A General Overview

Watertight doors- Need?

In order to maintain the efficiency of a watertight

bulkhead it is desirable that it remains intact.

In instances where it becomes necessary to provide
access between compartments on either side of a
watertight bulkhead, watertight doors are fitted. E.g.:
at the direct means of access required between the
engine room and the shaft tunnel in cargo ships.
In passenger ships watertight doors are more
frequently fitted to allow passengers to pass
between one point of the accommodation and
another.

Watertight doors- General

The number of openings in watertight bulkheads shall

be kept at the minimum compatible with the design

and proper working of the ship.
Where a doorway is cut in a watertight bulkhead care
must be taken to maintain the strength of the
bulkhead.
The opening is to be framed and reinforced if the
vertical stiffeners are cut in way of the opening.

Watertight doors- General

If the stiffener spacing is increased to accommodate

the opening, the scantlings of the stiffeners on either

side of the opening are increased to give an equivalent
strength to that of an un-pierced bulkhead. The actual
opening is kept as small as possible.
Openings in watertight bulkheads must be fitted with
watertight doors
All such doors shall be closed prior to departure of the
craft from the berth.

Hazardous Condition for the Ship

When the Doors Need to be Closed
When there is a restricted visibility.
In ports within the port limits of compulsory pilotage.

When the depth of water is less than 3 times the

draught.
In high traffic density.
Other factors when the master feels that the condition
is dangerous.

Watertight doors- General

Watertight doors may be hinged or sliding.
Mild steel or cast steel watertight doors fitted below

the waterline are either of the vertical or horizontal

sliding type as a swinging hinged type of door could
prove impossible to close in the event of flooding and
is not permitted.
Hinged watertight doors are only permitted above a
deck at least 2.0 metres above the deepest subdivision
load line

Categorization of Watertight
Doors
Watertight doors are categorized as :
CLASS 1 Hinged doors
CLASS 2 Hand operated sliding doors
CLASS 3 sliding doors which are power

operated as well as hand operated

Watertight doors- General

W/T doors shall be shown by suitable testing to be

capable of maintaining the watertight integrity of the

bulkhead.
Such testing shall be carried out for both sides of the
door and shall apply a pressure head 10% greater than
that determined from the minimum permissible
height of a down-flooding opening.

Watertight doors- General

Testing may be carried out either before or after the

door is fitted into the craft but, where shore testing is

adopted, satisfactory installation in the craft shall be
verified by inspection and hose testing.
Type approval may be accepted in lieu of testing
individual doors, provided the approval process
includes pressure testing to a head equal to, or greater
than, the required head.

Watertight Doors - Designs

With the larger number of watertight doors fitted in

passenger ships the doors may be closed by means of

hydraulic power actuated by remote control from a
central position above the bulkhead deck.

Regulations Regarding Closure of Watertight

Doors (including SOLAS chapter II-1, watertight
doors from regulation 14 to regulation 25)
All the power operated doors must be capable of

closing simultaneously from bridge and Ship Control

Center (SCC) in not more than 60 seconds when the
ship is in upright condition.
The door shall have an approximate uniform rate of
closure under power.
The closure time, from the time the door begins to
close to the time it closes completely shall be in no
case less than 20 seconds or more than 40 seconds
with the ship in upright condition.

Regulations Regarding Closure of Watertight

Doors (including SOLAS chapter II-1, watertight
doors from regulation 14 to regulation 25)
In case of hand operation of the door, during power

failure, the door must be closed within 90 seconds

All watertight doors shall be capable of being operated
when the craft is listed / inclined up to 15 on either
side, and
shall be fitted with means of indication in the
operating compartment showing whether they are
open or closed.

Regulations Regarding Closure of Watertight

Doors (including SOLAS chapter II-1, watertight
doors from regulation 14 to regulation 25)
shall be provided with an audible alarm, distinct from

other alarms in the area, which will sound for at least

5s but no more than 10s before the doors begin to
move whenever the door is closed remotely by power
and continue sounding until the door is completely
closed.

Regulations Regarding Closure of Watertight

Doors (including SOLAS chapter II-1, watertight
doors from regulation 14 to regulation 25)
The power, control and indicators shall be operable in

the event of main power failure, as required by

regulation II-1/15.7.3 of SOLAS. In passenger areas and
areas where the ambient noise exceeds 85 dB(A) the
audible alarm shall be supplemented by an
intermittent visual signal at the door.
Watertight doors shall remain closed when the craft is
at sea, except that they may be opened for access. A
notice shall be attached to each door to the effect that
it is not to be left open.

W/T Doors - Hinged

Hinged: In approved positions in the upper tween

decks well above the waterline, hinged watertight

doors are permitted.
These may be similar to the weather tight doors fitted

in superstructures, but are to have gunmetal pins in

the hinges.

W/T Doors - Hinged

W/T Doors Vertical Sliding

Vertical sliding doors may be closed by a vertical

screw thread, which is turned by a shaft extending

above the bulkhead and fitted with a crank handle.
This screw thread turns in a gunmetal nut attached to
the top of the door, and a crank handle is also provided
at the door to allow it to be closed from this position.

W/T Doors Vertical Sliding

W/T Doors Horizontal Sliding

Horizontal sliding doors are often fitted, and these

may have a vertical shaft extending above the

bulkhead deck, which may be operated by hand from
above the deck or at the door. This can also be power
driven by an electric motor and worm gear, the vertical
shaft working through bevel wheels, and horizontal
screwed shafts turning in bronze nuts on the door. The
horizontal sliding door may also be opened and closed
by a hydraulic ram with a hydraulic hand pump and
with control at the door and above the bulkhead deck.

Horizontally sliding w/t door

Watertight doors drill on ships

Drills for the operation of watertight doors shall take

place every week. Also the doors should be checked

before leaving the port.
All watertight doors, both hinged and power operated
should be operated daily during the rounds.
The door should be able to operate from both local and
remote places. i.e. bridge and ship control center.
If door is operated from remote location, there should be
an audio and visual alarm during closing.
There should be indication of both open and close on the
remote place of operation.

Loading a ro-ro passenger car ferry

 A bow visor is a feature of some ships, in particular ferries

and ROROs, that allows the bow to articulate up and down,

providing access to the cargo ramp and storage deck near
the water line.
In modern ferry design over the last 25 years, though, bow
visors have given way to clam doors which act like a
clamshell and are believed to be safer than bow visor doors.
In a bow visor door, the forces acting on the door from the
impact of the waves are absorbed by the hinges and locks
which may fail.
With clam doors, the forces of the waves are absorbed by
the surrounding bow superstructure.

 Furthermore, on seagoing vessels there should be inner

bow doors or 'collision bulkhead doors' in place behind

the loading ramp. These doors are an upper extension of
the collision bulkhead and act as a secondary barrier
against water entering the car deck, should the primary
bow door(s) fail.
There have been several recorded incidents in which bow
visors have partially opened whilst the ship is in motion,
resulting in the some ships having to put in to have their
visor locking mechanisms strengthened.
Bow visor failure has also directly caused the loss of some
ships, such as the MS Estonia.

MS Herald of Free Enterprise

MS Herald of Free Enterprise was a roll-on roll-off (RORO)

car and passenger ferry to operate on the DoverCalais route

across the English Channel. The ferry capsized on the night
of 6 March 1987, moments after leaving the Belgian port of
Zeebrugge, killing 193 passengers and crew.

MS Herald of Free Enterprise

 The ship comprised eight decks numbered

A to H from top to bottom which contained

the following:
A deck: Crew accommodation and radio room
B deck: Crew accommodation and galley

C deck: Passenger areas and galley

D deck: Suspended vehicle deck within E deck
E deck: Upper vehicle deck
F deck: Mezzanine level
G deck: Main vehicle deck
H deck: Engine rooms, stores and passenger accommodation

 Loading of vehicles onto G deck was through

watertight doors at the bow and stern. Both sets

of doors were hinged about a vertical axis,
meaning the status of the bow doors could not be
seen from the wheel house. Loading of vehicles
onto E deck and F deck was through a weather
tight door at the bow and an open portal at the
stern. Vehicles could be loaded and unloaded
onto E and G deck simultaneously using doubledeck linkspans in use at Dover and Calais.

Capsizing Background
On the day the ferry capsized, the Herald of Free Enterprise

was working the route between Dover and the Belgian port of
Zeebrugge. This was not her normal route and the linkspan
at Zeebrugge had not been designed specifically for the Spirit
class vessels: To compensate for this, the vessel's bow ballast
tanks were filled. However, the ship's natural trim was not
restored after loading. Had the Herald survived, she would
have been modified to obviate this procedure.

 Before dropping moorings, it was normal practice for the

assistant boatswain to close the doors.

However, the assistant boatswain, Mark Stanley, had

returned to his cabin for a short break after cleaning the car
deck upon arrival, and was still asleep when the harbourstations call sounded and the ship dropped her moorings.
The first officer, Leslie Sabel, was required to stay on deck to

make sure the doors were closed. Sabel was seriously injured
in the disaster and the court concluded from his evidence
that he thought he saw Stanley approaching was inaccurate.

 It believed that under pressure to get to his harbour station

on the bridge, he had left G deck with the bow doors open in
the expectation that Stanley would arrive shortly.
The court also described the attitude of boatswain Terence,

believed to have been the last person on G deck, as most

unfortunate. Asked why he did not close the doors given
there was no one else there to do it, he said it was not his
duty. However the court praised his work in the rescue.
Captain David could only assume that the doors had been

closed since he could not see them from the wheelhouse

owing to the ship's design, and had no indicator lights in the
wheelhouse.

 The ship left her berth in Zeebrugge inner harbour at 18:05

(GMT) with a crew of 80 and carrying 459 passengers, 81

cars, 3 buses and 47 lorries. She passed the outer mole at
18:24 and capsized about four minutes later.
When the ferry reached 18.9 knots after leaving the harbour,

water began to enter the car deck in large quantities. The

resulting free surface effect destroyed her stability.
In a matter of seconds, the ship began to list 30 degrees to

port. The ship briefly righted herself before listing to port

once more, this time capsizing. The entire event took place
within 90 seconds. The water quickly reached the ship's
electrical systems, destroying both main and emergency
power and leaving the ship in darkness.

 The ship ended on her side half-submerged in shallow water,

approximately 0.5 NM from the shore. Only a fortuitous turn

to starboard in her last moments, and then capsizing onto a
sandbar, prevented the ship from sinking entirely in much
deeper water.
Crew aboard a nearby dredger noticed the Herald's lights
disappear, and notified the port authorities. The alarm was
raised at 18:26 British time.
A rescue helicopter arrived within half an hour, shortly
followed by assistance from the Belgian Navy, who were
undertaking an exercise within the area.
The disaster resulted in the deaths of 193 people.

Improvements to designs
Since Herald Mishap

Indicators that display the state of the bow doors on

the bridge,

watertight ramps being fitted to the bow sections of the

front of the ship,

"freeing flaps" to allow water to escape from a vehicle deck

in the event of flooding.

Improvements to designs Since

Herald Mishap

The SOLAS regulations were changed in 1990 to require 125

centimeters (49 in) of freeboard (in the case of RORO
vessels, defined as the height between the vehicle deck and
the water line) for all new ROROs, instead of the previous
76 centimeters (30 in).

New International Maritime Organization (IMO)

regulations are in place that prohibit an open (undivided)
deck of this length on a passenger RORO vessel.

Some vessels omit the bow door configuration altogether

and vehicles enter and exit from rear doors only.

Tests of watertight doors

Every watertight door should be tested by subjecting the

door and its frame to a hydraulic pressure equivalent to the

head of water measured from the bottom of the door to the
margin line in way of the bulkhead to which the door is to be
fitted,
In no case should the test pressure be less than 6m head for
sliding doors or less than 3m head for hinged doors.
The framework to which the door frame is secured for the
purpose of testing at the works should not give greater
reinforcement to the frame than the stiffening of the
bulkheads to which it is to be fitted.

Tests of watertight doors

The test is to determine whether the door is sufficient

strength and reasonably watertight under pressure. The rate

of leakage and deflection of the door at the centre should be
recorded.
After a satisfactory hydraulic test, each watertight door and
its frame should be stamped with the following identification
marks:

Tests of watertight doors

After being fitted in place on the bulkhead at the ship, the

door and the attachment of the door frame to the bulkhead

should be included in the hose test required for watertight
bulkheads.
All sliding watertight doors should be operated by hand and,
if power operated, by power in the presence of the surveyor,
who should note and records the times taken to close the
doors.
The surveyor should see that any warning signals are efficient
and that the indicators register properly.
Hinged watertight doors are to be inspected and tried. The
surveyor should see that the lever operated clips are in order
and that the joints are watertight.