A Cold Welcome: The Unequal

Terms of Eastern Enlargement

DOROTHEE BOHLE


Dorothee Bohle is assistant professor in the political sciences department at the
Central European University, Budapest.


he Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 represented a political
breakthrough for the European Unions ambitious enlargement programme.
Entry negotiations were successfully concluded with the most advanced
candidate countries from southern and eastern Europe, which will join the European
Union in May 2004.
1

The closing of the negotiations was timely, coming after a decade of hesitation,
insecurities and drawbacks. It seems that the European Union has finally drawn far-
reaching conclusions from the breakdown of state socialism. However, even after the
Copenhagen summit, the signals towards the acceding countries remain mixed. Above
all, it has become clear that the European Union is not prepared to grant its new
members equal social and economic rights with the current fifteen EU states in the
near future. The transition periods concerning free movement of labour deny nationals
of the new member states a crucial right of EU citizenship. The financial
arrangements leave the acceding states with significantly fewer resources per capita
than the current members, as regards both agricultural subsidies and structural funds.

The recent concretisation of the terms of enlargement provides a good opportunity
for a more general assessment of the relation between the European Union and the
countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE). How is the unequal treatment of the
new members to be explained? Is it likely to be transitory, or are we witnessing the
emergence of an enduring second-class membership? These are the questions that my
essay addresses.

It would be wrong to see enlargement as an event in the history of the European
Union that is unrelated to its internal developments. Rather, enlargement has to be put
in the context of an ongoing process of neo-liberal restructuringi.e., the freeing of
market forces and the pushing back of the (social) interventionist statewhich has
informed EU integration ever since the mid-1980s. Consequently, I first briefly
review the main projects of neo-liberal restructuring in European integration and
analyse the social actors supporting them. I then go on to show how this neo-liberal
constellation determined relations between the European Union and the CEE
countries during the 1990s. I conclude by discussing some of the consequences of the
EU approach to enlargement for these countries and the new Europe.

Relaunching Integration
T


After a decade of stagnation on European integration, the project of the internal
market, launched in 1985, marked a break with Eurosclerosis and brought new
momentum to the integration process. The internal market project was clearly a neo-
liberal initiative. It emerged against the background of a perceived loss of European
competitiveness vis--vis the United States and Japan, and aimed at restoring this by
overcoming the fragmentation of the European markets. It was predominantly
characterised by negative integration, i.e., the elimination of national constraints on
trade and competition, and thus created a competency gap, in which national
policy is severely restrained in its problem-solving capacity, while European policy is
constrained by the lack of intergovernmental agreement.
2


The Maastricht Treaty (1992) constituted a qualitative new step in European
integration. At its centre lies economic and monetary union (EMU), the supranational
core of the new EU system. Externally, EMU aims at regaining sovereignty within the
global currency competition. Internally, it seeks to tie political actors to orthodox
monetarist fiscal and monetary policies, leaving little room for distributive options
and generous wage policies, and putting the different social and industrial-relations
regimes in direct competition.

EMU constitutes only one side of the European Unions new competitiveness
architecture. Shortly after Maastricht, the European Commission published a white
paper on Competitiveness, Growth and Employment which has since become one
of the main intellectual reference points in the socio-economic policy debate within
the European Union.
3
In contrast to the earlier negative mode of integration,
European innovation, industrial and infrastructural policies are openly promoted by
the white paper.

The concept and ideology of competitiveness has characterised European
initiatives ever since. In 1995 a Competitiveness Advisory Group was set up, whose
main task has been to put this ideology into effect. One of the most remarkable
outcomes of this effort was the promotion of benchmarking, which is defined by the
European Commission as

a tool for improving competitiveness and for promoting the convergence towards best
practice. This involves the global comparison of societal behaviour [sic!], commercial
practice, market structure and public institutions.
4


Benchmarking clearly aims at deepening neo-liberal restructuring in all spheres of
society.

Embedded Neo-Liberalism

It is widely acknowledged that the neo-liberal restructuring of the European Union
was strongly influenced by European transnational corporations. These forces, in
close co-operation with representatives of the European Commission, often bypassed
national governments in designing the next steps of European integration. Probably
the central elite platform of these transnational business groups is the European
Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), founded in 1983 on the initiative of Pehr
Gyllenhammar, chief executive of Volvo, with the support of Etienne Davignon, a

European Commissioner at the time. Today, ERT consists of forty-five CEOs and
chairmen of Europes most transnational and biggest corporations. Through intense
lobbying activity at national and supranational levels, regular official meetings with
the highest EU representatives, and strategic reports on burning issues of European
integration, ERT has acquired privileged influence in European policymaking.

However, ERTs influence alone obviously cannot explain the neo-liberal
character of European integration during the 1990s. Rather, the project of European
transnational corporations was able to capture the broader social and political scene
against the background of a fundamental socio-economic crisis, which opened the
terrain for experimentation with new ideological and political recipes. Of crucial
importance was the legitimation crisis of Keynesianism. After repeated experiences of
the failure of Keynesian recipes, European social-democratic and centrist forces, as
well as employees and trade unions, became more open to neo-liberal ideas.
Moreover, these actors discovered the European level to be one that allowed some of
the problem-solving capacity that nation-states lost in globalisation to be regained.

The incorporation of social-democratic, trade union and centrist demands into the
neo-liberal European order is reflected in a number of policies and initiatives, above
all, in the upgrading of structural and social funds, attempts at social regulation on the
European level, and European employment policy. Thus, we may speak of an
embedded neo-liberalism which has emerged in the European Union. According to
Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, who coined this term, embeddedness addresses the concerns
of European labour and social democracy, but this incorporation is done in such a
way that these concerns are, in the end, subordinated to the overriding objective of
neo-liberal competitiveness.
5


The incorporation of subordinated forces through flanking policies and side
payments is important, but insufficient to create public support for neo-liberal
restructuring. Rather, a second, and in the long term much more contradictory, means
of winning public support for neo-liberal restructuring in Europe is inscribed in the
European integration process: the mobilisation of societies under a national(ist)
banner.

Exploiting Nationalism

In order to see that this national(ist) mobilisation is inscribed in the project of neo-
liberal restructuring itself, it is necessary to review briefly the basic features of the
mode of recent European integration. Since the 1980s, the European mode of
integration has aimed at enhancing competitiveness at all levels of the EU member
states. Thus, the European Union, partly through directly taking over and
Europeanising certain state functions (e.g., monetary policy), and partly through
reshaping significantly the framework in which nation-states operate, is developing
into the interface that enhances regime competition between different national
systems of governance. The bulk of the process of adaptation to this new competitive
environment rests with the nation-state and national institutions, and it is at this level
that European populations are being mobilised.

Competition, however, as Wolfgang Streeck points out, is a pervasive force. It
transforms social solidarity even where an economy successfully adjusts to intensified

market pressures, and its effects extend far beyond the firms and sectors directly
exposed to it.
6
Earlier, in the postSecond World War arrangement, solidarity relied
on two principles, a social and a national one. Social policy was aimed at
redistributing the results of market activities within the framework of the nation-state.
This form of social solidarity has come under attack. Broader societal redistribution is
considered to contradict the requirements of competitiveness in the global economy.
Thus, social solidarity is increasingly being reduced to its national base.

This can take a more inclusive form, as reflected for instance in the revival of (neo-
liberal) national corporatist arrangements. It is not clear, however, whether this
benevolent form of national solidaritybenevolent and inclusive in the sense that
success in the global competition is seen as an effort of the whole society, including
marginalised groupsis strong enough to counterbalance the negative effects of
structural change, insecurity, and growing inequality which go hand in hand with neo-
liberal restructuring.

Competing with the benevolent form of national solidarity is an exclusionist
malevolent one which has emerged in western Europe since the 1980s. This
nationalistic mobilisation is represented by the radical right-wing populist parties,
which combine support for neo-liberalism with xenophobia, thus offering the losers
of neo-liberal restructuring a narrative of who is to blame for their fate. The radical
Right thus manages to forge an alliance between segments of the working class (i.e.,
the losers, who become nationalistic and xenophobic) and segments of the new
middle class, especially the private-sector segment, which strongly supports the
programme of radical neo-liberalism. Thus, the main political challenge to the social
forces supporting embedded neo-liberalism on a European scale comes from the new
(extreme) Right, which does not question neo-liberal restructuring per se, but its
embeddedness.

An Unequal Relationship

Although the European Union repeatedly stressed its solidarity with the efforts of
east Europeans to marketise and democratise their societies following the breakdown
of state socialism, its commitment towards enlargement evolved only gradually and
hesitantly over the 1990s. After an initial attempt to keep the CEE countries at
distance by offering them association instead of membership, the European Union
finally endorsed enlargement at its 1993 Copenhagen summit.

Enlargement, however, was made conditional on a range of economic and political
criteria. After 1993, the European Union started to develop a strategy to prepare the
applicant countries for membership. The main thrust of this pre-accession strategy
was to liberalise the external economic relations of CEE. In 1997, the European
Commission issued for the first time its avis (opinion) on the progress of the applicant
countries in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, and proposed a reinforced pre-accession
strategy in its Agenda 2000, the blueprint for enlargement.

On the basis of its evaluation, the commission recommended that entry
negotiations be started with five of the CEE states: Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Estonia and Slovenia (CEE-5). This recommendation was formally
endorsed at the Luxembourg summit in 1997, and in March 1998 entry negotiations

with the CEE-5 began. Eventually, in December 1999, the European Council, meeting
in Helsinki, decided to open accession negotiations with all ten CEE applicants. At its
Gothenburg summit in June 2001, the European Union finally opened the possibility
that the most advanced candidates from southern and eastern Europe could complete
entry negotiations by the end of 2002. At the Copenhagen summit in December 2002
the European Union successfully concluded entry negotiations with eight CEE
countries, together with Malta and Cyprus. (Of the ten CEE applicants, Romania and
Bulgaria were unable to complete the entry negotiations.)

Despite the fact that the commitment to, and the framework of, enlargement
evolved only gradually, from the early 1990s onwards a clear-cut and continuous
pattern of relations between the European Union and the CEE states is observable.
This pattern is characterised by an asymmetric power relationship and a high level of
conditionality. Both features are instrumental for the European Union in pushing
through a selective expansion of its deregulatory programme, while at the same time
constantly postponing the extension to the CEE countries of the more inclusive
aspects of the EU model.

That an asymmetrical power relationship exists between the European Union and
CEE is not surprising. Both in economic and political terms the European Union is the
stronger element in the relationship, and after all, it is the CEE countries that want to
join the club, and not the other way round. These basic initial conditions have,
however, been continuously reinforced by the European Unions insistence on
bilateral and differentiated treatment of each CEE state. The result of this bilateral
approach is twofold: economically, the basis has been created for a regional hub and
spoke structure, with each target state relating to the others via its relationship with
the western hub; politically, the consequence has been a competitive race for EU
membership among the CEE countries.

This competitiveness has been reinforced by the high level of conditionality the
European Union has imposed on membership. According to the Copenhagen criteria,
membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection
of minorities. Furthermore, it presupposes the existence of a functioning market
economy, as well as the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures and market
forces within the union. These criteria have been consolidated over the last ten years,
with the result that conditionality has figured much more prominently in the recent
entry negotiations than in previous enlargement rounds.

The Copenhagen criteria, moreover, went far beyond the acquis communautaire
the existing laws and policy arrangements of the European Union, which candidate
countries are obliged to adopt. They also exceeded the unions influence in the
domestic affairs of the member states. The European Commission has regularly
monitored the progress of the candidates in complying with the Copenhagen criteria.

Market Radicalism

Which aims have been served by the high conditionality and the establishment of
deeply asymmetrical bilateral relations? The answer is twofold. On the one hand, the
European Union uses its influence in the region in order to export the core of its

deregulatory programme. On the other, it continuously postpones its commitment to
extend the more inclusive features of the EU polity. Thus, ever since the Europe
Agreements of the mid-1990s that set the framework for bilateral EUCEE relations,
the main thrust of EU policy has been to secure the liberalisation and deregulation of
the applicants political economies. This enables the European Union to secure wide
influence over the emerging models of capitalism in the CEE states, and especially
over their competition policies and industrial standards. Moreover, in contrast to the
southern enlargement, where the new member states were obliged to liberalise
domestic markets only upon EU entry, and often with temporary exemptions, the CEE
countries are being required to open their markets before membership, without any
linkage between liberalisation and membership.
7


At the same time, the European Union has been very reluctant to extend to the
CEE countries all those policies that would make their transition and adaptation
easier, such as substantial financial aid, free movement of labour, or liberalisation of
agricultural trade. The earliest example of this attitude is the selective protectionism
incorporated in the trade sections of the Europe Agreements, where the European
Union conceived of a battery of protectionist instruments that targeted precisely those
sectors in which CEE had a competitive advantage: steel, textiles, clothing, chemicals,
and agricultural products. Similarly, in the pre-accession strategy, which is primarily
concerned with liberalisation of external economic relations and creating the
conditions for free movement of industrial goods, services and, to some extent
capital,
8
labour and also agricultural policy were excluded from liberalisation.
Finally, as regards financial aid, the European Union has supported its own members
much more strongly than its poor eastern neighbours.

Until recently, it was widely assumed that these asymmetries would disappear once
full EU membership had been attained. However, the agreements negotiated in
Copenhagen in 2002 indicate that, at least in the near future, the new entrants will be
relegated to a second-class membership. In the field of free movement of labour,
transition periods have been agreed upon. The free movement of persons is not solely
an economic issue; it is also an essential EU citizenship right, which is thus being
withheld from the nationals of the new member states.

In financial terms, the per capita transfers of EU funds for the east European
newcomers will be significantly lower than those for the current member states.
According to calculations made by Karl Debbaut, in the first year after accession
Poland will receive 67 per person, Hungary 49, Slovenia 41, and the Czech
Republic 29. By contrast, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain currently receive
437, 418, 211, and 216 per capita respectively.
9


This unequal financial treatment is the result of two EU policies. First, as regards
direct agricultural subsidies, the European Union will initially pay the newcomers
only 25 per cent of what the current member states receive, raising the amount in
steps to reach parity in 2013. Second, the European Union limited the maximum
transfer from structural funds to 4 per cent of the national GDP of member states. This
disadvantages the acceding countries as their GDP is much lower than that of the
current members.


Thus, despite (or because of) the relative poverty of the acceding states and the
comparatively high proportion of their population still depending on agriculture, they
will have to wait ten years before receiving full direct agricultural aid, and structural
transfers will be at a lower per capita rate than in the poorest of the present EU
members.

At the same time, and in stark contrast to its limited financial commitment, the
European Union has insisted that the new entrants pay full budget contributions from
the very beginning. As this would have turned some newcomers into net contributors
to the EU budget, individual countries will receive lump-sum compensation.

All in all, during the 1990s, the European Union managed, through a mixture of
power and conditionality (stick) and the promise of membership (carrot) to push the
CEE countries towards adopting a specific, neo-liberal reform model. This model is
more radical than the west European one. At its heart are the regulatory reforms of the
internal market. Moreover, reforms have been stipulated which are not part of the
acquis. Finally, the requirements have been presented as self-evident. There is little
debate within the European Union or the CEE states as to whether they are
appropriate for economically underdeveloped countries with huge restructuring
problems.

How to explain this outcome, which prescribes a much more market-radical variant
of neo-liberalism for CEE?

Transnational Capital

There are some obvious reasons for the discriminatory features of the EU
enlargement agenda. The most common explanation is the huge difference in socio-
economic structures between the member states and the acceding countries. Thus,
compared to the EU average, the CEE states are poor and underdeveloped. Given this
development gap, the export of embedded neo-liberalism, with its associated social
funding and rights, would be rather costly. Other explanations point to the fact that an
enlargement incorporating ten or more countries is a complex procedure, requiring
substantial reformfinancial, institutional and proceduralof the European Union
itself. Thus, enlargement threatens to unravel the complex pattern of package deals
and compromises within the European Union, may increase the tensions between its
small and large states, and may weaken the authority of the traditional French
German motor of EU integration.

However, these arguments cannot totally explain the discriminatory nature of CEE
integration. What must also be considered is the relation of forces within the
European Union, and the (un)willingness of the main EU forces to overcome the
obstacles to an enlargement on equal terms. In what follows, I will therefore take a
closer look at these forces and analyse their different agendas concerning
enlargement.

Starting with the dominant group, i.e., transnationally oriented capital, this is
definitely the most powerful supporter of enlargement, without whose backing
accession negotiations could hardly have started. Furthermore, it is increasingly clear
that this factor will set the pace of enlargement and to some extent the conditions of

it.
10
Indeed, taking ERTs position as indicative of that of transnational capital
generally, as early as 1991 ERT stated that the European Union should take
immediate action in response to the new challenge and the window of
opportunity offered by the astonishing developments in Eastern Europe.
11


Whereas initially ERT remained rather vague about how to exploit this window of
opportunity, since 1997 it has actively lobbied for enlargement to be speeded up. In a
message to EU heads of state in 1997, it invited the European Union to reform its
institutional structure in order to facilitate enlargement, and urged it to begin closer
co-operation with the applicant countries.

In 1999, ERT published its first report dealing exclusively with enlargement. It
stressed that enlargement offers a golden opportunity to improve the competitiveness
and prosperity of the whole European economy (existing EU members and new
candidates alike).
12
This report also reveals the significant degree to which individual
members of ERT have been engaged in CEE.

The rationale behind the support of ERTand of transnational capital in general
for extending EU boundaries is straightforward. For transnational corporations, the
inclusion of eastern Europe, its production facilities and its comparatively cheap and
skilled labour is an opportunity to reorganise their production chains, and thus
increase their competitiveness in European and global markets. The degree to which
this is happening is evident first in an increasing flow of foreign direct investment
(FDI) to the region, especially since 1994. The bulk of FDI (in terms of inflow) is
directed towards the Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech
Republic).

Second, foreign investors are exerting increasing control over strategic sectors of
the CEE economies. Thus, Hungarys leading export sectorsmachinery and food
are operated almost exclusively by foreign firms, and its financial and
telecommunication sectors are predominantly in foreign hands.

Third, foreign capital uses its control position to effect transborder restructuring of
the production process. For example, a remarkably high share (39 per cent) of
Hungarys exports is high-technology in nature. Much of this is due to a new
transborder division of labour, controlled by Western corporations, whereby Hungary
undertakes the export-oriented assembly of imported inputs.
13


For these reasons, transnational business supports EU enlargement. Although the
economic opening of the CEE countries during the 1990s already allowed
transnational capital to access their markets, production sites and labour, accession is
expected to reinforce business opportunities significantly. Yet transnational capital is
not lobbying equally strongly for the extension of the more inclusive features of the
EU system, and there is reason to believe that it is not really interested in seeing the
CEE states catch up in terms of social (or environmental) standards. Rather,
exploiting differences in wages, and in fiscal, social and environmental standards, is a
significant incentive for investment.

A Lack of Solidarity


If transnational capital is not pressing for the extension of the more inclusive
features of the EU polity, what about other actors? At this point, it is necessary to
examine the stance of Germany, which from the beginning has been the leading
proponent of enlargement. Despite its general support, Germany is not ready to
assume a heavier financial onus in order to make feasible the inclusion of the CEE
countries on equal terms. On the contrary: not only does Germany want other EU
countries to ease the burden of its disproportionately high transfers to CEE, but its
emphasis on budgetary reform openly conflicts with the goal of eastern
enlargement.
14


Germanys position, similar to that of other net contributors to the EU budget, also
reflects the disciplinary nature of EMU. Against a background of economic downturn
and worsening budget deficits since the beginning of the new millennium, EU states
have found it increasingly difficult to meet the Maastricht criteria. In this context, the
willingness of political actors to opt for budgetary solidarity with the east European
countries is severely limited. Moreover, as a result of its internal compromise of
embedded neo-liberalism, Germany advocates a long transition period for the
admission of east European labour to current EU member states. Thus, like ERT,
Germany pursues a pro-enlargement policy without taking on responsibility for
including the CEE countries on terms of equal social and economic rights.

The weaker EU actorssocial-democratic forces, trade unions and the elites of the
peripheral EU stateshave not offered the strongest support for enlargement. Thus,
trade union support for enlargement is at best lukewarm, and on both the EU and
national levels labour has lobbied strongly against the free movement of persons. The
Austrian trade union confederation GB, for example, proposed an income criterion
for free labour migration: average wages in the CEE countries had to reach 80 per
cent of the Austrian average wage for labour migration to be permitted. Even if this
extreme proposal (later picked up by Austrias far-right politician Jrg Haider) has
since been abandoned by GB, it is nevertheless in line with a broader reflex of both
German and Austrian trade unions to answer the challenge of eastern enlargement
with chauvinist welfare approaches.

Similarly, the elites of the peripheral EU states have repeatedly stressed that they
are not willing to foot the bill for enlargement. All in all, for the weaker actors of the
European Union, it is becoming clear that enlargement is not an EastWest winwin
experience, as ERT judges, but that a united Europe ... has become a zero-sum
game in which the extension of its benefits to the newcomers from the east will be
achieved only at some real costs to the current members.
15
Enlargement threatens to
undermine the compromise of embedded neo-liberalism in western Europe and to
weaken the bargaining position of the weaker actors. Given this threat, these actors try
to defend their achieved rights at the expense of the newcomers.

Thus, whereas the aim of integrating eastern Europe is shared by a limited, but
powerful, number of actors who are mainly interested in exploring the regions
economic potential, the idea of an equal inclusion of the CEE countries and of
genuine (financial) solidarity enjoys virtually no support. As a result, EUCEE
relations have been characterised by the attempt to create the best possible conditions
for west European capital.


The New European Order

I have argued that both the deepening of the European Union and the concrete
form of its eastward expansion are the result of a reconfiguration of social forces in
the union since the mid-1980s. Transnational capital and supranational actors took the
lead in both projects, but the outcome was different in each case. Through the
incorporation of social-democratic, centrist and peripheral political forces and trade
unions, restructuring in western Europe has developed into embedded neo-
liberalism. Transnational capital was also involved from the beginning in the
incorporation of eastern Europe. Because of the lack of support of virtually all social
forces within the European Union for granting the CEE countries equal economic and
social rights, the concrete terms of the eastward expansion have been characterised by
the export of a market-radical variant of neo-liberalism that offers the best possible
conditions for west European capital.

This narrow, interest-based and selfish approach has, however, produced a number
of drawbacks which threaten to undermine stability in the new Europe.

First, even if the European Union has managed (so far) to limit its internal conflicts
about distributing the costs of enlargement (essentially by restricting and
postponing these costs), there is increasing awareness that the benefits and burdens
have been unevenly shared out. Thus, for some private actors, enlargement is indeed a
winwin experience. However, proof that these private gains will have a public
trickle-down effect both in the east and the west has not yet been offered. The
European Unions previous (Keynesian) regime had a remedy for limiting and
socialising private gains: redistribution. As the current ideological climate and
relation of forces do not allow for much redistribution, something else must be offered
in compensation. As argued above, this is nationalism. While the rise of nationalism
and xenophobia does not necessarily endanger the project of enlargement, it makes
repressive options for pushing through a very unequal economic unification more
likely.

Second, the integration of the CEE countries under the patterns described above
has to date not produced the economic gains desired from their return to Europe.
Rather, these countries are developing the characteristics of a semi-periphery:
dualistic economic structures and precarious growth perspectives. Under the influence
of foreign direct investment, part of their economies are being upgraded and
transnationally integrated, although not on equal terms with the western core. The
modernised segments coexist with the more problematic legacies of the old system:
the ruins of heavy industry, agriculture, and the like. It remains for the already
impoverished eastern nation-states to restructure these industries. Bridges between
new and old segments of the economy remain scarce.

It is this differentiation between a western core and a centraleastern semi-
periphery which makes the prospect of a more equal European Union after
enlargement unlikely. Even if the new members eventually enjoy formal and legal
equality, and thus gain more equal access to the financial resources of the European
Union, the real, socio-economic inequality is likely to persist.



ENDNOTES


1. These countries are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Cyprus. My essay concentrates on the terms of
enlargement for the east European countries.

2. Fritz Scharpf, Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of
European Welfare States, in Governance in the European Union, ed. Gary Marks et
al. (London: Sage, 1996), p. 15.

3. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Class Agency and European
Governance: The Case of the European Roundtable of Industrialists, New Political
Economy 5, no. 2 (2000), p. 172.

4. Ibid., p. 175.

5. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, The Struggle over European Order: Transnational
Class Agency in the Making of Embedded Neo-Liberalism , in Social Forces in the
Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the
Global Political Economy, ed. Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (Houndmills,
England: Palgrave, 2001), p. 87.

6. Wolfgang Streeck, Competitive Solidarity: Rethinking the European Social
Model, working paper 99/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies,
Cologne, 1999 [http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp99-8/wp99-8.html].

7. Andras Inotai, Political, Economic and Social Arguments for and against EU
Enlargement: A Survey of the Influence of Pressure Groups, working paper 101,
Institute for World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 1999, p.
7.

8. Heather Grabbe, A Partnership for Accession? The Implication of EU
Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants, working paper, Robert
Schuman Centre, San Domenico di Fiesole, 1998, p. 11.

9. Karl Debbaut, EU Enlargement after Copenhagen, Socialism Today, no. 72
(February 2003) [http://www.socialismtoday.org/72/eu.html].

10. Inotai, Arguments for and against EU Enlargement, p. 10.

11. Cited in Otto Holman, The Enlargement of the European Union towards
Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of Supranational and Transnational Actors, in
Social Forces, ed. Bieler and Morton, p. 174.

12. The EastWest WinWin Business Experience, ERT, Brussels, 1999, p. 5.
The report can be found at [http://www.ert.be/pf/enf_frame.htm].


13. See Bla Greskovits and Dorothee Bohle, Development Pathways on
Europes Periphery: Poland and Hungarys Return to Europe Compared, Polish
Sociological Review 133, no. 1 (2001), pp. 328.

14. Adrian G. Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and
the EU (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 185.

15. Tony Judt, cited in Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order, p. 202.


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