Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

Document 59

Filed

Ofmn ^ P a g a - U ^ L Z ^
USDS SDNY
DOCUMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #:
DATE F I L E D :

. A z l z W

MARCUS I . WASHINGTON,
lO-cv-9647 (PKC)

PJaintiff,

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

-against-

W I L L I A M MORRIS ENDEAVOR
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, formerly known as
the W I L L I A M MORRIS AGENCY, INC., JEFF
MEADE, and SARAH WINIARSKI,
Defendants.

CASTEL, U.S.D.L
Plaintiff Mai-cus Isaiah Washington, proceeding gro se, brings this action against
defendants William Morris Endeavor Enteilaimnent, LLC ("William Moms Endeavor"), and
^

r ,> two William Morris Endeavor Human Resources employees, Jeff Meade and Sarah Winiarski.

d^udfd^'^

Washington moves for reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum and Order, filed March 27,

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2014, denying his motion for recusal. Defendants move to confiiTn an arbitration award rendered ^ c W i ^ ^ i - H ^

k>e Ofl^ M^<^<^TQy Arbiti-ator Timothy K. Lewis on June 25, 2014, which dismissed Washington's claims and
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s*Jl''^'^rdered he pay $43,707.60 in costs and fees. Defendants also seek a filing injunction against

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Washington. For the reasons fluthcr discussed, Wasliington's motion is denied and defendants'

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motions are granted.

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BACKGROUND
following facts are derived liom the parties' evidentiary submissions and

matters of which judicial notice may appropriately be taken, and are undisputed unless otherwise
-

noted.

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Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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Filed 09/05/14 Page 2 of 26

Plaintiff Marcus Washington initially filed suit against the defendants on

"pO^wi o-ol

December 22, 2010, asserting claims of discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981,
Title V I I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-l et seg., as well as New York
State Human Riglits Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 296, and New York City Human Rights Law,

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N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-107. (Compl. f 1, Docket # 2.) In a Memorandum and Order dated
July 20, 2011, the Court stayed the litigation pending an award in arbitration. Washington v.

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"

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William Morris Endeavor Entm't. LLC. No. lO-cv-9647 (PKC)(JCF), 2011 WL 3251504, at "^l
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011). Familiarity' with the facts as described in the Memorandum and Order
is

assumed.

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Washington subsequently appealed the Court's ruling to the Second Circuit. A

panel dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as a final order had not yet been issued by this
Court. Washington v. William Moms Endeavor Entm't. LLC, No, 11-3576-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 13,
2011), Docket # 39. The panel also denied Washington's motions for reconsideration en banc
and for a stay pending the filing of a petition for a wait of certiorari. Washington v. William
Morris Endeavor Entm't, LLC, No. 11-3576-cv (2d Ch. Feb. 3, 2012), Docket # 46; Washington
V. William Mon-is Endeavor Entm't. LLC. No. 11-3576-cv (2d Cir. May 23, 2012), Docket # 65.
Washington subsequently sent a letter to the Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York to
"inform [her] about the bias, impropriety and corrupfion that is happening within the Southern
District of New York and Second Circuit." (Washington Letter, Apr. 20, 2012, at 1, Docket
# 28.) In the letter, he requested that the Chief Judge "personaUy intervene and enlist a special
committee to investigate rhe facts and allegations in [the] letter to prevent 'manifest injustice.'"
(Id at 3.)

Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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On June 15, 2012, Washington submitted a demand for arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association (the "AAA"). (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 1, at 1-2.)
David L. Gregory was initially selected as the arbitrator. (See Emergency Mot. to Disqualify P.
Kevin Castel & James C. Francis ("Washington Mot.") Ex. Y, at 3, 15, Docket # 40.)' In the
arbitral proceeding, the parties indicated to Arbitrator Gregory that they were amenable to him
deciding the matter without an on-site hearing. (Id at 3.) Washington moved for summary
judgment on his claims and the defendants moved for the claims to be dismissed. (Id at 3-4.)
Washington also argued that the arbitration agreement he signed was "unconscionable, tainted

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with illegality, malum in se, and signed under duress in the depths of the Great Recession."
(Washington Mot. Ex. CC, at 4.)
In a series of "Interim Decisions," Arbitrator Gregoiy set discovery schedules and
ruled on threshold issues. (See Washington Mot. Ex. EE, at 1, 2-6.) In addition. Arbitrator
Gregory expressed concerns as to Washington's behavior during the course of the arbitration,
and found that Washington had defamed the defendants:
Claimant appears to regard as part of a White Supremacist
/^A^^^'^ ^0 i ^ 4 ' ' ' 0 ^ o f c r i m i n a l conspiracy virtually every person he perceives as
-f=<w:s^-fK*-|--thvV X?cc^\o^ not in complete agreement with him, including
J^uoseJi or^ 'S^W.V^^ 3)" distinguished federal judges Patterson and Castel.
aAr.^^-^
-h* JU^co^a^iClaimant, taking issue with hiterim Decision 2, surmises
\. -fve iy^ijt^ ce, of c^<
I must have been "threatened" or "bnbed" in order to
c ^ o ^ y J^tfU, ffa^k-jo/N
^'^^^ written such a "deceptive" Interim Decision 2. I can
6w.<iv^e(p^5^^J coIoUolcd -K^ + ^^^^'^ everyone, including Claimant, that I have never been
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bribed or threatened in my entire career. Respondents'
- p i lA/Rj
U M 5 ^ 4 , l a w y e r s and employees have been subjected to a stream of
c-rj^ ur>A>.-|i,*,+,cA..|c<A tQ5<^'^af-jj^yg^.jj.(^g ix^m the inception. Every person, including
in 2xKi^OrA.<u.
Claimant, is entkled to their opinions. But, we are not each

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' Thougli Washington has not suhmitted sworn statements support o f his submissions, the Court w i l l consider the
assertions in his briefs and the accompanying exhibits to the extent that they are otherwise admissible. See
Geldzahler v. N . Y . Med. Coll.. 746 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 n . l (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[DJespite [plamtiff] having received
the 56.2 Notice, we take into account his status as a gro se litigant and w i l l consider tlie unsworn statements in his
56.1 Response on the assumption that he would have testified to these statements in his Declaration.").

-3-

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entitled to our own facts. . . . Before I amved on the scene

as the Arbitrator in the summer of 2012, Claimant had
already crossed over the line from constitutionally
protected First Amendment speech into unprotected torts of
defamation, libel, and slander. I FIND that Claimant's
tortious speech continues substantially unabated.
(Id. at 45.) On December 17, 2013, Arbitrator Gregory issued a "Partial Final Award" finding
tfe s\if^-'-^'t-eS that William Morris Endeavor had discriminated against Washington in violation of "pertinent
'

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federal, state, and local law." (Washington Mot. Ex. A, at 1, 13.) Arbitrator Gregory then

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ordered Washington to file a motion for reasonable fees and costs. (Id. at 12.)
Approximately one montli later, on defendants' mofion, tlie AAA's

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Administrative Review Council (the "ARC") disqualified Arbitrator Gregory under AAA ^ ^ ' ' N \r^^

Employment Arbitrafion Rule 16. (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 4, at 2.) In February 2014,^^^^,"^^; ^
the parties selected Timothy K. Lewis as a replacement arbitrator. (Id.)
t i e ii*o(aLr*l4^vJ
After his appointment as the replacement arbitrator, Arbihator Lewis issued a
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Confidentiality Order in order to "restore order, efficiency, and decorum to a process that had j ^ - ^ ' i ^ CAI<-

MA- o^iV*^ ' h " ! become bogged down in personal attacks and unwananted innuendo, and to enable [the] matter
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proceed in good faith." (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, at 2.) The Confidentiality Order

'

explicitly prohibited parties from discussing the proceedings through "any form of
communicafion, including but not hniited to the internet, blogs, and other online media."
(Washington Mot. Ex. KK, at 2.) Arbitrator Lewis read the contents of the Confidentiality Order

during his first conference call with the parties. (See Zweig Decl,, July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, at 3.)
Ipt^ft^

While the call was in progress, Washington made posts to his blog concerning the

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Confidentiality Order and attached the Confidentiality Order to one of the posts. (Id at 4.)

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According to Arbinator Lewis, the posts were "inflammaton/racist, a^d in direct violation of
the Confidenfiality Order," (Id)

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From the time of Arbitrator Lewis's appointment, Washington expressed

'.

, , frustration with both him and the proceeding. (See Washington Mot. Ex. JJ, at 1 ("If Hon. Lewis o.^ a\[<re.ei

2-01'? - b^^Cjs not given and does not begin to read these pleadings before our conference call OR submit a

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notarized version of his oath, tlien tliere is absolutely no point in me getting on this call. I am not \j^t\^\c^\
going to waste my time talking with someone who is going to receive Sl,000/hour about my
case, who knows very little about what has happened and has made a conscious decision to
.remain in the dark.").) According to Arbitrator Lewis, during the first conference call
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Washington was "extremely disruptive," repeatedly interrupted other parties on the call, and
.

c\c. ^en3K4-i^;alled Arbitrator Lewis "crazy." (Washington Mot. Ex. LL ^ 2.)

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After tlie call. Arbitrator Lewis decided to hold separate calls witli each party.

(Id \) The call with Washington did not go well. Arbitrator Lewis described the call as

*ui4>W follows;
I then spoke with Claimant. I explained to Claimant that
his claims are serious and deser\'e careflil consideration but
that he must conduct himself in an appropriate manner as
he is acting as his own counsel and is a party to this
arbitration. Claimant refiised to listen. Claimant insisted
that 1 have no authority to conduct this arbitration; that he
will not read, respond to, or abide by any of my orders; and
that, despite the previous arbitrator's finding of
discrimination, he plans to file a motion in federal court to
have this arbitration "thrown out" (even though, as I
explained to Claimant, only a paitial award has been
entered and this arbitration is, therefore, not final; and
despite the fact that the United Stated Dishict Court for the
Southern District of New York previously ruled that he is
bound by the agreement he signed to have his claims
arbitrated and his appeal of that ruling to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was dismissed),
asked Claimant i f there was anything more he wanted to
discuss, and he said no.
( I d ^6.)

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After concluding the telephone conversations, Arbitrator Lewis ordered the

parties to participate in good faith and warned that further violations of the Confidentiality Order
"may result in the dismissal of all claims for abuse of the arbitration process." (Id. ^7.)

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Arbitrator Lewis then invited the parties to submit cross motions to vacate Arbitrator Gregory''s
'

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Partial Final Award. (Id.)

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Defendants subsequently submitted a motion to vacate Arbitrator Gregory's

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Partial Final Award. (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 4, at 3.) Washington neither submitted his
own motion, nor submitted a response to Arbitrator Lewis. (Id.) On April 18, 2014, pursuant to 'Jh\s^yAr. (Vc\\t^
AAA Employment Arbitration Rule 18, Arbitrator Lewis granted the motion and vacated

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Arbitrator Gregory's award. ( I d at 3-5.)

While defendants'modon to vacate was pending before Aj-bitrator Lewis,

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Washington sought leave from this Court to file an "Emergency Motion" requesting that both the
undersigned and Magistrate Judge Francis, to whom the case had been assigned for general
lA.hAf (/o'^i+l^pretrial supervision, recuse themselves from the case. (Docket #33.) As the arbitration was still
pending before the AAA at that time, the Court ordered that "[n]o motion to disqualify may be

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filed until 14 days following a Final Award in the arbitration proceeding." (Order, Mar. 7, 2014, Uxjv4 t\AAia\.
at 2, Docket # 38.) Despite the Court's explicit Order, Washington filed his proposed motion.

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'pN<,rv\o:\;orvvjq> (Docket # 40.) In addition to requesting recusal, Washington requested that a replacement judge ( ^ ^ , | T ,
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sanction opposing counsel and issue a defauU judgment in his favor. (Washington Mot. 3.)

\L . Washington's motion was denied by both Magistrate Judge Francis and the undersigned.

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Washington v. Wilham Moms Endeavor Entm't. No. lO-cv-9647 fPKOfJCFi 2014 WL

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1258308, at "^1 (S.D.N.Y. Mai. 26, 2014); (Order, Mar. 27, 2014, at 3, Docket# 43.)
^

'Washington subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. (Docket # 46.) In support of his

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Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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motion, Washington stated that, should the Court mle against him, he would fde a separate
action "against all parties involved" including the undersigned. Magistrate Judge Francis, and
Judge Patterson I
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(PL's Mot. for Recons. 30-31.)

^ addition to his submissions in support of his motion, Washington also

submitted a letter to the Court in which he stated that "[d]ue to the on-going fraud that has
occurred since the inception of this case, I cannot and will not continue litigating this case any

firrther

0*^vi-\ 2.>\'}-

under the jurisdiction and supervision of the American Arbitration Association . . . ."

(Washington Letter, Mar. 28, 2014, at 2, Docket # 2 (emphasis in original).) Washington made
similar statements to Arbitrator Lewis and the AAA on a number of occasions. (See, e.g.,
Washington Letter, Mar. 13, 2014, Ex. A, at 1, Docket # 39 ("I am not proceeding any fiirther
with the AAA and Lewis can do whatever he wants to do . . . ."); PL's Mot. for Recons. Ex. D, at
8-9 ("I refuse to re-arbitrate the merits of my case or entertain other legal aspects of dhs case
"))

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Between the time Arbitrator Lewis issued the Confidentiality Order and the time

he vacated Arbitrator Gregory's Partial Final Award, Washington continued to post updates to
his blog concerning tire litigation, in violation of the Confidentiality Order. (Zweig Decl., July 3,
2014, Ex. 3, at 4.) The posts contained private communications, the text of Arbitrator Lewis's
orders, as well as personal attacks directed at both Arbitrator Lewis and his law firm. (Id. at 3-4
n.2 (detailing and quoting Washington's blog posts from February 25, 2014, through March 15,
2014).) Washington also admitted to recording conference calls.^ (Id. at 5 n.3.)

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^ Judge Patterson has had no role in Washington's case. Washington's inclusion o f Judge Patterson appears to stem
\'^^'^'fW*
from his role as the presiding judge in a separate discrimination case against The W i l l i a m Morris Agency, Inc. S e e ^ - ^ J i / ^ ^
Rowe Entm't v. W i l l i a m Morris Agency Inc.. No. 98-cv-8272 (RPP), 2012 W L 5464611 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2012).
'^^Jlls ^iS
^ In addition to recording conference calls, Washington has apparently been posting his recordings on-line. (See

Washington Mot. 28 & n.2 (quoting fi-om a recording and providing a link to it).)

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One of tire issues Washington detailed in his postings was the alleged relationship
between the AAA

and William Morris Endeavor's counsel. On March 10, 2014, Washington

discovered that one member of defendants' legal team was married to an attorney employed by
f*'|-ciicW'
W

the AAA.

(Washington Mot.

55.) According to Washington, as the relationship had not been

\n previously disclosed, this was "undeniable proof that opposing counsel and the AAA

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conspired against him.

had

(Id.) In response to Washington's allegations. Arbitrator Lewis attested

v^c/lfllv*'-'^^^'-' though he knew the A.\

employee and had worked with her, he did not know her husband,

-^v/A+e.

or that she was married, before Washington raised the issue. (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, ^ ^'*5*T'

Q.^cly\X^

a t n . 7 . ) Arbitrator Lewis further stated: "In any event, the fact of this previously unknown

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relationship has absolutely no bearing on my impartiality in this aibitradon just as it did not, and ^ ki^t^sHta
^ ^^^^j^

obviously could not have, before Mr.

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Washington made me aware of it."

(Id.)

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Defendants subsequently moved for sanctions for violations of the Confidentiality ^ ^ . j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^

Order. (Id. at 1.) In response to the motion, Washington repeatedly stated that he would
P- MaHo<N-V

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continue to violate the Confidentiality Order, (PL's Mot.

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for Recons. Ex. D, at 9 ("Lewis cannot

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t\pY i(j)e>'^< ^lenuinely believe that he can come into a three year litigation and issue a Confidentiality Order
-svi5>ttlfi f
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knowing the facts of this case, and thmk diat I'm going to comply

"); I d at 10 ("Until I

receive complete and total justice, I will continue to publicly share with the world, the tiiith

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about what is happening to me in this case."),))On April 18, 2014, Arbitrator Lewis concluded

of^fct

that Washington had acted in bad faith and ordered an award to defendants of two-thirds of its

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legal fees and costs as a sanction. (Zweig Deck, July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, at 7, 9-10.) Based on

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so defendants' accounting, the fees totaled $43,707.60. (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 2, at 15.)

. ^ j ^ ^ j j ,^1^

(^"il^ ckcxso^i Arbitrator Lewis noted that he had authority to sanction Washington dirough dre 2009 arbitration
J

agreement between Washington and William Moms Endeavor as its scope included "all

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disputes" between the parties. (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, at 8-9.) Arbitrator Lewis
further warned Washington that his conduct was "unacceptable" and that further actions "may
result in additional sanctions, including [a] recommendation to the AAA that it terminate [the]
arbitration, with prejudice." (Id. at 10 (emphasis removed).)
Despite Arbitrator Lewis's warning, Washington continued to make posts to his
blog discussing the proceedings. (Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 2-7 nn.1-9.
Docket # 57 (detailing and quoting Washington's blog posts from April 18, 2014, through June
10, 2014).) In one blog post, Washington stated that he was working on a new complaint against
opposing counsel. Arbitrator Lewis, and others and threatened to file commercial liens against
"all parties involved." ( I d at 2-3 & n . l ; Zweig Decl., July 10, 2014, Ex. C, at 2.) hi a later post,
Washington posted an image of the cover page of a complaint he was drafting naming as
defendants, inter alia, opposing counsel, Arbitrator Gregory, Arbitrator Lewis, three named
Circuit Judges, Judge Patterson, the Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York, the
undersigned, the AAA, and the United States of America. (Zweig Deck, July 10, 2014, Ex. E, at

1)
In his subsequent communications, Washington repeatedly suggested that
Mvi Mofiflo Xo^

Arbitrator Lewis dismiss the case. (PL's Mot, for Recons.Ex. D, at 10; Zweig Deck, July 3,

u.V([c>< v^os f\o\^ 2014, Ex. 2, at 2.) On April 29, 2014, Arbiti-ator Lewis held a conference call with the parties.
LgwiS
,< , .

(Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 3.) The call quickly descended into disorder. (Id)
.,

According to Washington, this occurred when he raised the issue of arbitrability and asserted that

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process and equal protection rights were being violated, fraud was being committed, and

-ft. AiWXi [>-<. Arbitrator Lewis was exceeding his powers. (Id) Arbitrator Lewis repeatedly asked whether
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Washington would proceed in good faith, or whether he desired a dismissal of the arbitration.

[\c^^\^f^\j^^'^

Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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(Id.) Each time, Washington stated that due to "ongoing fi-aud" he would not continue in good
faith. (Id.) Near the end of the call, Washington stated that he would "soon" be suing Arbitrator
Lewis as well. (Id) Washington states that "of course" he recorded the call and recorded all the
conference calls. (Id.)
Arbitrator Lewis then invited defendants to move to dismiss Washington's claims
given Washington's request to do so and his violations of the Confidentiality Order. (Id.)
Defendants subsequendy moved for an order dismissing Washington's claims. (See id. at 1.) In
response to the motion, Washington sent an e-mail to opposing counsel stating that an adverse
ruling would not prevent him from litigating his case and promising that neither defendants nor
opposing counsel would "get away" with their actions. (Zweig Decl., July 10, 2014, Ex. F, at 1.)
On June 25, 2014, Arbitrator Lewis dismissed Washington's claims "with
prejudice and on the merits." (Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 14.) Arbitrator Lewis
r J , i A A 4f^'T provided two bases for his dismissal. First, he ordered dismissal because Washmgton requested^
(\(>+vjn ^

thg arbitration to be tenninated. (Id. at 8.) Second, Arbitrator Lewis found that dismissal was

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^ warranted as a sanction for Washington's repeated violations of his orders, including the
I

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Confidentiality Order. (Id.) Arbitrator Lewis drew authority for the sanction from the parties'

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Washington subsequently moved for reconsideration of the dismissal. (Washington Letter, July fl. !?>(^o| o4-

L(2wli'^*>J 15, 2014, at 2.)

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Lewilr-k
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T*-*cow>iM^ arbitration agi-eement and the "mles and applicable law" governing the arbitration. ( I d at 8-9.)
I suV>rti')fed

| |t^<^

After Arbitrator Lewis dismissed Washington's claims, defendants moved to

confirm the arbitral award and moved for a filing injunction against Washington. (Docket # 49,
55.) As Washington's motion for reconsideration was still pending before Arbitrator Lewis, he
viewed defendants' acdons as premature. (Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. C, at 2.)

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Washington infonned opposing counsel that its actions throughout the litigation ensured that he
would be "deprived of [his] rights under the color of law" and was the primary reason he would
be "taking legal action against [the firm] and other involved in this heinous conspiracy to
interfere with the human rights of African Americans." (Id.)
Arbitrator Lewis denied Washington's motion on July 22, 2014. (Baraett Letter,
July 29, 2014, Attach., at 1, Docket # 58.)
DISCUSSION
As Washington is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his submissions "to raise
the strongest arguments that they suggest." Graham v. Henderson. 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
I.

Washington's Motion for Reconsideration Is Denied.

Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Rule 60(b),
1^MAri<J*-_^ Fed. R. Civ. P. A motion to reconsider is "addressed to the sound discretion of the district
L/C"" -fU. court[.]" See Mendell ex rel. Viacom. Inc. v. Gollust. 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990). A
\

motion for reconsideration "is generally not favored and is properly granted only upon a showing

\Y*yM

of exceptional circumstances." Pichardo v. Ashcroft. 374 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal

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citadon and quotation marks omitted). "The standard for granting such a motion is strict, and

^v\i'^^^c'^^^'^"^^^^^^^^'^^ ^''^ generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
'

decisions or data that the court overlookedmatters, in other words, that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). "[A] modon to reconsider should not be granted where the moving
party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Id.
Motions for reconsideration "should be granted only when the defendant
identifies an intervening change of law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a
- 11 -

Case 2:10-cv-09547-PKC-JCF

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Page 12 of 26

clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov. Ine. v. YLL
Irrevocable Trust, 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
. - f I s.i v^; -1^4 wwfri

'Washington's submission does not identify any new facts that were not before the

- V Co^<\- i^'V-Court when it issued its Order. Further, Washington does not identify an intervening change in
oof 4v*-'->1^l>

that would alter the Court's prior ruling. Washington argues that the Court in its prior ruling

Uiiw,^, t-cocA^\<i'-''^^^ ""^^d his motion in its entirety or "with actual comprehension" because it did not reach the
A^tuAz.

"'r

issue of sanctions against opposing counsel or the request for a default judgment. Washington

"cA^j.^*^ ^^'^ explicitly requested that these issues be decided by a replacement judge and not the
midersigned. (Washington Mot. 3 ("Secondly, I am asking for the impartial federal judge that
replaces Castel to determine . . . .").) As the Court's Order denied die portion of Washington's
motion seeking recusal, it was not necessary to reach the remainder of the motion.

'^cJfM'^etftot^Lll'i^dl

Because the additional issues raised in Washington's motion were contingent on ^ ^ ^ ' ' ^ J ^ ^ '
the granting his request for recusal, the Court did not eiT in not addressing the issues raised.

Consequently, Washington's motion for reconsideration is denied.

j Uov^H

dii'^^'Cd

II. Defendants' Motion to Confirm die Arbitration Award Is Granted^<Tl

PFA'^^^'^VH

The FAA provides a "streamhned" process for a party seeking "a judicial decree

^c^c*/.

confirming an award, an order vacating it, or an order modifying or correcting it." Hall Street 4>cie4*<>ie *.1*>H*Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008). Under section 9 of the FAA, "a

o^^^ <!^\eS

court 'must' confirm an arbitration award 'unless' it is vacated, modified, or corrected 'as

aJ^eU^ic^^

prescribed' in 10 and 11." I d (quoting 9 U.S.C. 9). Section 10(a) of the FAA enumerates w' c{d.Ai j
four situations in which a court may enter an order vacating an arbitration award:
(1) where the award was procured by coiTuption, fraud, or
undue means;

'K-^-^^f <?lHjior\
b"W'|^-

Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the

arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter was not made.
9 U.S.C. 10(a).
hi this Circuit, grounds for vacatur under section 10 include an arbitrator's
"manifest disregard" for the law. T.Co Metals. LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply. Inc.. 592 F.3d
329, 339^0 (2d Cir. 2010). An award is in manifest disregard of the law if the arbitrators are
"fiilly aware of the existence of a clearly defined governing legal pnnciple, but refuse[ ] to apply
it, in effect, ignoring it." Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.. 548 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Ch.
2008) (alteration in original and citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
Section 11 of the FAA provides that a court may "make an order modifying or
correcting" an award:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of
figures or an evident material mistake in the description of
any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the
merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not
affecting the merits of the controversy.
9 U.S.C. 11. Finally, a court may remand an award to an arbitrator if the award is so indefinite
or ambiguous that the court does not "know exactly what it is being asked to enforce." Ams. Ins.
Co. V. Seagull Compania Naviera. S.A.. 774 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1985).
- 13 -

Case 2;10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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In opposition to defendants' motion to confirm the award, Washington provides

four argirments as to why the arbitral award should be set aside. First, Washington argues that
Arbitrator Gregory was improperly removed and, consequently, all of Arbitrator Lewis's orders,
including the order vacating Aibitiator Gregory's paitial award, aie void. Second, Washington
asserts that Arbitrator Gregory and Arbitrator Lewis's decisions to enforce the arbitiadon
agreement were in manifest disregard of the law. Third, Washington argues that the failure to
o\-h*. AA A

disclose the alleged relationship between opposing counsel and an AAA employee biased the

CAvrivi^A^^^ arbitral proceedings in defendants' favor. Finally, he asserts that opposing counsel has been
S^Kc A

engaging in a pattern of bad faith litigation warrandng then removal and sanctions.
a. Neither Arbitrator Gregory's Removal, Nor Arbitrator Lewis's Actions
Were Unlawful.
Washington's claims in arbitration were governed by the AAA Employment
Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedm-es. Rule 16 of these mles governs the procedure to
disqualify an arbitrator. Under Rule 16, a party may object to an arbitrator to the AAA, which
determines whether an arbitrator should be disqualified. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Employment
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures ("Arbitration Rules"). Rule 16(b). The AAA's
decision is conclusive. Id. Within the AAA, objections to appointed arbitrators are heaid by the
ARC. See Am. Arbitration Ass'n Adnhn. Review Council, Review Standards 1, available at
https://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dDocName=ADRSTAGE2012632&Rev
isionSelectionMediod=LatestReleased. According to the ARC, an objection to an arbitrator may
be made "at any time in die arbitration, up to the issuance of the Award or odier terminating

u p'^j 'wi'-fiv

order." I d at 2. The inclusion of the clause "other terminating order" indicates that the "Award" we-i'f/
contemplated by the ARC in this context is a final awai'd conferring jurisdiction to a competent

^tff^M.

'^''^l^.

court. See Michaels v. Marifomm Shpping. S.A.. 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1980) (construing a^\,i\/^^\^
- 1 4 -

V/PV*IJ(

'\\'^e\v l^+C^Mt a>i^cj(Li-

<>f

Case 2;10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

^ Ap^o^<A' lA

Document 59 Filed 09/05/14

Page 15 of 26

the phrase "the award" in 9 U.S.C. 10(a) to confer jurisdiction on a federal court only after a

disM'ti'ig M J final award).

r*\WJ^i!^4'

Washington asserts that the ARC exceeded its authority by removing Arbitrator

Gregory as an award had already been issued. The Court assumes, without deciding, that
decisions by the ARC are reviewable under the same standards as a decision by an arbitrator. An
inquii7 as to whether an arbitral panel exceeded its powers focuses on whether the panel had the
authority to reach an issue and not whether the issue was correctly decided. DiRussa v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, hrc. 121 F.3d 818, 824 (2d Cir. 1997).
d^if t^o\j

"/\v(-<t

order for an award to be "final," an arbitration award "must be intended by the

arbitrators to be their complete determination of all claims submitted to them." Michaels. 624
^jCo-fFA-A-

F.2dat413. Arbitrator Gregory's "Final Partial Award" was not a complete determination of all

d>r'Jc^0^y"4- claims. In the award. Arbitrator Gregoiy explicitly left open the issues of Washington's
'

f^cfi

-H 4
' ' ^A ,

reasonable fees and costs. (Washington Mot, Ex. A, at 12.) "Generally, in order for a claim to

';;e^'"
.

^'^Z^^i''

t^ViVi^

K-J party on the claim, but also the issue of damages." Michaels, 624 F.2d 413-14.

r^tt^^j . Vf>Tj^Ki
/-^"^ . L
M

oUC^-v^*-! ^^I^^m'

By leaving open the issue of costs. Arbitrator Gregory's award did not end the

arbitration proceedings and was therefore not a "final" decision. As the award did not terminate

, A. L-^ the arbitral proceeding, the ARC had the authoriry to decide on arbitrator objections.

^^^t^s

vacancy was created. Under Rule 18 of the Arbitration Rules, a vacancy is filled "in accordance

K^^***^^^^ applicable provisions of these Rules." Aibitrator Lewis was chosen to fdl the vacancy by

4TA4foifl+^ mutual consent of the parties. (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 4, at 2.) The appointment of
fvio^^fij C^jo^

VACA4<. / V ^ * ^

c*.v,aJ,j jo
'^i

^'^c^^es-

4** A-^A ^\i<wfIU

Washington also argues that Arbitrator Lewis exceeded his powers when he
If
4
vacated Arbitrator Gregor}''s award. When Arbitrator Gregory was removed, an arbitrator
fWfc.-y*'- 14 v*^*^
^r<t^\-

KVV c ^ ^ i j

be completely detennined, the arbitrators must have decided not only the issue of liability of a

P-^A ofi.

Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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Page 16 of 26

Arbitrator Lewis as a neutral arbitrator was consistent with Rule 12 of the Arbitration Rules.
^'^l'^'^^

When an arbitrator is chosen to fill a vacancy as a substitute arbitrator, the panel "shall determine a_
in its sole discretion whether it is necessary to repeat all or part of any prior hearings."

fi^K f

Arbitration Rules, supra. Rule 18.

As Arbitrator Lewis had the authority to determine whether prior proceedings

were to be repeated, he did not exceed his powers in vacating the previously issued award.
b.

1*^^

The Decisions to Enforce the Arbitration Agreement Were Not in

Manifest Disregard of the Law.

,.

_^

^o^cLrj-

A^<^

o\-e^

'~^+^' \ ) ^ ' ^ ' ^

y^^^^ \

In support of his argument that the arbitration agreement should not have been rf^'^-H'^'^'H^
enforced, Washington asserts that claims brought under Title VII are not arbitrable and that the

Uj^^^^rvc '/,volvdd

aibiti^ation agreement was unconscionable. A party seeking to vacate an ai-bitration award based

o]^'*^

on an alleged manifest disregard of the law must show some "egregious impropriety on the part fcarx^oAji
of the arbitrator." T.Co Metals, LLC, 592 F.3d at 339. Thus, an award will be enforced if there
is a "barely colorable justification" for the outcome reached. Id,

^v^'Mc/ctd t^.sU.i^o^

w;

In its prior Memorandum and Order staying the litigation in pending an award in

\\S

a,^^i\sl- i^o'^l'^^rd

arbitration, the Court held that Washington "ha[d] not shown that Congress intended to preclude ^jt^ev r^th
arbitration for claims asserted under either Tide VII or 42 U.S.C. 1981." Washington, 2011

h^J'Aene]-

]4vvt/<li#

WL 3251504, at *10. The Court also held that the arbitration agreement provided the arbitrator

.fo

^^^^

d t^or.s\-^

exclusive authority to decide issues of arbitrability and that the "Delegation Provision,"

\f,^e^tA^^f

which granted the arbitrator this authority, was not unconscionable. Id. at *i-6.

-vWfo^l^^'l'/

declines to revisit its prior decision.

v;l^c^fi>\o'vs.U2.^i^

y\-^^Y^j^aj

The Court

sanctioning Washington and dismissing his claims, Arbitrator Lewis drew

p^W.c ^\,cj , audiority from the aititration agi-eement. (Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 8-9.;
Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, at 8-9.) Arbitrator Lewis did not duectly address

^^j^

^t^^cjye^-

.f fv|>~6f,'c
d(ee^ed\'<r<\c^u<:Y.

Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC^JCF

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Page 17 of 26

Washington's argument that the agreement was uneonscionable. (See Washington Letter, July
15, 2014, Ex. A, at 8-9.; Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, at 8-9.) In relying on the arbittation
agreement for authority. Arbitrator Lewis implicitly determined that the agreement itself was not
unconscionable.
So jlrt tft i4" vJ^^ c*tci/\r Lewis was under no obligation to provide the reasoning for his award

vjtf IctAAi wto <^

Vejjc

courts will generally not attempt to analyze the reasoning process of an arbitrator. Rich v.
Spartis. 516 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 2008). However, "where a reviewing court is inclined to find

(sUs<*'J>t<^-

of-

^^a>i that arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence and that an explanation, if given,

J^d

J*^^ would have strained credulity, the absence of explanation may reinforce the reviewing court's

^^<^J>^-hf^^

rv^.) KAO-H&N
j v^^t^p-aA-j- '
0^/\?c4^44*'

confidence that die arbitrators engaged in manifest disregard." Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, hic.
c-U--^^
~
-Vi-i V'OS fv<*f*'i'>r
148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998).

^'^^ ^(^-''rj ^^f-^

There is a "barely colorable justification" for Arbifrator Lewis's detennination '{^sht-^"^^^*^

that the agreement was not unconscionable. In its prior opinion, the Court held that the
<^<^('f^)'/^J'|1v?f- "Delegation Provision" itself was not unconscionable and addressed argmnents similar to those

fv<t)^ejf;<7>

Washington raised with Arbitrator Lewis. See Washington. 2011 WL 3251504, at *7-8. Similar
-^^hr*^

'
<^c^oAif*Kjo
rK>| cv^ort^ i^^j reasoning could conceivably justify a finding that the agi-eement as a whole was also not
'"^
^^
Osjtr-^e^
Ire^iedj^dtcAl^c

bv-F f*^c-d^

ru^'o^ .

^^^^^o(,s
unconscionabb. Consequently, the Court concludes that Arbitrator Lewis did not act in manifest f>o^^ ^
e>v4^4 tc/i-MVl- .
VeUcUr< ^i^o\i^ or. c - i , . ' ^ f ^ cc^cke\<^'^e. ^i,-|^tii;f^
\^o^o*e.iUu
fr\ A\d of the law.

D^(f j,(6>.ctJ r<

-e^c)^</\cX>j-Vd|i-^ Mo/r"-r'
vic^KoOi'f-TiHt'^ll b < ^ c c ^
^

owb.'K-)-^

<\(^

e^^\\'<\^''''^

t^-ie^

^e^te^^

c. Tlie Arbitrator Did Not Exhibit Evident Partiality in Favor of

Defendants.

e/^Y- Washington argues that Arbitrator Lewis exhibited evident partiahty in favor of
defendants due to the relationship between opposing counsel and the AAA. Under section

l-t oeyi.f-f

] 0(a)(2) of the FAA, "evident partiality" will be found "when a reasonable person, considering
all of the circumstances, would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one side."

^^cfc^/i 'b'>ftfi>'''^.J f

- 1 7 -

atu^J^aJr
U^l^nc^'"

p/t. Jui'o*.*

Case 2;10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

Document 59

Filed 09/05/14 Page 18 of 26

Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Maklne Ticaret Ve Sanayi. A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). An arbitrator
who knows of a material relationship with a party and fails to disclose it meets this standard. Id.
The party asserting evident partiality has the bmdcn of proof Andros Compania Maritima. S.A.
V. Marc Rich & Co.. 579 F.2d 691, 700 (2d Cir. 1978).
r

Wvj/i / of Loeb Lt bU f- ^^^^ factors are helpful in determining whether nondisclosure meets the evident l^*-*

-fw)

V P^'"*^'^^^'y standard: "(1) the extent and character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise,

Or ^-^uci^r
loi

Co*. co^4in^,
of the arbitrator in the proceedings; (2) the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator ^/ccWc^^c,

c^t-h^j/i

^"^1^^^^^^

^ e c \-f-

and the party he is alleged to favor; (3) the connection of that relationship to the arbitrator; and

| oc]ed M^-

(4) the proximity in time b e U v e e n the relationship and the arbitration proceeding." Scandinavian
ReiiLSurance

Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 668 F.3d 60, 74 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal

^^^c **>c

quotation marks and citation omitted). Though the factors are useful, they aie not "mandatory,
exclusive, or dispositive." Id. "Partiality need not be actuaUy proven to be the basis for a
reasonable conclusion of partiahty, but it may not be based simply on speculation either."
United States v. hit'l Bhhd. of Teamsters. 170 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 1999).
A'A'A
Az.vi-f

-fiic-f-

Arbitrator Lewis has stated diat he was unaware of die relationship between

5e^(i^opposing counsel's law firm and an AAA employee before Washington brought it to his

1>( t / ' i - ^ (3rfc^ attend on. (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, at 8 n.7.) Once it had been brought to his attention,
c<^ \.v^ -h^i-i-1
\^c^\^j^
Arbitrator

)C i^tao^J
\ I. '
4vtx^dlo)*-H.^
-fle<.| .sU^i'M
M^Lt"^^

HIr '^p

Lewis attested that t h e relationship had no bearing on his impaitiahty. (Id.)

^i^^c
Washington has not submitted evidence that Arbitrator Lewis was dishonest in these statements.
_
r^cviA4-t>
Because there is no evidence in the record that Arbitrator Lewis was influenced in
decisions, Washington has not met his burden of showing that a reasonable person would

necessarily conclude, and the Court will not speculate, that solely on the potential relationship

h-ij *t uj\r4^
,c^^a
c^A

Cli/)xf=n
'''^A cyic

Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

Document 59

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Page 19 of 26

opposing counsel and a single AAA employee, that Arbitrator Lewis was biased toward

^^

li>tco-oxof
f^c^c^.

defendants.

^J^J^ft^fi^f),^.
ol*J^V)t>/)if OAC<, 4^a!<A.
^^)^St^\s

d. Defendants Did Not Secure the Award Through Improper Means.

Washington refers to the actions of opposing counsel as engaging in bad faith

lidgation. Bad faith is not a basis for vacatur under the FAA. In hght of Washington's pro se

e>r.yaiA^'if\, the Court construes this argument as an assertion that opposing counsel used undue means
^''vjr'*' ^^t|v'c/^ procure an award in defendants' favor. See 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(1). "Undue means" requires
^

'

lp4.f>^ t*^ls

"nefarious intent or bad faith, o r conduct that is immoral, if not illegal." ARMA. S.R.O. v. BAE
Sys. Overseas, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 245, 254 (D.D.C. 2013) (mtemal citations and quotation

"fnf. ^ t ) ' ^ - - f A . marks omitted).

c^teAl .TAio^k-.^ <LM

In his submissions, Washington accuses opposing counsel of withholding

Lhi^i^/'^e{fic{ evidence, and calls them " k h i g s

i.-ftM/cvW c_
."'^'^'i
P -ULJ

of

deception" and "masterful manipulators." Assuming,

arguendo, that Washington's assertions are tme, those actions did not cause defendants to
procure an award in t h e i r favor. Arbitrator Lewis provided two bases for his dismissal

f" ^'^^'^"^S'-*'"'"^ claimsWashington requested dismissal, and

as

r.

of

a sanction for his repeated

I^lLf

i,Ucurtl
,

Is

ff^s^\\

^^^^

^ ^ j ^ ^ ' f * * v i o l a t i o n s of the Confidentiality Order. (Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 8.)

x.

^'^itl'^'^'jtc^

u^Lij.aflojweJ Washington's actions, and not the defendants', resulted in the adverse ruhng. Washington may \ " ^ ' ; T ' + ' I *
fT^s-f
to4^iV

~
not now claim that opposing counsel caused Arbitrator Lewis to terminate the arbitration.

(C
(_/tovAi

Nx)^H^,
<,^/^t^

P^A-

IIL Defendants' Motion for a Filing Injunction Is Granted.

Ll-O cl<Li'^fc<

A disti-ict court possesses the authority to issue a filing injunction when "a

-(^"rciAl-ko^^k plaintiff abuses the process of the Courts to harass and

annoy

others with meritiess, frivolous,

j^^-j^ iS'h^ ^

-tviif JLocA,^^o>,-Vvexadous or repetitive proceedings." Lau v. Meddaugh. 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Ck. 2000) (per ^^^.J^ ^^j
-{v '[x. NM. Ill c
^ 1 , ii^'J js
fl>s
c u r i a m ) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted); see a l s o Malley v. N.Y.
^
CK^^^C^

<?v;^<Lf( ofi.\<;6c*a

ce^<\<^k)i

Case 2;10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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Page 20 of 26

CitvBd. ofEduc. 112 F.3d 69, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (fding injunction appropriate if

|i\4

complaints filed based on the same events).

4tf ^.A^a^ei^ *4^aA,o ^-fe>^

-t>w3

Document 59

To protect a party's due process rights, "[t]he unequivocal rule in [the Second

Circuit] is that the district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant sue sponte
without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard." Moates v. Barklev.
147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998). Where, as here, plaintiff was provided with notice and the

4 -3(.A<^V.I^

opportunity to be heard on defendant's request for a filing injunction, the requirements of due ^ ^ ^ ^

"^'tV f\Ao^Or-

process are satisfied.

^^^f ^P"".

^f^^J^^^^^^"^

In determining whether a filing injunction is appropriate, the Second Circuit has

' ^tA\r^j^r\d

enmnerated a number of factors for the district comt to consider, including "(1) die litigant's
history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative

ci^"<*^*/^4*

lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation . . . ; (3) whether the litigant is
represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or
has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other
sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties." Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc..
792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). "Ultimately, die question the com! must answer is whedier a
litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process
and harass other parties." Id.
The Court concludes that the circumstances of this case warrant restrictions on
Washington's further ability to pursue litigation in federal court arising out of his employment
with WUham Morris Endeavor.
First, Washington has repeatedly dueatened to continue litigation, even if the
instant action were to be dismissed with prejudice, hi a blog post, he provided an image of a

Of f!St4)*a-flC<
^ clec/ie(e.

Case 2:10-cv~09647-PKC-JCF

Document 59 Filed 09/05/14

Page 2 1 of 26

ca^s^\'coj c^aynd^wposed complaint that names as defendants every person who he feels has wronged him
through the course of this lidgadon, including judges of the Second Circuit and the Chief Judge
"^'t^ v>v>/i^

of the Southern Distnct of New York. (Zweig Decl., July 10, 2014, Ex. E, at 1.) Washington
has also explicidy dneatened to sue both Arbitrator Lewis and die undersigned should an adverse

uA^ej.

issued. (Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 2-3 & n.l; PL's Mot. for Recons.
30-31.) Further, he stated that, should subsequent suits not be successfiil, he would file
commercial liens against "aU parties involved." (Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 23 & n.l.) Washington's threatened actions would constitute "vexatious, harassing, or
duplicative" lawsuits. .ja;j(-4.oie I^W. k^^c iAl^B>M'^-fl<>jf<'d-f*t (^^ (^erc(ay

!N/< tjefcn <A/,;c( dlot.

f . < y ^ 6 +

Second, Washington's motive in pursuing additional litigation appears to be in

^W*4^)

^'o\^o^\j'i)ie^ bad faith, is punitive, and is not limited to compensation for a perceived wrong. Washington
C^v^a^i '

is l?<a/o(l|

made statements to opposing counsel that they would not "get away" with their acdons. (Zweig

^c-i>*4-4''c^

fctflc-^ijvjke Decl., July 10, 2014, Ex. F, at 1.) With each decision of an Arbitrator, or a court, Washington's

*"^--K)i-f-

list of defendants for his tlireatened suit increased. Arbitrator Gregory noted that Washington
appears to regard those who disagree with him as members of a vast conspiracy. (Washington

fc^>Ur<U 6<X4-)O" tA^rt^'^u^

Mot. Ex. EE, at 4-5.) There is ample support for Arbitrator Gregory's observadon in

clo^/M

Washington's numerous submissions to this Court. (See, e.g.. Zweig Decl., July 10, 2014, Ex. F, ^{Ux-OL *|at 2 (". . . I will be left with no choice but to being the process of filing a commercial lien against
[the undersigned] and the other predominately all-White/"Jewish" officers that have not only
violated my constitutional and God-given rights over the last three years, but have also engaged
in a sinister conspiracy to interfere with the human rights of African Americans by ensuring that
racism (global white supremacy) is maintained through America and the world . . . .");
Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 14 ("Lewis, the AAA, [opposing covmsel], and

'^^.^[^j,

Case 2:10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

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Page 22 of 26

William Morris are PRETENDING that Lewis has the actual authority to make the numerous
adverse decisions that he's made against me.").) Washington's assertions and behavior indicate
that claims in pursuit of his motives would be frivolous if brought. See Ransmeier v. Mariani,
718 F.3d 64, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2013) ("What [a hdgant] is not allowed to do, however, is to let his
misguided views cloud his judgment regarding what arguments may properly be made to this
Court.").
Third, the Court takes note of Washington's pro se status. However, "a court's
special solicitude towards pro se litigants does not extend to the willful, obstinate refusal to play
by the basic rules of the system upon whose very power the plaintiff is calling to vindicate his
rights." Lipin v. Hunt. 573 F. Supp. 2d 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (mtemal quotation marks and
citation omitted). "[WJhile pro se litigants may in general desei-ve more lenient treatment than
c^pnof Co/x^y those represented by counsel, all litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply with
J^'f' ^2*^- court orders." McDonald v. Head Cnm. Ct. Supervisor Officers. 850 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir.
b'xltrS, Its
1988).
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^o''Q^

Fourth, Washington has caused needless expense to the opposing party.

Art^i'l"^'f' ^^T^"*

cAiSepV/o.nA'co.iCorv Washington violated orders issued in the arbiti-al proceeding. His behavior led to the imposition
i,t loloyn^d

f sanctions totaling two-thirds of defendants' additionally incuixed costs, computed to be

*'^''^'\|43,707.60. (Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 2, at 15; Zweig Decl., July 3, 2014, Ex. 3, at 7, 9v^o\/d.to4-

Washington has repeatedly refiised to cooperate in the arbitral proceeding, leading to

additional delay and costs to the defendants. (See Washington Letter, Mar. 28, 2014, at 2;
Washington Letter, July 15, 2014, Ex. A, at 3.)
Finally, Washington has repeatedly stated diat he intends to continue litigation
and intends to file commercial liens against "all involved," regardless of any court order.

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Page 23 of 26

Arbitrator Lewis's issuance of monetary sanctions has not appeared to have an effect on

^ ^ ^ ^ I ^ ^ W a s h i n g t o n ' s actions. Consequendy, the Court concludes that lesser sanctions would not be
adequate to protect the courts and other parties. The evidence demonstrates that Washington "is

\A/o\j\d

6oyv>y^t/c;e.l likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and harass odier parties . . . ." The Court will

impose an injunction that is tailored to be the least restrictive to achieve its purpose. See Bd. of
Managers of 2900 Ocean Ave. Condominium v. Bronkovic. 83 F.3d 44, 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (per
curiam).
CONCLUSION
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reasons explained, Washington's motion for reconsideration (Docket

DENIED. Defendants' motion to confirm the arbitral award (Docket # 49) is

^^^^^l^^^-bRANTED.

Defendants' motion for a filing injunction against Washington (Docket # 53) is

^ . f ^ - ^ ^ GRANTED.
F R O M

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Case 2;10-cv-09647-PKC-JCF

Documeni 59

of
AGENTS, ARBITRATORS,

Plied 09/05/14

Page 24 of 26

c ^ . K f 4 ^ U ^ JnJroh^

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jay

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O R.\NY JUDGE, CLERK, COURT

REPORTER, E M P L O Y E E ORAGENT OF ANY COURT OF T H E

UNITED STATES O F A M E R I C A WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A
WRITTEN ORDER F R O M THIS COURT AUTHORIZING HIM T O
DO SO.

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(^'j\/^^&\c,h^Jk.i<l^^sc>^\(.A.

(2) F I L I N G O R O T H E R W I S E C O M M E N C I N G A N Y A C T I O N I N A N Y

J w ^ ^ b
c^\a> rf ^

la^'il <icK?* ^4^^

F E D E R A L DISTRICT COURT ARISING OUT O FO RR E L A T I N G TO

e^-H~<^ A-^fr

THIS ACTION O R T H E ARBITRATION P R O C E E D I N G B E F O R E

ARBITRATORS G R E G O R Y ANDL E W I S AGAINST ANY PERSON
OR ENTITY INCLUDING, B U TNOT L I M I T E D TO, DEFENDANTS
AND T H E I R P R E S E N T O R F O R M E R E M P L O Y E E S , AGENTS, O R
ATTORNEYS, T H E AMERICAN ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION

AND I T S P R E S E N T O R F O R M E R E M P L O Y E E S O R A G E N T S ,
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ARBITRATORS,

O R ANY JUDGE, C L E R K , COURT REPORTER,

E M P L O Y E E O R AGENT O FANY COURT O FT H E UNITED STATES

ooltv ^f

AMERICA WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A W R I T T E N ORDER

F R O M THIS COURT AUTHORIZING H I M T O D O SO.

(3) T R A N S M I T T I N G O R F I L I N G A N Y D O C U M E N T

WHICH

PURPORTS T O C R E A T E A L I E N O RRECORD O FANY DEBT

AGAINST A N Y PERSON O R E N T I T Y INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION
OR T H E ARBITRATION PROCEEDING BEFORE ARBITRATORS
G R E G O R Y AND LEWIS, INCLUDING, B U T NOT L I M I T E D TO,
DEFENDANTS AND T H E I R P R E S E N T O R F O R M E R E M P L O Y E E S ,

V^^gA.

Case 2:10~cv-09647-PKC-JCF

Document 59

Filed 09/05/14

Page 25 of 26

AGENTS, OR ATTORNEYS, T H E AMERICAN ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION AND ITS PRESENT OR FORMER E M P L O Y E E S OR
AGENTS, ARBITRATORS, OR ANY JUDGE, C L E R K , COURT
1^
^ ,

^ ^ . ^ { ^

REPORTER, E M P L O Y E E OR AGENT OF ANY COURT OF T H E

All ^f-j^M OA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A

Ct G c V ' vic^-^ "^t^iJ

W R I T T E N ORDER FROM THIS COURT AUTHORIZING HIM TO

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A VIOLATION OF THIS INJUNCTION MAY R E S U L T IN A FINDING

rM^^;^^

OF CONTEMPT OF COURT AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS. NOTHING IN

Mto-V^WW^'o'^

jj^js ORDER

SHALL PREVENT MARCUS I. WASHINGTON FROM

<>-v^<Aec '^'^^p^l^jICiPAXIP^G IN ANY ARBITRATION OR PROCEEDING H E R E T O F O R E

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COMMENCED OR APPEALING ANY ORDER OF THIS COURT.

1 C-V^(,L|

MARCUS I. WASHINGTON IS ADVISED THAT IT IS A F E D E R A L

CRIME, PUNISHABLE BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OF UP TO TEN Y E A R S , TO
F I L E , ATTEMPT TO F I L E , OR CONSPIRE TO F I L E , "ANY F A L S E L I E N OR
ENCUMBRANCE AGAINST T H E R E A L OR PERSONAL PROPERTY" OF ANY
TVica^fjf -V
" O F F I C E R OR E M P L O Y E E OF T H E UNITED STATES OR OF ANY AGENCY IN
cpf^1 ^--j^-^'+f
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BRANCH OF T H E UTVITED STATES GOVERNMENT . . . W H I L E SUCH
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O F F I C E R OR E M P L O Y E E IS ENGAGED IN OR ON ACCOUNT OF T H E

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PERFORMANCE OF O F F I C I A L DUTIES, OR ANY PERSON ASSISTING SUCH AN

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O F F I C E R OR E M P L O Y E E IN T H E PERFORMANCE OF SUCH DUTIES OR ON

cf ^ i 4 y

ACCOUNT OF THAT ASSISTANCE." 18 U.S.C. 1521,1114.

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Page 26 of 26

The Clerk shall enter judgment for the defendants and close the case. Counsel for
defendants is directed to supply plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein,
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied. See
l^S^'ftic^Jf*

Coppedge v. United States. 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

'^t^-fi^c^CKAf

SO ORDERED.

M>'C(.'-<*^ cjjAAjf >jlr|f

p. Kevin Castel
United States District Judge
JJO/ I

J^e^i 4*^-|vA Dated: New York, New York

C-xol^^^^'edSeptember 5, 2014

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-26-