PACIENCIA BENIGA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. RUFINA BUGAS, defendant-appellant.
Paulino A. Conol for plaintiffs-appellants.
Lorenzo P. de Guzman and Pacito G. Mutia and Marcial G. Mendiola for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Acting C.J.:
Joint appeal (Record on Appeal was approved on 23 March 1968) directly taken to the Supreme Court by both the plaintiffs and the defendant from an amended decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, in its Civil Case No. 2598, declaring the former as the owners and ordering the latter to deliver the possession of a portion of parcel of land but "without (the latter) having to account for the fruits and the produce of the same until actually delivered and to pay the costs of the proceedings." 1
The findings of fact in the said decision were, based upon a stipulation of facts and upon evidence adduced on controverted matters not covered by the stipulation. Said findings are as follows:
The land in controversy is
Bounded on the North by Salimpono River, SOUTH by Magsirawang Brook, EAST by V. Baol and R. Mabascog, WEST by D. Malon, A. Beniga and M. Luzing, containing an area of 2.1680 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 71458 in the name of the late Antonio Mabascog, and assessed at P1,680.00
and constitutes a portion of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Magsirawag (Guintomoyan), Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, designated as Lot 2031, Pls-646 under Free Patent No. 232966, containing an area of 47,429 square meters.
Free Patent No. 232966 was issued on 3 May 1963. The patentee, Antonio Mabascog, died on 5 September 1966. Before his death, however, he donated inter vivos, on 22 September 1965, the controverted portion of the parcel of land to the descendant Rufina Bugas, who, thenceforth, took possession of the property. 2 At the time of the donation, both donor and donee did not know about the issuance of the patent.
The deceased Antonio Mabascog was a widower at the time of the donation. 3 He died without a descendant or ascendant, leaving as his heirs the herein plaintiffs Paciencia Beniga Anselmo Burlat, Dionisia Malon, Buenaventura Vale, Agapito Vale, Alfonso Vale, Matea Vale and Manuel Vale, who are the children of the four deceased sisters of Antonio Mabascog.
Upon the foregoing facts, the court a quo held that the donation was null and void, being in violation of the 5 year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired under free patent, pursuant to Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 as amended by Commonwealth Act 496 (sic, but obviously referring to CA No. 456) and, therefore, the donation transferred no right to defendant Rufina Bugas, but held her possession and enjoyment of the property in litigation as made in good faith and, therefore, not accountable for the fruits that she had gathered therefrom.
Appellant-defendant's theory is that the 5-year prohibitory period should begin to run from the date of inscription of the patent in the Registry Book, which was on 13 January 1966, in cases where the contracting parties had no prior knowledge of the issuance of the patent at the time they executed their contract; and pursuant to this theory, she avers that the donation of 22 September 1965 does not fall within the prohibited period, hence, the donation is not invalid.
Obviously, the defendant-appellant's thesis is untenable. It proceeds on the unstated assumption that alienations by patentees to persons or entities not excepted by law are invalidated only if made within the five-year period from and after the issuance of the patent. This is incorrect, for Section 118 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act 2
No. 141 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456) recites as follows:
SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or an of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patentor grant nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
It is clear from the language of the law that the alienation of lands acquired by homestead or free patent grants is forbidden "from the date of approval of the application" up to and including the fifth year "from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant." Otherwise, the provision makes no sense, for the prohibition starting from the date of approval of the application would have no terminal date. Since the 1965 donation in favor of defendant-appellant was clearly within the period of prohibited alienation, whether the same be deemed to end five years counted from the issuance of the patent or grant, or five years counted from its registration or recording with the Register of Deeds, said donation is plainly void.
Anyway, it has been repeatedly held that the period is not computed from the date of registration with the Register of Deeds or from the date of the certificate of title. 4
Section 118 does exempt patentees and their purported transferees who had no knowledge of the issuance of the patent from the prohibition against alienation; for the law does not say that the five years are to be counted "from knowledge or notice of issuance of the patent or grant. The date of the issuance of the patent is documented and is a matter of government and official record. As such, it is more reliable and precise than mere knowledge, with its inherent frailties. Indeed, the policy of the law, which is to give the patentee a place where to live with his family that he may become a happy citizen and a useful member of our society, 5 would be defeated were ignorance of the issuance of a patent a ground for the non-application of the prohibition.
Equity, as ground for the validation of the donation, may not be invoked, for the prohibition under the aforesaid Section 118 is mandatory, 6 and the "general principles of equity will not be applied to frustrate the purpose of the laws or to thwart public policy." 7
As asserted by defendant-appellant donee, the donation of the land in violation of Section 118 shall cause the reversion of the property to the State, as provided for in Section 124 of the law. However, such reversion, which could be of the entire land covered by the patent, 8 is "a matter between the State and the Grantee ... or his heirs" 9 but does not preclude the heirs from suing to have the alienation declared invalid, 10 for their right to the possession of the land is superior to that of the transferee in the void alienation. 11
On the part of the plaintiffs-appellants, they counter-assign as error, the lower court's not ordering the defendant to pay damages, at least from receipt of judicial summons. It is true that possession in good faith ceases upon the possessor's becoming aware of the flaw of his title and from there on, the possessor should be held accountable for the fruits of the land. 12 However, in the instant case, the lower court made no findings as to the amount of the produce, hence it becomes necessary to remand the case to the court of origin for the determination of the value of the fruits accrued from and after summons, and of the deductions corresponding to the costs of production.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision, in so far as it decrees the nullity of the donation in favor of appellant Rufina Bugas, is hereby affirmed. The case is remanded to the court of origin for determination of the net indemnity due from respondent 3
Bugas to the plaintiffs-appellants Beniga, et al. Without costs. So ordered.
1 As per Amended Decision (Record an Appeal, page 102).
2 The donee had been reared from infancy by, donor and his predeceased wife.
3 See Exhibit "2," which is the deed of donation.
4 Register of Deeds v. Director of Lands, Re Consulta No. 1370, 72 Phil. 313; Arojo de Dumelod, et al. v. Vilaray, 92 Phil. 967: Crisanto v. Tajon, 93 Phil. 1111, unrep., L-4455, 22 May 1953.
5 Jocson v. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375.
6 Republic v. Ruiz, L-23712, 29 April 1968, 23 SCRA 348.
7 30 C.J.S. 981.
8 Republic v. Garcia, 105 Phil. 826, 830.
9 Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94 Phil. 405.
10 Eugenio v. Perdido, 97 Phil. 41.
11 Castro v. Orpiano, 90 Phil. 491.
12 Articles 552 and 1123, Civil Code of the Philippines; Tolentino, Com. & Jur. on the Civil Code of the Phil. 1963 ed., Vol. II, pages 242-243.
4
.G.R. No. L-14778 February 28, 1961
MARGARITA MANZANO, ROMANA MANZANO, FRANCISCA MANZANO and CRISTINA MANZANO, petitioners, vs. RUFINO OCAMPO, LEONARDA ERNA and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Espinosa Law Office for petitioners. Ignacio Nabong for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal by the trial court of petitioner's complaint against respondents for the annulment of a sale of a homestead.
The basic facts appear to be as follows:
Victoriano Manzano, now deceased, was granted a homestead patent on June 25, 1934, and the land was registered in his name on July 25, 1934 under Original Certificate of Title No. 4590. On January 4, 1938, he and respondent Rufino Ocampo agreed on the sale of said homestead for the amount of P1,900.00, P1,100.00 of which was paid by Ocampo to Manzano on the same day, and for the balance, he executed a promissory note, to wit:
Alangalang sa paglilipat sa akin ang lupang homestead ni VICTORIANO MANZANO, sa pamamagitan nito ay aking ipinangangakong babayaran kay nabanggit na VICTORIANO MANZANO o sa kaniyang tagapagmana ang halagang WALONG DAAN PISO (P800.00), Kualtang Pilipino, sa mga sumusunod na fecha:
P500.00
sa o bago dumating ng Enero 15, 1939
300.00
sa o bago dumating ng Enero 15, 1940
P800.00
T o t a l
Ang nabanggit na halagang babayaran ko ay aking eentrega sa kanila dito sa Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.
SA KATUNAYAN, ako'y naglagda ngayon ika 4 ng Enero, 1938 dito sa bayang Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija.
(Exh. "A")
Knowing, however, that any sale of the homestead at that time was prohibited and void, the parties likewise agreed that the deed of sale was to be made only after the lapse of five years from the date of Manzano's patent. And to protect the buyer Ocampo's rights in the agreed sale, Manzano executed in his favor a "Mortgage of Improvements" over the homestead to secure the amount of P1,100.00 already received as down payment on the price (Exh. "1").
Three months later, Manzano informed Ocampo that someone was offering to buy his homestead for P3,000.00, and Ocampo agreed to pay that same price therefor after Manzano's title would have ripened into absolute ownership.
On October 17, 1939, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved the proposed sale of Manzano's homestead to Ocampo (Exh. "2"). Accordingly, the parties executed the formal deed of Sale on October 19, 1939 for the price of P3,000.00, (Exh. "9"), of which Ocampo paid only P1,900.00, because the amount of P1,100.00 had already been delivered to Manzano on January 4, 1938. On the same day, the mortgage Exhibit "1" was released and a transfer certificate of title over the homestead issued in Ocampo's 5
name (Exh. "4"). Ocampo did not, however, immediately take possession of the land because Manzano requested that he be permitted to harvest its standing palay crop. Ocampo demanded from Manzano the return of his promissory note Exhibit "A", but the latter informed him that the same was misplaced or lost. Two years later, in 1940, the tax declaration over the homestead in question was transferred to Ocampo's name (Exh. 7).
On June 22, 1954, Manzano commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for the annulment of the sale of his homestead to Ocampo, on the theory that the same was executed on the same date as the promissory note Exhibit "A" and, therefore, within the prohibitory period of five years from the issuance of his patent. During the pendency of the case, Manzano died and was substituted by his heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found that the sale in question was in fact made after the expiration of five years from the date of Manzano's patent, and dismissed the complaint. Manzano's heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already stated, affirmed the lower court's judgment. Whereupon, Manzano's heirs resorted to this Court, urging that the sale of the homestead in question was made before, and not after, the expiration of five years from the date of Manzano's patent and is, therefore, void.
In upholding the validity of the sale in question, the Court of Appeals drew the following conclusions from the facts found to have been established:
It was satisfactorily explained by appellee Ocampo that the agreement of the parties was that Manzano would sell the homestead for the price of P1,900.00 after the expiration of the prohibitory period prescribed by law. The P800.00 stated in the promissory note was the balance of the price to be paid. As correctly observed by the lower court the phrase in tagalog "alangalang sa paglilipat sa akin ang lupang homestead" appearing in the promissory note, is futuristic in character meaning that the payment of P800.00 was in consideration of the transfer of the homestead to be made later. It should be noted that at the time the parties knew of said period of inhibition and were fully aware that the said period of five years had not yet transpired so that Manzano could not validly sell or mortgage the homestead. It was so explained clearly to them by Atty. Pacis. Owing to such knowledge the loan of P1,100.00 was only guaranteed by the mortgage of the improvements of the land (Exh. 1) and not by the homestead itself.
It appears that the said intended sale for only P1,900.00 after the lapse of five-year period was later on abandoned by the parties. Manzano himself, knowing perhaps that he could not be bound thereby, backed out of it claiming that there was another offer of P3,000.00 for the same property. Appellee Ocampo agreed to pay this same amount. It was at this new price of P3,000.00 that the land was actually sold to appellees on October 19, 1939. This sale, evidenced by Exhibit 3, was a complete abandonment of that original arrangement and is a totally distinct transaction from the promissory note and the deed of mortgage (Exh. 1). The payment of P1,900.00 to Manzano on October 19, 1939 as complement of the price of P3,000.00 is evidenced not only by said deed of sale, Exhibit 3, the genuineness and due execution of which was admitted by the plaintiffs, but also by the uncontradicted testimony of appellee Ocampo and his witnesses Primo Lopez and Agustin Eugenio. It goes without saying that the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, having been executed after the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent and previously approved by the corresponding Head of Department, pursuant to Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456, is perfectly valid. It was only after the execution of said deed of sale (Exh. 3) that the vendee took possession of the land and had it declared in his name for taxation purposes.
We are constrained to disagree with the above conclusions.
From the findings of the Court of Appeals, it is clear that a perfected contract of sale over the homestead in question had already been entered into by the parties on January 4, 1938 (i.e., within the period of prohibition) for the price of P1,900.00. There was nothing "futuristic" in this agreement, except that, being fully aware that any sale or conveyance of the homestead in question at the time was prohibited by law, the parties agreed that the execution of the deed of sale should be postponed to a future date, after Manzano's title 6
had ripened into absolute ownership. That a sale existed before the statutory five years had expired is shown by the fact that Ocampo had advanced to Manzano the amount of P1,100.00 as part of the price, and had signed for the balance the promissory note Exhibit "A", undertaking to pay P500 on or before January 15, 1939 (a date also within the period of prohibition), and the remaining P300.00, on or before January, 15, 1940. If no perfected sale had existed in January, 1938, there would have been no obligation on the part of Ocampo to pay part of the price, nor any reason or occasion for his executing a promissory note (an express acknowledgement of indebtedness) for the balance.
Knowing as they did, however, that any sale of the homestead in question was prohibited by law in 1938, the parties had to devise means and ways to circumvent the prohibition and at the same time still protect themselves from non-compliance of the agreement after the prohibitory period should have elapsed. Thus, the down-payment of P1,100.00 on the price already made to Manzano by Ocampo was made to appear as a loan secured by a "Mortgage of Improvements" signed by Manzano on the same day of the agreement of sale, January 4, 1938 (Exh. "12"), which mortgage is patently a simulated contract, because although entitled "Mortgage of Improvements", the subject-matter thereof was not any improvements on the homestead but "my land more particularly described as follows ...", which is the homestead itself. Indeed, appellees openly admitted in their brief (pp. 1-2) that the amount of P1,100.00 received by Manzano from Ocampo on January 4, 1938 was not really a loan but an advance on the agreed price of P1,900.00, and that it was only to protect the rights of the buyer Ocampo in the "intended sale" that the mortgage Exhibit "1" was executed. Upon the other hand the protection furnished the vendor Manzano, who had yet to receive P800.00 on the price, was the promissory note Exhibit "A" signed by Ocampo for such unpaid balance. Even if not simulated, the mortgage would have been void anyway, since section 118 of the Public Land Law prohibited encumbrance of homestead land within five years from issuance of the patent, unless the encumbrance should be in favor of Governmental entities.
That the parties modified this original agreement three months later, increasing the price to P3,000.00, with the understanding that the buyer, Ocampo, would not pay the balance of the price until after Manzano's homestead title had become absolute, does not imply that their original contract was abandoned and an entirely new and independent contract was entered into by them. For a partial payment on the price had already been made, and the parties did nothing more than increase the price originally stipulated and extend the term of payment, for which reason "Ocampo did not pay the amount stated in the promissory note" (Decision of Court of Appeals, p. 6). And even granting that the parties' original agreement had been novated "three months later" by the increase in price and extension of the time to pay its balance, the second transaction was still within the prohibitive period and is, therefore, as illegal and void as the first sale.
True to his promise to execute the formal deed of sale after his title would have become absolute, Manzano, on October 19, 1939, having received the approval of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the proposed sale (Exh. "2"), executed the deed of sale Exhibit "3" in favor of Ocampo, on the strength of which Ocampo obtained for himself Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15584 over the homestead in question (Exh. "4"). This execution of the formal deed after the expiration of the prohibitory period did not and could not legalize a contract that was void from its inception. Nor was this formal deed of sale "a totally distinct transaction from the promissory note and the deed of mortgagee as found by the Court of Appeals, for it was executed only in compliance and fulfillment of the vendor's previous promise, under the perfected sale of January 4, 1938, to execute in favor of his vendee the formal act of conveyance after the lapse of the period of inhibition of five years from the date of the homestead patent. What is more, the execution of the formal deed of conveyance was postponed by the parties precisely to circumvent the legal prohibition of their sale.
The law prohibiting any transfer or alienation of homestead land within five years, from the issuance of the patent does not distinguish between executory and consummated sales; and it would hardly be in keeping with the primordial aim of this prohibition to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader the piece of land that the state had gratuitously given to them,1 to hold valid a homestead sale actually perfected during the period of prohibition but with the 7
execution of the formal deed of conveyance and the delivery of possession of the land sold to the buyer deferred until after the expiration of the prohibitory period, purposely to circumvent the very law that prohibits and declares invalid such transaction to protect the homesteader and his family. To hold valid such arrangements would be to throw the door wide open to all possible fraudulent subterfuges and schemes that persons interested in land given to homesteaders may devise to circumvent and defeat the legal provision prohibiting their alienation within five years from the issuance of the homestead's patent.
We therefore, hold that the sale in question is illegal and void for having been made within five years from the date of Manzano's patent, in violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law. Being void from its inception, the approval thereof by the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources after the lapse of five years from Manzano's patent did not legalize the sale (Santander v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-6184, Feb. 28, 1958; Cadiz v. Nicolas, G.R. No. L-9198, Feb. 13, 1958). The result is that the homestead in question must be returned to Manzano's heirs, petitioners herein, who are, in turn, bound to restore to appellee Ocampo the, sum of P3,000.00 received by Manzano as the price thereof (Medel v. Eliazo, G. R. No. L-12617, Aug. 27, 1959; Santander v. Villanueva, supra; Fences v. Iriola, G.R. No. L- 11269, Feb. 28, 1958). The fruits of the land should equitably compensate the interest on the price.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and another one entered declaring null and void the sale of the homestead in question to appellee Rufino Ocampo. The Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to cancel appellee Ocampo's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15584, and reissue to the heirs of the deceased Victoriano Manzano the title to the homestead in question. Petitioners are, however, ordered to return to appellee Ocampo the amount of P3,000.00 received by their predecessor Victoriano Manzano as the price of said homestead. No costs.
1 Pascua v. Talens, 45 O.G. No. 9 (Supp.) 413; De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, G.R. No. L- 6088, Feb. 25, 1954.
8
G.R. No. L-6088 February 25, 1954
CATALINA DE LOS SANTOS, in her capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decased Julio Sarabillo, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MIDSAYAP, Most Rev. LUIS DEL ROSARIO and Rev. GERARD MONGEAU, defendants-appellants.
Manglapus and Gopengco for appellants. Clemente M. Alio for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 9, 1938, a homestead patent covering a tract of land situated in the municipality of Midsayap, Province of Cotabato, was granted to Julio Sarabillo and on March 17, 1939, Original Certificate of Title No. RP-269 (1674) was issued in his favor.
On December 31, 1940, Julio Sarabillo sold two hectares of said land to the Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap for the sum of P800 to be dedicated to educational and charitable purposes. It was expressly agreed upon that the sale was subject to the approval of the Secretar of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In December, 1947, a request for said approval was submitted in behalf of the Roman Catholic Church by Rev. Fr. Gerard Mongeau stating therein that the land would be used solely for educational and charitable purposes. The sale was approved on March 26, 1949, and on March 29, 1950, the deed of sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cotabato. No new title was issued in favor of the Roman Catholic Church although the deed was annotated on the back of the title issued to the homesteader.
In the meantime, Julio Sarabillo died and intestate proceedings were instituted for the settlement of his estate and Catalina de los Santos was appointed administratrix of the estate. And having found in the course of her administration that the sale of the land to the Roman Catholic Church was made in violation of section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the administratrix instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato praying that the sale be declared null and void and of no legal effect.
In their answer defendants claim that the sale is legal and valid it having been executed for educational and charitable purposes and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. They further claim that, even if it be declared null and void, its immediate effect would be not the return of the land to appellee but the reversion of the property to the State as ordained by law. Defendants also set up as a defense the doctrine of pari delicto.
As a preliminary step, the court, upon petition of counsel for defendants, directed the clerk of court, assisted by a representative of both parties, to appraise the value of the improvements existing on the controverted land and to submit to the court a report of his findings. This was done, the clerk of court reporting that the value of the improvements was done, the clerk of court reporting that the value of the improvements was P601.
After the parties had submitted the case on the pleadings, in addition to the report of the clerk of court as to the value of the improvements existing on the land, the court rendered decision declaring the sale null and void and ordering the plaintiff to reimburse to the defendants the sum of P800 which was paid as purchase price, plus the additional sum of P601 as value of the improvements, both sums to bear interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the complaint, and ordering defendants to vacate the land in question. Dissatisfied with this decision, the case was taken to the Court of Appeals but it was later certified to this Court on the ground that the appeal merely involves questions of law.
It appears that the patent covering the tract of land which includes the portion now disputed in this appeal was issued to the late Julio Sarabillo on December 9, 1938, and the sale of the portion of two hectares to the Roman Catholic Church took place on December 31, 1940. This shows that the sale was made before the expiration of the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent and as such is null and void it being in contravention of section 118 of 9
Commonwealth Act No. 141. The fact that it was expressly stipulated in the deed of sale that it was subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the approval was sought and obtained on March 26, 1949, or more than ten years after the date of the issuance of the patent, or the fact that the deed of sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds only on March 29, 1950, and was annotated on the back of the title on that date, cannot have the effect of validating the sale for the reason that the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources does not have any valid curative effect. That approval is merely a formality which the law requires if the sale is effected after the term of five years but before the expiration of a period of 25 years for the purpose of testing the validity of the sale on constitutional grounds. But, as was ruled by this Court, the absence of such formality will not render the transaction null and void (Evangelista vs. Montao,1 G.R. No. L-5567). What is important is the period within which the sale is executed. The provision of the law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant of the patent is mandatory. This cannot be obviated even if official approval is granted beyond the expiration of that period, because the purpose of the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has gratuitously given to him." [Pascua vs. Talens,2 45 Off. Gaz., No. 9, (Supplement) 413.]
The claim that the sale can be validated because it was made with the avowed aim that the property would be dedicated solely to educational and charitable purposes is likewise unmeritorious even considering the law invoked by counsel for appellants in favor of its validity. It is true that under section 121, Commonwealth Act No. 141, a corporation, association, or partnership may acquire any land granted as homestead if the sale is done with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and is solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious, or charitable purposes, or for a right of way, and apparently there is no limitation therein as to the time within which such acquisition may be made. But this provision should be interpreted as a mere authority granted to a corporation, association or partnership to acquire a portion of the public land and not as an unbridled license to acquire without restriction for such would be giving an advantage to an entity over an individual which finds no legal justification. It is our opinion that the authority granted by section 121 should be interpreted as subject to the condition prescribed in section 118, namely, that the acquisition should be after the period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent.
But appellants now contend that even if it be declared that the sale made to them by the homesteader is null and void yet its immediate effect would be not the return of the land to appellee but rather its reversion to the State wherein the Government is the interested party. (Section 124 of the Public Land Act). Appellants further claim that the present action cannot be maintained by the appellee under the principle of pari delicto.
The principles thus invoked by appellants are correct and cannot be disputed. They are recognized not only be our law but by our jurisprudence. Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any acquisition, conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of its provisions shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the reversion of the property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has been applied by this Court in a number of cases wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to be guilty of having effected the transaction with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. (Bough & Bough vs. Cantiveros & Hanopol, 40 Phil., 210, 216; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun,3 G.R. No. L-1411; Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan vs. Uy Hoo, et al.,4 G.R. No. L-2207; Caoile vs. Yu Chiao Peng,5 G.R. No. L-4068; Talento, et al. vs. Makiki, et al.,6 G.R. No. L-3529.) But we doubt if these principles can now be invoked considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as known here and in the United States is not absolute in its application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or application runs counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa case, "This doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction." (Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hu, supra.)
10
The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality (8 Manresa 4th ed., pp. 717-718), but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated (Pascua vs. Talens, supra). This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve" (Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Pantaleon de las Ama, et al., 74 Phil., 3). We are, therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law.
As regards the contention that because the immediate effect of the nullification of the sale is the reversion of the property to the State appellee is not the proper party to institute it but the State itself, that is a point which we do not have, and do not propose, to decide. That is a matter between the State and the Grantee of the homestead, or his heirs. What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants. Their right to remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee during and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the State. (See Castro vs. Orpiano, G.R. No. L-4094, November 29, 1951.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1 93 Phil., 275.
2 80 Phil., 792
3 93 Phil., 827.
4 88 Phil., 103.
5 93 Phil., 861.
6 93 Phil., 855
11
NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS, petitioners, vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64957,[1] affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. 1220,[2] dismissing petitioners Complaint for declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom.
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994, executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.[3]
According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a vast tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga, which extended to Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject Property to the petitioners, each portion measuring around 500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the labor and work done on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their predecessors.[4]
Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270, all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name of respondent.[5]
OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondents mother, Isabel Manahan y Francisco, and three other individuals, pursuant to Decree No. 10248, dated 13 February 1913, in Case No. 8502 of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands. The whole property covered by OCT No. 670 was subsequently adjudicated in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago (formerly Isabel Manahan y Francisco). Consequently, OCT No. 670 was cancelled and TCT No. T-53028 was issued exclusively in the name of Isabel Manahan Santiago. On 28 December 1968, Isabel Manahan Santiago executed a Deed of Donation transferring the property to her son, respondent herein, who subsequently secured TCTs No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270 in his own name.[6]
Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. Among the defects of OCT No. 670 pointed out by petitioners were that: (1) OCT No. 670 was not signed by a duly authorized officer; (2) Material data therein were merely handwritten and in different penmanships; (3) OCT No. 670 was not printed on the Official Form used in 1913, the year it was issued; (4) It failed to indicate the Survey Plan which was the basis of the Technical Description of the property covered by the title; (5) Decree No. 10248 referred to in OCT No. 670 was issued only on 11 April 1913, while OCT No. 670 was issued earlier, on 13 February 1913; and (6) Decree No. 10248 was issued over a property other than the one described in OCT No. 670, although also located in the Province of Rizal.[7] 12
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses on 03 July 1996. According to respondent, [t]he allegations in the Complaint would readily and patently show that the same are flimsy, fabricated, malicious, without basis in law and in fact[8]
As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.[9]
Citing the consolidated cases of Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, et al. and Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation v. Hon. Macario Peralta, Jr., et al.,[10] respondent argued that the Spanish title, on which petitioners based their claim, was neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892, which took effect on 16 February 1976, required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,[11] within six months from effectivity of the decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System. [12]
Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription. He pointed out that any action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. At the very least, respondent contended, it must be presumed that the questioned land titles were issued by the public officials concerned in the performance of their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law.[13]
Even assuming arguendo that the petitioners entered and occupied the Subject Property, they did so as mere intruders, squatters and illegal occupants, bereft of any right or interest, since the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent and his predecessors-in-interest.[14]
Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less, threatening to evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included as defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, Carmelino M. Santiago v. Remigio San Pascual, et al., which respondent instituted before the same trial court against squatters occupying the Subject Property. In its decision, dated 01 July 1992, the trial court held that there is no doubt that the plaintiff (respondent herein) is the owner of the land involved in this case on which the defendants have built their houses and shanties Although the decision in Civil Case No. 783 was appealed to the Court of Appeals, it had become final and executory for failure of the defendants-appellants therein to file their appellants brief.[15]
In the instant case, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses as prayed for by the respondent. During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents he had so far submitted to the trial court.[16]
After the preliminary hearing, the trial court issued the questioned Order, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint. Pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court read:
After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, this Court is inclined not to grant plaintiffs (sic) prayer. Finding credence and giving weight to plaintiffs (sic) lone but expert witness, it is crystal clear that, to quote:
1. a parcel of land titled illegally will revert to the State
13
2. it is the State who must file the corresponding case of annulment of title through the Office of the Solicitor General, and
3. a land illegally titled in the name of private individual, the State through the Office of the Solicitor General should file the corresponding case for cancellation of title. (TSN August 26, 1997).
The above quoted testimony is straight from horse (sic) mouth so to speak as this was the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) expert witness. And judging from the said testimony alone aforecited, plaintiffs (sic) cause [of action] is bound to fail. Plaintiffs (sic) own testimony wrote finis to their case. From the record, this case was initiated and filed by private individuals, Nemencio Evangelista, et. al., contradicting their witness (sic) testimony. To reiterate, this Court finds credence to the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) witness, i.e., is (sic) the State through the Office of the Solicitor General who must initiate and file a case of this nature when title to a land is being claimed to be obtained through fraud and allegedly spurious.
The opinion of this Court anent the testimony of the witness is not without basis. Explicit is the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
An action for reversion has to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101, Commonwealth Act No. 141. (282 SCRA 43).
As to the documentary evidence, having gone through with the Deed of Assignment/s purportedly executed by and between a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez and the plaintiffs, which is the principal if not the only basis of plaintiffs claim ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land, the same does not hold water in a manner of speaking, for being self-serving. Assignor Ismael Favila y Rodriguez claimed in said Deed that he is the Attorney-in-Fact by virtue of an alleged Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by his mga kapatid on February 23, 1965, but said Special Power of Attorney was not presented before this Court, thus there arises a doubt as to its existence and execution not to mention doubt on the existence of his mga kapatid who as alleged executed said Special Power Attorney (sic) in his favor.
Even if this Court granting arguendo would admit the authenticity of said Deeds of Assignment/s, that will not alter the outcome of the pending incident/s before this Court. Why? Because the said Deed of Assignment/s which were based on Spanish title have lost their evidentiary value pursuant to the Presidential Decree No. 892 i.e. DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
There is no need to elaborate on the above-cited provisions of PD 892 as they are self-explanatory. Suffice it to say that there is no showing, that plaintiffs complied with the said law i.e. to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree (February 16, 1976). Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System.
This being the case and likewise being clear that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint
Moreover, the principal issue in this case is for the declaration of nullity of defendants title, which has nothing to do with plaintiffs (sic) claim of ownership and possession even if we set aside, albeit momentarily, the truth that plaintiffs (sic) claim were based on barred Spanish Title/s, and thus plaintiffs were never the owners of the parcel of land subject of this case.
Further, defendants (sic) title especially so with the mother title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not having been questioned by any party. Only now that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on 14
the offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their case, unwittingly sealed their fate [17]
After the trial court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Order, dated 20 July 1999,[18] petitioners appealed both Orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 July 2002,[19] affirmed the Order of the trial court, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution, dated 14 February 2003.[20]
Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for Review [21] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues and praying for the reversal of the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of dismissal of the trial court:
I. Whether the lower courts dismissal of the petitioners complaint should be proscribed by the rules of evidence it being based inter alia on Engr. Navals testimony, which was indisputably not based on facts but conclusion of law.
II. Whether the lower courts dismissal of petitioners complaint should be proscribed by the rules of evidence it being done sans ample evidence except bare allegations of respondent.
III. Whether the provision of P.D. 892, i.e., Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system, holds of an exception.
IV. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically where petitioners are in possession of subject land, can be subject of prescription.
In his Comment,[22] the respondent, for the most part, reiterated the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed petitioners Complaint, but for reasons different from those relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
According to the respondent, petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint filed before the trial court stated no cause of action.
Before anything else, it should be clarified that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue[23] and the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action[24] are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between the lack of legal capacity to sue from the lack of personality to sue is a fairly common mistake. The difference between the two is explained by this Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[25]
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real party- 15
in-interest. It is the respondents contention that only the State can file an action for annulment of his certificates of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the ownership of the Subject Property to the State.
The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground, requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Complaint. In the case of Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers,[26] this Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for dismissal of an action or affirmative defense is concerned:
It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the determination of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and no other matter may be considered, and the court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said motion.
In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated a cause of action, the trial court should have limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity of the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of petitioners on 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994; and questioning the existence and execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of said Ismael Favila by his siblings on 25 February 1965. These matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the merits.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent hypothetically admitted that: (1) Petitioners predecessors-in-interest, in the concept of owners, had been in actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession of the Subject Property against the whole world since time immemorial; (2) The Subject Property was part of the vast tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain by virtue of a Spanish title; (3) Ismael Favila, an heir and successor-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, executed Deeds of Assignment covering the Subject Property in favor of petitioners; (4) Petitioners still occupied and possessed the Subject Property, on which their houses were erected, when they discovered that the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent; and (5) That petitioners filed the Complaint to prevent their eviction by the respondent. To determine whether these allegations are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is important for this Court to establish first the nature of petitioners action.
Indeed, petitioners Complaint filed before the trial court was captioned as an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title. However, the caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor, but rather the allegations therein should determine the nature of the action, because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and the evidence introduced.[27]
The trial court believed that petitioners action was ultimately one for reversion of the Subject Property to the public domain. Based on the testimony of Engineer Naval and the case of Nagao v. Court of Appeals,[28] it declared that the State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, is the party-in-interest in an action for cancellation of a certificate of title illegally issued in the name of a 16
private individual, because the eventual effect of such cancellation is the reversion of the property to the State.
The Court disagrees in this pronouncement of the trial court, and calls for a far closer review of its decision in Nagao v. Court of Appeals,[29] wherein the Court held that
It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942
Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes, segregated from the public domain, because the beneficiary is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence, dismissal of private respondents complaint was premature and trial on the merits should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.
It would have been entirely different if the action were clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141, which provides:
Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines.
In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut,[30] the difference between an action for declaration of nullity of land titles from an action for reversion was more thoroughly discussed as follows:
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence, in Gabila vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendants title because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendants fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant
In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject Property was part of the public domain. On the contrary, petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of their actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of Assignment executed in their favor and attached to their Complaint referred to a Spanish title 17
granted by the Queen of Spain to their predecessor-in-interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are asserting private title over the Subject Property, and consequently, their action could not be one for reversion.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather than an action for nullity of respondents certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the Subject Property.
Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, provides that:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Respondents certificates of title over the Subject Property appeared valid or effective; but according to the petitioners, they were fake, spurious and/or fraudulent, and a cloud on their title to the same property that needed to be removed. A cloud on title has been defined as follows:
Cloud on Title. A cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to property. The matter complained of must have a prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on the face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by extrinsic evidence[31]
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[32] Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.[33]
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in- interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.[34] If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.
18
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-in- interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. [35] Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners Complaint that petitioners predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested.[36] By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession; . . .
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject Property, then they could still present the Spanish title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. [37]
This Court cannot sustain petitioners argument. Actual proof of possession only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive period.[38] Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. 19
An apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions of the statute.[39]
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute.[40] Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership.
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of the real property on some other basis, such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree[41] or the Public Land Act.[42] Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action.
Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. 20
G.R. No. L-37682 November 26, 1932
CLAUDE NEON LIGHTS, FEDERAL INC., U. S. A., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE ADVERTISING CORPORATION and FRANCISCO SANTAMARIA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Gibbs & McDonough for petitioner. Courtney Whitney for respondents.
BUTTE, J.:
This case is to be determined upon the petition for writ of certiorari and the demurrer thereto filed by the respondents. The petition sets up two causes of action: one attacking the validity of a writ of attachment issued by the respondent judge on the petition and affidavit of the respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation, on April 6, 1932; the second, attacking the validity of the order of the respondent judge issued the same day on the petition of the respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation, appointing a receiver of the property which was seized by the sheriff under said writ of attachment.
On April 5, 1932, the respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation filed suit against the petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Manila, claiming P300,000 as damages for alleged breach of the agency contract existing between the said respondent and the petitioner. At the same time, said respondent filed in said court an application for writ of attachment duly verified in which it is stated that the defendant (petitioner herein) is a foreign corporation having its principal place of business in the City of Washington, District of Columbia. It is not alleged in said application that the defendant, Claude Neon Lights, Inc. (the petitioner herein) was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud its creditors or that it was insolvent or had removed or disposed of its property or was about to do so with intent to defraud its creditors. The only statutory ground relied upon in the court below and in this court for the issuance of the writ of attachment against the petitioner is paragraph 2 of section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that plaintiff may have the property of the defendant attached "in an action against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands".
On April 6, 1932, the respondent judge issued the writ of attachment as prayed for, and the sheriff has attached all the properties of the petitioner in the Philippine Islands. On the same date, on the ex parte petition and nomination of the respondent, the respondent judge appointed Manuel C. Grey receiver of said properties of the petitioner, fixing his bond at P3,000.
Motions to dissolve said writ of attachment and receivership were fled in the court below, supported by affidavits of the attorney in fact for the petitioner in which it is recited, among other things, that the petitioner is not indebted to the respondent in any sum whatever nor has it in any way breached any contracts with the respondent or at any time interfered in the management of its business in the Philippine Islands as carried on by its agent, the respondent, and it has faithfully complied with every condition of said contract; that the attachment of the machinery and plants of the petitioner, as well as its other assets, is highly prejudicial to it as it is unable to proceed with its business in the Philippine Islands and irreparable loss will result to it unless such attachment be raised; that the filing of said suit was malicious, without foundation, and intended only to injure the petitioner and to depreciate the value of its holdings in the Philippine Islands. It does not appear that any answer was made to said motion in which said allegations were denied or that any refuting evidence was offered.
On June 20 1932, the court denied said motions to vacate the attachment and receivership, declaring that the writ of attachment conforms to section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petitioner for certiorari prays that the writ of attachment issued by the respondent judge on April 6, 1932, as well as the order of the 21
same date, appointing Manuel C. Grey receiver of the property of the petitioner, be annulled.
The sufficiency of the application for the writ of attachment assailed by the petitioner upon several grounds but we shall confine ourselves to the consideration of the question whether or not paragraph 2 of section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to this petitioner.
The petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the District of Columbia; it had complied with all the requirements of the Philippine laws and the was duly licensed to do business in the Philippine Islands on the date said writ of attachment was issues. The petitioner was actively engaged in doing business in the Philippine Islands and had considerable property therein, which consisted to its manufacturing plant, machinery, merchandise and a large income under valuable contracts, all of which property was in the possession and under the control and management of the respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation, as the agent of the petitioner, on the date said attachment was levied. Considered from a practical and economic viewpoint, its position in the business community was indistinguishable from that of a domestic corporation.
Section 242 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which the petitioner's property was attached, reads as follows:
Attachment. A plaintiff may, at the commencement of his action, or at any time afterwards, have the property of the defendant attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered, unless the defendant gives security to pay such judgment, in the manner hereinafter provided, in the following cases.
1. In all the cases mentioned in section four hundred and twelve, providing for the arrest of a defendant. But the plaintiff must make an election as to whether he will ask for an order of arrest or an order of attachment; he shall not be entitled to both orders;
2. In an action against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.
It may be observed at the outset that the words of section 424, supra, taken in their literal sense seem to refer to a physical defendant who is capable of being "arrested" or who is "not residing in the Philippine Islands". It is only by a fiction that it can be held that a corporation is "not residing in the Philippine Islands". A corporation has no home or residence in the sense in which those terms are applied to natural persons. For practical purposes, a corporation is sometimes said, in a metaphorical sense, to be "a resident" of a certain state or a "citizen" of a certain country, which is usually the state or country by which or under the laws of which it was created. But that fiction or analogy between corporations and natural persons by no means extends so far that it can be said that every statute applicable to natural persons is applicable to corporations. Indeed, within the same jurisdiction a corporation has been held to be a "citizen" of the state of its creation for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Federal courts (Wisconsin vs. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S., 265) but not a "citizen" within the meaning of section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution of the United States which provides that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states (Paul vs. Virginia, 8 Wall., 169).
The question arises whether this petitioner, a foreign corporation, shall, in a metaphorical sense, be deemed as "not residing in the Philippine Islands" in the sense in which that expression would apply to a natural person.
Having regard to the reason for the statute which is the protection of the creditors of a non-resident, we are of the opinion that there is not the same reason for subjecting a duly licensed foreign corporation to the attachment of its property by a plaintiff under section 424, paragraph 2, as may exist in the case of a natural person not residing in the Philippine Islands. The law does not require the latter, as it does the former, to appoint a resident agent for service of process; nor to prove to the satisfaction of the Government before he does business here, as the foreign corporation must prove, that he "is solvent and in sound financial condition" (section 68, Act No. 1459, as amended, the Corporation Law), or to produce evidence of "fair dealing" (ibid.). He pays no license fee nor is his business subject at any time to investigation by the Secretary of Finance and 22
the Governor-General; nor is his right to continue to do business revocable by the Government (Cf. section 71, Act No. 1459 of the Corporation Law). His books and papers are not liable to examination "at any time" by the Attorney-General, the Insular Auditor, the Insular Treasurer, "or any other officer of the Government" on the order of the Governor-General (section 54, ibid.). He is not, like a foreign corporation "bound by all laws, rules and regulations applicable to domestic corporations" . . . (section 73, ibid.), which are designed to protect creditors and the public. He can evade service of summons and other legal process, the foreign corporation never. (Section 72, ibid.)
Corporations, as a rule, are less mobile than individuals. This is a specially true of foreign corporations that are carrying on business by proper authority in these Islands. They possess, as a rule, great capital which is seeking lucrative and more or less permanent investment in young and developing countries like our Philippines. Some of them came here as far back as the Spanish regime and are still important factors in our financial and industrial life. They are anything but "fly-by-night" concerns. The latter, we believe, are effectually excluded from our Islands both by our laws and by our geographical and economic situation.
If, as we believe, section 424, paragraph 2, should not be held applicable to foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippine Islands both because the language and the reason of the statute limit it to natural persons, we sustain and reinforce the provisions of section 71 of the Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, which provides in substance that if the Secretary of Finance or the Secretary of Commerce and Communications and the Governor- General find a duly licensed foreign corporation to be insolvent or that its continuance in business will involve probable loss to its creditors, they may revoke its license and "the Attorney-General shall take such proceedings as may be proper to protect creditors and the public". Section 71, supra, contemplates that the proceedings instituted by the Attorney-General shall effect the protection of all creditors and the public equally. Obviously, the benefit of that section will be minimized, if not entirely defeated, if a creditor or a few creditors can obtain privileged liens by writs of attachment based on the sole allegation, which is easily and safely made, that the corporation is "not residing in the Philippine Islands". (Cf. Kuenzle & Streiff vs. Villanueva, 41 Phil., 611.)lawphil.net
Paragraph 2 of section 424, supra does not apply to a domestic corporation. Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic corporations. (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and Marshall Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil., 70, 76; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil., 385, 411.) We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of law made especially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of domestic corporations. (Section 73, supra.)
It is true that the majority of the states in the American Union hold the contrary rule. But our situation is obviously very dissimilar from that of a state in the American Union. There forty-eight states and the central government, all creating corporations which do a tremendous interstate business, are contiguous and separated by imaginary lines. A higher degree of protection against irresponsible corporations may be more necessary there than here. We have no interstate business. Only the central government grants charters to corporations. But even in the American Union there is a minority rule which we regard as the better reasoned and the better suited to our conditions, both geographical and economical, and more nearly in harmony with the policy of our law both under the Spanish regime and since the American occupation. This minority rule is supported by the following authorities: Brand vs. Auto Service Co. (New Jersey, 1907), 67 Atl., 19, 20; Mellor vs. Edward V. Hartford, Inc. (New Jersey, 1929), 146 Atl., 206; Charles Friend & Co. vs. Gold Smith & Co. (Illinois, 1923), 138 N. E., 185; Fullilove vs. Central State Bank (Louisiana, 1926), 107 So., 590.
In the present instance, a particularly monstrous result has followed as s consequence of the granting of the writ attaching all of the property of the petitioner on the sole allegation that it "is not residing in the Philippine Islands". As the petitioner's business was a going concern, which the sheriff, who levied the writ, obviously could not 23
manage, it became necessary on the same day for the court to appoint a receiver. This receiver, as the demurrer admits, "was and is an employee working under the president of the respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation, so that to all intents and purposes, all the property of the petitioner in the Philippine Islands was seized and delivered into the hands of the respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation."
The prayer of the petitioner is granted. The order and writ of attachment complained of are annulled and set aside and the court below is directed to vacate the order appointing Manuel C. Grey receiver of the property of the petitioner and to require said Manuel C. Grey to submit his final report at the earliest practicable date. Costs in both instances to be borne by the respondent, Philippine Advertising Corporation. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.
24
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 December 12, 2005
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision1 of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT- 22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision2 of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT- 22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners predecessors-in-interest is spurious.
On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2101775 on grounds that:
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.6
Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied in an order7 dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the LRA.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the owners duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owners duplicate certificate of title.8 The LRA further declared:
25
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory.9
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt .
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. 10
Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it is only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted. It thus opined that respondents title may only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners title was void and should therefore be cancelled.11
The dispositive portion of the LRAs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT- 22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer that reconstitution be ordered immediately.
On June 14, 2001, petitioners motion for reconsideration and respondents prayer for immediate reconstitution were denied.13
26
From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review14 with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being subjected to the condition that petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction.15 Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision16 on September 13, 2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Respondents moved for reconsideration.18 On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,20 hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 on October 29, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.22
In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents title.23
Respondents motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24, 2004, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents TCT No. T- 210177.
SO ORDERED.24
From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively.
In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:
I
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS EXISTING TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:
27
a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.
b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and
c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER THE ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A "SHORT CUT", THE MAJORITY JUSTICES DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:
a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.
b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS PROPERTY. HENCE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINAS TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING.25
In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOKS TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO 28
HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.
IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME.26
On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 162335.27
In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners existing title; (c) they were not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.
The petitions must be denied.
The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owners duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2628 clearly provides:
Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;
....
When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owners duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No. 26. Thus:
Section 12. Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.29
Since respondents source of reconstitution is the owners duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and preference to the owners duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only 29
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts.30
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.31 A petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable.32
In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,33 this Court categorically declared:
Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioners title to the land is of doubtful authenticity.
Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals....
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of which title, petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals.
The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.34
In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.
The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial courts ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,35 we ruled that:
Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los Santos favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the Government. However, since all the facts are now before this Court, 30
and it is not within de los Santos power in any case to alter those facts at any other proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that cancellation proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy at bar, .... This Court will therefore make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.
No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand thereof.36
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al.37 does not apply in the instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:
[L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. 38
The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only one title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the same is sham and spurious.
The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial court. As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:39
Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas and the Solicitor Generals appeals from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molinas theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molinas cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.
The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents and petitioners title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need 31
to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process.
As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:42
Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding.
The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners title which was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place.43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:44
The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis
.
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.45
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice
WE CONCUR
32
G.R. No. L-14869 October 27, 1920
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, applicant-appelle, vs. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, objector- appellant. JUSTA DE GUZMAN, ET AL., objectors-appellees.
Hartigan and Welch for appellant. Gregorio C. Concepcion for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:
In 1913, cadastral proceedings were begun to settle the title to a considerable tract of land situated in the Province of Rizal. Thirteen of the cadastral lots were claimed by the municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and various private individuals. The judgment of the trial court adjudicated the parcels in question to the private claimants. From this judgment both the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila and the municipality of Cainta appealed, but subsequently the appeal of the latter wad dismissed for failure to prosecute. The contest has thus narrowed down to one between the Church as appellant and various individuals as appellees.
A ruling as to four of the lots can quickly be made. By stipulation during the trial, and by admission of counsel for appellant, Policarpio Buenviaje is conceded to have title to lot 2187. As to lot 2186, the only evidence before us, confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that Mamerta Roxas went into possession of the same in 1895; and when counsel for the Church made his offer to present rebuttal testimony, he failed to mention this lot. Likewise, as to lots 2213 and 2214, the only evidence before us, confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that Antonio, Benito, and Gervasio dela Paz went into possession of the same in 1896; the record states that "ambas partes dan por terminadas sus pruebas," while counsel for the Church in making his offer of rebuttal testimony again failed to include these two lots.
A more difficult situation has arisen with reference to the nine remaining cadastral lots. To understand it, a brief narration of the course of the proceedings in the trial court will have to be made.
The trial as to the land now before us opened with a stipulation to the effect that the composition title of the Church with the spanish Government included this land. The Church presented one witness and rested. The private oppositors then called their respective witnesses. Each endeavored to prove title by possession, best understood by the following table:
Parcel No. Oppositor. Possession began Acts of possession 2176, 2191, 2182 Justa de Guzman 1895 Planted rice; paid taxes 2178, 2180, 2190 Melecio S. Buenaventura 1882 Planted rice 2184, 2185 Justo S. Buenaventura 1885 Cultivation and harvest 2192 Justo Javier 1885 Planted rice; harvested.
Counsel for the Church, thereupon, made an offer to present additional testimony with reference to lots 2176, 2178, 2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, or the lots above enumerated in the table. Three witnesses were called to the stand, but each time, before any pertinent testimony could be secured from them, an objection was made by counsel for the oppositors that the proof related to the evidence in chief of the Church, and this was sustained by the court.
To resolve the facts into their simplest terms, it is evident that when an admission was made of the royal title, the Church had shown that it was the legitimate owner of the land to which it refers. The most perfect title could, however, be lost by abandonments. When, therefore, the private oppositors showed possession for the prescriptive period, they had made their case, and the burden of proof had shifted. To overcome this burden, it was then incumbent upon the Church to demonstrate that such possession had been interrupted, or that it was merely possession through the tolerance of the Church. 33
This brings us to the specific consideration of assignment of error No. 2 of the appellant to the effect that the court erred in refusing to admit evidence tendered by this claimant and appellant in answer to rival claims. A correct ruling can most appropriately be arrived at by a consideration of the nature of cadastral proceedings, with reference to the usual rules of trial practice and evidence.
The object of a cadastral petition, as all know, is that the title to the various lots embraced in the survey may be settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, promoted by the Director of Lands, somewhat, akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree. In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. In another sense, the Government is the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants. (Act No. 2259, sec. 10.) The trial is conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land Registration. (Sec. 11.) As to this court, now abolished, the Land Registration Act provides that it "shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice in special proceedings in courts of first instance." (Act No. 496, sec. 2) The Code of Civil Procedure, which is thus brought into relation with the Cadastral Act, prescribes the order in which the trial must proceed. (Secs. 56, 132). The usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence govern registration proceedings.
Obviously, orderly procedure must be followed if injurious surprises and annoying delays in the administration of justice are to be avoided. Evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material testimony should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously." (1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 346.)1awph!l.net
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their original case." (Sec. 132.) These exceptions are made stronger when one considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formul, an opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (Rodriquez vs. Director of Lands [1915], 31 Phil., 272; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural [1919], 39 Phil., 996.)
We believe that the offer of counsel for the Church could property be classified as evidence in denial of an affirmative fact; but that even if not technically rebuttal evidence, yet in the interest of justice and the ascertainment of the truth it should be received. Whether such evidence would be sufficient to overcome the case which exists in favor of the claimants of the nine lots cannot now be determined.
In so far as the judgment relates to lots No. 2186, 2187, 2213, and 2214, it is affirmed, and in so far as it relates to lots Nos. 2176, 2178, 2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, it is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court for the taking of additional evidence under the offer of counsel for the Church found on page 83 of the stenographic notes. No finding as to costs is made in this instance. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
34
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, - versus -
SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASIG, RIZAL,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Intervenor,
x-------------------------------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, represented by HON. SECRETARY ANGELO T. REYES, and the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, GENERAL NARCISO L. ABAYA,
Before the Court are these two petitions having, as common denominator, the issue of ownership of a large tract of land.
In the first, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 156951, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision[1] dated January 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59454, affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, of the Republics complaint for declaration of nullity and cancellation of a land title against the herein private respondent, the Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. (SHAI).
In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 173408, petitioners Rene Saguisag and five (5) retired military officers pray that Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., the present Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), be asked to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for having announced time and again that the military officers and their families in the contempt action would be ousted and evicted from the property subject of the main petition even before the issue of ownership thereof is finally resolved by the Court.
After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment[2] to the petition in G.R. No. 156951, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), followed by the Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP, joined causes with the petitioner Republic and thus sought leave to intervene. The Court, per its Resolutions dated September 3, 2003,[3] and September 29, 2003,[4] respectively, allowed the intervention and admitted the corresponding petitions- for-intervention.
Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both petitions were ordered consolidated.
36
The Republics recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast against the following backdrop:
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423[5] establishing a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley later renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR). The proclamation withdr*ew+ from sale or settlement and reserve[d] for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff of the *AFP+ the *certain+ parcels of the public domain [indicated in plan Psu-2031+ situated in the several towns and a city of what was once the Province of Rizal. On its face, the proclamation covers three (3) large parcels of land, to wit: Parcel No. 2 (portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A). Parcel No. 3 with an area of 15,912,684 square meters and Parcel No. 4 with an area of 7,660,128 square meters are described in the proclamation as situated inside Fort McKinley, Rizal. Specifically mentioned as excluded from Parcel No. 4 albeit within its boundaries are the American Battle Monument Cemetery (606,985 sq. m.), the Traffic Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and the Diplomatic and Consular area (100,000 sq.m.).
Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding certain defined areas from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declaring them open for disposition. These are Proclamation No. 461[6] and Proclamation No. 462,[7] both series of 1965, excluding portions of the reservation and declaring them the AFP Officers Village and the AFP EMs Village, respectively, to be disposed of under Republic Act (R.A.) 274[8] and R.A. 730[9] in relation to the Public Land Act (C.A. 141, as amended). Excluded, too, under Proclamation No. 172 dated October 16, 1987 and to be disposed pursuant to the same laws aforementioned, save those used or earmarked for public/quasi-public purposes, are portions of the reservation known as Lower and Upper Bicutan, Western Bicutan and the Signal Village, all in Taguig, Metro Manila.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and Development Act (R.A. 7227, as amended), investing the BCDA the power to own, hold and administer portions of Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President[10] and to dispose, after the lapse of a number of months, portions of Fort Bonifacio.[11]
At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as or are situated in what is referred to as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio. As may be gathered from the pleadings, military officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP on the JUSMAG area.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 15084[12] - in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. TCT No. 15084 particularly describes the property covered thereby as follows:
37
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx.
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as shown on subdivision Plan Psd 76057, being a portion of parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated in Jusmang (sic) Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an area of (1,320) SQUARE METERS xxx.. (Underscoring added.)
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991 on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale[13] purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total purchase price as written in the conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter.
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991 deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino are embodied in his Questioned Documents Report (QDR) No. 815-1093.[14] Its highlights:
QUESTIONED SPECIMENS:
1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) containing the signature of ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR. designated as Q-961 .
2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of SHAI containing the signature of ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR. ... designated as Q-962.
PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
To determine whether or not the questioned and sample/specimen signatures ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR. were written by one and the same person.
FINDINGS:
Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the specimens, submitted, under stereoscopic microscope and magnifying lens, with the aid of photographic enlargement reveals that there exist fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." such as in:
38
- The questioned signatures show slow, drawn, painstaking laborious manner in execution of strokes; that of the standard/sample signatures show free, rapid coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the manner of execution of letters/elements.
Furthermore, the questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a product of TRACING PROCESS by CARBON- OUTLINE METHOD.
CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned and the standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were not written by one and the same person.
The questioned signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q- 961" is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon process.
REMARKS:
The other questioned Deeds of Sale containing the signatures of "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." are still in the process of examination.[15]
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173[16] directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63883 and eventually raffled to Branch 71 of the court, the Republic alleged that fraud attended SHAIs procurement of TCT No. 15084. In paragraph No. 5 of the complaint, the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is void owing, inter alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying deed is spurious as the purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.[17]
In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI denied the material allegations of the complaint and countered that the impugned title as well as the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale are valid documents which the Republic is estopped to deny.[18] SHAI also alleged paying in full the purchase price indicated in the deed as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 6030203-C dated October 29, 1991.
39
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence) the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B." Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and B as its Exhibits "1" and 2, respectively. As the pre-trial order was written, it would appear that the parties agreed to limit the issue to the due execution and genuineness of Exhs. A and B.*19+
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit A is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place. The testimony of other witnesses revolved around the absence of bureau records respecting SHAIs application to acquire, payment of the purchase price and Psd- 76057, the plan described in TCT No. 15084. [20]
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who brought with him PNP QDR No. 001-96 and testified that Palads signature in Exhibit A (same as Exh. 1) is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis,[21] followed by the payment in full of the contract price. Atty. Vicente Garcia, the then Register of Deeds of Rizal, also testified about his having endorsed to Palad a letter- inquiry he received from SHAI respecting the authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palads response-letter dated January 23, 1992 (Exh. 10), according to Atty. Garcia, is to the effect that TCT No. 15084 must be genuine as it emanated from the Registrys office on the basis of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale.[22]
On rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit 10 and an LMB official would disclaim transmitting the same to Atty. Garcia.
Eventually, in a decision[23] dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Republics complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint dated November 15, 1991 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
The counterclaims are also DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
40
In not so many words, the trial court considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR.
Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 59454.
In the herein assailed Decision[24] dated January 28, 2003, the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic on the threshold abstract submission that the CA completely ignored, overlooked and/or grossly misappreciated facts of substance which, if duly considered, will materially affect the outcome of this case.
In its COMMENT To Petition, private respondent SHAI parlays the what-can-be-raised line. It urges the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the issues raised therein, particularly those bearing on the authenticity of Exhibit A/1, are mainly questions of fact, adding that the matter of the inalienability of the area purportedly sold is outside the issue agreed upon during the pre- trial stage.
The desired dismissal cannot be granted on the bases of the reasons proffered above.
While the Court, in a petition for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far from absolute. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[25] citing Floro v. Llenado,[26] for one, suggests as much. In Floro, we wrote:
xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court to review the finding of facts of the [CA], summarized in and subsequent cases as follows: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the [CA] are based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) ; 7) ; 8) ; 9) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of facts are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Words in bracket, added.)
To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least three of the exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9.
Private respondent SHAIs stance about the petitioner Republic being barred from raising the issue of inalienability since it failed to plead or assert the same at the pre-trial proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the general rule, as articulated in Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro,[27] is that the determination of issues at 41
a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of others on appeal. It should be pointed out, however, that the rationale for such preliminary, albeit mandatory, conference is to isolate as far as possible the trial out of the realm of surprises and back-handed maneuverings. And lest it be overlooked, the adverted rule on the procedure to be observed in pre-trials is, as Bergano v. Court of Appeals[28] teaches, citing Gicano v. Gegato,[29] subject to exceptions. And without meaning to diminish the importance of the same rule, the Court is possessed with inherent power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the demands of justice so require.[30]
Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be generally observed in pre-trial conferences hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to tackling the question of inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue more legal than factual. As it were, the element of surprise is not really present here. For the issue of inalienability, which is central to the Republics cause of action, was raised in its basic complaint, passed upon by the CA and, before it, by the trial court[31] and of which at least one witness (Palad) was examined as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of land in question at the time of the land alleged sale was part of the *FBMR+. Now as part of the *FBRM+ do you know whether the said parcel of land can be the subject of disposition?
A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be sold and it is already part of those government lands that has been assigned to other government agencies that is no longer within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say I have no more say on that because the proclamation to the effect was reserving this for particular purpose under the DND .*32+ (Words in bracket added.)
At any rate, Palads testimony drew nary an objection from private respondent SHAI. It even cross-examined said witness.[33] The rule obtains that the introduction of evidence bearing on an issue not otherwise included in the pre-trial order amounts to implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the court to try such issue.[34]
Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we now consider the clashing assertions regarding the JUSMAG area. Was it, during the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The Republics and the intervenors parallel assertions are correct.
42
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes.[35] Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable.[36] Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable,[37] unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land.[38] And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains,[39] even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. So it must be here.
There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that subject land is within military reservation,*40+ and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se,[41] its own evidence themselves belie its posture. We start with its Exhibit 2 (petitioners Exh. B), a copy of TCT No. 15084, which described the area covered thereby measuring 399,922 square meters as a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031 situated in Jusmang (sic) area Fort Bonifacio. Complementing its Exhibit 2 is its Exhibit 1 - the deed of sale - which technically described the property purportedly being conveyed to private respondent SHAI as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic) area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx (Emphasis added)
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described in private respondents Exhibits 1 and 2, formed part of that wide expanse under Proclamation No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of land of the public domain as falling within its coverage. These include, inter alia, the entire 15,912,684-square meter area constituting Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 located inside the now renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a redundant point, was declared a military reservation.
The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation Map of Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu 2031[42] prepared in September 1995 and certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates in colored ink the outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by Proclamation No. 423. As there also shown, the 399,992-square meter area embraced by SHAIs TCT No. 15084, defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the violet-colored borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No. 423.
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084 was and is still part of the FBMR, more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter Parcel No. 3 of the reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors BCDA, DND and AFP in this appellate proceedings, has maintained all along this thesis. Towards discharging its burden of proving that the disputed property is part 43
of the reservation, the petitioner Republic need only to demonstrate that all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No. 3 of Plan Psu 2031 have been reserved for military purposes. The evidence, however, of the fact of reservation is the law or, to be more precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself, the contents and issuance of which courts can and should take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.[43]
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the appellate court seemed to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind eye on, certain admissions made by the private respondent, the most basic being those made in its answer to the Republics allegations in paragraph 5 (e) and (g) of its complaint. To the Republics allegations that the property covered by TCT No. 15084 was and remains part the FBMR, SHAIs answer thereto reads:
2. It specifically denies the allegations in paragraphs 5 of the complaint, the truth of the matter being that in the Deed of Sale , the Director of Lands Certificate (sic) that he is authorized under the law to sell the subject property and that the lots were duly awarded by the [LBM] to the vendee.[44] ( Emphasis and word in bracket added.)
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the petitioner Republic alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the formers denial to such allegations on the inalienable nature of the property covered by TCT No. 15084 being in the nature of a general denial. Under the rules on pleadings, a specific, not a general, denial is required; a denial is not specific because it is so qualified or termed specific by the pleader.*45+ The defendant must specify each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely denies and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he will rely to support his denial.[46] Else, the denial will be regarded as general and will, therefore, be regarded as an admission of a given material fact/s stated in the complaint.
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to enter what, under the Rules, is tantamount to a general denial of the Republics averments that what SHAIs TCT No. 15084 covers is part of the military reservation. In the process, private respondent SHAI is deemed to admit the reality of such averment.
To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had more than sufficiently established its claim on the inalienability of the parcels of land covered by TCT No. 15084. In fine, it had discharged the burden of proof on the issue of inalienability. Be that as it may, the burden of evidence to disprove inalienability or, to be precise, that said parcels of land had, for settlement purposes, effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423, devolves upon the private respondent. This is as it should be for the cogency of SHAIs claim respecting the validity of both the underlying deed of sale (Exh. A/1) and its TCT No. 15084 (Exh. B/2) rests on the postulate that what it purportedly bought from the LMB had ceased to be part of the reserved lands of the public domain. Elsewise put, SHAI 44
must prove that the JUSMAG area had been withdrawn from the reservation and declared open for disposition, failing which it has no enforceable right over the area as against the State.
Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden by reason of lack of evidence. To be sure, it has not, because it cannot even if it wanted to, pointed to any presidential act specifically withdrawing the disputed parcels from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423. Worse still, its own Exhibit 5,*47+ a letter dated March 19, 1991 of then PA Commanding General, M/Gen Lisandro Abadia, to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the SHAI, cannot but be viewed as a partys judicial admission that the disputed land has yet to be excluded from the military reservation. The Abadia letter, with its feature dis-serving to private respondent SHAI, reads in part as follows:
Dear Mrs. Gabon:
This is in connection with your move to make a petition to President Aquino regarding the possible exclusion of Southside Housing Area from the military reservation and for its eventual allotment to the military officers presently residing thereat. Allow me to state that I interpose no objection . I find it helpful to our officers to be provided a portion of the Fort Bonifacio military reservation . (Underscoring added.)
Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard put to understand how the CA could still have found for SHAI.. The appellate court, apparently swayed by what SHAI said in its Brief for the Appellees[48] that:
Appellant [petitioner Republic+ is probably unaware that , then President Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation 461 when he excluded from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 an area of 2,455,810 square meters more or less. Likewise on October 16, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 also located at Fort Bonifacio containing an area of 4,436, 478 . So if we deduct the 6,892,288 *2,455,810 + 4,436,478 = 6,892,288] square meters covered by Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 of the areas reserved for military purposes of 7,053,143 square meters, what is only left is 160,857 square meters or more or less 16 hectares .*49+
justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land with the following disquisition:
The foregoing admission aside, appellants *now petitioners+ reliance on Proclamation No. 493 [should be 423] in insisting that the land in litigation is inalienable because it is part of the [FBMR] is too general to merit serous consideration. While it is true that, under the said July 12, 1957 Proclamation, then President Carlos P. Garcia reserved the area now known as Fort Bonifacio for military purposes, appellee [now respondent] correctly calls our attention to the fact, among other matters, that numerous exceptions thereto had already been declared through the years. The excluded areas under Proclamation No. 461, dated September 29, 1965 and 45
Proclamation No. 172, dated October 16, 1987 alone already total 6,892,338 square meters. (Figures in bracket added.)
The CAs justifying line does not commend itself for concurrence.
For one, it utilizes SHAIs misleading assertion as a springboard to justify speculative inferences. Per our count, Proclamation 423 reserved for military purposes roughly a total area of 25,875,000 square meters, not 7,053,143. On the other hand, Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 excluded a combined area of 6,892,338 square meters. Now then, the jump from an acknowledgment of the disputed parcels of land having been reserved for military purposes to a rationalization that they must have been excluded from the reservation because 6,892,338 square meters had already been withdrawn from Proclamation 423 is simply speculative. Needless to stress, factual speculations do not make for proof.
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent SHAI - and quite understandably, the appellate court - had not pointed to any proclamation, or legislative act for that matter, segregating the property covered by TCT No. 15084 from the reservation and classifying the same as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To reiterate what we earlier said, lands of the public domain classified as a military reservation remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from such classification and declared open to disposition.[50] The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.[51]
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of the JUSMAG area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its reclassification as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Still, such hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI. The reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 3[52] of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas had stated the observation that the reason for the ban is not very clear under existing jurisprudence,[53] the fact remains that private corporations, like SHAI, are prohibited from purchasing or otherwise acquiring alienable public lands.
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this disposition. An appropriate closure to this case could not be 46
had, however, without delving to an extent on the issue of the validity of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale which necessarily involves the question of the authenticity of what appears to be Palads signature thereon.
With the view we take of the case, the interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious. Consider:
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The Court perceives no reason why he should lie, albeit respondent states, without elaboration, that Palads declaration is aimed at avoiding criminal prosecution.*54+ The NBI signature expert corroborated Palads allegation on forgery.*55+ Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped Received by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words, the whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act.[56] There is also no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court[57] attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.[58]
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the deed of sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203C dated 29 October 1991, (sic) as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price.. An official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment,[59] it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. A Certification under date September 15, 1993 of the OIC Cash Division, LMB, states that OR # 6030203 in the amount of P11,977,000.00 supposedly paid by [SHAI] is not among the series of [ORs] issued at any time by the National Printing Office to the Cashier, LMB, Central Office.*60+ A copy of the OR receipt is not appended to any of the pleadings filed before the Court. We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
47
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.[61]
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit.
A final consideration in G.R. No. 156951. This case could not have come to pass without the participation of a cabal of cheats out to make a dishonest buck at the expense of the government and most likely the members of SHAI. No less than its former president (Ms. Virginia Santos) testified that a facilitator did, for a fee, the necessary paper and leg work before the LMB and the Registry of Deeds that led to the execution of the Deed of Sale and issuance of the certificate of title in question.[62] Ms. Santos identified Eugenia Balis, a geodetic engineer, as the facilitator*63+ who facilitated all these presentation of documents,*64] and most of the time, directly transacted with the LMB and the Register of Deeds leading to acquisition of title.[65] Engr. Balis was, in the course of Ms. Santos testimony, directly mentioned by name for at least fifteen (15) times. Not surprisingly, Engr. Balis did not appear in court, despite SHAIs stated intention to present her as witness.*66+
The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio land involved in this and the NOVA area litigations is, as described in the Report of the FactFinding Commission,*67+ so epic in scale as to make the overpricing of land complained of in the two hundred AFP [Retirement and Separation Benefits System] RSBS cases (P703 million) seem like petty shoplifting in comparison.*68+ The members of private respondent SHAI may very well have paid for what they might have been led to believe as the purchase price of the JUSMAG housing area. The sad reality, however, is that the over P11 Million they paid, if that be the case, for a piece of real estate contextually outside the commerce of man apparently fell into the wrong hands and did not enter the government coffers. Else, there must be some memorials of such payment.
At bottom, this disposition is nothing more than restoring the petitioner Republic, and eventually the BCDA, to what rightfully belongs to it in law and in fact. There is nothing unjust to this approach.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 173408 need not detain us long. As it were, the question raised by the petitioners therein respecting the ownership of the JUSMAG area and, accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain in the housing units each may be occupying is now moot and academic. However, contempt petitioners expressed revulsion over the efforts of the military establishment, particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from their respective dwellings, if that really be the case, even before G.R. No. 156951 could be resolved, is understandable as it is justified. We thus end this ponencia with a reminder to all and sundry that might is not always right; that ours is still a government of laws and not of men, be they in the civilian or military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not treat lightly any attempt to trifle, intended or otherwise, with its processes and proceedings. A 48
becoming respect to the majesty of the law and the prerogatives of the Court is a must for the orderly administration of justice to triumph.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is GRANTED and the appealed CA Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 (Exh. A/1) purportedly executed in favor of private respondent SHAI and TCT No. 15084 (Exh. B/2) of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such deed are declared VOID. The Register of Deeds of Pasig or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby ordered to CANCEL TCT No. 15084 in the name of SHAI and the area covered thereby is DECLARED part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the same has, in the interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation from such reservation. Private respondent SHAI, its members, representatives and/or their assigns shall vacate the subject parcels of land immediately upon the finality of this decision, subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act.
Cost against the private respondent SHAI.
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further thereon other than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same.
SO ORDERED.
49
G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA- G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.5 Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nt 50
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
. . . .
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the 51
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute."15 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nt Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
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(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in- interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, 53
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in- interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.