Section 5.

Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making

People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (1970)



Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
In Re Cunanan, 94 PHIL 534 (1953-1954)
Fast facts: The case at bar deals with an RA that, when effected, result in the passage and admittance to the practice of law of peoplewho have
previously flunked the bar exams. The enactment of the RA will result in the admittance of additional 1,094candidates. RA 972An Act to Fix the
Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955. Those who deemed to have passed by virtue of the RA shall be allowed to
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of thePhilippine Bar.OBJECTIVE: to admit to the bar those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from
which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, January 19, 1999
FACTS: The DOJ, through the Department of Justice, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the January 4, 1999 issuance of the Supreme
Court of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray. The DOJ, represented by the Solicitor -General, argued that the Court
no longer has the authority to grant the TRO because: (1) The Court lost its jurisdiction the moment it rendered its judgment that is already final and
executor. (2) It is encroaching on the powers specifically vested by the Supreme Court to the executive department in granting the TRO. (3) The
reason sought to be achieved by the TRO is nothing due to certain supervening events that transpired.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the
fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered.
RULING: No, the Court was within its authority when it granted the TRO despite the final and executory judgment having been rendered already.
Remember: The Court did not lose its jurisdiction when it granted the TRO. In its decision, it categorically answered the contention of the plaintiff in
such that it is not changing its judgment. The Court is merely suspending its execution temporarily.
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Bustos v. Lucero, 81 PHIL 648 (1948)
FACTS: The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound
over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order
that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was
issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.chanroblesAccording to the
memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared
at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not
guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses
could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11
of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the responding judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction
RULING: We are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the
accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in
which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at
the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108
does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue
a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
In Re Admission to the Bar: Argosino Bar Matter 712, 246 SCRA 14
FACTS: A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino
along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The
death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university
fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining,
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years. Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period
of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less than a
month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of
his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14
August 1993.

He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed
a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than
ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3)
Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is allowed to take the lawyers oath date to be set by the Court to practice the legal profession
HELD: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of
Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Fabian v. Desierto, GR 129742
Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation which was engaged
in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT
participated in the bidding for government construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private
respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against private respondent.

Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent
moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondents new counsel had been his classmate and close associate, hence,
he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative
charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to
the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid.
Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the
courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
In Re: De Vera



Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Baguio Markets Vendor v. Judge, GR No. 165922,
Facts: Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) in 2004 filed a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a
mortgage under Act 3135 and requested for exemption of payment of fees by invoking Article 62(2) of the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines (RA 6938). Respondent Judge denied the request citing that exemption is only covered by the Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities certain suits of LGUs. Petitioner sought reconsideration but Respondent Judge denied its motion stating that fees
collected under Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine Government but to a special fund under the Courts control.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines)?

Ruling: Article 62(6) of RA6938 does not give the petitioner the authority to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees because:
a. The fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to action brought under RA6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage under Act 3135 (An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages)
b. Petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of
obligations on behalf of cooperatives.

Petition is DENIED and Court affirms the Orders of the court a quo of Baguio City.


Important Point of the case:
Payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, therefore such a rule cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress.

Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Republic v. Gingoyon, GR No. 166429
Facts: The controversy stems from the promulgation of the Courts 2003 decision in Agan vs. PIATCO which nullified the Concession Agreement
for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III entered into between the Philippine
Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).

At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing
completion. Following the nullification of the contracts, the decision was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities as well as
whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for the construction of the facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the
NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO.

In December 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC and sought for the issuance of a writ of
possession, authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government declared that it had
deposited the amount of P3 Billion, representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value. The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court governs the expropriation proceedings while PIATCO claims that RA8974 should apply.
Issue: Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or RA8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case?
Ruling: RA8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case because the NAIA3 is a national government project. Rule 67
outlines the procedure with which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government to expropriate questionable private property.


Important Point of the case:
The Supreme Court has sole prerogative to promulgate rules pertaining to points of procedure, and not points of substantive
law. Since expropriation involves both procedural and substantive matter, the substantive aspect is left to legislation.

Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Maniago v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 104392

Facts: Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from
Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his buses met a vehicular accident with a passenger
jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. Consequently, a criminal case was filed against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya,
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by
private respondent Boado against Maniago. Maniago moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the
pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in
the criminal case. The lower court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed
independently of the criminal action.


Issue: Whether Boado can file a separate civil action against Maniago, despite no reservation has been made?



Ruling: No. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear in providing that a separate civil action must be reserved prior to the institution of a
criminal case. Without such reservation, it would be deemed that a complainant has agreed to have the civil action for damages be included
in the criminal suit.

Important Point of the case:
It is a matter of procedure whenever two actions must be tried in a single proceeding.
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Javellana v. DILG, GR No. 102549
Facts: In October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives
Atty. Javellana, an elected City Councilor of Bago City,Negros Occidental and continuously engaging in the practice of law. City Engineer Divinagracia filed an administrative case against Atty.
Javellana, for continuously engaging in the practice of law.Javellana also assails the constitutionality of Section 90 of RA 7169 the ground that the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law.
Issue: WON the Memorandum Circulars No. 80-38 and section 90 of RA 7160 was in violation of Art. 8 Section 5 of the constitution.
Held: NO, the law must be seen not as a rule on the practice of law but as rule on the conduct of officials intended to prevent conflict of interest.
Hence, the section 90 of RA 7160 was not in violation of the constitution.

Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Bar Matter No. 1222
Facts: The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was
employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during
the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had
downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.
Issue: WON the court may nullify the results of the Bar examination.
Held:"Bar Matter No. 1222.- Re: 2003 Bar Examinations.- Acting on the report and recommendation by the Chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee concerning the examination conducted on the morning of September 21, 2003 on the subject of Mercantile Law,
the Court Resolved to:
(a) NULLIFY the examination on this subject, in view of the Court's findings which affect the integrity of the examination in Mercantile
Law; and
(b) HOLD another examination in Mercantile Law on Saturday October 4, 2003, eight o'clock in the evening (being the earliest available
time and date) at the same venue (De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila.)
This resolution is without prejudice to any further action the Court may take on the matter."
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
Garrido v. Garrido, AC No. 6593
Facts: The wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido, Mrs. MaelostiseaGarrido, filed a case against his husband and his mistress Atty. Romana P. Valencia. The
two lawyers were having an illicit affair and have a child of their own. It was shown that the two got married in Hong Kong during the 70s. Then in
1993 Atty. Angel and Mrs. Garrido separated and Atty. Angel chose to live with his mistress and has since failed to render financial support for the
children of his legal wife.
The wife filed for a disbarment case against the two lawyers on the ground of gross immorality before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Discipline. The respondent contested that they were not yet lawyer when they have committed the alleged immoralities; hence they are
not subject to any disbarment case on the following ground and not to have violated the Canon1, Rul e 1. 01. Canon 1 Rul e 1. 01 of t he
Code of Professi onal Responsi bi l i t y, whi ch commands t hat a l awyer shal l not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Issue: WON they have violated the Canon 1 Rule 1.01.
Held: The court finds Atty. Garido guilty in violating the said rule but dismissed the case against Atty. Valencia for lack of merits. Furthermore, the
contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford t hem exempt i on from sanct i ons; good
moral charact er was al ready requi red as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court: Administration of Justice; Rule-Making
In re Letter of the UP Law Faculty
FACTS: In response to the controversy involving the Vinuya Case, the faculty of UP College of Law came upwith a statement entitled Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of theUniversity of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism andMisrepresentation in the
Supreme Court (Restoring Integrity Statement), whichstatement alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the same notonly as an
established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was posted onlineand at the Colleges bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme Court. The
manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein, theCourt believed, were inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers. Thus,
the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing respondentsto show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar
forviolations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conversely, compliance tosuch resolution was unsatisfactory, except for one respondent.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has the authority to sanction the members of the UP LAW Faculty despite the latters invocation of the principle of
academic freedom/freedom of expression.
RULING: Sanction awaits a subordinate who misbehaves.The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the
equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference.
In cases where the critics of the Supreme Court are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed theauthority of
this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding thecourts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded thelimits of
fair comment and common decency.That exercise of that authority is part of the SCs RULE-MAKING power to regulate the practice of Law
and admission to the BAR.
The Court reiterates that lawyers when they teach law are consideredengaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and
morethan lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath touphold the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Thus, their actions as lawprofessors must be measured against the same canons of professionalresponsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar
as the fact of their beinglaw professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers
Section 6. Supervision of Courts
Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464
FACTS: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge
BonifacioSanzMaceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal
cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth
and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over
all inferior courts
RULING: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Section 6. Supervision of Courts
Caoibes v. Ombudsman, GR 132177
CASE: Petitioner boxed respondent at his right eyebrow and leftlower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his
eyeglassesunserviceable;
May 23, 1997, Respondent Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the RTC of Las PinasCity, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a
Criminal Complaint for physical injuries,malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person inauthority
alleging that:
June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for thedismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of
grave misconduct or conductunbecoming a judicial officer using the same facts as above.
June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within10 days from receipt thereof.
Petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable SupremeCourt," praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold
its investigation of the case, andrefer the same to the SC which is already investigating what transpired on May 1997
Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has theauthority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability
of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, areunder its exclusive supervision and control.August 22, 1997, the Office
of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC statingthat it is within its jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the jurisdiction over the administrative case between the two judges.
HELD NO, the Ombudsman DOES NOT have jurisdiction over the case.
RATIO:
Section 6, Art. VIII of the Constitution: SC is vested with exclusive administrative supervisionover all courts and its personnel.
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative
matter.
The Ombudsman is duty bound to refer to the SC all cases against judges and courtpersonnel filed before it for determination as to whether and
administrative aspect isinvolved therein
Section 6. Supervision of Courts
Escalona v. Padillo, AM P-10-2785
FACTS: Escallona wanted to file a case against a certain Dalit. Padillo, a Court Stenographer III of the RTC of Paranaque, allegedly promised to
prepare the necessary documents and asked for P20,000 purportedly as payment for the prosecutor and among other requirement, to which Escallona
complied. However, subsequent verification from the Prosecutors Office showed no record of a case filed against Dalit. Escalona confronted Padillo
who promised to return to her the money. Padillo reneged on her promise. Hence this complaint.
However, Escalona withdrew her complaint against Padillo in a Sworn Affidavit of Desistance dated 10 July 2007 alleging that Padillo already returned
to her the P20,000.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the court acted with its jurisdiction in pursuing the administrative case againt Padillo despite Escallano and submitting an
Affidavit of Desistance
RULING:Yes. The court acted within its jurisdiction.
The issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employee has
breached the norms and standards of the courts.
The withdrawal of the complaint or the desistance of a complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint. No affidavit of
desistance can strip this Court of its jurisdiction under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and decide complaints against erring
officials and employees of the judiciary. Neither can the disciplinary power of this Court be made to depend on a complainants whims, since it is the
courts interest that proper delivery of justice to people is rendered at all times by its employees and to rule otherwise would undermine the discipline
of court officials and personnel
Section 7. Qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court; Lower Courts
In re JBC v. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
FACTS: Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the RTC, Davao City. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant
Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), as a result of which he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 183.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases filed
against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave misconduct per A.O. No.
183. He insists that before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in support of his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183;
and that he was denied due process, which was proved otherwise.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or Not Judge Quitains appointment as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Davao City is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes.
By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken into consideration in acting
on his application, Judge Quitain committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to.
It is necessary that every prospective appointee to the Judiciary should inform the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for
judicial office, including such circumstances that may reflect on his integrity and probity (honesty). These are qualifications specifically required of
appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 7. Qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court; Lower Courts
Kilosbayan v. Ermita, GR No. 177721
FACTS: Gregory S. Ong was being appointed by Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that
even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ong's birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself,
would not make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen being born to a
Filipino Mother and his Father being a naturalized Filipino Citizen and having presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
declaring him to be such.
ISSUE/S: Whether or Not Gregory Ongs appointment to the Supreme Court is unconstitutional
RULING: Yes. The Presidents appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice is unconstitutional. Ongs birth certificate speaks for itself,
it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth.
Ongs birth certificate is binding and is prima facie evidence of what it states that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his
father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for
the purpose, he is not to be appointed to the Supreme Court
Section 7. Qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court; Lower Courts
Topacio v. Ong, GR No. 179895
FACTS: Ong filed a petition for correction of an entry in his certificate of birth before the RTC in compliance with the SC decision in Kilos bayan
Foundation v. Ermita on July 3, 2007 enjoining him from accepting appointment to the position of Associate Justice of Supreme Court until have
shown through adversarial proceedings that he is a natural born citizen. In the present case, Petitioner Topacio filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to prevent Ong from exercising powers, duties and responsibilities as a Sandigan bayan Associate Justice. On September 5, Topacio filed a
letter-complaint praying that the Solicitor General to bring in a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latters capacity as an incumbent Sandigan
bayan member. Petitioner invoked par. 1, Sec. 7,Art. VIII of the Constitution and the decision in Kilos bayan Foundation v. Ermita. Ongs birth
certificate and bar records evidenced his Chinese citizenship. Petitioner avers that Ong should immediately vacate his post bearing out his status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The Solicitor General informed the petitioner that it cannot act favorably on the latters request for filing the quo warranto
suit until the resolution of the RTC case is decided by final judgment. In his answer, Ong contends that in Kilos bayan Foundation v. Ermita, he
voluntarily refused to accept the appointment in the Supreme Court and said decision does not annul his appointment but merely enjoined him from
accepting the post, there being no definite pronouncement that he is not a natural born citizen. Ong then filed his manifestation and motion to dismiss
before the RTC alleging that he was already recognized as a natural born citizen by a court decision. He attached the said decision in his birth
certificate. Ong further claims that the present petition is devoid of merit, or at the very least, it must await the final disposition of the RTC case which
to him involves a prejudicial issue. Meanwhile, the solicitor general alleges that the present petition is defectively verified.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the Solicitor Geneneral committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the filing of quo warranto suit
HELD: No there was no grave abuse of discretion in deferring an action on the filing of a quo warranto suit until after the RTC case has been decided
with finality. Rule 66 provides that an action for usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought
in the name of Republic of the Philippines against a public officer who does or suffers an act which by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for
forfeiture of his office. The Solgen when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section
can be established by proof must commence such action. However, the Solgen may suspend or struck down the institution of action for quo warranto
where there are just and valid reasons. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the
suit at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the
matter at hand
Section 10. Fixed Salary
Nitafan v. CIR, 152 SCRA 284
FACTS: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding
taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on
December 4, 1987. Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National
Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They contend that this constitutes
diminution of salary contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the salary of the members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law and that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. With the filing of
the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively. The
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the salaries of judges are subject to tax.
RULING: The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow
and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the
contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Hence, the doctrine in
Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David do not apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in
accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees
Section 11. Security of Tenure; Power to Discipline
Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 PHIL 297
FACTS: In 1948, Vargas was charged for treason. He was charged before the Peoples Court presided over by Judge Rilloraza et al. The Peoples
Court was created by CA 682 or the Peoples Court Act. Its main purpose was to charge treason cases and that it would be the final arbiter of such
cases. The Peoples Court would be composed of justices of the SC with the exclusion of SC justices who were members of the Philippine Executive
Commission during the Japanese occupation. It was deemed by the law that since those justices who worked with the PEC during the Japanese
occupation and that they worked for the Japanese in one way or the other, they would have to be disqualified from ruling the treason cases. Vargas
assailed such law asserting that such law created 2 Supreme Courts; that it also modified the constitutional provision on the membership of the SC;
that it also violated the SCs power to promulgate its own rules. The Sol-Gen denied all allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress can validly enact a law modifying the SCs original jurisdiction.
HELD: Treason is a criminal case punishable by death or life imprisonment. As such, the SC has original jurisdiction over it as provided in Article 8
of the Constitution. Any treason case may be appealed before the SC and Congress may not validly enact a law depriving the SC of its original
jurisdiction nor may it deprive the SC of its appellate jurisdiction. Further, the creation of the Peoples Court as the final arbiter of treason cases
involving such acts done during the Japanese occupation has created another supreme court composed SC justices and some CA justices not otherwise
disqualified. Such is a violation of the constitution. CA 682 is repugnant to the Constitution and the SC held it to be inoperative and the Peoples
Court was rescinded. The jurisdiction of the SC may only be exercised by the Chief Justice and Associate Justices appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, sitting en banc or in division, and in cases like those involving treason they must sit en banc. If,
according to section 4 of Article VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be composed" of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein referred to, its
jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus composed. To disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the Court particularly,
as in the instant case, a majority of them in a treason case is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power
Section 11. Security of Tenure; Power to Discipline
De La Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
FACTS: In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la
Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he
said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC
can remove judges NOT Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded
the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could
do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather
what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts,
the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
Section 11. Security of Tenure; Power to Discipline
People v. Gacott, 246 SCRA 52
Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing acriminal case was
annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment
was made by the Second Divisionof the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline respondent judge
Held: To support the Courts ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who
was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitutionclearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The
first clause which states that the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, is a declaration of thegrant of that disciplinary
power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that
all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the
other hand that the Court en banc can order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted therein. In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty
to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer oremployee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either thesuspension of any of them for a
period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested docket and unduedelay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially inadministrative matters, since even
cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.
Section 12. Prohibition to Be Designated to Any Agency Performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative Functions
In re Judge Manzano, 166 SCRA 246
Facts:
RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee onJustice pursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO 326 by
then Governor. Rodolfo Farinas. He sent a letter tot he SC st at i ng t hat before he accept s t he appoi nt ment , he woul d l i ke t o request
for t he i ssuance of aResolution (1) authorizing him to accept his appointment and assume and discharge the powers and dutiesat t ached t o i t
( 2) t hat hi s membershi p t o t he sai d Commi t t ee i s not vi ol at i ve of t he Independence of t heJudi ci ary or may be consi dered
as an abandonment of hi s posi t i on i n t he RTC ( 3) t o consi der t hat hi smembershi p i n t he commi t t ee i s a part of t he
pri mary funct i on of an Execut i ve Judge. However, one x a mi n a t i o n o f t h e EO s ,
i t wa s r e v e a l e d t h a t a mo n g t h e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e C o mmi t t e e i s t o r e v i e w compl ai nt s agai nst any apprehendi ng
offi cer xx who may be found t o have commi t t ed abuses i n t he discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for the
appropriate action. Another function ist o r e c o mme n d t h e r e v i s i o n o f a n y
l a w o r r e g u l a t i o n wh i c h i s b e l i e v e d p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e p r o p e r administration of criminal justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the acceptance of Judge Manzano of his appointment in the Committee will violatethe doctrine of separation of powers
Held:
It i s evi dent from t he st at ed funct i ons of t he Commi t t ee t hat i t performs
functi ons that areadministrative in nature
which are defined as those involving the regulation and control over the conductand affai rs of i ndi vi dual s fore t hei r own wel fare and t he
promul gat i on of rul es and regul at i ons t o bet t er carry out the policy of the legislature xxx. Under Art.8, Sec12 of the Constitution, the
members of the xxxcourt s xxx shal l not be desi gnat ed t o any agency performi ng quasi - j udi ci al or admi ni st rat i ve funct i ons.
While the doctrine of separation of powers is xxx not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, xxx it cannot j usti fy a member of t he
j udi ci ary bei ng r equi red to assume posi ti on xxx whi ch are non j udi ci ary i n character xx if he is expected to be confined to
the task of adjudication. Xxx He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official.
Thi s does not mean t hat t he RTS j udges shoul d adopt an at t i t ude of monastic insensibility. An RTC judge should render assistance to
said Committees xxx but only when itmay be reasonabl y i nci dent al t o t he ful fi l ment of t hei r j udi ci al dut i es. Hence, t he request
was deni ed
Section 13. Conclusions of the Supreme Court How Reached?
Consing v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78272
FACTS:
1.) Sometime in 1971, Petitioner Merlin Consing sold a newly constructed 4 bedroom house and lot to Respondent Caridad Santos.
2.) A Contract of Sale was drafted that in consideration of the agreement to sell the buyer will pay the seller P 110,000.00 with interest at 12%
per annum with a down payment of P25,000.00 and a monthly installment of P 1,020.14 payable on or before the fifth day of each
month beginning December 1971.
3.) Santos paid her monthly installments to the Consings. Starting May 1972, however, she defaulted in her payments.
4.) Final demand letter was sent to Santos with compel to comply otherwise Consing would be constrained to resort to court litigation
5.) Santos, represented by a lawyer, manifested her willingness to settle her obligations on the condition that the Consings comply with all the
laws and regulations on subdivisions and after payment to her of damages as a consequence of the use of a portion of her lot, more or less
168 sq.m., as a subdivision road.
6.) Consings filed an ejectment case against Santos.
7.) Santos also filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for specific performance with damages against the Consings.
8.) CFI rendered a favorable decision to Santos. Consing appealed to the CA.
9.) CA affirmed decision of the CFI.
10.) From the decision of the CA, petitioner-spouses Consings filed a petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
1.) Is the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals in this case comply with the requirements of Article VIII, section 13, of the
New Constitution.
Ruling / Ratio:
1.) SC ruled that the absence of certification in related Art. 8 Sec 13. will not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
2.) The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement and
may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission to account there of.
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
People v. Escober, 157 SCRA 541
FACTS:
1.) Escober, Punzalan and 3 others were accused of committing robbery with homicide inside the compound of Bee Seng Electrical Supply,
Inc., a family corporation owned by the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua in Balintawak, QC on Dec. 3, 1982.
2.) Escober was the guard on duty when the crime happened.
3.) As a result to the robbery, the two children of couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua died of multiple stab wounds.
4.) The RTC of QC sentenced both Escober and Punzalan with the DEATH penalty.
5.) Said case was raised to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1.) WON the decisions rendered in the lower court did clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. ( Art. 8, Sec 14
Constitution )
RULING / RATIO:
1.) SC ruled finds that the decision of the lower court falls short of this standard.
2.) The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts
from which such conclusions are deduced.
3.) SC acquitted Escober, but Punzalan was rendered GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155
Facts:
1. Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
2. Air France issued a first class round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, passenger Carrascoso traveled in first
class but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate the first class seat because a white man had a better right to it.
3. He refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager but after being pacified by fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the
seat.
4. Carrascoso filed for damages against AIR FRANCE.
Issues:
1.) WON damages may be recovered on the basis of expulsion
Ruling/ Ratio:
1.) Yes, damages can be recovered.
2.) SC ruled that the judgment rendered in the CA does not suffer from reversible error.
3.) Costs against Petitioner.
4.) The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. Passengers should be protected and insured a pleasant trip
5.) Wrongful expulsion is a violation of public duty by the air carrier a quasi delict. Damages are proper.
6.) Ticket was confirmed as first class is immaterial as claim is based on the wrongful expulsion itself.
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
People v. Bravo, 227 SCRA 285
Facts
Mario Bravo was convicted by the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan of murder of his mother-in-law. On appeal to the SC, Bravo contended,
among others that the decision rendered by RTC Judge Dizon, which contains a narration of facts according to that of the
prosecution, contains only selected facts in favor of a party. He argued that this selective finding of facts is in violation of Art. VIII
Sec. 14 which sets the requirement for the contents of a decision.
Issue
WON the decision rendered by the RTC is in violation of Art. VIII Sec. 14 which prescribes the contents of a decision
Ruling
It does not violate Art. VIII Sec. 14 which states that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." It is for the judge to determine from the narration of facts and assertions
made by both parties what actually happened in the case before him. Judge Dizon did this when he made what Bravo calls a "selective
finding of facts." Of course, it had to be selective. That is how a trial judge separates the chaff from the grain, extracts the truth from
the mass of conflicting claims, and determines the basis of the decision he will have to make.
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
Hernandez v. CA, 208 SCRA 429
Facts
Hernandez was convicted by the RTC of Cavite of estafa and violation of BP 22 on bouncing checks. He appealed the case to the CA
which affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Hernandez. On appeal to the
SC, Hernandez argued, among others, that:
- the decision of the CA merely adopted the statement of facts of the Solicitor general in the appellee's brief, thus violative of
Art. VIII, sec. 14, par. 1 which requires that decisions shall contain the facts and the law on which they are based; and,
- the CAs denial of his motion for reconsideration only made a comparison of his motion and the comment made by the
Solicitor General, thus violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2 which requires that any denial of motion for reconsideration
must state the legal basis thereof.
Issues
1) WON the decision of the CA violates Art. VIII, sec. 14, par. 1 prescribing the form of the decision
2) WON the CAs denial of the motion for reconsideration violates Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2
Ruling
1) There is no violation. The CA stated in its decision: "The facts of the case as summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows: "
and the quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor General.

What the CA, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The
constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no prohibition on
referring the decision to the briefs or memoranda of the parties. Precisely, briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the
courts in the writing of decisions.

2) There is no violation. The CA stated in its denial of the motion for reconsideration as follows:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-appellant of the decision dated December 13, 1991 and the comment thereon of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds no cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered. xxx
The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not find any "cogent reason that could justify a
modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered."
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
Nicos v. CA, 206 SCRA 127
Facts
Upon failure of NIC to pay its loan with UCPB, the latter foreclosed the mortgage on parcels of land and sold these in a public
auction. NIC filed in the RTC a case of annulment of the auction sale and recovery of possession of the land, on the ground that the
sale did not meet statutory requirements such as proper publication, among others. The RTC dismissed the case, which decision was
affirmed by the CA. The RTC decision read as follows:
Acting on the Demurrer to Evidence xxx filed by defendants xxx and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the
Sheriff's Auction Sale xxx was in complete accord with the requirements xxx the court finds the same to be impressed with merit. xxx
On appeal to the CA, NIC contended that the order of the RTC is not a reasoned decision as it does not clearly and distinctly explain
how it was reached, in violation of Art. VIII Sec. 14 which states that no decision shall be rendered by any court without stating
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the
decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the CA.
Issue
WON the order of the RTC is in violation of Art. VIII Sec. 14
Ruling
There is a violation.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. Otherwise, it leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
This constitutional provision applies only to decisions on the merits and not to those involving incidental matters. In the latter cases,
the Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute
resolutions.
In the instant case, insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale was one of the grounds for dismissal. An
order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits. Thus, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision
clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based. All the trial court did was summarily conclude "from
the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements." It did not bother to
discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. The failure to state the
factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
Borromeo v. CA, 186 SCRA 1
Facts: The petitioner has filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court with the courts and the Ombudsman repeatedly alleging that he
"suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions.
His complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and
resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not
state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void.
Issue: WON the minute resolutions issued by the Court, which do not bear the signatures of the Justices, are a violation of Section 14 Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: The minute resolutions are not a violation of the Constitution and in fact are encouraged to be used in disposing the bulk of the cases of the
lower courts.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the
certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its
resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of court.
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
Francisco v. Pernskul, 173 SCRA 324
FACTS: The case at bar started out as a simple one involving a sum of money between the petitioner and the private respondent because of the
formers refusal to return the deposited money to the latter alleging that the private respondent still owed a sum of money for the utility charges and
the cost of repainting the unit leased.
The petitioner, losing the case in the Metropolitan Court of Makati, had the case appealed before the Regional Trail Court which issued a
memorandum decision. The Motion for Review as well as the Motion for Reconsideration, contending that it is in violation of Section 14 Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, was denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Memorandum Decision issued by the Regional Trial Court is not a sufficient compliance with Section 14 Article VIII of
the Constitution?
RULING: The Memorandum Decision was made pursuant to what is allowed by Section 40 of B.PBlg. 129 which is not unconstitutional. There is no
question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties
as well as the courts themselves. However, this should be used springily and where the facts as in the main are accepted by both parties and in simple
litigations only.

Note: the purpose of Article VIII Section 14 is indicated on page 362 of the Constitutional Reviewer.
Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
Velarde v. Social Justice Society, GR 159357
FACTS: Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde challenged the Decision of the Regional Trial Court regarding the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed
by the respondent with regards to acts of endorsing an elective candidate made by religious leaders being violative to the letter or spirit of the
constitutional provisions.
The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the
constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are
tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating
the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC Decision did conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court
RULING: The RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Moreover, the court a
quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called Decision. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
To guide the judges in making a decision, the Court laid down the essential parts of a good decision consisting the following: (1) statement
of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and
resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially, in
cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.
Section 15. Period for Making Decisions
Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan AM No. 00-8-05-SC



Section 15. Period for Making Decisions
Edano v. Asdala, AM No. RTJ-06-2007



Section 15. Period for Making Decisions
Sesbreno v. CA, GR No. 161390