October 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; dishonesty. It is clear from the records that respondent Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses Floran when
he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to him. Respondent also
made it appear that the original owner of the land conveyed her rights therto to respondent and not to the
Spouses Floran. When the sale of the Spouses Florans land pushed through, respondent received half of the
proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register the
remaining portion of the land. Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the navet of the Spouses Floran to deprive
them of their valued property. This is an unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession. Aside from
giving adequate attention, care and time to his clients case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair and
honest in protecting his clients rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a
lawyer. Respondent lawyer violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is suspended from the practice of law for six months. Nemesio Floran
and Caridad Floran v. Atty. Roy Prule Ediza. A.C. No. 5325. October 19, 2011.
Attorney; grave misconduct. Respondent attorney was found to have violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending
money to her through the use of documents and false representations and by taking advantage of her education
and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the
loan to respondent were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the
property and that complainant could register the open deed of sale if respondent fails to pay the loan. By her
misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics
perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined. Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
v. Atty. Haide V. Gumba. A.C. No. 9000. October 5, 2011.
Attorney; misconduct. With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the
true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction,
respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful
purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold,
respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. Not only did
respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of
respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal
and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve
considering its nature and purpose. Respondents actions violated not only Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Responsibility, but pertinent sections of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as well. Thus, respondent is meted
the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and suspension from the practice of law for a period of two
years. Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua. A.C. No. 6655. October 11, 2011.
Attorney; notarization. The fact that the affiant previously appeared in person and signed the Deed of Donation
before the respondent notary public does not justify the respondents act of notarizing the Deed of Donation,
considering the affiants absence on the very day the document was actually notarized. In the notarial
acknowledgment of the Deed of Donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared
before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003,
because the latter died on July 29, 2003 a day before the Deed of Donation was notarized, and respondent was
aware of that fact. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Respondent should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before himto attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Atty. Florita S. Linco v. Atty. Jimmy D.
Lacebal. A.C. No. 7241. October 17, 2011.
Attorney; notarization of illegal document. A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what respondent did in this case. In preparing and notarizing an agreement for
extrajudicial dissolution of marriage a void document respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Respondent knew fully well that the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is
against public policy. Therefore, respondent may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rodolfo A. Espinosa and
Maximo A. Glindo v. Atty. Julieta A. Omaa. A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The Court deems Benedictoss falsification of her bundy cards tantamount to
dishonesty. This Court has defined dishonesty as the (d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service. However,
considering the presence of a mitigating factor this being Benedictos first administrative case in her nineteen
years in government service suspension for six months is already a sufficient penalty. Falsification of daily time
records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan. A.M.
No. P-10-2784. October 19, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. The act of the respondents in causing the removal of several pages in a
copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda of the Supreme Courts Second Division is a malevolent transgression of their
duties as court personnelparticularly, as employees detailed at the Office of Clerk of Court Second Division
(OCC-SD). Such act is unauthorized and a blatant disregard of the standard operating procedures observed by
the office in handling confidential documents, such as the Agenda. It compromised the ability of the OCC-SD to
efficiently perform its functions and also imperiled the environment of confidentiality the office is supposed to be
clothed with. Respondents clearly committed a willful breach of the trust reposed upon them by the
Court. Supreme Court v. Eddie V. Delgado, Utility Worker II, Joseph Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV, and Wilfredo
A. Florendo, Utility Worker II, all of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division. A.M. No. 2011-07-
SC. October 4, 2011.
Judge; failure to file statement of assets and liabilities. Respondent clearly violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees when he failed to
file his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation
why he failed to file his SALN for five consecutive years. While every office in the government service is a public
trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with
existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice. Office
of the Court Administrator v. Judge Uyag P. Usman, Presiding Judge, Sharia Circuit Court, Pagadian City. A.M.
No. SCC-08-12. October 19, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in
a criminal case involving a crime punishable by a capital offense, and his mere reliance on the recommendation
for bail by the public prosecutor, was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well
as a cavalier disregard of its requirement. He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong was a matter of judicial discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether
or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecutions
evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a
petition for bail from the accused. Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence
was not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. Atty. Franklin
G. Gacal v. Judge Jaime I. Infante, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Alabel, Sarangani. A.M. No. RTJ-04-
1845. October 5, 2011.
Judge; undue delay. As early as February 27, 2002, the case had been submitted for decision, but respondent
judge had yet to render a decision by the time the administrative complaint against him was filed on November 6,
2009. Judges should meticulously observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases because
failure to comply with the said period transgresses the parties constitutional right to speedy disposition of their
cases. Thus, failure to decide cases within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period may warrant imposition of
administrative sanctions on the erring judge. However, the Court is not unmindful of circumstances that justify
the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. When a judge sees such circumstances before the
reglementary period ends, all that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an
extension of time within which to decide the case. Evidently, respondent Judge failed to do any of these
options. Antonio Y. Cabasares v. Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, 8
th
Judicial Region,
Calbayog City, Western Samar. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011.
Sheriff; gross neglect of duty. Respondent Sheriff was remiss in performing his mandated duties: first, to give
notice of the writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate the property
within three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor and all persons claiming
under the latter; third, to remove the latters personal belongings in the property as well as destroy, demolish or
remove the improvements constructed thereon upon special court order; and fourth, to execute and make a
return on the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or
until its effectivity expires. The lapse of time almost two years it took for the respondent to unsuccessfully
execute the writ demonstrates his utter lack of diligence in performing his duties. Teresita Guerrero-Boylon v.
Aniceto Boyles, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-09-2716. October 11,
2011.
November 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; aiding illegal practice of law. It has been established that Dela Rosa who is not a member of the Bar
misrepresented herself as respondents collaborating counsel. There was also sufficient evidence to prove that
respondent allowed Dela Rosa to illegally practice law, appear in court, and give legal assistance to respondents
client. This is in violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that [a] lawyer shall
not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. The term practice of law implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood
or in consideration of his services. Holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that
purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating
oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F.
Busmente. A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.
Attorney; competence and diligence required. Respondent attorneys were engaged to represent complainant and
his son in in a civil case for forcible entry and damages. However, respondents failed to file an answer within the
10-day period required by the summons and the Rules of Court. Respondents claimed that, to their mind, the
civil case was actually for possession, notwithstanding that its title is for forcible entry, and that they mistakenly
assumed that the court would first issue an order stating that the case falls under the rules on summary
procedure before requiring their clients to answer. They further claimed that when no such order was issued by
the court, they again incorrectly assumed that the regular rules of procedure will apply and that they have fifteen
days to answer. All these, without seeking a clarification from the court or ascertaining exactly when the answer
should be filed and despite the summons issued and served stating a ten day period to file an answer. The
Supreme Court did not find respondents defenses acceptable as it betrayed a lack of necessary competence and
diligence. The respondents had in fact been negligent, or worse, had failed to exercise the required competence
and diligence in filing the answer to the complaint. Pursuant to Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client
who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but
also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause. Rogelio F. Estavillo v. Attys. Gemmo G. Guillermo and Erme S.
Labayog. A.C. No. 6899. November 16, 2011.
Attorney; conflict of interest. Respondent attorney drafted a demand letter on behalf of complainant in
connection with the dishonored checks issued by Ms. Koa. In the ensuing criminal cases, respondent filed a
Motion for Consolidation on behalf of Ms. Koa and appeared at the preliminary investigation hearing as Ms. Koas
counsel. Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant because
there was no professional fee paid for the services he rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the
demand letter only as a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend. A lawyer-client relationship can exist
notwithstanding the close friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the
moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the
demand letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in
the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent her in
the criminal cases is of no moment. Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent
from liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition
against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client
relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship. Lydia Castro-Justo v.
Atty. Rodolfo Galing. A.C. No. 6174. November 16, 2011.
Attorney; gross misconduct. Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her and her child in
pursuing and protecting their rights as heirs of her deceased husband who was a British national, including
claiming insurance proceeds due to the complainant and her child, as well as processing visa applications for
travel to England. Respondent solicited various sums from the complainant, allegedly for purposes do defraying
expenses in connection with the engagement. Respondent admitted having received money from complainant
but failed to render an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses incurred. Worse,
respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of
giving grease money or lagay to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the
normal course of conducting official business transactions as a means to expedite the visa applications. This runs
afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondents repeated reprehensible acts
of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking
complainants finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully
belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of
honesty and integrity required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the
privilege of exercising the noble legal profession. Marites Freeman v. Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes. A.C. No. 6246.
November 15, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct and dishonesty. Respondent admitted receiving pay-offs from Taguinod every
time the City Star, the paper published by Taguinod, is awarded a judicial notice from Branch 21 of the RTC of
Santiago City for publication. Respondents defense that he never demanded any money or any rebate from
Taguinod does not spare him from liability. Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1079 not only prohibits local
court personnel from demanding pay-offs, it also bars receipt of such pay-offs. By accepting pay-offs,
respondent also violated Section 2(e), Canon III of the Code of Conduct, mandating that court personnel shall not
[s]olicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which
it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in
performing official duties. These violations of respondent constitute grave misconduct or corrupt conduct in
flagrant disregard of well-known legal rules. Furthermore, by keeping the discounts or rebates for himself and
thereby profiting from them, he had committed a clear case of dishonesty. Francisco Taguinod v. Deputy Sheriff
Rolando Tomas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago City. A. M. No. P-09-2660. November 29, 2011.
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Under Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998, [a]n employee shall be
considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month
for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year. It is clear
from the facts that Calingasan has been habitually tardy. Consequently, as an employee of the judiciary, she
failed to live up to the stringent standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration
of justice. The excuses offered by respondent moral obligations, the performance of household chores, traffic
problems, health conditions, and domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient causes to excuse habitual
tardiness. Leave Division-OAS, Office of the Court Administrator v. Laraine I. Calingasan Stenographer II,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Sta Rosa, Laguna. A.M. No. P-11-3010. November 23, 2011.
Court personnel; inefficiency; time for completion and submission of TSN. Respondent failed to strictly follow
Administrative Circular No. 24-90 that prescribes a 20-day period from the time the notes are taken for the
completion and submission of the transcript of stenographic notes. Although the Court is solicitous of the plight
of court stenographers, being saddled with heavy workload is not compelling reason enough to justify
respondents failure to faithfully comply with the prescribed period provided in Administrative Circular No. 24-90
and, thus, she must be faulted. Otherwise, every government employee charged with inefficiency would resort to
the same convenient excuse to evade punishment, to the great prejudice of public service. Concerned Citizen v.
Maria Concepcion Divina, Court Stenographer, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan. A.M. No. P-
07-2369. November 16, 2011.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that
transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. Respondents actions transgressed the norms of
civility expected of judicial officers, even in their private lives, and constitute simple misconduct that must be
squarely penalized. Although beso-beso or air kissing may be considered a standard greeting between family
members, what respondent did was he not merely greeted his sister-in-law, but encroached into the territory of
unwarranted advances that offended acceptable standards of decency. Regardless of whether it reached the level
of criminal malice or lewdness, his conduct was unbecoming a court personnel, upon whom is placed the heavy
burden of moral uprightness. Beatriz B. Onate v. Severino G. Imatong, Junior Process Server, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Piat, Cagayan. A.M. No. P-11-3009. November 16, 2011.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Respondent, a security guard at the Court of Appeals compound in
Manila, accidentally fired his service pistol while in the process of unloading it for turnover to the guard on duty
for the next shift. Respondent failed to show that his service pistol was not mechanically sound at that time. In
ruling out mechanical causes, it can only be concluded that the undesired discharge of respondents service pistol
was the result of his own negligence; in the usual course of things, a firearm that is being unloaded should not
discharge if gun safety procedures had been strictly followed. However, we cannot consider the respondents
negligence as gross in nature because there is nothing in the records to show that the respondent willfully and
intentionally fired his service pistol. Also, at the time of the incident, the respondent did observe most of the
safety measures required in unloading his firearm. Court of Appeals by: COC Teresita Marigomen v. Enrique
Manabat Jr., Security Guard I, Court of Appeals, Manila. A.M. No. CA-11-24-P. November 16, 2011.

December 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Affidavit of Desistance; no effect on disciplinary proceeding. It bears to stress that a case of suspension or
disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant in a civil case but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession or its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is
not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and
his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an
affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings. Elpidio P. Tiong vs. Atty.
George M. Florendo. A.C. No. 4428. December 12, 2011
Attorney; gross immorality. Possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar
but is a continuing requirement to maintain ones good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of
law practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to
show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension
or disbarment. Respondents act of having an affair with his clients wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on
the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard
for his profession. He also violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by the complainant, which in itself is
prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Elpidio P. Tiong vs. Atty. George M.
Florendo. A.C. No. 4428. December 12, 2011

Attorney; gross misconduct; inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures. The respondent, while
an MTC judge, accepted a petition for declaratory relief filed by the Municipal Council of San Fernando,
Pampanga, assigned it to himself, and acted on it, all on the same day and without issuing summons or giving
notice to the complainant who was the part adversely affected by the resolution subject of the Municipal Councils
petition. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or
partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the
appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the
personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made. As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed
in the Rules of Procedure. This is expected upon members of the legal profession because membership in the bar
is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of
society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is
the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Daniel B. Liangco A.C. No. 5355. December 13, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to
secure the courts prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process. It is
imperative that a sheriff shall observe the following: (1) the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be
incurred by him; (2) he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; (3) the approved estimated
expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff; (4) the Clerk of
Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and (5) the executing sheriff shall disburse/liquidate his
expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the
party who made the deposit. Sheriffs are not authorized to receive any voluntarypayments from parties in the
course of the performance of their duties. A sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-
litigant without observing the proper procedural steps; otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty or extortion.
The duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no discretion on
whether or not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to follow-up its implementation. Unless
restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed. When
respondent took it upon himself to mediate between litigants and even provided an extension of the
implementation of the writ, he appeared to be lacking in the amount of diligence required of him in the
performance of his duties. Atty. Rutillo B. Pasok vs. Carlos P. Diaz, Sheriff IV, RTC Br 20, Tacurong City. A.M. No.
P-07-2300. December 12, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. All officials and employees involved in the administration of justice, from
judges to the lowest rank and file employees, bear the heavy responsibility of acting with strict propriety and
decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the publics respect for, and trust in, the Judiciary.
Respondents use of the letterhead of the court and of her official designation in the demand letters she prepared
hardly meets the foregoing standard. Despite her good intentions, she gave private individuals an unwarranted
privilege at the expense of the name of the court. Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio. They may notarize
documents or administer oaths only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. Thus, in
their ex-officio capacity, clerks of court should not take part in the execution of private documents bearing no
relation at all to their official functions. Arthur M. Gabon vs. Rebecca P. Merka, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial
Court, Liloan, Southern Leyte. A.M. No. P-11-3000. December 14, 2011
Court personnel; gross negligence in the performance of duty. Respondent clerk of court assigned to a cash
clerk the collections, remittances, financial reports and accountable forms. He later found out that some are
already missing. The clerk of court is the courts accountable officer, not the cash clerk. He is the courts chief
administrative officer. No amount of good faith can relieve him of his duty to properly administer and safeguard
the courts funds. Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound
administration of justice. They are designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and
premises. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and
property.Respondent is liable for gross neglect of duty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Clerk of Court
Hermenegildo I. Marasigan, RTC Kabacan, North Cotabato A.M. No. P-05-2082. December 12, 2011
Court personnel; immoral conduct. Respondents act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man
comes within the purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is classified as a grave offense. The image
of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct of the official and personnel who work thereat. Court employees
have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of justice. This Court has thus consistently
penalized court personnel who had been found wanting of such standards, even if they have precipitately
resigned from their positions. Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade
an administrative liability or an administrative sanction. Evelina C. Banaag vs. Olivia C. Espeleta, Interpreter III,
Branch 82, RTC. Quezon City. A.M. No. P-11-3011. December 16, 2011
Court personnel; leave for foreign travel without authority. The exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to
move from one place to another is not absolute. Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This
provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective supervision and management of all
courts and personnel under it. Pursuant to this, the Court issued OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their
foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If
judges and court personnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there
could be a disruption in the administration of justice. A situation where the employees go on mass leave and
travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are urgently needed, could possibly arise. Thus,
judges and personnel who shall leave the country without travel authority issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator shall be subject to disciplinary action. A judge or a member of the Judiciary, who is not being
restricted by a criminal court or any other agency pursuant to any statutory limitation, can leave for abroad
without permission but he or she must be prepared to face the consequences for his or her violation of the
Courts rules and regulations. OCA-OAS vs. Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens, etc. A.M. No. P-11-2927. December 13,
2011
Court personnel; unreasonable delay in remitting cash receipts. As custodian of court funds and revenues, it is
the duty of a clerk of court to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized
government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody. Atty. Cruz belated turnover of
cash deposited with him is inexcusable and will not exonerate him from liability. His failure to remit his cash
collections on time is violative of Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 which mandates that all fiduciary collections
shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, the authorized government depository bank. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Teotimo D.
Cruz A.M. No. P-11-2988. December 12, 2011
Presumption of innocence in disbarment proceedings; burden of proof; quantum of proof. The Court has
consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case
the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the
respondent. Siao Aba, et al. vs. Attys. Salvador De Guzman, Jr., et al. A.C. No. 7649. December 14, 2011

January 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; accounting of funds. When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose,
he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to
return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients
funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives
rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by the client. The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action. Hector Trenas vs. People of the Philippines. G.R. No. 195002. January 25, 2012.
Attorney; mistake of counsel. The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it is only in
instances wherein the negligence is so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved
client. It can be gleaned from the circumstances that petitioner was given opportunities to defend his case and
was granted concomitant reliefs by the court. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his
former counsel were so gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process. Cresencio C. Milla vs. People of
the Philippines and Carlo V. Lopez. G.R. No. 188726. January 25, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of her official duties but in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the
courts good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel
have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal
for the first offense. Under Section 58 of the same rules, dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service.
Thus, the respondent is dismissed for dishonesty when she made someone take the Civil Service Sub-professional
Examination on her behalf. Concerned Citizen vs. Domingo Nawen Abad, etc. A.M. No. P-11-2907. January 31,
2012.
Court personnel; grave abuse of authority. By the very nature of his duties, a sheriff performs a very sensitive
function in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound to know the basic rules relative to the implementation of
writs of execution, and should, at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his
duties. Administrative Circular No. 12 was promulgated in order to streamline the service and execution of court
writs and processes in courts and to better serve the public good and facilitate the administration of
justice. Paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 12 provides that All Clerks of Court of the Metropolitan Trial
Court and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, and/or their deputy sheriffs shall serve all court processes and execute
all writs of their respective courts within their territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the same
circular provides that No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ outside his territorial jurisdiction
without first notifying in writing, and seeking the assistance of, the sheriff of the place where the execution shall
take place. It is clear that respondents act of implementing the subject writs in San Fernando City, when his
territorial jurisdiction is confined only to Angeles City, is a violation of the Circular and tantamount to abuse of
authority. While respondent claimed that he personally informed the OCC of San Fernando City, he, however,
failed to prove that he made written notice as required by Administrative Circular No. 12. A mere submission of
the copies of the court processes to the OCC will not suffice as to the written notice requirement. The
requirement of notice is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and
oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act.Luis P. Pineda vs. Neil T. torres, sheriff II,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P-12-3027. January 30, 2012
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. A clerk of court performs a very delicate function as the custodian of the
funds and revenues, records, property, and premises of the court. He is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction,
or impairment of said funds and property. Even the undue delay in the remittance of amounts collected by them
at the very least constitutes misfeasance. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an
orderly administration of justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the
Circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds. Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92
mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon
receipt thereof, with an authorized government depository bank which is the Land Bank of the Philippines. The
respondents failure to remit their collection constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct.
Moreover, the failure of a public officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer shall be prima
facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property to personal use. Re: Report on
Financial Audit Conducted at MCTC, Santiago-San Esteban, Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012
Judges; administrative liability. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation
to the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial
remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies,
and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. A judges failure to
correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur
administrative liability, for to hold him administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly
unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Administrative sanction
and criminal liability should be imposed only when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed
with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety and
good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. Re:
Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.,
et al. A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J. January 31, 2012.
Judges; court personnel; gross misconduct; neglect of duty. Respondent Judge failed to exert due diligence
required of him to ascertain the facts of the case before he came out with the Order. He should be reminded of
his personal responsibility in the making of his decisions and orders. He should not rely on anybody else for the
examination and study of the records to properly ascertain the facts of each case that he handles. He cannot
simply pass the blame on his staff and hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. Moreover, respondent
Judge should have been more cautious since the case involved was an old inherited case with voluminous records
and what was sought to be executed was an order issued almost twenty (20) years ago. It is incumbent upon
him to devise an efficient court management system since he is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his functions. Although judges cannot be held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in good
faith, good faith in situations of infallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and
does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be
beyond permissible margins of error.
The records and pleadings filed have established the administrative liability of the clerk of court. First,
respondent Clerk of Court failed to inform respondent Judge of the existence of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court decisions. Second, he failed to inform and send the parties their respective notices and court
orders. Third, he issued the Certificate of Finality without verifying if indeed a motion for reconsideration was
filed in connection with the case. As custodian of judicial records, it is incumbent upon the clerk of court to
ensure an orderly and efficient court management system, and to supervise the personnel under his office to
function effectively. They must be assiduous in performing official duty and in supervising and managing court
dockets and records. It is also incumbent upon him to see to it that court orders were sent with dispatch to the
parties concerned. Thus, respondent Clerk of Court should ensure an orderly and efficient record management
system to assist all personnel, including respondent Judge, in the performance of their respective duties. Espina
and Madarang Company, et al. vs. Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj and Abie M. Amilil, Officer-in-charge, branch
Clerk of Court, both of theRegional Trial Court, Br. 14, Cotabato City.A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069. December 14, 2011.

February 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Administrative cases against lawyers; prescriptive period. The two-year prescriptive period for initiating a
complaint against a lawyer for disbarment or suspension provided under Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of
Procedure of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline should be construed to mean two years from the date of
discovery of the professional misconduct. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February
15, 2012.
Attorney; disqualification as notary public. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who
signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and the
truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act. The duties of a notary public
is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial act of
acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no
moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was intended because the
property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated
between them. What is being penalized is respondents act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one
of the parties. A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that
notaries public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in notarized documents will be undermined. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254,
February 15, 2012.
Attorney; government service; applicability of Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code of Professional
Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. Where a
lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Martin Lahn III and
James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent labor arbiter, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy
may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering the
same, were made subject of administrative cases. While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of
the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is
sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The unfounded insistence of
the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show
that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants. Martin Lahn III and James P.
Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense,
carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service. Given the total absence of
evidence to the contrary, the presumption that respondent clerk of court punched his DTR to make it appear he
was at the office on February 26, 2010 when he was in fact absent still prevails. Dishonesty is a malevolent act
that has no place in the judiciary. Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution declares that a
public office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Leave Division, Office of the
Adrministrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty, misrepresentation. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that court personnel who
wish to travel abroad must secure a travel authority from the Office of the Court Administrator. Section 67 of the
Omnibus Rules on Leave provides that any violation of the leave laws, rules or regulations, or any
misrepresentation or deception in connection with an application for leave shall be a ground for disciplinary
action. The respondent court stenographer traveled without securing a travel authority and did not state her
foreign travel in her leave application. She is guilty of violating at least two office rules and regulations. This
shows deception amounting to dishonesty.
Dishonesty means the concealment of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or connected with the
performance of his duties. It is an absence of integrity, a disposition to betray, cheat, deceive or defraud, bad
faith. The discrepancy in the respondents date of birth in her records does not amount to dishonesty, as she
made no false statement. No deliberate intent to mislead, deceive or defraud appears from the cited
circumstances of this case. The respondents date of birth is not a fact directly relevant to her functions or
qualification to office or connected with the performance of her duties. Sheila G. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer
III, RTC, Br. 36, Santiago City, Isabela vs. Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, same court. A.M. No. P-
11-2999. February 27, 2012.
Court personnel; habitual absenteeism. Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 provides that an employee is
considered habitually absent if the employee incurred unauthorized absences exceeding the 2.5 days allowed per
month for three months in a semester or at least three consecutive months during the year. In imposing penalty
of habitual absenteeism in administrative cases, however, the court may take into consideration mitigating
circumstances. The presence of factors such as length of service in the judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions
and feeling of remorse, and family circumstances, among other things, play an important role in the imposition of
penalties. Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon, etc. vs. Jesusa V. De Leon. A.M. No. P-11-2926, February 1, 2012
Judge; gross ignorance of law and undue delay. Well- settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be issued to
transfer possession or control of a property to another when the legal title is in dispute between the parties and
the legal title has not been clearly established. In this case, respondent judge evidently disregarded this
established doctrine when he granted the preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels whose legal title is
disputed. When the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. When
the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or
he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Atty. Rene
Medina, et al. vs. Judge Victor Canoy, et al. A.M. RTJ-11-2298, February 22, 2012.
Judges; delay in conducting summary hearing to extend the 72-hr TRO; gross ignorance of law; requirement of
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Judges are not administratively responsible for what they may do in
the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. Not every error or
mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can
be infallible in his judgment. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision,
order or actuation of the respondent judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
Complainants failed to adduce proof to show that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, ill will or
malicious motive when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. In addition, respondent judge should not
be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the
original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a summary hearing before the expiration
of the 72 hours, it could not be complied with because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court
from the parties addresses. Sps. Democrito and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. RTC, Br. 43,
Gingoog City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012.
Judges; immorality vs. simple misconduct. The New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that, as
a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. In particular, judges must conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a
judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times
in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that
looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. There was no evidence that respondent judge engaged in
scandalous conduct that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action against him. His admission of
homosexuality does not make him automatically immoral. However, respondent judge is guilty of simple
misconduct in causing the registration of title in his sons name with the intention of defrauding a possible
judgment-obligee. Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established rule of action, an unlawful behavior,
or negligence committed by a public officer. Aida R. Campos, et al. vs. Judge Eliseo M. Campos, MTC, Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision. Judges must resolve matters pending before them promptly and
expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated three-month period. If they cannot comply with the same, they
should ask for an extension from the Supreme Court upon meritorious grounds. The rule is that the reglementary
period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time.
Judges must dispose of the courts business promptly. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are
enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions on them.
Although there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit, the absence of such rules should not
serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were
never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports
and the memoranda which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of action for the
violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual
judicial audits may be conducted at least six months before a judges compulsory retirement. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte. A.M. No. RTJ-11-
2291. February 8, 2012.

March 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; lifting of indefinite suspension. Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional provisions
for the purpose of insulting Members of the Supreme Court is a serious breach of the rigid standards that a
member of good standing of the legal profession must faithfully comply with. Thus, the penalty of indefinite
suspension was imposed. However, in the past two years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has
repeatedly expressed his willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and standards in the practice of law,
and to serve the ends of justice if he should be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not been
informed of any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a
member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty
after it has been shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been served. Re: subpoena Duces Tecum
dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman/Re: Order of the
Office of the Ombudsman referring the complaint of Attys. Oliver O. Lozano & Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano
against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno(ret.). A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC & A.M. NO. 10-9-9-SC, March 20, 2012.
Court personnel; administrative case; quantum of evidence. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases. In
Section 3, it provides that, Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly
to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.
The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence. For these reasons, only
substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the administrative offense charged against her. In the
hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of
Court. In assessing whether there is substantial evidence in administrative investigations such as this case, the
Court is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. Dela Cruzs Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint
affidavit of arrest executed by the NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, photocopy of the marked
money, the Complaint Sheet, and the photographs of Malunao entering Dela Cruzs house, and the contents of
Malunaos bag after receipt of the money, all prove by subsantial evidence the guilt of Malunao for the offense of
grave misconduct. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya. A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his position or office to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel states:
Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that
such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. Respondents use of her position as Clerk III in
Branch 28 to solicit money from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision violates Section 2, Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and constitutes the offense of grave misconduct meriting the penalty of
dismissal. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya. A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012.
Judges; judicial clemency. In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, thus:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or
judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent
finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption
of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can
be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to
legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds merit in petitioners request. A review of the
records reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which occurred more than ten (10)
years ago. While she was found to have belatedly filed her motions for additional time to resolve the cases then
pending in her sala, the Court noted that she had disposed of the same within the extended period sought,
except in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC where she submitted her compliance beyond the approved 45-day extended
period. Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently shown diligence in the performance of her duties and has not
committed any similar act or omission. In the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator, her prompt
compliance with the judicial audit requirements of pending cases was acknowledged and she was even
commended for her good performance in the effective management of her court and in the handling of court
records.
Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Bohol Chapter has shown its high regard for petitioner per
the letter of support signed by a number of its members addressed to the IBP dated October 15, 1999 during the
pendency of her administrative cases and the IBP Resolution No. 11, Series of 2009 endorsing her application for
lateral transfer to the RTC of Tagbilaran City. Re: Petition for judicial clemency of Judge Irma Zita V.
Masamayor. A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC, March 6, 2012.

April 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; falsification. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended
on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case
without authority so to do.
The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore,
involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Re:
SC Decision date May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D.
Pactolin. A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012.
Attorney; groundless imputation of bribery. As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the reputation and
integrity of members of this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for
Inhibition.
Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of bribery and
wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the
inhibition of eleven Justices of the Court. Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer be seen as isolated
incidents that the Court can pardon given certain mitigating circumstances. Respondent Pea has blatantly and
consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities
to the Court.
Respondent Peas actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot be countenanced
especially for those privileged enough to practice law in the country. In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28
April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Attorney; lack of diligence. When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him
answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. His workload does not
justify neglect in handling ones case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he
can efficiently handle. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012.
Attorney; obligation to hold in trust money of his client. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client
that may come to his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his
own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not
utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has
misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him
constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Suzette
Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012.
Attorney; representation of conflicting interests. The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.
The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. To be held
accountable under this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit,
are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of themwould
affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. Anion vs. Sabistsana. A.C. No. 5098,
April 11, 2012.
Attorney; submission of falsified internal court documents. The falsification, subject of the instant administrative
case, lies in the fact that respondent Pea submitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at the
time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the thenponente.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members of the legal profession.
Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. As
disciples of truth, their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of the case and to
aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty
from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. In the instant case, the submission of a document purporting
to be a copy of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of
respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
Respondent led the Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of theponentes Agenda,
just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was later found to have been
inexistent in the courts records.
The Court noted that respondent Pea has not explained, to the Courts satisfaction, how he managed
to obtain internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and documents, which
he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal court documents has not been
properly explained. The cavalier explanation of respondent Pea that this Courts confidential documents would
simply find themselves conveniently falling into respondents lap through registered mail and that the envelopes
containing them could no longer be traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws
and its own internal rules have been violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom respondent
Pea now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have reached him. It is not
unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code
and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Pea benefitting from the same. Respondents actions
clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment. In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos.
145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming of a court personnel. Respondent is liable for conduct unbecoming a court
employee for his continued refusal to coordinate with complainants in the implementation of the writ of
possession, despite numerous attempts on their part to get in touch with him. It may be recalled that
complainants endeavored, no less than four (4) times, to communicate with respondent for the proper and
expeditious execution of the writ, but each time, respondent rebuffed their efforts. Finally, on25 April 2011, the
day respondent finally implemented the writ, respondent refused to allow Ms. De Jesus to inform complainants of
the intended implementation and opted to be accompanied by an ordinary bank employee to witness the
enforcement of the writ.
The persistent refusal of respondent to cooperate with complainants in the implementation of the writ runs afoul
of the exacting standards required of those in the judiciary. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy
burden of responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to perform. They are constantly
reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must
be avoided. This is so because the image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work there. The conduct of even minor employees mirrors the image of
the courts they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the judiciarys good name and standing as a true
temple of justice. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual
matters but also conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. There is no
doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not only a violation of the moral standards
expected of employees of the judiciary, but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage
which this Court abhors and is, thus, punishable. Evelyn J. Jailorina vs. Richelle Taneo-Regner, Demo II, RTC,
OCC, San Mateo, Rizal. A.M. No. P-11-2948, April 23, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Falsification of daily time record constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Section
52(A), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (MC No. 19, dated September 14,
1999) classifies dishonesty as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for first time offenses. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Araya. A.M. No. P-12-3053, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. The behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of
justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be
guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the publics respect for and
trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying
integrity, honesty and uprightness.
Respondents shouting at complainant within the court premises, reporting complainant to the police after she
was reprimanded for her solicitation, and refusing to talk with complainant judge are not only acts of discourtesy
and disrespect but likewise an unethical conduct sanctioned by Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service where the personnel are enjoined to act
with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. Such conduct is
exacted from them so that they will earn and keep the publics respect for and confidence in the judicial service.
This standard is applied with respect to a court employees dealings not only with the public but also with his or
her co-workers in the service. Conduct violative of this standard quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Thus, considering
respondents transgressions, i.e., disrespectful conduct, solicitation, and influence peddling of bail bonds, there is
no question that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct. Judge Salvador R. Santos, Jr. vs. Editha R.
Mangahas. A.M. No. P-09-2720, April 17, 2012.
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Under Sec. 52 (C) (4), Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of
1999, habitual tardiness is penalized as follows: First offense Reprimand; Second offense Suspension for 1-30
days; Third offense Dismissal from the service. Since it was proven that the present case is the second offense of
Gareza for being habitually tardy, the OCA correctly recommended for the penalty of suspension for 30 days with
warning that a similar offense in the future would be meted a more severe penalty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Sheriff Gareza. A.M. No. P-12-3058, April 25, 2012.
Court personnel; official and personal conduct. Respondent took more than six years to pay their obligation to the
complainant. Also, one of the land titles that respondents gave as collateral turned out to have been encumbered.
While they have already paid their obligation, such payment was conditioned upon the complainants execution of
an Affidavit of Desistance.
All these facts constitute conduct that reflects badly on the judiciary, diminishing the honor and integrity of the
offices they hold. This is especially true because respondents were admittedly given the loans because they were
considered prominent persons in the community; and that they were considered as such, presumably because
they worked in the judiciary.
In Villaseor v. De Leon, the Court emphasized that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel
must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, the
Court said that respondent was expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her
official conduct but also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to
avoid becoming her courts albatross of infamy. Re: Complaint filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro against Edna
Magallanes and Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M. No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Settled is the role of clerks of court as judicial officers entrusted with the
delicate function with regard to collection of legal fees. They are expected to correctly and effectively implement
regulations relating to proper administration of court funds. Delay in the remittance of collection constitutes
neglect of duty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Nini. A.M. No. P-11-3002, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. The following are the duties of a sheriff: first, to give notice of the writ and
demand that the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate the property within three (3)
days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under the
latter; third, to remove the latters personal belongings in the property as well as destroy, demolish or remove
the improvements constructed thereon upon special court order; and fourth, to execute and make a return on
the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every thirty (30) days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or
until its effectivity expires.
Respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of his mandated duties: he unilaterally gave the occupants 3
months, instead of the three (3) days provided by the Rules, to vacate the property; when he did evict the
occupants from the premises, a room containing their personal effects was padlocked, therefore delaying the
demolition of the improvements introduced on the property; finally, respondent failed to make a return on the
writ of possession after he implemented the same. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11,
2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the
disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sarmiento, et
al. A.M. No. P-11-2912, April 10, 2012.
Court personnel; unauthorized absences. Under the Civil Service rules, an employee should submit in advance,
whenever possible, an application for a vacation leave of absence for action by the proper chief of agency prior to
the effective date of the leave. It is clear from the facts that Dacsig had failed to acquire the necessary leave
permits. He offers no excuse or explanation for failing to obtain the necessary authorization for his leaves. Thus,
he is guilty of taking unauthorized absences. Rule IV, Section 52 (A) (17) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, provides that the penalty for frequent unauthorized absences of a first offender is
suspension for six months and one day to one year. Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk of
Court II, MCTC, Magddela-Nagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance. Civil Case No. 632, a case for ejectment, is covered by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. It is equally undisputed that in summary procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later
than 30 days after the last answer has been filed. Considering that no preliminary conference at all was held in
Civil Case No. 632, Judge Literato evidently failed to comply with a basic rule of procedure for which he should
accordingly be held accountable. Judge Literatos inaction in Civil Case No. 632 for 322 days constitutes utter
disregard for the summary nature of an ejectment case.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant
with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of a judges hands. In sum,
Judge Literato is administratively guilty of gross ignorance of the Rule on Summary Procedure and undue delay in
rendering a decision. Dr. Ramie G. Hipe vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato, Municipal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao Del
Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012.
Judge; gross misconduct. In Guerrero vs. Judge Deray, the Court held that a judge who deliberately and
continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of [the Supreme] Court is guilty of gross misconduct
and insubordination.
In the present case, the Court found that Judge Go failed to heed the Courts pronouncements. He did not file the
required comment to the Courts show-cause resolutions despite several opportunities granted him. His willful
disobedience and disregard to the show-cause resolutions constitutes grave and serious misconduct affecting his
fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office. It is noteworthy that Judge Go was
afforded several opportunities to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending before his court and
to comply with the directives of this Court, but he has failed, and continuously refuses to heed the same. This
continued refusal to abide by lawful directives issued by this Court is glaring proof that he has become
disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he purports to belong. Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Judge Go, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667, April 10, 2012.
Judge; gross misconduct and dishonesty. In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of
marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the
questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as
calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. Judge Indar, who
had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without
any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for
voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-
581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings were conducted in
the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision
annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the
truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indars appalling dishonesty. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Judge Indar. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012.
Judge; performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official functions.Judge Molato is
to be reprimanded for agreeing to serve as one of Lucky Corporations alternate bank signatories even if he may
not have performed such service for the corporation. He has no business agreeing to the performance of such
service. His offense constitutes a violation of Administrative Circular 5 which in essence prohibits public officials
from performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official functions for the reason that
the entire time of the officials and employees of the judiciary shall be devoted to their official work to ensure the
efficient and speedy administration of justice. Ramoncito and Juliana Luarca vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC,
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. A.M.
No. MTJ-08-1711/A.M. No. MTJ-08-1716, April 23, 2012.
Notary public; duty to ascertain the identities of the parties executing the document. A notary public is
empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and
affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be
mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from
a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its
genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary
act.
A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties
which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises duties calling for
carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they
should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
The Court cautioned all notaries public to be very careful and diligent in ascertaining the true identities of the
parties executing the document before them, especially when it involves disposition of a property, as this Court
will deal with such cases more severely in the future. Maria vs. Cortez. A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012.

June 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Administrative Complaint; moot and academic. The Court dismissed the complaint filed by Inter-Petal
Recreational Corporation against Chief Justice Renato Corona for being moot and academic after considering the
judgment of the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, which found the Chief Justice guilty of the charge
under Article II of the Articles of Impeachment, with the penalty of removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines as provided in Section 3(7), Article XI of the
Constitution. Re: Complaint Against the Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona dated September 14, 2011 filed
by Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation, A.M. No. 12-6-10-SC. June 13, 2012
Attorneys; disbarment cases imprescriptible. The defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that
administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the
offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a
lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they
stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for. Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco vs. Atty. Pablo Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012.
Attorney; False and untruthful statements in pleadings. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who
show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain
at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They
must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
The Court ruled that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed
the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any
false and untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical
injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a
case was filed. Rodrigo Molina vs. Atty. Ceferino Magat A.C. No. 1900. June 13, 2012.
Attorney; Neglect etc.Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise
to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve
the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. When the RTC ruled against
complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on
ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief be
filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to
know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his
negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer from the trial to the appellate court
stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he
did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainants
husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have
filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up
with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.
Also, as counsel, he had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to
a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:
18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the clients request for information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to
inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he
was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no
longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his negligence.
The failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigans Motion to Dismiss is negligence
on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients case, viz:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty
would render them liable for disciplinary action. Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When
a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should
be held accountable. Emilia R. Hernandez vs. Atty. Venancio B. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012.
Contempt; unauthorized practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court ruled that practice of law means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill. The OCA was able to establish the pattern in Karaans unauthorized practice of law. He would
require the parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the
plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other pleadings acting for
and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did
not indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance
Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person assuming to be an attorney or an
officer of a court, and acting as such without authority, is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of
the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed
against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) month, or both. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General
Santos City,A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Court personnel; discourtesy. Unless specifically provided by the rules, clerks of court have no authority to pass
upon the substantive or formal correctness of pleadings and motions that parties file with the court. Compliance
with the rules is the responsibility of the parties and their counsels. And whether these conform to the rules
concerning substance and form is an issue that only the judge of the court has authority to determine. The duty
of clerks of courts to receive pleadings, motions, and other court-bound papers is purely ministerial. Although
they may on inspection advise the parties or their counsels of possible defects in the documents they want to file,
which may be regarded as part of public service, they cannot upon insistence of the filing party refuse to receive
the same.
Canon IV, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that court personnel shall carry out their
responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible. Atty. Ramos was counsel in a case
before Teves branch. He was an officer of the court who expressed a desire to have the presiding judge, to
whom he addressed his motion, see and consider the same. Teves arrogated onto himself the power to decide
with finality that the presiding judge was not to be bothered with that motion. He denied Atty. Ramos the
courtesy of letting the presiding judge decide the issue between him and the lawyer. As held in Macalua v. Tiu,
Jr., an employee of the judiciary is expected to accord respect for the person and right of others at all times, and
his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. These are absent in
this case.
Civil Service Resolution 99-1936 classifies discourtesy in the course of official duties as a light offense, the penalty
for which is reprimand for the first offense, suspension of 1-30 days for the second offense, and dismissal for the
third offense. In two consolidated administrative cases, one for grave misconduct and immorality and the other
for insubordination, the Court meted out on Teves the penalty of suspension for six months in its resolution of
October 5, 2011. The Court of course decided these cases and warned Teves to change his ways more than a
year after the September 8, 2008 incident with Atty. Ramos. Consequently, it could not be said that he ignored
with respect to that incident the warnings given him in the subsequently decided cases. Still those cases show
Teves propensity for misbehavior. Thus, the Court imposed on Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court of
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, the penalty of 30 days suspension with warning that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Atty. Edward Anthony B. Ramos vs. Reynaldo S.
Teves, Clerk of Court III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-12-3061, June 27, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the women and men who work in the judiciary, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Like the rest of the personnel of the Court, the shuttle bus drivers are expected to observe the norms
and ethics of conduct of public officials and employees. Judiciary employees should be circumspect in how they
conduct themselves inside and outside the office. Any scandalous behavior or any act that may erode the
peoples esteem for the judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. Court employees are supposed to be well-
mannered, civil and considerate in their actuations.
Laribo Jr.s utterances, are by themselves, malicious and cast aspersion upon Diomampos character. The Court
cannot countenance such behavior. The Court sanctioned Laribo Jr. for his disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Since such conduct is classified as a grave offense, the penalty for the first offense is suspension from 6 months
and 1 day to one year. But the Court tempered OCAs recommended penalty and imposed a penalty of one month
suspension, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely, taking
into account that this is Laribos Jr. first infraction. Shirley D. Diomampo, Records Officer II, Sandiganbayan vs.
Felipe C. Laribo Jr., Shuttle Bus Driver, Sandiganbayan. A.M. No. SB-12-18-P. June 13, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service. And no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest
official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in
the public service. As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires
the highest standards of ethics, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law.
Respondent committed dishonesty by causing the unauthorized insertion of an additional sentence in the trial
courts order. Dishonesty has been defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. It implies
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual
who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. By her act, she has compromised
and undermined the publics faith in the records of the court below and, ultimately, the integrity of the Judiciary.
To tolerate such act would open the floodgates to fraud by court personnel.
The insertion of an additional sentence in an order of the trial court, regardless of the reason is not among
respondents duties. A legal researchers duty focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities, drafting memoranda
on evidence, outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial, and keeping track of the status of cases.
In Salvador v. Serrano, the Court held that courts have the inherent power to amend and control their process
and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. But such power rests upon the judge and not to clerks
of court who only perform adjudicative support functions and non-adjudicative functions. In the same vein, the
power to amend court orders cannot be performed by a legal researcher. It is well to remind that court personnel
are obliged to accord the integrity of court records of paramount importance, as these are vital instruments in the
dispensation of justice. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Under Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, promulgated
by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999 and implemented by
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the
service for the first offense. However, the Court, in certain instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal
due to the presence of mitigating factors such as the length of service, being a first-time offender,
acknowledgment of the infractions, and remorse by the respondent. The Court has also ruled that where a
penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a
consequence so severe. It is not only for the laws concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to
consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.
Considering that this is respondents first offense in her twenty-two (22) years of service in the Judiciary, the
admission of her act and her sincere apology for her mistake, her firm resolve not to commit the same mistake in
the future, and taking into account that she is a widow and the only one supporting her five children, the
recommended penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months is in order. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs.
Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M. No. P-09-
2646, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty.For Aguam to assert that she herself took and passed the examination when in fact
somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other
people, to preserve the courts good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the
conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in
their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Here, Aguam failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not therefore deserve
to remain with the Judiciary.
In Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, and Concerned Citizen v. Dominga
Nawen Abad, the Court dismissed the employees found guilty of similar offenses. In Cruz, Zenaida Paitim
masqueraded as Gilda Cruz and took the Civil Service examination in behalf of Cruz. The Court said that both
Paitim and Cruz merited the penalty of dismissal. In Sta. Ana, somebody else took the Civil Service examination
for Sta. Ana. The Court dismissed Sta. Ana for dishonesty. InAbad, the evidence disproved Abads claim that she
personally took the examination. The Court held that for Abad to assert that she herself took the examination
when in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Thus, Abad was for her offense. The Court
found no reason to deviate from these consistent rulings. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first
offense. Under Section 58(a) of the same rules, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The
OCA properly excluded forfeiture of accrued leave credits, pursuant to the Courts ruling in Sta. Ana and Abad.
The Court also consistently held that the proper penalty to be imposed on employees found guilty of an offense
of this nature is dismissal from the service. Lourdes Celavite-Vidal vs. Noraida A. Aguam, A.M. No. SCC-10-13-
P, June 26, 2012.
Court personnel; Disrespectful behavior. Section 2, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, requires
that court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible.
The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women who work there. Court personnel must at all times act with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to
earn and rebuild the publics trust in the judiciary as an institution. The Court would never countenance any
conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.
Under Rule XIV, Section 23 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, discourtesy
in the course of official dutiesis classified as a light offense. A first-time violation of this rule warrants the penalty
of reprimand. Considering a) respondents apology and admission of his mistakes; b) his retirement from service
on 1 July 2011 after long years of employment in the Judiciary; and c) this case being the first complaint against
him, he should be held liable for discourtesy and be meted out the penalty of reprimand.
Respondent committed other lapses in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. Instead of strictly
observing the required number of working hours in the civil service, he left his post in the middle of the day to
attend a social event. Worse, he chose to return to the office and enter the judges chambers while under the
influence of alcohol. His behavior constitutes a direct violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,
particularly Section 1, Canon IV on the Performance of Duties, which states: Court personnel shall at all times
perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and
responsibilities of their office during working hours. Judge Ethelwolda Jaravata vs. Precioso Orencia, Clerk of
Court, MTC, Agoo, La Union A.M. No. P-12-3035, June 13, 2012.
Court personnel; falsification. Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a grave offense. The act of falsifying
an official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on government service. At the
same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of public accountability and
integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses,
but both may be committed in one act.
The constitutionalization of public accountabilityshows the kind of standards of public officers that are woven into
the fabric of our legal system. Public office is a public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as
responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Reality may depart from these standards, but our society has consciously
embedded them in our laws, so that they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles. This Court, in the
exercise of its administrative jurisdiction, should articulate and apply these principles to its own personnel, as a
way of bridging actual reality to the norms we envision for our public service.
The Supreme Court exercised its administrative jurisdiction despite respondent Kasilags resignation, more than
two years after he was directed to file his Comment. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable. Even if the most severe of
administrative sanctions that of separation from service may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties
which may be imposed namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
There are no mitigating circumstances for respondent Kasilag. Dishonesty and the act of falsifying detract from
the notion of public accountability, as implemented by our laws. We apply the law as it is written.Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Jaime Kasilag, Sheriff IV, Regionatl Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila.A.M. No. P-08-
2573, June 19, 2012.
Court Personnel; gross insubordination. Respondent failed to explain why, despite her receipt of the Notices, she
did not comply with the directives of this Court to submit her comment. The records show that the OCA had sent
notices to her at RTCBranch 93 of San Pedro, Laguna, where she is the branch sheriff. While she apologized to
this Court for her failure to submit her comment, she did not explain the reasons for her non-submission thereof
and only averred that it was the first time she learned of the Complaint against her. The OCA did not find her
explanation satisfactory, because she did submit her Comment, but only after a Show-Cause Order had been
issued to her and almost a year after the first directive requiring her to file the Comment. Respondents
prolonged and repeated refusal to comply with the directives of the Supreme Court constituted willful disrespect
of its lawful orders, as well as those of the OCA. Respondent committed the infraction twice, yet failed to fully
explain the circumstances that led to the repeated omissions. Hence, there no reason to overturn or mitigate the
penalty recommended by the OCA.Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma.
Gross insubordination is the indifference of a respondent to an administrative complaint and to resolutions
requiring a comment thereon. The offense is deemed punishable, because every employee in the judiciary should
not only be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty; more than anyone else, they are bound to
manifest utmost respect and obedience to their superiors orders and instructions.Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma.
Consuelo Jole A. Fajardo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro, Laguna. A.M. No. P-12-3064, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; gross misconduct and dishonesty. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel stresses that
employees of the judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably
affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it. No other office in the government
service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the Judiciary.
Thus, the failure of judicial employees to live up to their avowed duty constitutes a transgression of the trust
reposed in them as court officers and inevitably leads to the exercise of disciplinary authority. By these standards,
respondent was found wanting, as she never denied the allegations that she had stolen and encashed the
30,000 check payable to Judge Rojas. She did not even refute the allegations of Dauz and Corpuz that she
misrepresented to both of them that she had authority to encash the check. Worse, neither did she ever deny the
allegations pertaining to her previous acts of stealing from and paying off her obligations to other trial court
judges. She has virtually admitted her wrongdoing.
Whether or not respondent has fully settled her obligation to Judge Rojas, and to the other trial court judges for
that matter, will not exonerate her from any administrative wrongdoing. This Court in Villaseor v. De Leon has
emphasized that full payment of an obligation does not discharge the administrative liability, because disciplinary
actions involve not purely private matters, but acts unbecoming of a public employee. The Court ruled that
respondents admitted acts of pocketing checks and later encashing them for her benefit constitute grave
misconduct. The Court has defined grave misconduct as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence.
Furthermore, stealing the checks and encashing them are considered acts of gross dishonesty
.
Dishonesty is
defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the personnel who work
therein. Court employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court of justice. Both
gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses that are punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.
Penalties include forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in government service.
The mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate a court employee from the consequences of
his or her acts. The Court has often ruled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy
way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction. Thus, respondent was still held
administratively liable for gross misconduct anddishonesty.Her resignation, however, would affect the penalties
the Court may impose. The penalty of dismissal arising from the offense was rendered moot by virtue of her
resignation. Thus, the recommendation of the OCA is appropriate under the circumstances. The Court imposed
upon respondent the penalty of a fine in the amount of 40,000 with forfeiture of all benefits due her, except
accrued leave credits, if any. The 40,000 fine shall be deducted from any such accrued leave credits, with
respondent to be personally held liable for any deficiency that is directly payable to the Court. She was further
declared disqualified from any future government service. The Court emphasized that all court employees, being
public servants in an office dispensing justice, must always act with a high degree of professionalism and
responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in
accordance with the law and court regulations. To maintain the peoples respect and faith in the judiciary, court
employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty. They should avoid any act or conduct that
would diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Executive Judge Melanio C. Rojas, Jr. RTC Branch 25,
Tagudin, Ilocos Sur vs. Ana Marivic L. Mina, Clerk III, RTC, Bracnh 25, Tagudin Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-10-
2867, June 19, 2012
Court personnel; misconduct defined. In Arcenio v. Pagorogon, the Court defined misconduct as a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. In this case, respondent was a mere Utility Worker who
had no authority to take custody of the office attendance logbook, the DTRs of his office mates, let alone case
records. Yet, respondent, taking advantage of his position as a Utility Worker and the access to the court records
and documents which such position afforded him, repeatedly wrought havoc on the proper administration of
justice by taking case records outside of the courts premises and preoccupying his office mates with the time-
consuming task of locating documents. Without doubt his actions constitute grave misconduct which merits the
penalty of dismissal. However, in view of his resignation, the Court found it proper to instead impose on
respondent the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000 with forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave credits,
if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. This of course is without prejudice to any criminal liability he may
have already incurred.
As regards the 68 missing court records to date have not yet been found, the Court deemed it proper to order
complainant to explain why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with in view of the apparent failure on her part
to exercise due care in the custody of the said case records. Our courts of justice, regarded by the public as their
haven for truth and justice, cannot afford and does not have the luxury of offering excuses to litigants for
negligence in its role of safekeeping and preserving the records of cases pending before it. The consequences of
such failure or negligence, if there be any, are simply too damaging not just for the parties involved but worse,
for our court system as a whole. Clerk of Court Arlyn A. Hermano vs. Edwin D. Cardeno, Utility worker I,
Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. A.M. No. P-12-3036, June 20, 2012.
Court Personnel; Procedure in the service and execution of court writs and processes. There was a valid
substituted service of summons in this case. As a rule, personal service of summons is preferred as against
substituted service and substituted service can only be resorted to by the process server if personal service
cannot be made promptly. Most importantly, the proof of substituted service of summons must (a) indicate the
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the
defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is
residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is
likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the
officers return.
Based on the records, Sheriff Villar exhausted efforts to personally serve the summons to Spouses Tiu as
indicated in his Sheriffs Return of Summons. When it was apparent that the summons could not be served
personally on the spouses, Sheriff Villar served the summons through Bauco, their employee, at the office
address of the couples business. It was evident that Bauco was competent and of sufficient age to receive the
summons on their behalf as she represented herself to be their General Manager and Caretaker.
The Sheriff also complied with the requirement of prior coordination as mandated in Administrative Circular No.
12 which lays down the guidelines and procedure in the service and execution of court writs and processes in the
reorganized courts. Documentary evidence indeed discloses that Sheriff Villar of Pasay City coordinated with the
Sheriff of Pasig City before he implemented the writ of preliminary attachment. In the Certification, the Clerk of
Court of Pasig City attested to the fact that Sheriff Villar formally coordinated with their office in connection with
the implementation of the writ of attachment. Attached to said certification is a certified true copy of Sheriff
Villars request for coordination on which the word received was stamped by the Office of the Clerk of Court and
Ex-officio Sheriff, RTC Pasig City.
By law, sheriffs are obligated to maintain possession of the seized properties absent any instruction to the
contrary. In this case, the writ of preliminary attachment authorizing the trial court to legally hold the attached
items was set aside by the RTC Order dated July 8, 2010 specifically ordering Sheriff Villar to immediately release
the seized items to Spouses Tiu. The instruction of the trial court was clear and simple. Sheriff Villar was to
return the seized properties to Spouses Tiu. He should have followed the courts order immediately. He had no
discretion to wait for the finality of the courts order of dismissal before discharging the order of attachment.
Nevertheless, Sheriff Villar showed no deliberate defiance of, or disobedience to, the courts order of release.
Records show that he took the proper step under the circumstances and filed with the trial court his Sheriffs
Report with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Clarificatory Order. There was nothing amiss in consulting the
judge before taking action on a matter of which he is not an expert. Spouses Rainier Tiu and Jennifer Tiu vs.
Virgilio Villar, Sheriff IV, RTC, OCC Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2986, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decisions. Judges are continuously reminded to resolve cases with dispatch to avoid
any delay in the administration of justice. Thus, under Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay
in rendering a decision or order is considered a less serious charge.
The Supreme Court ruled that the prudent course of action would have been for Judge Asis to request an
extension for acting on Civil Case No. 05-35013 instead of disposing the case only after being prompted to file a
comment on the present Complaint. The Court nevertheless deemed it proper to reduce the fine, considering the
existence of factors that mitigated the commission of the offense, namely: (a) this is his first infraction, and (b)
his delay in the disposition of the case resulted from his serious medical conditions. Leticia Jacinto vs. Judge
Josephus Joannes H. Asis, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City A.M. No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decision. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters
filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved withinthree months from the date they are submitted for
decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are
only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same, within which to render judgment. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature,
these rules are regarded as mandatory.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending before their courts. Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges
to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts.
In addition, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all magistrates to observe
scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all
motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically
through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the
disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her position
requires. The case was submitted for resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending when complainant filed
the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and remained unresolved per complainants manifestation
filed on September 8, 2010. More than four years after being submitted for resolution, the case was still awaiting
decision by respondent. Respondent irrefragably failed to decide the case within the 30-day period prescribed by
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This action is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on Summary
Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases,
and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Indeed, respondent even
failed to decide the case within the three-month period mandated in general by the Constitution for lower courts
to decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to report and
request for extension of time to resolve the case.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in
rendering a decision as a less serious charge for which the penalty is suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000.00 toP20,000.00. Given that respondent had
been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty of suspension is already inapplicable. Instead, the Court
imposed upon respondent, for her undue delay in resolving the case, a fine in the maximum amount
of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits Fe Valdez vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13, 2012.
Judge; gross abuse of authority and gross ignorance. In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not
through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State
Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. As such, the requirements
of the rules that the verified petition for contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated
with the principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the
contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal
action. However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the implementation
of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.
As pointed out by the OCA, the CAs disquisition is clear and categorical. In complete disobedience to the said
Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the Order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to
explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to require his presence in court on September 26, 2007, as
well as to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order seeking
State Prosecutor Comilangs explanation for his defiance of the subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of
even date, and directing, once again, his attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once
more why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1, 2007 Order finding State
Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine ofP30,000.00 and to suffer two
days imprisonment. In requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in
issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and
finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen
effectively defeated thestatus quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to preserve. State Prosecutors II
Josef Albert T.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They
must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less. Moreover,
refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes contempt, as in this case, where Judge Belen, in
contumaciously defying the injunctive order issued by the CA, was found guilty of indirect contempt. Judge
Belens actuations cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be easily brushed aside. Obstinate
disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt notwithstanding the
effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the
former, for which he must be held accountable and subjected to disciplinary action. Our conception of good
judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law. Hence considering the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belens previous infractions, which
are all of serious nature and for which he had been severely warned, the Court adopted the recommendation of
the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law. The Court can no longer afford to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the
impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary. State Prosecutors II Josef
Albert T. Comilang and Ms. Victoria Sunega-Lagman vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36, Calamba
City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding
penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. The remedy of the complainants in this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial
of their motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Courts Resolution dismissing the administrative case against
Judge Lubao is in order.
The records would show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as his branch clerk of
court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order, sent under
Registry Receipt, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in
bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard
considering that the records of the case would show that the court a quo summarily dismissed the case without
issuing summons to the defendants. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General
Santos City,A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent deserves to be sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law.
With her inaction on the petition for contempt, she betrayed her unbecoming lack of familiarity with basic
procedural rules such as what was involved in the contempt proceedings before her court. She should have
known that while the petitioners have the responsibility to moveex parte to have the case scheduled for
preliminary conference, the court (through the branch clerk of court) has the duty to schedule the case for pre-
trial in the event that the petitioners fail to file the motion. The respondent cannot pass the blame for the lack of
movement in the case to her staff who, she claims, were monitoring the case. As presiding judge, she should
account for the anomaly that since the respondents filed their answer, the petition for contempt had been
gathering dust or had not moved in the respondents court. Clearly, the respondent fell short of the standards of
competence and legal proficiency expected of magistrates of the law in her handling of the petition for contempt.
As in Magpali v. Pardo, she should be fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. It bears stressing that
when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Eladio D.Perfecto vs. Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2258, June 20, 2012.
Judges; inhibition. Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the main cases. The allegations in the
instant complaint are a mere rehash of the allegations in complainants Urgent Omnibus Motion to Expunge
Motion for Clarification and Recall the Resolution dated November 13, 2002 and the Urgent Motion to Inhibit and
the Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the main cases. These were in fact decided already on
October 19, 2011. The Complainant charges Justice Sereno of unfairly refusing to inhibit herself from taking part
in the deliberation in the main cases notwithstanding that Justice Carpios former law office supposedly worked
for her appointment in the Supreme Court. The charge is purely conjectural and the Court, in its April 17,
2012 per curiam decision in A.C. No. 6332 has already ruled that the charge has no extrinsic factual evidence to
support it. Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Loudes P.A Sereno dated
September 16, 2011 filed by Atty. Magdaleno M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13, 2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the
imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
In this case, the decision was purportedly issued on 7 April 2011, or more than four months since the last
submission of the parties position paper. The pretrial Order was purportedly issued on 26 January 2010, or more
than three months since the pretrial. Section 8 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provides that within five days
after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up
therein.
Further, paragraph 8, Title I(A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, entitled Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges
and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures, mandates that a
judge must issue a pretrial order within 10 days after the termination of the pretrial. Since the ejectment case fell
under the Rules on Summary Procedure, respondent judge should have handled it with promptness and haste.
The reason for the adoption of those Rules is precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, an
offense for which respondent judge may be held administratively liable. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, which under Section 1(b) of the
same Rule is punishable with suspension from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than 10,000, but not exceeding 20,000. Considering that
the instant administrative charge is only the third against respondent judge (the first has been dismissed, while
the second is still pending), and considering his relatively long tenure in the judiciary starting in 1997, he may be
reasonably meted out a penalty of 5,000 for being administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision.Pilar S. Tanoco vs. Judge Inocencio B. Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3, Cabanatuan City. A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1812. June 20, 2012.
Judge; unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without
undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to
the rule on speedy disposition of cases, as delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith
and confidence in the judicial system. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and
resolve cases within 90 days from submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a
judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the
Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for
good reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency,
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the
defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided
within the reglementary period and other factors, such as the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and
other analogous circumstances.
In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge Buenavista sought for an extension of time to decide and
resolve most of the cases pending before him, save only for one instance. Having therefore failed to decide cases
and resolve incidents within the required period constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of a fine
of P10,000.00 which the Court finds reasonable under the circumstances. Re: Report of the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Regional trial Court, Branches 72 and 22, Narvacan Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June
13, 2012.
Public Officials; SALNs. While no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN, the
same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the limitation and
prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of government officials and employees as well as the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713. The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents
stems from the inherent power of the Court, as custodian of these personal documents, to control its very office
to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented; and that the right of other
persons entitled to make inspection may be insured. In this connection, Section 11 of the R.A 6173 provides for
the penalties in case there should be a misuse of the SALN and the information contained therein. The Court
found no reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other
magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its
implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion.
The Court noted the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some
individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of
public documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking
access to the records. The moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestors
responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the law. While public officers
in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be
inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to
prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The Supreme Court also provided the following guidelines:
1. All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts, with the Office of the Court Administrator;
and for attached agencies, with their respective heads of offices.
2. Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV of the members, officials and employees of
the Judiciary, and may cover only previous records if so specifically requested and considered as justified, as
determined by the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under the terms of these guidelines and the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713.
3. In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be made by the Court En Banc.
4. Every request shall explain the requesting partys specific purpose and their individual interests sought to be
served; shall state the commitment that the request shall only be for the stated purpose; and shall be submitted
in a duly accomplished request form secured from the SC website. The use of the information secured shall only
be for the stated purpose.
5. In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the media, their interests should go beyond
pure or mere curiosity.
6. In the case of the members of the media, the request shall additionally be supported by proof under oath of
their media affiliation and by a similar certification of the accreditation of their respective organizations as
legitimate media practitioners.
7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of the media, must have no derogatory record of
having misused any requested information previously furnished to them. Re: Request for copy of 2008 Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary/ Re; Request of the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism [PCIJ] for the 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal
Data Sheets of the Court of Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC/A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA. June 13, 2012.
Retirement under R.A 910; Retirement vs. Resignation. Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts
carrying different meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any
time, retirement entails the compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and
jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employees own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her
post. Retirement takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance to ones employment, resignation
absolutely cuts-off the employment relationship in general; in retirement, the employment relationship endures
for the purpose of the grant of retirement benefits. RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of retirement
benefits to a justice or judge who has either retired from judicial service or resigned from judicial office. In case
of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as provided in RA
No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1 imposes the following minimum requirements for
optional retirement:
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of
which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of exception
remains to be on a case to case basis. The Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges
and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be by reason of incapacity to discharge the
duties of the office. In Britanico, it was held that the resignation contemplated under RA No. 910, as amended
must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More than physical or mental
disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from the intent of the justice or judge
who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or
factors beyond his/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambons case does not render him eligible to retire
under RA No. 910,as amended. First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement since he was less
than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he
failed to satisfy the service requirement not having been in continuous service with the Judiciary for three (3)
years prior to his retirement. Second, Judge Macarambons resignation was not by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and volition.
Thus, the ruling in Britanico cannot be properly applied to his case since his resignation was voluntary. Third,
there are no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambons request. Judge Macarambon failed to present
similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available and sufficient accumulated leave credits which we may tack
in to comply with the age requirement. A verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the time he left
the Court Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the
gap in the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to the COMELEC
upon his transfer. Finally, unlike in Britanico, the nature of his separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
However, although Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he may retire
under RA No. 1616 based on the documents he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service
requirements under the said law. Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen Macarambon under Republic
Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 14061-RET, June 19, 2012.

July 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; bigamy; gross immorality. A disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness
of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the
case.Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of
the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage
under the old Civil Code provisions. Respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.His acts of committing bigamy
twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Attorney; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.Section 27, Rule 138 provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. The crime of direct bribery
is a crime involving moral turpitude. The lawyers final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under
one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of the
lawyers conviction of the crime. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July
24, 2012.
Attorney; inexcusable negligence. The failure of counsel to file the requisite appellants brief amounted to
inexcusable negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc.
v. Saquilabon, it was held that an attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and
with utmost diligence. On account of respondents failure to protect the interest of complainant, respondent
indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence of the public. Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo and Jun Basilio vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro A.C. No. 6910.
July 11, 2012
Attorney; representation of conflicting interest. Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. Rule 15.03 also provides that A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts. in Hilado v. David, the Court held that an attorney is employed
that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his
clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing
his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court. Hence
the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. The prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorneys intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M.
Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.
Attorney; sharing of fees. A lawyer is proscribed by Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to divide
or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. In Tan Tek Beng
v. David , it was rule that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from
clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical
conduct. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Attorney; solicitation of clients. Based on the facts of the case, respondent violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in
business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is
conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This
inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of
a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as
a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The
reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one
and not in the other. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to
diminish the peoples faith in the Judiciary. If an employees questioned conduct tarnished the image and
integrity of his public office, he is liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The basis for his
liability is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. The Code, particularly its Section 4(c), commands that public officials and employees shall at all times
respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest.
The strictest standards have always been valued in judicial service. Everyone involved in the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is expected to live up to the strictest norm of competence,
honesty and integrity in the public service. The conduct of every court personnel must be beyond reproach and
free from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the Judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official duties but also in conducting
themselves outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office. Court personnel are enjoined to conduct
themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the Judiciary for the very image of the latter is
necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral
part of that organ of the government sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore,
should not only be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety
and decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion. The Court does not hesitate to condemn and sanction
such improper conduct, act or omission of those involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of
public accountability and diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the public in the Judiciary. Filomena B.
Consolacion vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan/Judge Emma S. Ines-
Parajas vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan A.M. No. P-06-2186 & A.M. No.
P-12-3026. July 3, 2012
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. In Alenio v. Cunting, the Court defined dishonesty and grave
misconduct as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack
of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness. Misconduct, on the
other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not
a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officers official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft. In Judge San Jose, Jr. v. Camurongan, the
Court held that, The act of taking monetary exhibits without authority from their custodian constitutes
theft. Thievery, no matter how petty, has no place in the judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ma.
Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal Researcher II RTC, Judicial Region III, Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija A.M. No.
P-11-3024, July 17, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty, gross neglect, grave misconduct. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution declares
that a public office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. The demand for moral uprightness is more pronounced for the members and personnel of
the judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of justice. The conduct of court members and personnel must
not only be characterized with propriety and decorum but must also be above suspicion, for any act of
impropriety ca seriously erode or diminish the peoples confidence in the judiciary. As frontliners in the
administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public
service.
Clerks of Court act as custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, property and premises and are thus,
liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. In Re: Report on the Judicial
and Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao Del Norte, it was held that the failure of the Clerk of Court to
remit the court funds constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. In this case, Peradilla is guilty of dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and grave misconduct
for her: (1) non-remittance of collections of judiciary funds; (2) non-issuance of official receipts and non reporting
in the Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposits of some of the collections; and
(3) erroneous reporting in the Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposits of some of the
collections. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lunalinda M. Peradilla, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, E1 Nido-
Linapacan, Palawan A.M. No. P-09-2647, July 17, 2012.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The Sheriff disregarded the procedure for the execution of judgments as
mandated by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. A sheriff is mandated to make an estimate of the
expenses which shall be approved by the court. It is only after the approval of the court that an interested party
shall deposit the amount with the clerk of court. Upon the return of the writ, the sheriff must submit a liquidation
and return to the interested party any unspent amount. The Sheriffs act of receiving money from the party for
the expenses to be incurred in the execution of the writs, without first making an estimate and securing prior
approval from the MTCC, as well as his failure to render accounting after its execution, are clear violations of the
rule. Even if conceding that the sum demanded by Sheriff is reasonable, this does not justify his deviation from
the procedure laid down by the rule. Neither the acquiescence nor consent of the complainant, before or after the
implementation of the writ will absolve him from liability. The mere act of receiving the money without the prior
approval of the court and without him issuing a receipt therefor is considered as a misconduct in office.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of
the performance of their duties. Corollarily, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a
party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps. Even assuming that such payments were indeed
given and received in good faith, such fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made
for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs and their deputies are the front-line representatives of the justice system,
and if, through their lack of care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust reposed
on them, they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. The image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest
employee. As such, the Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which
would tend to or actually diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Lambayong Teachers and Employees
Cooperative, represented in this act by its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso vs. Carlos P. Diaz, in his capacity as
Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City A.M. No. P-06-2246, July 11, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The manner in which a writ of execution is to be returned to the court,
as well as the requisite reports to be made by the sheriff or officer, is explicitly outlined in Section 14, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. In accordance with this rule, periodic reporting must be done by the sheriff regularly and
consistently every thirty (30) days until the judgment is fully satisfied. It is mandatory for the sheriff to make a
return of the writ of execution, so that the court and the litigants may be apprised of the proceedings undertaken
in the enforcement of the writ. The return will enable the courts to take the necessary steps to ensure the speedy
execution of decisions. The failure of a sheriff to make periodic reports on the status of a writ of execution
warrants administrative liability.
The Court faults respondent for not submitting his periodic reports on the progress of his implementation of the
writ. He is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task
expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.As officers of the
court, sheriffs are charged with the knowledge of what proper action to take in case there are questions on the
writ needing to be clarified; they are charged as well with the knowledge of what they are bound to comply
with.Sheriffs are expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of the
court,relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should at all times show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of their duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down by the Rules
of Court is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
Rhea Airene P. Katague, et al. vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 48, Bacolod City A.M. No. P-12-3067.
July 4, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The duty of a process server is vital to the administration of justice. A
process servers primary duty is to serve court notices which precisely requires utmost care on his part by
ensuring that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the parties. Unjustified delay in performing this task
constitutes neglect of duty and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. All employees in the judiciary
should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency. It is through the process server that defendants
learn of the action brought against them by the complainant. It is also through the service of summons by the
process server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. It is therefore important that
summonses, other writs and court processes be served expeditiously.
Heavy workload is not an adequate excuse to be remiss in the diligent performance of ones public duties as a
public servant. Otherwise, every government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty will
always use this as a convenient excuse to escape punishment to the great prejudice of public service
The Court has defined dishonesty as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of
intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only
of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of
mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It
was never alleged, much less established, that Dela Cruz was impelled by some evil design or corrupt motives to
commit said errors or to favor any party or litigant. Hence, he was found guilty only of negligence in the
performance of his tasks, and not of dishonesty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee
to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Judge
Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes Dela Cruz, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Judge Clapis is also liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail
hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an
opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. His Order granting bail indicates that he merely used
as basis the affidavit of one prosecution witness that was submitted earlier. Clearly, he failed to observe the
proper procedure in granting bail. His act is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a
patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of
bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.
If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not only be confusion
in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process. Judges are
reminded that having accepted the exalted position of a judge, they owe it to the public to uphold the exacting
standard of conduct demanded from them.Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Judge; gross misconduct. In Kaw v. Osorio, the Court held that while the respondent judge, in that case, may not
be held liable for extortion and corruption as it was not substantially proven, he should be made accountable for
gross misconduct. The acts of the Judge in meeting a litigant in a case pending before his sala, and telling her,
Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them) constitute gross
misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior in connection with ones performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to
exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a
persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment. The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity
and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
particularly Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Sections 2 and 4 of Canon 3 and Section 1 of Canon 4
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial at all times.
Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured
lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. Needless to state, any gross
misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary. Criselda C. Gacad
vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela ValleyA.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Judge; undue delay. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of the cases that it covers. The respondent failed to abide by this purpose in the way
that he handled and acted on the subject unlawful detainer case. Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer
is filed. The respondent set the case for preliminary conference at a time way beyond the required thirty (30)-day
period. Another of the respondents procedural lapses relates to the frequent resetting of the date of the
preliminary conference. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert his authority in expediting the proceedings of the
unlawful detainer case. Sound practice requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full control of the proceedings
in his court and to adopt a firm policy against unnecessary postponements.
In numerous occasions, the Court admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their solemn duty as
dispensers of justice because undue delay in the administration of justice erodes the peoples faith in the judicial
system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of justice in this country grind slowly, it
also invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the Judge. Judges should always be
mindful of their duty to render justice within the periods prescribed by law. Murphy Chu, et al. vs. Hon. Mario B.
Capellan, Assisting Judge, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012.

August 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; failure to account for money. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.
Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose, should be immediately
returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Emilia O. Dhaliwal vs. Atty. Abelardo B.
Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390, August 1, 2012.
Attorney; grave misconduct and dishonesty. The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public
from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence. The Court cited the case of In Re: Sotto and ruled that One of the
qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and,
when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow
such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients
and with the courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is
the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard
of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so
unworthily abused.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but
also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to
them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred or suspended for
committing deceitful and dishonest acts. This rule provides that in any of the following circumstances, to wit:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct;(5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so; the Court is
vested with the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere
suspension. Grace M. Anacta vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction. A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012.
Attorney; immorality. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must
perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the
above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath14 and Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Engr.Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012
Attorney; representing conflicting interest. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship,
sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging
inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith
and honest intention on the erring lawyers part does not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer
acquires knowledge of his former clients doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have
acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It
would simply be impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision
or lock the same into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one. Santos Ventura Hocorma
Foundation, Inc., represented by Gabriel H. Abad vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012
Attorney; sharing of fees with non- lawyers. Respondents defense that forgery had attended the execution of
the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of
complainants commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule
9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services
with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar. Engr.
Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual
matters but also conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. Respondent
engaged in sexual relations with a married man which not only violate the moral standards expected of
employees of the Judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from any whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the court as
a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court employee is also judged by his private
morals. The exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the
Court to those in the service of the Judiciary. Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not live up to her
commitment to lead a moral life.
Public office is a public trust. The good of the service and the degree of
morality, which every official and employee in the public service must observe, if
respect and confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand
that no untoward conduct affecting morality, integrity, and efficiency while holding office should be left without
proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account. Judge Armando S.
Adlawan, Presiding Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental vs. Estrella P. Capilitan,
6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental. A.M. No. P-12-3080. August 29, 2012
Court personnel; dishonesty and falsification of public document. Willful concealment of facts in the Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) constitutes mental dishonesty amounting to misconduct. Likewise, making a false statement in
ones PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty has been defined as
intentionally making a false statement on any material fact. Dishonesty evinces a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive
or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the PDS as a requirement for employment in the government.
Hence, making false statements in ones PDS is ultimately connected with ones employment in the
government. The employee making false statements in his or her PDS becomes liable for falsification. Moreover,
for respondent to be meted the penalty of dismissal, her dishonesty need not be committed in the performance of
official duty.
As the Court has previously ruled: The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is
dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with
his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest
official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is
given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and
entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and
dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.
When official documents are falsified, intent to injure a third person is irrelevant because the principal thing
punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as claimed in that document.The act
undermines the integrity of government records and therein lies the prejudice to public service. The act need not
result in disruption of service or loss to the government. It is the act of dishonesty itself that taints the integrity of
government service. A government officers dishonesty affects the morale of the service, even when it stems from
the employees personal dealings. Such conduct should not be tolerated from government officials, even when
official duties are performed well.
Employment in the judiciary demands the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency from its
personnel. All judiciary employees are expected to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all
times
.
An act that falls short of the exacting standards set for public officers, especially those in the judiciary,
shall not be countenanced. Manolito C. Villordon vs. Marilyn C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809, August 10, 2012
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give attention to a task or the
disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. The Court ruled in Pilipina v. Roxas: The Court cannot
countenance neglect of duty for even simple neglect of duty lessens the peoples confidence in the judiciary and
ultimately in the administration of justice. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public servants
must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a
public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Memoranda of Judge Eliza B. Yu issued to Legal
Researcher Marie Joy P. Lagman and to Court Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, all of Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 47, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-12-3033, August 15, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court clearly mandates the sheriff or
other proper officer to file a return and when necessary, periodic reports, with the court which issued the writ of
execution. The writ of execution shall be returned to the court immediately after the judgment had been partially
or fully satisfied. In case the writ is still unsatisfied or only partially satisfied 30 days after the officers receipt of
the same, said officer shall file a report with the court stating the reasons therefor. Subsequently, the officer shall
periodically file with the court a report on the proceedings taken to enforce the writ every 30 days until said writ
is fully satisfied or its effectivity expires. The officer is further required to furnish the parties with copies of the
return and periodic reports.
Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and execution of a writ do not excuse respondents
total inaction. Neither the Rules nor jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the periodic filing of reports by
sheriffs It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. A judgment, if
left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Therefore, sheriffs ought to know
that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in
their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in
accordance with their mandate. Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of
judgments is not unduly delayed. Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily
as possible. As agents of the law, high standards are expected of sheriffs
Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that reads, Court personnel shall at all times
perform official duties properly and with diligence. Astorga and Repol Law Offices, represented by Atty. Arnold
B. Lugares vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City. A.M. No. P-12-3029,
August 15, 2012.
Attorney; representation of non-client. Atty. Espejos claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend
assistance to Rodica deserves scant consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed, and in such cases, even if he does not accept a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to the
person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latters right. However, in this case, Rodica
cannot be considered as defenseless or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel in the
RTC case. Needless to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not been
represented by any lawyer, which, however, is not the case.
The Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their law firms client and without the
knowledge and consent of his
superiors, gave in to Rodicas request for him to indicate in the said motion the names of his law firm, Atty.
Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of giving more weight and credit to the pleading. As a member of the
bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in courts are acted upon in accordance with
their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the lawyer filing the same. More importantly,
he should have thought that in so doing, he was actually assisting Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that
she was being represented by the said law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not.
It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an officer of the
court. Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealings and must conduct himself
beyond reproach at all times. He must likewise ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common
sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. Jasper Junno F. Rodica vs. Atty. Manuel M.
Lazaro, et al. A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012

January 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; forum shopping as contempt of court. A disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales was filed for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed. The court held
that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist
the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration
of justice contravenes this obligation. The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum
shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate
forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court. In engaging in forum
shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by
misusing court processes. Thus, the court subjected Atty. Gonzales to censure. Anastacio N. Teodoro III vs. Atty.
Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760. January 30, 2013
Attorney; neglect. Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gacott who allegedly deceived the
complainant and her husband into signing a preparatory Deed of Sale that respondent converted into a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties owned by
another an act that could result in damage should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While it was his legal
staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or
present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the respondent liable, as the TCTs were
entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for his clients properties that were
in his custody.
Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a
lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the Court has consistently
held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. In Canoy v.
Ortiz, the court held that a lawyers failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in his duty to his client when,
without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya.Fe A.
Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475. January 30, 2013
Attorney; lack of diligence. Complainant filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Cefra for violating Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules 138 and139 of the Rules of Court. The court held that Atty.
Cefra was guilty of negligence in handling the complainants case. His acts in the present administrative case also
reveal his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court. The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. It further states that
a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. In addition, a lawyer has the duty to keep the client informed of the status of his case. Atty.
Cefra failed to live up to these standards as shown by the following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer
of documentary evidence within the period given by the RTC; (2) He failed to comply with the two orders of the
RTC directing him to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence; (3) Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate
motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTCs decision; (4) He failed to file an
appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTCs decision which was adverse
to complainants.
Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefras lack of diligence and inattention to his duties as a lawyer warrant
disciplinary sanction. The court has repeatedly held that [t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sps. Arcing and
Cresing Bautista, et al. vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C. No. 5530. January 28, 2013.
Attorney; reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys; guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency; good
moral character requirement. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:
(a) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or
judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent
finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption
of non-reformation.
(b) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
(c) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can
be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
(d) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to
legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service.
(e) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to
the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
In a previous Decision, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous
marriage with complainant Teves and a third marriage with one Constantino while his first marriage to Esparza
was still subsisting. These acts, according to the court, constituted gross immoral conduct.
In this case, the court held that Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion
in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves
and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. After his disbarment,
respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking
care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of
Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/Office-In-Charge
in the Assessors Office, which office he continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the
University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise
took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
Certain documents also attest to Respondents reformed ways such as: (1) Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang; (2)
Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from the Municipal Local
Government Office.
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the IBP- Cagayan Chapter and by his
former and present colleagues. His parish priest certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the
doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Respondent has already settled
his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves.
He sends regular support to his children in compliance with the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14) years
of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation
Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and certifications presented,
the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has
productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the
betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers,
concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways as in this case.
Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of law. He was, however, reminded that such privilege is
burdened with conditions whereby adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict
compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.Florence Teves Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo
L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition (for Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo L. Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22, 2013
Court personnel; refusal to perform duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins
court personnel to perform their official duties properly and with diligence at all times. Clerks of Court are
primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be
allowed to slacken on their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the
court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies of records upon request. As
such, they are expected to possess a high degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of their functions
to help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay.
As an officer of the court, respondent Clerk of Court was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias writs of execution to
implement the judgment in a Civil Case, despite orders from the RTC. Moreover, she failed to file the required
comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey the orders and processes of the
Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her name, constituting an implied admission of
the charges.Mariano T. Ong vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 32, Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-
3090. January 7, 2013
Judge; disciplinary proceedings against judges; presumption of regularity. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected
through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies.
Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus,
cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous
orders or judgments.
Even if the CA decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon
proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or
attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well
as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be
clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or
malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALIs
bare and self-serving claim, no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that
respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge
has regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Re: Verified complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q.
Bueser, et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; gross ignorance of law. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. was charged with gross ignorance of the law, manifest
partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty. The court held that the judge did not commit gross ignorance of the
law. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity with simple
rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public trust in the
competence and fairness of the court which he personifies. The complaint states that respondent judge, in
arbitrary defiance of his own September 25, 2006 Decision which constitutes res judicata or a bar to him to pass
upon the issue of Geoffrey, Jrs. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011 Order, provisional custody over
Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to the judgment on compromise agreement.
Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant against him since there is no
finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise. The preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired
to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a
parent, is not permanent. Geoffrey Beckett vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24, Cebu City. A.M.
No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013
Judge; misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or a
standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule
must be established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the execution of the final judgment against
accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference to the Courts action on the various petitions filed by
the former. Records are bereft of evidence showing any trace of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold the Sandiganbayan Justices administratively liable for grave
misconduct. Re: Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco against Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M.
No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; no abuse of authority when judge did not renew a temporary appointment. Complainant, a former Court
Stenographer III at the RTC, failed to show any proof that she was entitled to a permanent position. Other than
her allegation that she was given two very satisfactory and one satisfactory rating, there was no evidence
presented that she has met the prescribed qualification standard for the position. Such standard is a mix of the
formal education, experience, training, civil service eligibility, physical health and attitude that the job requires.
Respondent judge, who is the immediate supervisor of complainant, is in the best position to observe the fitness,
propriety and efficiency of the employee for the position. It should be impressed upon complainant that her
appointment in the Judiciary is not a vested right. It is not an entitlement that she can claim simply for the reason
that she had been in the service for almost two years.
The subsequent filing of complaint against Atty. Borja (officer-in-charge of the PAO-Virac) manifests
complainants propensity to file complaints whenever she does not get what she wants. Such attitude should not
be tolerated. Otherwise, judges will be placed in hostage situations by employees who will threaten to file
complaints whenever they do not get their way with their judges.
Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her position, the case against her should be dismissed.
Respondent judge should, however, be reminded to be circumspect in her actuations so as not to give the
impression that she is guilty of favoritism. Kareen P. Magtagob vs. Judge Genie G. Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No.
11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013

February 2013 Philippines Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; confidentiality of proceedings against attorneys; exception. Atty. Fortun filed a petition for contempt
against respondents for publicizing the disbarment case against him in media.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that proceedings against attorneys shall be private and
confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
The purpose of the rule is not only to enable the Court to make its investigations free from any extraneous
influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges
from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the
press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without authority. Malicious and unauthorized
publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors
and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by
either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court. However, Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not
prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a
legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of
disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun is itself a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on Atty. Fortun
himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case.
Thus, since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, media had a right to publish such fact under
freedom of the press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13,
2013.
Attorney; full discharge of duties to client; limitations. Atty. Villarin is expected to champion the cause of his client
with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any
and every remedy and defense including the institution of an ejectment case that is recognized by our
property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, the court held that in the full discharge of their duties to the client,
lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that they may displease the general public.
Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall perform their duty
to the client within the bounds of law. They should only make such defense when they believe it to be honestly
debatable under the law. In this case, Atty. Villarins act of issuing demand letters, moved by the understanding
of a void HLURB Decision, is legally sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary
in order to file an action for ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code
just to maintain his clients disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.
However, the facts show that Atty. Villarin brazenly typified one of the complainants as an illegal occupant when
the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision lot buyer. Given that he
knew such falsity, he thus advances the interest of his client through means that are not in keeping with fairness
and honesty. This is proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires that a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in
evidence any document that they know is false. Verleen Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva
Mendoza, Celedonio Alojado, et al. vs. Atty. Angelito Villarin, A.C. No. 9310. February 27, 2013.
Attorney; notarial practice; necessity of affiants personal appearance; nature of notarization; penalties when a
notary public fails to discharge his duties. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who
signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the personal appearance of the person who actually
executed the document, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or deed.
The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would
be undermined
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by
the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat
is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as
such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned
as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year. Patrocinio V.
Agbulos vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013.
Court personnel; discourteous acts. Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution states that a public office is a public
trust. It enjoins public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency and to, at all times, remain accountable to the people. As front liners of the justice system,
sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance of their duties. As
agents of the law, they are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in
serving the courts writs and processes and implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err
without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.
Sheriff Gelbolingos failure to properly respond to the letters is tantamount to discourtesy. A simple note as to
where their personal effects were temporarily stored could have assured Sasing that their belongings were not
confiscated but merely stored for safekeeping. The Court is fully aware that a sheriffs schedule can be hectic, but
she could have easily relayed the information to the other court staff to address Sasings concerns.
The administrative offense committed by Sheriff Gelbolingo is discourtesy in the course of official duties which,
under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section 52(C)(1), is a light offense.
The penalty imposable for such an offense is either a reprimand for the first offense, a suspension from 1 day to
30 days for the second offense, and dismissal from public service for the third offense. In this case, the court
admonished Sheriff Gelbolingo considering there was an effort on her part to meet with Sasing twice, but the
latter did not appear on the second scheduled meeting. Ray Antonio C. Sasing vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032. February 20, 2013.

Court personnel; public office is a public trust; simple neglect of duty. No less than the Constitution itself
mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency, for
public office is a public trust. The Court has repeatedly reminded those who work in the Judiciary to be examples
of responsibility, competence and efficiency; they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence,
since they are officers of the Court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of
those who would violate the norm[s] of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith
of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.
In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server in the RTC, with Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.
The court held that Esguerra was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Esguerra cannot blame the Civil Docket Clerk
for the delay in the service of the July 7, 2008 Order. If indeed a copy of the July 7, 2008 Order had been handed
to Esguerra only on August 8, 2008, a Friday, he should not have proceeded to mail the same; but instead,
should have served the Order personally to the parties, particularly to the herein complainant. Even the Notice of
Dismissal dated August 21, 2008 was mailed only on September 19, 2008, three (3) weeks after it was endorsed
to him sometime on August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts clearly demonstrate lack of sufficient or reasonable
diligence on the part of the respondent. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
mandates that Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. Clearly,
Esguerra had been remiss in the performance of his duties and has shown lack of dedication to the functions of
his office. Esguerras acts displayed a conduct falling short of the stringent standards required of court
employees. Erlinda C. Mendoza vs. Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967. February 13, 2013.
Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA); preliminary injunction; requirement of a hearing. Section 4 of Rule VI of the
2009 IRCA provides that [T]he requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the issuance
of a resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined requiring him to comment on the said application
within the period of not more than ten (10) days from notice.
In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the requisite hearing on the application for injunctive writ,
since the so-called new and substantial matters raised in the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 and
in the supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to respondents Ricafort, and they had already
been previously ordered to comment on the said application, at the time when the said subsequent matters
were already obtaining. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso.
Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity;
unbecoming conduct. Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed
against judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such
instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant.
Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the
complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the
investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.
In this case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no public
records were brought forth during the investigation. Judge Achas denied all the charges made against him, only
admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he reared fighting cocks.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by Canons of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no
clear evidence. Although Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and betting, he admitted rearing fighting
cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose
upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office.
Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities. His personal behavior outside the court, and not only while in the performance of
his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus,
any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents. Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC
Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013.
Judge; definition of ponencia; ponente if present can act upon an urgent motion alone or with another member
present. There is nothing in the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) which would have required the Division Clerk of
Court to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the two present regular members of the 14th Division, as
the complainants seem to believe. The complainants would have been correct if the absent member of the
Division was not the ponente herself but either of the other members. This implies that the ponente if present
can act upon the urgent motion alone or with another member present, provided that the action or resolution is
submitted on the next working day to the absent member or members of the Division for ratification, modification
or recall.
A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment,
requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose
during the pendency of the principal action. Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
are passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.
On the other hand, ponencia refers to the rendition of a decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the
main controversy. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the 14th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 did not
settle the controversy therein, but is a mere interlocutory order to restore the status quo ante, that is, the state
of things prior to the RTCs Order of December 21, 2011. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S.
Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J.
February 19, 2013.
Judge; government employee vis--vis government officer; liberal treatment upon retirement claims of judges
and justices. In a letter, former Chief Justice Panganiban requested that the government service which he
rendered from January 1962 to December 1965 in the Department of Education, its Secretary, and the Board of
National Education, be creditable so that he can meet the present service requirement of fifteen (15) years for
entitlement to retirement benefits.
Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a government employee includes any person in the service
of the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. A government officer, on the other hand,
refers to officials whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of
government, whether such duties are precisely defined or not. Clearly, the law, then and now, did not require a
specific job description and job specification. Thus, the absence of a specific position in a governmental structure
is not a hindrance for the Court to give weight to CJ Panganibans government service as legal counsel and
consultant.
The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon retirement
claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of service in cases of disability or
death while in actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave credits to the actual length of
government service in order to qualify one for retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement service in order to
complete the years of government service required; (4) extending the full benefits of retirement upon
compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering legal counseling work for a government
body or institution as creditable government service. Re: Request of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
for Re-Computation of his Creditable Service for the Purpose of Re-Computing his Retirement Benefits, A.M. No.
10-9-15-SC. February 12, 2013.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law; mandatory inhibition; no liability for damages in the exercise of judicial
functions. The court held that Judge Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. To be held administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, but must have also been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross
ignorance of the law is considered as a serious offense under Rule 140, Section 8, and is punishable under
Section 11.
Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to the judge, is a relative by affinity within the sixth
degree, Judge Dinopol should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case as mandated by Section
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua v. Johnson, the court explained that in civil actions for
damages, judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to answer for what they do in the exercise of
their judicial functions, provided they are acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et
al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Joewe Palad vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC,
Branch 24, Koronadal City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City/Eden V. Castro vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs.
Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol,
RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No.
OCA-IPI No. 07-2652-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-
IPI No. 08-2808-RTJ. February 12, 2013.
Judge; instituting administrative proceedings against justices. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, there are
three ways by which administrative proceedings may be instituted against justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon
verified complaint (as in this complaint) with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint
supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
In this case, complainants have no personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CAs
former Special 14th Division since they were not parties in the lower court. Thus, they are not permitted to
harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a
matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous
order he issues. The settled rule is that a Judge cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively
for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in the
consolidated CA petitions was discretionary, interlocutory and preservative in nature, and equally importantly, it
was a collective and deliberated action of the former Special 14th Division. Moreover, as an established rule, an
administrative, civil or criminal action against a judge cannot be a substitute for an appeal. Ethelwoldo E.
Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P.
Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; judicial conduct; definition of just debts; willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary action
against judges. Manlapaz charged Judge Sabillo with serious and gross misconduct for failure to return an
amount arising from a transaction.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a collection agency for the unpaid debts of its officials and
employees, but has nevertheless provided for Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that holds its officials and
employees administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This Section provides that willful failure to pay a just
debt is a ground for disciplinary action against judges and justices. Just debts, as defined in Section 23, Rule XIV
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, refer to (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or
(2) claims, the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court classifies willful failure to pay a just debt as a serious charge.
While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction that is private and outside of official transactions, the
rules do not thereby intrude into public officials private lives; they simply look at their actions from the prism of
public service and consider these acts unbecoming of a public official. These rules take into account that these
are actions of officials who are entrusted with public duties and who, even in their private capacities, should
continually act to reflect their status as public servants. Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of
uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with
others so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. Here, the
complainants claim is a just debt. The willfulness of Judge Sabillo in not paying is shown by his continuous failure
to settle despite demand letters sent to him. Thus, the court imposed the penalty of fine. Victoriano G. Manlapaz
vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC, Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771. February 13, 2013.
Judge; judicial audit; courts jurisdiction over an administrative case; presumption of regularity. The OCA
submitted its memorandum to then Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio on 10 July 2012 more than two
years and seven months after Judge Grageda compulsorily retired. During his incumbency, Judge Grageda was
never given the chance to explain the alleged violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars. Up to the
present, the OCA has not commenced any formal investigation or asked Judge Grageda to comment on the
matter. Thus, the complaint against Judge Grageda must be dismissed.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Mantua, the court held that this Court concedes that there are no
promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve as
license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never
given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the
memoranda which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of action for the
violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual
judicial audits may be conducted at least six months before a judges compulsory retirement. We recognize that
effective monitoring of a judges observance of the time limits required in the disposition of cases is hampered by
limited resources.
These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantuas right to due process.
For the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondents cessation
from office. In this case, Judge Gragedas compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right to institute a new
administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer acquire administrative
jurisdiction over him by filing a new administrative case against him after he has ceased to be a public official.
The remedy is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case against him for the alleged transgression.
Moreover, to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be substantial evidence that he committed an offense.
Otherwise, the presumption is that he regularly performed his duties. In Go v. Judge Achas, the Court held that,
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his
duties will prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave
offense, the evidence against him should be competent. Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial
Court, Br. 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC. February 27, 2013.
Judge; undue delay. The court held that Judge Amdengan committed undue delay in rendering a Decision in the
ejectment case. An action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure, Section 10 which
provides that within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of
the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment. This provision is mandatory, considering the
nature of an ejectment case.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an order is classified as a
less serious charge, punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The
court considered his candid admission and acceptance of his infraction as factors in imposing only a fine. Atty.
Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan, Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No.
MTJ-12-1818. February 13, 2013.

March 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint
he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law
office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings
filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:
CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAW.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing
of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, a
counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing
ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give
legal effect to the document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty. Bacolo was meted with the penalty the
suspension from the practice of law for one year. Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys. Charlie
Bancolo and Janus Jarder; A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.
Attorney; disbarment complaint; outright dismissal is warranted if the complaint, on its face, lacks merit. For
resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the complainant upon the dismissal of the Complaint for
disbarment he instituted against the respondent lawyers. Complainant claims he was denied due process
because (1) she was not allowed to file a Reply and (2) the Court deviated from usual procedure when it resolved
the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been submitted for resolution.
The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face, it is clearly
wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of People against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief Justice Davide,
Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient in form and substance, dismissed the same outright
for utter lack of merit. In the instant case, the Court did not dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it
even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Then, after a judicious study of the records, it
proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainants favor. Based on the Complaint and the supporting
affidavits attached thereto, and the respective Comments of the respondents, the Court found that the
presumption of innocence accorded to respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required
complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can already
judiciously resolve the case based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainants mistaken
notion, not all petitions or complaints reach the reply or memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the
case, the Court has the discretion either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their
respective responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can proceed to resolve the
case without need of informing the parties that the case is already submitted for resolution. Jasper Junno F.
Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Attorney; duty to exercise due diligence. The Court reiterated its ruling in Del Mundo v. Capistranothat when a
lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights.
Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the
legal profession, the court and society.
Respondents infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBDs directives for him to file his
pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but also his
disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon
to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an
officer of the court. As a member of the bar, he ought to have known that the orders of the CBD as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers were not mere requests but directives
which should have been complied with promptly and completely. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No.
9615. March 5, 2013.
Attorney; duty to hold in trust money received from client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose,
such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be returned to the client
immediately. The Court held in Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a lawyers failure to return the funds he holds on
behalf of a client, despite latters demand, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for
his own use and constitutes a gross violation of general morality and professional ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty.
Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to keep and maintain a general
docket. Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves admitted that he failed to keep and maintain a general docket of cases
assigned to their branch. As such, he failed to comply with his duty under Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court, thus:
Sec. 8. General docket. The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered and
prepared for receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered consecutively in
the order in which they were received, and under the heading of each case, a complete title thereof, the date of
each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that
by reference a single page the history of the case may be seen.
With this infraction, Mr. Teves was held liable for simple neglect of duty. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr.
Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to schedule the promulgation of
cases. In the Datan case, Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for promulgation, just gave the accused a
copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time when the presiding judge was serving her suspension. Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused
and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or
outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is his duty to calendar the case for
promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in fact, served
copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated first. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; imposable penalty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of
an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months
for the first offense, and dismissal for the second.
In the determination of the proper penalty, the Court looked into Mr. Teves past administrative cases.
Considering his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely, Mr. Teves still has not reformed. He has remained undeterred in disregarding the law and he
appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received. Mr. Teves repeated infractions
seriously compromise efficiency and hamper public service which the Court can no longer tolerate. As such, he
was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued
leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M.
Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves,
Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases. The OCA found that the court failed to
maintain a general docket book to keep track of the cases under it. Although the duty is vested with Mr. Teves as
the Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the members of her staff perform their
duties. The OCA also found that Mr. Teves repeatedly submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of
cases pending with their court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an efficient system of monitoring
their cases. Again, this is the primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that Judge Tormis
failed to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to
be informed that every case is in proper order.
Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to comply with her
duty to provide an efficient court management system in her court which includes the preparation and use of
docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella
M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S.
Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure
that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-
affidavits and other countervailing evidence. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since
November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot
claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No.
MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with the following
sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1) Dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a
fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis work history which reflects how she
performed her judicial functions. We find that there are several administrative cases already filed against her,
with most of these cases being decided against her. These cases show her inability to properly discharge her
judicial duties. Considering her past infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities she
committed in this present case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture
of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12,
2013.
Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds. As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente, an inhibition must be for just and
valid reason. Complainants mere imputation that the case was decided by the magistrates of the Court with
extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro,
et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by
the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved.
Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from
submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly,
and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or
interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a
pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the
imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr.
Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013; Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6,
2013.
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases pending in his
court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and poor health, will
not absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he
can, for good reasons, ask for an extension. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide
even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative
sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino
Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-
2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within
the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions
such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case,
depending on the following factors: (1) the number of cases not decided within the reglamentary period; (2) the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances; (3) the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the
delay; (4) the health and age of the judge; and (5) other analogous circumstances.
In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his more
than 15 years in the service. The Court likewise took into consideration the fact that the respondent judge
exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the Courts directives as contained in the resolution. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge
Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6,
2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a justification for the delay. Respondent
judge claimed that the delay was the consequence of the three suspension orders issued against her as she was
suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six months. Records reveal, however, that Judge
Tormis was repeatedly suspended in cases wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a member of the
Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify another violation of her solemn oath to
dispense justice. Even if she was allowed to avail of this excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the
cases that she failed to dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to said
suspensions. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative matter was instituted against Judge
Grageda, based on the result of a judicial audit conducted after his retirement. According to the Supreme Court,
for it to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency
of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on
the holding of a position or office in the government service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is
not lost by the mere fact that the public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the
case.
In present case, Judge Gragedas retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative
proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to
penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in the service. Accordingly, the complaint against
retired Judge Grageda was dismissed.Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2235. March 11, 2013.

April 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Cases on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; practice of law; notary. The practice of law is imbued with public interest and a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation,
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer
of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public
instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other lawyers and the
general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. Respondent committed acts of
deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Evidently, respondents conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing required from lawyers. Thus, he should be sanctioned. Efigenia M. Tenoso vs. Atty. Anselmo S.
Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April 11, 2013
Court personnel; dishonesty. In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the Court defined dishonesty as
intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception
or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is
not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a
person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave
rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed,
the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the
degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. Evidence showed that respondent was not the one who
took the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations. The Court, citing the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,
stressed that its employees should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of the esteemed
institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty perpetrated by its
employees. Civil Service Commission vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-08-2531. April 11, 2013
Court Personnel; simple neglect of duty. In this case, the personnel in charge of the court records failed to
elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals within the prescribed period due to the alleged heavy
workload. The Court held that he was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel commands court personnel to perform their duties properly and with diligence at all
times. The administration of justice is an inviolable task and it demands the highest degree of efficiency,
dedication and professionalism.
The Court is not unaware of the heavy workload of court personnel, given the number of cases filed and pending
before it. However, unless proven to exist in an insurmountable degree, this circumstance cannot serve as an
excuse to evade administrative liability; otherwise, every government employee faced with negligence and
dereliction of duty would resort to that excuse to evade punishment, to the detriment of the public service.
Clearly, Salazar is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task
expected of an employee, thus signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances
attendant to the commission of the crime shall be considered. The Court has mitigated imposable penalties for
various special reasons. It has considered length of service in the judiciary, acknowledgement of infractions,
remorse and family circumstances, among others, in determining the applicable penalty. In this case, while
Salazar is a second time offender for simple neglect of duty, her long years of service in the judiciary and the
admission of her negligence are circumstances to mitigate her culpability. Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17,
Davao City vs. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, etc., et al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013
Judge; Court Personnel; Grave misconduct; Gross neglect of duty; Gross inefficiency. In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort,
the court held that: Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions
must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved
in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.
First, the judges involved solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were
incomplete and questionable. Their actions constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that
inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The
Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones attention to a task expected
of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so
serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents show that official
receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on
different dates.
Third, the judges also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a
certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. This irregularity displayed the gross neglect of duty
of the judges.
Fourth, the judges are also guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with respect
to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority
status of one party.
On the other hand, the court interpreter is guilty of grave misconduct when she said she can facilitate the
marriage and the requirements on the same day. She proposed an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of
P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or
accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit
shall influence their official actions.
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as a grave offense that carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio
S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judges violated Canons 21 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. Ignorance of the law is a
mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an
indication of lack of integrity. In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and
upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation
of the law and more importantly of justice. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et
al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Public officer; Presumption of regularity. In People v. Jansen, the Court held that the solemnizing officer is not
duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official,
and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. However, in Sevilla v. Cardenas, the
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges
to the irregularity of the issuance. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al.A.M.
No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Prohibition against private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly
prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional
advice to clients. Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional
advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions,
duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time
and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and
assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a
sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a
member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period
of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to
participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments
and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special
proceedings.
In this case, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wifes
administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer, and
preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter. Sonia C. Decena and Rey C. Decena vs. Judge Nilo A.
Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8, 2013
Public Officers; public office is a public trust; public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. In this case, Gesultura, a Cashier II in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC, was
dismissed for an anomaly involving the Judiciary Development Fund and the General Fund. The Court held that
public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized
by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does the judicial
office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of justice. The
act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct which are grave offenses
punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first offense. Time and again, we have reminded court
personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately
with authorized government depositories the various funds they have collected, because they are not authorized
to keep funds in their custody. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P-04-1785. April
2, 2013

June 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence. In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan, the Court held that the failure to file a brief resulting in
the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In this case, the Court cannot accept as an excuse
the alleged lapse committed by his client in failing to provide him a copy of the case records.
In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San Juans control and is a task that the
lawyer undertakes.
Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that filing an appellants brief within the
reglementary period is critical in the perfection of an appeal. The preparation and the filing of the appellants brief
are matters of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of Atty. San Juan. It was
incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental to the perfection of his clients
appeal.
Third, Atty. San Juan lacked candor in dealing with his client. He omitted to inform Tomas of the progress of his
appeal with the Court of Appeals. Worse, he did not disclose to Tomas the real reason for the Court of Appeals
dismissal of the appeal. Neither did Atty. San Juan file a motion for reconsideration, or otherwise resort to
available legal remedies that might have protected his clients interest.
Atty. San Juans negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyers Oath that requires him to conduct [himself] as a
lawyer according to the best of (his) knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
(his) clients[.] He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.
Attorney; IBP findings and recommended penalties in administrative cases against lawyers are only
recommendatory. IBPs recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law is not
commensurate to the gravity of the infractions committed. These infractions warrant the imposition of a stiffer
sanction. The following acts and omissions of Atty. San Juan were considered: first, the negligence in handling
his clients appeal; second, his failure to act candidly and effectively in communicating information to his client;
and more importantly, third, the serious and irreparable consequence of his admitted negligence which deprived
his client of legal remedies in addressing his conviction.
In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal, the Court imposed a one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on a lawyer
who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of gross negligence in handling his clients case. With this case as
the norm, Atty. San Juan should be meted a suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law for his
negligence and inadequacies in handling his clients case.
Moreover, IBPs findings and stated penalty are merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has the power
to discipline erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct. Until finally acted upon by
the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the recommended penalty imposed cannot attain finality until adopted
by the Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper subject of implementation or
compliance. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Ismael Hadji Ali, a court stenographer I at the Sharia Circuit Court, represented that
he took and passed the Civil Service Professional Examination but evidence showed that another person took the
exam for him. Per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, the use of spurious Civil Service eligibility
constitutes dishonesty, among others. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali
failed to observe the strict standards and behavior required of an employee in the judiciary. He has shown
unfitness for public office. Pursuant to the Civil Service Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. Civil Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, et al., A.M. No. SCC-
08-11-P, June 18, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by a public officer. To
warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must
also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officers official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the
office.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who were led to believe that he is the legal representative
of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainants family
completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the premises.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and
Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Court stressed that to
preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly
and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, the court held that court employees are expected to be
paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official conduct but also in their personal dealings,
including business and commercial transactions to avoid becoming the courts albatross of infamy.
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all
times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor
and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. Rodolfo
C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013.
Court personnel; Prohibition in acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction of their
courts. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring
property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The rationale is that public policy
disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence
and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more
precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In this case, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the
property is no longer in litigation at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the estate under
judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-
1448, June 25, 2013.

July 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Attorney-client relationship. Respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. was charged for gross negligence
in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Supreme Court held him guilty of gross negligence. The relationship between an attorney and his client is one
imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-
mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a
lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention,
skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A
lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels
care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting
the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
court to prod him or her to do so. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the
Court has consistently held that the lawyers mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a
violation. Thus, the court suspended respondent for six (6) months. Josefina Caranza Vda de Saldivar v. Atty.
Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013
Attorney; Conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein
a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients.
In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related
matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The
rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case.
Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded
with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Contrary to Atty. Eras ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination of
the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the clients confidence once given should not be stripped by
the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not
do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented
the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous relation.
Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty.
Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment and suspension of lawyers; Burden of proof. The burden of proof in disbarment and
suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary
power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the
imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court
to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In this case, complainants failed to discharge their
burden of proving that respondents ordered their secretary to stamp a much later date instead of the actual date
of receipt for the purpose of extending the ten-day period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under
the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Such claim is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not backed by
any clear preponderant evidence necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the
Bar. Jaime Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July
31, 2013.
Attorney; Honesty; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege. Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to
assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth
and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court. Verily,
the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court
or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of
procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other
counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. Sonic Steel Industries,
Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 17, 2013.
Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty. Respondent, a court stenographer III,
was charged with gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was accused of
causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead. Before the Decision was
imposed, however, respondent already resigned. The Supreme Court held that the respondents resignation from
the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed against her in this administrative case. Her
cessation from office by virtue of her intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against her, for the act complained of had been committed when she was still in the service. Nor did
such cessation from office render the administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility
for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.
Respondents dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be cancelled, her
retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from re-employment in the government service to be
perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no longer be
implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the
sound discretion of the Court. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita v. Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013.
Court personnel; Misconduct; Penalty under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Effect
of death in an administrative case. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior. A
misconduct is grave or gross if it is out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful or such
conduct as is not to be excused. Respondent Ongs and Buencaminos acts of using the levied car for personal
errands and losing it while under their safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. These
are flagrant and shameful acts and should not be countenanced. Respondents acts warrant the penalty of
dismissal as provided in Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As
for respondent Buencamino, his death is not a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint against him. Respondent
Buencaminos acts take away the publics faith in the judiciary, and these acts should be sanctioned despite his
death.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are repositories of public trust and are under obligation to perform the duties of
their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities. Being frontline officials of the justice system,
sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance of their duties. Office
of the Court Administrator v. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, et al., A.M. No. P-09-2690, July 9, 2013.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty; Penalty under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases; Mitigating
circumstances. The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) charged respondent Sheriff lV Famero with Gross
Neglect of Duty amounting to Gross Misconduct for refusing to implement the Writ of Execution issued in a civil
case involving DBP. The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannot fully be excused for his failure to make
periodic reports in the proceedings taken on the writ, as mandated by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
For the respondents lapses in the procedures in the implementation of the writ of execution, he was found guilty
of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to the task expected of him.
Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is
a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. In the imposition of the appropriate penalty, Section 53
of the same Rules allows the disciplining authority to consider mitigating circumstances in favor of the
respondent. The court considered his length of service in the Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse
and other family circumstances, among others, in determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be
entitled to the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his more than 24 years of service in the Judiciary; (2) a
clear record other than for the present infraction which is his first offense, (3) the resistance of the informal
settlers to leave the property; (4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-grounded recognition that he could not
undertake any demolition without the appropriate court order. After considering the attendant facts and the
mitigating circumstances, the court also considered that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the
respondents work were to be left unattended by reason of his suspension. Thus, he was imposed the penalty of
fine instead of suspension from service. Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff
IV, RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of cases. As a frontline official of the
Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to
the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding
principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have
reposed in him and the institution he represents.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Nonetheless, the Court has
been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly
disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day
period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the
Court has almost invariably granted such request. Judge Carbonells failure to decide several cases within the
reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency. Considering that
Judge Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor health condition may have greatly contributed to his
inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which
reason the Court reduced the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000 to P20,000. Re: Failure of Former
Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC,
Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.

September 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Attorneys Fees. The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision with the Court of Appeals
in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, entered into a compromise agreement with the respondents
pending appeal without informing her counsel. Malvars counsel filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect Attorneys
Rights.
The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing or
completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention
to Protect Attorneys Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenors right to his stipulated professional fees.
The Court did so in the interest of protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering professional services on
contingent fee basis.
Although the compromise agreement was still approved by the Court, the payment of the counsels adequate and
reasonable compensation could not be annulled by the settlement of the litigation without the counsels
participation and conformity. He remains entitled to the compensation, and his rights are safeguarded by the
Court because its members are officers of the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud committed by the client as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel. In other
words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also
to see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the compensation of the attorney is dependent only on
winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of the case upon the clients initiative would not deprive the
attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional services rendered. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods
Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013.
Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed against respondent Atty. Ramos for
representing conflicting interests in the same case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Ramos violated Rule 15.03
of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is
prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether
or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount interest in the administration of justice. Atty. Ramos
justification that no confidential information was relayed to him is not an excuse since the rule on conflict of
interests provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case.
Thus, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latters opponent in the same
case. Joseph L. Orola, et al. v. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated his oath under Canon 18 to serve his
client with competence and diligence when he filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would
have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was
dismissed, Atty. Alcid, Jr. committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and
damages before the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC due to the amount involved. Atty. Alcid, Jr.
did not also apprise complainant of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in
handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. The legal
profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of
fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the clients interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must
be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr. has defied and failed to perform
such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyers Oath. Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P.
Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013.
Attorney; Practice of Law. Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the Attorneys Oath
thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, he found such Notice and realized he never signed the
Roll of Attorneys. Medado filed this Petition to allow him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Supreme Court held
that while an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as
it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such Canon also applies to law students and Bar
candidates. Medado was imposed a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign one (1) year after receipt
of the Courts Resolution. In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct. The audit team discovered cash shortages in the books of
accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As clerk of court, Atty. Apusen is primarily
accountable for all funds collected for the court, whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed
cashier who is under his supervision and control. As custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and
premises, he is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. Being a cash
clerk, Savadera is an accountable officer entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting money belonging to
the funds of the court. Clearly, she miserably failed in such responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages.
The Supreme Court held that no position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder
than a judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowliest
clerk, carry a heavy burden of responsibility. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to
the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. They must bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1903, September 10, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in the resolution of the Motion to
Dismiss a civil case considering that she had resolved the Motion to Dismiss beyond the 90-day period prescribed
for the purpose without filing any request for the extension of the period. The Supreme Court held that the 90-
day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the
Judge cannot decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files
a written request for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit
mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being
efficient. Under the circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the
Court to disregard Judge Lazaros limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her
undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note
the need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. Danilo E.
Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320,
September 2, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure to act on the twenty-three (23)
cases submitted for decision/resolution. The Supreme Court held that it has consistently impressed upon judges
the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is
justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in
the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the
reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. Judge Balumas gross inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in
deciding 23 cases within the reglementary period, merits the imposition of administrative sanctions. Re: Cases
Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency. Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in MTC and
MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired. The Supreme Court held that Judge
Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties. Judge Sorianos unreasonable delay in deciding
cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory
retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated. Inexcusable failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge. Judge Sorianos inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross negligence as
evinced by the loss of the records of at least four (4) cases which could no longer be located or reconstituted
despite diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for managing his court efficiently to
ensure the prompt delivery of court services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, Judge Soriano was
found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be taken from the amount
withheld from his retirement benefits. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano,A.M. No. MTJ-
07-1683, September 11, 2013.

October 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent Pedrea, a Public Attorney, was charged for sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court held that the records show that the respondent rubbed the complainants right leg with his
hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch
area; and pressed his finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his
acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted
misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. Atty. Pedreas
misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service
to indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as a
public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her
vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was meted out the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C.
No. 9401, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. A complaint for disbarment was filed against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for falsifying an inexistent decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court held that the respondent
was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court
proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all
times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Lawyers
are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the
purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. Thus, the
Court disbarred the respondent. Atty. Oscar L. Embido, etc. v. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732,
October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling
a criminal case, as a consequence of which the complainants were convicted. The Supreme Court held that Atty.
Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of
devotion and zeal in preserving his clients cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial,
object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer
of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and
livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut the presented
prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy
to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to
support his clients cause. Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Gagate was accused of gross ignorance of the law and
unethical practice of law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be
ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For
his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These
principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. Thus, the
Court found that the respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainants cause since
he: (1) failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the
proper bounds of law; and, (2) abandoned his clients cause while the grave coercion case against them was
pending. Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Obias was charged for grave misconduct and/or gross
malpractice. The Supreme Court held that since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that
she also acted as a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession.
In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real
estate transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from the category of legal services. Case
law instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view
to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is established.
Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by her
clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code. Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of
sale covering the subject property to her clients, she wilfully notarized a deed of sale over the same property in
favor of another person. It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Thus, respondent was disbarred by the
Court. Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte v. Epifania Fanny Obias, A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013.
Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was accused of receiving payment for
the TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the money to the cashier of the Clerk of Court only on 19 and 23
December 2010. The Supreme Court held that the respondent violated the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel
and Code of Ethics for Government Officials and Employees. The Court will not tolerate the practice of asking for
advance payment from litigants, much less the unauthorized acceptance of judicial fees. Section 11, Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, specifically provides that payment for requests of copies of the TSN shall be made to the Clerk
of Court. Clearly, therefore, payment cannot be made to respondent, as it is an official transaction, and, as such,
must be made to the Clerk of Court. Respondent, being a stenographer, is not authorized to accept payment for
judicial fees, even if two-thirds of those fees would be paid to her. Moreover, the issuance of an acknowledgment
receipt cannot be construed as having been done in good faith, considering the fact that respondent only
remitted the payment for the TSN five (5) months after her receipt of the supposed judicial fee, or only after the
instant Complaint had been filed against her. Her belated remittance was tainted with bad faith. Joefil Baguio v.
Maria Fe Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155, October 21,
2013.
Judiciary; Applicability of Sec. 7, Rule III, IRR of R.A. No. 10154. The issue presented in this case is whether or
not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 10154 applies to the
employees of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court ruled that the subject provision which requires retiring
government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from,
among others, the CSC should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would
disregard the Courts constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides,
retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious
requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154. The Court, however, noted that since the
Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the
clearance requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to
criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on
retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciarys power of administrative
supervision. Re: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring
Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Case/s from the Civil
Service Commission,A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013.
Judiciary; Duty of Sheriff to Promptly Serve Summons. Sherriff Nery was accused of failing to serve summons to
the defendant in a case where he asked for transportation expense, and despite being given an amount. The
Supreme Court found the respondent guilty. Summons to the defendant in a case shall forthwith be issued by the
clerk of court upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the
clerk of court, it is the duty of the sheriff, process server or any other person serving court processes to serve the
summons to the defendant efficiently and expeditiously. Failure to do so constitutes simple neglect of duty, which
is the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference. Moreover, sheriffs are not allowed to receive any payments from the
parties in the course of the performance of their duties. They cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money
from the parties without observing the proper procedural steps under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended. Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao v. Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153, October 14, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Judge Clemens was charged for gross ignorance of the law and violation of
the Child Witness Examination Rule. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit since the acts
of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any administrative liability on his
part. A complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. In the
instances mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the manifestations made by Atty.
Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with dispatch. Further, contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the
TSN showed that the respondent Judge was very much concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and
ensuring that the One-Day Examination of Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to
the fact that the witness was already exhausted, having testified for almost three (3) hours. Atty. Jerome Norman
L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31,
Calbayog City, Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant filed a case against Judge Patricio accusing him of gross
ignorance of the law, manifest bias and partiality for refusing to execute a judgment which was already final and
executory. The rule is that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus,
the Supreme Court held that Judge Patricio demonstrated ignorance of such rule by repeatedly refusing to
execute the final and executory judgment of conviction against the accused. The rules on execution are
comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents.
The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is
not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and
supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios acts unmistakably exhibit
gross ignorance of the law. Jesus D. Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Misconduct. Judge Pardo was accused of corruption. Judge Pardo did not deny that Rosendo, a
litigant who had a pending application for probation in his sala, went to his house, had a drinking spree with
him and stayed there for more than two hours. The Supreme Court held Judge Pardo liable for gross misconduct.
Citing jurisprudence, the Court held that a judges acts of meeting with litigants outside the office premises
beyond office hours and sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct.
Moreover, a judge was held liable for misconduct when he entertained a litigant in his home and received
benefits given by the litigant.Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Judge Moises Pardo and Jaime
Calpatura, etc. / Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit and Investigation Conducted in the RTC, Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI
No. 05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, October 25, 2013.
Judge; Grave Misconduct; Gross Neglect of Duty; Gross Dishonesty; Penalty. Grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty and gross dishonesty of which Judge Salubre, Edig, Palero and Aventurado are found guilty, even if
committed for the first time, are punishable by dismissal and carries with it the forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. As
to Judge Salubre and Edig, however, in view of their deaths, the supreme penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed
on them anymore. It is only the penalty of dismissal that is rendered futile by their passing since they are not in
the service anymore, but it is still within the Courts power to forfeit their retirement benefits.Report on the
financial audit conducted in the MTCC, Tagum City, Davao del Norte / Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Ismael L. Salubre, et al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618, October 22, 2013.
Judge; Remedy for Correcting Actions of Judge. A complaint for gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct,
oppression, bias and partiality was filed against Judge Omelio. The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the
filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of a judge perceived to
have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. The actions against judges should
not be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be
availed of by a party in a case. Moreover, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case
rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence,
the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there
is grave abuse of discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v. Judge George E. Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge
George E. Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-
2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013.

November 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Accountability for Money Received from Client. Atty. Lawsin undertook to process the registration and
eventually deliver, within a period of 6 months, the certificate of title over a certain parcel of land (subject land)
in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia. Atty. Lawsin received
from complainant the amounts of P15,000 and P39,000 to cover for the litigation and land registration expenses,
respectively. Atty. Lawsin, however, failed to fulfil his undertaking and failed to return the money to complainant.
The Supreme Court held that Atty. Lawsins failure to properly account for and duly return his clients money
despite due demand is tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code. Complainants
purported act of maligning him does not justify the latters failure to properly account for and return his clients
money upon due demand. Verily, a lawyers duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much so that
it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance. Azucena
Segovia-Ribaya v. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965, November 13, 2013.
Attorney; Administrative Proceedings; Sole Issue. Complainants filed a complaint for dishonesty against
respondent, a retired judge, for knowingly making untruthful statements in the complaint he filed against them.
The Supreme Court held that in administrative cases, the only issue within the ambit of the Courts disciplinary
authority is whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of the Bar. Other issues are proper subjects of judicial
action. On its face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed by the Spouses Williams against Atty. Enriquez does
not merit an administrative case. In order for the Court to determine whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of
dishonesty, the issue of ownership must first be settled. The issue of ownership of real property must be settled
in a judicial, not administrative, case. Sps. David Williams and Marissa Williams v. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C.
No. 7329, November 27, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Neglect of Duty. A complaint was filed against Atty. Venida for serious misconduct and gross
neglect of duty. Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent to handle her case before the
CA but the respondent had been remiss. Thus, her case was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that this is a
clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep
their clients informed of the status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request
for information. Respondents refusal to obey the orders of the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes
utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are
particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with
court directives being themselves officers of the court. Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C. No.
10043, November 20, 2013.
Attorney; Mishandling of Clients Case. Complainant-Spouses filed an administrative case against Atty. Dublin for
gross negligence and dereliction of duty for mishandling their case. The Supreme Court held Atty. Dublin guilty of
mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day period given to him to submit his formal
offer of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order lapsed without any compliance from him. Atty. Dublin
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03. Respondent admitted that
he deliberately failed to timely file the formal offer of exhibits because he believed that the exhibits were
fabricated and the same would be refused admission by the RTC. However, if respondent truly believed that the
exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he had the option to withdraw from the
case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as [w]hen the client pursues an
illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is handling or [w]hen the client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules. Thus, Atty. Dublin was imposed the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for 6 months. Sps. George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner v. Atty. Reni M.
Dublin, A.C. No. 5239, November 18, 2013.
Attorney; Notary Public; Notarial Register. Complainants filed a complaint against Atty. Kilaan for falsification of
documents, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain entries in the
application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate a public utility jeepney filed before
the LTFRB. Complainants also alleged that the Verification in Batingweds application for CPC was notarized by
Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty.
Kilaans Notarial Registry submitted to the RTC, the said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not
the Verification of Batingweds application. It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable
for the accuracy of the entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondents explanation
that he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his
Notarial Register to his secretary. Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary
public to keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to make
the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his
notarial commission. Since Atty. Kilaan failed to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register, his notarial
commission may be properly revoked. Mariano Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385,
November 11, 2013.
Attorney; Respect to Courts. Complainant alleged that Atty. Flores failed to give due respect to the court by
failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Supreme Court held
that Atty. Flores failed to obey the courts order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the
several opportunities given him. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should
be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the
Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men.
Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in
them. Moreover, Atty. Flores employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour
before the Courts. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal v.
Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court for unlawfully and forcibly acquiring part of their lot. The Supreme
Court held that respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, but not of grave misconduct. Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement on any material fact
and a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity
or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003 which resulted in the increased
land area of his lot. Nonetheless, respondents acts thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and
straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the concerned government agencies/officials.
Respondents deportment under the circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Respondent appears to have illegally forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is
expected to be familiar with court procedure and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders
and decisions of the courts. Heirs of Celestino Teves, represented by Paul John Teves Abad, Elsa C. Aquino and
Filimon E. Fernan v. Augusto Felicidario, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Complainant alleged that the respondent failed to execute
the decision in a land registration case despite receiving an amount for the implementation of the Alias Writ. The
Supreme Court held that the deposit and payment of expenses incurred in enforcing writs are governed by
Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as revised by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. The rule clearly requires that the
sheriff executing a writ shall provide an estimate of the expenses to be incurred, and such estimated amount
must be approved by the court. Upon approval, the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk
of court and ex officio sheriff. The expenses shall be disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff to execute the writ,
subject to liquidation upon the return of the writ. In this case, the money which respondent had demanded and
received from complainant was not among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court as it was not
even accounted for earlier in his Manifestation. He merely reported his receipt of the P20,000 in his liquidation of
expenses only after complainant demanded an accounting and in compliance to Judges directive. The Court has
ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an
unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty. Eleanor P. Olivan v. Arnel A.
Rubio, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3063, November 26, 2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty. An administrative complaint was filed against Ibay, Clerk II of MTCC, for
stealing a check. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of substantial defense to refute the charges against
her, Ibay is liable for the loss of the check and the forgery of De Ocampos signature, leading to the checks
encashment. The case against Ibay is bolstered by the fact that Judge Eduarte found striking similarities between
her handwriting in the inventory of cases and the forged endorsement in the check. Thus, there is substantial
evidence to dismiss Ibay on the ground of dishonesty. Section 52(A) (1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from
the service even when committed for the first time. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the
highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness,
honesty and diligence in the public service. The Supreme Court will not tolerate dishonesty, for the judiciary
deserves the best from all its employees. Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela v.
Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC, Cauayan, Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-3100, November 12, 2013.
Judges; Absence Without Approved Leave. Judge Villacorta III was granted authority to travel until February 3,
2011. However, he only returned to work on February 16, without securing an extension of his authority to travel
abroad. This happened again for a second time. The Supreme Court held that OCA Circular No. 49-2003
(Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must
be made for an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be received by the OCA ten
(10) working days before the expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences
beyond the original period unauthorized. In this case, Judge Villacorta was in a position to file an application for
leave to cover his extended stay abroad. Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41,
series of 1998, states that an official or an employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be entitled
to receive the salary corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. Re: Unauthorized Travel
Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC,
November 11, 2013.
Judges; Judicial Clemency in Administrative Cases. Judge Pacalna was held administratively liable for dishonesty,
serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and for violation the Code of Judicial Conduct.
He then filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency. The Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency: (1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to
a strong presumption of non-reformation; (2) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty
to ensure a period of reformation; (3) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself; (4) There
must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service; (5) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency. In this case, Judge Pacalnas petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance
and therefore, must be denied. Mamasaw Sultan Ali v. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505,
November 27, 2013.
Judges; Retirement Benefits. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba applied for retirement/gratuity benefits under
Republic Act No. 910. The 5-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba was paid to his heirs. On January 13,
2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946 which provided for more
benefits, including survivorship pension benefits, among others. On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for
survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, this Court
approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She received 1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from
January 1, 2011 to April 2012. Later, however, the Supreme Court revoked the resolution dated January 17,
2012. The Supreme Court held that the law accommodates the heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive
the improved gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to the
survivorship pension benefits. However, despite the fact that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive survivorship
pension, she no longer needs to return the survivorship pension benefits she received from January 2011 to April
2012 amounting to 1,026,748.00. The Supreme Court, in the past, has decided pro hac vice that a surviving
spouse who received survivorship pension benefits in good faith no longer needs to refund such pensions. Re:
Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse
of the Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013.

December 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Applicability of the Code of Professional Responsibility to lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official tasks. Private respondents were charged before the Court of Tax Appeals for violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. However, the CTA dismissed the case since the prosecution
failed to present certified true copies of the documentary evidence submitted contrary to Section 7, Rule 130 and
Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, filed a petition for certiorari but the petition was filed beyond
the reglementary period.
The Supreme Court held that the display of patent violations of even the elementary rules shows that the case
against respondents was doomed by design from the start. This stance taken by the lawyers in government
service rouses the Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the lawyers
representing the offices under the executive branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the
court from whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this
sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the governments goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the
blows of smuggling and similar activities. The Court reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks. Thus, RATS lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
208290, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Champertous contract. Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Baez, Jr. in connection with
the recovery of their properties from Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of legal services, where they would
not pay acceptance and appearance fees to Atty. Baez Jr., but that the docket fees would instead be shared by
the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay him 50% of whatever would be recovered of the
properties. Later, however, complainants terminated his services and entered into an amicable settlement with
Fevidal. Atty. Baez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal of their complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case
against him alleging that the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his attorneys charging lien was the
legal problem preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights
concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a
lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by
the client. In this case, however, the contract for legal services is in the nature of a champertous contract an
agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the clients rights
in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy
and are thus void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. Thus, the Court held that Atty.
Baez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conchita Baltazar,et al. v. Atty. Juan B.
Baez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment proceedings. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Macapagal. He was charged with
dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are
strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same case. The Supreme Court held that
these issues are proper subjects of and must be threshed out in a judicial action. However, since Atty. Macapagal
failed to file a comment and his position paper despite his receipt of Notice, he was reprimanded for failing to
give due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Nestor V. Felipe, et al. v. Atty. Ciriaco A.
Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 2, 2013.
Attorney; Disobedience to court directives. Complainant Sy charged Respondent Esponilla, Legal Researcher and
then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff of RTC
Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty. The complaint was in connection with the irregular
withdrawal of deposits for monthly rentals in a civil case based on a purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw
Rental Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Bayhon violated the
Lawyers Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to explain, in good
faith the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion which he himself filed, for proffering
misleading claims in the course of the subject administrative investigation, and for not having shown and proved
that he exerted his best efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion all in violation of the
resolutions issued by the Court. Atty. Bayhon was suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Elpidio
Sy, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar Esponilla, Legal Researcher and Officer-in-
Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Due diligence in handling clients case. Respondents were charged for gross negligence in handling the
labor complaints of complainant. The Supreme Court held that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be
ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For
his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles
are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In this case, Atty. Quesadas failure to attend the scheduled conference
hearings, despite due notice and without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and
diligence in managing his clients cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Felipe C.
Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044, December 2, 2013.
Attorney; Duty to represent a client must be within the bounds of law. The Supreme Court issued a Resolution
dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas Merdegia against Court of Appeals Justice Veloso. The
Resolution directed Atty. Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
The Supreme Court held Atty. Adaza II guilty of indirect contempt. Atty. Adaza prepared the administrative
complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the
motion for inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the
oral arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of
the issue of Justice Velosos bias. If they doubted the legality of the Resolution, they could have filed a petition
for certiorari.
Administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies
against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so
within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal
action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. Atty. Adaza
failed to impress upon his client the features of the Philippine adversarial system, the substance of the law on
ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an
officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts. Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S.
Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc./Re: Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-
J against Atty. Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013.
Attorney; Gross misconduct. Heenan filed a complaint against Atty. Espejo for violation of the Lawyers Oath due
to the latters failure to pay a loan. The Supreme Court found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross misconduct. The
deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to their clients. The prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer. The
fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an
attorney of Heenan is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily
discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be
justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer professional
dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer. Thus, Atty. Espejo was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Victoria C. Heenan
v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant claimed that since Judge Cajigals appointment as presiding
judge of RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, the latter has displayed gross inefficiency by failing to resolve within the
prescribed period a number of incidents. Moreover, complainant questions the propriety of the Judges decision in
a case he is involved in. The Supreme Court held that the charges of ignorance of the law are bereft of merit.
Judge Cajigals order was issued in the proper exercise of his judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to
administrative disciplinary action; especially considering that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the
part of the judge. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors
of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a
deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be
subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law
in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E.
Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013.
Judge; Voluntary inhibition. Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias because he voluntarily inhibited himself in
CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions. The
Supreme Court held that the fact that Justice Hernando voluntarily inhibited himself after writing the assailed
resolutions did not establish his bias against Rallos and her co-heirs considering that the inhibition was for the
precise objective of eliminating suspicions of undue influence. The justification of Justice Hernando was
commendable, and should be viewed as a truly just and valid ground for his self-disqualification as a judicial
officer in a specific case. Further, Rallos insists that she was entitled to be informed about the inhibitions of the
Justices and about their reasons for the inhibitions. The Court held that there is nothing in Rule V or in any other
part of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that specifically requires that the party-litigants be informed of
the mandatory or voluntary inhibition of a Justice. Nevertheless, a party-litigant who desires to be informed of the
inhibition of a Justice and of the reason for the inhibition must file a motion for inhibition in the manner provided
under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.
However, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in any action or proceedings should be immediately
notified of any mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has participated in any action
of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition. The requirement of
notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause
injustice to or to prejudice any party or cause.Re: Letters of Lucena B. Rallos, for alleged
acts/incidents/occurences relative to the resolutions(s) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 by Court of Appeals
Executive Justice Pampio Abarintos and Associate Justices Ramol Paul Hernando and Victoria Isabel Paredes/Re:
Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and Carmelita S.
Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013.

January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Contingent Fee. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency basis. The Supreme Court held
that spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of 2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the
latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya
clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo
undertook to pay their lawyer 2,000.00 as attorneys fees should the case be decided in their favor. Granting
arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement
securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is champertous and is
contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the
expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the
judgment is obnoxious to the law. The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his
client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyers expense is designed to
prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. The Conjugal Partnership of the
Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both deceased), substituted by their Heirs, namely:
Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel, Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed
Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188. January 15, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Deceitful and Dishonest Conduct. A Complaint for Disbarment was filed against Atty.
Solidum, Jr. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Solidum, Jr. violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers professional duties.
A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The Supreme Court found Atty. Solidum,
Jr. guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his
client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro
allowed Atty. Solidum, Jr. to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Atty. Solidum, Jr. drafted the MOAs knowing
that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same
MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his sons account whose name was similar to his
without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that he paid or undertook
to pay the loans he obtained from complainants. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and
his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from
his client. Atty. Solidum, Jr. failed to fulfill this duty. Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M.
Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Gross Immoral Conduct. A Petition for Disbarment was filed against Atty. Celera for
contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still subsisting. The Supreme Court
held that for purposes of the disbarment proceeding, the Marriage Certificates bearing the name of Atty. Celera
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue
as a member of the Bar. Atty. Celera exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act
of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.Rose Bunagan-Bansig v.
Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Willful Disobedience. A Petition for Disbarment was filed against Atty. Celera for
contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still subsisting. Atty. Celara failed to
file a Comment despite numerous Notices from the Court, stating that he never received such Notices. When said
excuse seemed no longer feasible, Atty. Celera just disappeared. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Celeras acts
were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade
the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial
process which this Court cannot countenance. Atty. Celeras acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for
suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Atty. Celeras conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately, or selectively.Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581,
January 14, 2014.
Attorney; Malpractice. A Complaint was filed against Atty. Mendoza of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) for
violation of the attorneys oath, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the charges
against Atty. Mendoza which she admitted is telling her clients Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible
advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule 15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness. However, while her remark was inappropriate and
unbecoming, her comment was not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the
Judiciary. Thus, she was only reprimanded and sternly warned.Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C.
No. 10135, January 15, 2014.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. A complaint for grave misconduct was filed against Mylene H.
Dela Cruz, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, Republic Act 6713, enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for
moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. The Supreme Court held that in this
case, Dela Cruz failed to live up to these exacting standards. The inculpatory acts committed by Dela Cruz are so
grave as to call for the most severe administrative penalty. Dishonesty and grave misconduct, both being in the
nature of a grave offense, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government
service. This penalty is in accordance with Sections 52 and 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino v. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3141.
January 21, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Making Untruthful Statements was
filed against Alfredo Pallanan, Sheriff IV, assigned at the Regional Trial Court. Complainant alleged that Pallanan
should not have implemented the writ of execution in the unlawful detainer case since there was a pending
motion for reconsideration with the court. Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or
to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be
manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. The Supreme Court ruled that Pallanan did not commit grave
misconduct. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be stayed via
compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was not complied here.
The sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to
the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his hands, it
is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness
to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is executed
without undue delay. This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case requires immediate
execution. Absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M.
No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. The audit of the financial transactions of Maniquis, former Officer-in-
Charge, Clerk of Court III, and that of his successor Atty. Buencamino (Atty. Buencamino), Clerk of Court IV
uncovered shortages in the books of accounts of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Mapue, Clerk III, admitted her
fault.
The Supreme Court held that the admission of Mapue of her liability does not exculpate Atty. Buencamino from
her own negligence. A clerk of court has general administrative supervision over all the personnel of the court.
The administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice as
his judicial duties. As custodian of court funds and revenues, the clerk of court is primarily accountable for all
funds that are collected for the court, whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is
under his supervision and control. Atty. Buencamino was remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk of
court. Atty. Buencamino failed to supervise Mapue and to properly manage the court funds entrusted to her,
enabling Mapue to misappropriate part of the funds. Atty. Buencaminos failure to properly supervise and manage
the financial transactions in her court constitutes simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to
give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. It is a less grave offense
punishable by suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc., et al./Re: Report on the financial audit conducted in the
Metropolitan Trial Court etc.,A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-MeTC. January 21, 2014.

February 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Notarization; Importance. An administrative case was filed against Atty. Rinen for falsification of an
Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to Spouses Durante of a parcel of land. In Bautista v.
Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that [a] notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. It converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments
would be undermined.
In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly
signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was
further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as
proof of their identity, remained unspecified in the deeds acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on
the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public exofficio. Thus,
Atty. Rinens notarial commission as revoked and he was disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public
for one year. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization not an empty act. Complainant charged Atty. Gupana of forgeries and falsifications in the
notarization of certain documents. The Supreme Court found Atty. Gupana administratively liable under Section 1
of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to
require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria
allegedly executed on April 29, 1994.
Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that
Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria,
however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the
notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. A notary publics function should not
be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest,
with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to
the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public
interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty. Gupanas revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for
one year are in order. Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. An administrative complaint
was filed against Salamanca, Clerk III of a Metropolitan Trial Court for unauthorized/unexplained absences and
other infractions: (1) failure to account for and turn over the partial settlement amount of a civil obligation; and
(2) failure to account for and turn over the payment for legal fees she received in a case. The Supreme Court
held that the acts of Salamanca constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of
integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise
fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, on the
other hand, pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a
wrong result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to
diminish the peoples faith in the Judiciary.
However, Salamancas dishonesty does not consist of her failure to remit court funds because the money she
received from the litigants did not acquire the status of court funds as no official receipt therefor was issued by
her. While Salamancas complained acts involved technically private money, the deceit she pulled off disrupted
the publics faith in the integrity of the judiciary and its personnel. Her conduct tarnished the image and integrity
of her public office and violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
Section 4(c) which commands that public officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others,
and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest. Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S.
Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk III Liza D. Salamanca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-
13-3119. February 10, 2014.
Court Personnel; Duty to Submit Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). Sheriff Collado was
charged with failing to disclose in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 certain time deposits, among others.
The Supreme Court cited Section 8 of RA 6713 which requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of their assets and liabilities. The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption, as well as at maintaining a standard of honesty
in the public service. With such disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to monitor the
affluence of public officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and balance mechanism to verify their
undisclosed properties and/or sources of income.
The Supreme Court held that based on Section 8 of RA 6713, all other assets such as investments, cash on hand
or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like, should be declared by the public official in his or her SALN. In this case,
however, it was established that she only declared the original amount of her time deposits in her SALN for the
years 2004 and 2005, and did not disclose the interests which had eventually accrued on the same. Accordingly,
Collado fell short of the legal requirement stated under Section 8 of RA 6713 and thus should be held
administratively liable for said infraction. Angelito R. Marquez, et al. v. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, etc., et
al., A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A complaint was filed against Susbilla-De Vera for soliciting money to
supposedly facilitate a legal proceeding in court. The court held Susbilla-De Vera guilty of the most serious
administrative offense of grave misconduct. To deserve the trust and confidence of the people, Susbilla-De Vera
was expected to have her dealings with the public to be always sincere and above board. She should not lead
others to believe that despite her status as a minor court employee she had the capacity to influence the
outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts did not live up to the expectation, for the records unquestionably showed
how she had deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the complainant in the adoption of
her niece and nephew. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel has enjoined all court
personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such
gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. The Court thus warranted her dismissal from
service. Veronica F. Galindez v. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. An administrative case was filed against respondents who are employees of
the Court of Appeals for transacting with partylitigants with a pending case before the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court held that the court personnels act of soliciting or receiving money from litigants constitutes grave
misconduct. The sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a
court employee. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest
in performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the judiciary.
Further, court personnel cannot take advantage of the vulnerability of partylitigants. In this case, respondents
were found guilty of grave misconduct and thus, dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and
perpetual disqualification from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
governmentowned or controlled corporations. Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v. Victor Sacia, Executive
Assistant IV and Efren R. Rivamonte, etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014.
Judge; Notarization; Prohibition. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Rojo for notarizing affidavits
of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, in violation of Circular No. 190 dated February 26,
1990. Circular No. 190 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize
documents only if connected with their official functions and duties.
The Supreme Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Circular No. 190,
and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not
connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits
of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction.
As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the
parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does
not state that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is
inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized
the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavits statements before
performing the marriage ceremony. Thus, Judge Rojo was suspended for six months from office.Rex M. Tupal v.
Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014.

March 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Disbarment cases; Initiation. Complainants who are members of the Congressional Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jimenez for violating Rule 12.03,
Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence in
handling an appeal in a case involving the Association and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case. InHeck v. Judge
Santos, the Court held that [a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the
person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. The procedural requirement observed in
ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment
cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or
failure of proof of the charges. Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged to represent a client in a
case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the
appellants brief on behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to
unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only suspended Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for
one month. Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez,A.C. No. 9116, March 12,
2014.
Attorney; Fidelity to Client. Atty. Guaren was charged with violating the Canon of Professional Responsibility when
he accepted the titling of complainants lot and despite the acceptance of P7,000, failed to perform his obligation
and allowing 5 years to elapse without any progress in the titling of complainants lot. The Supreme Court
reiterated that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy
is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration
of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. In this case, Atty.
Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however,
failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants lot despite the lapse of 5 years.
Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal
matter entrusted to him. Thus, Atty. Guaren violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and was suspended from the practice of law for six months.Stephan Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty.
Ronald L. Guaren,A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014.
Attorney; Neglect of Duty. Atty. Agleron was charged with violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. The Supreme Court held that once a lawyer
takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his clients
cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
In this case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint despite the fact that it was already prepared
and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full
payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorneys fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse
that would exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full
payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the
insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in
dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges. A lawyer
should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary
action such as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this case, Atty. Agleron was suspended
from the practice of law three months. Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization; Personal Appearance. A petition for disbarment was filed against Atty. Cabucana, Jr. for
falsification of public document. The requirement of personal appearance of the affiant is required under the
Notarial Law and Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004. The Supreme Court held that
as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same
person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable
him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is
the partys free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for three months. His notarial
commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two
years. Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.,A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014.
Judge; Violation of Administrative Rules; Unprofessional Conduct. Judge Larida, Jr. was charged for committing
various anomalies and irregularities. The Supreme Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed several lapses,
specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of locally-funded employees, and his
allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and
regulations issued for the governance and administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them,
as well as a laxity in the control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission to
submit the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of Court. Although it was very
likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr.
as the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer directly burdened with the responsibility for doing so.
Further, for knowingly allowing detailed employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida,
Jr. contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which he would have become
aware. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Bitas for fixing the
accuseds bail and reducing the same motu proprio. In this case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking,
which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
P2,000,000 but not more than P5,000,000. Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is
a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by Judge Bitas after the evidence is submitted in a hearing.
The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly
determine whether the prosecutions evidence is weak or strong. The Supreme Court held that not only did Judge
Bitas deviate from the requirement of a hearing where there is an application for bail, he also granted bail to
Miralles without neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Judge Bitas acts are not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on his part, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When
an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law. Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutors Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC,
Branch 7, Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City,A.M.
No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5, 2014.