1

Economic engagement entrenches neoliberalism- This designates any hindrance

to the market as requiring elimination.
Essex, Windsor political science professor, 2008
(Jamey, The Neoliberalization of Development: Trade Capacity Building and Security at the US
Agency for International Development, Antipode, 40.2, March, ScienceDirect)

The term TCB is relatively new, and is meant to move the international system beyond the impasse between discredited but institutionally entrenched
projects of development and aggressive efforts at global trade liberalization. Initially emphasized by developing states in the context of the WTO's 2001
Doha Round of negotiations, TCB has been operationalized in ways that reinforce and extend
neoliberalization, focusing development resources on building political and economic capacity
to participate in liberalized trade and globalizing markets. In this view, the ability to prosper through free trade
drives economic growth and allows the greatest possible flowering of freedom and democracy. States and civil society must be
brought into line with market mechanismscivil society through active cultivation and states
through limiting their functions to market facilitation and security provision. Phillips and Ilcan
(2004) describe capacity building as one of the primary political technologies through which
neoliberal govermentality is constructed and spatialized. They define neoliberal governance as the ways of
governing populations that make individuals responsible for changes that are occurring in their communities, with responsibility exercised and
enforced through markets, which increasingly emphasize skill acquisition, knowledge-generation, and training programs (Phillips and Ilcan 2004:397).
This perspective highlights the ways in which discourses and practices of capacity building
center on the creation and reproduction of social categories that mark off populations as
either responsible members of open, market-based communities moving toward development, or
irresponsible and potentially dangerous outliers (see Roberts, Secor and Sparke 2003). Moving from the
latter group to the former depends on acquiring the skills and knowledge that permit
individuals to practice responsible behavior and allow for discipline via the marketplace.
Diffusion of skills, knowledge, and traininginvestments in social capital and human
capitalare the driving forces of neoliberalizing development (Rankin 2004). It is in this context, Jessop (2003)
points out, that the networks praised by both Castells (1996) and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) become a seductive but ultimately empty (and even
celebratory) metaphor for understanding and challenging neoliberalization and neoimperialism. A more critical and useful analysis goes beyond
recognizing the re-categorization of populations and places along axes of responsibility, and, as noted in the above discussion of the strategic-relational
approach to the state, also considers the role of class-relevant social formations and struggles in the expansion and maintenance of political and
economic power. A closer examination of how USAID has instituted TCB, and what this means for state institutions' strategic selectivity relative to
development and securitization, is one way to analyze the process of neoliberalization and its significance for development and security. For USAID,
adopting TCB comprises one means to revise the agency's mission and align it with the unique combination of neoliberal and neoconservative doctrines
that dominate US trade and foreign policies. With development understood as a national security issue, USAID and its implementation of TCB have
become central to the US state's articulation of the relationship between development, trade, and security. In a 2003 report on TCB, USAID (2003b:3)
outlined a three-part framework for enacting successful development through TCB: participation in trade negotiations, implementation of trade
agreements, and economic responsiveness to new trade opportunities. USAID portrays this as the most effective way to incorporate developi ng states
into processes of globalization. This also poses new challenges for states, firms, and non-governmental organizations, however, as the rewards for
good policies and institutionsand the negative consequences of weak policies and institutionsare greater than ever, while economic globalization
has also created the need for better coordination and harmonization (USAID 2004b:7). USAID's three-part definition repositions development as a
form of infrastructure, institution, and network building that can ensure the success of trade liberalization efforts. Defining development
as the successful and total integration of a state and its economy into the fabric of neoliberal
globalization represents a significant change in the cartography of development through
which USAID works, and over which it has great strategic influence. Though national states remain at the heart
of this new cartography, USAID development programs now pivot on building state institutions capable (primarily) of enacting and reproducing
neoliberal economic policies within the context of capitalist internationalization. As the agency stated in its 2001 TCB report, US development policy is
committed to working in partnership with developing and transition economies to remove obstacles to development, among which are barriers to
trade (USAID 2001:3). The 2003 report likewise singles out trade negotiations as a powerful growth engine for developing countries, so long as they
are supported by sound institutions that can ensure transparency and predictability in economic governance, reinforcing economic reforms that are
critical for successful development (USAID 2003b:7). This follows from and reinforces the idea that state-managed foreign aid and assistance, the
staple of past USAID programs, must be supportive of, and not a substitute for, trade and economic self-help by developing countries. This position
echoes what USAID proclaimed at the development project's height, as discussed above, and relies on the idea that development progress is first and
foremost a function of commitment and political will directed at ruling justly, promoting economic freedom, and investing in people (USAID 2004b:11).
USAID defines ruling justly as governance in its various dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence; government
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption, while investing in people involves bolstering basic education and basic
health services (USAID 2004b:11, fn 8). This language draws from existing discourses of social capital and state effectiveness long favored by
Washington Consensus institutions such as the World Bank and IMF (Fine 2001; Peet and Hartwick 1999). How closely on-the-ground implementation
of TCB hews to these conceptualizations is rather more problematic. The invocation of political will, just rule, and state
efficiency are hallmarks of neoliberal rhetoric, and suggests that TCB is the latest in a long line
of strategies designed to further capital internationalization and the reproduction of the US-
dominated international state system. Yet the vague, catch-all character of TCB in practice indicates that it is less a fully
coherent strategic blueprint than the repackaging of existing development activities, meant to bring USAID in line with state and hegemonic projects
predicated on the neoliberal doctrine of free trade and the neoconservative obsession with security. A USAID official remarked that initial attempts to
institute TCB cast a very wide net: [In the field] you would get these surveys from Washington, and they would say, we're trying to conduct an
inventory of all our trade capacity building activities. And in the beginningand I don't know how this has evolvedbut in the beginning of those
surveys, I mean, it was sort of ludicrous because virtually anything that we were doing in the economic growth sphere could be described as trade
capacity building (interview with the author, December 2004). The broad practical definition of TCB, coupled with the increased emphasis on
international markets as a means of alleviating poverty and spurring economic development, belies the continuity between the current focus on trade
liberalization and previous development programs. The same USAID official continued: My understanding was that *developed countries] would ask
the developing countries, what do you need in terms of trade capacity building, to get you ready to participate in the WTO and globalized trade
regimes? And they would give these long laundry lists that would run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and the developed countries would go,
whoa, we can't do all this So we started developing these inventories of all our trade capacity building investments, and one of the objectives of
those inventories was so we could talk to the developing world and tell them, look, we're doing all this stuff in trade capacity building already
(interview with the author, December 2004). Despite this, there are two important changes that have occurred with the agency' s adoption of TCB. The
first relates to the institutional relations through which USAID operates; the second centers on changing understandings and practices of security and
state weakness. As stated above, the emphasis now placed on ensuring that development is
ideologically and institutionally subordinate to trade liberalization places the onus for
successful development on responsible states that can adequately facilitate capitalist
accumulation via free trade. This shift has necessitated that USAID alter the character and intensity of the partnerships through which
it plans and implements capacity building and other development programs (see Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, on USAID's subcontracting activities).
This has meant changes in how USAID serves as both site and strategy for class-relevant social forces institutionalized in and by the state. The most
important partners with which USAID has strengthened or pursued relations to advance capacity building programs have been the Office of the US
Trade Representative (USTR), USDA's trade-focused Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), and internationalizing fractions of capital. TCB therefore must be
analyzed not as technocratic jargon, but as a new means of reproducing and re-institutionalizing class-relevant social struggles in and through the
national state. The danger USAID faces in so tightly intertwining itself with market-oriented state
institutions and capital arises from the continual narrowing of the agency's strategic
selectivityneoliberal doctrine serves as the basis for agency work, and further
neoliberalization is the intended outcome . The benefit comes in the form of larger budgets and even the reproduction of
USAID itself, and the agency has received large appropriations to implement TCB (see Table 1). While these numbers still represent a small portion of its
total budget, TCB has moved quickly up the list of agency priorities, and has gained prominence as a guidepost for continued and intensified
neoliberalization (USAID 2004a). It is important to note, however, that even as USAID funding for TCB projects has steadily i ncreased, the agency's
proportional share of overall US government spending on such activities has decreased, due to increases in TCB funding channeled into sector-specific
trade facilitation activities or into WTO accession, areas where capital and USTR command greater expertise. Geographically, USAID has concentrated
TCB funding in states where acceptable neoliberalization is already underway, in areas of geostrategic importance, particularly the Middle East, Eastern
Europe, and the former Soviet Union (USAID 2001:6, 2003c:2), and in those countries eager to engage in free trade agreements. Since 2001, the
agency's TCB funding to countries with which the US is pursuing Free Trade Agreements (Morocco, the Andean Pact, CAFTA, and SACU) more than
tripled, with much of this funding targeted at building institutions compatible with the requirements of WTO accession or specific features of bilateral
and regional agreements with the US (USAID 2004a).1 This differs from the geopolitical criteria previously underlying USAID development funding
primarily in that trade policy has moved to the center of agency strategies, though this is complicated by emerging national security discourses focused
on counter-terrorism and failing or failed states. The second strategically and institutionally important change accompanying USAID's adoption of TCB
rests on the altered relationship between development and security, as outlined in the 2002 and 2006 NSS. Here, development bolsters weak states
that might otherwise become havens for terrorist and criminal networks, which could then pose a threat to American interests abroad and
domestically. USAID, the State Department, and the White House have therefore identified development, along with defense and diplomacy, as the
three pillars of US security strategies (USAID 2004b:8; White House 2002, 2006). The focus on strengthening weak states in new development
schema demonstrates how the neoliberal understanding of states as rent-seeking regulatory burdens on market relations becomes strategically
intertwined with the security concerns and objectives of neoconservatism (USAID 2004b:12; on neoconservatism, see Lind 2004). Two points stand out
here. First, recalling that neoliberalization does not only or even primarily imply the rolling back of the state apparatus, the emphasis on TCB demands
that weak states be strengthened by removing trade barriers and making economic and social policy sensitive to liberalized global market signals.
Second, weakness here stems directly from states' inability or unwillingness to properly
insinuate themselves into the networks, flows, and institutions of neoliberal capitalism.
Distanciation and disconnectedness from internationalizing capital is not only economically
wrongheaded, but is the source of political and social weakness, producing insecurity that
threatens continued capitalist accumulation under the rubric of neoliberalization. Roberts, Secor and
Sparke (2003:889) thus identify an emphasis on enforced reconnection with the global capitalist system, mediated through a whole repertoire of
neoliberal ideas and practices. TCB offers a potential and enforceable technical fix for disconnectedness, as being outside neoliberalization is to be
against neoliberalization, and thus to pose a security risk. USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios made this clear in a May 2003 speech: For countries
that are marginalized, that are outside the international system, that are outside development, that are not developing, that are not growing
economically, that are not democratizing, look at the different factors that lead to high risk in terms of conflict. Income level is one of the highest
correlations between marginalized states and risks in terms of conflicts (USAID 2003a:np). The agency's 2004 White Paper expanded on this to provide
a more detailed strategic framework for development and aid programs, establishing a loose taxonomy of states according to the need for
development assistance, the commitment to initiate neoliberalization, and the degree to which states are capable and fair partners in the use of
development resources (USAID 2004b). This geographic categorization was updated and expanded further with the agency's 2006 Foreign Assistance
Framework, which bases its categories on criteria developed from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a new (and thoroughly neoliberal)
development institution established in 2004 (USAID 2006; see Table 2). In these frameworks, USAID identifies relatively weak institutions, particularly
those necessary to establish and maintain market openness and political stability, as the crux of underdevelopment. Running across such taxonomies is
a consideration of strategic states, a designation that depends less on USAID objectives than on the geostrategic and forei gn policy goals of the US
executive and Congress. The agency recognizes that the determination of which developing states are considered strategic is a matter for other US
state institutions, but also notes: Increasingly, the primary foreign policy rationale for assistance may be matched by or indistinguishable from the
developmental or recovery objectives. Thus, the strategic allocation of ESF [Economic Support Fund] and like resources will begin to benefit from the
same principles of delineation, selectivity and accountability proposed in this White Paper (USAID 2004b:21).2 Incorporating
developing states into networks of neoliberal globalization is, in this view, the essence of
producing and maintaining security in line with US foreign policy objectives . This understanding of the
link between development, trade, security, and state weakness is echoed in the strategies of other US state institutions, most notably the US Trade
Representative (see US Trade Representative 2001). USAID articulates development progress and improved security in terms of the facilitation of
liberalized market relations by stable developing state institutions. While more candid interviews with USAID officials indicate that not everyone at the
agency is on board with this approach, it has nonetheless become official strategy, and presents a serious contradiction, as development comes to
depend on internationalizing and liberalized market forces, even as these remain dominated by predatory finance capital (Harvey 2005; McMichael
1999, 2000a). Internationalizing market relations are fundamentally unstable and, as a means of
achieving security outside the narrow concerns of capitalist accumulation, completely
insecure. A brief examination of how food security fits into USAID strategies regarding trade, security, and state weakness demonstrates this.

Neoliberal engagement of Latin America results in inequality, oppression, and
militarymoral obligation to put those sacrificed at the center of decision
making.
Makwana 6 (Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html, ZBurdette)

Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization The goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all
barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. In this
scenario, public life will be at the mercy of market forces, as the extracted profits benefit the
few, writes Rajesh Makwana. The thrust of international policy behind the phenomenon of economic
globalization is neoliberal in nature. Being hugely profitable to corporations and the wealthy elite, neoliberal polices are propagated through the
IMF, World Bank and WTO. Neoliberalism favours the free-market as the most efficient method of global
resource allocation. Consequently it favours large-scale, corporate commerce and the privatization of resources. There has been much international attention
recently on neoliberalism. Its ideologies have been rejected by influential countries in Latin America and
its moral basis is now widely questioned. Recent protests against the WTO, IMF and World Bank were essentially protests against the
neoliberal policies that these organizations implement, particularly in low-income countries. The neoliberal experiment has failed to
combat extreme poverty , has exacerbated global inequality , and is hampering international
aid and development efforts. This article presents an overview of neoliberalism and its effect on low income countries. Introduction After the Second
World War, corporate enterprises helped to create a wealthy class in society which enjoyed excessive political influence on their government in the US and Europe.
Neoliberalism surfaced as a reaction by these wealthy elites to counteract post-war policies that favoured the working class and strengthened the welfare state.
Neoliberal policies advocate market forces and commercial activity as the most efficient methods for producing and
supplying goods and services. At the same time they shun the role of the state and discourage government
intervention into economic, financial and even social affairs. The process of economic globalization is driven
by this ideology; removing borders and barriers between nations so that market forces can drive
the global economy. The policies were readily taken up by governments and still continue to pervade classical economic thought, allowing corporations and
affluent countries to secure their financial advantage within the world economy. The policies were most ardently enforced in the US
and Europe in the1980s during the ReganThatcherKohl era. These leaders believed that expanding the free-market and
private ownership would create greater economic efficiency and social well-being. The resulting deregulation, privatization and the removal of border restrictions provided
fertile ground for corporate activity, and over the next 25 years corporations grew rapidly in size and influence. Corporations are now the most productive economic units in the
world, more so than most countries. With their huge financial, economic and political leverage, they continue to further their neoliberal objectives. There is a
consensus between the financial elite, neoclassical economists and the political classes in
most countries that neoliberal policies will create global prosperity. So entrenched is their
position that this view determines the policies of the international agencies (IMF, World Bank
and WTO), and through them dictates the functioning of the global economy. Despite reservations from within
many UN agencies, neoliberal policies are accepted by most development agencies as the most likely means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions.
There is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of economic globalization and its
proposed benefits. Neoliberal policies have unarguably generated massive wealth for some
people, but most crucially, they have been unable to benefit those living in extreme poverty
who are most in need of financial aid. Excluding China, annual economic growth in developing countries
between 1960 and 1980 was 3.2%. This dropped drastically between 1980 and 2000 to a mere
0.7 %. This second period is when neoliberalism was most prevalent in global economic policy.
(Interestingly, China was not following the neoliberal model during these periods, and its
economic growth per capita grew to over 8% between 1980 and 2000.) Neoliberalism has also
been unable to address growing levels of global inequality. Over the last 25 years, the income
inequalities have increased dramatically, both within and between countries. Between 1980 and 1998, the
income of richest 10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not including
China). The shortcomings of neoliberal policy are also apparent in the well documented economic
disasters suffered by countries in Latin America and South Asia in the 1990s. These countries were left
with no choice but to follow the neoliberal model of privatization and deregulation, due to their financial
problems and pressure from the IMF. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia have since
rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and World Bank. Instead they have
favoured a redistribution of wealth, the re-nationalization of industry and have prioritized the
provision of healthcare and education. They are also sharing resources such as oil and medical
expertise throughout the region and with other countries around the world. The dramatic
economic and social improvement seen in these countries has not stopped them from being
demonized by the US. Cuba is a well known example of this propaganda. Deemed to be a danger
to freedom and the American way of life, Cuba has been subject to intense US political,
economic and military pressure in order to tow the neoliberal line. Washington and the
mainstream media in the US have recently embarked on a similar propaganda exercise aimed at
Venezuelas president Chavez. This over-reaction by Washington to economic nationalism is
consistent with their foreign policy objectives which have not changed significantly for the past
150 years. Securing resources and economic dominance has been and continues to be the USAs
main economic objective. According to Maria Pez Victor: Since 1846 the United States has carried out no fewer
than 50 military invasions and destabilizing operations involving 12 different Latin American
countries. Yet, none of these countries has ever had the capacity to threaten US security in any
significant way. The US intervened because of perceived threats to its economic control and
expansion. For this reason it has also supported some of the regions most vicious dictators such
as Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, and Pinochet. As a result of corporate and US influence, the key international bodies that developing countries
are forced to turn to for assistance, such as the World Bank and IMF, are major exponents of the neoliberal agenda. The WTO openly asserts its intention to improve global
business opportunities; the IMF is heavily influenced by the Wall Street and private financiers, and the World Bank ensures corporations benefit from development project
contracts. They all gain considerably from the neo-liberal model. So influential are corporations at this time that many of the worst violators of human rights have even entered
a Global Compact with the United Nations, the worlds foremost humanitarian body. Due to this international convergence of economic ideology, it is no coincidence that the
assumptions that are key to increasing corporate welfare and growth are the same assumptions that form the thrust of mainstream global economic policy. However,
there are huge differences between the neoliberal dogma that the US and EU dictate to the
world and the policies that they themselves adopt. Whilst fiercely advocating the removal of
barriers to trade, investment and employment, The US economy remains one of the most
protected in the world. Industrialized nations only reached their state of economic development by fiercely protecting their industries from foreign markets
and investment. For economic growth to benefit developing countries, the international community must be allowed to nurture their infant industries. Instead economically
dominant countries are kicking away the ladder to achieving development by imposing an ideology that suits their own economic needs. The US and EU also provide huge
subsidies to many sectors of industry. These devastate small industries in developing countries, particularly farmers who cannot compete with the price of subsidized goods in
international markets. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, most capitalist countries have increased their
levels of state intervention over the past 25 years, and the size of their government has
increased. The requirement is to do as I say, not as I do. Given the tiny proportion of
individuals that benefit from neoliberal policies, the chasm between what is good for the
economy and what serves the public good is growing fast . Decisions to follow these policies are out of the hands of the
public, and the national sovereignty of many developing countries continues to be violated, preventing them from prioritizing urgent national needs. Below we
examine the false assumptions of neoliberal policies and their effect on the global economy.
Economic Growth Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is the yardstick of economic globalization which is fiercely pursued by multinationals and countries alike. It is the
commercial activity of the tiny portion of multinational corporations that drives economic growth in industrialized nations. Two hundred corporations account for a third of
global economic growth. Corporate trade currently accounts for over 50% of global economic growth and as much as 75% of GDP in the EU. The proportion of trade to GDP
continues to grow, highlighting the belief that economic growth is the only way to prosper a country and reduce poverty. Logically, however, a model for continual financial
growth is unsustainable. Corporations have to go to extraordinary lengths in order to reflect endless growth
in their accounting books. As a result, finite resources are wasted and the environment is
dangerously neglected. The equivalent of two football fields of natural forest is cleared each
second by profit hungry corporations. Economic growth is also used by the World Bank and government economists to measure progress in
developing countries. But, whilst economic growth clearly does have benefits, the evidence strongly suggests
that these benefits do not trickle down to the 986 million people living in extreme poverty,
representing 18 percent of the world population (World Bank, 2007). Nor has economic growth
addressed inequality and income distribution. In addition, accurate assessments of both poverty levels and the overall benefits of
economic growth have proved impossible due to the inadequacy of the statistical measures employed. The mandate for economic growth is the perfect platform for
corporations which, as a result, have grown rapidly in their economic activity, profitability and political influence. Yet this very model is also the cause
of the growing inequalities seen across the globe. The privatization of resources and profits by the few at
the expense of the many, and the inability of the poorest people to afford market prices, are
both likely causes. Free Trade Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its
current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and
their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as
affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures. Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries by
levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and revenue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low,
effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development. With this self interest driving globalization, economically powerful
nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico is an example of free-market fundamentalism
that gives corporations legal rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Since its
implementation it has caused job loss, undermined labour rights, privatized essential services,
increased inequality and caused environmental destruction. In Europe only 5% of EU citizens work in agriculture, generating
just 1.6% of EU GDP compared to more than 50% of citizens in developing countries. However, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies to EU farmers
to the tune of 30 billion, 80% of which goes to only 20% of farmers to guarantee their viability, however inefficient this may be. The General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS) was agreed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Its aim is to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations that are considered to be "barriers
to trade". The agreement effectively abolishes a governments sovereign right to regulate subsidies and provide essential national services on behalf of its citizens. The Trade
Related agreement on International Property Rights (TRIPS) forces developing countries to extend property rights to seeds and plant varieties. Control over these resources and
services are instead granted to corporate interests through the GATS and TRIPS framework. These examples represent modern free trade
which is clearly biased in its approach. It fosters corporate globalization at the expense of local
economies, the environment, democracy and human rights. The primary beneficiaries of
international trade are large, multinational corporations who fiercely lobby at all levels of
national and global governance to further the free trade agenda. Liberalization The World Bank, IMF and WTO have
been the main portals for implementing the neoliberal agenda on a global scale. Unlike the United Nations, these institutions are over-funded, continuously lobbied by
corporations, and are politically and financially dominated by Washington, Wall Street, corporations and their agencies. As a result, the key governance structures of the global
economy have been primed to serve the interests of this group, and market liberalization has been another of their key policies. According to neoliberal ideology, in order for
international trade to be free all markets should be open to competition, and market forces should determine economic relationships. But the overall result of a completely
open and free market is of course market dominance by corporate heavy-weights. The playing field is not even; all developing
countries are at a great financial and economic disadvantage and simply cannot compete.
Liberalization, through Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poorer countries to open their markets to foreign
products which largely destroys local industries. It creates dependency upon commodities which
have artificially low prices as they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency
speculation from abroad. The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute
financial and economic crisis in many developing countries. At the same time, foreign
speculators and large financial firms make huge gains. Market liberalization poses a clear economic risk; hence the EU and US
heavily protect their own markets. A liberalized global market provides corporations with new resources to
capitalize and new markets to exploit. Neoliberal dominance over global governance structures has enforced access to these markets. Under
WTO agreements, a sovereign country cannot interfere with a corporations intentions to trade even if their operations go against domestic environmental and employment
guidelines. Those governments that do stand up for their sovereign rights are frequently sued by corporations for loss of profit, and even loss of potential profit. Without this
pressure they would have been able to stimulate domestic industry and self sufficiency, thereby reducing poverty. They would then be in a better position to compete in
international markets.


The alternative is to reject the neoliberalism in the plan creates open
discussion and puts pressure on real policymakers
Roberts, Cornell government professor, 2009
(Kenneth, Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?, pg 1-7)

In recent years voters in Latin America have elected a series of left-of-center presidents, starting with Venezuela in 1998 and continuing (to date) with
Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Paraguay. Although this political "left turn" has bypassed a number of countries, and
the new governments that are part of it comprise a remarkably heterogeneous lot, there seems little doubt that the political winds have shifted in the
region. The turn to the left has followed a decade-and-a-half of free market or "neoliberal"
reform, when technocrats throughout the region-with staunch support from the U.S.
government and international financial institutions-forged a powerful policymaking consensus
around the virtues of free trade, deregulated markets, and private entrepreneurship. Since it is not
clear whether the region's new leftist governments have identified, much less consolidated, viable alternatives to market liberalism, it is far too early to
claim that Latin America has entered a post-neoliberal era of development. What is clear, however, is that the shift to the left signals a
" repoliticization " of development issues in Latin America-that is, a demise of the "Washington Consensus"
(Williamson 1990) for free market capitalism and the onset of a highly contested search for alternatives that lie "beyond neoliberalism." In short,
Latin America is no longer (if it ever was) suspended at "the end of politics" (Colburn 2002), where
technocratic consensus is complemented (or secured) by a combination of social demobilization,
political resignation, and mass consumerism. The repoliticization of development has both
policy and process dimensions. On the policy front, it signifies that neoliberalism is no longer
the only game in town; although predefined socialist alternatives to capitalism have long since evaporated, vigorous debates have
emerged around non-neoliberal "varieties of capitalism" that envision a more active role for state power in asserting national autonomy, shaping
investment priorities, ameliorating inequalities, and providing social services and other public goods. In terms of process, r epoliticization
entails the emergence or revival of popular subjectivities that are contesting the technocratic
monopolization of policymaking space -in some cases at the ballot box, in others on the streets. Repoliticization,
therefore, involves a reciprocal interaction between the rise of new actors and an expansion of
the issue agenda to include a broader range of alternatives . This book tries to make sense of these new
subjectivities-that is, to identify some of Latin America's new social and political actors and to explain the origins, inspirations, and interests that lie
behind their activation. In contrast to much of the emerging work on Latin America's left turn, we look beyond the rise of left-leaning
governments and their policy choices to focus attention on the socioeconomic and cultural terrain in
which new political options are being forged. Individual chapters thus explore how neoliberalism has shaped and
constrained popular subjects by breaking down some traditional actors, transforming others, and providing a stimulus for the emergence of new ones-
at least some of which bear the seeds of potential social orders beyond neoliberalism. Our approach starts with the recognition that neoliberal
"structural adjustment" programs represented much more than a simple change in development policies. By slashing tariffs and other trade barriers,
privatizing state-owned enterprises and social services, and deregulating markets to encourage the free flow of capital, neoliberal reforms realigned
existing relationships among states, markets, and societies in fundamental ways (Garret6n 2003a). As such, they transformed the social, political, and
cultural landscapes that had developed during the mid-twentieth-century era of state-led import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Initially, this meant
breaking down the popular collective subjects of the lSI era-in particular, organized labor and labor-based parties-and imposing market discipline over
everlarger swaths of social life. As labor unions weakened, however, new popular subjects, such as community-based organizations and indigenous
movements, that rejected the insecurities of market individualism and its commodification of social relationships began to emerge. Their diverse
attempts to reweave the social fabric are the primary focus of this volume. The essays included here trace many of the contours of this rapidly evolving,
neoliberal social and political landscape. Collectively, the essays explore three basic sets of questions. First, what are the new patterns of social
interaction generated by the process of market restructuring, and how do these reshape the ways in which societal interests and identities are
articulated, organized, and represented in the political arena? Interests and identities are often redefined as market reforms create new economic
niches (or destroy old ones), commodify social relationships, alter traditional uses of land, water, or natural resources, and shift the scale or locus of
public policymaking. Second, what new social and political actors have emerged, and how do they respond to the multifaceted changes associated with
market restructuring? Traditional actors may enter into decline, but new ones invariably arise; we must ask, then, how these new actors are
constituted, how they adapt to market opportunities and insecurities, and what strategies they follow when they try to enter the political arena,
redefine the policy agenda, and contest public authority. Third, and finally, to what extent do these actors and their responses provide the building
blocks for new paths of social, economic, and political development that might be more equitable and inclusive than those that have characterized the
neoliberal era? What lies "beyond neoliberalism" is unlikely to be determined by grand ideological
visions or political blueprints; instead, it will be constructed piece by piece, from below,
through the grassroots participation and decentralized experimentation of new popular
subjects. This volume offers no simple answers to these complex questions, much less a new theory of neoliberal politics. Instead, it offers a series
of portraits written from a variety of disciplinary perspectives about how people adapt and respond-both individually and collectively-when their
economic moorings shift and the social fabric is torn asunder. These portraits are hardly comprehensive; they do not cover every country in Latin
America, much less all the stations in the region's heterogeneous and fragmented sociocultural landscape. The editors do not claim that the particular
set of actors and issues included in this volume is the best or the only one that could have been chosen. Nevertheless, we have selected topics based on
their importance and the quality of research they have generated, and we believe our portraits jointly illuminate the diverse experiences of social
actors during the neoliberal era. These portraits provide compelling evidence that capitalism is, as Schumpeter (1950) aptly characterized it, a force of
"creative destruction" that simultaneously breaks down and reconfigures various fields of social interaction. Our chapters are replete with examples of
the dialectical interplay between capitalism's advance and the social, cultural, and political responses it elicits-though not, as will become evident, in
the manner classically envisioned by Marx. These responses, whether deliberate or reactive, bear the seeds of what may in fact lie beyond
neoliberalism, a horizon that remains opaque but is increasingly being sketched by a diverse array of popular movements in the region. As explained
later, the various dimensions of this dialectical interplay lie beyond the scope of any single academic discipline, making an interdisciplinary approach
vital to a more comprehensive understanding. An Integral Approach to Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Response Social and political
changes in Latin America have long been conditioned by patterns of economic development. This can be seen, for example, in the nineteenth-century
association between oligarchic politics and agro-export development models, or in the rise of populist social and political mobilization during the early
stages of industrialization in the middle of the twentieth lower class groups. These demands were typically funneled through the corporatist
intermediary channels of mass party and union organizations, which brokered exchanges between states and organized societal interests. In short, lSI
encouraged groups-defined primarily in terms of class categories-to self-organize in order to advance their interests in a policymaking environment
where states increasingly penetrated and regulated social and economic relationships, including labor markets and land tenure arrangements.
Together, these two processes encouraged strong labor and, in some cases, peasant movements to develop, which in turn provided a social foundation
for Latin America's first mass party organizations. The social, cultural, and political construction of popular subjects duri ng the lSI era was thus anchored
in the favorable combination of rapid industrialization, state interventionism, and social reform. These linkages between state-led industrialization and
grassroots organization were frayed, however, by economic pressures and political polarization in the 1960s and 1970s (O'Donnell 1973), and they
were largely severed by the debt crisis of the 1980s. While neoliberal structural adjustment policies helped restore economic stability in the aftermath
of the debt crisis, they exacerbated-indeed, they often institutionalized-the social dislocations wrought by the crisis itself. Changes in labor markets-in
particular growing informalization, a greater reliance on subcontracting and temporary labor, and flexible rules for hiring and firing-made collective
action in the workplace increasingly difficult to sustain, leading to a sharp decline in trade union density in most of the region. Likewise, the
parcelization of landholdings and the penetration of market relations in the countryside undermined historic patterns of peasant mobilization for land
reform in much of the region (Kurtz 2004). The retreat of the state subjected new sectors of the economy and society to market discipline, undermining
the rationale and effectiveness of collective action aimed at eliciting state redress . Historic labor-based parties entered into decline or adapted in part
by distancing themselves from labor and other organized mass constituencies. This trend that was propelled both by the structural conditions of
neoliberal capitalism and by technological advances in political communication (most prominently, television) that rendered mass party organizations
increasingly dispensable for electoral mobilization. Following the restoration of democratic rule in most of Latin America in the 1980s, U.S.-style media-
based advertising and campaign tactics diffused rapidly across the region, allowing candidates to appeal directly to voters without the mediation of
mass membership party organizations. Latin America entered the new millennium, then, largely devoid of the mass social and party organizations that
dominated the landscape during the populist/lSI era. Labor movements had been downsized and politically marginalized, and they were less capable of
representing the diverse interests and identities of a precarious and in formalized workforce. Likewise, where they survived at all, mass parties were
transformed into professionalized or patronage-based electoral machines (see, e.g., Levitsky 2003); elsewhere, they were displaced by independent
personalities and populist outsiders. The dominant trends pointed toward a fragmentation and pluralization of civil society-with a multitude of
interests, identities, and decentralized groups struggling to make their voices heard (Ox horn 1998a)-and a deinstitutionalization of political
representation, as evidenced by extreme levels of electoral volatility and the rise of personality-based, antiparty candidates. A bottom-up
perspective is thus essential to understand how the demise of lSI and the transition to
neoliberalism realigned the social landscape in ways that disarticulated the class-based popular subjects of the lSI era.
Such a perspective is also essential, however, for explaining popular responses to market
liberalization and the openings that eventually emerged for the construction of new types of
collective subjects that bear the seeds of what may lie beyond neoliberalism. Neoliberal
reforms are directed-indeed, often imposed-by state officials in collaboration with (or under the pressure of)
transnational power centers, but civil society and grassroots actors are hardly passive
bystanders (Arce 2005). These actors invariably seek to exploit, resist, evade, or cope with state
initiatives, and their responses often produce outcomes that are quite different from those
envisioned by policymakers and economic elites. In particular, grassroots actors employ a variety of measures to alleviate
material hardships and reduce exposure to market insecurities; as Karl Polanyi (1944) argues, there are social and political limits to the commodification
of social relationships, and these limits may be quickly breached in contexts of egregious inequalities such as those prevail ing in contemporary Latin
America. Popular responses thus attempt to reweave a social fabric torn by economic crisis and
market dislocation. These responses are often local, decentralized, and territorially based,
building on traditions of communitybased organizing, or focused on ethnic and cultural claims rather than the
class/corporatist patterns of interest representation that were hallmarks of the lSI era. Although new popular subjects may not initially target public
authorities or policymaking arenas, grassroots activism often becomes politicized over time, posing the formidable challenge analyzed by Benjamin
Goldfrank in chapter three-that of translating local initiatives into nationallevel political alternatives. This challenge highlights the importance of a
bottom-up perspective in the construction of new popular subjects in the neoliberal era. The primary objectives of this volume, then, are to develop an
interdisciplinary perspective on the multiple forms of societal responses to market liberalization and to assess their effects. We do this in four principal
fields where neoliberalism has altered the social landscape: electoral politics, ethnic mobilization, environmental governance, transnational migration.
In each area we explore new patterns of social interaction, identify various responses, and analyze the potential impact of emerging popular subjects.
2
TEXT
THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENTER INTO BINDING
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OVER AN OFFER THAT THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENT THE
CROSS-BORDER TRADE ENHANCEMENT ACT

CHINA WILL SAY YES TO EFFORTS TO REDUCE US-MEXICO BORDER COSTS, B/C
IT IMPROVES VALUE OF CHINESE EXPORTS TO MEXICO

[Robert R. Editor, Business Mexico Online Commentary: China sees Mexican
trade deals as stepping stones to other markets; Mexico beware! Business
Mexico Online JUNE 7, 2013 [http://business-mexico-online.com/commentary-
china-sees-mexican-trade-deals-as-stepping-stones-to-other-markets-mexico-
beware/]

The price China is likely to exact will be twofold: 1) Using Mexicos numerous free trade
agreements with other countries as a platform to export Mexican-made-or-assembled Chinese
goods around the world, and 2) reducing obstacles and tariffs on Chinese exports. Peas great
mistake is in thinking that Mexico and China are equals It is a mistake for Mexico to buy into
the Chinese propoganda that both countries are in similar situations as developing nations, and so
should work together in a fraternal alliance. China has the second-largest economy in the world,
and is a world power, militarily, economically, politically and commercially. Although China
may have many problems similar to those of a developing country, such as pollution and rural
poverty, those are due to decades of obtrusive communist policies and unrestrained government
development at all costs. That is very different from the progressive maturity of true developing
countries. Mexico is a true developing nation, struggling to pull itself up by its bootstraps, with
all the advances and stumbles along the way that a poor country trying to democratize tends to
suffer. Peas great mistake is in thinking (at least in public rhetoric, if not in private) that Mexico
and China are equals that can work together to leverage each other into the First World.
Undoubtedly China will cold-heartedly pursue its own national interests, and it is Chinese
economic growth rather than Mexican growth that will be Chinas priority. This does not mean
that Mexico will inevitably be harmed by Chinas aggressive international trade policies, but any
carelessness or lack of long-term planning by the Mexican government could cause the Sino-
Mexican relationship to tip dangerously in Chinas favor. Current Mexico-China balance of trade
figures indicate that China exports nearly 10 times more products to Mexico than Mexico exports
to China, so it has to be understood from the outset that any new trade agreements are not starting
from a level playing field. The agreements reached during Chinese President Xis visit to Mexico
this week reveal some of Chinas underlying interests: 1) Access to Mexican oil to fuel Chinas
expanding economy. 2) Access to the United States market through Mexicos NAFTA agreement
with the United States and Canada. 3) Access to the European Union and other regions and
countries through Mexicos other free trade agreements 4) Reducing the risk of Chinese products
being subject to higher tariffs or anti-dumping measures.

GENUINE CONSULTATION ON REGIONAL HOTSPOTS NECESSARY TO BUILD A
FRAMEWORK OF TRUST NECESSARY TO SAVE US-SINO RELATIONS, IMPACT IS
WORLD PEACE
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang 12
[Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun at the Eighth Lanting Forum of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Stay committed to peaceful development and win-win
cooperation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China: 28
December 2012 Westlaw]
China and the United States, one the world's largest developing country and the other the biggest developed one, are also the
two largest economies in the world. That makes their relationship one of the most important yet complex in the world.
Whether the two countries will live amicably with each other is an issue whose significance
goes far beyond the bilateral scope and which concerns peace, stability and prosperity of
the whole world. Some regard it a law of history that there have always been fierce clashes,
at times, conflicts and wars, between an established power and an emerging power. But we
reject such fatalism. In our view, in this globalized era when countries are inter-dependent with
their interests closely linked, there has been a major shift in international relations. In the face
of frequent global challenges, all countries would want to stick together to meet challenges together and pursue common
development. This is an unstoppable historic trend. Those who go along with it will prosper and
those against it perish. We are sober-minded on this and it is from this perspective that we view and
approach China-US relations. We are committed to seeking new answers to old problems
and are determined to foster a new major-country relationship based on mutual respect
and win-win cooperation. What has happened in China-US relations shows that both sides stand to gain from
cooperation and lose from confrontation. This year marks the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the Shanghai Communique
and the resumption of contact between the two countries. China-US relations have entered a stage where
they should no longer have doubts about further growth of this relationship. Over the past 40
years, great progress has been made in China-US relations. In particular, the two presidents have reached important
agreement to build a new type of major-country relationship based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation, heralding a
new, historic starting point for China-US relations. Two-way trade has surged from nearly zero at the time of resumption of
contact to 446.6 billion US dollars last year and is expected to exceed 500 billion US dollars this year. The two sides, once in
estrangement and confrontation, now engage in dialogue and cooperation. We have had the Strategic and Economic
Dialogues (SandED), the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange and a total of more than 90
consultation mechanisms covering political, economic, trade, security, defense, scientific,
technological, people-to-people, cultural, energy, the environment and many other fields.
This is not commonly seen in major-country relations and speaks volumes about the
dynamism and potential of China-US relations. More than 3.5 million visits are taking place between the two
countries every year, nearly 10,000 every day on average. The two countries have maintained close
communication and coordination on counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change and regional
hotspot issues. That being said, China and the United States still differ significantly in social system, development stage,
history, culture and tradition and still face major and sensitive issues including Taiwan and Tibet-related issues. These issues,
if not handled properly, will upset or even seriously damage the bilateral relationship. To dispel strategic mistrust
and build a new type of major-country relationship is a demanding task which calls for
unflinching efforts from both sides. At the current stage, I believe it is important for the two countries to do the
following: First, they need to have candid and in-depth communication so as to avoid strategic
misjudgment. China and the United States have maintained close high-level contacts and exchanges through quite a
number of mechanisms of dialogue and communication including the SandED, the Strategic Security Dialogue and the
Consultation on Asia-Pacific Affairs. Given the profoundly changing and complex international and
regional landscape and the growing destabilizing factors and uncertainties, to have in-
depth, candid discussions to find solutions and to strengthen coordination and cooperation
will help reduce mutual suspicion and boost strategic mutual trust. Apart from increasing dialogue,
coordination and cooperation on global issues and international and regional hotspot
issues, it is also important that the two sides truly follow the principle of mutual respect,
understand each other's national condition and public opinion, respect each other's choice
of social system and development path, and refrain from imposing one's own will on the
other side.

THESE REGIONAL HOTSPOTS INCLUDE LATIN AMERICA
Beijing Xinhua 09
[Xinhua: 1st Round Sino-US Strategic, Economic Dialogue Concludes in
Washington World News Connection July 29, 2009 Westlaw]
IV. On Sino-US Cooperation on International and Regional Issues The two sides discussed the common
international challenges facing the two countries. They were resolved to maintain close
communication and coordination and work together with the rest of the international
community for the settlement of conflicts and reduction of tension that trigger regional and
global instability. The two sides noted that traditional and nontraditional security threats are intertwined, and
situations in Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and African require combined efforts. The two sides reaffirmed the
importance of the Six-Party Talks, the continuing efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the
maintaining of peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. They emphasized the importance of implementing UN
Security Council Resolution 1874 and resolving the nuclear issue on the Peninsula through peaceful means. The two sides
agreed to exert greater efforts for the early realization of the aforementioned goals. The two countries also pledged to increase
coordination to jointly promote stability and development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They agreed that senior officials from
both countries with responsibilities for Iran and the Middle East should continue to consult closely on these issues. The two
sides expressed their willingness to increase coordination and consultation on the issue of Sudan to jointly seek an early and
enduring political settlement of the Darfur issue and promote the peace process between the north and the south of Sudan.
BOTh sides pointed out their shared opposition to terrorism and pledged to work collaboratively to strengthen global non-
proliferation and arms control regimes. They reiterated their respective nuclear policies and discussed the upcoming 2010
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] Review Conference and the Conference on Disarmament. The two sides also exchanged
views on the Global Nuclear Security Summit proposed by the US side and reiterated the importance of existing dialogues on
security, arms control, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism issues. The two sides intend to further enhance dialogue and
cooperation to combat transnational challenges, such as cross-border crimes, terrorism, the illegal drug trade and piracy. The
two sides agreed to enhance consultation on policy planning, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia,
and Latin America within the Strategic Dialogue framework, with a view to broadening and
deepening cooperation on issues of mutual concern. V. On Mechanism for China-US Strategic and Economic
Dialogue The two sides expressed their shared view that the SED will continue to advance China-US relations in tandem with
other existing bilateral mechanisms. The Dialogue represents a major initiative to further develop
China-US relations in the new era, and offers an important platform for the two countries to
deepen understanding, enhance mutual trust, and promote cooperation. In order to more fully
explore shared solutions on a wide range of common challenges, the Chinese and US delegations look forward to further
discussions on specific matters raised at the dialogues through special representatives of the two presidents, working groups,
and existing bilateral dialogues.

OUR IMPACT IS THE BIGGEST EVERY IMPACT SCENARIO CAN BE
SOLVED BY SINO-US RELATIONS
Beijing Xinhua 09
[Beijing Xinhua in English China's official news service for English-
language audiences (New China News Agency)] Xinhua 'Commentary':
World Has Every Reason To Closely Watch Obama's China Visit
11/17/09 Westlaw]
As American geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski said at a January seminar marking the 30th anniversary of the two countries'
diplomatic ties, China and the United States have become important forces in global political and
economic stability. Since the ice-breaking visit by late U.S. President Richard Nixon to China in 1972 against the
backdrop of the Cold War, bilateral cooperation has expanded to the areas of politics, economy,
military and culture. BOTh countries are aware of the importance of their relations. Though Obama won the
presidential election under the banner of "Change," he decided to keep the U.S.' China policy of communications and
cooperation unchanged, according to Harry Harding, a leading China specialist in the United States who has advised several
presidents. President Hu Jintao also stressed more than once that healthy development of Sino-U.S. relations is
not only in the fundamental interests of both countries, but is also conducive to peace, stability and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Given the interwoven relations that China
and the United States share in a global village, both nations see huge potential in seeking
their common interests through expanded cooperation. And major challenges, such as the
global economic downturn, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change, cannot be
tackled by a single country on its own. Instead, they need the joint efforts of the
international community, where the United States and China, as two influential countries,
should play exemplary roles. Obama's visit to China offered an opportunity for China and the United States to reach
understandings and agreements and seek solutions to a variety of global issues. China served as an important
engine to drive forward global economic recovery while the United States saw its economy reverse the
trend of recession in the third quarter of this year. To reinforce the positive economic momentum and
promote global development in a steady, orderly manner, the United States and China need to join hands in the
spirit of mutual support. Among all of the issues, global warming is a problem of immediate
consequence. Earlier this month in Barcelona, representatives from more than 40 small-island countries warned during a
five-day convention on climate change that any delay in a solution to the problem would increase the possibility of their homes
being flooded. As the world's two major greenhouse gas emitters, how the United States and
China will cooperate and assume responsibility is a concern with global ramifications.
Undoubtedly, China and the United States still, and will always, have disagreements, especially in the
fields of trade, currencies, greenhouse gas emissions, and political and military trust. But disagreements provide
room for talks, improved communications and enhanced cooperation.
3
INTERP - PREDICTIONS MUST HAVE A CLAIM, A WARRANT, AND STRONG DATA
TO GET A DEFAULT 100% PROBABILITY, ANYTHING LESS GETS 0%.

STRONG DATA REQUIRES (1) EXPLICIT DISCLOSURE OF (2) QUANTIFIABLE
RESEARCH METHODS
QUANTIFIABLE RESEARCH METHODS MUST SPECIFY SAMPLE SIZE, THE MODEL
AND VARIABLES USED, T STATISTICS, OLS COEFFICIENTS, R-SQUARED

Wooldridge
02
[Jeffrey Professor of Economics, Michigan State University, previously Associate Professor of
Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D. Economics, UCSD; Introductory
Econometrics: A Modern Approach 2nd Edition. Pages 150-1]

We end this chapter by providing a few guidelines on how to report multiple regression results
for relatively complicated empirical projects. This should teach you to read published works in
the applied social sciences, while also preparing you to write your own empirical papers. We will
expand on this topic in the remainder of the text by reporting results from various examples, but
many of the key points can be made now. Naturally, the estimated OLS coefficients should
always be reported. For the key variables in an analysis, you should interpret the estimated
coefficients (which often requires knowing the units of measurement of the variables). For
example, is an esti- mate an elasticity, or does it have some other interpretation that needs
explanation? The economic or practical importance of the estimates of the key variables should
be discussed. The standard errors should always be included along with the estimated
coefficients. Some authors prefer to report the t statistics rather than the standard errors (and
often just the absolute value of the t statistics). While nothing is really wrong with this, there is
some preference for reporting standard errors. First, it forces us to think carefully about the null
hypothesis being tested; the null is not always that the population parameter is zero. Second,
having standard errors makes it easier to compute confidence intervals. The R-squared from
the regression should always be included. We have seen that, in addition to providing a
goodness-of-fit measure, it makes calculation of F statistics for exclusion restrictions simple.
Reporting the sum of squared residuals and the standard error of the regression is sometimes a
good idea, but it is not crucial. The number of observations used in estimating any equation
should appear near the estimated equation. If only a couple of models are being estimated, the
results can be summarized in equation form, as we have done up to this point. However, in
many papers, several equations are estimated with many different sets of independent
variables. We may estimate the same equation for different groups of people, or even have
equations explaining different dependent variables. In such cases, it is better to summarize the
results in one or more tables. The dependent variable should be indicated clearly in the table,
and the independent variables should be listed in the first column. Standard errors (or t
statistics) can be put in parentheses below the estimates.


THEY DON'T MEET THEY ARE WEAK DATA

Rosekind 09
[Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D Kevin B. Gregory Alertness Solutions The Moebus
Aviation Report on "Scientific and Medical Evaluationof Flight Time
Limitations": Invalid, Insufficient, and Risky Alertness SolutionsJanuary 2009]

While the extensive scientific literature on fatigue has definitively established its role in reducing
alertness, performance, and safety, there remains a significant and critical gap in the scientific
data available to address policy issues and provide specific solutions. There are few studies that
have specifically tested an alertness strategy/fatigue countermeasure or compared an
established regulatory policy to an alternative or quantified the benefits of implementing an
Alertness Management Program (AMP)/Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS). Regulatory
authorities continually confront this gap between the science establishing fatigue as a significant
safety issue and having data to address policy issues or provide specific solutions in their efforts
to address fatigue risks through policymaking. EASA's request for scientific and medical
evaluation of 18 specific flight time limitation questions is one more example of such an effort.
However, the resulting MAR addressing the 18 posed questions is invalid, insufficient, and risky.
The following highlights some of the most significant and relevant issues in each of these areas.
I. Invalid
a. No data. In 13 of the 18 questions posed there is direct acknowledgement that no data is
available to address the question or the data that are cited do not specifically address the
question posed. Therefore, 73% of the questions do not have any data or relevant,appropriate
data to provide an evaluation of the issue identified (e.g., #1, 6, 10, 13).
b. Recommendations without data . Though acknowledging no data or no relevant data are
available, specific recommendations are still made to address the questions posed. The primary
task identified was to provide a scientific and medical evaluation of the questions posed,
however, the MAR goes beyond this tasking to provide specific recommendations intended for
policy making .These recommendations were not data-driven and relied on generalizing from
other information to fill the "data gap" . However, the recommendations are presented in a
manner to suggest that they could be used for data based policies.
c. Subjective data sources . A significant number of the scientific citations used to substantiate
specific points were studies that utilized only subjective , self-reporting measures. Subjective,
self-report measures can be discrepant from objective measures of alertness and performance,
biased, and influenced by varied sources. It is critical that scientific data used as a basis for
policy making be based on objective , measurable outcomes related to performance, relevant
operational variables, behavioral actions,errors, incidents, accidents and appropriate safety
measures. Subjective measures can complement these other varied objective outcomes but are
highly questionable as the exclusive source for an evaluation or recommendation. For example,
the MAR cites previous NASA research related to a subjective survey on sleep quantity and
quality in onboard crew rest/bunk facilities (1). Yet the MAR does not include a complementary
NASA study that included objective physiological measures of sleep quantity and quality in
onboard rest facilities during actual operations involving two different flight patterns and three
different aircraft (2).
d. Ignores operational experience and safety history. While a scientific and medical evaluation of
the 18 questions posed is relevant, equally relevant is the operational experience and safety
history of the activities being addressed. Policy making to address established safety issues
could consider safety data, operational experience, relevant scientific findings, and where
appropriate, economic factors. When the MAR goes beyond scientific and medical evaluation to
make "practical" recommendations, it enters a realm where these other relevant factors (safety
data, operational experience, 'economics, etc.) become significant considerations.
e. No quantification of risk/benefit . In policy-making efforts, it is critical to go beyond
documentation of an effect to quantifying specifics of the risk . Regarding fatigue, this translates
into both quantifying the risk and identifying the specific areas where these risks are expressed.
First, this allows decisions about what specific fatigue-related risks to address and their priorities
. Second, it provides a basis for determining expected,quantifiable benefits and outcomes that
could be measured by implementing policies and activities . The MAR expert panel made an
effort to use this approach in a couple of its responses (e.g., #2, 12). However, the quantification
of risks and subsequent, quantifiable benefits of implementing policies and recommendations
should be the lead issue in addressing all of the questions posed .

THE REASON TO PREFER IS EDUCATION STRONG DATA IS KEY TO GOOD
POLICYMAKING

Saks 86
[Michael J. Prof of Law at Arizona State University, cited in a Supreme Court
opinion and thousands of articles. B.A., B.S., Pennsylvania State University,
1969; M.A., 1972; Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1975; M.S.L., Yale Law School,
1983. *63 IF THERE BE A CRISIS, HOW SHALL WE KNOW IT? 46 Md. L. Rev. 63
Fall, 1986]
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSES
One of the most important aspects of this as well as related earlier articles by Professor Galanter
[FN2] and his colleagues [FN3] is that they inquire into the degree to which relevant empirical
evidence supports the claims made concerning a litigation explosion, and they share with us the
findings of that inquiry. The explosion appears to be more rhetorical than real.
Those offering wholesale condemnation of our civil justice system, and counseling a variety of
reforms ranging from tinkering to *64 radical alteration, are confident they know a serious
problem exists and, what is more, they know its causes . [FN4] Their language is so strong and
so clear that one hesitates to doubt the accuracy of their vision. But in support of their views, they
generally offer little more than unsupported assertions or anecdotes , examples of which
Professor Galanter has cited. Mere assertion is simply that, and repeating something often or
enlarging the chorus does not make it any more true.
As I have noted elsewhere, [FN5] government by anecdote is a bad idea not because the
anecdotes are untrue or are not evidence (though sometimes they are untrue and therefore are not
evidence), [FN6] but because they contribute so little to developing a clear picture of the
situation we are concerned about. It makes a difference if for every ten anecdotes in which an
undeserving plaintiff bankrupts an innocent defendant, zero, ten, one hundred, one thousand, or
ten thousand equal and opposite injustices were done to deserving and innocent plaintiffs . [FN7]
The proportion of cases that results in some sort of error , [FN8] and the ratio of one kind of
error to the other, ought to be of greater interest to a serious policy-maker than a handful of
anecdotes on either side of an issue. After all, the reforms to be adopted are intended to change
that ratio and the tens of thousands of anecdotes it summarizes.
This brings us, then, to the kind of information that should form the core of the debate: data . If
the explosion is real and the *65 crisis serious, it should not be difficult to find data confirming
those fears. In this regard, Professor Galanter makes two important contributions to the liability
crisis debate. He summarizes some important data, and he helps us to think about what they
mean. Conscientious policy-makers will be interested to learn that 98% of civil litigation goes on
in state courts, that those filings have declined in the past several years, and that even tort filings
have increased only 1 % more than population growth. [FN9] Those urging reform, when they do
point to data, usually point to the 2% of litigation that is handled by federal courts. Professor
Galanter helps us to interpret the meaning of those federal data, [FN10] which show a 123%
increase in filings over the past decade.
First of all, he notes that an increase in filings is not necessarily a reflection of an increase in
plaintiffs' litigiousness. Changes in filing rates are equally a reflection of defendants' resistance
to resolving disputes short of litigation. The filing rate reflects, as well, the volume of
transactions, the number of actionable injuries resulting from those transactions, lawyers' case-
screening practices, and, no doubt, numerous othervariables. [FN 1 1] Any real understanding of
what is going on requires knowing what lies behind and gives rise to any change (or stability) in
filing rates.
Moreover, Professor Galanter shows us that the 123% increase *66 means something other than
appears at first blush. By disaggregating those cases into the categories supplied by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Professor Galanter finds that it is the federal
government itself that has added by far the largest fraction of the increase in litigation, having
increased its filings (of over-payment recoveries) by 6,683%! [FN12] Except for products
liability (of which one-fourth were asbestos claims, now waning), the federal caseload for tort
cases has been fairly stable.
These are but a few illustrations of the way Professor Galanter, and other empirically oriented
legal scholars, force us to deal with the evidence of the world we propose to reshape through law
reform. We need not limit policy debates to a mutually uninformative swapping of anecdotes or a
heated exchange of quotations. In my view, it is enormously helpful to inform ourselves about
our world empirically , and to think intelligently about the alternative interpretations of the
relevant empirical data. [FN13]
That the topographic map of vociferous reformers is not consistent with the most fundamental
features of the landscape over which they presume to reign should give us all pause. If their
assessment of our condition the easiest part of problem-solving can be so inconsistent with
the evidence, we might well be hesitant to accept their diagnosis of causes and their prescribed
treatment.

ITS A VOTER FOR PRECEDENT

Sterba 06
[Sonya K. Department of Psychology University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Misconduct in the Analysis and Reporting of Data: Bridging Methodological and
Ethical Agendas for Change ETHICS & BEHAVIOR, 16(4), 305318 2006]
In conclusion, ethical and methodological specialists gatekeeping efforts in the area of data
analysis and reporting have remained strikingly disparate and insular to date. They neither
coordinate with each other nor involve the research community in outreach efforts aimed at
engendering self-monitoring. Their independent efforts have led to insufficient examination
of the prevalence of overt and covert misconduct, and to inconsistent standards that are
unreliably enforced. Yet the quality control of data analyses and reporting practices is of
prime importance . Thus, I propose three tactics to improve the prevention, detection, and
deterrence of analysis and reporting misconduct that each involve melding of the
methodological and ethical arenas. First, psychologists need to better coordinate ethical and
methodological standards pertaining to data analysis and reporting. Published
methodological standards can lack the ethical imperative to motivate change, and published
ethical standards can lack the specificity to direct that change. One first step toward
coordinating standard setting across ethical and methodological specialties is offered here.
Methodologists could be included on the committees of psychologists who create and revise
research ethics codes and who respond to allegations of research ethics misconduct. In turn,
committees disseminating methodological guidance, such as the APA Task Force on
Statistical Inference, could include psychologists with research ethics expertise to aid in
integrating an ethical perspective. Second, we need to increase applied researchers access to
coordinated training in quantitative methods and research ethics. This will afford them the
detailed methodological knowledge and the ethical imperative to better selfmonitor their
own analysis and reporting. Specifically, a cross-fertilization of ethics and methods
instruction needs to take place throughout undergraduate and graduate training , and also at
the faculty level. Currently, statistical and methodological courses are typically devoid of
research ethics discussions, and vice versa. In fact, these ethics courses and methods courses
are typically offered in different departments, by faculty members who rarely interact.
Faculty guest lectures from the companion discipline can begin to bridge these fields. In
addition, short quantitative workshops (such as those offered by the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research) and ethics workshops (such as those
sponsored by the APA Ethics Committee) are outlets for reaching researchers who may not
have access to methodological or ethical specialists at their home institutions. (Neither the
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research nor the Ethics Committee
currently lists ethics in data analysis and reporting as a topic area covered in their educational
outreach efforts.) It is essential that undergraduate and graduate psychology students be
made mindful of the intersection of their methodological practices with ethical imperatives
as they begin to conduct their own investigationsbefore poor habits become ingrained. We
cannot expect students to completely autonomously make the connections between ethical
and methodological imperatives; we need to scaffold them in this endeavor. This type of
blended educational effort would increase the pool of journal and grant reviewers qualified to
detect and enforce standards for analysis and reporting conduct. This, in turn, would render
the field s examination of data analysis and reporting practices more pervasive and more
reliable . Third, psychologists need to more consistently implement strategies for preventing
and deterring data analysis and reporting misconduct. Random auditing of analyses in
articles submitted for peer review, and perhaps also systematic surveying of peer reviews
themselves, are potential preventative deterrents (Kimmel, 1996). These deterrents would
essentially be an expansion of the Codes mandate to keep data available for potential
reanalysis. If an audit of a given analysis reveals errors or discrepancies, the response would
not be to try to determine whether this error was intentional or accidental. Instead, journal
editors and reviewers would take it as their responsibility to inform authors of the ethical or
methodological standards that were violated and issue a penaltysuch as a request for
reanalysis or replicationregardless of intent. This removes some of the professional
hesitancy, fear of reprisals, and time involved in trying to prove intentional misconduct. This
suggestion is in line with Snows (1959) argument that if we do not penalize false
statements made in error, we open up the way, don t you see, for false statements by
intention (quoted in Kimmel, 1996, p. 273).

AND VOTE NEG ON PRESUMPTION THE AFFS HARMS AND SOLVENCY HAVE
ZERO PROBABILITY BECAUSE THEY ARE WITHIN THE STATISTICAL MARGIN FOR
ERROR

Zellner 07
[Arnold Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago Philosophy and
objectives of econometrics Journal of Econometrics Volume 136, Issue 2,
February 2007, Pages 331-339]
On the relation of science and econometrics, I have for long emphasized the unity of science
principle, which Karl Pearson put forward as follows: the unity of science is a unity of methods
employed in analyzing and learning from experience and data. The subject matter discipline may
be economics, history, physics, or the like, but the methods employed in analyzing and learning
from data are basically the same. As (Jeffreys, 1957) and (Jeffreys, 1967) expresses the idea,
There must be a uniform standard of validity for all hypotheses, irrespective of the subject .
Different laws may hold in different subjects, but they must be tested by the same criteria ;
otherwise we have no guarantee that our decisions will be those warranted by the data and not
merely of inadequate analysis or of believing what we want to believe . Thus the unity of
science principle sets the same standards for work in the natural and social sciences. For example,
this range of considerations is particularly relevant for those in economics who cross-correlate
variables and assert causation on the basis of such correlations alone (See Zellner (1979a) for
consideration of such tests and of alternative definitions of causality) or those who carelessly test
all hypotheses in the 5% acceptreject syndrome. Also, we must emphasize the importance of a
general unified set of methods for use in science and the undesirability of unnecessary jargon and
ad hoc methods.
Given that we take the unity of science principle seriously, we may next ask what are the main
objectives of science. As Karl Pearson, Harold Jeffreys, and others state, one of the main
objectives of science , and I add of econometrics, is that of learning from our experience and
data. Knowledge so obtained may be sought for its own sake, for example, to satisfy our curiosity
about economic phenomena and/or for practical policy and other decision purposes. One part of
our knowledge is merely description of what we have observed; the more important part is
generalization or induction, that is that part which ... consists of making inferences from past
experience to predict future [or as yet unobserved] experience, as Jeffreys puts it.
Thus there are at least two components to our knowledge, description and generalization or
induction. While generalization or induction is usually considered to be more important,
description plays a significant role in science, including economics. For example, Burns and
Mitchell's monumental NBER study Measuring Business Cycles is mainly descriptive but
valuable in providing general features of business cycles about which others can generalize .
While some have damned this work as measurement without theory , the opposite sin of
theory without measurement seems much more serious. In fact there are too many mathematical
economic theories which explain no past data and which are incapable of making predictions
about future or as yet unobserved experience. Such economic theories are mathematical denk-
spielen and not inductive generalizations to which I referred above. Further, I shall later mention
another important role for description in connection with reductive inference.
In learning from our experience and data, it is critical that we understand the roles and nature of
three kinds of inference, namely, deductive inference, inductive inference, and reductive
inference.
As regards deductive inference, Reichenbach (1958) explains, Logical proof is called deduction;
the conclusion is obtained by deducing it from other statements, called the premises of the
argument. The argument is so constructed that if the premises are true the conclusions must also
be true. ... It unwraps, so to speak, the conclusion that was wrapped up in the premises. Clearly,
much economic theory is an exercise in deductive inference. However, the inadequacies of
deductive inference for scientific work must be noted. First, traditional deductive inference leads
just to the extreme attitudes of proof, disproof, or ignorance with respect to propositions. There is
no provision for a statement like A proposition is probably true in deductive inference or logic.
This is a deficiency of deduction for scientific work wherein such statements are very widely
employed and found to be useful. Second, deduction or deductive inference alone provides no
guide for choice among logically correct alternative explanations or theories. As is well known,
for any given set of data, there is an infinity of models which fit the data exactly. Deduction
provides no guide for selection among this infinity of models.
Thus, there is a need for a type of inference which is broader than deductive inference and which
yields statements less extreme than deductive inference . This type of inference is called
inductive inference by Jeffreys. It enables us to associate probabilities with propositions and to
manipulate them in a consistent, logical way to take account of new information. Deductive
statements of proof and disproof are then viewed as limiting cases of inductive logic wherein
probabilities approach one or zero, respectively.
Jeffreys (1967), who has made major contributions to the development of inductive logic in his
book Theory of Probability states that inductive inference involves making inferences from past
experience to predict future experience by use of inductive generalizations or laws . And given
actual outcomes, the procedures of inductive inference allow us to revise probabilities associated
with inductive generalizations or laws to reflect the information contained in new data .
Note that for Jeffreys induction is not an economical description of past data, as Mach suggested
since Mach omitted the all-important predictive aspect of induction. Further, predictive inductive
inferences have an unavoidable uncertainty associated with them, as Hume pointed out many
years ago. For example, it is impossible to prove, deductively or inductively that generalizations
or laws, even the Chicago quantity theory of money , are absolutely true . Even Newton's laws,
which were considered absolutely true by many physicists in the nineteenth century, have
been replaced by Einstein's laws. Thus there is an unavoidable uncertainty associated with laws in
all areas of science, including economics. Inductive logic provides a quantification of this
uncertainty by associating probabilities with laws and providing logically consistent procedures
for changing these probabilities as new evidence arises . In this regard, probability is viewed as
representing a degree of reasonable belief with the limiting values of zero being complete
disbelief or disproof and of one being complete belief of proof.
For Jeffreys, Bayesian statistics is implied by his theory of scientific method. Thus, Bayesian
statistics is the technology of inductive inference. The operations of Bayesian statistics enable us
to make probability statements about parameters values and future values of variables . Also,
optimal point estimates and point predictions can be readily obtained by Bayesian methods.
Probabilities and/or odds ratios relating to competing hypotheses or models can be evaluated
which reflect initial information and sample information. Thus, many inference problems
encountered in induction can be solved by Bayesian methods and these solutions are compatible
with Jeffreys's theory of scientific method. See, e.g., Berry et al. (1996), Box and Tiao (1973),
DeGroot (1970), Fienberg and Zellner (1975) and (Zellner, 1971) and (Zellner, 1979b) for
presentations, discussions and applications of Bayesian methods.
To illustrate inductive inference in econometrics, consider Milton Friedman's Theory of the
Consumption Function . In his book Friedman set forth a bold inductive generalization which, he
showed, explained variation in much past data, a fact that increased most individuals degree of
reasonable belief in his theory. Further, Friedman proposed a number of additional tests of his
model and predicted their outcomes, an example of what we referred to above as inductive
inference . Many of these tests have been performed with results compatible with Friedman's
predictions. Such results enhance the degree of reasonable belief that we have in Friedman's
theory. This is the kind of research in economics and econometrics , which illustrates well the
nature of inductive inference and is, in my opinion, most productive .
As regards inductive generalizations, there are a few points, which deserve to be emphasized.
First, a useful starting point for inductive generalization in many instances is the proposition that
all variation is considered random or nonsystematic unless shown otherwise . A good example of
the fruitfulness of such a starting point is given by the random walk hypothesis for stock prices in
stock market research. Many researchers have put forward models to forecast stock prices by use
of variables such as auto sales, changes in money, and the like only to find that their forecasts are
no better than those yielded by a random walk model. In other areas, when a researcher proposes
a new effect, the burden is on him to show that data support the new effect . The initial hypothesis
is thus, No effect unless shown otherwise .
Heg
American legitimacy and credibility is a faade to hide its struggle for
international dominance that makes destruction inevitable
Gulli 13. Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough
College in New York, For the critique of sovereignty and violence,
http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence, pg. 5
I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: The sovereign everywhere, be
it the political or financial elite, fakes the legitimacy on which its power and authority
supposedly rest. In truth, they rest on violence and terror, or the threat thereof. This is an
obvious and essential aspect of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of
the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired
and made more brutal by the lack of hegemony. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly
true with respect to the greatest power on earth, the United States, whose hegemony has
diminished or vanished. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called the West, of which the US has
for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the sheer drive for
domination has to show its true face, its raw violence. The usual, traditional ideological
justifications for dominance (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have
now become very weak because of the contempt that the dominant nations (the US and its
most powerful allies) regularly show toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-
called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them,
when they act autonomously and against the dictates of the West, the specter of punishment,
in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains
a clear limit, a possibility. Not so for the dominant nations: who will stop the United States from
striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious
France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are
painfully aware of their structural, ontological and historical, weakness. All attempts at
concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) only heighten the brutality
in the exertion of what remains of their dominance. Although they rely on a highly
sophisticated military machine (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an
equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has traditionally been and increasingly is an outpost for
military operations and global policing (now excellently incarnated by Africom), they know
that they have lost their hegemony.
BioT
No risk of bioterror
Stratfor 7, private intelligence agency, analyzes geopolitical trends, 12/21/ (Bioterrorism:
Sudden Death Overtime?,
http://www2.stratfor.com/analysis/bioterrorism_sudden_death_overtime)
In this season of large college bowl games and the National Football League playoffs in the United States, and large nonsporting events such as the New
Years Eve celebration in New Yorks Times Square not to mention the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing a discussion of bioterrorism and the
threat it poses might be of interest. First, it must be recognized that during the past several decades of the modern terrorist era,
biological weapons have been used very infrequently and there are some very good reasons for this. Contrary to their
portrayal in movies and television shows, biological agents are difficult to manufacture and deploy effectively
in the real world. In spite of the fear such substances engender, even in cases in which they have been somewhat effective they have
proven to be less effective and more costly than more conventional attacks using firearms and
explosives. In fact, nobody even noticed what was perhaps the largest malevolent deployment of
biological agents in history, in which thousands of gallons of liquid anthrax and botulinum
toxin were released during several attacks in a major metropolitan area over a three-year
period. This use of biological agents was perpetrated by the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo. An examination of the groups
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program provides some important insight into biological weapons, their costs and their limitations. In
the late 1980s, Aums team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-of-the-art
biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even
tried to acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Between April of
1990 and August of 1993, Aum conducted seven large-scale attacks involving the use of thousands
of gallons of biological agents four with anthrax and three with botulinum toxin. The groups first attempts at unleashing mega-
death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April of 1990, Aum used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol sprayers to release
liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the Diet and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport in
Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of agent released, there were no mass casualties and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the
attacks had taken place. When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aums scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their
biological weapons facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax, and between June and August of
1993 the group sprayed thousands of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time Aum not only employed its fleet of sprayer trucks, but
also use sprayers mounted on the roof of their headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, the attacks
produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the groups successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin
nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had occurred. Aum Shinrikyos
team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a
virtually unlimited budget. The team worked in large, modern facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. Despite
the millions of dollars the group spent on its bioweapons program, it still faced problems in creating virulent biological agents, and it also found it
difficult to dispense those agents effectively. Even when the group switched to employing a nerve agent, i t only succeeded in killing a handful of
people. A comparison between the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attack and the jihadist attack
against the Madrid trains in 2004 shows that chemical/biological attacks are more expensive
to produce and yield fewer results than attacks using conventional explosives. In the March 1995
Tokyo subway attack Aums most successful the group placed 11 sarin-filled plastic bags on five
different subway trains and killed 12 people. In the 2004 Madrid attack, jihadists detonated 10
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and killed 191 people. Aums CBW program cost millions and took years of
research and effort; the Madrid bombings only cost a few thousand dollars, and the IEDs were
assembled in a few days. The most deadly biological terrorism attack to date was the case involving a series of
letters containing anthrax in the weeks following the Sept. 11 attacks a case the FBI calls Amerithrax. While the Amerithrax letters
did cause panic and result in companies all across the country temporarily shutting down if a panicked employee spotted a bit of drywall dust or
powdered sugar from doughnuts eaten by someone on the last shift, in practical terms, the attacks were very ineffective. The Amerithrax letters
resulted in five deaths; another 22 victims were infected but recovered after receiving medical treatment. The letters did not succeed in
infecting senior officials at the media companies targeted by the first wave of letters, or Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, who were targeted by a
second wave of letters. By way of comparison, John Mohammed, the so-called D.C. Sniper, was able to cause mass
panic and kill twice as many people (10) by simply purchasing and using one assault rifle. This
required far less time, effort and expense than producing the anthrax spores used in the Amerithrax case. It is this cost-benefit ratio that, from a
militants perspective, makes firearms and explosives more attractive weapons for an attack. This then is the primary reason that more attacks using
biological weapons have not been executed: The cost is higher than the benefit. Certainly, history has shown that militant organizations and
homegrown militants are interested in large sporting events as venues for terror; one needs to look no further than the 1972 Munich Massacre, the
1980 Olympic Park bombing or even the 2005 incident in which University of Oklahoma student Joel Hinrichs died after a TATP-filled backpack he was
wearing exploded outside a football game at Oklahoma Memorial Stadium, to see this. Because of this, vigilance is needed. However, militants planning
such attacks will be far more likely to use firearms or IEDs in their attacks than they will biological agents. Unfortunately, in the real world guns and
suicide bombs are far more common and more deadly than air horns filled with creepy bioterror.
No impact to bioterror
Mueller 99, John Mueller, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State and Karl Mueller, June, 99 (Foreign
Affairs, l/n)

Biological weapons seem a promising candidate to join nuclear ones in the WMD club because, properly developed and deployed,
they might indeed kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical, however,
because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used, even though knowledge of their
destructive potential goes back centuries. (The English, for example, made some efforts to spread smallpox among
American Indians during the French and Indian War.) Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason,
because biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and control. Although terrorist groups or
rogue states may overcome such problems in the future through advances in knowledge and technology, the record thus far is not
likely to encourage them. Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with
plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures may have killed thousands of
Chinese but apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese
troops and had little military impact. In the 1990s the large and extremely well funded Japanese
cult Aum Shinrikyo apparently tried at least nine times to set off biological weapons by spraying
pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops. these efforts failed to cause a single fatality -- in fact,
nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place. For best results biological weapons need to be
dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds, which is very difficult to do. Explosive methods of
dispersion, moreover, may destroy the organisms. And except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of
lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult; even if refrigerated, most have a limited lifetime. The
effects of such weapons are gradual, very hard to predict, and could spread back onto the
attacker, and they can be countered with civil defense measures.
Nuke Terror
TURN - Allowing our borders to be opened will lead to loss of all American
freedoms and nuclear terrorism
Schlafly 1 (Phyllis, J.D., Oct, The Phyllis Schlafly Report, The Threat of Terrorism Is From Illegal
Aliens, http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2001/oct01/psroct01.shtml) TYBG

At the same time, Americans have some soul-searching to do about our security. Why were our
FBI and CIA caught so completely by surprise? Why have they been spending their resources
chasing after a few people who were no harm to society, such as one loner on a mountaintop at
Ruby Ridge and a pathetic religious group in Waco, while the plotting foreign terrorists crossed
our borders and lived in our country illegally, took their flight training in Florida, and repeatedly
boarded our planes? The terrorists are foreigners, most or all of whom should not have been
allowed to live in our country. As FBI Director Robert Mueller admitted, at least some of the
hijackers were "out of status," i.e., they had no proper immigration documents. It should be
repeated over and over again: The terrorism threat is from illegal aliens who are allowed to
live in our midst -- and this is a failure of our immigration laws and our immigration officials.
The criminals who were convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, of the murders in
front of the CIA headquarters in 1993, and who were involved in a 1998 plot to bomb New
York's subway system were Middle East aliens who should not have been in the United States.
They were either granted a visa that should never have been issued or had overstayed a visa and
should have been expelled. The 1996 Khobar Towers bombings, the 1998 attacks on the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen were all carried
out by radical Middle East groups. Since easy access into the United States has been
repeatedly exploited by aliens bent on terrorism, it should have been no surprise that it was
used by the World Trade Center/Pentagon hijackers. The policy of opening our borders to
anyone who wants to sneak into our country illegally -- or to remain illegally after entering
legally -- must be exposed and terminated. This is the most important security precaution our
government must take. The flood of illegal aliens coming across our southern border from
Mexico is well known. The opportunity for illegals to come across our vast northern border is
not as well known, but offers easy opportunities for illegals bent on criminal acts. Canada has a
no-questions-asked immigration policy, and many border crossings between the United States
and Canada are unmanned. The third wide-open door for illegals is the issuing of visas by 3,700
U.S. consular officers around the world. Our State Department has a laissez faire policy on
issuing visas and approves 80% of the 8 million visa applications every year. The State
Department manual used by consular officials states that "mere membership" in a recognized
terrorist group, or even "advocacy of terrorism," does not automatically disqualify a person
from entering the United States. Congress passed a law ordering the immigration service to
track foreign visitors and students and match their entry into this country with the expiration
date of their visas. Congress also ordered the immigration service to create a database of
foreign students that would be accessible to law enforcement. These requirements are not due
to go into effect until 2003! Visa visitors -- whether tourist, student or worker -- should be
tracked on a federal database that flags the names when their exit dates come around. It is
inexcusable that visa applicants aren't screened more carefully, and that aliens aren't expelled
when their visa expires. Immigration officials don't even know how many people are in the
United States on visas or how many are so-called "overstays," but it's clearly a substantial factor
in illegal immigration. Many new airport security measures are now making airline travel longer
and more difficult. The question should be asked how any of these measures, if they had been in
place, would have prevented the 9/11 hijackings. We want security measures that will put
criminals at risk, not harass law-abiding citizens. The chance of U.S. citizens hijacking a plane
on a suicide mission is infinitely smaller than the chance of foreign enemies doing the same.
Why are all passengers interrogated about their luggage rather than about their citizenship?
It's time to rethink the rule that an airplane be a gun-free zone. If the foreign masterminds
behind this attack had thought that the crew or passengers were armed, they might not have
invested so much in this type of terrorism. The courageous actions of passengers against the
hijackers on the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania apparently prevented the plane from
reaching its target where many more people would have been killed. Self-help is essential in an
emergency when no law enforcement officials are available. While we worry about hijacked
planes today, we may soon worry about hijacked foreign missile silos. Terrorists who would
commit the unspeakable crimes of 9/11 would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons.