Samuel Taylor

Did the Senate lose all importance under Augustus? What problems did
Augustus face in establishing a satisfactory role for the equestrian order?
What was the importance of the urban plebs?


Augustus dealings with the ordines were primarily a process of stratification of a hierarchy
subordinate to the auctoritas of the princeps. Whereas beforehand, the upper classes had been a
relatively homogenous group of senators and equites competing in the arena of the Senate,
Augustus transformed this into a more clearly defined class and administrative system focused on
his own power. Though the Senate retained honour and prominence, Augustus was now the sole
dispenser of power and patronage. This excludes the plebs somewhat, but the significance of the
urban populus is that they become the last credible possible source of threat to Augustus power
and therefore Augustus treated them with caution even though they did not play an active role in
the hierarchy.

There were some ways in which the Senate did not become wholly redundant under Augustus,
continuing to be given respect and exercising a degree of power. The most significant expression of
this was in Augustus constant taking care to be seen to be deferring to the Senate and to being
legitimised by the Senate. Officially, the Senate freely granted Augustus his titles and was the source
of his power, and Augustus in turn gave the Senate an appropriate level of respect. He attended the
Senate as a private member (though no one can have been in any doubt as to the extent to which
this private member overshadowed proceedings), and Suetonius tells us that he allowed and
encouraged extensive freedom of speech and discussion (54), even when it was pejorative towards
himself. To a degree, Augustus played the role of a humble politician by refusing the title of dominus,
going through the city on foot at times, soliciting votes at election time and restricting his own
prerogative (Suetonius 56). The continuing significance of the Senate can be shown in men of
senatorial rank dominating access to the emperor, the Senate legislating prolifically without having
to refer to the popular assembly and the supreme authority of the Senate in religious matters
1
. In
addition, even when the Senate was operating under Augustus control, it was performing a role
which was essential for him the Senatorial seal of approval made his actions palatable to upper-
class opinion. In order to preserve the apparent legitimacy of this support, the Senate retained the
appearance of independence in every area of public policy or administration. Therefore, the Senate
did not lose all importance under Augustus and continued to play a reasonably significant political
role both practically and symbolically.

However, it is undeniable that during Augustus reign, the Senate was essentially relegated to the
role of a puppet of the emperor. The Senates power and status rested solely on the extent of its
auctoritas
2
, and so it was eclipsed in a situation in which the auctoritas of the princeps was
theoretically limitless (see the ratification of Augustus power in Dio 53.12). Augustus auctoritas
allowed him to act outside of the rule of law, and so even on a theoretical basis, the Senates
supremacy was obliterated. On a practical level, this picture of Augustus total control of the Senate
is even starker. Not only was Augustus able to change restrictions on senatorial eligibility and purge

1
Pelling and Crook p. 331
2
Wirszubski p. 113
Samuel Taylor
the Senate, he was even seemingly able to crush opponents at will through proscription and
execution. Rank didnt provide any immunity from this: praetors and equites were executed, while
even Caius Toranius, Augustus own guardian, was a target (Suetonius 27). Augustus had control of
public finances, the military and most provinces, and was constantly voted into new terms of power
(Dio 53.16). While some might argue that changes to senatorial qualifications must have been
backed by senatorial decrees
3
, in reality the far more convincing explanation is that of an emperor
shaping the Senate at will to suit his own aims. Although some of Augustus reforms did not remain
in place over time, in matters such as formalising the process of hereditary senatorial positions and
the procedures of the Senate itself (in codes like the Lex Iulia) we see the impunity with which
Augustus could mould the Senate. In the rejection of having 3 consuls (Suetonius 37) and in the
ridiculous numbers of awards and titles given to Augustus (Res Gestae 4 and ad nauseam), the
Senate is seen to have enshrined Augustus as the father of the nation. Senatorial obsequiousness
reached the point that A had to restrain his family from commenting on politics because those
comments would be interpreted as his own opinion and put into law in the Senate one example of
this being the debates over inheritance tax in 13 BC. These were not the actions of a powerful and
independent Senate, rather they represent one which was enslaved to Augustus and his imperial
court.

This subordination was part of an adaption of the hierarchy of the Late Republic to one that was
more concretely stratified and completely centred on the auctoritas of Augustus in his role as
princeps. Neither the senatorial class nor the equestrian order had been very clearly defined. They
were roughly equivalent in terms of wealth and status, and the lack of coherent divisions had been
exacerbated by the systems of competing patronage networks which cut across all the classes. As
evidence of this social fluidity, see the swelling of the ranks of the senators which took place during
the civil wars and Triumvirates. Augustus reforms had two major effects on this situation. Firstly,
they effected a transition from a system of competing patrons and networks of clients to one of an
imperial monopoly on the giving out of favours and the support of the populus. While the amici of
the emperor were still largely drawn from the upper classes, they were more independent of the
Senate, and the processes of patronage took place in the context of an imperial court rather than
jockeying for power in the Senate. Favours, in the form of positions, titles, or material goods, both
honoured the patron for his munificence and emphasised that the client was not competing with the
patron. Augustus was able to use patronage to bind the upper classes and the people closer to
himself, reinforce his position as the father and pinnacle of Roman society and reorder that society
as he wanted in this case, to draw clearer distinctions between senators and equites. As a result,
Cassius Dio (53.2), Suetonius (41) and the Res Gestae (15) tell us of his financial gifts to senators and
the people, while the equestrian class was shaped by his distribution of magistracies and other
positions. The second major effect of his reforms was that increasingly sharp distinctions became
drawn between the senatorial and equestrian orders. He used detailed censi to review the birth
statuses, physical ability, moral and professional behaviour and property qualifications of the upper
classes
4
. By changing senatorial census requirements, he deepened the divide between senators and
knights, thus strengthening the hierarchy which supported him. This, combined with his focus on

3
Brunt 1984 p. 428
4
Millar and Segal p. 91
Samuel Taylor
arbiting moral behaviour in Rome (Dio 54.16), produced upper classes which were significantly more
moral and capable than they had been.

So what was the point of these changes? Through them, Augustus was creating a senatorial class
which would be more effective at administering his government, while the equites became a group
which would fill military and civil positions adequately but also from which individuals could be
called to fill the ranks of the Senate, should the need arise. Augustus brought back the checks on
qualification for the equestrian order along the lines of wealth, birth and moral conduct, while
expanding the range of positions which were filled by the knights and appointing them directly.
Suetonius gives Augustus main aim as that of trying to preserve the Roman people pure (40), and
part of that included purifying the ruling classes and filling government with imperially-sanctioned
elements. Whether it was military positions such as the militia (which specifically had to be filled by
the honesti), judicial roles, tax-collecting or specific roles such as procuratorships or prefectures,
Augustus mined an improved equestrian order for suitable candidates. He brought back the military
connotations of being an eques with personally reviewing the order in the reinstated custom of the
transvectio (Suetonius 38). Cassius Dio tells us that Augustus personally instructed proconsuls,
procurators and propraetors before they carried out their duties (53.15). The constant refrain is that
Augustus exacted absolute control over the whole process of the expansion and formalisation of the
ordines and their involvement in government. The increased employment of the equites shows their
willingness to be a part of Augustus political project and their acceptance of his position as patron
and ruler the source of patronage and the wielder of the utmost auctoritas and potestas. While it
is unclear at times whether the award of titles involves actual duties which they had to carry out, it
seems that Augustus patronage reshaped the equestrian class. Wealth and status was required in
order to be considered for favours, but it had to have been obtained in an honourable manner and
fully earned through hard work. While it is a stretch too far to talk of an equestrian civil service, the
apparatus of state under Augustus was made up of these individuals who had been handpicked as
part of a system of imperial patronage. His social reforms can now be seen to have had a clear and
direct relevance to his political and administrative goals.

Lastly, the underlying significance of the populus as the only remaining potential source of credible
challenge to Augustus regime needs to be discussed. We can only talk of the urban plebs in fairly
limited terms, but it does seem to have been the case that although they generally strongly
supported Augustus, occasionally a threat to him did emerge and as a result Augustus seems to have
treated them with caution. For example, while he resisted their demands to increase supplies of
wine (Suetonius 42), Augustus continued monthly distribution of corn and was forced to abandon his
plan of more infrequent distribution because of popular pressure. His claim that continuing
distribution was necessary because a figure like the populares of the Republic might exploit plebeian
discontent is surprisingly honest. With his iron grip on the military, the provinces and the upper
classes, only mass civil unrest would have perhaps been able to dislodge Augustus. He seems to have
been very concerned with avoiding possible discontent Suetonius describing that he generously
showered money from wars on the people and took action to decrease the price of corn in times of
scarcity (41), while the Res Gestae waxes lyrical on how he freed the entire people from the fear
and danger of grain famine and distributed money and grain to the populus at his own expense (5
and 15). Unprecedented levels of public spectacle (Suetonius 43) were another way of buying
popular support. As a result, while there were some serious political threats to the regime in the
Samuel Taylor
form of Egnatius Rufus 19 BC disturbances and that of Plautius Rufus in 6 AD, Augustus was largely
free to carry out his political programme unhindered by popular dissent. Though we should be
sceptical about the genuineness of such displays, there does seem to have been a considerable
degree of popular support for him. The apparently (though suspiciously) spontaneous offer of the
title of pater patriae and the seemingly voluntarily honouring of his birthday (Suetonius 57 and 58)
perhaps can be more taken at face value than instinct would suggest.

In conclusion, it is probably fitting to end a discussion of Augustus relationship to the ordines with
Suetonius tale of Cornelius presenting his sword to the Senate and declaring This will make him
*Augustus+ consul, if you will not (26). The reality of Augustus potestas has largely been taken for
granted here, but it should not be understated. As it was, Augustus was able to manipulate the
ordines such that blunt force was mostly not needed to quell opposition, but the silent threat of the
legions was behind every reform of his. Nevertheless, he redefined the classes and exploited chains
of patronage to create a state with which he could best solidify his position and extend his power.
The success with which he did this is shown by the fact that the ordines remained largely unchanged
after him for some time, and the ease with which the imperial family dominated politics against
external factors, at least, if not always internal ones is a tribute to his effectiveness.


Bibliography
Res Gestae Divi Augusti
Potter and Damon, The "Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre", The American Journal of
Philology, Vol. 120, No. 1 (Spring 1999)
Suetonius, Augustus
Cassius Dio, The Roman History
C. Pelling and J.A. Crook, Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 10 (Cambridge University Press 1996)
Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (Gerald Duckworth & Co 1977)
Richard Saller, Personal Patronage Under The Early Empire (Cambridge University Press 1982)
Fergus Millar and Erich Segal (ed.s), Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects (Clarendon Press 1984)
Chaim Wirszubski, Libertas as a political idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate
(Cambridge University Press 1968)
Richard Talbert, 'Augustus and the Senate', Greece & Rome, Second Series, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Apr 1984)
PA Brunt, 'The Role of the Senate in the Augustan Regime', The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol.
34, No. 2 (1984)
TP Wiseman, 'The Definition of 'Eques Romanus' in the Late Republic and Early Empire', Historia:
Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd. 19, H. 1 (January 1970)
PA Brunt, 'Princeps and Equites', The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 73 (1983)