region XI). Aquino issued said E. O.pursuant ant R. A. 6734, which the provinces and cities voting
favorably in suitable plebiscites shall beincluded in the ARMM. The
provinces and cities which plebiscite no vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shallremain in
the existing administrative regions. Provided however, that the President may, by administrative
determination,merge existing regions. James Chiongbian, a Sultan Kudarat congressman, fled a
certiorari prohibition to protest the E.O., claiming that President Aquino had no power to reorganize
administrative regions because said provision in R. A. 6734
1) also states that provinces, cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remainthe existing administrative regions
2) the Constitution does not expressly provide the President the power to mergeadministrative
regions; in fact Art. 10, Sec. 10 of the Constitution (see II of your outline) prohibits this and
3) even grantingthat the President is allowed to merge administrative regions, there is law setting
standard on how it is to be done.
Held
Chiongbian is wrong. Reasons:
1)The sentence shall remain in the existing administrative regions phrase, Providedhoweverdentthatmay,
bytheadministrationPresi determination merge the
existing regions.
2)Past legislation, particularly R. A. 5345 issued in 1968, authorized the President the help of a
Commission onReorganization, to reorganize the diferent example departments including
administrative regions. This showsthat traditional power to reorganize administrative regions has
always been lodged in the President
3) The standard is found in R. A. 5345 which states to promote simpli government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with no goals for accelerated social and
economic development and to improve service transaction of the publi
Salient points:
Tests for valid delegation
Completeness Test
Law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions sothat there is nothing for the
delegate to do except to enforce it.
Sufcient Standard Test
Maps out the boundaries of the delegates authority by defning thel the circumstances under which it isto be
pursued.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearingwhich may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as asafeguard against ofcial arbitrariness. It is a gratifyingcommentary
on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of thiscountry is rich with applications of this guaranty
as proof of ourfealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. Thisis not to say that
notice and hearing are imperative in every casefor, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions in viewof the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need toprotect the
general welfare from a clear and present danger. Theprotection of the general welfare is the
particular function of thepolice power which both restraints and is restrained by dueprocess. The
police power is simply defned as the power inherentin the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all thegreat public needs
and is described as the most pervasive, theleast limitable and the most demanding of the three
inherentpowers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain
(Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659)
Legislative standard neednot be expressed
Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated tothe military authorities discriminate
against Americans andresident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the FifthAmendment which
restrains discriminatory legislation by Congressas amounts to denial of due process? The Court found
thePresident's orders and the implementation of the curfew to beconstitutional. Chief Justice Stone,
writing for the unanimous Court,took into account the great importance of military installations
andweapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the"solidarity" that individuals of Japanese
descent felt with theirmotherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actionsserved an important
national interest. The Court ducked the thornyrelocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which
the Courtviewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued thatracial discrimination was
justifed since "in time of war residentshaving ethnic afliations with an invading enemy may be a
greatersource of danger than those of a diferent ancestry
(Hirabayashi vs US,320 US 81)
The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrativeregions have been by the President
pursuant to authority grantedto him by law. The choice of the President as delegate is
logicalbecause the division of the country into regions is intended tofacilitate not only the
administration of local governments but alsothe direction of executive departments which the law
requiresshould have regional ofces. The regions themselves are notterritorial and political divisions
like provinces, cities, municipalitiesand barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces
foradministrative purposes."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislativepower in conferring on the President
the power to mergeadministrative regions. The question is whether Congress hasprovided a
sufcient standard by which the President is to beguided in the exercise of the power granted and
whether in anyevent the grant of power to him is included in the subjectexpressed in the title of the
law. On the question of standard. Alegislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply
begathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in
other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.With respect to the power to
merge existing administrative regions,the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the
grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit:
"to promote simplicity, economy andefciency in the government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economicdevelopment and to improve the
service in the transaction of the public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative
regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logicalto suppose that in authorizing the
President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal
from some of those regions of the provinces nowconstituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose
of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions
(Chionbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253)
Sources:
Case digest (Ynit vs. IAC)
Full text of case
Case digest (de llana vs.
Alba) Full text of case
Hirabashi vs. US 320 US 81
Chiongbian vs. Orbos 245 SCRA 253
Salient points
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. State Immunity (supra)
9. Election through popular will
Act of State
Incorporation Clause
Confict between municipal law and international law
G.R. No. L-7995 May
31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely afected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.
Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the R passed. The said law provides for a
prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this
case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore
it is unconstitutional. Specifcally, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was
violated according to him.
Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided
that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The
Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the
latter is always subject to qualifcation or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never
curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
---
Civilian Supremacy
---
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and
GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staf and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign
are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved. The IBP fled a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents hefactualnecessity ofdeterminationcallingthearmedforcesof t is
subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the
PNP
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufciency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of
the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction diferent category from the power to declare
martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualifcation.
The reason for the diference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is
considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support
the assertion that there exists no justifcation for
calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is militarized , Artin. IIviolationoftheConstitutionof.TheSecdeployment.3 of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are
the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character
of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution,
the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the
PNP.
---
Government to serve and protect the people
People to defend the State
Separation of Church and State
Independent Foreign Policy
Nuclear Free Philippines
Just and dynamic social order
---
Salient Points:
Section 6 (Art. 2 of 1987 Phil. Con). The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
The principle simply means that the Church is not to interfere in purely political matters or temporal
aspects of man's life and the State, in purely matters of religion and morals, which are exclusive
concerns of the other.
This is not as simple as it appears for the exact dividing line between the respective domains or
jurisdictions of the Church and the State has always been the subject matter of much
disagreements.
Section 7(Art. 2 of 1987 Phil. Con). The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its
relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
The Constitution mandates the State to pursue an independent foreign policy, aware of the unwelcome
consequences of a policy characterized by excessive dependence on another country.
(1) and independent foreign policy simply means one that is not subordinate or subject to nor
dependent upon support of another government. An independent nation rejects foreign dictation and
decides for itself what the national interest is and how it is to be promoted and protected.
(2) an independent foreign policy, however, it is not one that completely rejects advice or assistance
from without. Neither does it mean abandoning traditional allies or being isolated from the
international community.
Section 8(Art. 2 of 1987 Phil. Con). The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
The aim of this provision is to forbid the making, storing, manufacture or testing in our country of
nuclear weapons, devices or parts thereof as well as the use of our territory as dumping site for
radioactive wastes and the transit within our territory of ships or planes with nuclear weapons.
Section 9(Art. 2 of 1987 Phil. Con). The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that
will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.
The promotion of just and dynamic social order is accomplished through policies
that provide adequate services (in the feld of health, education, housing, etc.) promote full
employment (see Art. XII Sec. 1; Art. XIII sec. 3 par. 1), and a rising standard of living and an
improved quality of life.
Sources:
Case digest (Ichiong vs.
Hernandez) Full text of case
Case digest (IBP vs. Zamora)
"Texbook on the Philippine Constitution" (Hector De Leon) pgs. 78, 82, 84, 85
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social Justice
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726
Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works
promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to
trafc of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public ofcers. Among
others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional
precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all
people.
Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.
Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group.
Salient points:
Section 10 (Art. 2 of 1987 Phil Con). The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
SOCIAL JUSTICE according to Dr. Jose P. laurel (in Calalang vs. Williams) "Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex."
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
Sources:
Case digest and Salient points