Cases in Constitutional Law 1

Constitutional Law 1
August 30, 2014

1

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999
JUAN DOMINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO
SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.

DAVIDE, JR., CJ .:
Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998
1
of the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter
DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the
11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998
2
of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedents are not disputed.1wphi1.nt
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative
District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.
3

On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson
and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy,
which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents
alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered
voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations, private respondents
presented the following evidence:
1. Annex "A" the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of
Congressman of the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof
he wrote his date of birth as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in
the constituency where he seeks election for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in
item 10, that he is registered voter of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Sarangani;
2. Annex "B" Voter's Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997
indicating respondent's registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;
3. Annex "C" Respondent's Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January
15, 1997;
4. Annex "D" Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial
& Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr.
Conrado G. Butil, which reads:
In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox
copy of the triplicate copy of COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the
name of Juan Domino.
Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to
Carlito Engcong on September 5, 1997, while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued
to Mr. Juan Domino but was cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name
of Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997.
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2

5. Annex "E" The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in
the name of Juan Domino dated September 5, 1997;
6. Annex "F" Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March
2, 1998 addressed to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and
Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which states:
For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of
Community Tax Certificate containing Nos. 11132201C-11132250C issued to you on
June 13, 1997 and paid under Official Receipt No. 7854744.
Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.
7. Annex "G" Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman
in the 3rd District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the
Regional Election Director, National Capital Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4
thereof, he wrote his birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his "residence in
the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election" as 3
years and 5 months; and, in item 9, that he is a registered voter of Precinct No. 182,
Barangay Balara, Quezon City;
8. Annex "H" a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION
RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent dated August 30, 1997
addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on
September 22, 1997, stating among others, that "[T]he undersigned's previous residence
is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he
is a registered voter" and "that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned
has transferred and conducts his business and reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Province of Sarangani prior to this application;"
9. Annex "I" Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR OF CANCELLATION OF THE
VOTER'S [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and
sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani.
4

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has been
residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC
the following exhibits, to wit:
1. Annex "1" Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and
Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal
and respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to
before Notary Public Johnny P. Landero;
2. Annex "2" Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of
sale executed by and between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios
Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on
November 4, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;
3. Annex "3" True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO.
725 captioned as "In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of
Precinct No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino,
Petitioners, -versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and the
Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City,
Respondents." The dispositive portion of which reads:
1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-
A, Barangay Old Balara, in District III Quezon City as completely
erroneous as petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City but of
Alabel, Sarangani where they have been residing since December 1996;
2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as
done in good faith due to an honest mistake caused by circumstances
beyond their control and without any fault of petitioners;
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3

3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from
Precint No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No.
14A1 of Barangay Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and
4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the
election/voter's registration records of the petitioners in Quezon City to
the Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other Comelec
Offices of Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are obviously qualified
to excercise their respective rights of suffrage.
4. Annex "4" Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to
Change of Residence addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani,
dated August 30, 1997.
5. Annex "5" Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of
applications for registration approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20,
1997, showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and
112 both under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as
transferees without VRR numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and
September 30, 1997, respectively.
6. Annex "6" same as Annex "5"
7. Annex "6-a" Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous
Registration (Annex "I", Petition);
8. Annex "7" Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No.
31326504 dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay
Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
9. Annex "7-a" Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan,
Election Officer IV, District III, Quezon City, which reads:
This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer
registered voters of District III, Quezon City. Their registration records (VRR) were
transferred and are now in the possession of the Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.
10. Annex "8" Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the
circumstances and incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance with respondent.
11. Annexes "8-a", "8-b", "8-c" and "8-d" Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness
Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed
and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying
their alleged personal knowledge of respondent's residency in Alabel, Sarangani;
12. Annex "8-e" A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before
Notary Public Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of fifty-five (55) residents of
Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and certifying under oath that they personally know the
respondent as a permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to
present;
13. Annexes "9", "9-a" and "9-b" Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year
1997, BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent; and,
14. Annex "10" The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and
circumstances leading to his relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani,
appending Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "D-1", "E", "F", "G" with sub-markings "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H" his CTC No. 111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are the same
as Annexes "1", "2", "4", "5", "6-a", "3", "7", "9" with sub-markings "9-a" and "9-b" except
Annex "H".
5

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for
the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following findings:
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4

What militates against respondent's claim that he has met the residency requirement for the position
sought is his own Voter's Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex "B", Petition]
and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence,
standing alone, negates all his protestations that he established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who
previously ran for the same position in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections of
1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-
A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year
residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
All told, petitioner's evidence conspire to attest to respondent's lack of residence in the constituency
where he seeks election and while it may be conceded that he is a registered voter as contemplated
under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the position of Congressman for the
Lone District of the Province of Sarangani.
6

On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering
that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution
disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.
7

The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers,
8
shows
that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province
of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by
the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed the parties
to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant petition.
9

On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the second
highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene.
10
INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and
in her Comment in Intervention
11
is asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to
proclaim her as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring
petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding
upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of petitioner.
12

The first issue.
The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings
declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC
cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the
COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that
will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO
to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the
COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the
residency requirement.
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5

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual
findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote
in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or
exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of
citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters
necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority.
However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in
relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.
13
In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action
that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding.
14
Thus, a decision in an exclusion
proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be
registered as a voter in any other election.
15

Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar
16
we ruled that:
. . . It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has become
final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is
ridiculous to suppose that such an important and intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and
determined with finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion
of persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellant's petition for inclusion
in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged
Filipino citizenship would still have been left open to question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from
Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It
is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of
another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of
voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he
is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or
transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as
provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189.
17
The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged
voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's
registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the
record in the inactive file.
18

Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action are
indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is
a party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINDO himself and his wife, praying that
he and his wife be excluded from the Voter's List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against DOMINO for alleged false
representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is
essential that there must be between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and
identity of causes of action.
19
In the present case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval
v. Guray, et al.,
20
the Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue ruled that:
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in
the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the election list of Luna, isres
judicata, so as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before
us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of
a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is
tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to
the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter of the
municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality,
against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said municipality. The present
proceeding of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate
voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for
the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there
be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art.
1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)
In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the
exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the
present que warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or
August 30, 2014
6

expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the
object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six
months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present
proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal
residence required for eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist
therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the
petition for excluision and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of
things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.
The Second Issue.
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998
election as stated in his certificate of candidacy?
We hold in the negative.
It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
21
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
22
"Domicile" is
a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind,
namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new
one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
23

Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos
Sur
24
and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in
the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and
has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.
25
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the
purpose.
26
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
27

It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was
sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his
residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires
not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent
place of abode, one's home.
28

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as
a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is
absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor
does the fact of physical presence without intention.
29

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease
contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence,
no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile.
30
Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January
1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement.
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7

Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to
a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising
the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided
preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence.
31
The fact that a
party continously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
32

His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which he had no control
cannot be sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2)
consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22.
33

While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he
was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon City on 22 October
1997,
34
and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence
on 30 August 1997,
35
DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to
represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.
36
Domino's failure to do so rendered him
ineligible and his election to office null and void.
37

The Third Issue.
DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any
reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is
voted for and receives the highest number of votes
38
and provided further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.
39

It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as
provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives.
40

The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate.
41
A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a
member of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the
election ordering the suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This
resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as
candidate for the position.
Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and
not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
42

Issue raised by INTERVENOR.
After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the province of Sarangani, may
INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning
candidate?
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
43
In every election, the people's choice is the paramount
consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a
candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his
place.
44

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
45
To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for
the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes
the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
46

August 30, 2014
8

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election.
47

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath
of victory cannot be transferred
48
from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes
49
and does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to
make a choice and the election is a nullity.
50
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective
position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice.
51

INTERVENOR's plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be sustained.
INTERVENOR's reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case
52
to wit: if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law
of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes
by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected, is misplaced.
Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible candidate.
Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is not
yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that
allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring
him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere
belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be
treated as stray, void, or meaningless.
53

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division and
the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J .:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it
is aimed.
1
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the election."
2
The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to
prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."
3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8:
4

August 30, 2014
9

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
5
with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In
his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in
Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772
6
and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be
issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."
7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
8
On the same day, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March
20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before
the March 20, 1995 deadline.
9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head
Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the
head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her
original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"
10
which she sought to rectify
by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
11
Impugning respondent's motive in filing the
petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her
intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her
six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme
Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the
creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve
his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner
now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along
with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1,
13
came up
with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy.
14
Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after
the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months)
was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked
was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First
Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying
affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she
always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in
her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has
been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of
Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
August 30, 2014
10

However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to
allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not
cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked
was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks
clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is
devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case
ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.
The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the
election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of
elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But
in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential
deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to
be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely
affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting
minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before
this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in
her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different
documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of
August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
(Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and
not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood
is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit.
Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City,
August 30, 2014
11

she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor
of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City
of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in
1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24,
1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that
prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She
registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident
of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned
such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There
must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and
(3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus
manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly
declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of
such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice
of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior
the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since
childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte
for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent
registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter
Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This
may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa,
Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her
residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district
for six months only.
15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration
16
of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.
17
The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no
new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution
granting the petition for disqualification.
18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the
canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
August 30, 2014
12

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified
into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside
the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the
said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over
the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of
settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with
the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required
by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic
20
this court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
21
Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence
and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken
up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be
to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
22
It is
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,
23
we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As
these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray,
24
the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
August 30, 2014
13

intention."
25
Larena vs. Teves
26
reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent
therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino,
27
held that the absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected does not constitute loss of residence.
28
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and
other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate
for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in
the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
29

xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather
than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
residence.
30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
31
this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the
same meaning as domicile.
32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her
actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the
space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's
questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she
would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in
her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the
entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a
candidate seeks election thus:
August 30, 2014
14

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing
than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second
Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when
(petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila."
The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place
where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in
1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election
of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and
thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not,
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where
the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by
the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence
in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves,
33
supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with
his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having
lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question
and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is
a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,
34
We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve
his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place
of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner
was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).
35

August 30, 2014
15

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we
lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution:
36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to
1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College,
now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she
taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with
her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point
to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila,
as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there
and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by
appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part
of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew:
the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did
not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time.
38
In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence."
39
The presumption that the wife
August 30, 2014
16

automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
"residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply
relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile
it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence.
40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female
spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile
of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever
(the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence
because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when
the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or
place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the
concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of
origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single
place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges
the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity
and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account
the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in
or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live
together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision
must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place.
A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living
in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one
place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some
August 30, 2014
17

other
place.
41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an
iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations
42
where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other
such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical
reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal
43
this
Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the
existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce."
44
Note that the Court allowed the wife either
to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under
the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin,
the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo
vs. Vasques de Arroyo
45
the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other.
Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights
can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by
process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium.
At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a
mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by
the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883,
Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in
England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can
still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for
the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever
attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in
a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to
the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other
states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21
Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the
Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative,
upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her
possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur.
Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was
sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the
use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by
virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem
here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac,
Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming
that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a
result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To
underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence
has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and
spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
August 30, 2014
18

rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses.
46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code)
and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the
rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in
Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland."
47
Furthermore, petitioner
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her
home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and
"residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not
domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either
reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical
for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of
selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile
different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's
claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions
were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
48
Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with
Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to
be merely directory,
49
"so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it."
50
The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court
in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that:
51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the
reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days
within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which
may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or
some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after
the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and
other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a
decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881,
52
it is evident
that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
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19

candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
53
Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including
the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 104960 September 14, 1993
PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF ELECTION
INSPECTORS, PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR COMELEC,
TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.
Otilia Dimayuga-Molo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

VITUG, J .:
An event in this decade, which future generations would likely come to know simply as the "EDSA People's Power
Revolution of 1986," has dramatically changed the course of our nation's history. So, too, not a few of our
countrymen have by it been left alone in their own personal lives. One such case is that of the petitioner in this
special civil action for certiorari.
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former Governor of
Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos. Sometime in the early
part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte,
1
caused the construction of his residential house therein. He soon thereafter also
served as Barangay Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan Election and 1986 "snap" Presidential Election,
Romualdez acted as the Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted.
2

When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were about to come to a close,
some relatives and associates of the deposed President, fearing for their personal safety, whether founded or
not, "fled" the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one, together with his immediate family, left the Philippines
and sought "asylum" in the United States which the United States (U.S.) government granted.
3
While abroad,
he took special studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and international business finance.
4

In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to run for a congressional seat
in Leyte. On 23 March 1987, he finally decided to book a flight back to the Philippines but the flight was
somehow aborted.
5

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20

On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District Director of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him that he should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or
before 23 August 1992, thus:
. . . Failure to depart on or before the specified date may result in the withdrawal of voluntary
departure and action being taken to effect your deportation. In accordance with a decision made
to your case, you are required to depart from the United States at your expense on or before 23
August 1992.
6

Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines, arriving on December 1991
apparently without any government document.
7

When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the Commission on Election ("COMELEC") on 01
February 1992 for the Synchronized National and Local Election scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner
registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. The chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors, who had known Romualdez to be a resident of the place and, in fact, an elected Barangay
Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed him to be registered.
Romualdez's registration, however, was not to be unquestioned. On 21 February 1992, herein private
respondent Donato Advincula ("Advincula") filed a petition with the Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte,
praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under
BP 881 and RA 7166.
8
Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his
profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he
did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to
qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
9

On 25 February 1992, Romualdez filed an answer, contending that he has been a resident of Tolosa, Leyte,
since the early 1980's, and that he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom
during the period from 1986 up to the third week of December 1991.
10

After due hearing, the Municipal Court of Tolosa, Leyte rendered a decision
11
on 28 February 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court finds the respondent to be a resident of
Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat. Hence, the instant
petition for exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte is hereby ordered DENIED and petition DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Upon receipt of the adverse decision, Advincula appealed the case to the respondent court.
On 03 April 1992, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision,
12
thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Philip Romualdez disqualified to register as a voter
for the 1992 elections and hereby reverses the decision of the lower court in toto.
The Municipal Registrar of the Commission on Elections of Tolosa, Leyte, is hereby ordered to
delete and cancel the name of respondent Philip G. Romualdez from the list of qualified voters
registered February 1, 1992, at Precinct 9, barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse.
On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing respondent Regional Trial Court
Judge Pedro Espino to cease and desist from enforcing questioned decision.
13

The petitioner has raised several issues which have been well synthesized by the Solicitor General into
August 30, 2014
21

(1) Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired jurisdiction over, respectively, Case No. 01-S. 1992 and Case
No. 92-03-42, the petition having been filed by one who did not allege to be himself a registered voter of the
municipality concerned; and
(2) Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petitioner to have voluntarily left the country and
abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails for the first time the jurisdiction of the respondent Court and the
MTC of Tolosa, Leyte, in taking cognizance of the case, despite an absence of any allegation in the petition
filed with the MTC that Advincula was himself a registered voter in Precinct No. 9 of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte conformably with Section 142 of the Omnibus Election Code.
14

When respondent Advincula filed the petition with the MTC for the exclusion of herein petitioner Romualdez,
the latter countered by filing his answer
15
and praying for the denial of the petition, without raising the issue of
jurisdiction. But what can be telling is that when the MTC decision, denying the petition for disqualification,
went on appeal to the RTC, Romualdez, in his own appeal-memorandum, explicitly prayed that the MTC
decision be affirmed. This unassailable incident leads us to reiterate that "while lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will
estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction."
16
Undoubtedly, the petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent not only by his active participation in the proceedings thereat but,
more importantly, in having sought an affirmative relief himself when the appeal was made to the latter court
whose jurisdiction he, in effect, invoked. Furthermore, the question is not really as much the jurisdiction of the
courts below as merely the locus standi of the complainant in the proceedings, a matter that, at this stage,
should be considered foreclosed.
In any case, we consider primordial the second issue of whether or not Romualdez voluntarily left the country
and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Here, this time, we find for the petitioner.
The Solicitor General himself sustains the view of petitioner Romualdez. Expressing surprise at this stance
given by the Solicitor General, respondent Advincula posits non sequitur argument
17
in his comment assailing
instead the person of Solicitor Edgar Chua. If it would have any value, at all, in disabusing the minds of those
concerned, it may well be to recall what this Court said in Rubio vs. Sto. Tomas:
18

It is also incumbent upon the Office of the Solicitor General to present to the Court the position that
will legally uphold the best interest of the government, although it may run counter to a client's
position.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence"
as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention."
19
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure,
or for like reasons, one intends to return.
20
That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established
during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be
lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.
21
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
withanimus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
22

The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused great
apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of
their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as
"abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of
"domicile by choice."
We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us that the petitioner had, in
fact, abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established his domicile elsewhere.
August 30, 2014
22

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of
every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of government so as to ensure that the
government can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of the governed.
23
We, therefore,
must commend respondent Advincula for spending time and effort even all the way up to this Court, for as the
right of suffrage is not to be abridged, so also must we safeguard and preserve it but only on behalf of those
entitled and bound to exercise it.
WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE; of the Decision of
the respondent Regional Trial Court dated 03 April 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court dated 28 February 1992 is hereby REINSTATED and the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court in this case is correspondingly made PERMANENT. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts
1
is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that
he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-
bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
August 30, 2014
23

The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives"
was filed on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any
ruling, giving priority to any right or interest not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the
renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to
discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the
State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first
task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are
subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment
to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement
of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the
latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history
of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil
arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised
Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general
laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
August 30, 2014
24

Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its
sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is
illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law
within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise
such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to
surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be
attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is
enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored
by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six
months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos
2
, which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge
of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the
Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is
not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-
defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As
stated in United States v. Gustilo,
3
it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks
to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the
accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
4

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be
supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
August 30, 2014
25

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded
capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call
he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional
restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the
issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by
chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he
was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany
seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned
one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place
of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to
attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually
make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following
observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:
5

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to
be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from
arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need
for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated
like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly
go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown
around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle
to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence.
August 30, 2014
26

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want
their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also
claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his
mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave
jail.
We remain unpersuaded.1wphi1.nt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of
Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing
Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full
complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also
provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he
attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed
several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a
member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently
under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the
prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give
a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal
illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."
6
This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.
7
The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need to its
exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never
has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who
are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
8

August 30, 2014
27

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded.
9

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
10

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent
the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.
11

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment,
it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.
12
The term
refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place
to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.
13
Imprisonment is the detention
of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion
14
and it "[is] something more than
mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior
barrier."
15

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in
society.
16
Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a
potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates
for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and
elimination of certain rights.
17

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-
election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the
State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
August 30, 2014
28

[G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999]
MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated May 10, 1998, of the First
Division of the Commission on Elections, dismissing petitioner Marcita Mamba Perezs petition for
the disqualification of private respondent Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo as a candidate for Representative
of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections, as well as the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, dated June 11, 1998, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of
the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998,
petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at
least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, 6 of the
Constitution.
In support of her claim, petitioner presented private respondents certificates of candidacy
[1]
for
governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections; his voters affidavit
[2]
which he used in
the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1997 elections; and his voter registration record dated June 22,
1997,
[3]
in all of which it is stated that he is a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality
of Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of Cagayan. Petitioner alleged that private
respondent filed an application
[4]
for the transfer of his registration as voter from Gattaran, Cagayan
(First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third District) only on December 17, 1997 and that said
application was approved only on January 7, 1998. Petitioner prayed that in the event the case was
not finally decided before the elections and private respondent obtained the highest number of
votes, the latters proclamation be suspended.
In his answer, private respondent claimed that while he had been a resident of Gattaran,
Cagayan in 1990, he transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an apartment at
No. 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from public view
because, at that time, his marriage to his former wife was still subsisting. In support of his claim,
he presented the affidavit
[5]
of the owner of the apartment, Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, in which it is
stated that private respondent had been his lessee since July 1990. In addition, private respondent
presented the contract of lease
[6]
of another residential apartment at Kamias Street, Tanza,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996, between him, as lessee, and
Tomas T. Decena, as lessor; his marriage license dated January 7, 1997;
[7]
the marriage certificate
between him and his present wife, Lerma Dumaguit, dated January 18, 1998;
[8]
the birth
certificate
[9]
of their daughter, Geniah Laureen D. Aguinaldo; and various letters,
[10]
all of which
show that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year before the May
11, 1998 elections.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,
[11]
dismissed
the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as
representative for the Third District of Cagayan.
August 30, 2014
29

On May 11, 1998, private respondent was elected Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan, with 65,058 votes over his rival Manuel N. Mambas 58,507 votes.
[12]
Accordingly, on
May 16, 1998, he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office.
On May 22, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating her allegation that
private respondent lacked the requisite residency in the Third District of Cagayan and arguing that
the proclamation of private respondent was not a legal impediment to the continuation of the
hearing on her motion in view of R.A. No. 6646, 6. Her motion was, however, denied by the
COMELEC en banc in its resolution of June 11, 1998. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
private respondent had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan since July 1990 when he rented an
apartment there in order to hide his mistress. Petitioner contends that transfer of residence to the
place where private respondent is keeping his mistress cannot amount to a change of domicile
because ones domicile is the place where one and ones legitimate family resides. She also argues
that private respondent could not have changed his residence to Tuguegarao in 1990 considering
that his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections, as
well as his voter registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997, indicate that
he is a resident of Gattaran, which is in the First District of Cagayan. Petitioner avers that in the
absence of clear and positive proof, ones domicile of origin should be deemed to continue and that
to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must prove an actual change of domicile, a
bonafide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and of establishing a new one, and
unequivocal acts which correspond with the intention.
On the other hand, private respondent asks that the instant petition be dismissed. He argues
that after his proclamation on May 16, 1998 and his assumption of office on June 30, 1998, the
COMELEC lost jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications for the office of Representative. He
argues further that this case should have been filed with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
In a supplemental pleading,
[13]
petitioner replies that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over
the case because she filed the petition for disqualification on March 30, 1998, before the elections
on May 11, 1998, and that pursuant to R.A. No. 6646, 6, the COMELEC could continue the
proceedings for the determination of the disqualification of private respondent.
The threshold issue, therefore, is whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant
petition for certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondents eligibility for the office of
Representative of the Third District of Cagayan. Petitioner, in sustaining the affirmative side of the
question, invokes the following provision of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
(COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by
the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the
elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed
on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion
for reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11,
1998. Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of
proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been
August 30, 2014
30

proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the
proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioners action. In the same
vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent
was already a member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the
same. Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondents
ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:
[14]

The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear
and complete. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon
the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners remedies should have been (1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition for
disqualification, and move for the issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the
proclamation of private respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event the
motion was denied before the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition for certiorari in
this Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent; or
(2) to file a petition forquo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within ten
(10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as Representative-elect on May 16,
1998.
[15]
Obviously, neither of these remedies can be availed of now.
In any event, even assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to resolve the instant petition
for certiorari, we find no merit in petitioners allegation that private respondent is ineligible for the
office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan.
Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution states:
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election.
The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently in our decision
in Aquino v. COMELEC,
[16]
as follows:
. . . [T]he place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law
as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing
in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who
August 30, 2014
31

have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the
same area either by origin or by choice.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed his residence from
Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the following: (1) the
affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes
St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease
between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at
Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996; (3) the
marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4)
the certificate of live birth of private respondents second daughter; and (5) various letters
addressed to private respondent and his family, which all show that private respondent was a
resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections on
May 11, 1998.
There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a
resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the merit
of this factual finding.
Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was a resident of Gattaran, at least until
June 22, 1997, is shown by the following documentary evidence in the record, to wit: (1) his
certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections; (2) his
voters registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3) the fact that
private respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of 1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.
The contention is without merit. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is
not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. Thus, inFaypon v. Quirino,
[17]
this Court held
that the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to
consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the
elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of
Gattaran. Under the law,
[18]
what is required for the election of governor is residency in the
province, not in any district or municipality, one year before the election.
Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC:
[19]

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the
May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually
a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for
more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao
since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it
would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the
province of Cagayan.
As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this nature is Gallego v. Vera,
[20]
in which
this Court held: [W]hen the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be
thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. In this
case, considering the purpose of the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is
August 30, 2014
32

familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that private
respondent is qualified, having been governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years
immediately before his election as Representative of that provinces Third District.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

ANTERO J. POBRE,
Complainant,

- versus -

Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 7399

Present:

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
*

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 25, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J .:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre
invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I
am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme
Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and
August 30, 2014
33

constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through
counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part
of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial
anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted
to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which,
after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court
would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the
position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof. Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the
Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as
the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.
[1]

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the
legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents
to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for
the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.
[2]

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost
sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable
this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and
denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts
August 30, 2014
34

do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in
the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity
and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege.
[3]
The disciplinary authority of the assembly
[4]
and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
[5]

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling
the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.
[6]
We draw her attention to the ensuing
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to
take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority
on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected
senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of
the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to
August 30, 2014
35

maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and
are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren
in private practice.
[7]
Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the
impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting
remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of
the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that,
I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was
to be surrounded by idiots. Iwould rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary
functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule,
demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal
wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual
privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents
them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in
insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-
officio chairperson,
[8]
have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the
position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and
defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x
August 30, 2014
36

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the
Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within
its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

x x x x

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.
[9]

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,
[10]
we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer
[11]
that the duty of attorneys to the courts
can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is
the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent
upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more.
The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good
fidelity x x x to the courts.

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel
[12]
that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of
the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
[13]

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a
strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and
dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be
August 30, 2014
37

disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official
duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.
[14]

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as
long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,
[15]
a good character
being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of
such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law
invest in them.
[16]

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the
rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent
purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with
the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose
them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty.
Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang
[17]
who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however,
deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative
on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially
this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to
enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without
fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional
hall.
[18]
It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper
language against another Senator or against any public institution.
[19]
But as to Senator
Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to
order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary
action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.
[20]
The lady senator clearly violated the
August 30, 2014
38

rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing
their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that
disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree
with her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean
and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe
to the courts.
[21]

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact
made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not
categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of
her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J .:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were,
said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed
the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
August 30, 2014
39

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2)
whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the
purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well
as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen,
either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.
1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an
open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was
not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence,
contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication
began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging
in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public
attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our
people to expose.1wph1.t
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by
some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is
said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961".
To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public
Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the
Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are "available to
adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of
NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS
(5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public
information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of
MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent
Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while
Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col.
Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the
intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan
of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational
technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism"
and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
August 30, 2014
40

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2) typewriters only" to
Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953,
1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in
several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the
feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the
planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a
loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of
Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be
divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military
man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6)
that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA,
NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano
clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding
positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed
by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and
Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the
letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that,
having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano
clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting
tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which
plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans,
and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces,
that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that
the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high
ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the
intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their
associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over
the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communicati on is false,
they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of
the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners"
of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".Wherefore, the order
appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-
general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
August 30, 2014
41

CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
"Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG
YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP;
and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people
who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate
directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this
lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
1
issued
by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and
capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of
these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two
(2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These
numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001."
2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December
22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-
list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations,
but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation
scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization
to directly participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
August 30, 2014
42

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep
the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who
substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or
evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions."
3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of
[some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents
not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed.
4
On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna
and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.
5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within
three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,
6
but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001.
7
During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition
9
before
this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,
10
the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a
non-extendible period of five days from notice.
11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
12
docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,
13
the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It
added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but
barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments
14
on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their
respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.
15

Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785."
16

The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus
Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
17
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A
18
dated November 9,
2000.
19

August 30, 2014
43

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001.
Indeed, under both the Constitution
20
and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a
verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no
motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure.
21

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
22
The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there
was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to
this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality
because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
23
It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of
other remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency."
24
Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules."
25

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves
the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
26

Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution."
27
For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects
to the participation of "major political parties."
28
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations."
29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law."
30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the
participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO,
31
Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao."
32
This was also clear from the following exchange between
Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:
33

"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP,
Liberal at Nacionalista?
August 30, 2014
44

MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in
order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat
in Congress.
34
He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that
there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000
votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But
this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political
party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list
system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or
any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must
be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence,
when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully,
usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature."
35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
August 30, 2014
45

could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-
style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack
of
well-
defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-
list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group.
Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration
in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
36
Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who
have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this
intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.
37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in
Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
38

August 30, 2014
46

The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941
"does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society."
39
In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6
40
of RA 7941 may
participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the
super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections.
41

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that
the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion
of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan
42
admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters
could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors.
43

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more
awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of
one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns
of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its
noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily,
it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even
those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled
80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the
OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the
party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,
44
in order to enhance the chance
of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible.
45
Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within
it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to
do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory
"open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the
benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through
regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system
would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could
not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
August 30, 2014
47

Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
46
In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in
order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary
48
that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of
the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions
ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x
x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not
even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual
opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence,
they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the
law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed
above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution
or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
49
Indeed, the
function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-
guess it.
50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political
parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No.
4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001
elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to
the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which
parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents
herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate
in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
August 30, 2014
48

Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is
a government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts.
51
It is
not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they
qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in
and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in
the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words,
while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that
they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and
other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."
52

Third, in view of the objections
53
directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and
supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties
I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that
also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec
can pierce through the legal fiction."
54

The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent
their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera."
55

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."
56
The
prohibition was explained by a member
57
of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."
58

August 30, 2014
49

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered."
59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with
election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system
seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does
not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by,
the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal
60
and unfair to other parties, but
also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9
of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors;
so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist.
To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be
able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or
regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x."
61

Epilogue
August 30, 2014
50

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law.
The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine
hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is
possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is,
without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would
create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginal ization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play
on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not
have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary
hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the
extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties
and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The
Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list
election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Taada for
respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and
Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
R E S O L U T I O N
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to
deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain
the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taadare quested that his
right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
August 30, 2014
51

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator Taada
and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating
charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at
the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed
his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he
did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the
resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read
slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator
Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the
United States, all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but
Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and
his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege
speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes,
but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then
presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of
any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating
the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of
order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Taada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At
about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized
by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote.
Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the
rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore,
urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over
the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
August 30, 2014
52

Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner
when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and
submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant
the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco
Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial
points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We
refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended
senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at
liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might
change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not
allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should
characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not
where two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as
such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate
only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves
into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his
place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent
makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in
matters of similar nature.
August 30, 2014
53

The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of
February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr.
Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do,
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those
four on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only
by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House:
does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House".
(Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of
"the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all
the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute
a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had
been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three
senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the
latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the
majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by
that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising
from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
August 30, 2014
54

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September
12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m.,
after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted
when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a
head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.
1
Rep. Arroyo
appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going
to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is
shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by
Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the
Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation:
(1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned
at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound
system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief
of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings
from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28,
August 30, 2014
55

1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four
versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in
the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17
appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain
the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the
other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as
petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the
correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the
word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the
House,
2
the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the years or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum;
(2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,
3
the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?"
and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,
4
the Chair refused to
recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report
approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109,
5
the Chair suspended the
session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is
argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996,
because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by
Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and
asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly
passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other
departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
6
which affirmed
the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill
doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is
no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the
adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar
as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may
be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the
House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully
observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious
and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No.
39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr.
Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198."
7
This
Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.
8

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave
abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are
merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of
the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings"
9
and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this
contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,
10
the constitutional provision that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of
August 30, 2014
56

autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.Pendatun,
11
it was held:
"At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural,
and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,
12
the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more
just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,
13
it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does
not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary
legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional
quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it
proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred
upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,
14
the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration
is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it
should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts
of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank,
15
the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The Constitution
declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a
branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject
to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would
be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as
void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State,
16
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will
be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure
upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We
thinkno court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by
itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory
17
is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of
an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in
the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not
properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the
requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It
may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation
thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the
direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative
sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an
act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made
to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot
declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to
govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187;
State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
August 30, 2014
57

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the
power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights
are involved.
18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a
House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is
shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others
may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working
of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an
alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission,
contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government]
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review."
19
Implicit in this statement of the former Chief
Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy
requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national
security,
20
it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . .
It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a
branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our
Art. VIII. 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still
making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to
the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the conference
committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members should have been
taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact
was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such as this involving
approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference
committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on
the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority
Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:
August 30, 2014
58

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the
procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on his
point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules.
The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to
my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody
objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote,
any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House
approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the
House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.
22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even more
just.
23
The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial
consideration.
24
In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is
the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional
actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be
allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem."
25

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon the last and third
readings of a bill,
26
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
27
and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.
28
Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the members
by yeas and nayshad already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension
and subsequent adjournment of the session.
29
It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the
parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything
anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week,
Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The
Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in
the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions
for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of
the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to
precedence.
30
And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and
would have put an end to any further consideration of the question.
31

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount
to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by
Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction."
32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not he
concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
33
Rep. Arroyo
waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence
of a quorum.
34

August 30, 2014
59

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only
the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No.
7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report
was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings.
35
Rep.
Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report
36
but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting
had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report.
37

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are
conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by
Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case
38
we "went
behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved
by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of
both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-
fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts."
39
This Court quoted from Wigmore on
Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check
an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and
mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution;
but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which
had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no
more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
"enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.
41

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI.
26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed."
42

In other cases,
43
this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and
abroad.
44
The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether
the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an
established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in
the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the
enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since
our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima,
Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
August 30, 2014
60

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of
November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740,
was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts
as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of
one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein.
46
With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,
47
this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for
regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all
are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been
declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory
of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment
has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined,
of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case
48
may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
49

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

August 30, 2014
61

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO,
AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
VITUG, J .:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the preventive
suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases filed
against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having
been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it
referred, for approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum,
dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13
May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three
informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer,
being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini
Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong
Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru
Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu
Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai
Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen
Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to
said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused."
1

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel,
were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
August 30, 2014
62

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order
for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail
without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant
her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to
come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May
1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty
upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and Preliminary Injunction
before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking
cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the consideration of her
motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining
order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to accept a fellowship from the John
F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner
from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and
to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by
the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill
of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly
approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner's arraignment not
later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two
amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993
resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal cases,
docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266,
assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding
Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the
nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist
from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail
bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceedings with her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the
matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate
the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into one information
under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash
said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The
presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion of the
prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
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63

On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its 03rd August 1995
order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated
to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan,"
docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January
1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby
suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.
"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the
Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the
implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this Court of the
action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the suspension order
as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at that time."
2

Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the
statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by
BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan,
3
the Court reiterated:
"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the
Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to
the career or non-career service."
4

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of
the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the
court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and butsabout
it."
5
Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan
6
observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension."
7

August 30, 2014
64

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and
not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
8

En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the information
must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has
been said that
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation;
that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019
or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from
office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the
grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x .'
"xxx xxx xxx
"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts
for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds
provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the
accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal
proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of
the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry
whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense
punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code."
9

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before
trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence
of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the
court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that
he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that
the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
10

The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the Sandiganbayan has
been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon to resolve several other matters
on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,
11
petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez,
12
petitioner sought
the nullification of the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena,
13
petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No.
16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting
in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended
informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan,
14
petitioner assailed the denial
by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of
Pedellaga. In one of these cases,
15
the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R.
Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of the
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65

delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A piece-
meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section
3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were authorized under Executive Order
No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving
applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they
had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not
granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019."
16

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to
discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days."
17

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in
its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
18
the Court affirmed the order of
suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the
court on the prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled:
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power
of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a
Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension,
when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the House of Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-
equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents
one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the
Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision
allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality
has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any
August 30, 2014
66

emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to
an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view
19
that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own
judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a
specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the
Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must
promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to
render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G.
TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO,
FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S.
BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No.
59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J .:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief,
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He
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67

asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also
asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it,
particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the
admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., Member of the House of
Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one
hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated the
following:.
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the
free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even
pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can
always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid,
such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing.
. . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or
recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and
prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino
people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by
the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223,
1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmea, jr., to appear before it to
substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the
attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio
Osmea, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The
special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the
adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct;
and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec.
7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious
words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction,
the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary
injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent
adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving
Congressman Osmea a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said
congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same
daybefore closing its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending
him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres
Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)
1
filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and
then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committeewhose
members are the sole respondentshad thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to
produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is
also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was,
by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
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Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8,
1960, found Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making without
basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of
the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the
House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., be, as he hereby is,
declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20
that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3)
supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so
because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes
the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its
members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any
other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that
he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense."
2
Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of
Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the
floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were
censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a
member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked
his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be
censured, committed to prison
3
, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this
decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a
foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
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Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he
argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other
business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that
such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not,
however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws
4
extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any
rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them."
5
And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular
measure."
6

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of
all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con
duct of business, and as security against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433;
Holt vs.Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte
Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e.
977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140
S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western
Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted
the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution,
despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds'
Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in
black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a
coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by
this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been
said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The principle is well established that the courts will not
assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature
since each department is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member,
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the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const.
Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.
7
In
1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a
bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no
hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court
of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in
the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the
general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may
deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body
'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection,
and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and
require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the
exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative
department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An
attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power,
would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles
controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary
action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction
to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of
impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard
the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of
comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic
illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two
occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of
orders.
8
And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been
considered.
9

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924,
Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had
assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate.
The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this
Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate
petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension
for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave
the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically
provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the
Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth
District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy."
But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the
affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth
District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who
had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were
granted to it by the Jones Law
10
; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and
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71

preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the
Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the
power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension
11
which the Constitution did not
impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in
1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations
are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage
or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.
12

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction
had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved
the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as
such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or
academic.
13
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all
members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable
cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino
14
and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.
15

At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court
thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and
decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon,
JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
August 30, 2014
72

G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA,
JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIO, J .:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a
decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and
annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had
hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it
"peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the
affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to
avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the
"political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left to a decision by
the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive
branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded
against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act."
(Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,
especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case,
a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry,
for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional
grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to
be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two
coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative
branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It
does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and
legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who
has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer
justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of
a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the
test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
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73

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the
canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case
No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members,
three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of
Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as
follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Congressman
1st District
Benguet LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Congressman
1st District Palawan
LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
Congressman
2nd District Nueva Ecija
LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Congressman
1st District Davao del Sur
LDP
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JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Congressman
4th District Batangas
LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Congressman
2nd District Zamboanga del Sur
(formerly GAD, now NP)
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was
submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23)
votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in
some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman
Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for
Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the
members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot
1
Congressman
Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to
neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET
Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed
Congressman Camasura by letter
2
that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del
Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having
allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP
members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical
and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March
12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.
3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two
congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it
'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.
4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera,
received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives,
during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to
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75

rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on
the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto
attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET
because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral
protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is
sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal
impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be
confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which
would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in
favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of
some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz
and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set
for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de
Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote,
for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of
his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to
continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility
as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an
incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should
not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do
with the merits of the cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in
the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide
instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members
chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting
of three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate
the legislative component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such
contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-
judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to
membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation
with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in
Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
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76

promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week
recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the
Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and
membership in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018
cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs.
Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman
Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of
the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion
that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly
adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their
relief from membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a
member of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan
also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano,
resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by
purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-
legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the
term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be
legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political
disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their
membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to
EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE
the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the
corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-
members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his original
vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative
who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination
of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camasura
from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
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4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment
5
on the
petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings
of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of
said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole
authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those
who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well),
hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the
political party;
6
that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,
7
for if a member of
the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified;
8
and that the expulsion of Congressman
Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP
9
and the decision to rescind his membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political
question beyond the reach of judicial review.
10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action
against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET.
11
Moreover, the
petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that
withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET.
12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party
respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not
question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of
Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura
as a member of the HRET.
13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to
do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the
promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice.
14
Hence, although the Tribunal may not
be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for
"in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision
as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."
15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded
as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination
of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation reported that the
House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat
in the Tribunal.
16

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition
of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the
tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of
the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political
parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political
aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
August 30, 2014
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be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three
upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest member of votes
therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to
control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court
had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of
Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial
tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the
National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference.
(Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the tripartite
scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while
composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the
limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following
exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of
the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish
these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the
Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral
Tribunal is a constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still
be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate
departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative,
the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
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MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if the
ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are
deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid
of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these
electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of
government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto
themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their members,
and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently
we have an independent electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the
wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still
the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House
and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are independent
when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the Executive,
there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some
incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that
in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in
accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an political considerations. That is why I am
asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with
sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust that
the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis
supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may
shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve
the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is
a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well
abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of
the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of
Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes
by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of
the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
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Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may
not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the
records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political
party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not
entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed
before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the
office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced
by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University.
It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political
implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief
Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their
own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party
disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The
purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's
decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for
Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly
aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the
Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of
the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to
his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise
its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The
Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the
Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives
was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is
clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and
void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr.
Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.
as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the
Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling
the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set
aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the
speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice,
hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to
be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.

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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 84297 December 8, 1988
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J .:
Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga
during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the
inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he
brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on
May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes
and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent
thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent
also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so
petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared
petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition
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entitled "Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections, Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G.
Timbol," docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on January 25, 1988, the Court set aside the
COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46.
Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in
accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by private
respondent.
A. The Main Case
This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of (1) the resolution of the HRET, dated May 2,
1988, in Case No. 46, holding that the protest filed by private respondent had been filed on time, and (2) its July 29,
1988 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The
Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the HRET while the private respondent filed his comment with a
motion to admit counter/cross petition and the petitioner filed his consolidated reply. Thereafter, the Court resolved
to give due course to the petition, taking the comments filed as the answers to the petition, and considered the case
submitted for decision.
Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the HRET.
Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent's election protest would have
been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the protest would be
timely. Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondent's protest had been seasonably filed.
To support his contention that private respondent's protest had been filed out of time and, therefore, the HRET did
not acquire jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. A sworn
petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial
or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election. [Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner argues that even assuming that the period to file an election protest was suspended by the pendency of
the petition to annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time, considering that he was proclaimed on May
27, 1987 and therefore private respondent had only until June 6, 1987 to file a protest; that private respondent filed
a petition to annul the proclamation on May 28, 1987 and the period was suspended and began to run again on
January 28, 1988 when private respondent was served with a copy of the decision of the Court in G.R, No. 80007;
that private respondent therefore only had nine (9) days left or until February 6, 1988 within which to file his protest;
but that private respondent filed his protest with the HRET only on February 8, 1988.
On the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit:
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with the Office of the
Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary
of the Tribunal, together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each
protestee,within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on November 22, 1987 where
the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be
filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation. Election contests arising from the
1987 Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and
transmitted by him to the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the
date of effectivity of these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, ruled the HRET:
On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within fifteen (15) days from
November 22, 1987, or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by the Protestant (private respondent herein), promulgated a
Resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio. This resolution had the effect of nullifying the
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proclamation, and such proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant received a copy of the
Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents
and purposes, therefore, Protestee's (petitioner herein) proclamation became effective only on
January 28, 1988, and the fifteen-day period for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from
that date.
Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28. The protest,
therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of this Tribunal. (Rollo,
p. 129.]
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.
Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in unambiguous
terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election
ofany Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should
be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective
regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be
emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over
election contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC.
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is
readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested
in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by
constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate
jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election
were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be emphasized, however,
that such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code to each and every aspect of
that particular electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one
of several laws governing said elections. *
An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987
congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests in the
respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the exercise of
the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute.
The Court is of the considered view that it may not.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its
jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through Justice
Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:
... [The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a
settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177; emphasis supplied.]
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been
exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Senate and the House of Representatives under the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to an
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independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the
1935 Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions].
Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it
in this wise:
See. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra, at 1621. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution
has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature"
[Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and
complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature
and the Electoral Commission Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 1401. The same
may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three branches of
government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for
that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant
of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the
Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that the jurisdiction over election
contests involving members of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction
over the conduct of elections for all elective national and local officials.
That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, consonant with the return to the
separation of powers of the three branches of government under the presidential system, is too evident to escape
attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's purely administrative powers, namely,
the exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections; to deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register
political parties and accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters and
prosecute, where appropriate, violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making
power. In this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
are fully applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987
Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay
officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period
within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but,
more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the
latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
B. Private-Respondent's Counter/Cross Petition
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Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his functions and duties as the Representative of
the first district of Pampanga during the pendency of the protest. However, on May 5, 1988, the HRET resolved to
defer action on said prayer after finding that the grounds therefor did not appear to be indubitable. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the HRET on May 30, 1988. Thus, private respondent
now seeks to have the Court annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction on the premise that the grounds therefor are too evident to be doubted.
The relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petition is not forthcoming.
The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of a
protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of whether or not
there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer for the aforementioned ancilliary remedies also lies within the
HRETs sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007, where the Court declined to take cognizance of the private
respondent's electoral protest, this Court said:
The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC
itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests
of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
Moreover, private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET's resolution to defer action on his
prayer for provisional relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action
with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to review or and and set aside. But then again, so long as
the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal is full, clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in
any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same." (Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.] As early as 1938 in Morrero v.
Bocar (66 Phil. 429, 431 (1938)), the Court declared that '[the judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in
the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Under
the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is made explicit. The power granted to the Court includes
the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government (Art. VIII, Sec. 11. Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's collective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly
shown.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's Counter/Cross Petition is likewise
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992]
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G. TIOZON, petitioners, vs.
RAUL A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as Secretary of the House of Representatives,
MR. JOSE MARIA TUANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Gen. Services Division of the House of
August 30, 2014
86

Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA, as Chief Accountant of the House of
Representatives, and the HON. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
ROMERO, J .:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of
Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent RaulDaza,
then incumbent congressman of the same congressional district, from continuing to exercise the
functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent
resident of the United States since October 16, 1974.
Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as
permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election
Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On March 13, 1992, respondents,
through the Solicitor General, filed a motion for extension of time to file their comment for a period of
thirty days or until April 12, 1992. Reacting to the said motion, petitioners on March 30, 1992,
manifested their opposition to the 30-day extension of time stating that such extension was excessive
and prayed that respondent instead be granted only 10 days to file their comment. On May 5, 1992,
the Court noted the manifestation and opposition.
On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition
before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992
elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (SPC 92-084) and that the instant
petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987
until June 30, 1992.
[1]

On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact that he is a
permanent resident of the United States; that although he was accorded a permanent residency
status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter order of the District Director, USImmigration and
Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A.,
[2]
he had long waived his status when he returned to the
Philippines on August 12, 1985.
[3]

On April 13, 1992, public respondent Camilo Sabio, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, Mr. Jose Mari Tuao, as OIC of the General Services Division, Mrs. Rosalinda G.
Medina, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives and Commission on Audit, filed their
comment. They contend that if indeed Congressman Daza is a greencard holder and a permanent
resident of the United States of America, then he should be removed from his position as
Congressman. However, they opined that only Congressman Daza can best explain his true and
correct status as a greencard holder. Until he files his comment to the petition, petitioners prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted.
[4]

Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before the COMELEC (SPC 92-
084) and hypothesizing that the case before the COMELEC would become moot should this Court
find that his permanent resident status ceased when he was granted a US non-immigrant visa, asked
this Court to direct the COMELEC to dismiss SPC No. 92-084.
[5]

On May 5, 1992, petitioners filed their reply. On May 21, 1992, this Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent Daza should be
disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from exercising the functions of
his office being a permanent resident alien of the United States at the time when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1987 Elections. To buttress their contention, petitioners cite
the recent case of Caasi v. Court of Appeals.
[6]

August 30, 2014
87

In support of their charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder, petitioners presented to us
a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
which reads:
[7]

File No. A20
968 618
Date: Nov 5,
1991
LOS91
4732
Geraghty, O'Loughlin and Kenney
Attn: David C. Hutchinson
386 N. Wasbasha Street
St. Paul, Minn. 55102-1308
SUBJECT:
Daza, Raul A.
Your request was received in this office on ____________; please note the paragraph(s) checked below:
xxx xxx xxx
10. [XX] Other remarks:
Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject became a Lawful Permanent Resident on Oct.
16, 1974. As far as we know subject (sic) still has his greencard. No he has not applied for citizenship.
Sinerely, (sic)
Sgd.
District Director
Form G-343 (Rev. 8-20-82)N
We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot and academic for
it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992
[8]
that they seek to unseat
respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June
30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the
House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the
appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza's certificate of
candidacy before the election
[9]
or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten
(10) days after Daza's proclamation.
[10]
Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against
respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts
already consummated.
[11]
Fourth, as a defacto public officer,
[12]
respondent cannot be made to
reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of
a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered.
[13]

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for being MOOT and
ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED.

August 30, 2014
88

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 135996 September 30, 1999
EMILIANO R. "BOY" CARUNCHO III, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and The Chairman ATTY. CASIANO ATUEL, JR. and MEMBERS, ATTY.
GRACE S. BELVIS, DR. FLORENTINA R. LIZANO, City Board of Canvassers, City of Pasig, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the lone
district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized elections. The other candidates were: Arnulfo G. Acedera, Jr.
(Lakas-NUCD-UMDP); Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C. Bassig (Independent); Esmeraldo T.
Batacan (PDR-LM Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C. Rivera, Jr. (PRP/PDR); Elpidio G. Tuason
(Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal Party/LAMMP).
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of May 12, 1998, respondent Pasig City Board of Canvassers composed of Atty.
Casiano Atuel, Jr. as Chairman, Atty. Grace S. Belvis as Vice-Chairman, and Dr. Florentina Lizano as Member,
started to canvass the election returns. The canvass was proceeding smoothly when the Board received intelligence
reports that one of the candidates for the congressional race, retired General Arnulfo Acedera, and his supporters,
might disrupt and stop the canvassing.1wphi1.nt
At exactly 6:00 o'clock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General Acedera and his supporters stormed the Caruncho
Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing of election returns was being conducted. They allegedly
forced themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the process. As pandemonium broke loose,
the police fired warning shots causing those present in the canvassing venue, including the members of the Board
and canvassing units, to scamper for safety. The canvassing personnel exited through the backdoors bringing with
them the Election Returns they were canvassing and tallying as well as the Statement of Votes that they were
accomplishing. They entrusted these documents to the City Treasurer's Office and the Pasig Employment Service
Office (PESO). Election documents and paraphernalia were scattered all over the place when the intruders left.
The following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units recovered the twenty-two (22) Election Returns and the
Statement of Votes from the Treasurer's Office and the PESO. However, page 2 of each of the 22 election returns,
which contained the names of candidates for congressmen, had been detached and could not be found. An
investigation was conducted to pinpoint liability for the loss but it yielded negative result. Hence, the Board secured
proper authority from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
1
through Election Director for the National Capital
Region Atty. Teresita Suarez, for the reconstitution of the missing page by making use of the other copies of the election
returns, particularly the provincial copy or the copy in the ballot boxes placed therein by the Board of Election Inspectors.
At 2:40 a.m. of May 17, 1998, the Board, satisfied that it had finished canvassing the 1,491 election returns from as
many clustered precincts, proclaimed Henry P. Lanot as the winner in the congressional race for the lone district of
Pasig.
2
The votes obtained by the leading three candidates were: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes; Emiliano R. "Boy"
Caruncho III 42,942 votes, and Arnulfo Acedera 36,139 votes. The winner, Lanot, led his closest rival, Caruncho, by
17,971 votes.
However, on May 21, 1998, petitioner Caruncho filed a "Motion to Nullify Proclamation on the Basis of Incomplete
Returns"
3
with the COMELEC. He alleged that the Board had proceeded with the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the
winning congressional candidate even though one hundred forty-seven (147) election returns involving about 30,000
votes, were still not canvassed. He prayed that the COMELEC en banc declare the proclamation null and void and that
the Board of Canvassers be directed to convene and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the votes of the candidates for
the House of Representatives and thereupon proclaim the winner. On June 1, 1998, petitioner filed an amended motion to
correct some errors in the listing of precincts under paragraph 10, pages 2 and 3, and paragraph 12, pages 3 and 4, of the
original motion.
4

On June 8, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued an Order requiring respondent Pasig City Board of
Canvassers to comment on the amended motion to nullify Lanot's proclamation. In his comment filed on June 23,
August 30, 2014
89

1998, respondent Atty. Casiano G. Atuel, Jr. admitted the disruption and stoppage of the canvass of election returns
on May 11, 1998 but asserted that there were only twenty-two (22) election returns, not 147 as claimed by
Caruncho, that were missing but these were eventually recovered. The Board stated in part:
. . . . Contrary to the insinuation of Atty. Irene D. Jurado, only 22 Election Returns were reported
missing. On the following day, May 15, 1998, the sub-canvassing units have recovered the 22
missing Election Returns and the Statement of Votes from the Treasurer's Office and from the Pasig
Employment Service Office (PESO). There are no missing election returns.
That to the surprise of the Board and of the 22 canvassing units, they found out that Page 2 of the
22 Election Returns they recovered were detached and missing. We wish to inform the Commission
that Page 2 of the Local Election Returns contained the name of candidates for Congressman. We
conducted investigation on who did the detachment of Page 2 of the 22 Election Returns. However,
nobody from the Treasurer's Office nor from the PESO admitted that they committed such election
offense.
It is impossible that 147 Election Returns were missing. The COMELEC Instruction is very specific
that only Election Returns to be canvassed are suppose(d) to be brought out from the Ballot Boxes
containing still uncanvassed Election Returns. The instruction further stated that once it was read by
the Board, it will be stamped "READ" and then deliver the same (sic) to the 22 sub-canvassing units.
Sub-canvassing units cannot get another Election Returns unless the same is finished, tallied,
stamped as "CANVASSED," and submit the same to the Secretariat and placed inside a separate
ballot boxes with stamped "READ" and "CANVASSED" (sic) sealed with metal seals, padlocked,
chained and padlocked again. It was at this time where (sic) the sub-canvassing units will get
another Election Returns from the Board for tally and so on. Sub-canvassing units are not allowed to
canvass 2 or more Election Returns at one time. This was the very reason why only 22 Election
Returns were reported missing but were recovered without Page 2.
That at the very start of the proceeding, the leading candidates for Congressman were as follows:
HENRY LANOT FIRST
EMILIANO CARUNCHO SECOND
ARNULFO ACEDERA THIRD
As the canvass goes on, Henry Lanot was leading Caruncho by thousands. Very few Election
Returns have Caruncho leading and even if leading, the lead was only a few votes.
Proper authorities from the Commission on Elections was secured through Atty. Teresita C. Suarez,
Election Director for National Capital Region for the purpose of making use of other copies of the
Election Returns particularly the Provincial Copy or the Copy in the Ballot Boxes. Fortunately, the
authorities arrived on time so that the Board of Canvassers waste(d) no time in opening the Ballot
Boxes to retrieve the copies from the Board of Canvassers left inside the Ballot Boxes by the
careless Board of Election Inspectors. Provincial copies were used as well in the reconstitution of the
missing page 2 of the 22 recovered Election Returns.
That there was no truth on the insinuation made by Atty. Irene D. Jurado that there were 147
Election Returns which were not canvassed which will affect the result of election for Emiliano
Caruncho. The Board did everything to have all election returns accounted forth (sic). We let no
stone unturned before we finally come to the conclusion. That we have finished canvassing the
1,491 Election Returns and proclaimed the winning candidates.
That granting without admitting that there were missing Election Returns which were uncanvassed,
and if ordered canvass(ed), the more Lanot will widen his lead because the trend was that Henry
Lanot's lead swollen (sic) as more election returns were canvassed.
That for the first time, I am revealing this shocking fact to the Commission on Elections that on two
(2) occasions, an unidentified persons (sic) talked to me at the unholy hours of the night 2 days while
canvassing was going on and offered me TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS in cold cash just
to proclaim "BOY" as the elected Congressman. I declined the offer and told the man that I am a
straight man, I am on the level, I have a family and I am about to retire. . . .
That at 2:40 A.M. of May 17, 1998, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed all the winning candidates
for Local positions. As to the Congressman, the following results are as follows:
August 30, 2014
90

HENRY LANOT 60,914 votes
EMILIANO "BOY" CARUNCHO 42,942 votes
ARNULFO ACEDERA 36,139 votes
The lead of Henry Lanot from Emiliano Caruncho was 17, 971 votes.
xxx xxx xxx
5

On June 24, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division
6
promulgated a Resolution
7
decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission:
1. Declares that the proclamation of the winning congressional candidate of Pasig City as NULL AND VOID;
2. Orders that the respondents-Members of the City Board of Canvassers of Pasig City to RECONVENE at the Session Hall of the
Commission and use the Comelec copy of the one hundred forty-seven (147) election returns above-mentioned and CANVASS said
authentic copy of the election returns and include the results thereof with the tally of all election returns previously canvassed and,
thereafter, PROCLAIM the winning candidate; and
3. Orders the Law Department of this Commission to investigate candidate Arnulfo Acedera and if after the investigation, the
evidence so warrant, to file the necessary charges against him.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, on June 26, 1998, respondent Board filed a "Supplemental Comment" raising the following matters:
(a) the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the case under Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code; (b) petitioner
failed to record his objections to the elections returns and the certificate of canvass in the minutes of the
proceedings of the Board, and (c) the winning candidate, Henry Lanot, was not impleaded in the motion to nullify his
proclamation.
8

On July 8, 1998, proclaimed winning candidate Henry Lanot filed a motion for leave to intervene in the case.
9
He
also prayed for the reconsideration of the June 24, 1998 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and for referral of
the case to the COMELEC en banc. In his motion for reconsideration
10
that was attached to said motion to intervene,
movant Lanot argued that failure to notify him of the case was fatal as he was a real party in interest who must be
impleaded therein. He also alleged that under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7166, the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction over the case and that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 was "not based on facts."
That same day, petitioner, represented by new counsel,
11
filed a motion praying for the "formation" of a new Board of
Canvassers on account of the June 24, 1998 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.
12
The following day, the
COMELEC Second Division issued an order setting the case for hearing and postponing the "reconvening of the City
Board of Canvassers of Pasig City."
13
On July 15, 1998, movant Lanot filed an opposition to the motion for the formation
of a new Board of Canvassers on the ground that the Resolution of June 24, 1998 is null and void for the following
reasons: (a) he was not notified of the proceedings and therefore his right to due process was violated; (b) said resolution
had not become final and executory by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, and (c) the case was no longer a pre-
proclamation controversy but an electoral protest under the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, not the COMELEC.
14

At the hearing on July 21, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the filing of memorandum. Movant Lanot,
however, manifested that he was no longer filing a memorandum. Thus, the COMELEC, ruled that "with or without
said memorandum," the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
15
Meanwhile, on July 27, 1998, petitioner filed an opposition to Lanot's motion for reconsideration
16
after
which Lanot filed his comment on the opposition.
17

On September 28, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division granted Lanot's motion for intervention and elevated his
motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.
18

Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc
19
promulgated a Resolution dated October 1, 1998 reconsidering the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division and dismissing petitioner's amended motion (petition) to nullify the proclamation on the
basis of incomplete returns for lack of merit.
20
Relying on facts narrated by the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in its
comment on the motion to nullify the proclamation, the COMELEC en banc found:
Thus, the board of canvassers did everything to have all election returns accounted for, and finished canvassing all the election
returns of 1,491 clustered precincts of Pasig City. On the basis of the canvass, the board proclaimed the winning candidates for
local positions. As to the winning candidate for congressman, the results were as follows:
Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes
August 30, 2014
91

Emiliano "Boy" Caruncho 42,942 votes
Arnulfo Acedera 36,139 votes
However, granting arguendo that there were missing twenty-two (22) election returns involving about 4,400 votes, the same no
longer affect the results of the election as candidate Henry P. Lanot obtained the highest number of votes, with a lead of 17,971
votes over his closest rival, Emiliano "Boy" Caruncho. The board of canvassers duly proclaimed candidate Henry P. Lanot as the
winning representative of the lone district of Pasig City.
Consequently, we find without basis petitioner's allegation that the proclamation of Henry P. Lanot was based on an incomplete
canvass. We carefully examined the Comelec copies of the Statement of Votes and found no truth to the assertion that there were
one hundred forty seven (147) election returns not canvassed.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner seeks to nullify respondent COMELEC en banc's Resolution of October 1, 1998, contending that said
body acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in overruling his claim that 147 election
returns involving about thirty thousand (30,000) votes were not canvassed. Petitioner argued that it was enough
reason for contesting the proclamation of Lanot as winner under an incomplete canvass. However, as in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, petitioner failed to implead in the instant petition the proclaimed winning
candidate, Lanot.
The petition must be dismissed.
Petitioner initiated this case through a motion to nullify the proclamation of Lanot as the winner in the congressional
race in Pasig City. Named respondents in the motion were the individual members of the Board of Canvassers in
that city. The proclaimed winner was not included among the respondents. For that reason alone, the COMELEC
should have been forewarned of a procedural lapse in the motion that would affect the substantive rights of the
winning candidate, if not the electorate. Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires
due notice and hearing.
21
The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of the
motion to set aside his proclamation.
22
It was only the intervention of Lanot in SPC 98-123, which the Second Division of
the COMELEC allowed, which cured the procedural lapse that could have affected the popular will of the electorate.
However, petitioner again failed to implead Lanot in the instant petition for certiorari. In this connection, Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
23
As the winning candidate whose
proclamation is sought to be nullified, Henry P. Lanot is a real party in interest in these proceedings. The COMELEC and
the Board of Canvassers of Pasig City are mere nominal parties whose decision should be defended by the real party in
interest, pursuant to Rule 65 of the said Rules:
Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-
judicial agency tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with
such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be
the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent or
respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the
private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an
answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein.If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public
respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not
appear or participate in the proceedings therein. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, quasi-judicial agencies should be joined as public respondents but it is the duty of the private respondent to
appear and defend such agency.
24
That duty cannot be fulfilled by the real party in interest such as the proclaimed
winning candidate in a proceeding to annul his proclamation if he is not even named as private respondent in the petition.
Ordinarily, the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party in interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of
the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance
with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the petition.
25
However, this being an election case which
should be resolved with dispatch considering the public interest involved, the Court has not deemed it necessary to
require that Henry P. Lanot be impleaded as a respondent in this case.
A crucial issue in this petition is what body has jurisdiction over a proclamation controversy involving a member of
the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. Article VI thereof states:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . .
August 30, 2014
92

The foregoing constitutional provision is reiterated in Rule 14 of the 1991 Revised Rules of the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives, to wit:
Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
In the recent case of Rasul v. COMELEC and Aquino-Oreta,
26
the Court, in interpreting the aforesaid constitutional
provision, stressed the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over its members, thus:
Sec. 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code provide that "(t)he Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . ." In Javier v. Comelec (144 SCRA 194), this Court interpreted the phrase
"election, returns and qualifications" as follows:
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to
the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns;
and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscore the
exclusivity of the Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members. Inasmuch as petitioner contests the
proclamation of herein respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner. . . .
In the same vein, considering that petitioner questions the proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winner in the
congressional race for the sole district of Pasig City, his remedy should have been to file an electoral protest with
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
27

Even granting arguendo that the thrust of petitioner's case is to question the integrity of the election returns or the
validity of the "incomplete canvass" as the basis for Henry Lanot's proclamation, and not the proclamation itself, still,
the instant petition is devoid of merit.
The factual question of how many election returns were missing as a consequence of the disruption of the
canvassing of election returns has been definitely resolved by the COMELEC en banc. Thus, raising the same issue
before this Court is pointless because this Court is not a trier of facts.
28
The facts established below show that all the
legal steps necessary to carry out the reconstitution of the missing page 2 of the twenty-two (22) election returns have
been followed. Proper authorization for the reconstitution of that page was secured from the COMELEC. The
reconstitution was based on the provincial copy of the election returns that was retrieved from the sealed ballot boxes. For
his part, petitioner failed to have the anomaly recorded in the minutes of proceedings of respondent Board as required by
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166. Respondent Board, therefore, observed the following provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code:
Sec. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. In case its copy of the election returns is missing, the board
canvassers shall, by messenger or otherwise, obtain such missing election returns from the board of election inspectors concerned,
or if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of the
authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission, and forthwith direct its
representative to investigate the case and immediately report the matter to the Commission.
The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have been received by it, may terminate the
canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the available election returns if the missing election returns will not
affect the results of the election.
Granting that the proclamation was made without taking into account the twenty-two (22) election returns, still, the
COMELEC did not abuse its discretion. The election returns represented only 4,400 votes. That number cannot
affect the result of the election because Henry Lanot's lead over his closest rival, herein petitioner, was 17,971
votes. As the second paragraph of Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code aforequoted states, the Board of
Canvassers could have totally disregarded the twenty-two (22) election returns and legally proclaimed Lanot as the
winner in the election in Pasig City for Member of the House of Representatives.
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation.
29
A canvass cannot
be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitted.
30
However, this is
true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election. It bears stressing that in
the case at bar, the COMELEC has categorically found that the election returns which were not counted by respondent
canvassers represented only 4,400 votes. To be sure, this number will not affect the result of the election considering that
Lanot's lead over petitioner was already 17,971 votes.
August 30, 2014
93

On the whole, this Court finds that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued
the assailed Resolution of October 1, 1998 dismissing petitioner's motion to nullify the proclamation of Henry P.
Lanot as Member of the House of Representatives for the lone district of Pasig City.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 134142. August 24, 1999]
SANTANINA TILLAH RASUL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
TERESA AQUINO-ORETA,respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J .:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to set aside Resolution No. 3047-A promulgated on May 29, 1998 of the Commission on
Elections (the Commission) en banc
[1]
proclaiming the twelve (12) winning senatorial candidates, particularly,
the proclamation of private respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta who is the twelfth (12th) winning
candidate. Further, the instant petition prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus against the respondent
Commission to compel it to canvass the remaining certificates of canvass and to conduct special elections in the
areas where no elections were held on May 11, 1998. The assailed resolution reads in full:
RESOLUTION NO. 3047-A
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
for the election of senators of the Philippines, officially canvassed in open and public proceedings
the certificates of canvass of votes cast nationwide for senators in the national and local elections
conducted on May 11, 1998.
NOW, THEREFORE, on the basis of the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass submitted by
seventy-eight (78) Provincial Boards of Canvassers, eighteen (18) City Boards of Canvassers of
cities comprising one or more legislative districts, four (4) District Boards of Canvassers of Metro
Manila, and one on absentee voting, the remaining uncanvassed certificates no longer affecting the
results, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers finds that
the following twelve (12) registered candidates for senator in said elections obtained the highest
number of votes set out after their respective names, as follows:
NAME NUMBER OF
VOTES
August 30, 2014
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1. LOREN B. LEGARDA-LEVISTE 14,996,764
2. RENATO L. CAYETANO 13,231,222
3. VICENTE C. SOTTO III 11,578,572
4. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR 10,267,969
5. ROBERT Z. BARBERS 9,805,188
6. RODOLFO G. BIAZON 9,395,603
7. BLAS F. OPLE 9,326,183
8. JOHN RENNER OSMEA 9,278,600
9. ROBERT S. JAWORSKI 8,955,002
10. RAMON B. REVILLA 8,707,391
11. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. 7,349,873
12. TERESA AQUINO-ORETA 7,238,086
AND, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), Republic Act Nos. 6646 and 7166, and other election laws, the
Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
hereby PROCLAIMS the above-named twelve (12) candidates the duly elected Senators of the
Philippines in the May 11, 1998, elections to serve for a term of six (6) years, beginning on
June 30, 1998, in accordance with Article VI, Section 4 of the Constitution.
x x x x x x x x x.
[2]

Petitioner argues that the Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when, acting as a National Board of Canvassers, it declared
that the remaining uncanvassed certificates would no longer affect the results and proceeded to
proclaim the twelve (12) winning senatorial candidates. Petitioner contends that due to the
indefinite suspension of special elections in some areas
[3]
, the total population of registered
voters affected number about 268,282; and that at the time of the proclamation of the `twelve
(12) winning candidates, 150,334 votes were not yet canvassed. Thus, the 268,686 registered
voters who have yet to cast their votes where special elections have been suspended, combined
with the uncanvassed votes of 150,334 from other areas of the country total
419,020. Consequently, petitioner submits that there is a possibility that 12th

ranking senatorial
candidate, Teresa Aquino-Oreta, who had a total number of votes of 7,269,444 or a lead of
280,012 votes over the 13th

placer, Roberto Pagdanganan, who had a total of 6,989,432, could
be dislodged by the latter, if the aforestated uncanvassed votes plus the number of registered
voters of the deferred special elections totaling 419,020 were considered. According to
petitioner, the number of votes is sufficient to affect the final result with respect to the 12th and
last winning position. In other words, petitioner submits that the inclusion of respondent Teresa
Aquino-Oreta who was ranked number 12 among the winning candidates was premature and
based on incomplete canvass.
[4]

In her comment, private respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta alleged that the instant petition
should be dismissed for being moot and academic considering, among others, that the
Commission had already completed the canvass of all the votes for the senatorial candidates;
that it has already conducted all the special elections prayed for by the petitioner; and the results
August 30, 2014
95

of the special elections conducted by the Commission did not affect the proclamation of all the
12 winning senatorial candidates.
[5]

Without necessarily going into the veracity of the proofs submitted by private respondent to
substantiate the foregoing allegations, we find the instant petition devoid of merit.
In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections
[6]
, this Court has ruled that where the candidate
has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to
file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. In like
manner, where as in the case at bar, petitioner assails the Commissions resolution proclaiming
the twelfth (12th) winning senatorial candidate, petitioners proper recourse was to file a regular
election protest which under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code exclusively
pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code provide that (t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of theirrespective Members. x x x.
[7]
In Javier vs. Comelec
[8]
, this Court
interpreted the phrase election, returns and qualifications as follows:
The phrase election, returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and thecasting and counting of thevotes;
returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election
returns; and qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligiblity or the inadequacy of his
certificate of candidacy.
[9]

The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunals jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.
[10]
Inasmuch as petitioner contests the proclamation of herein
respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the Senate
Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner. Rule
14 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides that an election protest must
be filed by any candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted upon for
the same office. It reads in full:
RULE 14. Election Protest. A verified petition contesting the election of any Member of the
Senate shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and been
voted for the Office of Senator within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the
protestee. No joint election protest shall be admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and sufficient
reasons, may consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them jointly.
The Office of the Solicitor General in its `Manifestation in Lieu of Comment filed before
this Court had pointed out that in a Resolution dated October 6, 1998
[11]
, this Court dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by Roberto M. Pagdanganan involving the same issues as the
case at bar for being moot and academic as Pagdanganan had already filed a case with the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. Had petitioner properly filed her election protest before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
August 30, 2014
96

same may have been consolidated with the protest of Roberto Pagdanganan for good and
sufficient reasons as required by said rules.
In fine, this Court may not take cognizance of this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28517 February 21, 1968
AMELITO R. MUTUC, GINES SORIANO with TV SCREEN NAME NESTOR DE VILLA, JOSE ALARILLA,
TOMAS A. BALUYUT, OSCAR CALVENTO, RAFAEL GAITE, MICHAEL JOSEPH, AMADO DE VERA, JR. and
FILOMENA VILLAMOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MAXIMO ESTRELLA, TEOTIMO GEALOGO, JOSE LUCIANO, JUSTINO
VENTURA, JOHNNY WILSON, PEDRO ISON, BERNARDO NONATO, IGNACIO BABASA, JUAN TENGCO and
CESAR ALZONA respondents.
Amelito R. Mutuc for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Ramon Barrios for respondents Comelec, et al.
CASTRO, J .:
The petitioners were the candidates of the Nacionalista Party, for the offices of
mayor, vice mayor and councilors in the municipality of Makati, Rizal in the general
elections held on November 14, 1967. The private respondents were the rival
candidates of the Liberal Party.
Originally brought here as an appeal from two resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), this case, in our resolution of January 17, 1968, was considered,
August 30, 2014
97

alternatively, as a special civil action for certiorari. In essence, it poses the novel
question of whether the Comelec has the power to order a canvass of the returns,
disregarding the return from one precinct which is blank or incomplete in the sense that
it does not have any entry of the votes cast for any candidates, upon its finding that the
votes from that precinct are not likely to alter the results of the election.
In counting the votes from the various precincts in Makati, the municipal board of
canvassers was confronted with an election return which, while listing the names of the
candidates, contained no entry at all of the votes cast for them. This was the return
from precinct 124. A recourse to the provincial treasurer's copy of the same return
yielded no result as it was likewise blank or incomplete. So was the Comelec's copy,
except that this showed the total number (263, according to the parties) of the votes
cast in the precinct. As a result, counting had to be stopped.
On November 20, the board of canvassers filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, alleging that because of discrepancies in the returns from certain
precincts in Makati, among them precinct 124, the board could not proclaim the
winning candidates, and, for this reason, praying for the opening of the ballot boxes in
the precincts in question.
The board did not, however, press its petition. Instead, it asked the Comelec on
November 24 to be allowed to proceed with the proclamation of the winning
candidates, disregarding for this purpose the return from precinct 124, on the claim that
as the Comelec's copy of the return showed that there was a total of only 263 votes
cast in that precinct, the results of that election would not materially be changed by
their inclusion.
The Comelec granted the request on the same day and set the proclamation of
the winners for the following day, November 25. Accordingly, the board of canvassers
reconvened and proclaimed the respondents elected to the various elective offices in
Makati on the basis of the canvass it had so far made, minus the return from precinct
124. It subsequently withdrew the petition it had previously filed in court for the opening
of the ballot boxes.
The petitioners asked the Comelec to reconsider its resolution of November 24
and to annul the proclamation of the respondents, but their motion was denied in
another resolution dated December 22.
Hence the present petition.
It is now a settled doctrine that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and
cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation.
1
Indeed, it is the ministerial duty of
a municipal canvassing body to count the votes cast "in the same manner as
hereinbefore provided for the provincial board [of canvassers],"
2
which means to say to
count all the votes cast. Thus, section 160 of the Election Code enjoins provincial
boards of canvassers as follows:
As soon as all the statements are before it but not later than fifteen days
next following the date of the election, the provincial board of canvassers shall
proceed to make a canvass of all the votes in province for national, provincial
and city candidates, and upon the completion of the canvass, shall make, as the
August 30, 2014
98

case may be, separate statements of all the votes received by each candidate . .
.
3

A municipal board of canvassers must therefore count all the votes cast in the
election and, for this purpose, must consider all returns presented to it by the municipal
treasurer. If material defects there are in the form of the returns, it must send them
back to the corresponding boards of inspectors for correction.
4
If certain precincts have
not sent in their returns, the board must send for them and the fiscal should forthwith
institute criminal proceedings against those who may be criminally responsible for the
delay.
5
If there is a discrepancy between two authentic copies of an election return and
the difference affects the result of the election, the board may ask the proper court of
first instance to order a recount of the ballots.
6

All these serve to underscore the need to count all the votes cast in an election.
Only when the returns are palpably irregular or obviously manufactured may they be
rejected
7
but even then the board must exercise "extreme caution."
8
And where a
return is falsified, the board may apply to the Comelec for authority to use another copy
which is genuine and authentic.
9
Why must all the votes be counted when there is a
need to finish the canvass on time so that proclamation can be made before the
beginning of the term of office? Because to disregard returns is in effect to disfranchise
the voters.
10

The Comelec was, under the circumstances, bereft of power to order the board
of canvassers of Makati to disregard the return from precinct 124, even if it noted from
its copy (which was likewise blank or incomplete) that the number of votes cast in the
precinct (263) was too small to be of any significance to any candidate. This, because
the Comelec has no power to decide questions involving the right to vote,
11
as to
disregard a return is in effect to deny the voters their votes.
As it is, the Comelec's judgment that the results of the election in Makati would
not be materially changed by the inclusion of the votes in precinct 124 is seriously
disputed by the petitioners, and indeed it is admitted by the respondents that between
the respondent Cesar Alzona, who garnered 18,190 votes to place eighth among the
councilors, and the petitioner Michael Joseph, who polled 17,969 to land on the ninth
spot, there is a difference of only 221 votes. Conceivably, the 263 votes in precinct 124
could upset the balance.
What the Comelec should have done is to take the logically obvious and simple
step of ordering the opening of the ballot box to find out if the copy of the return
deposited therein was properly accomplished and, if it was, to order that it be used in
the canvassing of the votes. This it had the power to do in the fulfillment of its
constitutional duty of insuring "free, orderly, and honest elections." And this it was
unimpeded and had ample time to do, considering that from November 24 when it
ordered the proclamation, there were still 37 days to go to the statutory date of
assumption of office by the elected candidates (January 1).
As this Court said in Cauton v. Commission on Elections:
12

If it is shown that the copies in the hands of the Commission on Elections
and of the municipal treasurer are similarly tampered [with] as the copies in the
hands of the provincial treasurer, then it becomes evident that all the three
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99

copies of the election returns outside the ballot box do not constitute a reliable
basis for a canvass. The only copies left to be checked . . . are the ones inside
the ballot boxes. Certainly, the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its
power to administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections may
order the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside each
ballot box is also tampered [with] like the three copies outside the ballot box,
corresponding to each precinct.
This is the reason why in two other

cases
13
we upheld the power of the Comelec
to direct canvassing boards to use returns other than those specified by law if the latter
are found to have been falsified.
It is, however, contended that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case because
the respondents have been proclaimed and have subsequently assumed office, and
that as a matter of fact some of the petitioners, more specifically the petitioner Michael
Joseph, have pending election protests in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
some of the respondents. It is indeed true that after proclamation the usual remedy of
any party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election protest. But that is only
on the assumption that there has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at
bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect
the basic issues.
14

In view of the conclusion we have thus reached, the Comelec should direct the
opening of the ballot box corresponding to precinct 124 for the purpose of retrieving the
copy of the election return deposited therein so that it may be used in canvassing anew
the votes cast for the local officials of Makati, and, should it be found that the ballot box
copy is likewise blank or incomplete, the Commission should order a count of the
ballots, giving notice, for this purpose, to all the candidates. This is the procedure that
best recommends itself, what with the lack of specific procedure for dealing with a
situation such as this. Judicial recount of the ballots under section 163 of the
Code
15
cannot be the remedy because there is no discrepancy between one, authentic
copy and another authentic copy of the same return. As we have earlier stated the
copies of the election return in this case contain no entries as to the number of votes
received by each candidate. So there really is no discrepancy, but only a failure to
accomplish the form of the return properly. Indeed what has been submitted is no
return at all.
In deciding this case in the way we now do, we are by no means to be
understood as formulating a rule to control future cases which, although factually and
substantially similar to the present case, may require an altogether different qualitative
approach. And we recognize that situations may and do arise where it becomes
advisable and wholly justified not to await all returns before proceeding with the
proclamation of the winning candidates. The solution we have here adopted has been
impelled by, and is predicated solely upon, the peculiar and unusual circumstances
here obtaining, relative to which the Comelec acted with inordinate haste.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions of the Commission on Elections of November
24, and December 22, 1967 are set aside, and the proclamation of all the private
respondents made on November 25, 1967 is annulled. The Commission on Elections
is hereby directed (1) to order the board of inspectors of precinct 124 of Makati, after
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due notice to all the candidates, to open the ballot box corresponding to the said
precinct for the purpose of retrieving therefrom the copy of the election return for use in
the new canvass to be held by the municipal board of canvassers, if said copy has
been properly accomplished, or, in the event that the said copy is blank or incomplete,
to count all the votes cast in the said precinct and then properly accomplish a return
based on such count; and (2) thereafter to order the municipal board of canvassers of
Makati, without delay and after due notice to all the candidates, to hold a new canvass
of all the votes cast in that municipality, and to proclaim the winning candidates in
accordance with the results thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,
vs.
August 30, 2014
101

REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ, J .:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its
twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber,
including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party.
1

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment
in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and
joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
members.
2

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On
December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
3

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and
injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the
petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.
4

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments
because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan.
5
His claim is that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because
the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being
the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed
the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered
to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae
in compliance with an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as
ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected
by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has the
competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House
of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v.
Cuenco.
6

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
August 30, 2014
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In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of
two members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been
validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the
petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only
himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators
Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-man
composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this
Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the
Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As the
majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and could not
also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of
the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this
argument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the
respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The
petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in
doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate
and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice
of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in
connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.
Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given
situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such
statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on
constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and
determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise
involved the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the
wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While
he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel
August 30, 2014
103

that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may,
for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually
questioning the respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For
another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases
7
that where serious constitutional
questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The
same policy has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections,
8
where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five members of the
Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be restrained
from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for
an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it.
Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could still
rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional
question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now
resolved.' It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us,
the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being
barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is
an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional
statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent
are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to
make a quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista
Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the
chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista
Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing
discontent over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what
was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in this
reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on appointments where three of the
Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who
had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration
Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and
respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court,
contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was
invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the
Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political
group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the
Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional
representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution.
The Court held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does
not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said House.
Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as votes shift
from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to
thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House
of Congress.
August 30, 2014
104

The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the
Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in
relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet
achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have
died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case
expressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress,
provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the
former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a
permanent change. That change fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments
after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional
REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority
of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a
consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the
Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against
members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of
their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the
House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary
number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to
the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the
Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who
was supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerably
simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-
registration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to
justify the questioned reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself,
then the proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP,
not being a duly registered political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges
granted by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot
legally claim the right to be considered in determining the required proportional
representation of political parties in the House of Representatives.
9

xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the
right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly
registered with the Comelec.
10

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date,
the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division
dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party.
11
This has
taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best
he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the
seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in
the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged."
The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a
faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the
Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946.
12
The Liberal Party won. At that
time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the
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105

Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority
party in both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of
Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the
Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements
among its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is
democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states
has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still
temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for
that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now
"history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they
belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen
members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the
Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection.
13
Inconsistently, the petitioner is now
opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than
half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general
congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even
be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has
not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us
is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained
of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if
the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes
the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the
alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a
defect, the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important
constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of
the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is
understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or
factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent
shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our
jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be
resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course,
we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but
merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we
do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989,
is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.
August 30, 2014
106

SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents.
Mary Concepcion Bautista for and in her own behalf.
Christine A.Tomas Espinosa for private respondent Hesiquio R. Mallillin

PADILLA, J .:
The Court had hoped that its decision in Sarmiento III vs. Mison,
1
would have settled the question of which
appointments by the President, under the 1987 Constitution, are to be made with and without the review of the
Commission on Appointments. The Mison case was the first major case under the 1987 Constitution and in construing
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
this Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and the country's
experience under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, held that only those appointments expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed by the Commission on Appointments, namely, "the heads of the
executive department, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution." All
other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments.
Accordingly, in the Mison case, the appointment of therein respondent Salvador M. Mison as head of the Bureau of
Customs, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, was held valid and in accordance with the
Constitution.
The Mison case doctrine did not foreclose contrary opinions. So with the very provisions of Sec. 16, Art. VII as
designed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution. But the Constitution, as construed by this Court in appropriate
cases, is the supreme law of the land. And it cannot be over-stressed that the strength of the Constitution, with all its
August 30, 2014
107

imperfections, lies in the respect and obedience accorded to it by the people, especially the officials of government,
who are the subjects of its commands.
Barely a year after Mison, the Court is again confronted with a similar question, this time, whether or not the
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an "independent office"
created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
(CA, for brevity). Once more, as in Mison, the Court will resolve the issue irrespective of the parties involved in the
litigation, mindful that what really matters are the principles that will guide this Administration and others in the years
to come.
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman
of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not
specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly
vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
2

The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second
sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they
are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section
2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights. It provides:
(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
The above conclusions appear to be plainly evident and, therefore, irresistible. However, the presence in this case
of certain elements absent in the Mison case makes necessary a closer scrutiny. The facts are therefore
essential.
On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista
as"Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights." The letter of designation reads:
27 August 1987
M a d a m:
You are hereby designated ACTING CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, to succeed
the late Senator Jose W. Diokno and Justice J. B. L. Reyes.
Very
truly
yours,
CORA
ZON C.
AQUIN
O
HON. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
3

Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and members of the Commission on Human Rights, befitting
an independent office, as mandated by the Constitution,
4
the President of the Philippines on 17 December 1988
extended to petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. The appointment letter is as
follows:
17
Decem
ber
1988
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108

The Honorable
The Chairman
Commission on Human Rights
Pasig, Metro Manila
M a d a m:
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, the following are hereby appointed to the positions
indicated opposite their respective names in the Commission on Human Rights:
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA Chairman
ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR Member
SAMUEL SORIANO Member
HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN Member
NARCISO C. MONTEIRO Member
By virtue hereof, they may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office
furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of their oath of office.
Very truly yours,
CORAZON C.
AQUINO
5

It is to be noted that by virtue of such appointment, petitioner Bautista was advised by the President that she could
qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights,
requiring her to furnish the office of the President and the Civil Service Commission with copies of her oath of office.
On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice of this Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan, petitioner Bautista took her
oath of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. The full text of the
oath of office is as follows:
OATH OF OFFICE
I, MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA of 3026 General G. del Pilar Street, Bangkal, Makati, Metro
Manila having been appointed to the position of CHAIRMAN of the Commission on Human Rights,
do solemnly swear that I will discharge to the best of my ability all the duties and responsibilities of
the office to which I have been appointed; uphold the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
and obey all the laws of the land without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
MARY CONCEPCION
BAUTISTA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 22nd day of December in the year of Our Lord,
1988 in Manila.
MARCELO B.
FERNAN
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the
Philippines
6

Immediately, after taking her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista
discharged the functions and duties of the Office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which, as
previously stated, she had originally held merely in an acting capacity beginning 27 August 1987.
On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information and documents as required by its rules in connection
with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.
7
On 10 January 1989,
the Commission on Appointments' Secretary again wrote petitioner Bautista requesting her presence at a meeting of the
Commission on Appointments Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights set for 19 January 1989
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109

at 9 A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City that would deliberate on her
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.
8

On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating, for the
reasons therein given, why she considered the Commission on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. The petitioner's letter to the Commission on
Appointments' Chairman reads:
Januar
y 13, 1
989
SENATE PRESIDENT JOVITO R. SALONGA
Chairman
Commission on Appointments
Senate, Manila
S i r:
We acknowledge receipt of the communication from the Commission on Appointments requesting
our appearance on January 19, 1989 for deliberation on our appointments.
We respectfully submit that the appointments of the Commission commissioners of the Human
Rights Commission are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The Constitution, in Article VII Section 16 which expressly vested on the President the appointing
power, has expressly mentioned the government officials whose appointments are subject to the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of Congress. The Commissioners of the
Commission on Human Rights are not included among those.
Where the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments is required, as in the case of the
Constitutional Commissions such as the Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Elections, it was expressly provided that the nominations will be subject to
confirmation of Commission on Appointments. The exclusion again of the Commission on Human
Rights, a constitutional office, from this enumeration is a clear denial of authority to the Commission
on Appointments to review our appointments to the Commission on Human Rights.
Furthermore, the Constitution specifically provides that this Commission is an independent
office which:
a. must investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights;
b. shall monitor the government's compliance in all our treaty obligations on human
rights. We submit that, the monitoring of all agencies of government, includes even
Congress itself, in the performance of its functions which may affect human rights;
c. may call on all agencies of government for the implementation of its mandate.
The powers of the Commission on Appointments is in fact a derogation of the Chief Executive's
appointing power and therefore the grant of that authority to review a valid exercise of the executive
power can never be presumed. It must be expressly granted.
The Commission on Appointments has no jurisdiction under the Constitution to review appointments
by the President of Commissioners of the Commission on Human Rights.
In view of the foregoing considerations, as Chairman of an independent constitutional office. I cannot
submit myself to the Commission on Appointments for the purpose of confirming or rejecting my
appointment.
Very truly yours,
MARY
CONC
August 30, 2014
110

EPCIO
N
BAUTI
STA
Chairm
an
9

In respondent Commission's comment (in this case), dated 3 February 1989, there is attached as Annex 1 a letter of
the Commission on Appointments' Secretary to the Executive Secretary, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr. making
reference to the "ad interim appointment which Her Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista on 14
January 1989 as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights"
10
and informing Secretary Macaraig that, as
previously conveyed to him in a letter of 25 January 1989, the Commission on Appointments disapproved petitioner
Bautista's "ad interim appointment' as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in view of her refusal to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments. The letter reads:
1

F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y

1
9
8
9
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary
Malacanang, Manila
S i r:
This refers to the ad interim appointment which Her Excellency extended to Atty. Mary Concepcion
Bautista on 14 January 1989 as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights.
As we conveyed to you in our letter of 25 January 1989, the Commission on Appointments,
assembled in plenary (session) on the same day, disapproved Atty. Bautista's ad
interim appointment as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in view of her refusal to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.
This is to inform you that the Commission on Appointments, likewise assembled in plenary (session)
earlier today, denied Senator Mamintal A. J. Tamano's motion for reconsideration of the disapproval
of Atty. Bautista's ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights.
Very
truly
yours,
R
A
O
U
L

V
.

V
I
C
August 30, 2014
111

T
O
R
I
N
O

S
e
c
r
e
t
a
r
y

1
1

On the same date (1 February 1989), the Commission on Appointments' Secretary informed petitioner Bautista that
the motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights" was denied by the Commission on Appointments. The letter reads as follows:
1
Februa
ry 1989
ATTY. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA
Commission on Human Rights
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Bldg. Pasig, Metro Manila
Dear Atty. Bautista:
Pursuant to Sec. 6 (a), Chapter II of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, the denial by the
Commission on Appointments, assembled in plenary (session) earlier today, of Senator Mamintal
A.J. Tamano's motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of your ad interim appointment as
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights is respectfully conveyed.
Thank you for your attention.
Very
truly
yours,
R
A
O
U
L

V
.

V
I
C
T
O
R
I
N
O

August 30, 2014
112

S
e
c
r
e
t
a
r
y

1
2

In Annex 3 of respondent Commission's same comment, dated 3 February 1989, is a news item appearing in the 3
February 1989 issue of the "Manila Standard" reporting that the President had designated PCHR Commissioner
Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission" pending the resolution of Bautista's case which had
been elevated to the Supreme Court. The news item is here quoted in full, thus
Aquino names replacement for MaryCon
President Aquino has named replacement for Presidential Commission on Human Rights Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista whose appointment was rejected anew by the Congressional commission
on appointments.
The President designated PCHR commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as acting chairman of the
Commission pending the resolution of Bautista's case which had been elevated to the Supreme
Court.
The President's action followed after Congressional Commission on Appointments Chairman,
Senate President Jovito Salonga declared Bautista can no longer hold on to her position after her
appointment was not confirmed for the second time.
For all practical purposes, Salonga said Bautista can be accused of usurpation of authority if she
insists to stay on her office.
In effect, the President had asked Bautista to vacate her office and give way to Mallillin (Mari Villa)
13

On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission on Appointments had acted on her "ad
interimappointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" petitioner Bautista filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as unlawful
and unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action of the Commission on Appointments as well
as of the Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully extended appointment
of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the ground that they have no lawful and
constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment."
14

The prayer for temporary restraining order was "to enjoin the respondent Commission on Appointments not to
proceed further with their deliberation and/or proceedings on the appointment of the petitioner ... nor to enforce,
implement or act on any order, resolution, etc. issued in the course of their deliberations."
15

Respondents were required to file comment within ten (10) days.
16
On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an amended
petition, with urgent motion for restraining order, impleading Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin the designated acting
chairman as party respondent and praying for the nullification of his appointment. The succeeding day, a supplemental
urgent ex-parte motion was filed by petitioner seeking to restrain respondent Mallillin from continuing to exercise the
functions of chairman and to refrain from demanding courtesy resignations from officers or separating or dismissing
employees of the Commission.
Acting on petitioner's amended petition and supplemental urgent ex-parte motion, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order directing respondent Mallillin to cease and desist from effecting the dismissal, courtesy
resignation, i removal and reorganization and other similar personnel actions.
17
Respondents were likewise required
to comment on said amended petition with allowance for petitioner to file a reply within two (2) days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
Respondents Senator Salonga, the Commission on Appointments the Committee on J & BC and Human Rights filed
a comment to the amended petition on 21 February 1989.
18
Petitioner filed her reply.
19
On 24 February 1989,
August 30, 2014
113

respondent Mallillin filed a separate comment.
20
The Court required petitioner to reply to respondent Mallillin's comment
.
21
Petitioner filed her reply.
22

In deference to the Commission on Appointments, an instrumentality of a co-ordinate and co-equal branch of
government, the Court did not issue a temporary restraining order directed against it. However, this does not mean
that the issues raised by the petition, as met by the respondents' comments, will not be resolved in this case. The
Court will not shirk from its duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, in the same way that it did not in Mison.
As disclosed by the records, and as previously adverted to, it is clear that petitioner Bautista was extended by Her
Excellency, the President a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17
December 1988. Before this date, she was merely the "Acting Chairman" of the Commission. Bautista's appointment
on 17 December 1988 is an appointment that was for the President solely to make, i.e., not an appointment to be
submitted for review and confirmation (or rejection) by the Commission on Appointments. This is in accordance with
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine in Mison which is here reiterated.
The threshold question that has really come to the fore is whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17
December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which she had been appointed, by taking
the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging the functions and duties thereof, could extend another
appointment to the petitioner on 14 January 1989, an "ad interim appointment" as termed by the respondent
Commission on Appointments or any other kind of appointment to the same office of Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights that called for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive and Legislative Departments of government, and after careful
deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the negative. When Her Excellency, the President converted
petitioner Bautista's designation as Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by
virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office (of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the
appointment. Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President. To paraphrase the
great jurist, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in the celebrated case of Marbury vs. Madison.
23

xxx xxx xxx
The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The appointment being the sole act of the
President, must be completely evidenced, when it is shown that he has done everything to be
performed by him.
xxx xxx xxx
Some point of time must be taken when the power of the executive over an officer, not removable at
his will must cease. That point of time must be when the constitutional power of appointment has
been exercised. And this power has been exercised when the last act, required from the person
possessing the power, has been performed. ....
xxx xxx xxx
But having once made the appointment, his (the President's) power over the office is terminated in
all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the
person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.
xxx xxx xxx
THE "APPOINTMENT" OF PETITIONER BAUTISTA ON 14 JANUARY 1989
It is respondent Commission's submission that the President, after the appointment of 17 December 1988 extended
to petitioner Bautista, decided to extend another appointment (14 January 1989) to petitioner Bautista, this time,
submitting such appointment (more accurately, nomination) to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
And yet, it seems obvious enough, both in logic and in fact, that no new or further appointment could be made to a
position already filled by a previously completed appointment which had been accepted by the appointee, through a
valid qualification and assumption of its duties.
August 30, 2014
114

Respondent Commission vigorously contends that, granting that petitioner's appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison
case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it is within the president's prerogative to voluntarily submit such
appointment to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation. The mischief in this contention, as the Court
perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the President (with Congress agreeing) may, from time to time move power
boundaries, in the Constitution differently from where they are placed by the Constitution.
The Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned
with power not political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative
(Commission on Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The evident constitutional
intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the matter of appointments to public office, between the
President and Congress (the latter acting through the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of
the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent that the Constitution has blocked
off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so
also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission on
Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of political
options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained.
Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review
presidential appointments, create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President
alone. Stated differently, when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to make
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, the executive's voluntary act of submitting such
appointment to the Commission on Appointments and the latter's act of confirming or rejecting the same, are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction.
EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN
APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO
VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989
Under this heading, we will assume, ex gratia argumenti, that the Executive may voluntarily allow the Commission
on Appointments to exercise the power of review over an appointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution in
the President. Yet, as already noted, when the President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the
position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with the advice to her that by virtue of such appointment
(not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her
duties after taking her oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the subject position which, under the
Constitution, is to be made, in the first place, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, was then
and there a complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath
of office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed her, indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy in the
subject office on 14 January 1989 to which an appointment could be validly made. In fact, there is no vacancy in
said office to this day.
Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or re-appointment on 14 January 1989 was
anad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to
appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad
interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the
review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that
are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, can not
bead interim appointments.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 163-A, 30 JUNE 1987, PROVIDING THAT THE TENURE OF THE CHAIRMAN AND
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SHALL BE AT THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Respondent Mallillin contends that with or without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, petitioner
Bautista, as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, can be removed from said office at anytime, at the
pleasure of the President; and that with the disapproval of Bautista's appointment (nomination) by the Commission
on Appointments, there was greater reason for her removal by the President and her replacement with respondent
Mallillin Thus, according to respondent Mallillin the petition at bar has become moot and academic.
We do not agree that the petition has become moot and academic. To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding
oneself that day is night just because the drapes are drawn and the lights are on. For, aside from the substantive
questions of constitutional law raised by petitioner, the records clearly show that petitioner came to this Court in
timely manner and has not shown any indication of abandoning her petition.
August 30, 2014
115

Reliance is placed by respondent Mallillin on Executive Order No. 163-A, 30 June 1987, full text of which is as
follows:
WHEREAS, the Constitution does not prescribe the term of office of the Chairman and Members of
the Commission on Human Rights unlike those of other Constitutional Commissions;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Section 2, sub-paragraph (c) of Executive Order No. 163 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the
President. Their tenure in office shall be at the pleasure of the President.
SEC. 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, this 30th
day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
(Sgd.)
CORA
ZON C.
AQUIN
O
Preside
nt of
the
Philippi
nes
By the President:
(Sgd.) JOKER P. ARROYO
Executive Secretary
24

Previous to Executive Order No. 163-A, or on 5 May 1987, Executive Order No. 163
25
was issued by the President,
Sec. 2(c) of which provides:
Sec. 2(c). The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed
by the President for a term of seven years without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (No. 163) speaks of a term of office of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights which is seven (7) years without reappointment the later
executive order (163-A) speaks of the tenure in office of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights, which is "at the pleasure of the President."
Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office. As Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Concepcion in his
concurring opinion in Alba vs. Evangelista,
26
stated:
The distinction between "term" and "tenure" is important, for, pursuant to the Constitution, "no officer
or employee in the Civil Service may be removed or suspended except for cause, as provided by
law" (Art. XII, section 4), and this fundamental principle would be defeated if Congress could legally
make the tenure of some officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President, by clothing the
latter with blanket authority to replace a public officer before the expiration of his term.
27

When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision that
"the term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission (on Human Rights)
shall be provided by law" (Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of the Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) years,
without reappointment, as provided by Executive Order No. 163, and consistent with the constitutional design to give
the Commission the needed independence to perform and accomplish its functions and duties, the tenure in office of
said Chairman (and Members) cannot be later made dependent on the pleasure of the President.
August 30, 2014
116

Nor can respondent Mallillin find support in the majority opinion in the Alba case, supra, because the power of the
President, sustained therein, to replace a previously appointed vice-mayor of Roxas City given the express provision
in Sec. 8, Rep. Act No. 603 (creating the City of Roxas) stating that the vice-mayor shall serve at the pleasure of the
President, can find no application to the Chairman of an INDEPENDENT OFFICE, created not by statute but by the
Constitution itself. Besides, unlike in the Alba case, here the Constitution has decreed that the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall have a "term of office."
Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created by the
Constitution to be independent as the Commission on Human Rights-and vested with the delicate and vital functions
of investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as
remedial measures therefor, can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its
Chairman and Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being
antithetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared
unconstitutional.
The Court is not alone in viewing Executive Order No. 163-A as containing the seeds of its constitutional
destruction. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly point to its being plainly at war with the
constitutional intent of independence for the Commission. Thus
MR. GARCIA (sponsor). Precisely, one of the reasons why it is important for this body to be
constitutionalized is the fact that regardless of who is the President or who holds the executive
power, the human rights issue is of such importance that it should be safeguarded and it should be
independent of political parties or powers that are actually holding the reins of government. Our
experience during the martial law period made us realize how precious those rights are and,
therefore, these must be safeguarded at all times.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GARCIA. I would like to state this fact: Precisely we do not want the term or the power of the
Commission on Human Rights to be coterminous with the president, because the President's power
is such that if he appoints a certain commissioner and that commissioner is subject to the President,
therefore, any human rights violations committed under the person's administration will be subject to
presidential pressure. That is what we would like to avoid to make the protection of human rights
go beyond the fortunes of different political parties or administrations in power.
28

xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO (sponsor). Yes, Madam President. I conferred with the honorable Chief Justice
Concepcion and retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes and they believe that there should be an independent
Commission on Human Rights free from executive influence because many of the irregularities on
human rights violations are committed by members of the armed forces and members of the
executive branch of the government. So as to insulate this body from political interference, there is a
need to constitutionalize it.
29

xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO: On the inquiry on whether there is a need for this to be constitutionalized, I would
refer to a previous inquiry that there is still a need for making this a constitutional body free or
insulated from interference. I conferred with former Chief Justice Concepcion and the acting
chairman of the Presidential Committee on Human Rights, retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, and they are
one in saying that this body should be constitutionalized so that it will be free from executive control
or interferences, since many of the abuses are committed by the members of the military or the
armed forces.
30

xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Congress can create this body, but as I have said, if we leave it to
Congress, this commission will be within the reach of politicians and of public officers and that to me
is dangerous. We should insulate this body from political control and political interference because of
the nature of its functions to investigate all forms of human rights violations which are principally
committed by members of the military, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
31

xxx xxx xxx
August 30, 2014
117

MR. GARCIA. The critical factor here is political control, and normally, when a body is appointed by
Presidents who may change, the commission must remain above these changes in political control.
Secondly, the other important factor to consider are the armed forces, the police forces which have
tremendous power at their command and, therefore, we would need a commission composed of
men who also are beyond the reach of these forces and the changes in political administration.
32

xxx xxx xxx
MR MONSOD. Yes, It is the committee's position that this proposed special body, in order to
function effectively, must be invested with an independence that is necessary not only for its
credibility but also for the effectiveness of its work. However, we want to make a distinction in this
Constitution. May be what happened was that it was referred to the wrong committee. In the opinion
of the committee, this need not be a commission that is similar to the three constitutional
commissions like the COA, the COMELEC, and the Civil Service. It need not be in that article.
33

xxx xxx xxx
MR. COLAYCO. The Commissioners earlier objection was that the Office of the President is not
involved in the project. How sure are we that the next President of the Philippines will be somebody
we can trust? Remember, even now there is a growing concern about some of the bodies, agencies
and commission created by President Aquino.
34

xxx xxx xxx
.... Leaving to Congress the creation of the Commission on Human Rights is giving less importance
to a truly fundamental need to set up a body that will effectively enforce the rules designed to uphold
human rights.
35

PETITIONER BAUTISTA MAY OF COURSE BE REMOVED BUT ONLY FOR CAUSE
To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and
her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7)
year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due process
properly safeguarded. In the case of NASECO vs. NLRC,
36
this Court held that before a rank-and-file employee of the
NASECO, a government-owned corporation, could be dismissed, she was entitled to a hearing and due process. How
much more, in the case of the Chairman of a constitutionally mandated INDEPENDENT OFFICE, like the Commission on
Human Rights.
If there are charges against Bautista for misfeasance or malfeasance in office, charges may be filed against her with
the Ombudsman. If he finds a prima facie case against her, the corresponding information or informations can be
filed with the Sandiganbayan which may in turn order her suspension from office while the case or cases against her
are pending before said court.
37
This is due process in action. This is the way of a government of laws and not of men.
A FINAL WORD
It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the rule of law, after petitioner Bautista had elevated her case
to this Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated an Acting Chairman for the Commission on Human Rights
(pending decision in this case) instead of appointing another permanent Chairman. The latter course would have
added only more legal difficulties to an already difficult situation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits,
privileges and emoluments of said office. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against
respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is
made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

August 30, 2014
118

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and
GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the
Commission on Elections, respondents.
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
Before us is an original Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G.
Matibag ("Petitioner" for brevity) questions the constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of the
following: (1) Alfredo L. Benipayo ("Benipayo" for brevity) as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC" for brevity); and (2) Resurreccion Z. Borra ("Borra" for brevity) and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. ("Tuason"
for brevity) as COMELEC Commissioners. Petitioner also questions the legality of the appointment of Velma J.
Cinco
1
("Cinco" for brevity) as Director IV of the COMELECs Education and Information Department ("EID" for
brevity).
The Facts
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February
15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a
"Temporary" capacity. On February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of
petitioner to the same position in a "Temporary" capacity.
2

On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman,
3
and Borra
4
and Tuason
5
as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring
on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and
Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of
the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interimappointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation.
6
However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said
appointments.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the
same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008.
7
They took their oaths of office
for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation.
8

Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8,
2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to
the same positions.
9
The Office of the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on
Appointments.
10
They took their oaths of office anew.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001
11
addressed to
petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge
of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K.
Sadain objected to petitioners reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001
12
addressed to the
COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-
in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department.
13
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during
the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on
April 18, 2001,
14
citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, which states in part:
August 30, 2014
119

"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the foregoing
prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new employees or fill new
positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the effective performance of its
mandated functions during the prohibited period, provided that the changes in the assignment of its field
personnel within the thirty-day period before election day shall be effected after due notice and hearing."
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated
April 23, 2001.
15
Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint
16
with the Law Department
17
against
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of
the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on
temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her
removal as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. Simultaneously, petitioner
challenges the designation of Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID. Petitioner, moreover, questions the legality of
the disbursements made by COMELEC Finance Services Department Officer-in-Charge Gideon C. De Guzman to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and other emoluments.
In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad
interimappointments of Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners, respectively,
for a term of seven years expiring on February 2, 2008.
18
They all took their oaths of office anew.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of this Court are as follows:
1. Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may exercise its power of
judicial review in constitutional cases;
2. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interimappointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution;
3. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the
same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
4. Whether or not Benipayos removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment
to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a
collegial body;
5. Whether or not the Officer-in-Charge of the COMELECs Finance Services Department, in continuing to make
disbursements in favor of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco, is acting in excess of jurisdiction.
First Issue: Propriety of Judicial Review
Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this Court may exercise its power of
judicial review in constitutional cases. Out of respect for the acts of the Executive department, which is co-equal with
this Court, respondents urge this Court to refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of the ad interimappointments
issued by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason unless all the four requisites are present. These are: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional issue; (3) the exercise of the judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case.
19
Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are
absent in this case. Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the
case because she has not sustained a direct injury as a result of the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out that petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to
any of the positions assumed by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by
the appointments of these three respondents.
August 30, 2014
120

Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments at the
earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001 despite the fact that the ad
interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued as early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the petition
was filed after the third time that these three respondents were issued ad interim appointments.
Respondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legality of petitioners reassignment from the EID to the Law
Department. Consequently, the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments is not the lis mota of this case.
We are not persuaded.
Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to the Law Department, where she
was placed on detail service.
20
Respondents claim that the reassignment was "pursuant to x x x Benipayos authority
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and as the Commissions Chief Executive Officer."
21
Evidently,
respondents anchor the legality of petitioners reassignment on Benipayos authority as Chairman of the COMELEC.
The real issue then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is
only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC
Chairman, an office created by the Constitution.
On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed office in accordance with
the Constitution, then petitioners reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the
reassignment is in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake in
the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayos assumption of office. Petitioners personal and substantial injury,
if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the
constitutional issue in this petition.
Respondents harp on petitioners belated act of questioning the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad
interimappointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of filing of the petition that
determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a
constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it
is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal."
22
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the
constitutional issue before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound
discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon.
23
There is no doubt petitioner raised the
constitutional issue on time.
Moreover, the legality of petitioners reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of Benipayos ad
interimappointment and assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality of Benipayos ad interim appointment and
assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioners reassignment from the EID to the Law Department cannot
be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The legality of the directives
and decisions made by the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections may be put in doubt if
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this Courts duty to determine whether
other agencies of government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion
given them, this Court may even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue
raised.
24
Here the petitioner has complied with all the requisite technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires the
resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Second Issue: The Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment
Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the COMELEC is a temporary appointment that is prohibited by
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her
pleasure, and can even be disapproved or simply by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. For this reason,
petitioner claims that an ad interim appointment is temporary in character and consequently prohibited by the last
sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
August 30, 2014
121

Based on petitioners theory, there can be no ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to the other two
constitutional commissions, namely the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit. The last sentence
of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution is also found in Article IX-B and Article IX-D providing for the
creation of the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit, respectively. Petitioner interprets the last
sentence of Section 1 (2) of Article IX-C to mean that the ad interim appointee cannot assume office until his
appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments for only then does his appointment become
permanent and no longer temporary in character.
The rationale behind petitioners theory is that only an appointee who is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments can guarantee the independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed appointee is beyond the influence of
the President or members of the Commission on Appointments since his appointment can no longer be recalled or
disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, the appointee is at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers
since his appointment can be terminated at any time for any cause. In the words of petitioner, a Sword of Damocles
hangs over the head of every appointee whose confirmation is pending with the Commission on Appointments.
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution provides as follows:
"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can
no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time
and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim appointment is permanent in character.
In Summers vs. Ozaeta,
25
decided on October 25, 1948, we held that:
"x x x an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), Section 10, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is an appointment permanent in nature,
and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its
provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an acting appointment
which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued." (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad
interimappointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de
jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,
26
this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as follows:
"A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the
President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus
named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The
individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is
complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."
Petitioner cites Blacks Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time
being." Hence, petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment is undoubtedly temporary in character. This
argument is not new and was answered by this Court in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,
27
where we explained that:
"x x x From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should experience difficulty in understanding the
situation. Private respondent had been extended several ad interim appointments which petitioner mistakenly
understands as appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word ad interim which
August 30, 2014
122

creates such belief. The term is defined by Black to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time being". Thus, an
officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or
temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent (Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not
the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Estebans appointments, the
term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in
which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the
Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter with the power of appointment, is unable to
act. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the
Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to
explain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of
Appeals,
28
where the Court stated:
"We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the
appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity,
rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. In the instant case, the appointment
extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor
limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondents appointment as Executive Assistant II
was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioners
submission that private respondents ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary appointment
which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent
but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them." (Emphasis supplied)
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee
and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that "[n]o officer or employee in the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law."
29
Thus, an ad interim appointment
becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of
anad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and
any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.
30
Once an appointee has qualified, he
acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be
removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the
disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes
are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory
conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can
complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad
interim appointees.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or
designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power.
31
A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the
kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional
commissions, including the COMELEC. Thus, in Brillantes vs. Yorac,
32
this Court struck down as unconstitutional
the designation by then President Corazon Aquino of Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson
of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that:
"A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will.
No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the
Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted
such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.
x x x
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections,
foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is not available to the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the
Philippines."
August 30, 2014
123

Earlier, in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista,
33
a case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which did not have a
provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments to the COMELEC, this Court nevertheless declared
unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor General as acting member of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that
the designation of an acting Commissioner would undermine the independence of the COMELEC and hence violate
the Constitution. We declared then: "It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of
the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to act temporarily." (Emphasis
supplied)
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were
extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac
34
and Solicitor General
Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
35
The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"
36
, this provision should be harmonized
with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC
requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume
office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution.
The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution - on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments - did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to
remain in session throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the need
to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. The following discussion during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission elucidates this:
"FR. BERNAS: X x x our compulsory recess now is only 30 days. So under such circumstances, is it
necessary to provide for ad interim appointments? Perhaps there should be a little discussion on that.
x x x
MS. AQUINO: My concern is that unless this problem is addressed, this might present problems in terms of
anticipating interruption of government business, considering that we are not certain of the length of
involuntary recess or adjournment of the Congress. We are certain, however, of the involuntary adjournment
of the Congress which is 30 days, but we cannot leave to conjecture the matter of involuntary recess.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct, but we are trying to look for a formula. I wonder if the Commissioner has a
formula x x x.
x x x
MR. BENGZON: Madam President, apropos of the matter raised by Commissioner Aquino and after
conferring with the Committee, Commissioner Aquino and I propose the following amendment as the last
paragraph of Section 16, the wordings of which are in the 1935 Constitution: THE PRESIDENT SHALL
HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE RECESS OF CONGRESS WHETHER IT
BE VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL
DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF
THE CONGRESS.
This is otherwise called the ad interim appointments.
x x x
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to the proposed amendment of Commissioners Aquino and
Bengzon, adding a paragraph to the last paragraph of Section 16? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendment is approved."
37
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the
purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies
in government offices, including the three constitutional commissions. In his concurring opinion inGuevara vs.
August 30, 2014
124

Inocentes,
38
decided under the 1935 Constitution, Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. explained the rationale behind ad
interim appointments in this manner:
"Now, why is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limited? Because, if they expired before the session
of Congress, the evil sought to be avoided interruption in the discharge of essential functions may take
place. Because the same evil would result if the appointments ceased to be effective during the session of
Congress and before its adjournment. Upon the other hand, once Congress has adjourned, the evil
aforementioned may easily be conjured by the issuance of other ad interim appointments or
reappointments." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the timely application of the last sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution barely avoided the
interruption of essential government services in the May 2001 national elections. Following the decision of this Court
in Gaminde vs. Commission on Appointments,
39
promulgated on December 13, 2000, the terms of office of
constitutional officers first appointed under the Constitution would have to be counted starting February 2, 1987, the
date of ratification of the Constitution, regardless of the date of their actual appointment. By this reckoning, the terms
of office of three Commissioners of the COMELEC, including the Chairman, would end on February 2, 2001.
40

Then COMELEC Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou was appointed only on January 11, 2000 to serve, pursuant to
her appointment papers, until February 15, 2002,
41
the original expiry date of the term of her predecessor, Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo, who was elevated to this Court. The original expiry date of the term of Commissioner Teresita
Dy-Liacco Flores was also February 15, 2002, while that of Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was November 3,
2001.
42
The original expiry dates of the terms of office of Chairperson Demetriou and Commissioners Flores and
Desamito were therefore supposed to fall after the May 2001 elections. Suddenly and unexpectedly, because of
the Gaminde ruling, there were three vacancies in the seven-person COMELEC, with national elections looming
less than three and one-half months away. To their credit, Chairperson Demetriou and Commissioner Flores
vacated their offices on February 2, 2001 and did not question any more before this Court the applicability of
theGaminde ruling to their own situation.
In a Manifestation
43
dated December 28, 2000 filed with this Court in the Gaminde case, Chairperson Demetriou
stated that she was vacating her office on February 2, 2001, as she believed any delay in choosing her successor
might create a "constitutional crisis" in view of the proximity of the May 2001 national elections. Commissioner
Desamito chose to file a petition for intervention
44
in the Gaminde case but this Court denied the intervention. Thus,
Commissioner Desamito also vacated his office on February 2, 2001.
During an election year, Congress normally goes on voluntary recess between February and June considering that
many of the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate run for re-election. In 2001, the Eleventh
Congress adjourned from January 9, 2001 to June 3, 2001.
45
Concededly, there was no more time for Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason, who were originally extended ad interim appointments only on March 22, 2001, to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments before the May 14, 2001 elections.
If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were not extended ad interim appointments to fill up the three vacancies in the
COMELEC, there would only have been one division functioning in the COMELEC instead of two during the May
2001 elections. Considering that the Constitution requires that "all x x x election cases shall be heard and decided in
division",
46
the remaining one division would have been swamped with election cases. Moreover, since under the
Constitution motions for reconsideration "shall be decided by the Commission en banc", the mere absence of one of
the four remaining members would have prevented a quorum, a less than ideal situation considering that the
Commissioners are expected to travel around the country before, during and after the elections. There was a great
probability that disruptions in the conduct of the May 2001 elections could occur because of the three vacancies in
the COMELEC. The successful conduct of the May 2001 national elections, right after the tumultuous EDSA II and
EDSA III events, was certainly essential in safeguarding and strengthening our democracy.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make ad
interimappointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to
be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the prospective
appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume
office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows
the appointee to immediately qualify and assume office.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a
matter within the prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot
inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent
August 30, 2014
125

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the
instant case.
The issuance by Presidents of ad interim appointments to the COMELEC is a long-standing practice. Former
President Corazon Aquino issued an ad interim appointment to Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg.
47
Former President
Fidel V. Ramos extended ad interim appointments to Commissioners Julio F. Desamito, Japal M. Guiani,
Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall and Manolo F. Gorospe.
48
Former President Joseph Estrada also extended ad
interim appointments to Commissioners Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, Luzviminda Tancangco, Mehol K. Sadain and
Ralph C. Lantion.
49

The Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed briefly put the appointee at the mercy of both
the appointing and confirming powers. This situation, however, is only for a short period - from the time of issuance
of the ad interim appointment until the Commission on Appointments gives or withholds its consent. The Constitution
itself sanctions this situation, as a trade-off against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also
part of the check-and-balance under the separation of powers, as a trade-off against the evil of granting the
President absolute and sole power to appoint. The Constitution has wisely subjected the Presidents appointing
power to the checking power of the legislature.
This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body. The
vacancies in the COMELEC are precisely staggered to insure that the majority of its members hold confirmed
appointments, and not one President will appoint all the COMELEC members.
50
In the instant case, the Commission
on Appointments had long confirmed four
51
of the incumbent COMELEC members, comprising a majority, who could
now be removed from office only by impeachment. The special constitutional safeguards that insure the
independence of the COMELEC remain in place.
52
The COMELEC enjoys fiscal autonomy, appoints its own officials
and employees, and promulgates its own rules on pleadings and practice. Moreover, the salaries of COMELEC
members cannot be decreased during their tenure.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Third Issue: The Constitutionality of Renewals of Appointments
Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of the their ad interim appointments and their subsequent
assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution, which provides as follows:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last members for three
years, without reappointment. X x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the Commission on Appointments, his ad
interim appointment can no longer be renewed because this will violate Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
which prohibits reappointments. Petitioner asserts that this is particularly true to permanent appointees who have
assumed office, which is the situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their ad interimappointments are deemed
permanent in character.
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be
extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the
exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the
merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the
qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the
disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President
can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of
a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments
to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by
the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution.
Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is
recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows:
August 30, 2014
126

"Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments
submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of
Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall
not again be considered by the Commission." (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if
the President renews the appointment.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim appointments of by-passed
appointees. Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion in Guevara vs.
Inocentes
53
why by-passed ad interim appointees could be extended new appointments, thus:
"In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the Commission, because
the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive objection of the Commission. It ceases, also,
upon "the next adjournment of the Congress", simply because the President may then issue new
appointments - not because of implied disapproval of the Commission deduced from its inaction during the
session of Congress, for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect adversely the interim
appointments only by action, never by omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval
of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint those so by-
passed by the Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating
that the reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly
inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said adjournment of the
Congress, the President is free to make ad interim appointments or reappointments." (Emphasis supplied)
Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
present Constitution on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim.
54
The jurisprudence under the 1935
Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present Constitution.
The established practice under the present Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of by-
passed ad interim appointees. This is a continuation of the well-recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution,
interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole
appointing power in the President.
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor
by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad
interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not
because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad
interimappointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond
the fixed term of seven years.
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four situations
where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be
reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving
more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term
and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a
member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also
serving more than seven years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term
of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be
reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will
result in the appointee also serving more than seven years.
The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy
arises from death or resignation. Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of
such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed
under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first
appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being
reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.
The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of office as COMELEC
member whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for an unexpired
term of any length of time can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly
explained this intent in this manner:
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127

"MR. FOZ. But there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in the case
of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies only when the term or
tenure is for seven years. But in cases where the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would
be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying words "without reappointment" in the case of
those appointed, then it is possible that an interpretation could be made later on their case, they can still be
reappointed to serve for a total of seven years.
Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear that even in the case of those first appointed
under the Constitution, no reappointment can be made."
55
(Emphasis supplied)
In Visarra vs. Miraflor,
56
Justice Angelo Bautista, in his concurring opinion, quoted Nacionalista vs. De
Vera
57
that a "[r]eappointment is not prohibited when a Commissioner has held office only for, say, three or
six years, provided his term will not exceed nine years in all." This was the interpretation despite the express
provision in the 1935 Constitution that a COMELEC member "shall hold office for a term of nine years and
may not be reappointed."
To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of
seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of five or
three years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the
person previously appointed completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any
kind.
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not
constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is
neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action
could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments.
The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office. There must be a
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on
reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the Presidents power to make ad
interim appointments.
In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad
interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the
President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will effectively be
disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the
President to make ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This
Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.
The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present
Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who
have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to
insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.
As reported in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Vicente B. Foz, who sponsored
58
the
proposed articles on the three constitutional commissions, outlined the four important features of the proposed
articles, to wit:
"Mr. Foz stated that the Committee had introduced basic changes in the common provision affecting the
three Constitutional Commissions, and which are: 1) fiscal autonomy which provides (that) appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released to the Commission in the same manner (as) provided for the
Judiciary; 2) fixed term of office without reappointment on a staggered basis to ensure continuity of functions
and to minimize the opportunity of the President to appoint all the members during his incumbency; 3)
prohibition to decrease salaries of the members of the Commissions during their term of office; and 4)
appointments of members would not require confirmation."
59
(Emphasis supplied)
There were two important amendments subsequently made by the Constitutional Commission to these four
features. First, as discussed earlier, the framers of the Constitution decided to require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of all appointments to the constitutional commissions. Second, the framers decided
to strengthen further the prohibition on serving beyond the fixed seven-year term, in the light of a former chair of the
Commission on Audit remaining in office for 12 years despite his fixed term of seven years. The following exchange
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
August 30, 2014
128

"MR. SUAREZ: These are only clarificatory questions, Madam President. May I call the sponsors attention,
first of all, to Section 2 (2) on the Civil Service Commission wherein it is stated: "In no case shall any
Member be appointed in a temporary or acting capacity." I detect in the Committees proposed resolutions a
constitutional hangover, if I may use the term, from the past administration. Am I correct in concluding that
the reason the Committee introduced this particular provision is to avoid an incident similar to the case of the
Honorable Francisco Tantuico who was appointed in an acting capacity as Chairman of the Commission on
Audit for about 5 years from 1975 until 1980, and then in 1980, was appointed as Chairman with a tenure of
another 7 years. So, if we follow that appointment to (its) logical conclusion, he occupied that position for
about 12 years in violation of the Constitution?
MR. FOZ: It is only one of the considerations. Another is really to make sure that any member who is
appointed to any of the commissions does not serve beyond 7 years."
60
(Emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Christian Monsod further clarified the prohibition on reappointment in this manner:
"MR. MONSOD. If the (Commissioner) will read the whole Article, she will notice that there is no
reappointment of any kind and, therefore as a whole there is no way that somebody can serve for more than
seven years. The purpose of the last sentence is to make sure that this does not happen by including in the
appointment both temporary and acting capacities."
61
(Emphasis supplied)
Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment of any kind. On the
other hand, the prohibition on temporary or acting appointments is intended to prevent any circumvention of the
prohibition on reappointment that may result in an appointees total term of office exceeding seven years. The evils
sought to be avoided by the twin prohibitions are very specific - reappointment of any kind and exceeding ones term
in office beyond the maximum period of seven years.
Not contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the Constitution tightened even further the screws
on those who might wish to extend their terms of office. Thus, the word "designated" was inserted to plug any
loophole that might be exploited by violators of the Constitution, as shown in the following discussion in the
Constitutional Commission:
"MR. DE LOS REYES: On line 32, between the words "appointed" and "in", I propose to insert the words OR
DESIGNATED so that the whole sentence will read: "In no case shall any Member be appointed OR
DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting capacity."
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): What does the Committee say?
MR. FOZ: But it changes the meaning of this sentence. The sentence reads: "In no case shall any Member
be appointed in a temporary or acting capacity."
MR. DE LOS REYES: Mr. Presiding Officer, the reason for this amendment is that some lawyers make a
distinction between an appointment and a designation. The Gentleman will recall that in the case of
Commissioner on Audit Tantuico, I think his term exceeded the constitutional limit but the Minister of Justice
opined that it did not because he was only designated during the time that he acted as Commissioner on
Audit. So, in order to erase that distinction between appointment and designation, we should specifically
place the word so that there will be no more ambiguity. "In no case shall any Member be appointed OR
DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting capacity."
MR. FOZ: The amendment is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. DE LOS REYES: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendment is approved."
62

The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not
violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad
interim appointments and renewals of appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit because all the
appointments and renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on
February 2, 2008.
63
Any delay in their confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office.
Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three
respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution. The
continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office
August 30, 2014
129

expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
Fourth Issue: Respondent Benipayos Authority to Reassign Petitioner
Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove her as Director IV of the EID and reassign her to the Law
Department. Petitioner further argues that only the COMELEC, acting as a collegial body, can authorize such
reassignment. Moreover, petitioner maintains that a reassignment without her consent amounts to removal from
office without due process and therefore illegal.
Petitioners posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any color of title to the office of Chairman of the
COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and consequently he has
full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective.
Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chairman of the
COMELEC is vested with the following power:
"Section 7. Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties. The Chairman, who shall be the Chief
Executive Officer of the Commission, shall:
x x x
(4) Make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Service Law." (Emphasis supplied)
The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or
reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman
is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioners appointment papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001, attached as
Annexes "X", "Y" and "Z" to her Petition, indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the EID only in
an acting or temporary capacity.
64
Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she
hold Career Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as
prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission.
65
Obviously,
petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina
G. Bacal,
66
this Court held that:
"As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment
to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that
position. As held in Achacoso v. Macaraig:
It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed. Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as
temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and at a moments
notice, conformably to established jurisprudence x x x.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A
person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the
first place, or as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated x x x."
Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not possessed of the necessary qualifications
to hold the position of Director IV, petitioner has no legal basis in claiming that her reassignment was contrary to the
Civil Service Law. This time, the vigorous argument of petitioner that a temporary or acting appointment can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power happens to apply squarely to her situation.
Still, petitioner assails her reassignment, carried out during the election period, as a prohibited act under Section
261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides as follows:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
August 30, 2014
130

x x x
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service - Any public official who makes or causes any
transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers,
within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission."
Petitioner claims that Benipayo failed to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc to effect transfers or
reassignments of COMELEC personnel during the election period.
67
Moreover, petitioner insists that the COMELEC
en banc must concur to every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period.
Contrary to petitioners allegation, the COMELEC did in fact issue COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November
6, 2000,
68
exempting the COMELEC from Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. The resolution states in
part:
"WHEREAS, Sec. 56 and Sec. 261, paragraphs (g) and (h), of the Omnibus Election Code provides as
follows:
x x x
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
x x x
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service Any public official who makes or causes
any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school
teachers, within the election period except upon approval of the Commission.
WHEREAS, the aforequoted provisions are applicable to the national and local elections on May 14, 2001;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to appoint, transfer or reassign personnel of the Commission on
Elections during the prohibited period in order that it can carry out its constitutional duty to conduct free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections;
"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the foregoing
prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new employees or fill new
positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the effective performance of its
mandated functions during the prohibited period, provided that the changes in the assignment of its field
personnel within the thirty-day period before election day shall be effected after due notice and hearing."
(Emphasis supplied)
The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or
reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to COMELEC field personnel and not
to head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised Administrative Code,
69
the COMELEC Chairman is
the sole officer specifically vested with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The COMELEC
Chairman will logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean
amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel
should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such
concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to approve every
personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be
interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a
second approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel.
The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution
No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus,
Benipayos order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the
Omnibus Election Code. For the same reason, Benipayos order designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is
legally unassailable.
Fifth Issue: Legality of Disbursements to Respondents
August 30, 2014
131

Based on the foregoing discussion, respondent Gideon C. De Guzman, Officer-in-Charge of the Finance Services
Department of the Commission on Elections, did not act in excess of jurisdiction in paying the salaries and other
emoluments of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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