PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,




- versus -




VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER,
Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 184053

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:


August 31, 2011
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D E C I S I O N


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:


This is an appeal of the Decision1[1] dated February 12, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01162, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Virginia Baby P. Montaner, which affirmed the Decision2[2]
dated April 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 93, in Criminal Case No. 0748-SPL. The RTC found appellant Virginia
Baby P. Montaner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as
defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In an Information3[3] dated April 21, 1998, appellant was charged as
follows:

That on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San
Pedro, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said accused by means
of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully

1[1] Rollo, pp. 4-10; penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Associate
Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring.
2[2] CA rollo, pp. 19-22.
3[3] Records, pp. 1-2.
funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis the
following Prudential Bank Checks Nos.:

1. 0002284 P5,000.00
2. 0002285 P5,000.00
3. 0002286 P5,000.00
4. 0002287 P5,000.00
5. 0002288 P5,000.00
6. 0002289 P5,000.00
7. 0002290 P5,000.00
8. 0002291 P5,000.00
9. 0002292 P5,000.00
10. 0002293 P5,000.00

all having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
and all aforesaid checks are postdated June 17, 1996 in
exchange for cash knowing fully well that she has no funds in the
drawee bank and when the said checks were presented for
payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank on
reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite demand accused
failed and refused to pay the value thereof to the damage and
prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned total amount
of P50,000.00.


Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge leveled against her during
her arraignment on June 10, 1998.4[4] Thereafter, trial ensued.


The parties evidence was summarized by the trial court, as follows:


4[4] Id. at 37.
The evidence for the prosecution disclose that on May 17,
1996, accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner, in exchange for cash,
issued to private complainant Reynaldo Solis in his house at
Caliraya Street, Holiday Homes, San Pedro, Laguna, ten (10)
Prudential Bank checks, specifically, check nos. 0002284,
0002285, 0002286, 0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290,
0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 all postdated June 17, 1996,
each in the amount of P5,000.00 all in the total amount of
P50,000.00. Accused represented to complainant Solis that the
checks were fully funded. When private complainant deposited
the checks for encashment however, they were dishonored for
the reason account closed. Private complainant verbally and
thereafter, thru demand letter (Exhibit A) formally demanded
that accused settle her accounts. Despite receipt of the demand
letter, accused Montaner failed to pay the value of the ten (10)
checks, thus private complainant Reynaldo Solis filed the instant
complaint for estafa. In connection with this complaint, private
complainant Solis executed a sworn statement (Exhibit D).

Ruel Allan Pajarito, Branch Cashier O-I-C of Prudential
Bank testified that they placed the mark account closed on the
ten (10) checks issued in the account of accused Montaner
considering that at the time the same were presented to them,
the account of accused Montaner was already closed. Witness
Pajarito further testified that as per their records, the account of
accused Montaner, account no. 00099-000050-4 was closed on
July 11, 1996. The checks were returned on October 4, 1996 for
the reason account closed.

Accused, thru counsel initially manifested that she is
intending to file a demurrer to evidence. However, her right to
file the same was considered waived in view of her failure to file
the demurrer despite due notice.

To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia
Baby P. Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10)
checks in private complainants favor claiming that the ten (10)
checks were borrowed from her by one Marlyn Galope because
the latter needed money. She gave the ten checks to Galope,
signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount and payee
were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any
negotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not
funded. When she learned that a case was filed against her for
estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that
money will not be given to her if she will not issue the said
checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent to
her by private complainant and claimed that her husband, who
supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for abroad in July
1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.5[5]

In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant
for the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of said
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby sentences accused Virginia
Baby P. Montaner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua as
maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the
amount of P50,000.00.6[6]


Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse
ruling was merely affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated
February 12, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED. Accordingly, the challenged Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.7[7]

5[5] CA rollo, pp. 20-21.
6[6] Id. at 22.
7[7] Rollo, p. 10.


Hence, appellant interposed this appeal before this Court and adopted
her Appellants Brief with the Court of Appeals, wherein she put forth a
single assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.8[8]


Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly
signed in blank, to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter
to secure a loan. Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable
doubt that she issued the checks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis)
into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had ever
transpired between her and Solis. Admitting that she may have been
imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not
translate to criminal liability.

We are not persuaded.

Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

8[8] CA rollo, p. 87.

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x
x:

x x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

x x x x

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or
his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3)
days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.


The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2)
lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the
payee.9[9]

In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code. According to Soliss clear and categorical

9[9] Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks,
each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in
exchange for their cash equivalent. We quote the pertinent portions of the
transcript:

[On Direct Examination]

Q: Mr. Witness, why did you file this complaint against the
accused?
A: She issued me checks in exchange for cash, ten postdated
checks, maam.

Q: When did Mrs. Montaner issue to you these checks?
A: In May 1996, maam.

Q: What was the purpose of issuing to you these checks?
A: Because she needed cash, maam.

Q: And how many checks did she issue to you?
A: Ten checks, maam.

Q: And what is the date of the checks that were issued to
you?
A: June 17, 1996, maam.

Q: What is the total value of these ten checks?
A: Fifty Thousand Pesos.

Q: At the time these checks were issued to you, what if any, was
her representation about them?
A: To deposit those checks on their due date, maam.

Q: And aside from telling you to deposit those checks on their due
date, what else did she represent to you regarding these checks?
A: None, maam.

Q: Did you deposit these checks?
A: Yes, maam.

Q: Where?
A: At the Premier Bank, San Pedro, Laguna.

Q: What happened to these checks after depositing the same?
A: The checks bounced, maam.

Q: All these checks?
A: Yes, maam, all checks bounced for reason account closed.

Q: After these checks were dishonored what did you do?
A: I informed her about that.

Q: Thru what, verbal or written?
A: Initially it was verbal, then I informed her thru a demand letter,
maam.

x x x x

Fiscal (continuing):

Q: You said that the accused issued to you ten checks in
exchange for cash, where are those checks?
A. The original checks are with me here, maam.

Q. Handed to this representation are checks, Prudential Bank
checks Nos. 002284, 002285, 002286, 002287, 002288,
002289, 002290, 002291, 002292, 002293 all dated June 17,
1996 and all in the amount of P50,000 [should be P5,000.00]
each. Mr. Witness, there appears from these checks a signature
at the bottom portion whose signature is this?
A. The signature of Mrs. Montaner, maam.

Q. Why do you say it is her signature?
A. She signed those in my presence, maam.

Q. I am showing these checks to the opposing counsel for
comparison

Atty. Peala

The checks are admitted, your Honor.

x x x x

[On Cross-Examination]

Atty. Peala (continuing):

Q: When Mrs. Montaner issued those checks, ten checks were
they issued in your house or in her house?
A: In my house, sir.

Q: Mrs. Montaner brought the checks in your house?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell us the time of the day when she brought the
checks to you?
A: May 17, 1996 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, sir.

Q: Was she alone or including her husband?
A: She was alone, sir.10[10]

From the circumstances narrated above, it was evident that Solis
would not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her
issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were
undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash.
However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by
the bank because the account was already closed.

Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 199611[11]
which was received by appellants husband to inform appellant that her
postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or
else face legal action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand
nor did she deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three
days from receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of
deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense
or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code.

10[10] TSN, November 25, 1998, pp. 4-8.
11[11] Records, p. 15.

As for appellants claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the
blank but signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would
give them as a guarantee for a loan, the Court views such statements with
the same incredulity as the lower courts.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. The Court has no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside
judicial cognizance.12[12]

Appellant wishes to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted
with her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of
suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on
them. Verily, appellants assertion defies ordinary common sense and
human experience.

Moreover, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has far less
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on

12[12] People v. Garin, 476 Phil. 455, 474 (2004); People v. Samus, 437 Phil. 645, 659 (2002).
affirmative matters.13[13] We agree with the lower courts that appellants
bare denial cannot be accorded credence for lack of evidentiary support. As
aptly noted by the trial court, appellants failure to produce Galope as a
witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her cause.14[14] In all, the
Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding the conviction of appellant
for estafa.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 12,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01162 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:

13[13] Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396, 400, citing
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, 630.
14[14] Records, p. 212.





RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson





LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice






MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice



CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.



RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice







SECOND DIVISION

JOHN DY,
Petitioner,



- versus -
G.R. No. 158312

Present:

QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.,
Chairperson,



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and The HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS,
Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
November 14, 2008
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
This appeal prays for the reversal of the Decision15[1] dated January
23, 2003 and the Resolution16[2] dated May 14, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23802. The appellate court affirmed with
modification the Decision17[3] dated November 17, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 of Quezon City, which had convicted petitioner
John Dy of two counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-46711 and Q-
93-46713, and two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 2218[4]
(B.P. Blg. 22) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-46712 and Q-93-46714.

15[1] Rollo, pp. 31-50. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos, with Associate
Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Regalado E. Maambong concurring.
16[2] Id. at 51.
17[3] Records, pp. 438-457. Penned by Presiding Judge Salvador C. Ceguera.
18[4] AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A
CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
approved April 3, 1979.
The facts are undisputed:
Since 1990, John Dy has been the distributor of W.L. Food Products
(W.L. Foods) in Naga City, Bicol, under the business name Dyna Marketing.
Dy would pay W.L. Foods in either cash or check upon pick up of stocks of
snack foods at the latters branch or main office in Quezon City. At times,
he would entrust the payment to one of his drivers.
On June 24, 1992, Dys driver went to the branch office of W.L. Foods
to pick up stocks of snack foods. He introduced himself to the checker, Mary
Jane D. Maraca, who upon confirming Dys credit with the main office, gave
him merchandise worth P106,579.60. In return, the driver handed her a
blank Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Check with Check No.
553602 postdated July 22, 1992. The check was signed by Dy though it did
not indicate a specific amount.
Yet again, on July 1, 1992, the same driver obtained snack foods from
Maraca in the amount of P226,794.36 in exchange for a blank FEBTC Check
with Check No. 553615 postdated July 31, 1992.
In both instances, the driver was issued an unsigned delivery receipt.
The amounts for the purchases were filled in later by Evelyn Ong,
accountant of W.L. Foods, based on the value of the goods delivered.
When presented for payment, FEBTC dishonored the checks for
insufficiency of funds. Raul D. Gonzales, manager of FEBTC-Naga Branch,
notified Atty. Rita Linda Jimeno, counsel of W.L. Foods, of the dishonor.
Apparently, Dy only had an available balance of P2,000 as of July 22, 1992
and July 31, 1992.
Later, Gonzales sent Atty. Jimeno another letter19[5] advising her
that FEBTC Check No. 553602 for P106,579.60 was returned to the drawee
bank for the reasons stop payment order and drawn against uncollected
deposit (DAUD), and not because it was drawn against insufficient funds as
stated in the first letter. Dys savings deposit account ledger reflected a
balance of P160,659.39 as of July 22, 1992. This, however, included a
regional clearing check for P55,000 which he deposited on July 20, 1992,
and which took five (5) banking days to clear. Hence, the inward check was
drawn against the yet uncollected deposit.
When William Lim, owner of W.L. Foods, phoned Dy about the matter,
the latter explained that he could not pay since he had no funds yet. This
prompted the former to send petitioner a demand letter, which the latter
ignored.
On July 16, 1993, Lim charged Dy with two counts of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d)20[6] of the Revised Penal Code in two

19[5] Records, p. 270.
20[6] ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
x x x x
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As
amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
Informations, which except for the dates and amounts involved, similarly
read as follows:
That on or about the 24
th
day of June, 1992, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there [willfully]
and feloniously defraud W.L. PRODUCTS, a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines with business address at No. 531 Gen. Luis St.,
Novaliches, this City, in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which he made to complainant to the effect that
Far East Bank and Trust Co. check No. 553602 dated July 22,
1992 in the amount of P106,579.60, payable to W.L. Products is a
good check and will be honored by the bank on its maturity date,
and by means of other deceit of similar import, induced and
succeeded in inducing the said complainant to receive and accept
the aforesaid check in payment of snack foods, the said accused
knowing fully well that all his manifestations and representations
were false and untrue and were made solely for the purpose of
obtaining, as in fact he did obtain the aforesaid snack foods
valued at P106,579.60 from said complainant as upon
presentation of said check to the bank for payment, the same was
dishonored and payment thereof refused for the reason stop
payment and the said accused, once in possession of the
aforesaid snack foods, with intent to defraud, [willfully],
unlawfully and feloniously misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same or the value thereof to his own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said W.L. Products,
herein represented by RODOLFO BORJAL, in the aforementioned
amount of P106,579.60, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.21[7]
On even date, Lim also charged Dy with two counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 in two Informations which likewise save for the dates and amounts
involved similarly read as follows:

x x x x
21[7] Records, pp. 2, 14-15.
That on or about the 24
th
day of June, 1992, the said
accused, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously
make or draw and issue to W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS to apply on
account or for value a Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check no.
553602 dated July 22, 1992 payable to W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS in
the amount of P106,579.60 Philippine Currency, said accused
knowing fully well that at the time of issue he/she/they did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check
when presented 90 days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Payment
stopped but the same would have been dishonored for
insufficient funds had not the accused without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment, the said accused despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, failed to pay said W.L. Food
Products the amount of said check or to make arrangement for
payment in full of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.22[8]
On November 23, 1994, Dy was arrested in Naga City. On
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to all charges. Thereafter, the cases
against him were tried jointly.
On November 17, 1999 the RTC convicted Dy on two counts each of
estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The trial court disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, accused JOHN JERRY DY ALDEN (JOHN DY)
is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of swindling
(ESTAFA) as charged in the Informations in Criminal Case No.
93-46711 and in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713, respectively.
Accordingly, after applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and P.D. No. 818, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as

22[8] Id. at 8, 20-21.
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711 and of ten (10)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713.
Likewise, said accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of B.P. 22 as charged in the
Informations in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46712 and in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-46714 and is accordingly sentenced to
imprisonment of one (1) year for each of the said offense and to
pay a fine in the total amount of P333,373.96, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
FINALLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of private
complainant, W. L. Food Products, herein represented by Rodolfo
Borjal, and against herein accused JOHN JERRY DY ALDEN (JOHN
DY), ordering the latter to pay to the former the total sum of
P333,373.96 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum
from September 28, 1992 until fully paid; and, (2) the costs of
this suit.
SO ORDERED.23[9]
Dy brought the case to the Court of Appeals. In the assailed Decision
of January 23, 2003, the appellate court affirmed the RTC. It, however,
modified the sentence and deleted the payment of interests in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In
Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711 (for estafa), the accused-
appellant JOHN JERRY DY ALDEN (JOHN DY) is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum plus eight
(8) years in excess of [P]22,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-
93-46712 (for violation of BP 22), accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year and to
indemnify W.L. Food Products, represented by Rodolfo Borjal, the
amount of ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED

23[9] Id. at 457.
SEVENTY NINE PESOS and 60/100 ([P]106,579.60). In Criminal
Case No. Q-93-46713 (for estafa), accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to thirty (30) years as maximum.
Finally, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714 (for violation of BP
22), accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
one (1) year and to indemnify W.L. Food Products, represented
by Rodolfo Borjal, the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FOUR PESOS AND 36/100
([P]226,794.36).
SO ORDERED.24[10]
Dy moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied in the
Resolution dated May 14, 2003.
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS
PROVEN THE GUILT OF ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF ESTAFA ON TWO (2) COUNTS?
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS
PROVEN THE GUILT OF ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF VIOLATION OF BP 22 ON TWO (2) COUNTS?
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS, THE TOTAL SUM OF
[P]333,373.96?25[11]

24[10] Rollo, p. 49.
25[11] Id. at 15.
Essentially, the issue is whether John Dy is liable for estafa and for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
First, is petitioner guilty of estafa?
Mainly, petitioner contends that the checks were ineffectively issued.
He stresses that not only were the checks blank, but also that W.L. Foods
accountant had no authority to fill the amounts. Dy also claims failure of
consideration to negate any obligation to W.L. Foods. Ultimately, petitioner
denies having deceived Lim inasmuch as only the two checks bounced since
he began dealing with him. He maintains that it was his long established
business relationship with Lim that enabled him to obtain the goods, and not
the checks issued in payment for them. Petitioner renounces personal liability
on the checks since he was absent when the goods were delivered.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, avers that the
delivery of the checks by Dys driver to Maraca, constituted valid issuance.
The OSG sustains Ongs prima facie authority to fill the checks based on the
value of goods taken. It observes that nothing in the records showed that
W.L. Foods accountant filled up the checks in violation of Dys instructions
or their previous agreement. Finally, the OSG challenges the present
petition as an inappropriate remedy to review the factual findings of the trial
court.
We find that the petition is partly meritorious.
Before an accused can be held liable for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4885,26[12] the following elements must concur: (1) postdating or
issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued; (2) insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3)
damage to the payee thereof.27[13] These elements are present in the
instant case.
Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law28[14] defines issue
as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who
takes it as a holder. Significantly, delivery is the final act essential to the
negotiability of an instrument. Delivery denotes physical transfer of the
instrument by the maker or drawer coupled with an intention to convey title
to the payee and recognize him as a holder.29[15] It means more than
handing over to another; it imports such transfer of the instrument to
another as to enable the latter to hold it for himself.30[16]
In this case, even if the checks were given to W.L. Foods in blank, this
alone did not make its issuance invalid. When the checks were delivered to
Lim, through his employee, he became a holder with prima facie authority to
fill the blanks. This was, in fact, accomplished by Lims accountant.

26[12] AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION TWO, PARAGRAPH (d), ARTICLE THREE
HUNDRED FIFTEEN OF ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-EIGHT HUNDRED AND
FIFTEEN, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
approved June 17, 1967.
27[13] People v. Romero, G.R. No. 112985, April 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 90, 96.
28[14] Also known as ACT No. 2031. AN ACT ENTITLED THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW, enacted February 3, 1911.
29[15] De la Victoria v. Burgos, G.R. No. 111190, June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 374, 379.
30[16] Lewis County et al. v. State Bank of Peck, 170 Pacific Reporter 98, 100 (1918), citing
BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS, 2
nd
Ed., p. 13.
The pertinent provisions of Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law are instructive:
SEC. 14. Blanks; when may be filled.Where the
instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in
possession thereof has a prima facie authority to
complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature
on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature
in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable
instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as
such for any amount. . (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the law merely requires that the instrument be in the
possession of a person other than the drawer or maker. From such
possession, together with the fact that the instrument is wanting in a
material particular, the law presumes agency to fill up the blanks.31[17]
Because of this, the burden of proving want of authority or that the authority
granted was exceeded, is placed on the person questioning such
authority.32[18] Petitioner failed to fulfill this requirement.
Next, petitioner claims failure of consideration. Nevertheless, in a
letter33[19] dated November 10, 1992, he expressed willingness to pay
W.L. Foods, or to replace the dishonored checks. This was a clear
acknowledgment of receipt of the goods, which gave rise to his duty to
maintain or deposit sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks.

31[17] I A.F. AGBAYANI, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES, 168 (1987 ed.).
32[18] J.C. CAMPOS, JR. AND M.C. LOPEZ-CAMPOS, NOTES AND SELECTED CASES
ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 351 (3
rd
ed., 1971).
33[19] Records, p. 43.
More significantly, we are not swayed by petitioners arguments that
the single incident of dishonor and his absence when the checks were
delivered belie fraud. Indeed damage and deceit are essential elements of
the offense and must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction.34[20] Deceit as an element of estafa is a specie of fraud. It is
actual fraud which consists in any misrepresentation or contrivance where a
person deludes another, to his hurt. There is deceit when one is misled --
by guile, trickery or by other means -- to believe as true what is really
false.35[21]
Prima facie evidence of deceit was established against petitioner with
regard to FEBTC Check No. 553615 which was dishonored for insufficiency of
funds. The letter36[22] of petitioners counsel dated November 10, 1992
shows beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received notice of the
dishonor of the said check for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner, however,
failed to deposit the amounts necessary to cover his check within three
banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor. Hence, as provided for
by law,37[23] the presence of deceit was sufficiently proven.

34[20] People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 436, 445; People v.
Dimalanta, G.R. No. 157039, October 1, 2004, 440 SCRA 55, 61-62.
35[21] People v. Romero, supra note 13 at 97.
36[22] Records, p. 43.
37[23] ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).
x x x x
(d) x x x The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to
cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds
shall be prima facieevidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As
amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner failed to overcome the said proof of deceit. The trial court
found no pre-existing obligation between the parties. The existence of
prior transactions between Lim and Dy alone did not rule out deceit
because each transaction was separate, and had a different consideration
from the others. Even as petitioner was absent when the goods were
delivered, by the principle of agency, delivery of the checks by his driver
was deemed as his act as the employer. The evidence shows that as a
matter of course, Dy, or his employee, would pay W.L. Foods in either cash
or check upon pick up of the stocks of snack foods at the latters branch or
main office. Despite their two-year standing business relations prior to the
issuance of the subject check, W.L Foods employees would not have parted
with the stocks were it not for the simultaneous delivery of the check
issued by petitioner.38[24] Aside from the existing business relations
between petitioner and W.L. Foods, the primary inducement for the latter
to part with its stocks of snack foods was the issuance of the check in
payment of the value of the said stocks.
In a number of cases,39[25] the Court has considered good faith as a
defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a check. This good faith may be
manifested by making arrangements for payment with the creditor and
exerting best efforts to make good the value of the checks. In the instant
case petitioner presented no proof of good faith. Noticeably absent from the
records is sufficient proof of sincere and best efforts on the part of petitioner
for the payment of the value of the check that would constitute good faith
and negate deceit.

38[24] TSN, July 19, 1995, pp. 507, 516.
39[25] People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 436; People v.
Dimalanta, G.R. No. 157039, October 1, 2004, 440 SCRA 55.
With the foregoing circumstances established, we find petitioner guilty
of estafa with regard to FEBTC Check No. 553615 for P226,794.36.
The same, however, does not hold true with respect to FEBTC Check
No. 553602 for P106,579.60. This check was dishonored for the reason that
it was drawn against uncollected deposit. Petitioner had P160,659.39 in his
savings deposit account ledger as of July 22, 1992. We disagree with the
conclusion of the RTC that since the balance included a regional clearing
check worth P55,000 deposited on July 20, 1992, which cleared only five (5)
days later, then petitioner had inadequate funds in this instance. Since
petitioner technically and retroactively had sufficient funds at the time Check
No. 553602 was presented for payment then the second element
(insufficiency of funds to cover the check) of the crime is absent. Also there
is no prima facie evidence of deceit in this instance because the check was
not dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Uncollected deposits are
not the same as insufficient funds. The prima facie presumption of deceit
arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds. Notably, the law speaks of insufficiency of funds but not of
uncollected deposits. Jurisprudence teaches that criminal laws are strictly
construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the
accused.40[26] Hence, in the instant case, the law cannot be interpreted
or applied in such a way as to expand its provision to encompass the
situation of uncollected deposits because it would make the law more
onerous on the part of the accused.
Clearly, the estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code is committed when a check is dishonored for being
drawn against insufficient funds or closed account, and not against

40[26] See U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil 243 (1917); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil 725, 728 (1956).
uncollected deposit.41[27] Corollarily, the issuer of the check is not liable
for estafa if the remaining balance and the uncollected deposit, which was
duly collected, could satisfy the amount of the check when presented for
payment.
Second, did petitioner violate B.P. Blg. 22?
Petitioner argues that the blank checks were not valid orders for the
bank to pay the holder of such checks. He reiterates lack of knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds and reasons that the checks could not have been
issued to apply on account or for value as he did not obtain delivery of the
goods.
The OSG maintains that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It cites pieces of evidence that point to Dys culpability:
Maracas acknowledgment that the checks were issued to W.L. Foods as
consideration for the snacks; Lims testimony proving that Dy received a
copy of the demand letter; the bank managers confirmation that petitioner
had insufficient balance to cover the checks; and Dys failure to settle his
obligation within five (5) days from dishonor of the checks.
Once again, we find the petition to be meritorious in part.
The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as
follows: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment;

41[27] Cf. Salazar v. People, G.R. No. 151931, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 598.
and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.42[28]
The case at bar satisfies all these elements.
During the joint pre-trial conference of this case, Dy admitted that he
issued the checks, and that the signatures appearing on them were
his.43[29] The facts reveal that the checks were issued in blank because of
the uncertainty of the volume of products to be retrieved, the discount that
can be availed of, and the deduction for bad orders. Nevertheless, we must
stress that what the law punishes is simply the issuance of a bouncing check
and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating thereto.44[30] If inquiry into the reason for which the checks are
issued, or the terms and conditions of their issuance is required, the publics
faith in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes
will certainly erode.45[31]
Moreover, the gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one
of malum prohibitum. The only valid query, then, is whether the law has
been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so
much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.46[32] Indeed, non-

42[28] Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, August 1, 1994, 234 SCRA 639,
643-644.
43[29] Records, p. 400.
44[30] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 301, 307.
45[31] People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 85.
46[32] Cueme v. People, G. R. No. 133325, June 30, 2000, 334 SCRA 795, 805.
fulfillment of the obligation is immaterial. Thus, petitioners defense of
failure of consideration must likewise fall. This is especially so since as
stated above, Dy has acknowledged receipt of the goods.
On the second element, petitioner disputes notice of insufficiency of
funds on the basis of the check being issued in blank. He relies on Dingle v.
Intermediate Appellate Court47[33] and Lao v. Court of Appeals48[34] as
his authorities. In both actions, however, the accused were co-signatories,
who were neither apprised of the particular transactions on which the blank
checks were issued, nor given notice of their dishonor. In the latter case,
Lao signed the checks without knowledge of the insufficiency of funds,
knowledge she was not expected or obliged to possess under the
organizational structure of the corporation.49[35] Lao was only a minor
employee who had nothing to do with the issuance, funding and delivery of
checks.50[36] In contrast, petitioner was the proprietor of Dyna Marketing
and the sole signatory of the checks who received notice of their dishonor.
Significantly, under Section 251[37] of B.P. Blg. 22, petitioner was
prima facie presumed to know of the inadequacy of his funds with the bank

47[33] No. L-75243, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 595.
48[34] G. R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, 274 SCRA 572.
49[35] Id. at 590.
50[36] Id. at 596.
51[37] SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days
after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
when he did not pay the value of the goods or make arrangements for their
payment in full within five (5) banking days upon notice. His letter dated
November 10, 1992 to Lim fortified such presumption.
Undoubtedly, Dy violated B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing FEBTC Check No.
553615. When said check was dishonored for insufficient funds and stop
payment order, petitioner did not pay or make arrangements with the bank
for its payment in full within five (5) banking days.
Petitioner should be exonerated, however, for issuing FEBTC Check No.
553602, which was dishonored for the reason DAUD or drawn against
uncollected deposit. When the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored by the bank because the check deposit made by petitioner, which
would make petitioners bank account balance more than enough to cover
the face value of the subject check, had not been collected by the bank.
In Tan v. People,52[38] this Court acquitted the petitioner therein
who was indicted under B.P. Blg. 22, upon a check which was dishonored for
the reason DAUD, among others. We observed that:
In the second place, even without relying on the credit
line, petitioners bank account covered the check she issued
because even though there were some deposits that were still
uncollected the deposits became good and the bank certified
that the check was funded.53[39]

52[38] G. R. No. 141466, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 777.
53[39] Id. at 781.
To be liable under Section 154[40] of B.P. Blg. 22, the check must be
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
In the instant case, even though the check which petitioner deposited
on July 20, 1992 became good only five (5) days later, he was considered by
the bank to retroactively have had P160,659.39 in his account on July 22,
1992. This was more than enough to cover the check he issued to
respondent in the amount of P106,579.60. Under the circumstance
obtaining in this case, we find the petitioner had issued the check, with full
ability to abide by his commitment55[41] to pay his purchases.
Significantly, like Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, B.P. Blg. 22
also speaks only of insufficiency of funds and does not treat of uncollected
deposits. To repeat, we cannot interpret the law in such a way as to expand
its provision to encompass the situation of uncollected deposits because it
would make the law more onerous on the part of the accused. Again,

54[40] SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less that thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.
x x x x
55[41] Cf. Idos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110782, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 194, 212.
criminal statutes are strictly construed against the Government and liberally
in favor of the accused.56[42]
As regards petitioners civil liability, this Court has previously ruled
that an accused may be held civilly liable where the facts established by the
evidence so warrant.57[43] The rationale for this is simple. The criminal
and civil liabilities of an accused are separate and distinct from each other.
One is meant to punish the offender while the other is intended to repair the
damage suffered by the aggrieved party. So, for the purpose of
indemnifying the latter, the offense need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt but only by preponderance of evidence.58[44]
We therefore sustain the appellate courts award of damages to W.L.
Foods in the total amount of P333,373.96, representing the sum of the
checks petitioner issued for goods admittedly delivered to his company.
As to the appropriate penalty, petitioner was charged with estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 81859[45] (P.D. No. 818).
Under Section 160[46] of P.D. No. 818, if the amount of the fraud

56[42] See U.S. v. Abad Santos, supra note 26; People v. Yu Hai, supra note 26.
57[43] Eusebio-Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 158495, October 21, 2004, 441 SCRA 137, 147.
58[44] Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128927, September 14, 1999, 314 SCRA 370, 379.
59[45] AMENDING ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE BY INCREASING
THE PENALTIES FOR ESTAFA COMMITTED BY MEANS OF BOUNCING CHECKS,
done October 22, 1975.
60[46] SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act. No. 4885, shall be punished by:
exceeds P22,000, the penalty of reclusin temporal is imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000 but the total
penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be termed reclusin
perpetua.61[47] Reclusin perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the
offense, but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the
amount of the fraud involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. John Dy is hereby
ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711 for estafa, and Criminal Case
No. Q-93-46712 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, but he is ORDERED to pay
W.L. Foods the amount of P106,579.60 for goods delivered to his company.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713 for estafa, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prisin mayor, as
minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusin perpetua, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, and John Dy is hereby
sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment and ordered to indemnify W.L.
Foods in the amount of P226,794.36.
SO ORDERED.

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall [in] no case exceed
thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;
x x x x
61[47] People v. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 617, 629.




LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:





CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice



C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.





LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice





Estafa and Blg. 22; Complaint w/ laws and jurisprudence.

I wish to share a criminal complaint for Estafa and BP 22 that I prepared
recently, with focus on the legal research aspect thereof, for the information
of my regular readers, to wit:




REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
X x x CITY



X x x,
Complainant, I.S. No. _______

- versus - For: ESTAFA
and B.P. Blg. 22.

X x x
(Alias: x x x),
Respondent.
x---------------------------------x



COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT


THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT respectfully alleges:

1. COMPLAINANT. The complainant is x x x, of legal age, married,
Filipino and, for purposes of this criminal complaint, with postal address at:

X x x

2. RESPPONDENT. The respondent is x x x, aka, of legal age, married,
xxx national, and with the following three (3) addresses, where summons
and notices may be served, to wit:

X x x.

3. NATURE OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. - This is a criminal
complaint for ESTAFA and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involving the sum of
Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) arising from various checks issued by the
respondent to the complainant.

4. ULTIMATE FACTS.

X x x.

4.11. For the record, and to form part hereof, by incorporation and
reference, attached hereto are copies of the following supporting documents,
to wit:

X x x.

5. DISCUSSION.

APPLICABLE LAWS
5.1. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on deceit/swindling (estfa)
provides any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned therein shall be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years; provided that the fraud be committed by any of the following
means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
X x x.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
X x x.
(a) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee,
without prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended
party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case,
the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty.
(b) By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
been dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
(As amended by Republic Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
5.2. Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon any person
who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious
contract.



5.3. Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the
damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed
upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other
deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.

5.4. Further, B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) provides:

5.4.1. Any person who makes or draws and issues any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment
of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year
or by fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

5.4.2. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to
cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.

5.4.3. Where the check is drawn by a corporation,
company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.

5.4.4. The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

5.4.5. It shall be the duty of the drawee of any check,
when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon
presentment, to cause to be written, printed or stamped in
plain language thereon, or attached thereto, the reason for
drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same: Provided,
That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
such drawee bank, such fact shall always be

explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all
prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence of
any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's
refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached
thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be
prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said
check, and the due presentment to the drawee for
payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was
properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check.

5.4.6. Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop
payment, the drawee shall state in the notice that there
were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the
payment in full of such check, if such be the fact."

5.5. BP Blg. 22 enumerates the elements of the crime to be

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.

There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on
the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds
in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the
dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of
the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to
make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose.

5.5.1. The statute has created the prima facie
presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves
a state of mind would be difficult to establish. The
presumption does not hold, however, when the maker,
drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in
full by the drawee bank of such check within 5 banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee bank. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly
provides that this presumption arises not from the mere
fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there
must also be a showing that, within five banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer
failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by
the drawee of such check.



LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: ESTAFA

5.6. In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P.
MONTANER, G.R. No. 184053, August 31, 2011, the accused was
convicted for the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph
2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that on
or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Virginia (Baby) P.
Montaner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said accused by means of false
pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully funded draw, make
and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10) Prudential Bank Checks, all
having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all
aforesaid checks were postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash
knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the
said checks were presented for payment the same were dishonored by the
drawee bank on reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite demand accused
failed and refused to pay the value thereof to the damage and prejudice of
Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.

To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P.
Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private
complainants favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from
her by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money. She gave the
ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount
and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any
negotiation. She further told Galope that the checks were not funded. When
she learned that a case was filed against her for estafa, she confronted
Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will not be given to her if
she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of
dishonor sent to her by private complainant and claimed that her husband,
who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for abroad in July 1996
and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.

In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for the
crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum and
to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the amount of P50,000.00.

Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling
was merely affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated February
12, 2008.

Hence, appellant interposed an appeal before the Supreme Court and put
forth a single assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.

Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly
signed in blank, to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter
to secure a loan. Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable
doubt that she issued the checks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis)
into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had ever
transpired between her and Solis. Admitting that she may have been
imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not
translate to criminal liability.

The Supreme Court was not persuaded.

The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

x x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

x x x x

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The
failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or
the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting
false pretense or fraudulent act.

According to the Court, the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of
a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was
issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage
to the payee.[1]

In the said case, the prosecution sufficiently established appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code. According to Soliss clear and categorical
testimony, appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks,
each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in
exchange for their cash equivalent.

From the circumstances, the Court held that it was evident that Solis
would not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her
issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were
undoubtedly issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash.
However, when Solis attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by
the bank because the account was already closed.

Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which
was received by appellants husband to inform appellant that her postdated
checks had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal
action from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she
deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from
receipt of notice. This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is
an element of the crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent
act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.

As for appellants claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the
blank but signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would
give them as a guarantee for a loan, the Court viewed such statements with
the same incredulity as the lower courts.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. The Court has no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside
judicial cognizance.[2]

Appellant wished to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted
with her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of
suspicion that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on
them. Verily, appellants assertion defies ordinary common sense and
human experience, the Court stated.

Moreover, the Court added, it is elementary that denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-
serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[3] It agreed with the
lower courts that appellants bare denial cannot be accorded credence for
lack of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by the trial court, appellants
failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her
cause. In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding the
conviction of appellant for estafa. Hence, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the
two decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court.

LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: B.P. BLG. 22

5.7. In EUMELIA R. MITRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
FELICISIMO S. TARCELO, G.R. NO. 191404, July 5, 2010, the petitioner
Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was the Treasurer, and Florencio L. Cabrera
(deceased), Jr. was the President, of Lucky Nine Credit Corporation (LNCC),
a corporation engaged in money lending activities. Between 1996 and 1999,
private respondent Felicisimo S. Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC.
As the usual practice in money placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued
checks equivalent to the amounts he invested plus the interest on his
investments by Mitra and Cabrera, were issued by LNCC to Tarcelo.

When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were
dishonored for the reason account closed. Tarcelo made several oral
demands on LNCC for the payment of these checks but he was frustrated.
Constrained, in 2002, he caused the filing of seven informations for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) in the total amount of P925,000.00 with
the MTCC in Batangas City.

After trial on the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of
the charges and ordered them to respectively pay the mandated fines for
each violation and with subsidiary imprisonment in all cases, in case of
insolvency and it further adjudged them civilly liable and ordered them to
pay, in solidum, private complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the amount of
NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P925,000.000).

Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that: they
signed the seven checks in blank with no name of the payee, no amount
stated and no date of maturity; they did not know when and to whom those
checks would be issued; the seven checks were only among those in one or
two booklets of checks they were made to sign at that time; and that they
signed the checks so as not to delay the transactions of LNCC because they
did not regularly hold office there. The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision.

Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals claiming, among others, that there was no proper
service of the notice of dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals dismissed her
petition for lack of merit.

Mitra went up to the Supreme Court on a petition for review and
submitted the issues: WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION WHO OWNS
THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE DRAWN
BEFORE LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE SIGNATORIES; and WHETHER
OR NOT THERE IS PROPER SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND
DEMAND TO PAY TO THE PETITIONER AND THE LATE FLORENCIO
CABRERA, JR.

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

The Court held that a check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a
substitute for money and as a convenient form of payment in financial
transactions and obligations. The use of checks as payment allows
commercial and banking transactions to proceed without the actual handling
of money, thus, doing away with the need to physically count bills and coins
whenever payment is made. It permits commercial and banking
transactions to be carried out quickly and efficiently. But the convenience
afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect
confidence in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure
public interest.

BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific
purpose of addressing the problem of the continued issuance and circulation
of unfunded checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm caused by
these bouncing checks to the community, BP 22 considers the mere act of
issuing an unfunded check as an offense not only against property but also
against public order.[4] The purpose of BP 22 in declaring the mere
issuance of a bouncing check as malum prohibitum is to punish the offender
in order to deter him and others from committing the offense, to isolate him
from society, to reform and rehabilitate him, and to maintain social
order.[5] The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the penalty of imprisonment
for at least 30 days or a fine of up to double the amount of the check or both
imprisonment and fine.

Specifically, BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty
days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit
to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored
by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act.

SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee.

Mitra posited in the petition that before the signatory to a bouncing
corporate check can be held liable, all the elements of the crime of violation
of BP 22 must first be proven against the corporation. The corporation must
first be declared to have committed the violation before the liability attaches
to the signatories of the checks.

The Court stated that it found itself unable to agree with Mitras
posture. The third paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check
is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this
Act." This provision recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act
through its officers. Hence, its wording is unequivocal and mandatory that
the person who actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable for a
violation of BP 22. This provision does not contain any condition,
qualification or limitation.

The Court cited the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[6] where it
ruled that the accused was liable on the unfunded corporate check which he
signed as treasurer of the corporation. He could not invoke his lack of
involvement in the negotiation for the transaction as a defense because BP
22 punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for
which the check was issued or in consideration of the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. In this case, Mitra signed the LNCC checks as
treasurer. Following Llamado, she must then be held liable for violating BP
22.

Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawers
knowledge that he has insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank to
cover his check. Because this involves a state of mind that is difficult to
establish, BP 22 creates the prima facie presumption that once the check is
dishonored, the drawer of the check gains knowledge of the insufficiency,
unless within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the
drawer pays the holder of the check or makes arrangements with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check. The service of the notice of
dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity to make good the check within
those five days to avert his prosecution for violating BP 22.

Mitra alleged that there was no proper service on her of the notice of
dishonor and, so, an essential element of the offense is missing. This
contention, the Court said, raised a factual issue that was not proper for
review. It is not the function of the Court to re-examine the finding of facts
of the Court of Appeals. Our review is limited to errors of law and cannot
touch errors of facts unless the petitioner shows that the trial court
overlooked facts or circumstances that warrant a different disposition of the
case[7] or that the findings of fact have no basis on record. Hence, with
respect to the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of the notice of
dishonor, the Court gives full faith and credit to the consistent findings of the
MTCC, the RTC and the CA.

The defense postulated that there was no demand served upon the
accused, said denial deserves scant consideration. Positive allegation of the
prosecution that a demand letter was served upon the accused prevails over
the denial made by the accused. Though, having denied that there was no
demand letter served on April 10, 2000, however, the prosecution
positively alleged and proved that the questioned demand letter was
served upon the accused on April 10, 2000, that was at the time they
were attending Court hearing before Branch I of this Court. In fact,
the prosecution had submitted a Certification issued by the other Branch of
this Court certifying the fact that the accused were present during the April
10, 2010 hearing. With such straightforward and categorical testimony of
the witness, the Court believes that the prosecution has achieved what was
dismally lacking in the three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor Ting and
Caras evidence of the receipt by the accused of the demand letter sent to
her. The Court accepts the prosecutions narrative that the accused refused
to sign the same to evidence their receipt thereof. To require the
prosecution to produce the signature of the accused on said demand letter
would be imposing an undue hardship on it. As well, actual receipt
acknowledgment is not and has never been required of the prosecution
either by law or jurisprudence. [emphasis supplied]


With the notice of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose
the presumption that Mitra and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient
funds to cover the checks upon their presentment for payment. In fact, the
account was already closed.

To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in the
above-quoted provision, the Court said, a violation exists where:

1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or for
value;

2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment; and

3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
[8]

The Court added that there was no dispute that Mitra signed the
checks and that the bank dishonored the checks because the account had
been closed. Notice of dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay
the checks or make arrangements for their payment within five days from
notice. With all the above elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape the
civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach.[9]



6. PRAYER.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after
notice and hearing the respondent be indicted for ESTAFA and VIOLATION
OF B.P. BLG. 22 to protect/preserve the right/interest of the complainant to
recover his claim of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), plus
exemplary damages of P100,000.00, moral damages of P100,000.00,
attorneys fees of P125,000.00 plus 5% of the recoverable amounts,
and costs of suit.

X x x City, October 18, 2011.



X x x
Complainant
LTO Drivers License No.
__________________
Expiring on _________


Assisted By:

LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER LAW OFFICES
Counsel for the Complainant
Unit 15, Star Arcade. C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1740
Tel. No. 8725443; Fax No. 8462539.


MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.
Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85
IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907
IBP Leyte Chapter
PTR 1016909, 1/7/11, Las Pinas City
MCLE Compliance No. IV-1326, 2/3/11


SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before in Muntinlupa City me this ___
day of October 2011, affiant/complainant showing his official identification
document as stated above.


Administering Assistant City
Prosecutor



Annexes: A to L, supra.

SECOND DIVISION


JAIME U. GOSIACO, G.R. No. 173807
Petitioner,
Present:


QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
LETICIA CHING and EDWIN
CASTA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

April 16, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

The right to recover due and demandable pecuniary obligations
incurred by juridical persons such as corporations cannot be impaired by
procedural rules. Our rules of procedure governing the litigation of criminal
actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) have given the
appearance of impairing such substantive rights, and we take the
opportunity herein to assert the necessary clarifications.



Before us is a Rule 45 petition62[1] which seeks the reversal of the
Decision63[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 29488. The Court of
Appeals' decision affirmed the decision64[3] of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 68 in Criminal Case No. 120482. The RTC's decision reversed
the decision65[4] of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Branch 58 in
Criminal Case No. 70445 which involved a charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
against respondents Leticia Ching (Ching) and Edwin Casta (Casta).

On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested
P8,000,000.00 with ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money
was loaned to ASB for a period of 48 days with interest at 10.5% which is
equivalent to P112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through its Business
Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS checks no.
0009980577 and 0009980578 for P8,000,000.00 and P112,000.00
respectively. The checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against DBS


62[1]Rollo. pp. 3-44.

63[2]Dated 19 July 2006 and penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada and
concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alino-Hormachuelos, Chairperson Fourth Division,
and Amelita G. Tolentino. id. at 88-95.

64[3]Dated 12 July 2005 and penned by Judge Santiago G. Estrella; id. at 83-87.

65[4] Dated 08 February 2001 and pendered by Judge Maxwel S. Rosete; id. at 73-82.
Bank Makati Head Office branch. ASB, through a letter dated 31 March 2000,
acknowledged that it owed petitioner the abovementioned amounts.66[5]




Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San
Juan Branch to deposit the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the
checks were dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop
payment order and for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner informed
respondents, through letters dated 6 and 10 April 2000,67[6] about the
dishonor of the checks and demanded replacement checks or the return of
the money placement but to no avail. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal
complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
San Juan against the private respondents.

Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching
denied liability and claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She
asserted that she did not have knowledge as to how much money ASB had
in the banks. Such responsibility, she claimed belonged to another
department.


66[5]The letter was signed by Luke Roxas; id. at 60

67[6]Id. at 62.

On 15 December 2000, petitioner moved68[7] that ASB and its
president, Luke Roxas, be impleaded as party defendants. Petitioner, then,
paid the corresponding docket fees. However, the MTC denied the motion as
the case had already been submitted for final decision.69[8]




On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it
did not absolve her from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a
corporate officer of ASB, was civilly liable since she was a signatory to the
checks.70[9]

Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the RTC. Petitioner
appealed to the RTC on the ground that the MTC failed to hold ASB and


68[7]Id. at 67-71

69[8]Records, p. 764.

70[9]See note 4.
Roxas either jointly or severally liable with Ching. On the other hand, Ching
moved for a reconsideration which was subsequently denied. Thereafter, she
filed her notice of appeal on the ground that she should not be held civilly
liable for the bouncing checks because they were contractual obligations of
ASB.

On 12 July 2005, the RTC rendered its decision sustaining Ching's
appeal. The RTC affirmed the MTCs ruling which denied the motion to
implead ASB and Roxas for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. The RTC
also exonerated Ching from civil liability and ruled that the subject obligation
fell squarely on ASB. Thus, Ching should not be held civilly liable.71[10]

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on the
grounds that the RTC erred in absolving Ching from civil liability; in
upholding the refusal of the MTC to implead ASB and Roxas; and in refusing
to pierce the corporate veil of ASB and hold Roxas liable.


On 19 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC
and stated that the amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to
ASB and not to Ching. Roxas testimony further bolstered the fact that the
checks issued by Ching were for and in behalf of ASB. The Court of Appeals


71[10]See note 3.
ruled that ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case since it is not a
natural person and in the case of Roxas, he was not the subject of a
preliminary investigation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was
no need to pierce the corporate veil of ASB since none of the requisites were
present.72[11]

Hence this petition.


Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) is a corporate officer who
signed a bouncing check civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22; (2) can a
corporation be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case; and (3) is there a basis to
pierce the corporate veil of ASB?

B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Section 1
of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or
entity, the person or persons, who actually signed the


72[11]See note 2.
check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this
Act.






B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing
checks as payment for pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing
checks adversely affected confidence in trade and commerce. The State
criminalized such practice because it was deemed injurious to public
interests73[12] and was found to be pernicious and inimical to public
welfare.74[13] B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the act of making and issuing bouncing
checks. It is the act itself of issuing the checks which is considered malum
prohibitum. The law is an offense against public order and not an offense
against property.75[14] It penalizes the issuance of a check without regard
to its purpose. It covers all types of checks.76[15] Even checks that were


73[12]Lozano v. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, L-66839-42, L-71654, 74524-25, L-75122-49,
L-75812-13, 75765-67, L-75789, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323.

74[13]People v. Laggui, G.R. Nos. 76262-63, 18 March 1989, 171 SCRA 305, 311.

75[14]See Note 12.

76[15]Id.
issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were held to be within the ambit of
B.P. Blg. 22.77[16]

When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate
name he may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute.78[17]
The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud
another of money or property, draws or issues a check on any bank with
knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on
presentment.79[18] Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer
is predicated on the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from
his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his personal
act.80[19] As we held in Llamado v. Court of Appeals:81[20]



77[16]Que v. People, Nos. L-75217-18, 21 September 1987, 154 SCRA 160.

78[17] 1643 18B AM. JUR. 2D CORPORATIONS citing Semones v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel.Co., 106 N.C. App. 334, 416 S.E.2d 909 (1992).

79[18]Id. citing Walker v. State, 467 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist.1984).

80[19]68 A.L.R. 2D 1269.

81[20]Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99032, 26 March 1997, 270 SCRA 423.
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally
liable for the amount of the check because it was a check of the
Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the same in his
capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The
third paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states: Where the
check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person
or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such
drawer shall be liable under this Act.

The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing
corporate check can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the
recent case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders Inc.,82[21] the Court ruled
decisively that the civil liability of a corporate officer in a B.P. Blg. 22 case is
extinguished with the criminal liability. We are not inclined through this case
to revisit so recent a precedent, and the rule of stare decisis precludes us to
discharge Ching of any civil liability arising from the B.P. Blg. 22 case
against her, on account of her acquittal in the criminal charge.

We recognize though the bind entwining the petitioner. The records
clearly show that it is ASB is civilly obligated to petitioner. In the various
stages of this case, petitioner has been proceeding from the


82[21] G.R. No. 166405, 6 August 2008.

premise that he is unable to pursue a separate civil action against ASB itself
for the recovery of the amounts due from the subject checks. From this
premise, petitioner sought to implead ASB as a defendant to the B.P. Blg. 22
case, even if such case is criminal in nature.83[22]

What supplied the notion to the petitioner that he was unable to
pursue a separate civil action against ASB? He cites the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, particularly the provisions involving B.P. Blg. 22 cases,
which state that:

Rule 111, Section 1Institution of criminal and civil action.

x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions,
the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complainant or information


83[22]A traditional theory in criminal law is that a corporation cannot be prosecuted . B.P.
22 clearly adheres to the traditional theory, as nothing therein holds a juridical person liable for
the violation of the said law. Nonetheless, a more modern rule pronounces that a corporation
may be criminally liable for actions or omissions made by its officers or agents in its behalf. And
that while a corporation cannot be imprisoned, it may be fined, its charter may be revoked by the
state, or other sanctions may be imposed by law. See Cox, James. Corporations. 2
nd
ed. Aspen
Publishers. New York. 2003 p. 130.
also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not
so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded
by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.


Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.84[23]


We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead
ASB in the B.P. Blg. 22 case, or any other corporation for that matter, even
if the Rules require the joint trial of both the criminal and civil liability. A
basic maxim in statutory construction is that the interpretation of penal laws
is strictly construed against the State and liberally construed against the
accused. Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may
be impleaded as an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of
that law, even in the litigation of the civil aspect thereof.


Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and
demandable obligations against a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or
diminished by a rule of procedure. Technically, nothing in Section 1(b) of


84[23]Section 1, Rule 111(b), 2000 Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado explained the rationale for the implementation of the abovementioned rule. The reason
was to declog the courts of B.P. 22 cases because ordinarily payment of docket fees is not
required in a criminal case for actual damages because prior to its amendment, it became the
practice of creditors to use the courts as their personal collection agencies by the mere
expediency of filing a B.P. Blg. 22 case. See FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW
COMPENDIUM, Vol. II. 9
th
revised ed. pp. 293-294.
Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the
juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules
prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil


action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22,
including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.

In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued
the bouncing check in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil
liability of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil
Code. B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused this criminal liability of the signer of the check
in behalf of the corporation with the corresponding civil liability of the
corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability
not from the corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its
behalf. Prior to the amendments to our rules on criminal procedure, it
though clearly was permissible to pursue the criminal liability against the
signatory, while going after the corporation itself for the civil liability.

However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil
and criminal liability attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the
previous option to directly pursue the civil liability against the person who
incurred the civil obligationthe corporation itselfis no longer that clear. In
theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case for B.P.
Blg. 22 should not affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same
check, since such implied institution concerns the civil liability of the
signatory, and not of the corporation.





Let us pursue this point further. B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil
liability on the signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil liability
of the corporation for the amount represented from the check. The civil
liability attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful act of
signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the account,
while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very
obligation covered by the check or the consideration for its
execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct.
The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of each.

If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the civil action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22
action is only the civil liability of the signatory, and not that of the
corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action against the
signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute. It
follows that the actions involving these liabilities should be adjudged
according to their respective standards and merits. In the B.P. Blg. 22 case,
what the trial court should determine whether or not the signatory had
signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the
bank account, while in the civil case the trial court should ascertain whether
or not the obligation itself
is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory,
proceed independently and simultaneously without being ultimately
conclusive on one or the other.



It might be argued that under the current rules, if the signatory were
made liable for the amount of the check by reason of the B.P. Blg. 22 case,
such signatory would have the option of recovering the same amount from
the corporation. Yet that prospect does not ultimately satisfy the ends of
justice. If the signatory does not have sufficient assets to answer for the
amount of the checka distinct possibility considering the occasional large-
scale transactions engaged in by corporations the corporation would not be
subsidiarily liable to the complainant, even if it in truth the controversy, of
which the criminal case is just a part, is traceable to the original obligation of
the corporation. While the Revised Penal Code imposes subsidiary civil
liability to corporations for criminal acts engaged in by their employees in
the discharge of their duties, said subsidiary liability applies only to
felonies,85[24] and not to crimes penalized by special laws such as B.P.
Blg. 22. And nothing in B.P. Blg. 22 imposes such subsidiary liability to the
corporation in whose name the check is actually issued. Clearly then, should


85[24]See REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 103. Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of
other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also
apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
the check signatory be unable to pay the obligation incurred by the
corporation, the complainant would be bereft of remedy unless the right of
action to collect on the liability of the corporation is recognized and given
flesh.


There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the
corporation be pursued even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory
remains extant. First, the possibility that the plaintiff might be awarded the
amount of the check in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and in the civil action
against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that should not be permitted.
Considering that petitioner herein has no chance to recover the amount of
the check through the B.P. Blg. 22 case, we need not contend with that
possibility through this case. Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, it is best
we refer the matter to the Committee on Rules for the formulation of proper
guidelines to prevent that possibility.

The other concern is over the payment of filing fees in both the B.P.
Blg. 22 case and the civil action against the corporation. Generally, we see
no evil or cause for distress if the plaintiff were made to pay filing fees based
on the amount of the check in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and the civil action.
After all, the plaintiff therein made the deliberate option to file two separate
cases, even if the recovery of the amounts of the check against the
corporation could evidently be pursued through the civil action alone.

Nonetheless, in petitioners particular case, considering the previous
legal confusion on whether he is authorized to file the civil case against ASB,
he should, as a matter of equity, be exempted from paying the filing fees
based on the amount of the checks should he pursue the civil action against
ASB. In a similar vein and for a similar reason, we likewise find that
petitioner should not be barred by prescription should he file the civil action
as the period should not run from the date the checks were issued but from
the date this decision attains finality. The courts should not be bound strictly
by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so,
manifest wrong or injustice would result.86[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right
of petitioner Jaime U. Gosiaco to pursue an independent civil action against
ASB Holdings Inc. for the amount of the subject checks, in accordance with
the terms of this decision. No pronouncements as to costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be REFERRED to the Committee on
Revision of the Rules for the formulation of the formal rules of
procedure to govern the civil action for the recovery of the amount
covered by the check against the juridical person which issued it.

SO ORDERED.



86[25]Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.103959, 21 August 1997, 278 SCRA98,113,
citing Raeses v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76518, 13 July 1990, 187 SCRA 404,
and as cited in Cometa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, 6 February 2001, 351 SCRA294,
310.







DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:






LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson






CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice





ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.




LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.




REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice





G.R. No. 99032 March 26, 1997
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J .:
Before us is a petition to review the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 85-38653
convicting petitioner of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year of
prision correccional and to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to reimburse Leon Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the
costs of suit.
The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Accused-appellant, Ricardo Llamado, together with Jacinto Pascual, was charged with
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and pleaded "not guilty" of the crime charged.
Accused Jacinto Pascual remained at large. Thus trial on the merits was conducted
against accused-appellant, Ricardo Llamado, only.
Accused Ricardo Llamado and his co-accused Jacinto Pascual were the Treasurer and
President, respectively, of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation.
As found by the trial court, private complainant, Leon Gaw, delivered to accused the
amount of P180,000.00, with the assurance of Aida Tan, the secretary of the accused in
the corporation, that it will be repaid on 4 November 1983, plus interests thereon at 12%
plus a share in the profits of the corporation, if any.
Upon delivery of the money, accused Ricardo Llamado took it and placed it inside a
deposit box. Accused Jacinto Pascual and Ricardo Llamado signed Philippine Trust
Company Check No. 047809, postdated 4 November 1983, in the amount of
P186,500.00 in the presence of private complainant.
The aforesaid check was issued in payment of the cash money delivered to the accused
by private complainant, plus interests thereon for sixty (60) days in the amount of
P6,500.00.
On 4 November 1983, private complainant deposited the check in his current account
with the Equitable Banking Corporation which later informed the complainant that said
check was dishonored by the drawee bank because payment was stopped, and that the
check was drawn against insufficient funds. Private complainant was also notified by the
Equitable Banking Corporation that his current account was debited for the amount of
P186,500.00 because of the dishonor of the said check.
Private complainant returned to Aida Tan to inform her of the dishonor of the check. Aida
Tan received the check from private complainant with the assurance that she will have
said check changed with cash. However, upon his return to Aida Tan, the latter informed
him that she had nothing to do with the check.
Thereupon, private complainant went to accused Ricardo Llamado on 11 November 1983
to inform him of the dishonor of the check. Accused offered in writing to pay private
complainant a portion of the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15 November
1983, and the balance to be rolled over for a period of ninety (90) days. This offer was
accepted by private complainant.
Accused, however, failed to remit to private complainant the aforesaid 10% on or before
15 November 1983 and to roll over the balance of the money.
Private complainant then demanded from the accused the payment of P186,500.00 but
accused failed to pay and instead, accused offered to return to private complainant only
30% of his money which was refused by the latter. Thus, the filing of the complaint for
violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 against the accused.
2

On the other hand, petitioner's version of the relevant facts, is as follows:
It was the practice in the corporation for petitioner to sign blank checks and leave them
with Pascual so that Pascual could make disbursements and enter into transactions even
in the absence of petitioner.
One of the checks which petitioner signed in blank and gave to Pascual is the check in
question, Exhibit "A."
The check was later issued to private complainant, filled up with the amount P186,500.00
and date November 4, 1983.
The check was dishonored on November 7, 1983 when private complainant presented it
for payment because its payment had been stopped (Exhibits A-6 and A-7). However,
there were also no sufficient funds in the account to cover the amount of the check.
Private complainant went to see Aida Tan, the "Secretary" of Pan-Asia Finance
Corporation, about the dishonor of the check because "she was the one who handled
[sic] the check and gave it to me." He returned the check to Aida Tan who gave him a
receipt for it (Exhibit C), and promised "to return the cash money." However, she did not
do so. Instead, she returned the check to private complainant (pp. 9-11, tsn, January 6,
1986; p. 9, tsn, January 6, 1986).
On November 11, 1983, private complainant entered into an agreement (Exhibit H) with
petitioner whereby Pan-Asia Finance Corporation would pay private complainant 10% of
the P186,500.00 by November 14, or 15, and the balance will be rolled over for 90 days
(pp. 1-4, tsn, June 30, 1986). Private respondent was not however paid as agreed upon.
In late 1985, petitioner was charged with violation of BP 22 under the following
Information: . . .
3

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of
violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused Ricardo A. Llamado
guilty of Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment for a period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay a fine of
P200,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The Accused is
likewise condemned to reimburse Leon Gaw the aforesaid amount of P186,500.00 plus
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
In this petition, petitioner alleges that:
1. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it convicted petitioner of the charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 although the check was only a contingent payment
for investment which had not been proven to be successful, thus the check was not
issued "to apply on account or for value" within the contemplation of the batas;
2. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it convicted petitioner of the charge for
merely signing the check in question without being actually involved in the transaction for
which the check was issued, in disregard of the pronouncement of this Court in Dingle vs.
IAC, 148 SCRA 595;
3. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it refused to apply the "novation theory"
recognized by this Court in Ong v. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 578, and Guingona, Jr. v.
City Fiscal of Manila, 128 SCRA 577, despite admission by private complainant that
before the charge was filed in court or even the prosecutor he had entered into a new
agreement with petitioner supplanting the check in question;
4. respondent Court of Appeals erred because it held petitioner personally liable for the
amount of the check in question, although it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance
Corporation and he signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation.
The petition is without merit.
For clarity, petitioner's second allegation shall be discussed first. Petitioner argues that
respondent court erred in disregarding the pronouncement in Dingle vs. IAC,
4
that
"absent knowledge by the maker or drawer of the issuance of a check much less of the
transaction and the fact of dishonor, the accused should be acquitted."
The respondent court did not err. In Dingle vs. IAC, the petitioner was acquitted
because: 1.) from the testimony of the sole prosecution witness, it was established that
he dealt exclusively with petitioner's co-signatory; 2.) nowhere in the prosecution
witness' testimony was the name of petitioner ever mentioned in connection with the
transaction and the issuance of the check; and, 3.) the prosecution witness therein
categorically stated that it was Nestor Dingle, petitioner's co-signatory who received his
two letters of demand. These lent credence to the testimony of petitioner that she
signed the questioned checks in blank together with her husband without any
knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of dishonor.
Moreover, while Paz Dingle and her husband Nestor Dingle owned the business, the
business was managed by Nestor, petitioner Paz's co-signatory.
The above circumstances in Dingle vs. IAC do not obtain in the case at bar. Here, the
private complainant testified that upon delivery of the money, petitioner took it and
placed it inside a deposit box; that Jacinto Pascual and petitioner Ricardo Llamado
signed the questioned check, postdated November 4, 1983, in the amount of
P186,500.00 in the presence of private complainant; notice of the fact of dishonor of the
check was made on petitioner, who offered in writing
5
to pay private complainant a
portion of the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15 November 1983, and the
balance to be rolled over for a period of 90 days.
Petitioner denies knowledge of the issuance of the check without sufficient funds and
involvement in the transaction with private complainant. However, knowledge involves a
state of mind difficult to establish. Thus, the statute itself creates a prima facie
presumption, i.e., that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or
credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the check's presentment for
payment.
6
Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption by paying the amount of the check
within five (5) banking days from notice of the dishonor.
7
His claim that he signed the
check in blank which allegedly is common business practice, is hardly a defense. If as
he claims, he signed the check in blank, he made himself prone to being charged with
violation of BP 22. It became incumbent upon him to prove his defenses. As Treasurer
of the corporation who signed the check in his capacity as an officer of the corporation,
lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction is not a defense.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent court erred when it convicted petitioner of
violation of BP 22 when the check was only a contingent payment for investment which
had not been proven to be successful, thus the check was not issued "to apply on
account or for value" within the contemplation of the batas. This contention is untenable.
The check was issued for an actual valuable consideration of P180,000.00, which
private complainant handed to Aida Tan, a secretary in petitioner's office. In fact,
petitioner admits that private complainant made an investment in said amount with Pan-
Asia Finance Corporation. Petitioner contends that the money which private
complainant gave the corporation was intended for investment which they agreed will be
returned to private complainant with interests, only if the project became successful. But
then, if this were true, the check need not have been issued because a receipt and their
written agreement would have sufficed.
True, it is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue
checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment, or as evidence of
indebtedness, if not a mode of payment. But to determine the reason for which checks
are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the
public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.
8
So, what the law punishes
is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum.
9

With regard to petitioner's third allegation, the "novation theory" recognized by this Court
in certain cases, does not apply in the case at bar. While private complainant agreed to
petitioner's offer to pay him 10% of the amount of the check on November 14 or 15,
1983 and the balance to be rolled over for 90 days, this turned out to be only an empty
promise which effectively delayed private complainant's filing of a case for Violation of
BP 22 against petitioner and his co-accused. As admitted by petitioner in his
Memorandum, private complainant was never paid as agreed upon.
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount of the
check because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the
same in his capacity as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The third
paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states:
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of respondent
court AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.


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Date: Monday, July 09, 2012

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October
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Court Of Appeals Decisions


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October 2006 List

CA GR CR HC NO. 02046

CA G.R. CR-H.C. NO.


Court of Appeals Decisions

SPECIAL TWELFTH DIVISION

01064

CA-G. R. CR NO. 00841

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. NO. 00871

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. NO. 01554

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. NO. 00129

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. NO. 00754

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. NO. 00794

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. NO. 01739

CA-G.R. CR-HC NO. 00193

CA-G.R. CR-HC NO. 00199

CA-G.R. CR-HC NO. 00270

CA-G.R. CR-HC NO. 00807

CA-G.R. CR-HC NO. 01952

CA-G.R. CR-HC NO. 01953

CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. NO. 00899

CA-G.R. H.C. CR NO. 01944







[CA GR CR HC NO. 02046, October 04, 2006]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
LAURENCE QUIMSON ALIAS LALAINE, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

SABIO, J.L., JR., J.:

Under review is the September 14, 1999 Decision
[1]
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 37 in Criminal Case No. L-
5864, finding accused-appellant LAURENCE QUIMSON alias LALAINE
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of estafa defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life and perpetual absolute
disqualification, and to indemnify private respondent the amount of
P127,000.00 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from April 20, 1998, until
fully paid, and costs.

The accusatory portion of the Information
[2]
under which the accused-
appellant Laurence Quimson alias Lalaine was tried and convicted, reads
as follows:
That on or about the 3
rd
day of November, 1997 in Barangay Baay,
municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused purchased from the
complainant Emmanuel Austria 55,000 pieces of bangus fingerlines (sic)
worth P132,000.00 and in payment thereof and with intent to defraud, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously paid P5,000.00 cash and
a PNB Republic Bank Check No. 1393766 post-dated February 6, 1998 in
the amount of P127,000.00 knowing fully well that at the time of issuance
thereof the said check is without funds such that when the check was
presented for encashment with the drawee bank the same was dishonored for
having been drawn against Insufficient Funds and despite repeated demands
for her to pay the face value of the check, she failed to do so up to the
present, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Art. 315, par. 2(d), Revised Penal Code.

Upon her arraignment on January 24, 1996, the accused pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The trial court summarized the evidence for the prosecution as follows:

Emmanuel Austria is a 25-year old businessman engaged in raising and
selling bangus fingerlings in his fishpond in Barangay Malimpec, Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On October 25, 1997, he met the accused, Laurence Lalaine
Quimson at the house of his cousin in Brgy. Domalandan, Lingayen,
Pangasinan. She needed 55,000 pieces of bangus fingerlings to be cultured
and raised in her fishpond in Brgy. Baay, Lingayen, Pangasinan. She went to
his fishpond and she liked the fingerlings that she saw, so she ordered 55,000
pieces of bangus fries to be delivered to her fishpond in Baay, for which the
agreed price was P2.40 per piece or a total of P132,000.00.

As agreed upon by Emmanuel Austria and accused, Lalaine Quimson, on
November 3, 1997, he brought the bangus fingerlings to her fishpond in Sitio
Singit, Baay, Lingayen on his truck driven by Leolarte Yar-Santos. Accused
Lalaine Quimson paid Emmanuel Austria P5,000.00 cash and a PNB
Republic Check for the amount of P127,000.00, postdated February 5, 1998.

When the check matured and the payee, Emmanuel Austria, tried to encash it
with the bank, it was returned to him on the ground of DAIF (drawn
against insufficient fund). He immediately went to the house of Lalaine
Quimson, and she requested for a 30-day extension as she had no money.
Thereafter, she requested for an additional 15-day extension, and then,
another 15-day extension. She having failed to pay any amount on the check,
he referred the matter to Atty. Rafael Campos of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO) who prepared a demand letter which he signed and sent by mail to
and received by Lalaine Quimson. Despite the demand letter, she still
failed to pay on the check. So, Emmanuel Austria filed with the PAO his
Affidavit-Complaint, dated May 28, 1998, and Atty. Campos conducted a
pre-litigation conference in his office at the PAO, wherein Emmanuel and
Lalaine attended. Despite effort of Atty. Castro to have them settle their
differences, nothing came out of the conference. Hence, the filing of the
complaint for estafa.

On the other hand, the accused Laurence Lalaine Quimson and her
husband, Peter Quimson, do not deny that she issued the postdated PNB
Republic Bank Check, but she issued the check to comply with the condition
imposed by Emmanuel Austria merely to guarantee the payment by her
husband of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the bangus fingerlings
that Austria sold and delivered to her husband at their fishpond and upon the
assurance of Austria to her that he would not encash the same. The husband
and wife claim that the transaction was between Emmanuel Austria and the
husband, Peter Quimson alone; and the wife, accused Laurence Lalaine
Quimson, had nothing to do with it and did not know anything about it,
except as a guarantor, because she is employed as a public school nurse in
Domalandan, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and the fishpond business is exclusively
the business of her husband.

On September 14, 1999, the court a quo rendered its now assailed decision
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The dispositive portion
[3]
of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused, LAURENCE QUIMSON, alias Lalaine, is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA,
defined and penalized under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 4885, and she is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life and perpetual
absolute disqualification, and to indemnify Emmanuel Austria in the amount
of P127,000.00 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from April 20, 1998,
until fully paid, and costs.

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal from the decision above-quoted,
raising the following assignment of error
[4]
:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF THE
OFFENSE OF ESTAFA DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT, AS
THERE IS ABSENT THAT QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY OR
SUFFICIENT TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY
OF PETER QUIMSON THAT HE PARTIALLY PAID COMPLAINANT
THROUGH HIS FATHER AND WIFE MONTHS BEFORE THE
MATURITY OF THE CHECK
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT COMPLAINANTS FATHER
AND WIFE AS WITNESSES IS FATAL TO THE CASE AGAINST THE
APPELLANT
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT NOT
ON THE BASIS OF THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION BUT RATHER ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT TO
SUFFER THE PENALTY OF THIRTY (30) YEARS IMPRISONMENT

In support thereof, accused-appellant believes that she should have been
acquitted of the offense charged as the evidence presented by the prosecution
is insufficient to sustain her conviction.

According to accused-appellant, it was her husband, Peter Quimson, who
contracted with Emmanuel Austria for the purchase of the bangus fingerlings
and that the check she issued was merely to guarantee the obligation of her
husband. Complainant was informed that the check was not funded and was
requested not to encash it.

Accused-appellant maintains that she cannot be held liable for estafa because
when the postdated check was issued, she informed the complainant that
there was no sufficient fund in the bank to cover the value of the check. The
fact that appellant repeatedly informed complainant of the insufficiency of
the funds with the bank militates strongly against the trial courts decision
that appellant is liable for estafa.

We find the appeal meritorious.

Generally, findings and conclusions of the trial court are binding upon Us in
the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness or palpable error
[5]
or unless it
has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.
[6]


To our mind, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of estafa as defined under the
Revised Penal Code on Article 315, 2 (d), was committed by appellant. More
particularly, the prosecution did not prove the existence of fraud to constitute
the issuance of the check as fraud contemplated by the law on estafa.

Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, for which accused-appellant was charged and
convicted, penalizes estafa when committed, among other things, --

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud:
xxx xxx xxx

(d) by posting a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check

Under the Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the RPC, estafa is committed by
any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is
committed with the following essential elements which must be proved to
sustain a conviction:

(1) a check is drawn or postdated in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time the check was issued;
(2) there are no funds sufficient to cover the check; and
(3) the payee sustains damage thereby.

Basically, the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury
must be established by sufficient and competent evidence in order that the
crime of estafa may be established. In order to constitute estafa under the
statutory provisions, the act of postdating or of issuing a check in payment of
an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; accordingly, it
should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. In fine, the
offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party
by reason of the issuance, whether postdated or not, of the check. It must be
shown that the person to whom the check is delivered would not have parted
with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the
other party
[7]
.

Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and must be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. The false pretense
or fraudulent act must be committed prior or simultaneously with the
issuance of the bad check. Thus, the drawer of the dishonored check is given
three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the
check. Other wise a prima facie presumption of deceit arises.
[8]


In this case, the trial court failed to consider the testimonies of appellant with
respect to the agreement that the check issued by the accused shall be a mere
guarantee for the eventual payment of the bangus fingerlings delivered to
accused-appellant.

In failing to prove the element of deceit, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code.

The transaction between appellant and Austria, in our view, was one for a
loan of the bangus fingerlings, and she issued the check to guarantee
payment thereof. As such, she has the obligation to make good the payment
of the items she purchased. But such obligation is civil in character and in the
absence of fraud, no criminal liability under the RPC arises from the mere
issuance of a postdated check as a guarantee of payment. Complainant
Austria by delivering the bangus fingerlings to the accused-appellant without
promptly getting paid, for all intents and purposes, had sold on credit, the
amounts due thus turning into simply money obligations.

The trial court convicted the appellant on the general allegation that all the
elements of estafa under Art 315 2 (d) f the RPC had been proved by the
prosecution without making any reference to or giving any proof of the
actual fraud that appellant allegedly committed to make her liable for estafa.
It is elementary that where an allegation in the information is an essential
element of the crime, the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to
sustain a conviction. In this case, the prosecution did not establish
specifically and conclusively the fraud alleged as an element of the offense
charged.

The prosecution failed to establish beyond a shadow of doubt that appellant
employed deceit. Its evidence was overcome by the defenses proof that that
the check was issued to guarantee a pre-existing obligation, as in fact the
complainant granted the accused an extension of a total of sixty (60) days for
the accused to pay the obligation. In effect therefore, appellant issued the
check as evidence of indebtedness to cover the value of the bangus
fingerlings. It has been ruled in this connection that a drawer who issues a
check as security or evidence of investment is not liable for estafa.
[9]


Furthermore, We find that accused-appellant acted in good faith during the
transaction. Appellant asked the complainant not to deposit the check
knowing that it was not funded, and in fact, complainant granted the accused
extensions. Good faith is a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a
check.

As held in People vs. Ojeda
[10]
, the Revised Penal Code was enacted to
penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as mala in
se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is
concurrence of freedom, intelligence, and intent which together make up the
criminal mind behind the criminal act. Thus, to constitute a crime, the
act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complaint of is innocent.

In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution is concededly weak. In
such cases, even if the evidence for the defense is also weak, the accused
must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances
are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible
with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must
acquit.
[11]


Courts are mandated to put prosecution evidence under severe testing.
Furthermore, the constitutional presumption of innocence requires them to
take a more casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring
the innocence of the accused.
[12]
The evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.
[13]
Considering the failure of the prosecution to
discharge its burden of proof and overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence, it is not only appellants right to be freed; it is even more, the
Courts constitutional duty to acquit her.
[14]


WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSE and SET
ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, for
lack of sufficient evidence to prove fraud or deceit beyond reasonable doubt.
However, she is ordered to pay private complainant the balance of her
obligation in the amount of P127,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum
until fully paid. She is hereby ordered released immediately from
confinement in the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City,
unless she is being held for another lawful cause. The director of the Bureau
of Corrections is directed to inform the Court of the action taken hereon
within five (5) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE L. SABIO JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REGALADO E. MAAMBONG
Associate Justice

RAMON M. BATO, JR.
Associate Justice


[1]
Rollo, p. 15

[2]
Original Records, p. 1

[3]
Rollo, p. 22

[4]
Brief for Accused-Appellant, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 76-77

[5]
People vs Molina, et. al., 292 SCRA 742 (1998)

[6]
People vs Laceste, et. al., 293 SCRA 397 (1998)

[7]
Timbal vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 136487, December 14, 2001

[8]
People vs. Ojeda, GR Nos. 104238-58, June 7, 2004

[9]
Pacheco vs. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 595 (1999)

[10]
GR Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004

[11]
People vs. Batoctoy, et. al., 401 SCRA 478 (2003)

[12]
People vs. Ratunil, 334 SCRA 721 (2000)

[13]
People vs. Canete, 384 SCRA 411 (2002)

[14]
People vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003)



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