Lee, Chai-On, 1990, On The Three Problems of Abstraction, Reduction and Transformation in Marx's Theory of Value

Go
On
the Three Problems
of
Abstraction, Reduction
and
Transformation
In
Marx's Labour Theory
of
Value
by
Chai-on LEE
for the degree
of
Doctor
of
Philosophy
in Economics
Birkbeck College
University
of
London
^
-1-
ABSTRACT
We
examine
the
nature of value
in
a
triad
context of
the
substance
of value,
the
magnitude
of value and
the form
of value.
Using
Marx's
own methodological rhetoric, we call
the three issues,
respectively, abstraction problem, reduction problem and
transformation
problem.
1 Abstraction
problem concerns
in
what concrete way
Marx
actually
uses
the `power
of abstraction'
in
analysing commodity value.
Neither
a capitalist production nor a
direct
exchange
is
presupposed, and non-labour products are not excluded
from the
category of commodity.
It is
shown
that
even
in
such cases
abstract
labour is
still
the
only
identical
substance,
the
creator
of commodity value.
Once this is
admitted, we can explain why
heterogeneous
and
diachronous labours
are reducible
to homogeneous
and synchronous
labours.
2 Reduction
problem concerns
in
what quantitative proportions
the
heterogeneous
and
diachronous labours
can
be
reduced
to
homogeneous
and synchronous
labours. In
measuring and
determining
labour-values
as well as
in the
operation of
the law
of value, we
distinguish between
simple commodity production and capitalist
commodity production, and show
that,
only
in the
capitalist
production case,
the labour-values
are empirically measurable.
3 Transformation
problem concerns
the
quantitative and
the
qualitative relationship
between
value and price of production.
We
show
the two
equalities
between the
sum of values and
the
sum
of prices and
the
sum of surplus-values and
the
sum of profits
obtain even
if the input
values are retransformed
into
price of
production
terms.
-2-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The
exposition of
this thesis has been heavily indebted to Dr
Simon Mohun
and
Dr Chris Arthur. The idea
of
this thesis
has
been
originally
indebted
to
my
friend, Prof. M. H. KIM,
who
taught
me
the
significance of
the
category of
labour
when
he
was a
junior,
and
to
my
former teacher, Prof. S. H. LEE,
who
helped
me
to
realise why
Marxian
economists were
dogmatic
and unscientific
when
I
was
doing Msc. I
am also personally
indebted to Mr A.
Greeman
and
Mr D. Yaffe for beneficial discussions,
and
to Prof.
M. Desai for his
written comments on my
transformation
problem.
Dr Ben Fine has been doing
a supervision on my work.
More thanks
to him.
-3-
To My Father
who
departed last
year
February in
my absence
and
to
many
friends
of mine
in Korea
who rightly
have been
reproaching my stupidity
for doing
a
PhD
abroad.
-4-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION page
7
1.1 Marx's Method
of
Abstraction
10
1.2 Marx's Method in `Capital'
16
1.3 Marx's Method in Labour-Value
23
2. ABSTRACTION PROBLEM
31
2.1 Three Premises in Marx's Abstraction
41
Appendix to 2.1: The Definition
of
the Commodity
55
2.2
Marx's
Process
of
Abstraction
63
2.2.1 Formal Abstraction
64
2.2.2 Concrete Abstraction
69
2.2.3 Marx's Abstraction
74
2.2.4 Identical Substance
84
2.3 Reality
of
Abstraction
88
3. REDUCTION PROBLEM
101
3.1 Marxian Approaches to the Reduction Problem ill
3.1.1 Reduction by Money Wages
111
3.1.2 Reduction by Indirect Labours 118
3.1.3 Reduction
by Exchange-value
124
3.1.4 Reduction by Social Norms 130
3.1.5 No Reduction
with a
Heterogeneous Labour
Theory
of
Value 135
Appendix to
3.1: Rubin'
s
Labour Theory
of
Value 140
-
rj
-
3.2 The Determination
of
the Magnitude
of
Value
page
150
3.2.1 Simple Commodity Production Case
151
3.2.2 Capitalist Commodity Production Case
157
3.2.3
Indirect Labour
and
Direct Labour
161
3.3 The Value
of
Labour-Power
170
4. TRANSFORMATION PROBLEM
175
4.1 Problems to he Raised
182
4.2 Propositions for
a
Proper Value Concept 190
4.3 Critiques
of
the `Rectifications' 207
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 224
* REFERENCES * 230
-6-
1. INTRODUCTION
The intent
of
this thesis is
a critique of
the
existing
Marxian
labour-
theories
of value as well as an anti-critique of
the
existing anti-
Marxian
criticisms.
The `critique', however, is
not simply a negation
or a rejection of others
but is
establishing positive
theses.
The
word
`critique',
here, is to be taken in the Marxian
sense.
Its intention is
neither
to discover fundamental faults in
others'
methodology nor
to
point out
the
utter
fallacy
of several
theoretical
theses that
others
have
regarded as evident
truths. As is known, Marx
gave
his
Capital the
sub-title
"A
Critique
of
Political Economy". He
criticised contemporary political economy
in
such a way
that,
while
taking
over some of
its
results,
he
created something new
in the
place
of
the
whole.
He did
not simply reveal
the
mistakes of others;
his
aim
was not primarily a negation of
foreign theses but
a positive, more
correct and complete solution of some problems raised
by his
predecessors, and of a number of others
that had
never
been
raised
before.
Looking back
upon
the
past value
debates, however, Marxian
economists
have
more or
less failed in
providing such a criticism,
especially when
dealing
with anti-Marxian criticisms.
Most
of
them have
usually contented
themselves
with pointing out
that the
criticisms
had
started
from the
misconceptions of
Marx
when
dealing
with
the
question
and,
therefore, the
criticisms could not
have been
right.
But they
themselves
failed to
present
the
right conception
(or
at
least
generally
agreed conception) of
Marx
even within
the Marxian
camp.
In the first
place, a criticism
telling
us
that the basic
-7-
concepts of an author are utterly wrong and
therefore
also
his
conclusions
must
be
wrong,
is
not even
logically
cogent.
After
all,
although
it
was an evidently wrong, upside-down concept of
truth to
say
that the Sun
and
the
moon rotate
daily-around the Earth,
such a
misinterpretation of reality
did
not prevent
the best
astronomers of
antiquity
from
computing
the
exact
time
of solar and
lunar
eclipses
in
advance on
the basis
of
false
appearances which,
however,
reflected real
relations.
This
was not a matter of a
lucky
guess,
but
genuine
foresight
that
could
be
regarded as scientific at contemporary
standards.
It
was possible
because the laws
of appearance reflect
the
laws
of reality:
he
who
knows the former
also
knows
some aspects of
the
laws
of reality'even
if he
was mistaken regarding
the true
contents of
the latter. Of
course
his logical
conclusions may
lead to
utterly
incorrect
end results;
but these
results must
be judged
on
the basis
of
a
genuinely
scientific examination of
the
case rather
than from the
point of view of an a priori rejection and/or negation.
The
present
thesis in
view of
this
would not concentrate on negating anti-Marxian
and
Marxian
criticisms as
fundamentally
wrong.
Instead
of negations and
rejections, we concentrate our
discussion
on presenting positive
theses.
We
present
Marx's
value
theory in
a
triad
context of
the
`substance'
of value,
the
`magnitude'
of value and
the `form'
of value.
Most discussions in
value
debates have been focussed
on
these issues
separately.
It
will
be
seen
in this thesis that
without
the first issue
resolved,
the
second
issue is
never
to be
settled, and without
the
second resolved,
the third is
never
to be
settled.
In the
first issue,
we examine concretely point
by
point
how
Marx
actually uses
his `power
of abstraction'
in
analysing commodity
values.
In
such an examination, we show
it is for the
sake of
his
-g-
theoretical
consistency
that
non-labour products should not
he
excluded
from
the
category of commodity and neither
direct
exchange nor
capitalist production should
be
presupposed.
We
show even
in
such
cases, abstract
labour is
still
the
only
identical
substance,
the
only
creator of commodity values.
In the
second
issue,
we
discuss how to
measure
the
socially
necessary
labour-tome in determining the
magnitude of value.
Previous
debates
on
this
question
have
always remained
definitional; the
amount
of
homogeneous labour is by definition the
magnitude of value and yet
the Marxian
economists calculate
the
magnitude of value
from the
premise
that
every
labour
unit
is homogeneous
as presented
in Morishima
(1973,
1975 i'
76ab
Iq')?
1974,1978), Brody (1974),
Steedman (1Q
T5'1
76
etc.
). This
reduces
the theoretical
problem of
the
magnitude of value
to
a simply
arithmetical and
technical
problem.
In
our
discussion
of
the
magnitude
of value,
however, the homogeneity
of
labour,
since
its
amount
is by
definition the
magnitude of value,
is itself
at
issue. We
question
from
the
outset why
heterogeneous
and
diachronous labours
are reducible
to
homogeneous
and synchronous
labour,
and why
it is legitimate to term the
heterogeneous labours in terms
of
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour. These
questions
have been
missing
in the
previous
discussions
on
Marx's
reduction problem of skilled, complex
to
unskilled, simple
labour,
except
in Tortajada (1977). In
measuring and
determining the
magnitude of value as well as
in
explaining
the
operation of
the law
of
value, we
distinguish between
commodity production and show why
the labour-values
are empirically
measurable only
in the
capitalist production case.
In the third issue, lastly,
we
develop further the distinction
between the
simple commodity production and
the
capitalist commodity
-9-
1
production
in the distinction between
We
agree with
the
modern criticisms
in Samuelson
(1982), Steedman
(1979),
etc.
that there is
a certain
inconsistency in the Marxian
rectifications
of
the
original
transformation
procedure,
but
argue
that Marx's
original
two
equalities
between the
sum of prices and
the
sum of values, and
the
sum of profits and
the
sum of surplus-values, may well
hold
even after
the input
values are retransformed
into the
same price of production
terms
as output values.
In
verifying
this
argument, we criticise
the
conventional misconceptions of
the
relationship
between
value and price
of production and suggest a
drastic
change of
the labour-value
concept.
Using Marx's
own methodological rhetoric, we
titled the three
chapters which
deals
with
the
above
three issues,
respectively,
abstraction problem, reduction problem and
transformation
problem.
The
logical
and
the theoretical
relationship of
the three
problems
to Marx's
own method needs some explanation
before the three issues
are
discussed,
and yet,
in the first
place,
Marx's
method of abstraction
in
general
needs our explanation
before
anything else.
This introductory
chapter consists of
three
sections.
In the
first
section,
in 1.1,.
we examine
Marx's
in
general
and criticise previous
Marxian
misconceptions of
it. In the
second section,
in 1.2,
we present our own
interpretation
of
Marx's
abstraction method.
In the third
section,
in 1.3, lastly,
we
delineate
the
relationship
of
the three
problems of abstraction, reduction and
transformation,
to Marx's
abstraction method.
-
10
-
1.1 Marx's Method
of
Abstraction; Marxian interpretations.
It has become
a commonplace
to
repeat
that Marx's
economic
theory
was
the
outcome of a
dialectical
process which advanced
from the
abstract
to
the
concrete.
About
what constitutes
the
abstract,
however, there
has
been
a certain
disagreement
within
the Marxist
group.
Broadly
speaking,
the
abstract
has been interpreted in two distinct
ways, one
is
a
`selective'
abstraction
(or
a
`successive
approximation'),
the
other
is
a
ùniversal'
abstraction
(or
a
`pure
theory'
of capitalism).
The
one
is
primarily
found in
western
Marxism
and
the
other
in the Japanese
Marxist (Unoist)
group1.
To begin
with,
in the
western
Marxist
group
of
Sweezy (1970),
a
Meek (1973), Mandel (1972),
Colletti (1973), Carver
(1975,1980),
etc.,
Marx's
abstraction
has been thought
of as a
`selective' (or
a
`successive
approximation') method which
isolates
certain aspects of
the
real world
for intensive investigation
and provisionally assumes others
away,
to be
reintroduced, one at a
time,
only at a
later
stage of
the
analysis.
This
method should start
from
simple commodity production and
then introduce
capitalist commodity production at a
later
stage.
From
a
formal
point of view,
this
method
(`successive
approximation')
is by
Sweezy (op
cit, p
11)
and
Meek (op
cit, pp
299-304)
conceived as
being
similar
to that
of neo-classical modelling.
Yet, this
method
is
denounced
as partial and one-sided
by the Japanese Marxist
group
of
Uno
(1980),
Sekine
(1980),
Albritton (1984), Itoh
(-aSffil 1988),
etc.
They
1
As
will
he
seen
in
our
later discussions in 1.1, however,
even
the
difference between the two interpretations is, in
our opinion,
trivial.
It is
only
the Unoists
who
have insisted
on
the difference. We
shall
see
here the Unoist
stages-theory
is
a more outspoken aberration
from
Marx's
own.
-
11
-
suggest a
ùniversal'
abstraction,
instead, to
comprise all
the basic
categories generally
associated with any capitalist economy.
This
posits a pure capitalist economy at
the
outset.
By
pushing
the
capitalist nature of all economic
forms to their furthest limits and
thereby
positing a society
`corresponding to the theory', they
create an
intellectual
milieu where
the
economies can exist
in their
purest
form,
a pure capitalist society consisting of none
but
capitalists and
proletarians.
The Unoists
presuppose
three distinct levels
of abstraction
associated with
different types
and
degrees
of necessity,
i.
e.
the
pure
theory
of capitalist economy at
the
most abstract
level, the
empirical
analysis of
the
current state of capitalism at
the least
abstract
level,
and
the
stages-theory of capitalist
development
mediating
them. When
moving
from the
most abstract
to the
more concrete, necessity
is
increasingly
qualified
by
contingency whereas,
in the
case of
the
pure
theory, for instance,
necessity
is
not qualified
by
contingency at all
(Uno,
op cit, p xxiii,
Sekine,
op cit, pp
146-150, Albritton,
op cit, pp
58-60,
etc.
). So, the
pure
theory is
not capable of explaining why and
how
a capitalist economy can change
from
one stage
into
another; only
the
stages-theory can explain
this
with some contingencies.
This
argument
implies that the
stages of
the
capitalist
development
are not
explicable
in terms
of
the inherent
nature
(or
contradictions) of
capitalism
but in terms
of
the
contingent, accidental elements mixed
with
the basic
contradiction
between the
capitalist and
the
proletariat.
The
same criticism may apply
to the
western
Marxist interpretation.
In
their
alleged
formal
similarity
between Marx's
and
the
neo-classical
modelling, a crucial
difference between the two is ignored. When, in
the
neo-classical case, a new category, e.
g.
`capital', is introduced
-
12
-
into
earlier models,
the
new category needs
to he imported from
outside
the
existing model not
from inside,
while,
in Marx's
case,
it
must
always generate
from the
existing model,
from inside, from the intrinsic
contradiction of
the
earlier
(preceding)
models.
The
same contingency
as
in the Unoist
case plays an
important
role
in
explaining
the
transition from the
simple commodity production
to
capitalist production
in the
western
Marxist
case.
Among the three distinct levels
of abstraction
in the Unoists
case,
the Unoist `pure
theory'
of capitalism
bears
a striking
resemblance
to Weherian ìdeal
typus',
somewhat
different from the
neo-
classical modelling.
However,
such a universal abstraction cannot
help
but be
an
èmpty
abstraction'.
The
reason
is the
same as
for Marx in
his Grundrisse
Ìntroduction'
where
he
called
the
`population'
an
èmpty'
abstraction.
He
called
it
an
èmpty
abstraction' as
it
proved
to
produce only empty concepts and phrases when
the
social classes, etc.
of which
it
was composed were
dispensed
with.
When the Unoists theorise
a pure capitalism at
the
most abstract
level,
the basic
pre-requisite
categories and concepts
for
capitalism, e.
g.
value, surplus-value,
exploitation, etc. are all entirely suppressed and are supposed
to be
explained at
later
stages.
Without
such prerequisite concepts and
categories, no
doubt, the
`pure'
theory
must
be
an empty abstraction.
This
explains why
the Unoists
explain
the
category of capital,
the
genesis
of capital,
the transformation
of pre-capitalist society
into
capitalist society only
in the
circulation of money and commodities or
in terms
of non-economic violence.
They
cannot explain
it in the
context of value-production.
There is
one common point
the two
abstractions share with each
other.
Both
of
them distinguish Marx's
abstraction
from
the
neo-
-
13
-
classical and
the Weberfan
modellings
in the
manner of
the
abstraction.
They
argue
Marx
abstracts
(historically
and socially) essential elements
of capitalism
but
others abstract arbitrarily chosen non-essential
elements.
This
presupposes
that
a certain preconception of
the
èssential
elements' must
he taken before
making
the
abstraction
in
Marx's
case.
What
puzzles us most
in this
explanation
is how to identify
what
are
the
essentials and what are
the
non-essentials
from the beginning.
A true
method,
if it deserves the
name, would
have to
explain
how to
grasp
the
essentials
in the beginning. But the
method
in the
case of
the
western and
the Japanese Marxists
requests us
to
start
from the
èssentials'
as'if we
knew the
èssentials'
and
the
`non-essentials' but
only
did
not
know
which were
to he
preferred.
If
we
knew the
essentials
from the beginning
with no special method
to derive them,
we would, of
course,
disregard the
non-essentials.
But
we might
be
expected
to
start
from the
non-essentials only
because
we are unfortunately unaware of
the
èssentials'.
Then,
we could
finally
arrive at
the
èssentials' by the
guide
of a proper method.
Sweezy (op
cit, pp
11-13)
and
Meek
(op
cit,
pp
299-306)
explain
that
only
by the
repetition of
trial-and-errors has
Marx
grasped
the èssentials' in the
abstraction.
"But
where
to
start?
How to distinguish the
essential
from the
non-essential?
Methodology
can pose
these
questions,
but
unfortunately
it
cannot provide ready-made answers.
If it
could,
the
`process
of scientific understanding' would
be
a
far
more
routine matter
than it
actually
is. In
practice,
it is
necessary
to formulate hypotheses
about what
is
essential,
to
work
these
hypotheses through,
and
to
check
the
conclusions against
the data
of experience.
(Sweezy,
op cit, pp
12-13)
In
relying on
trial-and-error, the
alleged manner of
the Marxian
abstraction,
however, has little
specific
difference from that
of non-
Marxian
modellings.
Sweezy described the Marxian trial-and-error
-
14
-
process as
due to Marx's
personal experience, academic
background
and
his
specific
intuition (op
cit, pp
12-15). Referring to Hegel's
thought,
which emphasised process and
development through the
conflict
of opposed or contradictory
forces, he
explained
Marx's basic
preconception of
the
capitalist economy as
that
of
"class
conflict".
"It follows that the
essential economic relations are
those
which
underlie and express
themselves in the form
of class conflict.
They
are
the
essential elements which must
be isolated
and analysed
through the
method of abstraction.
Even this hypothesis, however,
could
lead to divergent
procedures.
" ( Sweezy, ibid,
p
15).
In the
above,
he
posits
Marx's
"class
conflict" as a
hypothesis,
which
requires an empirical
test for its
non-falsification.
Even
after
the
empirical
test, however, it
can never
be
anything other
than
a so-far-so-
good
conjecture.
From the hypothetical "class
conflict" as
his basic
preconception of
the
capitalist economy, according
to Sweeezy, however,
Marx
made several other conjectures
in
selecting
the
commodity,
finally,
as a starting-point.
"That
capital
is the
all-dominating economic power of
bourgeois
society' meant
to Marx,
as
it
would
have
meant
to
one of
the
classical economists,
that the
primary economic relation
is that
between
capitalists and workers.
...
This
relation must
form the
centre of
investigation; the
power of abstraction must
be
employed
to isolate it, to
reduce
it to its
purest
form, to
enable
it to be
subjected
to the
most painstaking analysis,
free
of all unrelated
disturbances.
...
What is the
nature of
this
capital-labour
relation?
In form, it is
an exchange relation.
...
It is
evident,
therefore, that the
study of
the
capital-labour relation
must
begin
with an analysis of
the
general phenomenon of exchange.
In this
way we arrive at
the
actual starting-point of
Marx's
Political Economy.
" (Sweezy, ihid,
pp
16-17)
After
all, ultimately,
Marx's
conjectures are all
grounded on
his
own
personal experiences and
intuitions
as
influenced by Hegel's
philosophy.
His
starting-point consists of only a
tissue
of
hypotheses,
assumptions,
and conjectures,
i.
e. of
dogmatism,
as against which
there
would
be
an
equal right of counter-dogmatism.
Either dogmatism
could never
be
-
15
-
justified.
The two interpretations
we
have
so
far briefly
examined
beget
other parallel approaches when applied
to Marx's
actual analysis of
commodity value.
As
we will see
in 2.2
of
this thesis, there
are
two
approaches
in
explaining
Marx's
abstract
labour. One is `formal
abstraction',
the
other
is `concrete
abstraction'.
The
one corresponds
to the
`selective'
abstraction
in the
western
Marxist
group
(as it
selects a
formal identity). The
other corresponds
to the
ùniversal'
abstraction
in the Japanese Marxist
group
(as it is in the
same
genus-
species approach).
Although they
are not
from the
same corresponding
groups
or authors,
the
parallelism
is
conspicuous anyway.
1.2 Marx's Method in `Capital'
As
against
the two interpretations
which reduced
Marx's
method of
abstraction
to
a
`progression from the
abstract
to the
concrete',
Mandel
(1972,1976),
Nicolaus (1973),
etc.
began to
note carefully
that
a
abstract
to the
concrete' was necessarily
to be
preceded
by
a
concrete
to the
abstract' and
the
latter
progression was recommended
by Marx himself in `Preface'
to A
Contribution to the Critique
of
Political Economy
(1970).
But they
stopped short of affirming
Marx's
actual starting-point,
the
commodity,
was
indeed
not
the
abstract
but the
concrete.
Although they
made such a
distinction between the two
progressions,
they
simply explained
it
away
in terms
of
the distinction between the
method of
ìnquiry'
and
that
of
èxposition'
which
Marx
made
in `Postface'
to the
second edition of
Capital
(1976a,
p
102).
-
16
-
Echeverria (1978,1980)
was
the
first to
contend
that Marx's
starting-point
was
the
concrete.
"a
correct scientific method must start
from the
concrete so as
to
deduce from it
abstract concepts with which
to
explicate
the
concrete
in its totality"
(1980,
p
213).
So far
as
the
conceptual ordering was concerned,
Echeverria
was right
inasmuch
as
Marx himself insisted in his
Marginal Notes
on
Adolph
Wagner's Lehrbuch der Politischen Oekonomie
(op
cit,
1975a,
pp
198-9),
"I did
not start
from the
concept, value, and
did
not
derive the
concepts, use-value and exchange-value,
from the
value concept
but from
a concretum,
the
commodity".
Echeverria
was
followed by Sayer
(1983).
"Marx has
no mysteriously previleged starting-point.
Like the
rest of
mankind,
he
starts
from the
material reality of what
is
given,
in the
head
as well as
in
reality;
the
phenomenal
forms
of our everyday
experience.
"
says
Sayer
(ibid,
p
102), "What differs,
perhaps,
is
what
he does
with
these forms. "
We do
not say
Marx did
not start
from the
abstract.
We
say
that, before
starting
from the
abstract,
he had to
start
from the
concrete.
The
abstract,
Marx's
starting-point
in his
synthetic process,
is different from the
abstract
in
others' synthetic process.
His
abstract category, unlike others' abstract,
is
expected
to
generate
new
categories
from its
own
inherent
contradictions.
The
neo-classical
modellings and
the Unoist's
pure
theory
are not capable of
generating
new categories
from
within
but have to import them from
without.
To
find
out
his
peculiar abstract category,
Marx
started
from
a concrete
and went
through
a pains-taking analysis of
the
given
concrete.
Only by
the
use of
the
`power
of abstraction'
(Marx, 1976a,
p
90), did Marx
secure such an abstract.
We
will see
in Chapter 2
of
this thesis in
-
17
-
what concrete way
Marx derived the
desirable
abstract category,
i.
e.
abstract
labour, from the
analysis
of
`the
commodity' using
his
own
peculiar
`power
of abstraction'.
Starting from the
commodity, at
first, Marx derived two
antithetical
ingredients, i.
e. use-value and exchange-value.
With them,
he
explained
the
nature of commodity exchange, as an externalisation of
the
commodity's
inherent
antithesis
between
value and use-value.
Through the
acts of exchange,
the
externalisation made another
antithesis
between
relative
form
of value and equivalent
form
of value,
i.
e.
between
money
form
and ordinary commodity
form. By the
objectification of
the latter
antithesis,
the
commodity
is
differentiated into
money and ordinary commodity.
Marx
explained
this
by the
analogy of embryology
(1976a,
p
181).
Even
when
it is
externalised,
the inherent
antithesis
between
use-value and exchange-value
is
still retained
in the
money as well as
in the
ordinary commodities,
from
which
he
explains
the
nature of
commodity circulation.
In the
process of commodity circulation,
the
externalised antithesis
between
money and ordinary commodity
(between
equivalent
form
of value and relative
form
of value) combines
together
with
the inherent
antithesis
between
exchange-value and use-value of
the
money and of
the
ordinary commodities.
By the
mixed
development
of such
combined antitheses, according
to Marx, the
money and
the
ordinary
commodity are metamorphosed
into
each other, and
thereby
generate
another
development that transforms
money
into
capital, and
labour-power
into
a commodity.
He
explained
this by the
analogy of ontogeny
(e.
g.
ibid,
pp
198- 227,
p
269)
as proceeding
from
an egg
(the
commodity)
to
a
larva (the
circulation of money and ordinary commodities),
from the
larva to
a chrysalis
(the hoarding
of money and ordinary commodities)
-
18
-
and,
finally, from the
chrysalis
to
a
butterfly
(capital).
From the
category of capital, on
the
other
hand, Marx derived
various
individual
capitals, e.
g.
industrial
capital, merchant capital,
commercial capital, money-dealing capital, money-lending capital,
interest-bearing
capital,
banking
capital,
land-capital,
etc.
in the
same way as
he derived the two
sub-categories, money and ordinary
commodity
from the initially
given
category,
`the
commodity'.
He
derived
such a ramification of capital
from the
analysis of
the
structure of capital-circuits, which
he
analysed
in the
second volume of
Capital
as
the
circulation process of
the three forms
of capital,
i.
e. money capital, commodity capital and production capital.
This
relied on
the
analogy of phylogenesis
(in
the
whole
third
volume of
Capital).
When Marx derived individual
capitals,
they did
not
have to
possess
identical
substance with each other.
Among the individuals,
some may well
have
no substance2.
Land, interest-bearing
capitals,
banking
capitals, etc. are capitals as
long
as
they
are self-valorising
values,
but they do
not subsume
labour-powers
under
themselves. In
view
of
this,
when
investigating the
substance of commodity value,
Marx's
starting-point,
"the
commodity", was not an ordinary
individual
commodity.
He
started
from the
concrete.
Yet,
not
from
an
isolated
individual
concrete
but from the
simplest concrete
totality,
which
comprised not only all
individual
categories and relations
but
also
their
relationship
to the totality. In
other words,
`The
commodity'
comprises not only ordinary
individual
commodities
but
money, capital,
2A
deserted house is
still a
house
unless
it is demolished but it is
not a
house if it is
not virtually occupiable.
A disused
car
is
still a
car
but it is
not a car
if it is
not safe
to drive.
-
19
-
wage-labour,
land,
etc., and
the
external
(mutual)
relations
between
those individual
categories plus
the
relationship of all
those
(individual
categories and relations)
to the
whole.
It is
an organic
whole as a substantive existence.
It differs from
a mere
ìdea'
or
`sum'
of
the
parts.
Some
might argue
that Marx's
starting-point,
the
commodity,
has
no
immediate
referent
in the
concrete reality and so must
be
an abstract rather
than
a concrete.
This
argument
is
not valid,
however. For
a concrete category
does
not necessarily
have to
contain a
direct
referent
in
reality;
it
may as well
he
a conceptual reproduction
of reality.
When Marx
said,
"the
concrete
is
concrete
because it is
a
synthesis of many particular
determinants, i.
e. a unity of
diverse. "
(1973,
p
101), the
concrete
in his
remark was not an unmediated
datum
for thought but
was mediated.
The
concrete
totality
as a synthesis of
many particular
determinants,
although not specified as yet, can also
be
concrete even
if
we can
hardly find
out
its direct
referent
in
reality.
This
concrete
totality
comprises not only
(a)
ordinary
individual
categories
but
also
(b)
the
relation
between those individual
categories
and
(c)
the
relationship of
both (a)
and
(b) to the totality.
Most
empirical. sciences
do
not admit
the
`totality'
category.
In them, the
parts are prevented
from finding their
significance within
the
whole and,
the
whole
degenerates into
a mere
ìdea'
or
`sum'
of
the
parts.
With the totality
out of
the
way, an
individual
concrete cannot
be treated
any
better than
a sort of onion,
from
which one coat
is
peeled off after another
in its
analysis.
In the
end of
the
analysis,
there
remain only
the
same onion coats, nothing substantial or nothing
abstract
but the
superficial sameness.
They know
well
that
every
factor
in
reality
is linked (directly
or
indirectly)
with every other and so
any
factor in the
system cannot
be
an autonomous,
independent
variable
-20-
standing out and above
to determine
other
factors. Thus, to
explain
something,
by
seeking
for
every external relation relevant
to it, there
is
established a simultaneous
determination
system.
Yet, because the
`totality'
as such
is
missing,
the
`simultaneous'
system cannot
help but
be
circular since each category presupposes every other and everything
posited
thus is
also
to be
a pre-supposition.
This is the
case with
the
supply and
demand theory
of price.
But, despite its
circularity,
the
`simultaneous' determination has
a relative merit against a uni-
directional' determination because the latter ignores the directly
and
indirectly linked
nature of many relevant
factors
and so
is
one-sided
and
limited. Thus,
some empirical scientists
tend to denote the
simultaneous system as
"essence"
and
the
uni-directional system as
"phenomenon" (Elster, 1985,
pp
124-5).
In Marx's
case,
by
contrast,
he
provides
the
circular
`simultaneous'
system with a new category,
the
`totality'.
He
regards
the
`simultaneous' determination
as a phenomenal and
the
ùni-
directional' determination
as an
immediate
actuality3.
In
physics,
the
movement of
heavenly bodies is
usually explained
by the
organically
linked forces
of
the
gravitational
system which can only exist
3
Hegel
(1975,
pp
200-222)
explains
in the
same way.
In the Essence,
Hegel
enumerates
three
grades,
i.
e. essence, phenomenon and actuality.
In
others'
discussing Hegel's logic,
actuality
is
usually missing.
The
conventional
duality
of
the
essence and
the
phenomenon maybe refers
to
the
relationship
between
real actuality and
immediate
actuality
in
Hegel's
case.
A
superficial appearance, which must
be
one-sided and
limited, is
called
ìmmediate
actuality'
in Hegel. Real
actuality
in
Hegel is
supposed
to bridge
phenomenon and essence.
Essence
must show
itself,
and
its
appearance
is in
phenomenon.
But the
essense appears
differently from itself. That is
why actuality must
bridge the
phenomenon and
the
essence.
Without it, the
phenomenon will
be
disconnected from the
essence.
In
case of
Marx's
value
theory,
we
propose,
Hegel's
essence, phenomenon and actuality each corresponds
to
the
substance
of value,
the
magnitude of value and
the transformation
of
value, respectively.
-
21
-
externally
and
between
separate
individual bodies. Yet, the
whole
universe
itself is
not explicable
by
such an external system of
gravitational forces
as
it
moves4
by itself
grounding
upon
its
own
intrinsic
contradictions.
So far
as
the
`totality'
category
is
missing,
the
gravitational
system which
is
a circular, simultaneous
determination
system cannot explain
the
universe
itself just
as
the
circular supply
and
demand theory
of price cannot explain
the
movement of
the
economy as
a whole
.
We
said
in the
above
that Marx's
starting-point,
the
concrete
totality,
comprises not only
(a)
ordinary
individual
categories
but
also
(b)
the
relation
between those individual
categories and
(c)
the
relationship of.
both (a)
and
(b)
to the totality. Of the three things,
Marx
examined
the last
one
(c) in two
ways.
The
relationship of
(a)
to
the totality
was
the
one
(a).
And the
relationship of
(b)
to the
totality is the
other
(p).
The
purely external relation
between the
distinct
commodities with
the totality
out of
the
way
is disregarded
on
the
grounds
that it
could only produce, at
best,
a circular,
simultaneous
determination
system
(i).
The three
categories, a,

and
i, are referred
to,
respectively, as value, market value and market
4
Someone
might say
the
word,
`movement' is
not suitable
for the
universe
itself
on
the
grounds
that there
could
be
no
frame
of reference
for
measuring
the
movement of
the
whole universe.
But in the
above
case,
the
movement
is
not
in
relation
to
external
things but in
relation
to itself. An inherent
change
(e.
g. growth)
is
also a movement.
5
"Every
substantial change
that is
of concern
to knowledge
manifests
itself
as a change
in
relation
to the
whole and
through this
as a change
in the form
of objectivity
itself. Marx has formulated this idea in
countless places.
I
shall cite only one of
the best-known
passages.
À
negro
is
a negro.
He
only
becomes
a slave
in
certain circumstances.
A
cotton-spinning
jenny is
a machine
for
spinning cotton.
Only in
certain
circumstances
does it become
capital.
Torn from those
circumstances
it
is
no more capital
than
gold
is
money or sugar,
the
price of sugar.
'
(Marx, 1969b,
p
159)" (Lukacs, 1971,
p
13).
_22_
price.
(a)
the
relationship
value
(or
social
{R}
the
relationship
--f
market value and
{y}
the
(external)
ri
-
market price
of
individual
commodities
to the totality.
value)
of mutual commodity relations
to the totality.
individual
value
elationship
between individual
commodities.
Among the three, he
conceived
the first
as an essential and
the
second
as a
derivative
of
the first. "Supply
and
demand"
says
Marx (1981,
p
296), "imply the transformation from
value
into
market value".
Between
the
value and
the
market value, not only a qualitative
difference but
a
quantitative
discrepancy is
necessarily
implied in his
remark.
This
presupposes a certain situation
in
which
the
commodities of
identical
kind
can
have disparate individual
values.
Why
can
the
value category which,
in
principle, must
be
of a
social character
be individualised in terms
of
individual
value?
In
principle,
the
making of commodity value
is in the
conversion of
the
actual
labours
expended
by
private producers
into
social
labour terms.
So, in the
conversion,
the
commodities of
identical kind
come
to have
a
unified
(social)
value.
But,
according
to Marx
(ihid,
p
296), they
may
values.
They
can only
have
a unified value as
the
market value
determined by the
supply and
demand (by the
competition
within
the
same sector of production), which
lies
somewhere
between the
highest
and
the lowest individual
value.
The latter (market
value)
does
not necessarily coincide with
the
(social)
average of
the individual
values
depending
on
the
situation of supply and
demands. Marx
called
6
There
are
three
cases
in
all of
the
relationship
between
market price,
market value and social value.
(Case 1)
market prices = market values = social values.
"
corresponds
to
a von-Neuman equilibrium
"
equal rates of profit with no surplus profits
(even development)
-23-
the
market value which
differed from the
social value a
`false
social
value'
(1981,
p
I6
799). Then, how
can
the
commodities of
identical kind
values?
Are the individual
values also of a
social character?
1.3 Marx's Method in Labour-value
As is
said
in the
previous section,
Marx
started
from the
simplest
concrete
totality, the
commodity.
In the totality, Marx
reduced all
distinct
commodities
to
a mediated uniformity,
to
commodity values.
To
know
why
the distinct
commodities were reducible
to
commodity values,
Marx had to find
out
the identical
substance which could reproduce
the
heterogeneous
elements of
the
commodities as
its
own external
diversities,
and so could
transform them into homogeneous
elements.
It
is
shown
to be
abstract
human labour that transforms the heterogeneous
elements of
the
commodities
into the
products of
the heterogeneous
elements of
labour
and
then into homogeneous labour. All this
characterises
Marx's
process of abstraction
in
analysing commodity
values.
When the distinct
commodities are reduced
to the
mediated
uniformity,
to
commodity values,
the
next question
Marx
askes
is how
or
(Case 2)
market prices = market values
*
social values
"
the
play of supply and
demand
ceases
to influence
market prices
"
equal rates of profit with surplus profits
(uneven development)
(Case 3)
market prices
#
market values
s
social values
-
corresponds
to
a
Marshallian
and/or
Wairasian
equilibrium
"
the
play of supply and
demand does
not cease
to
act
"a
temporary,
accidental equilibrium of supply and
demand
-
24
-
in
what quantitative proportion
they
are reduced
to the
value category.
This
refers
to the
question of
how the heterogeneous
and
diachronous
labours
actually expended
in
producing
the
commodities change
into the
homogeneous
and synchronous
labours to
make
the
value quantum.
Marx
explained
this
away
in terms
of a social process.
This
made
his
whole
discussion look
rather
like
a circularity.
Marx's
value refers
to the (quantitative)
relationship of
distinct
commodities
to the totality. Since it
relates
to the totality,
that is, to the
society,
it is
said
to have
a social character.
This
can
be individualised in terms
of
individual
value
in distinction from
market value.
This implies that the labour
amounts calculated
in
social
labour terms
are
disparate for individual
cases.
By this, he
meant
that
the
commodities of
identical kind
could
values
even when
they
are calculated
in
social
labour terms. How
are
they
calculated
in
social
labour terms? This
refers
to the
same question as
what
Marx
meant
by the
`social
process'
that determined the
quantitative
proportions
in
which
the heterogeneous labours
were reduced
to
homogeneous labour.
The
quantitative reduction problem comprises
two distinct
questions;
how to
synchronise
diachronic labours
and
how to homogenise
heterogeneous labours. The
commodities of an
identical kind have
an
identical
use-value as well as an
identical
value.
So,
a commodity
just
brought in the
market place must
have the
same value not only as
the
commodity appearing
in the
market a
long time
ago
but
also as
the
(potential)
commodity
in the
production process.
This is
what we call
the
synchronisation of
diachronic labours. The diachronous labours
embodied
in distinct
use-values are
to he
comprised
in the
category of
-25-
heterogeneous labour. The heterogeneous labours
which obtain
for
distinct
use-values are
homogenised in the
same name of
the
value
quantum,
the
commodity value.
heterogeneous labours.
This
we call
the homogenisation
of
As for the
synchronisation,
in the first
place, we
begin
with a
hard
and
fast demarcation between direct labour
and
indirect labour,
grounded
upon
the
exchange relation of
the
commodities necessitated
by
their
production condition.
The direct labours
congealed
in the
commodities of
identical kind
are easily synchronised
by
reference
to
the direct labour
currently expended
in
producing
the
same commodity.
Since the
current production condition
is incessantly
variant,
the
direct labours
can always
be
either
devalued
or appreciated,
depending
on
the
productivity and
the intensity
of
the direct labour7.
The
amount of
indirect labour,
on
the
other
hand, is
not
linked
to the
current production condition of
the
commodity
in
question
but to
the
ad
infinitum
production conditions of all
the
other commodities
in
the
society.
Instead
of considering such an
infinite
sequence, we can
calculate
it in
current
labour terms by
reference
to the
value of
the
production materials observed
in their
own markets.
Even if the two
parts of
the
value,
direct
and
indirect labour,
are calculated
by
different
principles,
the
calculation
is
not
inconsistent. The
apparent
inconsistency
which
holds
only
in the
case of
individual
commodities can
7
Devaluation
occurs
to the
commodity previously produced when
its
currently necessary
social
labour
time is brought down by the
improvement
of production conditions.
Moral depreciation
occurs
to the
commodities previously produced when
its
use-value
is displaced by
another use-value.
Depreciation itself is
possible when
the
use-value
of a previously
produced commodity
is
physically worn or
torn. Value-
destruction
occurs
when
the
use-value with which
the
value
in
question
coexists
is
proved socially useless
(or
over production).
The first
three
categories
have little to do
with exchange
itself.
-26-
disappear
when we
take
all
those individual
commodities
into
account as
a single whole and
thus
see
the indirect labours
of
the individual
commodities all
transpire
into direct labours. With this,
we can
calculate
labour-values
empirically.
As for the homogenisation
of
heterogeneous labours,
secondly,
it
only concerns
direct labour
parts
because indirect labours
are already
homogenised
as represented
labour in the
market value of
the
production
materials.
The
amount of
direct labour
which
is
an
intrinsic
magnitude
t
can
be
expressed as
J
z(t)dt,
where
t is the duration
of
direct labour
o
time
and
i(t)
is the intensity
of
labour. Since the intensity
of
labour, i(t), differs in different
sectors of production and
that
varies
with
time
and places,
it is, in
principle,
immeasurable. We
can only
know from the
prior analysis of
the
substance of value
that this direct
labour
amount,
though it is immeasurable, determines the
magnitude of
value newly created.
But the
amount of
direct labour is
not
directly
measurable
in
social
labour terms. If it is
measurable, and
thus if it
is
possible
to
calculate
direct labours in
social
labour terms in this
manner,
the
commodities of
identical kind
can
in
no case
have disparate
individual
values.
But, there is
no
intrinsic
existence
that
never appears.
It
shows
itself but differently from itself. To
show
the
way
in
which
the
intrinsic
magnitude
is
externalised and
thus becomes
observable,
Marx
Jt
introduces
an equation
form,
v(l+e) =
i(t)dt,
where v
is the
value of
0
labour-power
and e
is the
rate of exploitation.
In
capitalist
production,
the direct labour
amount
is
externalised
in terms
of v(l+e).
Marx
explained
this just
after
his
analysis of value
in Chapter 4
of
Capital, vol
I. Different
capitals may
have different
v and
different
e
-
27
just
as
different
production spheres can
have different
i(t). But from
the homogeneous
character of
the
quantum8, v,
Marx discovers the law
of
the
equal rates of exploitation
in different
sectors of production and
denotes
v(1+e) as v+s
in
general
terms,
where s stands
for
surplus-
value.
In this
operation,
the two
magnitudes, v and e, are all
calculated
in
social
labour terms. Thus, the direct labour
on
the
right
side of
the
equation can
be
calculated
by
reference
to the
social
process reflected
in the
social values of v and e.
Individual
differences
within
the
same sector of production still remain as
individual
values,
however. The
measurement of v(1+e)
depends
on market
values and so
it
might cause a charge of circularity.
But
we
deny its
circularity
for'two
reasons,
firstly, because the
rate of exploitation
(e) is
no exchange category and, secondly,
because the
è' is
applicable
not
to individual labourers but to
collective
labourer. Only because
t
the
equation
form,
v(1+e)=
J
i(t)dt
is in
reference
to
our prior
o
analysis of
the
substance of value,
the
calculation of
the direct
labour, though it is
grounded
on market values,
is
not circular.
Then, how to
calculate v and e empirically?
This belongs to the
transformation
problem of values
into
prices of production.
Empirically,
we can only observe market prices.
From the
ever-
fluctuating
market prices, we can easily compute a certain
trend
of
the
fluctuation,
viz. average normal prices
(Marx, 1976a,
p
269, fn 24).
8
So-called
competition
between labour-powers
cannot
itself
explain
the
law
of equal rates of surplus-value.
Nor
can
the
competition
between
many capitals explain
the law
of equal rates of profit.
The
competition, strictly speaking, cannot create such an evenness as
the
equal rates of something
but
would rather create enlarged unevenness
unless
the
agents of competition are equal
in
every aspect,
homogeneous
in
every
term. So,
we say
the
competition
is
simply an external
condition of
the
evenness while
the homogeneity is the intrinsic,
essential
cause of
it.
-
28
-
The latter
plays a role as a
guide-light
for
producers and consumers
(in
the
neo-classical case,
however, the former
acts a
guide-light).
This
Marx
called market value.
This
market value,
Marx
explained, was
to he
determined
somewhere
between the highest
and
the lowest individual
value.
But, in
capitalist production,
the individual
values are
individual
Because the direct labour itself is
no
more
the
agent of production
but
capital
is the
agent of production,
the
newly created value
is
supposed
to be
proportional
to the
amount of
capital rather
than the
amount of
direct labour. Formerly, the
individual
value
is
expressed as c+v(l+e) where c and v are
the
market
values.
Now, the transformed
price of production
is
expressed as
(c+v)(l+r)
where r
is the
proportionality
factor
of
the
new value
to the
amount of
the
advanced capital.
Thus, the
empirical measurement problem
of v and e comes
down to the
relationship
between
c+v(1+e) and
(c+v)(l+r),
which we call
the transformation
problem of value
into
price
of production.
But thanks to his
prior analysis of
the
substance of value,
Marx
argues
the
profit, r(c+v) must originate
in the
surplus-value, ev.
The
amounts,
therefore,
should
be
equalised.
Normally,
price of production
for individual
capitals,
(c+v)(l+r), does
not coincide with
individual
values, c+v(l+e),
because
of
the two
mutually conflicting
laws, the law
of
the
equal rates of surplus value and
the law
of
the
equal rates of
profit.
Its discrepancy is
mainly
due to the individually different
proportions of capital
between
c and v.
The two laws
are antithetic
to
each other.
The
one
is in
a uni-directional causality and
the
other
in
a circular causality.
The former is
an
immediate
actuality,
the latter
is in the
phenomenon.
To
avoid
the
circularity as well as
the
uni-
directional
causality, we
have to
collapse
them into
a new one.
We
-
29
-
reduce
the two laws to the
relation of an
identity by
putting
both
of
them in the
context of
the
wholeness.
We have
no more
differences in
the
capitals' composition.
Marx finds the two laws
are no
longer
conflicting each other.
We have
only one
law instead
of
the two: total
surplus
labour,
Eevi,
equals
total
profit,
Er(ci+v1), total
price of
production, z(l+r)[c1+vi],
equals
total
value,
Zc1+v1(l+e).
In the
totality
of capital, or
in the totality
of commodity,
there is
something.
more
than
a mere
`sum
of
the
parts'.
A
certain substantive existence
must
be
comprised
in it. Otherwise, the two
equalities can
in
no way
be
justified. To that
extent, without
the
prior-analysis of
the
substance
of value,
it is impossible to identify the
relationship
between total
surplus value and
total
profit, and
between total.
value and
total
price
of production.
This is
why
Marx's totality
category
has been insisted
upon
in the
previous section,
1.2.
-
30
-
2. ABSTRACTION
PROBLEM
2.0 Overview
Abstraction
problem
in this
chapter concerns
in
what concrete way
Marx
exploits
his
peculiar
`power
of abstraction'1
in
analysing commodity
values, and with what necessity
he
arrives
in the
analysis of commodity
value at
the
conclusion
that human labour is the
substance of value.
We
call
this
àbstraction
problem' only
to focus
our attention on
his
abstraction process,
in
which
he
actually used
the
power of abstraction.
The
whole process
in
which
he
analyses
the
commodity value using
the
power of abstraction
is
presented
in the first two
sections of
the first
chapter
in
Capital,
vol.
I, 4th
edition.
We
summarise
it in the
following five
steps,
from (1)
to
(5),
as capitulated
in the following
six points,
from (a)
to (f).
(1) Starting from the
simplest economic concretum,
i.
e.
the
/976A
commodity,
Marx
,.
p
125) derives the two
concepts, use-value and
exchange-value.
Then, he discovers
at
first that the
use-value
is
inherent in the
commodity whilst
the
exchange-value
is
external
to the
commodities as something accidental and purely relative.
He thus
launches
an
investigation into the
(exchange-)
value which,
like the
use-
value,
is inherent in the
commodity,
inseparably
connected with
it
1
As he himself
claims
"In
the
analysis of economic
forms [e.
g.
value-
forms
..
by LEE],
neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of
assistance,
the
power of abstraction must replace
both. " (1976a,
p
90),
Marx
uses
his
peculiar
`power
of abstraction'
in
analysing
the
commodity
values.
But his
actual use of
the
power of abstraction
has
rarely
been
examined
concretely.
-
31
-
(ibid,
p
126). From his
observation
of
the
multifarious exchange
relations
between
commodities,
Marx inferred that
(exchange-)
value was
inherent in the
commodity; a commodity
has
many exchange-values
instead
of one whilst each of
them
expresses
the
same exchange-value of
the
commodity,
from
which
he inferred that the
valid exchange-values of a
particular commodity expresses something equal, and so cannot
be
anything other
than the forms
of appearance of
the
same content
inherent
in the
commodity
(cf. ibid,
p
127).
(a)
Use-value is inherent in the
commodity
(ibid,
p
126).
(b) Every
commodity
has
multifarious exchange-values, whose content
is inherent in the
commodity
(ibid, Ist
para. of p
127).
(2) To investigate
what
the intrinsic
value
is, Marx's
abstraction
process runs as
follows. First, he begins
with an equation
form, "1
quarter of corn =x cwt of
iron", by
which
he
represents
the
exchange
relation of
two
commodities.
From this
equation
form, he infers that
a
common element must exist
in the two different
commodities.
(c)
The
exchange-relation of
two
commodities can
be
represented
by
an equation
form,
which signifies a common element must exist
in
the two
commodities
(ibid, 2nd
para. of p
127).
(3)
Next, to
search
for the
common element of
the two
commodities,
he
passes
in
review
the
various properties possessed
by the two
commodities
in the
exchange and, according
to the
method of exclusion, separates all
those that
cannot stand
the test
until at
last
only one property
remains,
that
of
being
products of
labour. Marx's investigation did
not
stop short at
identifying the
property of
"being
the
product of
labour"
as
the
sought-for common element.
Even the
product of
labour is further
investigated
until all
the distinct
products of
labour
are reduced
to
the labour
which produced
the
commodities, and
further, finally, to
-
32
-
human labour in the
abstract.
(d)
If
we abstract
from their
use-value, only one property remains,
that
of
being the
products of
labour. But the labours
which
produced
the
commodities are all
to be
reduced
to the
same
kind
of
labour,
abstract
human labour (ibid, 1st
and
2nd
para. of p
128).
(4)
Most
criticisms of
Marx,
e.
g.
Boehm-Bawerk
(1984,
p
69),
etc.
have
misconceived, only
the
`property
of
being the
products of
labour'
or simply
the
àbstract human labour'
as
Marx's
sought-for common
element.
The
moment
he
arrived at
the
most abstract category,
human
labour in the
abstract,
Marx turned his
attention
back to the
residue
made up of
the heterogeneous
properties of
the
commodity-producing
labour that had been thus far
excluded
for failing to
constitute
the
common property.
He discovered the
residue
became
a phantom-like
objectivity as
homogeneous human labour. Marx
explains
it in the
context
that
every
human labour
expended
in
producing commodities
turns
out
to be homogeneous
only
because
abstract
human labour is
materialised
in them (op
cit, p
129). This
needs a
lot
of explanation
in the
main
part of
this
chapter.
(e)
Now turning back to the
residue of
the
products of
labour,
we
find
out
in
each case nothing
but the
same phantom-like
objectivity,
the
congealed quantities of
homogeneous human labour
(ihid, 3rd
para. of p
128, italics
are
LEE's).
(5) In the
homogeneous human labour, he
discovered his
sought-for common
factor in the
commodities as
the
value of
the
commodities
(ibid,
p
128). In the
values,
the labours
embodied
in
commodities are all
homogenised. Thus,
he declares
(ibid,
p
129 &P 131), the
substance of value
is "labour"
(not
abstract
labour
nor
homogeneous labour).
-
33
-
(f)
The
common
factor in the
exchange relation
is
`value'. In the
value,
the labours
embodied
in
commodities are
homogenised
as
they
have
abstract
labour
character.
It follows from this that the
ultimate cause of
the homogenisation
of
labour in the
value
is
abstract
labour,
and so
the
creator of
the
commodity value
is
abstract
labour. The
substance of
the
commodity value
is human
labour (ibid, 4th
para. of p
128
and
1st
para. of p
129).
The three
points,
(a), (b)
and
(c),
established
in the first two
steps are
the three
premises of
Marx's
abstraction process.
The two
points,
(d)
and
(e),
established
in the third
and
the fourth
step
consist of
the two
phases of
his
abstraction process
itself. The last
point,
(f),
established
in the last
step
is the
conclusion of
the
whole
foregoing
steps.
Most
anti-Marxian criticisms except
for Eldred
and
Hanlon
(1981)
have taken (a) for
granted.
Eldred
and
Hanlon (1981)
argued,
"A
given
kind
of commodity,
the
product of a particular
type
of concrete
labour
(say,
steelmaking
labour)
can
be
realised as a use-value
in
many
different kinds
of consumption practices
(say,
ship-building, making
screws, making wires, etc.
):
Instead
of
having just
one use-value, many
commodities
had
several"
(ibid,
p
47). They described the
use-value as
an external
(not inherent) to the
commodity as
it turned
on
the
external
circumstance of
the
commodity's use.
Yet,
(a) is
crucial
in defining
the dual
nature of
the labour
embodied
in
commodities as concrete and
abstract
labour. This distinguishes Marx's
use-value
from the
neo-
classical utility concept
(one is inherent, the
other
is
not).
Such
a use-value
then
could no
longer
correspond
to
a certain
-type
of concrete
labour but
could only verge on
the
neo-classical
concept of utility.
When the
use-value cannot correspond
to
a certain
concrete
labour, however, Marx's
peculiar one-to-one correspondence
-34-
between
the two factors
of
the
commodity, on
the
one
hand,
and
the dual
character
of
the labour
embodied
in the
commodity, on
the
other
hand,
can no
longer hold2. By
criticising
Marx's intrinsic
use-value concept
'"d
contained
in (a),
Eldred
and
Hanlon
()
rejected
Marx's dual
nature
of
labour
and,
thus, tried to
grasp
Marx's
use-value concept as
something akin
to the
neo-classical utility concept with
the intention
to
grope
for
a certain compromise
between Marx's labour theory
of value
and
the
neo-classical utility
theory
of value as can
be
seen
in their
paper
(1981).
We, therefore, in this
chapter shall
begin by defending
(a) in the
very
first
section,
2.1. We
will
discuss it
with
(b)
and
(c)
together
since
(a), (b)
and
(c)
are
the three
premises of
Marx's
A
certain relationship
between
value,
labour,
abstract
labour
2
Himmelweit
and
Mohun (1981)
point out
that, in
a
joint
production
case,
the
so-called one-to-one correspondence
fails. This
argument
misconceives
Marx's
concrete
labour
concept as specific
to
a certain
process of production rather
than to
a certain use-value.
Our
position
to the joint
production case
is in the distinction between
a composite
production case and a
joint
production case.
In
either case,
it is
true,
multiple
kinds
of use-value are produced
in
a single process of
production.
But, in the latter
case, unlike
the former
one,
the
multiple use-values
become
a single use-value as a composite commodity,
in
which sense, only one
kind
of concrete
labour
corresponds
to the
single process of production.
But, in the joint
production case,
by
contrast, multiple
kinds
of concrete
labour
coexists
in
a single process
of production.
On
account of
this,
we argue
Steedman's
(1975)
negetive
values arise
from two
mutually
incompatible
assumptions
(i.
e.
joint
production
is
not compatible with
homogeneous labour). The homogeneous
labour
category cannot obtain
for two
partially similar
labours. It
obtains, as will
he
seen
in 2.2,
only
in
referring
to the
genuinely
heterogeneous labours. Actually,
as
is
seen
in 1.3, the
most crucial
question
in Marx's
labour theory
of value
is that
of
how to
calculate
(or
measure)
the
unit of
homogeneous labour for distinct labours,
all
the
rest
is
a mere
technical
problem.
Despite this, however, the
calculation of
the homogeneous labour has
never
been discussed but,
instead, has been
assumed
from the
outset with no verification
in
Steedman
and
in
most value
debates
as well.
So far
as
the homogeneous
labour is
not examined,
it
was a virtual abandonment of
Marx's
labour
theory
of value
itself.
-35-
and
homogeneous labour is
elaborated
in
(f)
and contributes a notion of
what value
is
and what
the
substance of value
is. But the
relationship
in (f) has
never
been
properly noted
in
previous
Marxian
and anti-
Marxian literature. The
various categories of value,
labour,
homogeneous labour
and abstract
labour
are usually seen as
if being
interchangeable
with each other, and so
the
`substance
of value'
has
never
been distinguished from `value' itself (it is
usually presumed
that
`labour=value'). This
sort of misconception stems
from the
confusion of
the two
phases of
Marx's
i.
e.
(d)
and
(e}.
The (e)
which
is the
second phase of
Marx's
abstraction process
has been ignored in discussing Marx's
value
theory
as
if Marx's
abstraction process concluded at
(d)
rather
than
proceeded
to
(f).
As to
(d), (e)
and
(f),
some other questions still need
to be
discussed;
why and
how the
abstraction
from
use-value results
in
value
and abstract
labour,
why and
how
actually expended
heterogeneous labours
take
on a phantom-like objectivity as
homogeneous labour; how
homogeneous labour is different from
abstract
labour;
why
in the
commodity
is
congealed
homogeneous labour,
etc., etc.
Boehm-Bawerk
(. 1984),
who
had
no
idea
of
(e), i.
e.
the
second
phase of
Marx's
abstraction process, could not contribute at all
to
(e)
and
(f).
Instead
of asking
the
more
fundamental
questions,
i.
e. why and
how
actually expended
heterogeneous labours take
on a phantom-like
objectivity as
homogeneous labour, how the homogeneous labour is
distinguished from
abstract
labour,
why
in the
commodity are
the
congealed
homogeneous labour,
etc.,
Boehm-Bawerk
(-
6'J'
t,
pp
64-80)
asks
only
the
following futile
questions.
(1) The
exchange of
two
commodities cannot
be
conceived under an
equation
form. Where
equality and exact equilibrium obtain, no
change
is likely to
occur
to disturb the balance. When in the
case
-36-
of exchange
the
matter
terminates
with a change of ownership of
the
commodities,
it
points rather
to the
existence of some
inequality
which produces
the
alteration
(pp 68-9).
(2)
Marx
rigged
the
result
by
excluding
the
exchangeable
goods
which are not products of
labour in the
search
for the
common
factor
which
lies
at
the
root of exchange value
(p 70).
(3)
Even
when non-labour products are excluded,
there is
no reason
why
there
should
he
no alternatives
to labour
as
"the
common
factor" (p 75).
In the
above,
(1)
questions
(c)
while
(2)
and
(3) both
question
(d).
Recent
anti-Marxian criticisms,
Eldred
and
Hanlon (1981,
p
47), Cutler,
Hindess, Hirst
and
Hussain (1977,
p
14), Bowles
and
Gintis (1981a,
p6),
etc. realised
there
was a
big
problem
in (1). (1)
only argues
that it
is "inequality"
that
yields an exchange of
two
commodities, which admits
a certain content
inherent in the two
commodities must
be
existent
to
define the
"inequality"
of
the
commodities.
Whence, the inherent
content which
(b)
argues
for is
not
denied in (1). (1) does
not
disagree
with
(b). (1)
only criticises
the
equivalent exchange not
the
existence of
the inherent
content.
Yet
(c) derives from (b),
and
(c)
itself does
not argue any equivalent or non-equivalent exchange
but
only
argues
the
èquation form'. So, (1)
might not
be
capable of
denying
(3). Thus, they had to
revise
(1) into (1')
as
follows;
(1') Exchange
may
be
conceived as
being
equivalent
in the juridical
sense,
that is, that both
parties
to it
agree
to the
equity of
the
terms
of
the
exchange and receive what
they
were promised,
but
not
as an equation
(there
not
being
any substantive
identity between
the things
exchanged).
(Cutler, Hindess, Hirst
and
Hussain, 1977,
p
14, italics
are sic.
).
Thus,
(1')
attacks an equation whereas
(1) did
an equality.
(1') denies
any substantive
identity
whatsoever
between the things
exchanged and so
rejects
both (b)
and
(c)
whereas
(1)
accepted
(b)
while
denying (c).
As for the
other
two
questions which
Boehm-Bawerk
raised,
i.
e.
(2)
and
(3), both
attack
(d)
alone and are repeated
in
many anti-Marxian
criticisms,
e.
g.
Cutler, Hindess, Hirst
and
Hussain (1977,
pp
58-9),
-
37
-
Hodgson (1982,
pp
76-9), Elster
(1985,
p
139),
etc.
Thus, they have
long
occupied a central position
in
most value
debates. Marxian
replies
to them, however, have been
made
in
a
teleological
context only.
According
to them (e.
g.
Pilling, 1972,
-Gerstein,
1976, Elson, 1979b,
Himmelweit
and
Mohun, 1981,
etc.
),
since
Marx
aimed
to interpret
capitalist society with
the
value concept,
Marx `defined'
value as a
purely social substance, as
human labour3. This has two drawbacks.
Firstly, it ignores
some other cases of
labour that
can never
have
any
social
implication (e.
g.
products of
direct domestic labours).
Secondly, it
assumes what
has to be
proved
from the
very
beginning. The
pre-supposition
that
value
is
a social substance
is
not verifiable until
Marx's
other remarks,
(a), (b), (c), (d), (e)
and
(f)
are
fully
examined.
Or
else, quite often,
it has been justified from
a pragmatic
standpoint as
being
useful as a
heuristic device in
explaining
the
exploitation of
the
working class
(Dobb, 1940,1973, Sweezy, 1942, Meek,
A
1973k Mandel, 1972, Morishima, 1973, Brody, 1974,
etc.
). But
even such
a
heuristic device is
still
teleological. Exceptionally, however, if
human labour
were presumed
to be
an estranged
labour
as
in Arthur's
3
This
argument assumes,
in the first
place, a certain social relation
between individuals
grounded
on a certain specific
[or
capitalist!
]
social
division
of
labour
system, and
then
argues
the
social relation
between individuals is
reflected
in the
value relation
between the
commodities
the individuals
produce.
So, the
non-producers
based
on a
property relation rather
than labour
relation are
from the
outset
precluded
in the
so-called commodity
fetish. By
contrast,
however, Marx
starts
from
a commodity relation and
then
analyses
it to find that it
reflects a certain system of
division
of
labour. So, he is
capable of
extending
his
analysis
further into the
production relation
between
persons
based
on not only
labour
relations
but
also property relations.
In the former
case,
if
you want
to include the
non-producers case, you
would
have to define from the
outset
the
production relation
being based
on property and
labour
relations
both. If then, the
value relation
between
commodities should
be
seen as reflecting not only
labour
relations
but
also property relations, which
leads to the
same
perspective as
the
neo-classicals.
-
38
-
suggestion
(1986),
it
might well
be justified to have
presupposed
that
value
had
a social
implication
as
it directly implied the
commodity
exchange relation.
But the
estranged
labour
category seems
to be
an
unnecessary
detour. The
is logically far
better than the
estranged
labour
as a premise
in
analysing commodity
values since
the latter
requires more sophisticated explanations.
Marxian
replies
to
(1')
also
have
a
drawback. The
replies
have
deviated from the
essence of
(c)
which
(1')
attacked.
Arthur (1979a,
p
71)
and
Harris (1978,
p
307)
replied
to
(1') in the terms
of
"equivalent
exchange" as a stipulated axiom.
Elson
(19796
pp
153-4),
on
the
other
hand,
also replied
to
(1') in the terms
of
"equation"
as a conventional
axiom.
We
will show
in 2.1 that both
replies
have
confused
(1)
with
(1').
We
reply
to
(1') in 2.1
where we
discuss (a), (b), (c).
We
reply
to
(2) in
relevant parts of
both 2.1
and
2.2
arguing
that
non-
labour
products cannot
he left
out of consideration
in Marx's
analysis
of commodity value.
Especially in Appendix to 2.1,
we show certain
forms
of exchange
instead
of certain objects of
it
must
be
excluded
in
the
analysis of commodity value
(even labour-products
must
he
excluded
while some non-labour products are
to be included). We
reply
to (3) in
2.2,
arguing
that
even when non-labour products are
taken into
account,
the
only property
to
remain as
the
common
factor
will still
be that
of
`being
products of
labour'.
In 2.2,
we
discuss the
main part of
Marx's
abstraction process
which comprises
(d), (e)
and
(f).
We
will compare our own
interpretation
of
Marx's
abstraction process with other
Marxian
interpretations
of
it,
and
thus
show
in
what way
Marx has derived
not an
empty
but
a
legitimate
abstract category which
is
capable of unfolding
-
39
-
11
itself
out of
itself, by itself,
probing
its
own
depth
only
to
reproduce
the
concrete
totality in
mind.
In 2.3,
we
deal
with a most crucial question; on
the
reality of
Marx's
abstract
labour
concept.
We
shall show
Marx's
abstract
labour is
not a metaphysical category
(like Robinson, 1964,1977,
etc.
)
nor
labour
represented
in
exchange values
(like Rubin, 1973,1978), but is
a real
existence as a consequence of
its being
commodity-producing
labour. We
show
that
any commodity-producing
labour
can satisfy
the two
requirements
for the
reality of abstract
labour; the free
mobility of
labour
and
the
versatility of
labour. Since
abstract
labour is the
result of
Marx's
abstraction,
the
abstract
labour
must
be the
most
abstract and,
therefore, by definition,
cannot
have
any
direct
referent
in the immediate
world.
Nevertheless,
we show
it is
realistic.
-
40
-
2.1
Three Premises in Marx's Abstraction
This
section works with
the following three
premises
in Marx's
process
of abstraction of commodity values.
(a)
Use-value is inherent in the
commodity.
(b)
Every
commodity
has
is inherent in the
commodity.
(c)
The
exchange-relation of
two
commodities can
be
represented
by
an equation
form. The
equation
form
signifies a common element
must exist
in the two
commodities.
In the
above,
(a) is to define the dual
nature of
labour in his later
abstraction process, and
(b) is to define the
existence of an
intrinsic
value
in his later
(c) is
a synthesis of
the two;
both (a)
and
(b)
are presupposed
in (c).
As for (a),
to begin
with.
As
mentioned
in the
previous section,
Eldred
and
Hanlon (1981)
were novel
in
criticising
(a)
and,
thereby,
questioning
Marx's
one-to-
one correspondence
between the two factors
of commodity
(use-value
and
value), on
the
one
hand,
and
the dual
nature of
the labour
embodied
in
commodities
(concrete labour
and abstract
labour),
on
the
other
hand,
which
forms the
very
ground
of
Marx's
abstraction of commodity values.
In
return
for denying Marx's dual
nature of
labour, Eldred
and
Hanlon (1981)
proposed an alternative
duality, i.
e. concrete
labour {_
embodied
labour)
versus abstract
labour (=
represented
labour).
4
In
this duality, they
conceive abstract
labour
as a represented
labour,
i.
e. as
the
abstraction made
in
exchange
from
all
kinds
of concrete
4
The duality
of
labour is distinct in the two
cases.
Marx's
duality Eldred
and
Hanlon's
duality
use-value
--t
concrete
labour
embodied
labour
--#,
concrete
labour
value
-
abstract
labour
represented
labour
-f
abstract
labour
-
41
-
labour,
as
the
universal character of particular concrete
labours. This
duality
is
a contrast
to Marx's dual
nature of
labour. When Marx
gave
the
second section of
the first
chapter of
his Capital the title,
"The
Dual Character
of
the Labour Embodied
in Commodities", the dual
character of
labour
referred exclusively
to
embodied
labour.
Eldred
and
Hanlon
offer a counter-example against
(a):
a
given
kind
of commodity,
the
product of a particular
type
of concrete
labour
(say,
steelmaking
labour),
can
he
realised as a use-value
in
many
different kinds
of consumption practices
(say,
shipbuilding, making
screws, making wire, etc.
),
which suggests
that, instead
of
having just
one use-value, commodities
have
several
(ibid,
p
47). If the
use-value
is
multiple
for each
commodity,
it
would no
longer he in
one-to-one
correspondence with concrete
labour
and should
be dependent
on
the
external circumstance of
its
use and/or on
its immediate
consumer.
But,
on
the
contrary,
if
use-value
is the
product of concrete
labour, then
the
use-value would
be inherent
and unique
in the
commodity.
However, that
objection was already anticipated
by Marx himself
in the first
section of
the first
chapter of
Capital
vol.
I.
"Every
useful
thing is
a whole composed of many properties;
it
can
therefore he
useful
in
various ways.
The discovery
of
these
ways
and
hence
of
the
manyfold uses of
things is the
work of
history"
(Marx, 197c
p
125)
Marx
acknowledges
in the
above
that
a use-value can
have
several
usefulnesses.
But he distinguishes between the
usefulness and
the
use-
value
itself
as
follows.
"The
usefulness of a
thing
makes
it
a use-value.
But this
usefulness
does
not
dangle in
mid-air.
It is
conditioned
by the
physical
properties of
the
commodity, and
has
no existence apart
from the
latter. It is therefore the
physical
body
of
the
commodity
itself,
" (ibid,
p
126)
-
42
-
In the
above,
he
attributes
to the
physical
body
of
the
steel rather
than to the
the
steel's use: why steel
is (and
why crockery
is
not) useful
in
ship-building, making screws, wires, etc.
Crockery has
no adequate physical property
in
making screws, wires, ship-
building,
etc. and so
is
not useful
in those. Such
a physical property
of
the
usefulness
Marx
called use-value, which
has
nothing
to do
with
the
its
use nor with
its immediate
consumer.
The best
evidence
for the inherency
of
the
use-value
is in the
organic character of use-value units.
A tiny
unit, say,
10
mg of steel
is
still a steel
but its
use-value
is
not
the
use-value as steel
but
as
a mineral nutrient or a medical
ingredient;
similarly a
half
unit of
calf
is
no more a calf
but is
called veal, etc.
A
certain
discontinuity
is
necessarily
involved in the
quantitative measurement of use-values:
its
quantitative change must
have its limit, by
exceeding which
the
quality suffers a change.
Even if there
were a qualitative change
through
a quantitative change of use-value,
it
would not
be
a change of
quality altogether
but
only of
its definite
character.
In the
case of
the
neo-classical concept of utility,
however, there
can
be
no
discontinuity in
measuring utilities.
It is
often
definable
even
for
a
tiny
unit of
goods
whilst use-value
is
not
definable
unless
in terms
of
another use-value
(e.
g.
10mg
of stell as a mineral or medical
ingredient).
The
measure of utility
is
not
inherent in
commodity
but turns
on
the
its
use and/or on
its immediate
consumer.
For this
reason, although steel
is
not
in
general
substitutable
by
paper,
for instance,
on account of each's peculiar physical property,
steel's and paper's utility are
in
principle mutually substitutable.
There is
no
hard
and
fast demarcation between
steel's utility and
-43-
paper's utility as all
those
rest on
the immediate
consumer of
them.
The
case
is different
with use-values.
Steel's
use-value can
in
no case
he
substitutable
by
paper's use-value.
This
explains why use-value
is
inherent in the
commodity whilst utility
is
not; no matter even
if the
use-value
is
of a non-labour product
bought
and sold as a commodity.
[q.
e.
d.
of
(a) ]
Every
commodity
is
a use-value,
but
every use-value
is
not a
commodity.
Depending
on
its
quantitative abundance,
for the
reasons of
its
aforesaid organic character, a use-value passes
through three
distinctive
stages; use-value
for its immediate
owner, use-value
for
others, and use-value
for
none
(Marx, 1970,
p
50). Only in the
middle
stage among
the three, the
use-value
has its definite
character as a
commodity.
The
neo-classical equality of marginal utilities may also
seem
to
explain such a critical point of
the
conversion
from
use-value
for its immediate
owner
to
use-value
for
others.
But the
case
is
quite
different. In the
case of
utility theory, the
use-value
to be
converted
into
a commodity
is
not entirely useless
for its immediate
owner
but
merely
less
useful
than the
use-value
to be
exchanged with
it. But in
case of
the
use-value
theory, the
use-value
to
convert must
be
entirely
unimportant
in the direct
consumption of
its immediate
owner, and so
is
useful
for its immediate
owner only as an exchange-value.
From this
we
obtain
the following
proposition as a corollary of
(a).
(P2.1)
a use-value versus a commodity:
Every
use-value
is
not a
commodity,
but
every commodity
is
a use-value.
The
use-value as a
commodity, of course, needs not necessarily
be
a product of
labour.
As for (b),
secondly.
Marx's
second
premise,
(b)
exchange value
is inherent in the
-
44
-
commodity
takes
root
in the
following
observation.
"A
given
commodity, a quarter of wheat
for
example,
is
exchanged
for
x
boot-polish,
y silk or z
gold,
etc.
In
short,
it is
exchanged
for
other commodities
in the
most
diverse
proportions.
Therefore
the
wheat
has
many exchange-values
instead
of one.
But
x
hoot-polish,
y silk or z
gold,
etc., each represents
the
exchange-
value of one quarter of wheat.
Therefore
x
boot-polish,
y silk, z
gold,
etc., must, as exchange values,
be
mutually replaceable or of
identical
magnitude.
It follows from this that, firstly, the
valid
exchange values of a particular commodity express something equal,
and secondly, exchange-value cannot
be
anything other
than the
mode
of expression,
the `form
of appearance', of a content
distinguishable from it. " (Marx, 1976a,
p
127)
In this
observation,
the
exchange-value of a certain commodity
is
simply
conceived
to be the
quantity of another commodity
that
exchanges
for
one
unit of
the former
commodity.
The
exchange-value of a quarter of wheat,
for
example, changes constantly with
time
and place
depending
upon what
becomes its
counterpart
in
exchange.
It
can
he
x
boot-polish
at one
place, y silk at another place, and z
gold
at
the third
place etc.
They
must
be
synchronous,
however, if they
express
the
exchange-value of one
and
the
same
thing. Otherwise, they
will not
be
mutually replaceable,
nor of
identical
magnitude.
Only
when
they
are synchronous are
they
mutually replaceable or of
identical
magnitude.
When they
are mutually
replaceable and of
identical
magnitude,
then they
can express something
equal.
Although the
content
is
not yet
identified
and whether a
commodity's content
is identical
with other commodities' contents
is
not
yet certain,
it is
affirmed
that the
content, which we may call
tentatively
an
intrinsic
value,
is inherent in the
commodity
if
only
its
multifarious exchange-values are synchronous.
5
5
The inherent
content
in (P2.2)
and
in (b) both is
somewhat
different
from
an
intrinsic
value.
Firstly, the inherent
content may not
he
uniform
for different
commodities
in
quality as well as
in
quantity.
Yet
commodity
A's intrinsic
value may not
differ in
quality
from
commodity
B's intrinsic
value.
Secondly, the inherent
content obtains
through the
multiplicity of exchange relations.
But the intrinsic
value
-45-
It is
not
known
what
the inherent
content
is,
what constitutes
the
content of
the
exchange-values.
Nor is it known
yet whether
distinct
commodities
having distinct
use-values may also
have distinct
inherent
contents.
But it is
affirmed
that
exchange-value
is inherent
in the
commodity
if
only
there
are multifarious synchronous exchange
relations
for
each commodity.
The
commodity
in this
case need not
be
products of
labour. Even
uncultivated
land, if it is traded for
money
within
infinite
synchronous exchange relations of
it,
can
have the
inherent
content of
its
exchange-value.
Its
content,
though it is
inherent,
may not
be identical
with
that
of other commodities as
Marx
said
in
Capital,
vol.
I, "the imaginary
price-form may also conceal a
real value relation or one
derived from it,
as
for instance the
price of
uncultivated
land,
which
is
without value
because
no
human labour is
Q
objectified
in it. " (Marx, 197(
p
197). So,
we
have the following
proposition
(P2.2).
(P2.2)
the inherency
of exchange-value: every commodity
has its
own
multifarious exchange-values, whose content must
be inherent in the
commodity provided
that its
multifarious exchange-values are
synchronous.
No
matter even
if the
commodity
is
a non-labour product.
The
only
difference between (b)
and
(P2.2) is in the
proviso of
the
latter, "provided that its
multifarious exchange-values are
synchronous".
But the
provisory clause needs
to be
eliminated
for
a
complete verification of
(b). In Appendix to 2.1,
we revise
(P2.2) into
(b) by
showing
that the definition
of
the
commodity already satisfies
the
provisory clause.
For the
moment, since we
have
no clear
definition
of
the
commodity yet, we
have to
add such a proviso
in the light
of a
purely
formal logic. [q.
e.
d.
of
(b)]
cannot obtain even
through the
multiplicity.
A
necessity
itself is
something
different
from the
multiplicity of
the
same experience.
-46-
As is
seen
in (P2.2),
non-labour products are not precluded
in
the
premise
for
analysing commodity values.
According to Marx (1976,
p
197), there
are
two kinds
of non-labour product
that
count as
commodities;
the first kind is
of regular, customary commodity,
the
second
kind is
of accidental, occasional commodity.
Under the first kind fall
uncultivated
land,
systematised
bribery
and
the like. This kind is
among
the
most
important
objects of
commerce and
is transacted
as such.
It has the
same
form
of price as
any other commodity and conceals a real value relation
in itself. This
is because,
as
(P2.2)
says,
it
can
have
multifarious and synchronous
exchange relations as
in the
case of ordinary commodities.
Yet its
value relation
is
not comprehensible unless as a certain category of
capital.
By
contrast,
the
second
kind is
among
the
exceptional objects of
accidental, occasional exchanges.
The
commodities which originally
cannot
become
commodities
in
principle and yet are still offered
for
sale
(e.
g.
morality, conscience,
honour, bribery)
are
the
case.
They,
too have
a price
form. But the
price
form has
no
inherent
content
because,
as
(P2.2)
says,
their
exchanges are not accompanied
by their
own
infinite
synchronous exchange relations.
Their
price
form does
not
conceal
in itself
a real value relation even as a capital and must
be
explained away as
definitely
contingent.
Boehm-Bawerk
(1984,
p
69-73), Hodgson
(1982, P 78),
etc. raised
an objection against
this. They
argued
that
non-labour products were
not
to be included in
considering
Marx's
equation
form because, if the
non-labour products
had been included in the
equation
form, human labour
would not
have been identified
as
the
sought-for common element.
But
we
-47-
show
in 2.2
that,
even
if
non-labour products are
included, it
makes no
difference
at all
to the
result of
Marx's
abstraction;
the
sought
for
common element will still
be human labour.
As for (c), lastly.
Marx (l97$
p
127)
started
from the
multifarious, synchronous
exchange relations and
then
affirmed
in (b)
that
every commodity
has the
inherent
content of
its
exchange-values.
In
(c),
to investigate
what
the inherent
content
is,
and
to know
whether
the inherent
contents of
the
commodities are
identical
or not,
Marx
posits another premise.
He
abstracts a single exchange relation
from the infinite (multifarious)
exchange relations, and
then
puts
it in
an equation
form, "1
quarter of
corn =x cwt of
iron",
which signifies
the
existence of a common element
of
identical
magnitude
in the two different things, in 1
quarter of corn
and similarly
in
x cwt of
iron. This
we call
Marx's third
premise,
the
equation
form
of exchange.
As to the
equation,
there have been two
polemics.
(1) how
can a single exchange relation
he justified
as
abstracted
from infinite (multifarious)
exchange relations?
(2) how
can
the
èquation' form
of
the
single exchange relation
be justified?
(1) Eldred
and
Hanlon (1981,
p
29-30)
criticised
Marx's
single
exchange relation of only
two
commodities as
being isolated from the
totality
of commodity exchange relations.
Because they
conceived
abstract
labour
as
the
abstraction
from
all
forms
of concrete
labour,
the
single exchange relation of only
two
commodities
did
not seem
to
them
able
to
articulate such an abstraction
from
all
kinds
of concrete
labour,
and only money seemed
to function
such an articulation.
So,
they
(ibid,
p
30)
argue
that the
articulation
demands
universal exchange
relations rather
than
an
isolated
single exchange relation.
In Marx's
case,
by
contrast, abstract
labour is
admittedly
-48-
.j
abstracted
from the
single exchange relation.
But,
when
he
gets
the
single exchange relation,
Marx
passes
through three
stages,
i.
e.
(a)
the
infinite (multifarious)
exchange relations,
() the
single exchange
relation of only
two
commodities,
(') the
common element
inherent in the
two different
commodities.
He bends (a)
the infinite (multifarious)
exchange relations round and
back into ()
a single exchange relation of
only
two
commodities, and puts
it in (7)
an equation
form, "l
quarter of
corn =x cwt of
iron", into
which
the initially
given
infinite
(multifarious)
exchange relations are condensed.
His three
stages,
be
it
noted, correspond
to Hegel's three distinct
causalities
(Hegel, 1975,
pp
213-218). In the
search
for `the
relationship of substantiality',
Hegel transferred his
attention
from (a')
an ad
infinitum
causality
to
(')
a reciprocal causality
(or
the
relation of action and reaction),
then from the
reciprocity
to
(i')
a self contained reciprocation.
Each
of
them
corresponds respectively
to the
aforesaid
Marx's three
stages.
In the last
causality,
in the
self-contained reciprocation,
Hegel finds
out
the
assimilation of cause with effect,
i.
e. necessity
(see ibid,
p
218). The
question
(1), however,
only refers
to the transition from (a)
upto
(p). The
question
(2)
refers
to the
other
transition from ()
to
(i).
(2)
Eldred
and
Hanlon
(1981,
p
47), Cutler, Hindess, Hirst
and
Hussain (1977,
p
14)
and
Bowles
and
Gintis
(1981a,
p
6)
criticise
Marx's
equation
form
as arbitrary and unjustifiable
(a $30
shirt
is identical
by definition to
a
$30 hook). Modern Marxists,
e.
g.
Harris
(1978,
p
307), Arthur
(1979a,
p
71),
etc. reply
to them that the
equation
form is
justifiable by the
stipulation of equivalent exchanges.
Their
reply,
however, is logically incoherent
with
Marx's
original meaning of
(c).
The
equivalent
exchange
for its
stipulation requires at
least two
pre-
-49-
requisites.
The
substance of value and
the
magnitude of value
both
are
logically
prior
to the
stipulation of
the
equivalent exchange.
But, in
(c),
the
equation
form is
posited
before the
the
magnitude of value are
defined. So, the
stipulation of equal exchange
must
be invalid in the
case of
(c).
Moreover, because
prices of
production normally
deviate from
values,
Boehm-Bawerk (1984,
pp
32-38)
argues a quantitative
deviation
of value
from
price of production was
enough
to
reject
the
equation
form
of
(c)
and
the intrinsic
value
concept as well.
Elson (197 9A,
pp
153-4)
replied
to Cutler
et al.
(op.
cit.
) in
a
different
context
from the
mere stipulation.
She
argued,
"Marx is
not
alone
in describing' this kind
of exchange
in terms
of equivalence:
it is
op Cit
a
general
feature
of
the
work of economists of all
kinds" (p 154).
In this
remark, she
implies the
neo-Ricardian
(the
Sraffian)
equation
form based
on money prices as well as
the
neo-classical equivalence of
marginal utilities
in the
commodity exchange.
But the
equivalence of marginal utilities
does
not refer
to
any
intrinsic
existence common
to the two distinct
commodities
in the
exchange.
It
refers only:
to the
external relations of each commodity
with
its
consumer;
the
external relation of commodity
A
with
Mr Smith
compared with another external relation of commodity
B
with
the
same
Mr
Smith. The
neo-Ricardian
(Sraffian)
system of equations also
does
not
refer
to
any
intrinsic
existence common
to the two
commodities
in
exchange since
the
equivalence
between
a
$30
shirt and a
$30 book is
simply
definitional. The two
commodities on
both
sides of
the
equation
form
are made commensurable not
in themselves but
only
by the
mediation
of money prices6.
So far
as
the
èquation
form' is based
on money
6
Some Marxists
in the
represented
labour
theory
of value
(the
-
50
-
prices,
we would
have to
explain
the two
categories of
`money'
and
`price'
before
explaining values since
the two
are
logically
prior
to
value.
But in Marx's
case,
the
equation
form is logically
prior
to the
categories of money and prices.
The
equation
form
ought
to
obtain with
no mediation of money prices.
Only because the
equation
form does
not
presuppose any monetary mediation nor
the
stipulation of equivalent
exchanges,
it has been
accused of
being
arbitrary and axiomatic
by
anti-
Marxian
criticisms.
Yet the
equation
form is
an essential premise
to
start
from in
Marx's
abstraction method.
If the
equation
form
were admitted
to be
arbitrary and axiomatic,
Marx's
whole
theoretical
system would also
have
to be
rejected
for similar
reasons.
We, therefore, have to
explain why
it is
not arbitrary nor axiomatic, on what
grounds
Marx
abstracts
the
equation
form, the
existence of
"a
common element of
identical
magnitude",
from the infinite (multifarious)
exchange relations
if it is
not
from the
stipulation of equivalent exchanges nor
from the
conventional equation
form
(based
on money prices or marginal utilities,
for instance).
Marx,
as was said.
in the
above,
derived
a single exchange
relation of only
two
commodities after passing
through
multifarious
exchange relations.
We
explained
this in terms
of
bending
multifarious
exchange relations round and
back into
a single exchange relation.
We
have to distinguish this from
a mere
juxtaposition. Otherwise, it
would
be
nothing
but
a mental practice.
How
can we
distinguish Marx's
Ruhinists) take the
same position as
the
neo-Ricardian
in that the
equation
form is
obtained
by the
mediation of money
(without
necessarily
precluding unequal exchanges).
The
value-form analytics realise
that
this
position must abandon
Marx's intrinsic
value concept as
is
seen
in
the
above.
They thus
denied the intrinsic
value concept
together
with
the
one-to-one correspondence
between
concrete
labour
and use-value and
between
abstract
labour
and value.
-
51
-
abstraction
of
the
equation
form from
a mere
juxtaposition?
Marx's intention in
(c)
was only
to
show
the inherent
contents
of
different
commodities seen
in
(b)
were
identical
with each other.
In
(b),
it
was simply affirmed
that the
multifarious exchange-values of a
certain commodity were nothing
but the forms
of appearance of a content
inherent in the
commodity.
But the
content was not shown yet
to be
identical (qualitatively)
with
that
of another commodity.
Only by
setting out
the
equation
form in (c),
Marx
explicitly shows
that the
inherent
contents are
identical
with each other
though it is
not
identified
yet what
it is. Then, how
can we
distinguish Marx's bending
of
the
multiple exchange relations
into the
from
a mere
juxtaposition?
When
we
trace hack
several exchange relations merely
to
a
representative single relation, we
have
a mere
juxtaposition. In this
case,
the
representative single relation
is
not expressible under an
equation
form because it
would only
be just
another
individual
relation.
Marx's
single exchange relation,
to be
represented
in
an equation
form,
has to
condense
infinite
exchange relations
into itself. To do this it
must
take the individual, inherent
contents of
the distinct
commodities
in
exchange as a single whole, as one and
the
same.
When
we meet, at
first, infinite (multifarious)
exchange
relations
before
our eyes,
they
appear as a mere sum of
individual,
independent, disparate
exchange relations and,
in their isolation,
as
purely accidental and contingent.
This is because
we
do
not conceive
the inherent
contents of
the
exchange relations as what
they
appear.
Insofar
as
they
are
disparate from
each other,
they inevitably
appear as
contingent.
This
chaotic situation was not acceptable
(if
commodity
exchanges were contingent,
it
would
be
simply ridiculous
to
seek
for
_52_
socio-economic
elements
in the
commodity
exchanges).
To
elicit
the
necessity,
Marx tried to
comprehend
those
individual
(inherent)
contents
as a single whole,
in the totality.
The
contingent, roughly speaking,
depends
not upon
itself but
on something else
(the force
of
gravitation,
for instance, is itself
a contingent
factor because it turns
on
the
external relations of
two distinct bodies). When
we
take the individual
contents
in
a single whole
like the
whole universe,
the
contingent
factors
are simply swept off as
there
would
be
no more external
relations.
All
we
have in
such cases
is the
concept of
internal
relation,
the internal
self-relation,
the intrinsic
causation,
the
substance,
the
necessity, etc.
Then, by
reflection, any
distinction
between its individual
parts
transpires into
a mediated uniformity.
This is
why
Marx tried to
comprehend
the disparate, individual, inherent
contents as a single
ùniverse' in the totality,
whose content can
be
condensed
into
a single equation
form! This is
what
distinguishes
Marx's
from
a mere
juxtaposition. Marx's
next
task is, therefore, to identify
what
the identical inherent
content
is.
Without this, the
equation
form in (c)
will remain as a mere premise.
Marx
goes
right
into the investigation
of what
the identical inherent
content
is. This belongs to the
next chapter. [q. e.
d.
of
(c)]
In Appendix to 2.1, however,
we will show
that
some
forms
of
exchange even
if their
objects are
labour-products
are
to he
precluded
in (c). The
exchange of
gifts
at
Christmas, the
exchange of
the
products of
domestic labour in
a
household, direct barter
and
the like
are
the
cases.
Such forms
of exchange cannot satisfy
the
proviso of
(P2.2)
and so
have
no
inherent
contents.
The
criterion
for the
exclusion
from the
equation
form
of
(c) is
not
in the
objects of
-
53
-
exchange
but in the form
of exchange.
in the Appendix to 2.1.
This
proposition will
be
examined
[summary]
(a)
the inherency
of use-value:
the
physical property of commodity
in distinction from the
usefulness of
the
commodity,
the
organic
character of
the
use-value units.
(b)
the inherency
of exchange-value: synchronous, multifarious
exchange relations necessarily
begets the inherency
of exchange
value
though it
may
differ for distinct
commodities.
(c)
the
equality of
the inherent
contents:
the individual inherent
contents are put
in the
context of
the totality
as a single whole.
Thus the distinction between the individual
categories
transpire
into
a mediated uniformity.
This distinguishes Marx's
single
exchange relation
from
a mere
juxtaposition.
-54-
Appendix
to 2.1 The Definition
of
the Commodity
This
section
is
supplementary
to the
previous section,
2.1. We here
examine what
kind
of exchange should or should not
be
counted
in Marx's
equation
form in his
abstraction of commodity values and why.
In (c),
the
exchanges which cannot satisfy
the
proviso of
(P2.2),
that is,
which
cannot
have
multifarious synchronous exchange-values
for
each article
in
the
exchange, are simply
to be
excluded as
the
articles
have
no
inherent
content of exchange-values.
Traditionally,
most
Marxian
economists
have
conceived non-labour products are such cases.
We
criticised
this in the
previous section.
Boehm-Bawerk (1984,
p
70)
regarded such a position as
a
trick
performed
by the
one who, urgently
desiring to bring
a white
ball
out of an urn,
took
care
to
secure
this
result
by
putting
in
white
halls
only.
In
(c),
Marx
excluded not
the
specific objects of exchange
(e.
g.
non-labour products)
but the
specific
forms
of exchange
(e.
g.
the
exchange of
gifts
at
Christmas, the
exchange of
the
products of
domestic
labour in
a
household), however. We
examine
here the
reasons.
When
we
discussed (b) in the
previous-section, we said
in (P2.2)
that the
exchange of a use-value
does
not
guarantee
the
use-value
has
the inherent
content of
its
multifarious exchange-values
(in this
stage,
however, be it
noted,
the inherent
content
is
no
intrinsic
value).
When
a use-value cannot
have
multifarious exchange-values synchronously,
the
use-value
has
no
inherent
content of
its
exchange-values.
It is then
undoubtedly excluded
from (c).
Such
use-values need not
be
non-labour
products.
Even the
non-labour product, when
it is traded for
money as a
good
object of property and commerce, can
have its
own
infinite
synchronous exchange relations
like land
and can
have
a real value
a
relation
in its
price
form (Marx, 1976,
p
197). Even
a product of
_55-
I
labour,
on
the
other
hand, if, to the
contrary,
it is
not
traded
for
money as
the
object of property and commerce, cannot
have
synchronously
its
own multifarious exchange values and can
have
no
inherent
content of
the
exchange-values.
It is true that
non-labour products cannot
substantiate
the
sought-for common element as
human labour. But
even
in
such cases, as will
be
seen
in 2.2,
we can explain
both the
act of
exchange
itself
and
its
rate of exchange
in terms
of necessity with
its
inherent
content
(which is
no
intrinsic
value).
What fails in
possessing
the inherent
content of exchange-values
is
not
the
specific objects of exchange
(like
the
non-labour products)
but the
objects
in the
specific
forms
of exchange.
The
exchange of
gifts
at
Christmas, the
exchange of
the
products of
domestic labour in
a
household, direct barter,
etc,
do
not create synchronously
the
multifarious exchange-values
for
each object.
Although those forms
of
exchange are still seen even
in the
most
developed
capitalist society,
they do
not
belong to
commodity exchange
in the
strict sense of
the
word.
Especially the first two
cases, viz.
the
exchange of
gifts
at
Christmas
and
the
exchange of
the
products of
domestic labour in
a
household,
reflect a sort of communal
life
rather
than
an
individuated
private
life. Such
exchanges can stand
good
to the
exclusion of
monetary
interventions
and are
dispensed
even
in the
spirit of equality.
The
objects of utility are not offered
in
such cases as commodities and
hence do
not
have
exchange-values.
The
same applies
to the third
case,
i.
e.
direct harter. In the
case of
direct harter,
where
there is
no
universal equivalent
functioning
as money,
the
objects of utility cannot
count as commodities
but
only as use-values as
Marx
said
in Chapter 2
of
Capital,
vol.
I;
-
56
-
"...
there is in fact
no commodity
acting as universal equivalent,
and
the
commodities possess no
general relative
form
of value under
which
they
can
he
equated as values and
have the
magnitude of
their
values compared.
Therefore they
definitely do
not confront each
other as commodities,
but
as products or use-values only.......
They
can only
bring their
commodities
into
relation as values, and
therefore
as commodities,
by bringing them into
an opposing
relation with some one other commodity, which serves as
the
universal equivalent.
" (Marx, 1976a,
p.
180)
In the
above,
Marx
says
that
so
far
as
there is
no universal equivalent
functioning
as money,
different
products of
labour
are not converted as
yet
into
commodities.
What distinguishes direct barter from
commodity
exchanges
is the
universal equivalent
functioning
as money.
This is
indicative
of synchronous exchange.
At the
same rate
às
the
transformation
of
the
products of
labour into
commodities
is
accomplished, one particular commodity
is transformed into
money'
(ibid,
p
181}
and with
it
ends
the direct barter. If
so, we
have two
polemics.
(1)
why without money, are
the things
exchanged not commodities?
Rather, to begin
with,
(2)
what
is
meant
by direct barter? On this,
we
read again;
"That form
was x commodity
A=y
commodity
B. The form
of
the
direct
exchange of products
is
x use-value
A=y
use-value
B. The
articles
A
and
B in this
case are not as yet commodities"
(ibid,
p
181)
"So long
as a chaotic mass of articles
is
offered as
the
equivalent
for
a single article
(as is
often
the
case among savages),
instead
of
two distinct
objects of utility
being
exchanged, we are only at
the threshold
of even
the direct
exchange of products.
" (ibid,
p.
181,
n5,
italics
are
by Lee)
In the
above,
Marx's direct
exchange presupposes
the
exchange of use-
values not
the
exchange of commodities.
But the
exchange of use-values
does
not
directly
mean a
direct barter however. If it is to he
a
direct
barter,
a certain
degree
of
the development
of exchange
is
necessarily
required.
He
says
in the
above
that
when a chaotic mass of articles
is
offered as
the
equivalent
for
a single article
instead
of
two immediate
-
57
-
objects
being
exchanged,
the
exchange
is
still on
the brink
of
the
transition
to direct
exchange.?
This describes
what
the demarcation
line is between
the direct
exchange and
the
gift
exchange.
A larger
volume of exchange
does
not
itself
make any
difference to the
gift
exchange and
to direct harter.
In the
sense
that the direct barter is distinguished from the
gift
exchange,
be it
noted,
the
articles
in the direct barter become
commodities post
factum through the
act of exchange although
they
are
not
born
as commodities.
Marx
said
"The
articles
A
and
B in this
case are not as yet commodities,
but
become
so only
through the
act of exchange.
" [ibid,
p181]
Even if they become
commodities post
factum, however, the
articles
in
the direct barter
cannot
have
any
inherent
content of
their
exchange-
values.
Because there is
no monetary
intervention, the
exchange
is
still accidental and contingent and
there
can
be
a certain
degree
of
infiltration between the direct
exchange and
the
gift
exchange.
Under
such a situation, each use-value can
hardly have the infinite
exchange
relations synchronously and
hence
cannot
have the inherent
content of
the
exchange-values.
To
satisfy
the
proviso of
(P2.2),
a universal
equivalent, money,
is
essential.
A
necessity
itself is
something
7
This indicates that,
among
the four distinct
value-forms,
i.
e.
(a) the
simple,
isolated,
or accidental
form
of value,
(b) the total
or expanded
form
of value,
(c) the
general
form
of value and,
lastly, (d) the
money
form, both (a)
and
(b) belong to the
prehistory of
direct
exchange,
(c)
alone may corresponds
to the direct
exchange while
(d)
corresponds
to
commodity exchange.
In 4.2,
we will
discuss the distinction between (d)
the
money
form
and
the
equation
form
of exchange
discussed in 2.1. In
(d),
there is
a certain asymmetry
between the both
sides of
the
equation
while
in the
simple equation
form discussed in 2.1,
or
in Marx's
Chapt. l. l, there
is
no asymmetry.
We
explain such an
inconsistency in
terms
of
internal
and external
form
of magnitude.
-
58
-
different
from
the
multiplicity of a simple experience.
It is
very simple
to imagine that
some
individual,
after
first
having
satisfied
his (or her) direct
consumption, offers
the
surplus
to
exchange
it
with others.
Then, the direct harter
should
he
placed
in
the
very
first
savage stage rather
than,
as we
have
shown
in the
above,
at
the
middle
between the
communal
form
of exchange
(=
gift
exchange)
and
the
private
form
of exchange
(=
commodity exchange).
Such
a notion
of
direct barter is
unfounded even as an
historical fact, however,
firstly, because it
proceeds
from the development
of
isolated
individuals
and, secondly,
because the
productive
force
of an
individual
labour
can never
be
elevated upto
the level to
satisfy
the direct
consumption of
the individual. Let
us examine
these two
reasons more
closely.
Human history
never
began
with
isolated individuals. "Human
beings become individuals
only
through the
process of
history. He
appears originally as a species-being, clan
being, herd
animal and
the
like
-
although
in
no way whatever as a social animal
in the
political
sense.
Exchange
was a chief means of
the individuation
of such a
species-being.
The
exchange made
the herd-like
existence superfluous
and
thus dissolved it" (Marx, 1973,
p
496) into
separate
individuals.
There
was an exchange
before the individual
existence of
human being
and
the
exchange presupposed
"the
relationship of reciprocal
isolation
and
foreignness" (Marx, 1976k
p
182). When
a
larger
amount of use-values
was produced
than
was required
for direct
consumption,
it
was used at
first,
not
for
an
individual direct barter, but for
an exchange
between
different
communities or
between
one community and members of another
community.
This is
why
the direct
exchange originally evolved at
the
few
points where primitive communities came
into
contact with each
_59_
other.
At this
stage,
the
exchange
itself
was
the
making of
the
connection
between isolated
primitive communities.
Only
when
the direct
barter
moved
into the interior
of
the
community
did it
exert a
disintegrating influence
upon
it.
Direct
exchange
between
communities was not,
however,
automatically
introduced to the internal life
of
the
cowgunities.
As
was
implied in the
above, products
did
not
become the
objects of
"direct
exchange"
inside the
community until
the
products
become "commodities"
in the
the
community.
But in
order
to become
commodities as a regular phenomenon
in the
external relations of a
community, at
least
some part of
the
products
has
got
to he
produced
intentionally for the
purpose of exchanging with other communities or
with members of
the latter. Direct barter
makes
the
articles exchanged
become
commodities post
factum through the
act of exchange.
When the
article
is
produced
intentionally
as a commodity,
it is
no
longer the
object of
direct
exchange.
For this to happen,
not only
the
output
but
its inputs
must
he
required
to be directly
and
indirectly
exchanged with
each other
by the
physical and
technical
necessities with
the
emergence
of money
(Weeks, 1981,
pp..
30-31, has the
same point on
this).
"From
that
moment, as soon as products
have become
commodities
in the
the
community,
by
reaction,
the
products
can
become the
objects of
direct
exchange and
then become
commodities
/976a
,
even within
the
community"
(Marx,
p
182, italics
are
by LEE) because,
at
that time,
a certain
degree
of
the
social
division
of
labour
must
have
already
developed inside the
community
to the
extent
that
"a
chaotic
mass of articles can
he
offered as an equivalent
for
a single article,
instead
of
two distinct
objects of utility
being
exchanged"
(ibid,
p
181}.
-
60
-
When the direct
exchange
is
reflected
into the
community,
"the
community must
have
already
begun to be dissolved
or
disintegrated
through the
(direct)
exchange
itself
which originally
had
played a role
in
connecting
isolated
communities"
(Marx, 1973,
p
496). But,
as soon
as exchange
began to dissolve
a community,
the
matter will
have to turn
"in
such a way
that
as an
individual
a man relates
himself
only
to
himself,
while
the
means with which
he
posits
himself
as
individual have
become the
making of
his
generality
and commonness"
(Marx, ibid,
p
496).
Exchange thereafter has become the
only means of associating
isolated
individuals. Amidst
such a'situation,
"money becomes
a real community"
(ibid,
p
225)
and
the
previous real community
has
already collapsed
into
an oblivion.
With the
collapse of
the
previous real community, so-
called non-labour products enter
into the
category of commodity
following the
case of
labour
products.
In
sum, exchange
has
changed
its
character
three times;
at
first, direct
exchange played a role
in
connecting
isolated
communities,
then
when
it
was
developed into
a commodity exchange,
direct
exchange
is
reflected
into the
community playing a role
in dissolving
and
disintegrating the
community.
After the
community
has disintegrated,
however, the direct
exchange changes
into
a commodity exchange with
the
emergence of money as a chief means of associating
isolated individuals.
To that
extent,
direct
exchange
is
characterised as an
"ultimate
individualism"
whereas commodity exchange
is
a means of
"associating
individuals".
8
Marx's discussion
of value
theory is
confined
to this
8
Still,
a value
theory
must not start
from the
empty phrase
that the
exchange relation of commodities reflects a social relation
behind the
commodities.
Rather, it
must
track down the depths
of why and
in
what
way a social relation
is
reflected
in the
commodity exchange.
Tributes,
tax,
rent, etc.
do
not
fall
under
the
cayegory of commodity exchange.
So, these
categories
should
be imported from
outside
if the
value
theory
starts
from the
aforesaid empty phrase.
-
61
-
final
stage, commodity exchange
(characterised by the
emergence of
money) comprising not only a capitalist commodity production
but
also
(on the distinction between
simple commodity
exchange and capitalist commodity exchange, we
discuss in Chapter 3
and
Chapter 4). Thus,
we can put our
(P2.2) into (P2.2')
as
follows.
(P2.2)
every commodity
has
must
be inherent in the
commodity provided
that its
multifarious
exchange-values are synchronous.
No
matter even
if the
commodity
is
a
non-labour product.
(P2.2')
every commodity
has
multifarious exchange-values, whose
content must
be inherent in the
commodity.
Compare the two
propositions,
the
provisory clause of
the
(P2.2) is
deleted. This is because the
condition
is
satisfied
in the
very notion
of
the
commodity; money price
itself
satisfies
the
proviso.
In the
end,
as
(P2.2')
exactly
holds, Marx's
original
(b)
obtains with no provisory
clause.
In
passing,
lastly,
we can offer another reason why
it is
wrong
to
say
that
only
the
products of
labour
can embody social relations.
It
is
a mere
dogmatism to
say
that
only products of
labour
can count
in
Marx's
abstraction of commodity values on
the
grounds
that
non-labour
products cannot embody any social relation
(cf
Pilling, 1972,
p
297).
But to have
a social character
it is
not necessary
to be
a product of
labour. No
matter whether
it is
a
labour-product
or not, any commodity
can embody a social relation
because the
act of commodity exchange
itself is the
only means of associating
isolated individuals. Labour
itself,
strictly speaking,
has
no
direct
relation
to
a society
(e.
g.
domestic labours in
a
household). It
can
be
a social
labour
only
through the
act of commodity production.
-62-
2.2
Marx's Process
of
Abstraction
This
section works with
Marx's
whole process of abstraction.
It
starts
from the three
premises,
(a), (b)
and
(c),
-examined
in the
previous
section,
2.1,
consisting of
the two
phases,
(d)
and
(e),
as versed
in
2.0,
and ending with
the
conclusion,
(f),
as versed with
its
preceding
phases
in 2.0. In this
section, we examine
its
whole process and
its
conclusion except
the three
premises already examined
in the
previous
section,
2.1. While
examining
(d), (e)
and
(f),
we must reply
to the
two
anti-Marxian criticisms,
(2)
and
(3),
confronted
in 2.0. We
reproduce
them
as
follows.
(d) identical
substance as abstract
human labour: If
we abstract
from their
use-value, only one property remains,
that
of
being the
products of
labour. But the labours
which produced
the
commodities
are all
to be
reduced
to the
same
kind
of
labour,
abstract
human
labour.
(e)
external
diversities
reduced
to homogeneous labour: Turning
back to the
residue of
the
products of
labour,
we
find
out
in
each
case nothing
but the
same phantom-like objectivity,
the
congealed
quantities of
homogeneous human labour.
(f)
value
is the
sought-for common element,
human labour is the
substance of value, and abstract
labour is the
creator of value:
The
common
factor in the
exchange relation
is `value'. In the
value,
the labours
embodied
in
commodities are
homogenised because
they have
abstract
labour
character.
It follows from this that the
ultimate cause of
the homogenisation
of
labour in the
value
is
abstract
labour,
and so
the
creator of
the
commodity value
is
abstract
labour. The
substance of
the
commodity value
is human
labour.
(2)
Marx
rigged
the
result
by
excluding
the
exchangeable
goods
which are not products of
labour in the
search
for the
common
factor
which
lies
at
the
root of exchange value.
(3) Even
when non-labour products are excluded,
there is
no reason
why
there
should
be
no alternatives
to labour
as
"the
common
factor".
Before
examining
Marx's
abstraction process
itself for (d), (e)
and
(f),
however,
we clarify
in
what way
Marx's
process of abstraction
is
distinct from the two
analytical abstractions which
have been
so
far
-63-
suggested
in Marxian literature
proceeding
from the
particular
to the
most abstract.
We
shall compare
here three
approaches; one
is
characterised
as seeking a
formal identity
(=
abstract universality),
another
is
characterised
as seeking
the
genus
(=
concrete universality),
and
the last is Marx's
own abstraction of
identical
substance
(=
a self-
actualising universality).
In the Marxian literature, the first
grasps
Marx's
àbstract
labour'
merely as another aspect of concrete
labour
while
the
second
grasps
it
as
the
abstraction
from
all
forms
of concrete
labour;
one
is in the
embodied
labour theory
of value,
the
other
is in
the
represented
labour theory
of value.
Marx's
abstraction,
by
contrast,
grasps
àbstract labour'
as
the identical
substance of all
forms
of concrete
labour,
which
differs from `the
abstraction
from
all
forms
of concrete
labour' in that
while one
is
a real
labour in
production,
the
other
is
an abstract category made
in
exchange.
2.2.1 Formal Abstraction
The first
approach seeks
for
abstract universality
(or formal identity)
by
analysing a
given
concrete object,
isolating its differences,
separating
the
given
concrete object
into its
abstract elements and
giving
them the form
of
àbstract
universality'.
For instance,
a
chemist place a piece of
flesh in his
retort,
tortures it in
many ways,
and
then informs
us
that it
consists of nitrogen, carbon,
hydrogen,
etc.
In
comparing
two different fleshes,
a common element
is found
after
analysing
the two things in
such a way, and
thus is
given
the
name,
(or formal identity). This
method
turns things
upside
down; it
cannot
take things
as
they
are
because the
abstract
-
64
-
matters
obtained
from
the
analysis of
the flesh in the
above would
have
already ceased
to be flesh. This is
why
`neither
microscopes nor
chemical reagents are of assistance' especially
in
analysing economic
forms; the
abstract element obtained
from the
analysis of
the
commodity,
e.
g.
utility, use-value, value, etc. should not
have
ceased
to be the
commodity.
This
approach,
however, has been followed by
most
Marxian
economists
in the
position of
the
embodied
labour theory
of value.
a
Brody
(1974),
Morishima
(1973),
Bowles
and
Gintis
(1981
,
Samuelson
(1982), Roemer
(1982),
Wolff
(1984),
Elster
(1985),
etc. conceive
human
labour
as
the
sought-for common element and
interpret Marx's
value
magnitudes
to be
nothing
but èmployment
multipliers'
discussed in
modern economics
(by Kahn
and
by Keynes). In this
case,
the labours
embodied
in
commodities must
be homogeneous by definition. Otherwise,
it
cannot
be the
sought-for
`common'
element.
This
approach
has been
criticised
in two distinct
ways.
One is by
showing
that
value can
be
rendered negative
in the
cases of
joint
production and/or choices of
technique in Steedman
(1975).
The
other
is by
showing any commodity
other
than labour-power
can
be
cast
in the
same role as
the
substance of
value.
The latter is
a more
generalised criticism
than the former. We
examine
here the latter
alone.
Samuelson
(1982,
pp
12-13)
and
Brody
(1974,
p
85) have long
since
demonstrated that labour-power is logically indistinguishable from
any other products and/or services,
that is, there is
a strict symmetry
between labour-power
and any other commodity.
Samuelson
(1982,
pp
12-13)
showed
it
most succinctly
by transforming the
given eigenvector
relations of
the labour theory
of value,
i.
e.
A[A+dl(l+e)]
=
A,
where
A
is
a value vector,
A the
raw material
inputs
matrix,
d the
stipulated
-
65
-
vector of subsistence wage-goods, e
the
rate of exploitation of
labour,
I
into the
eigenvector
formulation
of a raw material
theory
of value,
i.
e.
A[A(1+e4')+d1)
=A where
A, A
and
d
are as
the
above and yet et'
is the
rate of exploitation of Lth commodity.
Comparing the two
eigenvector
systems
in the
above, we can
find
out a perfect symmetry
between labour-
power and
the
cth commodity-power.
Samuelson's
criticism
is further
elaborated
in detail in Roemer
A
(1982), Bowles & Gintis
(1981j,
Wolff (1984), Elster (1985),
etc. as
A.
follows
(its best
example
is in Bowles & Gintis, I981.
"Consider
an economy with
two
goods,
food (F)
and
jewellery M.
Food is
used
to
produce all
goods
and
is in the
wage
bundle,
while
jewellery is
consumed only
by
non-workers and
is
not used
in
production.
Specifically
suppose
1/2 bushel
of
F
and
1/2 hour
of
labour
are used
to
produce one
bushel
of
F,
and
1/2 bushel
of
F is
in the
wage
bundle. Also
suppose
1/4 bushel
of
F
and one
hour
of
labour is
used
to
produce a unit of
J.
We
obtain
labour
values
by defining
the
value of
labour
as unity,
and
the
value of
jewellery
and
food
as
the
amount of
labour time
directly
and
indirectly
embodied
in them. It is
easy
to
see
that
the
value of
labour-power,
AL
is
given
by
AL=(1/2)AF,
where
AF
is
the
value of
food. Also, the
value of
food is
given
by
AF=(1/2)AF+1/2.
Thus
A F=l and
AL=1/2.
Also the
value of
jewellery
is
given
by
AJ=(1/4)AF1
=5/4.
Finally, the
of
labour-power is
eL=(1-AL)/(AL) =1.
Labour is therefore
exploited.
...
The
same
is true, however, for
a
food theory
of
value.
We
now
define the
value of
food
as unity, and
the
value of
jewellery
and
labour
as
the
amount of
F directly
and
indirectly
embodied
in them. It is
easy
to
see
that AF=3/4, aJ=3/4
and
AL=1/2.
The
rate of exploitation of
food-power is
eF=[1-(3/4)]/(3/4) =1/3, so
food is
exploited!
" (Bowles
and
Gintis,
1981X
p
19)
Being based
on
the
above analysis,
Bowles
and
Gintis
(1981}
argue;
"Indeed, if
we
define
a
`basic
good'
as any which enters
directly
or
indirectly
into the
production of any element
in the
wage
bundle, then
we can show
that
any
basic
commodity can
be treated
as
a measure
of value.
Further, this
commodity can
he
shown
to be
"exploited" in the
sense
that
profits represent a
transformation
of
surplus-value
extracted
from this
commodity.
..
There
are
-
66
-
innumerable inputs into the
process which are
both
socially necessary
to
production-and
are not commodities
(e.
g.
land).
Yet
any such non-reproducible resource
(if it is
a
basic
input)
can also serve as a measure of value.
Moreover,
each can
be
shown
to be
exploited
in the
precise sense
defined
above.
" (ihid,
p
7)
To
strengthen
Samuelson's
argument,
Bowles
and
Gintis in the
above
deliberately
eliminate every aspect of asymmetry
between the labour-
input
and any other ordinary
input. Even the
non-labour product, e.
g.
land is
also shown
in their
article
to be
able
to
act as
the
measure of
value and as
the
source of profits.
Just
as
`labour'
as a nuwneraire
is
distinct from `labour-power'
as a commodity
in the
case of
the labour
theory
of value, so
in the food theory
of value,
`food'
as a numeraire
is differentiated from `food-power'
as a commodity; one
is
as an
input
(as
a numeraire) and
the
other as an output
(as
a commodity).
The
exchange relation
between the labour-power
and
its
wage-goods
is however
conceived as a production process of
the labour-power
whilst
the
production process of
food-power is identified
as
if being the
exchange
relation of
the food-power
with
its
production materials.
Well,
anyway,
in the
neo-classical perspective, exchange
is itself
a production
process
because it
can also
increase
utilities.
The
elimination of
the
asymmetry
between the labour-case
and
food-case is taken
a step
further by the following
analogy.
"But
clearly every commodity
has
an abstract
form
as a commodity
and a concrete
form
as a physical entity engaged
in
production.
A
lathe
can
be
considered
the
union of
lathe-power, its
abstract
potential
to
perform useful
functions,
and as
lathing, the
concrete
activity of
the lathe
engaged
in
production.
"[ibid,
p.
7]
In the
above,
instead
of
the
`two factors
of
the
commodity',
they take
the dual
character of any commodity after
Marx's
`dual
character of
labour'. Hence, they
conclude;
-67-
"The
conclusion seems
inescapable. If
wage
labour is treated
as a
commodity, and
labour
as
its
use-value,
it has
no
`special
character'
in terms
of which
the labour theory
of value can
be
justified.
If the labour theory
of value
is to be defended
at all,
it
must
be by
virtue of some non-commodity aspect of wage
labour.
......
the theoretically
necessary and sufficient non-commodity
aspect of
labour-power
must
be located
at sites
distinct from the
site of capitalist production:
family
and state.
...
" (ibid,
pp.
7-8)
For the
sake of
justifying Marx's labour theory
of value,
they
suggest
redefining
the
concept of
labour-power in its
non-commodity character as
a
"to-be-hired"
good,
as a unique asymmetric point
between the labour-
power and any other ordinary commodity.
To
abandon
the
commodity
character of
labour-power, however, is
actually
tantamount to
rejecting
the
concept of
labour-exploitation; the
word, exploitation presupposes
an exchange relation,
the
commodity character of
labour-power
since
it
is distinct from the
word, expropriation.
They
suggest rejecting
the
concept of
labour-exploitation
only
to
save
the labour theory
of value.
For
all
this, however,
even
if
we
define the labour-power
as a
"to-be-hired"
good,
it is
still a commodity unless
it is to be hired
free
of charge.
Marx too defined labour-power
as a
"to-be-hired"
good
when
he
assimilated
the
price of
labour-power
with
the
rent of a
house
(Marx, 1976a,
p
277-279). Yet he
still
defined it
as a commodity
because
a
"service" is
also a commodity
(see (P2.2)
and
(P2.2')). No
matter whether
it is hired
or sold,
the
nature of a commodity exchange
still applies
to the
price of
labour-power.
Asymmetry between labour input
and ordinary
input is decisive in
rejecting
the food theory
of value as well as
the
misconceived
àbstract
universality'
(= formal identity)
approach.
In the
above example,
the
two labour-inputs
of
the two distinctive
production processes, of
food
and
jewellery,
are assumed
to be homogeneous. The labour
which produces
-
68
-
food
is
assumed
to he identical
with
the
other
labour that
produces
jewellery.
This
assumption
leads to
symmetry
between labour inputs
and
ordinary
inputs, leading to indifference
between the
many alternative
theories
of value.
In
case of
food-inputs, the food
which
is
used
in
producing
food
is
necessarily assumed
to be identical to the
other
food that is
used
in
producing
jewellery. Although they
are used
in two distinct
production
processes,
they
are
homogeneous in their
objective, physical character.
Yet in the
case of
the labour-input, the two labour-inputs in the two
distinct
production processes are not
homogeneous. They
are
living,
thus
varying
their
concrete
forms in
a
fluid
state and may change
their
expenditure of energy with
time
and place.
In
reference
to the
exchange relation
in
which every
labour
input (or
every
labour-power) is treated
as
the
same commodity
by being
exchanged with
the
same wage
goods,
the
concept of
homogeneous labour
might seem
justifiable; the
amount of
labour input in
each production
process might
be
calculated as
that
of
homogeneous labour by
reference
to the
exchange-value of
the labour inputs. The
value
theory then
may
become
a simple cost
theory
of price with no explanation of
the
source
of profit
if
a certain uniform rate of exploitation
is
not postulated.
But the
uniform rate of exploitation
is itself
undefinable
for the
separate
individual labours
of a collective
labourer (see Chapter 3).
2.2.2 Concrete Abstraction
The
second approach seeks a concrete universality
(or
the
genus)
by
leaving
given concrete
things
as a
ground
and
bringing into
relief only
-
69
-
èssential
looking
particulars' while setting aside
the inessential-
looking
particulars
in the
syllogistic
context of
individuality,
universality
and particularity.
Unlike the first
approach,
it
seeks
the
common element, not
among
the ingredients, but in
a syllogistic abstraction presupposing
that
no common element
is inherent in two distinct things just
as
the
axiom
dictates, "everything is
essentially
distinct". It
classifies
the
abstract
ingredients into two
groups,
the
essential and
the inessential
looking
particulars.
Between the two
groups,
only
the
essential
looking
particulars are
brought into
relief
in
a syllogistic context.
The
criterion,
however, for the
essential and
the inessential is
arbitrary.
When
we start
from apple,
pear, peach, persimmon, etc.,
the
genus
can
he
anything.
It
can
be
either
`fruit'
or
`circle'
or
`globe' (as
they
are
all round) or
ènergy'
or
ùtility'
or
`scarcity'
etc..
The
greatest
defect in this
approach
is its
arbitrariness, against which
there
can
be
an equal right of counter-arbitrariness.
The
sought-for common element
in the
approach
is taken in
an
abstraction
from
all
kinds
of
essential-looking particulars
(differences). This
approach
has been followed by
most
Marxian
economists
in the
position of
the
represented
labour theory
of value,
e.
g.
Rubin
(1973,1978),
Eldred
and
Hanlon
(1981),
Weeks
(1981),
Colletti (1973,1979), Arthur
(1976),
etc.
This has been
widespread
even
in the
anti-Marxian criticisms
in
showing
the
common element can
be
something other
than labour,
e.
g.,
utility, scarcity, energy, etc.
We
read;
"They
confuse abstraction
from the
genus,
and abstraction
from the
specific
forms in
which
the
genus
manifests
itself.
...
The
special
forms
under which
the
values
in
use of
the
commodities may appear,
whether
they
serve
for food,
shelter, clothing etc.,
is
of course
-70-
disregarded,
but
the
value
in
use of
the
commodity as such
is
never
disregarded. " (Boehm
Bawerk, 1984,
p.
74)
"I
suggest
that
commodity production may
be
seen
in terms
of
the
first
two
moments of such a
development
[in (abstract)
universality
and particularity
in the
syllogistic context; added
by LEE]. It
has
created a wealth of concrete particulars.
No
one
form
of
labour,
such as agriculture, predominates over
the
rest
-
wealth
is
created
by
a wide variety of
labours. But in
value social
labour
is
recognised only as abstract.
This
is
estranged
from
the
wealth of
development
of concrete
labours
because
the
nexus of commodity exchange, as
the
social
link between
private
labours,
totalizes them
only as abstract.
Social labour
can come
to itself
as a synthesis of
these
moments, as concretely
universal,
in
so
far
as socialism overcomes
the
estrangement
between them. Socialism is the
genuine
unity of
the
many
in the
one.
" (Arthur, 1976,
p.
13)
In the
above,
Arthur
and
Boehm-Bawerk both
see
the
use-value of a
commodity as a particular
feature
of
the
commodity.
Over
what
constitutes
the
universal
feature (or
the
genus)
of
the
particular
features, however, they disagree
with each other.
Boehm-Bawerk
sees
ùse-value in
general'
as
the
genus
whereas
Arthur
sees
'value'
with no
affix as
the
genus
as against
the
species of
the
use-values.
Arthur
makes another
jump to
see abstract
labour
as
the
genus
as against
concrete
labours
as
its
species.
In the latter
position, not only
àbstract labour' but
also
`concrete labour in
general'
can equally
count as
the
abstraction
from
all
kinds
of concrete
labour.
But, if the
abstract
labour
as
the
genus
corresponds
to the
value with no affix and
the
concrete
labour
as
its
species
to the
use-
values,
Boehm-Bawerk's
criticism
in the
aforesaid
(2)
must
be legitimate
since non-labour products
have
no chance
to
enter
into the
world of
commodity.
So far
as
the
non-labour products are not precluded
in this
approach,
it
would
be
more
legitimate to identify the ùse-value in
general'
as
the
genus
as against
the distinct
use-values as
its
species,
rather
than in the logical
syllogism of
labour. But
many other
syllogisms are still arguable with equal significance
(e.
g.
ènergy in
-
71
-
general'
as against
`definite forms
of energy',
ùtility
as such' as
against
`specific
degrees
of
the
utility',
`scarcity
as such' as against
`specific
extents of
the
scarcity', etc.
). Depending
on what
distinction is
selected as
the
essential, one syllogism must
be
asserted
to the
exclusion of all
the
other syllogisms.
This
marks
the best
example of why
Marx's
concept of abstract
labour
cannot
be
sought
for in
this
genus-species
approach.
Instead
of rejecting
this
second approach,
most
Marxian
philosophers
have devoted their
energies
to the
justification
of
the logical
syllogism of
labour; they
only explained
why
the logical
syllogism of
labour
should
be
asserted
to the
exclusion
of all
the
other syllogisms, and so
have had to
exclude non-labour
products
from the
cmmodity category on
the
grounds
that
only products
of
labour
can embody social relations.
This
pretext,
however,
was
already criticised
in
our
Appendix to 2.1. Land, for
example,
is
not a
product of
labour but it
nevertheless contains a real value relation and
a social relation as well
in its
price
form. A labour
product, on
the
other
hand,
e.
g.
the
products of
domestic labour in household, does
not
necessarily embody a social relation
in itself.
Kay (1979),
while.
taking tentatively the
genus-species
approach,
realises
before long
what a
big
problem
lies in the
genus-species
approach.
"Moreover,
as
the few lines
cited above show,
this
method of
procedure
leads inexorably towards
a
dehistoricisation
of
the
categories.
For if
our abstractions are
derived
merely as common
properties
-
i.
e.
from
specific
form to
genus
-
not only can
they
have
no
form
of existence at all,
but
equally
they have the
same
status,
the
same possibility of non-existence and
therefore
existence, at all periods
in history.
......
then
as concrete
labour indisputably
exists
in
every
form
of society,
it
must
follow
that
abstract
labour has the
same universal presence.
And if
abstract
labour is
universally present
then its
product, value,
cannot
be far from the
scene even where we
do
not
find the definite
historical
form
of commodity production.
" (ibid,
p
55)
_72_
Very honestly
and correctly,
in
short,
Kay'in the
above
has
pinpointed
that the
genus-species
approach
is
metaphysical and ahistorical
just
as
the
neo-classical
syllogism of utility
is
also metaphysical and
ahistorical
in the
same
genus-species approach.
So, he
argues;
"The
plain
fact is that despite the
odd remarks we might
find in
Capital
and elsewhere
in Marx's
works
to the
contrary, abstract
labour is
not
the
common property of concrete
labour,
nor
is
concrete
labour the
mode of existence of abstract
labour. If
we
take Marx's
analysis as a whole and
do
not
focus
our attention on
individual
passages
this becomes
abundantly clear.
" (ibid,
p
56)
In the
above,
gay
eventually
discards the
genus-species
approach as
being
unscientific.
But,
unfortunately,
his keen intelligence
suddenly
deserts him
as
he
moves
towards
a
Rubin-like tautology.
"In its
role of universal equivalent, money shows not only
that
all
commodities
do in fact have
a common property,
it
acts as
this
common property.
As the
medium of circulation,
it is the
means
through
which
the
particular
individual
concrete
labour
embodied
in
any one commodity can
become transformed into
any, and every, other
type
of
labour. That is to
say
it is the
medium
through
which
concrete
labour becomes
abstract
labour. In
a word
it is
money
that is the form
of existence of abstract
labour. " (ibid,
p
58)
In the
sphere of exchange and
in
money,
he finds
out abstract
labour
as
a
`practical truth'. Arthur (1979b)
regarded such an abstract
labour
as
a magic, as
the inversion
of abstract and concrete performed
by
commodity exchanges since
the
commodity exchanges appear
to him to
give
`practical
truth' to
such an ahistorical abstraction.
However, to
justify
such a magic as scientifically
legitimate,
we
have to
explain
what money
is before
explaining what value
is
since
the
money would
be
logically
prior
to
commodity values.
At this
stage of value analysis,
however,
as we said
in 1.2, the
money category
is to be
comprised
in the
same category as ordinary commodities.
Only
when we examine
the
-73-
external
and
the internal
magnitudes of value, we need
to distinguish
money
from
other commodities.
Only in that latter
case,
there
must
be
a
certain asymmetry
between the both
sides of
the
equation
form
of
exchange.
Otherwise, there is
no reason
for
an asymmetry
to
appear as
far
as we examine only
the internal
magnitudes of value.
We
will
discuss the internal
and
the
external magnitudes of value
in 4.2.
2.2.3 Marx's Abstraction
The third
approach
is Marx's
own.
It
seeks
for ìdentical
substance' or
à
seif-actualising'universality'.
Marx's
ìdentical
substance'
(a
self-
actualising universality)
is distinct in
many aspects
both from the
`formal identity' (abstract
universality) of
the first
approach and
from
the
`genus' (a
concrete universality) of
the
second.
If
we compare
it
with
the
`formal identity' (abstract
universality) of
the first
approach,
first
of all,
both
are
distinct in
two
points while
being
similar only
in
one point.
Either
of
them
asserts
itself to the
exclusion of all
distinct
particulars,
to the
exclusion of all
heterogeneous
elements
irrespectively
of whether
the
particulars are essential or
inessential. Only in this
point,
both
are
similar.
But in the following two
points,
they
are
distinct.
Firstly, the formal identity
must
be
existent
in
every
individual
with no exception whereas
Marx's identical
substance may well
be
absent
in
some
individuals. Secondly, the formal identity,
once
it
is
asserted
to the
exclusion of all
the different
elements, must
be
severed
firmly from the different
elements whereas
Marx's identical
substance can reproduce all
the
excluded
distinctive
particulars
-
74
-
directly
from
within as
if they
were
its
own attributes.
The formal
identity,
therefore, takes things
not as what
they
are
but
one-sidedly
and partially;
a part
(identified
as
the formal identity)
can
in
no case
replace
the
whole
(inclusive
of
the
excluded
heterogeneous
elements).
On the
other
hand,
when we compare
Marx's
ìdentical
substance'
(a
self-actualising universality) with
`the
genus'
(the
concrete
universality) of
the
second approach,
by
contrast,
both have
no
similarity,
however. Firstly, `the
genus'
(the
concrete universal)
is
definable
only after
the
essential and
the inessential
particulars are
distinguished,
which may well
be dogmatic because
what constitute
the
essential particulars
is to be known from the beginning. On the
contrary
to this, however, Marx's identical
substance
has
no concern
with
distinguishing between the
essential and
the inessential
particulars.
It is
rather
indifferent to
any
distinct
particular.
All
the distinct
particulars can
be
reproduced
directly from
within
the
identical
substance as
if being its
own attributes.
Secondly,
`the
genus'
(the
concrete universal) must
be
recognised
in
every
individual
(or
species) with no exception; otherwise,
it
cannot
be the
genus.
Marx's identical
substance,
however, does
recognise exceptions; among
the individuals,
some may well
have
no
identical
substance.
The
genus
(the
concrete universal),
too, therefore,
cannot
but he
partial and one-
sided since
it
excludes so-called
ìnessential'
particulars
from the
outset even with no clear-cut criterion
for distinguishing them.
Marx's identical
substance
is,
accordingly,
the
only alternative
approach among
those that have
ever
been
suggested
to he
capable of
grasping
things
as what
they
are and as what
they
can
be. This is
because the
ìdentical
substance' can reproduce
(rather
than discard
or
exclude)
the
distinct
particulars
directly from
within as
if they
were
_75_
its
own attributes.
What is
more,
the
particulars
thereby
reproduced
now count as
the
external
differences (diversities)
of
the identical
substance and
thus
are
homogenised
as qualitatively equal and
quantitatively
different
ones.
Abstract labour, for instance,
which
is
Marx's identical
substance, can create
its
various concrete particulars
directly from
within and yet asserts
itself
still
to the
exclusion of
all
the distinct
particulars, which
then
count as
the
external
diversities
of
the
abstract
labour
and are
homogenised. Only in this
last
approach,
the
ìdentical
substance' can
develop into the
concrete
totality by
synthesising all
the distinctive
elements of
the
objective
world as referred
to by
analogy with embryology, ontogeny, phylogenesis,
etc.
Now that
we
have
seen
the distinctive
character of
Marx's
let
us examine
in
concrete
terms how Marx
actually
abstracted
the ìdentical
substance' and analysed commodity values.
His
method of abstraction starts
from the following
remark.
"As
use-values, commodities
differ
above all
in
quality while as
exchange-values
they
can only
differ in
quantity, and
therefore do
not contain an atom of use-value.
" (Marx, 1976a,
p.
128)
Recall Marx's three
premises of
the
(a), (b)
and
(c}.
In
(a), it is
said
that
use-value
is inherent in the
commodity.
In (b), it is
said, every commodity
has the inherent
content of
its
own
exchange-values.
In
(c),
the inherent
content of
the
commodity
is
assumed
to be identical
with
that
of every other commodity.
To
investigate
what
the identical
content
is, Marx in (d) discards
all
the
heterogeneous, distinctive
particulars of commodities until
he finds
an
ìdentical
substance'
(a
self-actualising universality).
As far
as
(d)
goes
alone,
the
ìdentical
substance' seems
to be in
quite
the
same
-76-
process
as
the `formal identity'
since either of
them
equally excludes
the distinctive
particulars.
Marx's
exclusion process
began
with
the
very above remark.
In the
above, as
the first
step
in his
exclusion of
the
distinctive
particulars,
Marx
only points out a
hard
and
fast
distinction between
the two kinds
of
distinctive
elements; one
is
exchange-value as an external, quantitative
kind, the
other
is
use-value
as an
intrinsic,
qualitative
kind. By the hard
and
fast distinction,
Marx
specifies exchange-value as asserting
itself to the
exclusion of
use-value.
Although it is
asserted
to the
exclusion of use-value,
however, the
exchange-value cannot count as
the identical
substance as
far
as
it does
not
create
the
previously excluded
heterogeneous
elements
from
within.
The
situation appears rather
to the
contrary,
however. Use-
value seems
to
create exchange-values as
if they
were
its
own attribute.
But the
use-value cannot
be the
substance of
the
exchange-values
for two
reasons.
Firstly, it is
not
identical but inherently distinctive in
each
distinct
commodity, and so cannot
he the
ìdentical
substance'.
Secondly,
use-value creates
its
exchange-values as
if they
were
its
own
attributes
but the
exchange-values
thereby
created of a commodity are
similar with rather
than distinct from those
of
the
other commodity
(e.
g.
in
money prices).
The
sought-for
identical
substance must satisfy
at
least three
conditions.
First, it is to be intrinsic,
not external
(use-value
may
do for this). Second, it
must
be identical for distinct
commodities
(use-value
cannot
do for this). Third, it
must
be
capable
of reproducing
from
within all
the
previously excluded
heterogeneous
elements as
its
own external
diversities (when
the
use-value produces
exchange-values
as
if being its
own attributes,
it
creates
however
_77_
external similarities rather
than
particulars).
Marx thus
continues.
"If
then
we
disregard the
use-value of commodities, only one
property remains,
that
of
being
products of
labour. But
even
the
product of
labour has
already
been transformed in
our
hands. "
(Marx,
ihidj
p
128)
MS4N
First
of all,
for the
reason we
have
shown
in the
above,
Marx discards
use-value.
When the
use-value
is discarded, however,
all
the
physical
properties of
the
commodities, since
they
are
inherently linked
with
the
use-value, are also
discarded. As
a result,
he finds
out
that the
only
property
inherent in
commodities
that
can remain
is
nothing
but being
products of
labour.
At this
stage and not until
this
stage,
Marx
excludes so-called
non-labour products without a word.
It is, however,
not
because the
non-
labour
products are put aside
from the
outset
but because
non-labour
products
fail to have the identical
content with
the
other commodities
that the
only property
inherent in
commodities
that
can remain
is in
"being
products of
labour". For Marx, the identical
substance need not
be held by
every commodity; among
the individual
commodities, some may
well
have
none of
the identical
substance.
9
It did
not matter even
if
he
excluded non-labour products at
this
particular stage
for having
no
identical
substance; albeit
in
a
different
context,
Marx
explained
their
prices
in the
same necessary
terms
as
the
others
(he
ascribed
them to
a
different
category, capital, with
the
result
that the
mechanism which
determined their
prices
differed from the
mechanism which
determined the
9
Some
national
states may well
have
enough
formalities
as
the
state
even
if they
have
no sovereign powers.
We
nevertheless regard
them
as
the
state unless
they
are completely colonised.
This does
not prevent
us
to
say
that
a sovereign power constitutes
the
substance of
the
state.
-
78
-
prices of
the
other ordinary commodities).
Since Marx's
abstraction
has
been
misconceived
as a
formal
abstraction of
the
`formal identity'
or of
the `genus',
he has been
misunderstood
to have
excluded
the
non-labour
products
from
the
category of commodity
in (c)
rather
than in (d) in
order
to define "being
products of
labour"
as
the
only property
that
remained.
In the
several paragraphs preceding
the
above-quoted
in
Capital,
vol.
I, Marx
explained
the
nature of
the
sought-for common element at
length. "Each
of
them,
so
far
as
it is
exchange-value, must
therefore
be
reducible
to this third thing",
"is
reduced
to
an expression
totally
different from its
visual shape",
"cannot be
a
geometrical,
physical,
chemical or other natural property of commodities",
"is
characterized
precisely
by its
abstraction
from their
use-values", etc.
(ibid,
p.
127).
All this
was only
to justify his discard
of
the
physical properties of
the
commodities.
Even
when
the
the
commodities are
discarded, however,
why and
how
could
Marx
conclude
that
non-labour
products
fail to have the identical
content with
the
other commodities?
Why
and
how did he find
out
the
only property
that
remained was
that
of
`being
products of
labour'? Why
not utility, energy, scarcity, etc.?
In
satisfying
the
aforesaid
three
conditions,
i.
e.
(1) it is to be
intrinsic,
not external,
(2) it
must
commodities,
(3) it is to be
capable of reproducing
from
within all
the
previously excluded
heterogeneous
elements as
its
own attributes
(as its
own external
diversities), those
alternatives are, of course,
definitely
inferior to the
`labour factor'
and are plainly not
broken
off
from the
physical properties
of
the
commodities.
Even
so, why
labour?
Our
answer
to this
must refer
to the
very notion of
the
-
79
-
ìdentical
substance'.
The differences thus
far
excluded
(i.
e. use-
values,
the distinct
particulars) must
he
produced
by the identical
substance
from
within as a consequence of
its
own attributes.
In this
very notion,
the
question of what
has
produced
the distinctive
particulars,
the
use-values,
is
suggesting
to
some extent a correct
perception of
the
relationship
between the
use-value
(being
created) and
the
sought-for
identical
substance
(creating); "the
past
is
not utterly
denied, but
only
laid
aside and
thus
at
the
same
time
preserved
in the
present
being" (see
Hegel, 1975,
p
163). Marx traced back to
"the
past
of
the
commodities", remembering
that the
use-values,
the distinct
particulars, must
have been
produced
by the identical
substance
in
question
from
within as
if they
were
its
own attributes.
The
use-values
may well
be traced back to the `products
of
labours' (later
on
to the
`concrete,
useful
forms
of
labour,
and
then to human labour in the
abstract).
But
`being
products of
labour'
was not enough
in
counting as
the
identical
substance
that
could satisfy
the
aforesaid
three
conditions.
Marx took the
process
further into the
sought-for
identical
substance
and said
in the
above
"even
the
products of
labour have
already
been
transformed in
our
hands". He
explained
it in detail.
"With
the disappearance
of
the
useful character of
the
products of
labour, the
useful character of
the kinds
of
labour
embodied
in
them
also
disappears; this in turn
entails
the disappearance
of
the
different
concrete
forms
of
labour. They
can no
longer be
distinguished, but
are all
together
reduced
to the
same
kind
of
labour, human labour in the
abstract.
" (Marx,
op cit, p
128)
In
a step-by-step
fashion, Marx transfers his
attention
from
one
prospect
to
another.
When
abstracting
from
use-values,
he transferred
his
attention
from the
commodities
to the
products of
labour
and
-80-
simultaneously
from
the
products of
labour to the labour
embodied
in
commodities. When
abstracting
from the
useful concrete characters of
labour
embodied
in
commodities,
however, he transferred his
attention
from the
embodied
labour
to living labour.
'
If the
second stage of
his
abstraction
is
missing, and
thus Marx
derives àbstract
labour'
not
from living labour but directly from
embodied
labour,
then the
abstract
labour
could not satisfy
the
aforesaid
three
conditions and would
be the
same as
the `formal
identity'
of
the first
approach, merely as a mental product.
But Marx's
abstract
labour derives,
not
from
embodied
labour, but from living
labour,
and
the
abstract
labour
can count as a practical
truth because
the living labour is in
a
fluid (flexible)
state,
taking
on any of
its
various concrete
(feasible)
forms from
within as
if they
were
its
own
attributes.
The
only problem
in
regard
to this is
merely
the
versatility as well as
the free
mobility of
living labour.
In
many places,
Marx
explained what
he
meant
by the
word,
1993
àbstract labour',
e.
g. Grundrisse
(,
pp.
104-5),
CCPE
(1970,
pp.
29-32 &
pp.
55-6),
Capital
vol.
I (1976a,
p.
134),
Results
(1976b,
pp.
1012-4 &
pp.
1032-4),
etc..
He looked
at abstract
labour from two
points of view; one
is in the free
mobility of
labour between different
spheres of production,
the
other
is in the
versatility of
labour in its
application.
We
will show
in the
next section,
2.3, that
any
labour
that
produces a commodity can satisfy
the two
requirements
for the
reality of abstract
labour, the
versatility of
labour
and
the free
mobility of
labour,
regardless of any existing
legal, historical,
socio-
economic,
technological impediments.
In the
result,
Marx finds
out
finally that
abstract
labour is
the
sought-for
identical
substance.
But he knew
well
this
ìdentical
-
81
-
i
substance'
could not
be "the
common element of
identical
magnitude"
he
originally
sought-for
in (c). Unless the thus-far
excluded
distinctive
particulars
are counted
in in the
category,
the
abstract
labour
although
it derives from living labour is
still
the
same as
the
`formal
identity',
as
the
one-sided, partial substance.
To have
the
sought-for common element,
Marx
returned
to the thus
far disregarded distinct
particulars
from
which
the
ìdentical.
substance'
(=
abstract
labour)
was abstracted.
Marx
called
it the
residue of
the
products of
labour,
which was genuinely
heterogeneous
since
ìdentical
elements'
had been
abstracted
from it.
"Let
us now
look
at
the
residue of
the
products of
labour. There
is
nothing
left
of
them in
each case
but the
same phantom-like
objectivity;
they
are merely congealed quantities of
homogeneous
human labour, i.
e. of
human labour-power
expended without regard
to
the form
of
its
expenditure.
......
As
crystals of
this
social
substance, which
is
common
to them
all,
they
are values
-
commodity
values
[Warenwerte]. " (,
p.
128, italics
are
by LEE)
/9760
Marx
argues
in the
above
that the
genuine
heterogeneity
which consists
of
the distinct
particulars
has
changed
into its
opposite, a
genuine
homogeneity. This Marx
called
"a
phantom-like objectivity" as
it defies
our ordinary senses.
But he did
not explain why and
how
such a phantom-
like
event could
happen,
which should
be
our main
discussion
point
in
the
next subsection,
2.2.4. Without
explaining
the
reason,
he instead
goes
on
to
summarise
the
whole abstraction process as a conclusion
in
the following.
"We have
seen
that
when commodities are
in the
relation of
exchange,
their
exchange-value manifests
itself
as something
totally independent
of
their
use-value.
But if
we abstract
from
their
use-value,
there
remains
their
value, as
it has just been
defined. The
common
factor in the
exchange-relation,
in the
exchange-value
of
the
commodity,
is therefore its
value.
" (ibid,
p
128)
_82_
Marx defined in the
above
the
is
value, which
distinguishes
the
value
from the identical
substance, abstract
labour.
Value is different from
abstract
labour just
as use-value
is different
from
concrete
labour. But
use-value corresponds
to
concrete
labour
as
value corresponds
to
abstract
labour. They
are
in
one-to-one
correspondence.
Such
a one-to-one correspondence
between the two
factors
of commodities, on one
hand,
and
the dual
nature of
the labour
embodied
in the
commodities, on
the
other
hand,
makes all
the
concrete
particulars of a commodity as
the
external
diversities
of
the identical
substance,
the living labour
which produced
the
commodity.
All this, in
the final
analysis, results
from the initial
abstraction
from the
use-
value of commodities.
First, Marx
pointed out a
hard
and
fast demarcation between
use-
value and exchange-value; one
is inherent
and qualitative while
the
other
is
external and quantitative
(i.
e.
between
use-value and money
price),
by
which
the disregarding
of
the
use-value
is justified.
Secondly, the disregarding
of
the
use-value automatically
led to the
disregard
of
the
the
commodities and
thus
all
the
different
commodities are. reduced
to being
products of
labour, to the
labours
embodied
in
commodities.
The
between
the two factors
of
the
commodity, on
the
one
hand,
and
the dual
nature
of
the labour
embodied
in the
commodities, on
the
other
hand, led to the
exclusion of non-labour products as
they have
no
identical
substance.
Thirdly, by
reducing all
the
useful, concrete characters of
the labour
embodied
in
commodities
to the
external
differences (diversities)
of
the
living labour that
produced
the
commodities, abstract
human labour
was
firmly
established
as
the
sought-for
identical
substance.
Lastly, the
residue of
the
products
of
labour is
seen as
the
-83-
homogeneous
labour.
It
was phantom-like since
the
genuine
heterogeneity
which consisted
of
the
(heterogeneous) distinct
particulars
has
changed
into its
opposite, a
genuine
homogeneity. But
why and
how
could such a
phantom-like
event
happen?
2.2.4 Identical Substance
The
moment
he finds
out
the
is
value,
Marx
examines
the
nature of value
in
more
detail
starting
from the following
remarks.
"A
use-value, or useful article,
therefore, has
value only
because
abstract
human labour is
objectified or materialised
in it. How,
then, is the
magnitude of
this
value
to he
measured?
By
means of
the
quantity of
the
`value-forming
substance',
the labour,
contained
in the
article.
This
quantity
is
measured
by its
duration,
and
the labour-time is itself
measured on
the
particular
scale of
hours, days
etc.
" (Marx,
p
129)
!
9? 6a
In the
above,
Marx
answers
the
question of why
the heterogeneous
elements of
labour
can change
into the different
quantities of
homogeneous labour. It is,
according
to him in the
above, only
because
abstract
human labour is
objectified or materialised
in it. But
why
do
they
change
into homogeneous labours
when abstract
human labour is
materialised
in them? This is
still
to he
replied
to here.
Another
problem
to be discussed in
passing
is
of
Marx's
statement
in the
above;
Marx defined in the
above
the
`value-forming
substance' as
labour
not as abstract
labour. Thus, Eldred
and
Hanlon
(1981,
p
36)
criticised
Marx for having fallen `back
to the
level
of
the
Ricardians
who simply
treated labour
as
the
substance of value'.
Since
they
regard
abstract
labour
as
the
abstraction
from
all
kinds
of
-
84
-
a
concrete
labour in
exchange and
the
abstract
labour
as
gaining
a
palpable existence
in
money,
the
ordinary commodity-producing
labours
appear
to them to have
nothing
to do
with commodity values.
So, they
criticise
Marx's definition
of
the
substance of value as
tantamount to
the Ricardian
embodied
labour theory
of value.
We
must show,
however,
why
Marx's definition
of
the
human labour differs
from the Ricardian definition
of
the
the
same
human labour.
If, for instance, Marx had defined the
`value-forming
substance'
to be
abstract
labour, then the determination
of
the
magnitude of value
would
have to he
measured
by
means of
the
quantity of
the
abstract
labour
contained
in the
article.
Given the distinction between
abstract
and
homogeneous labour together
with
that between
concrete and abstract
labour, however, the
abstract
labour is
not quantitatively measurable
because it
cannot stand
good
on
its
own; any embodied
labour
contains
in
itself the dual
character and,
by the
same
token,
any
living labour
must
attain a certain concrete useful
form before its duration
can
he
measured.
This
explains why
the
substance of value cannot
be defined
as
àbstract labour'.
Abstract labour is the identical
substance of commodities,
the
creator of
the
commodity values
(causa
sui).
But the
substance of value
is
not
the
abstract
labour but labour
as such.
Why? Any
colmnodity-
producing
labour
can satisfy
the two
requirements of
the
abstract
labour
(the
versatility of
labour
and
the free
mobility of
labour,
see
2.3),
and
hence it
can also create
the
commodity value.
Whence in the
substance of value,
there is
not only abstract
but
also
the
concrete
character of
labour. In the
substance, all
the heterogeneous,
useful
and concrete
characters
of
labour Marx finds
out
to transpire into
a
-
85
-
phantom-like
objectivity,
into homogeneous
labours. Yet
why
do they
transpire into homogeneous labours?
Let
us start
from
our
two
plain maxims.
(1)
Everything is
essentially
distinct (i.
e,
heterogeneous).
(2) Everything is identical
with
itself.
If by
any chance
it is
possible
to
reduce various objects
to
some
identical
substance
despite their
essential
distinctions, then it
would
he
also possible
to
see
the
essential
differences
as
the
external
diversities
of
the identical
substance.
The
reason
is this; first, by
;
(I),
everything cannot
be identical
with something other
than itself,
and secondly,
by (2), if two
certain
distinct
objects are said
to be
substantially
identical, the two
objects can
be
said
to he
no
longer
essentially
distinct but
merely
diverse. But the
external
diversities
thereby
obtained can change
into homogeneous
ones,
into
quantitatively
different terms;
why?
The
answer can still
derive from the
above
(1)
and
(2); because they
are substantively
identical.
As far
as
the
qualitative
differences
are
identical in
substance
and
hence
are merely
the
external
diversities
of
the identical
substance,
it is
easy
to
see
the distinctions between the
external
diversities in
quantitative considerations.
For instance,
we measure
the length
of
different
chords
that have been
put
into
a state of
vibration, with an eye
to the
qualitative
difference
of
the tones
caused
by their
vibration, corresponding
to this difference
of
length. Marx in
the
same manner
termed
such
diversities in terms
of
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour
and argued
that they
are all reducible
to
976a
intensified
or multiplied simple
labour
(,
p
135). But
we
have to
show why
it is legitimate to term the
various concrete, useful
forms
of
-
86
-
labour
in terms
of
the
skill and
the
complexity
of
labour,
and
in
what
quantitative
proportions
they
are reduced
to the
same, simple
labour.
As
a result, we
have three
questions as regards
homogeneous
labour. (1)
Why
can any
labour that
produces a commodity
directly
count
as substantively
identical,
as abstract
labour? (2) How is it
legitimate to term the
various useful, concrete
labours in terms
of
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour? (3) If the
various
heterogeneous
labours
change
into the different
quantities of
homogeneous labour, then
in
what quantitative proportions are
the different
sorts of
labour? We
reply
to
(1)
and
(2) in the
next section,
2.3,
while replying
to
(3) in
chapter
3.
_87_
2.3
Reality
of
Abstraction
This
section works with
two
questions.
(1)
why can any
labour that
produces a commodity count as substantively
identical,
as abstract
human
labour? (2)
why
is it legitimate to term
various useful, concrete
labours in terms
of
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour? Both
questions are already raised
in 2.2.4 but have been
reserved
for this
section.
Unless the two
questions are properly answered,
the human
labour
embodied
in
commodities
is
not reducible
to homogeneous labour,
to the
category of commodity value, and
then
we cannot say
the
substance
of value
is human labour. This is because, if
all commodity-producing
labours
are not seen as substantively
identical, the
embodied
human
labours
which are essentially
heterogeneous,
as
is
seen
in 2.2.4,
cannot
transpire into the
external
diversities
of
the identical
substance.
On
account of
this,
we can also say,
if (1) holds,
naturally
(2) follows.
Of the two
questions,
therefore,
(2) is
already comprised
in (1).
We
said
in the
previous section
that the labour
which counts
in
reality as abstract
labour
must satisfy
two
requirements;
the free
mobility of
labour between different
spheres of production, and
the
versatility of
labour in its
application.
We
only
have to
show why and
how
any
labour in
commodity production can satisfy
these two
requirements.
However, before discussing the immediate
question, we would
have
to
sort out
the
validity problem of
the
abstract
labour
as an
historical
category.
There
are
three
conflicting
theories
as
to this.
(1)
Itoh
(1988),
Morishima
and
Catephores
(1975),
etc. confine
the
category of
abstract
labour to the
period of capitalist production only.
(2)
Aumeeruddy
and
Tortajada
(1979),
etc. regard
the
abstract
labour
-
88
-
category
as a natural, an ahistorical concept,
as valid across all
periods.
(3)
Engels (1981b,
pp
898-9)
sees
the
abstract
labour
as valid
even
in direct
exchange
like Smith's fisher-hunter's
economy.
But, in
our position,
we confine
the
abstract
labour
category
to the
case of
commodity production
regardless of whether
it is in the
capitalist
economy or
in the
pre-capitalist or non-capitalist economy.
We have
already shown
in Appendix to 2.1 that
is distinct
not only
from direct barter but
also
from
capitalist commodity
production.
We
would
have
to
show
here
why
the
other
three
positions
are
groundless
and
to be
rejected.
(1) Itoh (1988),
Morishima
and
Catephores (1975),
etc. argue
the
abstract
labour
category
is
valid only
in
a capitalist economy either
for the
reason
that the
value concept
in
a pre-capitalist economy would
involve
a
logical
contradiction
(Morishima
and
Catephores, 1975,
p
316)
or
for the
reason
that the task
of explaining
the labour theory
of value
in the
simple commodity production should
he
avoided
(Itoh, 1988,
p
78).
"..,
the
classical
historical locus
of
the
concept of value cannot
be
any pre-capitalist economic
formation but
capitalism
itself.
The
attempt
to define
a pre-capitalist value epoch
historically,
thus
seems
to
us
to be involved in
a
logical
contradiction.
"
(Morishima
and
Catephores,
op cit, p
316)
"A
traditional interpretation
of
the labour theory
of value,
therefore, depends
on
the
assumption of a society of simple
in
which social reproduction
is
effected
entirely
by
small,
independent
commodity producers.
This
interpretation, however, has to
presuppose an
imaginary
classless
society of commodity producers prior
to
a capitalist society, and
cannot
demonstrate the
validity of
the labour theory
of value as
the law
of motion of capitalist production.
With
all
these
difficulties, Marx's labour theory
of value
in the initial
analysis
of commodities
has been
a source of
incessant
confusions and
debates, including that
of
the `transformation
problem'
from
values
into
If, therefore,
we can avoid
discussing
the labour theory
of value prior
to the
notion of capitalist
production,
by
purifying
Marx's
original
theory
of
forms
of value,
we can
dissipate the basic
source of
difficulties
and confusions
concerning
Marx's
value
theory,
and can expect
later
to demonstrate
-
89
-
the labour
theory
of value with a much more solid social
basis. "
(Itoh,
op cit, p
78)
In the
above,
Morishima
and
Catephores
say
that to define the
value
concept
in the
pre-capitalist society
involves
a
logical
contradiction
(they did
not explain what constitutes such
logical
contradictions).
Itoh,
on
the
other
hand,
presupposes abstract
labour
as valid only
in
capitalist society with
the intention
of avoiding many
troublesome
questions which might arise when
he
presupposes otherwisewhilst
in Itoh
(1980,
p
59) he
argues
that
abstract
labour is
ahistorical)
For two
reasons,
he
wants
to
avoid
the task
of explaining
the labour theory
of
value
in
simple commodity production.
First, it has to
presuppose an
imaginary
classless society.
Second, it
can
damage the
validity of
the
labour theory
of value as
the law
As
against
the three
allegations
in the
above, we
have to
show
that,
firstly, (Ia)
to define the
value concept
in the
capitalist economy
alone
involves
more
logical
contradictions
than to define it in the
pre-
capitalist society, secondly,
(1)
does
not
have to
presuppose a classless society and,
lastly, (ii)
even
if
we
apply
the
abstract
labour
category
to the
simple commodity production,
it
cannot
damage the
validity of
the labour theory
of value as
applicable
to the
capitalist production.
(1a) It is
an empty abstraction, as
is
said
in 1.1, to
start
from
a capitalist society
in
analysing commodity values
just
as
it is
an
empty abstraction
to
start
from `population' before
explaining
the
classes of which
it is
composed.
Moreover,
when
the
categories of
abstract
labour,
commodity value, etc. are confined only
to
a capitalist
economy,
the
category of capital
is to be logically
prior
to those
of
abstract
labour
and commodity value.
Then,
we
have to theorise
what
-90-
capital
is
and wherefrom
the
capital arises
before
explaining
the
commodity
value and
the
abstract
labour
category
(in Marx's
case,
however,
they
are not explicable until
the latter
categories are
fully
explained).
To
explain
the
genesis of capital and/or
the
concept of
capital without
the
value category, you must rely on
the
so-called
primitive accumulation
based
on extra-economic violence.
10
But the
extra-economic violence
itself does
not suffice
for the theory
of
the
genesis
of capital
but
can only
be
one of
its
external conditions
necessary
in
speeding up
the
accumulation of capital.
(1) It is true that
an
imaginary
classless society
is to be
presupposed
in the
In the
world of
commodity exchange; everybody must
be
equal.
But,
as we will show
in
3.2, the law
of value
in the
simple commodity production necessarily
requires a
feudal
caste system
for the
reproduction of
the
commodity
producing economy
itself
and yet, at
the
same
time,
paved
the
way
for
the
capitalist commodity production
by
creating
the
weeded-out commodity
producers,
the
proletariat:
the
abstract
labour in the
commodity
10
Japanest Marxists
(the
Unoists) have tried to
explain
the
genesis
of
capital
from the
extra-economic violence
(the
military,
the
usury,
the
merchant capital, etc.
)
rather
than from the law
of value operating
in
This
was
inevitable
as
far
as
the
assumption of capitalist economy precedes
the
concepts of value and
abstract
labour. But, in the
other respect, we presume
that this has
the intent
of
justifying the Japanese
colonisation of
Korea
of
1910
as
beneficial to Korea's
capitalist
development. If, to the
contrary, we
could explain
the
genesis of capital as
the
necessary consequence of
the
law
of value operating
in
simple commodity production as
in 3.2
of
this
thesis,
we could argue
Korea
could
have
well
developed
on
the
capitalist
road even without
the Japanese invasion. In this, however,
we
do
not
say
there
actually existed
the
simple commodity production society
in
real
history. We
only say
that it
existed
historically
even within
the
non-capitalist
society and
has
paved
the
way
to the
capitalist mode of
production; and
that it
can still persist even within
the
capitalist and
even after
the
capitalist economy.
-
91
-
production
undermined
the feudal
caste system
by dint
of
the
versatility
of
the labour.
(17)
It is
wrong
to
presume
that the labour theory
of value can
be
simply applied
to
obtain
the laws
Only in the
sense
that
is
also a
kind
of commodity
production
does the labour theory
of value still
hold. Even
so,
however,
since
the
has
an additional, more
fundamental
element
in the
very notion of capital, you need an
additional
theory
which can explain
the
additional category, capital.
This
additional
theory
will, of course,
have to he based
on
the labour
theory
of value since
the
category of capital
is based
on commodity
production.
It
would,
for
example, need
to include
a
theory
of uneven
development. The
additional
theory is
not
fully
elaborated
by Marx,
however. Today,
even
the labour theory
of value apart
from the theory
of uneven
development is
still unsettled and yet
is
even argued
to
explain
the law
(2)
Aumeeruddy
and
Tortajada (1979)
argue
that
abstract
labour
is
an ahistorical concept
being
valid across all periods
in history.
Grounded
upon
the following Marx's letter to Kugelmann dated
on
11th
July 1868, they interpret Marx's law
of value and
the
abstract
labour
as
a natural
law
and a natural
human labour.
"Finally, this letter leaves
open
the
possibility of a naturalist
interpretation
of
the
concept of
`law': `No
natural
laws
can
be
done
away with.
What
can change
in historically different
circumstances
is
only
the form in
which
these laws
assert
themselves'
(op
cit. p.
251, Sic). Consequently, it
seems
that Marx
is here
considering
`value'
to he
an ahistorical concept, and
that
it is
only
the form in
which
it
manifests
itself,
exchange-value,
that is historically
determined. " (Aumeeruddy
and
Tortajada, 1979,
pp.
9-10)
-
92
-
In the
above, abstract
labour
and
Marx's
labour-value
are all addressed
as valid
even
in the
antediluvian period as a certain norm
for the
allocation
of
the
community's
labour. Since they have
no clear
distinction
between labour
and value,
they
misconceive
in the
above
interpretation
Marx's
abstract
labour
as natural
human labour, Marx's
labour (the
substance of value) as value,
Marx's
value as
the
value-form
(the
exchange-value) and,
lastly, Marx's
value
form
as money while
Marx's
money
being
evaporated
into
oblivion.
Based
on
these
misconceptions,
they
argue, value
(Marx's labour) is
an ahistorical
concept and only
the
value-form
(Marx's
value)
is historically
determined. Once
we
disregard those
conceptual misconceptions,
it is
not wrong
to
say
that human labour (their
value)
is
an ahistorical
concept and value
(their
value-form)
is historically determined. The
law
which
governs
the
social allocation of
labour is
a natural
law but
the form in
which
the
social allocation of
labour is
governed
is the
historically determined "Law
of
Value". Only in this
context was
it
right
for Marx to have
considered
labour (their
value)
to be
an
ahistorical concept and value
(their
exchange-value)
to be historically
determined. Even
so,
however, Marx
still regarded abstract
labour
as
not an ahistorical concept since
he derived it from the
analysis of
commodity exchange.
Labour is
one
thing
and
Abstract Labour is
another:
the
one
is
ahistorical whereas
the
other
is historical: the
one contains
11
Although Marx's
value
belongs to the
period of commodity production,
the
value-form
for Marx belongs to
an antediluvian period.
If
we
look
at
Marx's discussion
on
the
value
-form
in Chapter 1 Section 3
of
Capital,
vol.
I,
among
the
four distinct
value-forms,
i.
e.
(a) the
simple,
isolated,
or accidental
form
of value,
(b) the total
or expanded
form
of value,
(c) the general
form
of value and,
lastly, (d) the
money
form,
as
is
seen
in Appendix to 2.1, both (a)
and
(h) belong
at
the
latest to the
prehistory
of
direct
exchange,
(c)
only
belongs to the
direct
exchange
(Marx, 1976a,
p
181,
n5) and
(d)
to the
commodity
exchange.
-93-
its
own concrete, useful character
in itself, the
other
has
no
definite
characteristic
of
its
own.
One
could say
both the
versatility of
labour
and
the free
mobility of
labour
can
be
seen even among-the
barbarians
as
they
are
fit
by nature
to
work
for
anything and, moreover, are
free from
all
the
legal
and extra-economic
impediments to the free
movement of
labour.
But,
we will show
in this
section,
there is
a
devil
of a
difference
between the barbarians
who were
born fit to be
used
for
anything and
the
civilized people who apply
themselves to
everything.
In the
case of
the
barbarians, there is
a spontaneous
inclination to develop the
natural as
well as
the
acquired
inequalities
of
labour
with no counter-tendency
that
could consolidate
the
given equality while,
in
case of
the
commodity-producing
labours, there is
an obvious
tendency thanks to the
itself to
eliminate
those inequalities,
which are,
though,
more or
less
of
its
own making.
This
will
be
verified
later.
(3) The
notion of
the direct
exchange
based
on
individual
labours,
as
is
seen
in Appendix to 2.1, is ill-grounded. Firstly,
because
such a notion precedes
from the development
of
isolated
individuals (human history
never
began
with
isolated individuals)
and,
secondly,
because the
productive
force
of an
individual labour
could
never
be
elevated up
to the level to
satisfy
the direct
consumption of
the individual. Marx
(1973,
p
104)
once commented on
Smith's labour
concept
in the famous heaver-deer
economy
based
on
the direct harter;
"It
was an
immense
step
forward for Adam Smith-to throw
out every
limiting
specification
of wealth-creating activity.
...
With the
abstract universality of wealth-creating activity we now
have the
universality
of
the
object
defined
as wealth,
the
product as
such
or again
labour
as such,
but labour
as past, objectified
labour.
...
Now,
it
might seem
that
all
that had been
achieved
thereby
was
to discover the
abstract expression
for the
simplest and most
ancient
relation
in
which
human beings--in
whatever
form
of society--
-
94
-
play
the
role of producers.
This is
correct
in
one aspect.
Not in
another.
...
As
a rule,
the
most
general abstractions arise only
in the
midst of
the
richest possible concrete
development,
where
one
thing
appears as common
to
many,
to
all.
Then it is thinkable
in
a particular
form
alone.
(Marx, 1973,
p
104)
In the
above passage,
Marx's
criticism
is. that Smith's labour
category
is only based
on past, embodied
labour
rather
than living labour. Why
did Marx
argue
the labour
on which
Smith's direct
exchange was
based
was
not
the living but the
embodied
labour? Because the labour
mobility
between the different
spheres of
production is
precluded
in the direct
exchange,
(however humble the
exchange-rates come out
to be,
our
hunter
would not change
his job into
a
fisher! )
they do
not compare current
labours but
past
labours. Once the
mobility
is
precluded,
it is
no more
a
living labour
nor abstract
labour.
Now that
we
have
seen
that the three
arguments
in the
above,
(1), (2)
and
(3),
are not admittable, we
have to
verify
the
aforesaid
proposition
that, in the
irrespective
of whether
it
is in
a pre-capitalist, capitalist or a non-capitalist economy,
there is
an apparent
tendency to
eliminate
the
natural and
the
acquired
inequalities
of
labour,
which are more or
less being
made
by the
itself,
while,
in the
case of
the barbarians, there
was a spontaneous
inclination to develop the inequalities
of
labour
with
no counter-tendency
that
could consolidate
the
given equality among
them.
Marx looked
at abstract
labour from two
points of view,
form
and
content,
in the
way
that
a certain
level
of
labour-versatility
(content)
always corresponds
to
a certain
degree
of
labour-mobility
(form). If
the labour-versatility
comes
to
conflict with
the
existing conditions of
labour-mobility,
for instance, because
of
legal
and conventional
obstacles
(e.
g. racism, sexism, patent, etc),
then
comes
the
period of
-95-
a
flourishing
underground economy or
the
period of a necessitated social
reformation
as
the latter turns into
a
definite fetter
of
the former.
Inasmuch
as
the two
are
in
such a
dialectical
relation as
between the
form
and
the
content of
the
same abstract.
labour,
according
to Marx,
either of
them
need not
he
perfected
in
a
literal
sense.
A
commodity
production
itself is
enough
to
make
for the
reality of abstract
labour.
But
why and
how?
The first thing
we must consider
in
relation
to the
versatility
problem
is the fact that there is
a natural as well as an acquired
inequality
of
talents, intelligence
and
inclination
among
human beings.
Those
natural as well as acquired
inequalities
are,
however,
not
incompatible
with
the
versatility of
labour.
If the labour-inequality
could
be differentiated into two kinds,
i.
e. natural
inequality
and acquired
inequality,
we can classify
the
inequality itself into two
groups,
a surmountable
inequality by
means of
education and
training,
and an
insurmountable inequality
even
by the
training
and
the
education.
Similarly,
our commodity production,
too
can
be differentiated into the two
analogous parts, one
is
of an
original
(creative)
character,
the
other
is
of an
imitative
character.
The
production of
the
commodities of an original character may not
be
vouchsafed even
by the
education and
the training. We
are,
therefore,
mainly concerned with
the former
case
(the
commodity production of an
original character) with regard
to the
versatility problem of
labour.
A design,
a plan, an
invention,
a project, an
idea,
etc. may
he
said
to be
a creative activity which requires a
high
originality.
Because it has
no objectively alienable
form in itself (it is
not
suitable
to
be
offered
for
sale),
this
sort of work
becomes
a commodity
only
in two
ways: either
in
a patent
form
or
in
combination with other
-96-
physical
labours.
In the former
case, when a patent or a
legal
protection
is facilitated,
the
creative work
is
no more an ordinary
commodity
but
a sort of capital, a sort of
fictitious
capital
like land,
based
on
legal
protections.
12
Artistic
works and
highly
original
ideas
are
the
cases.
In the latter
case, where
the
creative work combines
itself
with
other physical
labours
to
produce a materialised good
(e.
g.
fashion
design), it
also converts
itself into
a sort of capital as
it
would
bring
more
than
normal profit
if the imiation
of
the
materialised
good
is legally
prohibited.
Once it is
materialised, what matters
in its
imitation
will only
be
a
technical
problem.
Even if its imitation is
legally
prohibited,,
its law-abiding imitator
can easily
follow it
with a
slight modification or with an
improvement
or with a new
invention
hinted
at
by its
predecessor with much
less
effort
than
originally
required.
In this latter
case,
the labour
simply
becomes
a surmountable
labour. As far
as such an
imitative
activity goes,
any
labour,
any
socially normal
labour,
can
have
a
full
versatility.
A
is itself, in
principle, an
imitative
rather
than
an original, creative activity.
Provided that
a sufficient
degree
of
training,
education, experience, etc. could
be
offered,
there
would
be
no
job that
a normal, ordinary
labour-power
cannot afford
to
12
Someone
may object
to
ours saying
that the
category of capital
is
exploited
in discussing
abstract
labour
even
though the
abstract
labour
was originally
to hold
even
in the
In the
case of simple commodity production,
it
would not
be
analogized with a
sort of capital
but
with a social caste.
This is
another example of
why,
in the
simple commodity production, a caste system or a secret
guild
system
(like the Freemasonry),
which prevented
the
original works
from being immitated
by
others, naturally
developed. The
concept of
capital
in the
above
case
is
rather similar
to the
category of property
(e.
g.
land) than that
of modern
(industrial)
capital.
As far
as
it is
based
on a
legal-property
relation,
it is favourably
analogized with
the
caste system of a
feudal
society.
-97-
carry
out, no matter
how long
a
time it takes
in the
education and
the
trainings
as
far
as
the imitation
can
be
compared
favourably
with
its
originality.
In
general,
we
therefore
say, any
labour
can
have the full
versatility
of
labour if it is in
a commodity production.
In the
commodity production,
the
so-called natural and
the
acquired
inequality
of
labour-power
simply
transpire into
a
learned difference
of education,
training,
experience, skills, etc.
The
moment a commodity production
is
introduced, the
versatility problem already
dissolves into the
reduction
problem of
the
skilled, complex
into
an unskilled, simple
labour. This
is
why
it is legitimate to
reduce various useful, concrete
forms
of
labour to the differences in the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour.
A
great
work of art,
for instance,
can
become
a commodity when
it is
offered
for
sale
but its
value
is
not valuable
because it is
not
an ordinary commodity
but
rather a
fictitious
capital
(see Capital,
vol
III, 1981,
p
772, TSV I, 1964,
pp
267-8,
pp
410-411) When the
work
itself is
copied
in
mass products,
however, its
value will
be determined
by the
amount of
labour technically
expended
for
copying
it
and
its
original artistic
labour
will only play a very mean part compared
to the
total labour
engaged
in the
copy.
It is true that,
when a creative work
is
combined
in
a material
production with other physical
labours, the
creative work
is
usually
rewarded
highly
as
it
contributes
to
a sort of excess profit.
On
account of
this
advantage, commodity production urges and encourages
every
invention
and
improvement. But the
work can
be
caught up
by
imitators
with
less
effort.
This is
why
in the
case of commodity
production,
there
is
an obvious
tendency to
eliminate
the
natural as
well as
the
acquired
inequalities between labours,
which are,
though,
more or
less
commodity
production's own making.
In the
case of
the
-
98
-
barbarians,
however,
though there
are certainly some
given equalities
and no
legal
and extra-economic
impediments to the
mobility of
labour,
while
there develops
a spontaneous
inclination to develop the
natural as
well as
the
acquired
inequalities
of
lahour, there
can
be
no counter-
tendency that
consolidates
the
given equality as
they have
no commodity
production.
In this
manner,
the two
requirements
for the
reality of abstract
labour
are absolutely satisfiable
in the
commodity production as
there
is
a certain mechanism
that
makes
the human labour
versatile as well as
mobile
in the
commodity production even
though
they
are never
fulfiled
in
a complete
literal
sense.
Marx's
is based
on a
conviction
that
not only our
theoretical
action
but
also
the
existing
objective world
is
one-sided and
finite. The finitude
and
the
one-
sidedness of
the
objective world can only
be
superseded
by
a practical
activity
(e.
g.
immitation,
underground economy, education,
training,
experience, etc.
)
and, similarly,
the
one-sidedness and
the finitude
of
our
theory
needs
to he
superseded
by
receiving
the
existing world
into
our conception.
The former is
a practical activity and
the
other a
theoretical
activity.
The
certitude of
the
virtual
identity between
theory
and reality
is thereby
obtained.
Last but
not
least, however, before
ending
this
chapter, our
proposition
that
any
labour that
produces a commodity can count as
abstract
labour
needs a more strict specification.
That is, in the
case
that individual labourers do
not produce commodities
independently but
only as organs of a collective
labourer (as in
a capitalist production),
the individual
labourers
cannot count as abstract nor as concrete
labour. Given the
between the two factors
of
the
commodity,
on one
hand,
and
the dual
characters of
the labour
-
99
-
embodied
in
commodities, on
the
other
hand, the individual labours
cannot count
themselves
as abstract nor as concrete
labour because the
individual
labours
cannot count
in the
directly.
Only
a collective
labourer
as such can count
in
such a
correspondence as abstract and as concrete
labour. On
account of
this,
Marx (1976a,
pp
643-4)
explains
that, in the
capitalist production, an
individual labourer
cannot produce any use-value nor any value unless
in
conjunction with a collective
labourer. Only in
simple commodity
production,
the individual labour
can produce value as well as use-
value.
This,
of course,
does
not mean
that individual labours have
neither abstract nor concrete character of
labour. An individual
labourer
can also
have the
abstract as well as
the
concrete character of
labour
as
long
as
it is
engaged
in the
commodity production.
I,
as an
individual, have
a
human
character
but I
cannot count as
human being
as
such.
We have the following
proposition.
(P2.3) In
individual labourer
cannot produce
value and use-value and,
by
the
same
token,
cannot count as abstract
and as concrete
labour. Only
as an organ of a collective
labourer,
possess
the dual
character of
the labour
embodied
in
commodities.
-100-
3. REDUCTION PROBLEM
3.0. Overview
Reduction
problem
in this
chapter concerns
in
what quantitative
proportions
the labours
embodied
in
commodities are reducible
into
homogeneous
and synchronous
labour. This
problem also concerns
in
what
way
the
magnitude of value
is determined
and
is
measured empirically.
In theory, the
magnitude of value
is determined by the
amount of
labour
contained
in the
commodity since
the labour forms the
substance of
value.
But the labours
are all
different in three terms. First, in
terms
of
living labour,
every
individual labour is distinct from
each
other.
Second, in terms
of
dead labour, the labour
contained
in
one
article
is
essentially
distinct from the labour
contained
in
another
article of a
different kind. Third, in terms
of
the time difference,
yesterday's one
hour
of
labour is
not equivalent
to today's
one
hour
of
labour. So,
we
have three distinct
questions.
The
one
is how to
normalise
the individual differences
of
labour (as in the
case of
the
unskilful and
lazy labours). The
second
is how to homogenise the
of
the different kinds
of commodity.
The third is
how to
synchronise past
(diachronic) labours.
As for the first
question,
however, it is
only meaningful
for
the
same
kind
of
labour. If
one
individual labour is lazier than
another,
then the two
individual labours
must
be
of
the
same
kind. We
cannot
directly
compare
laziness between two distinct kinds
of
labour.
Given that
each
distinct
use-value corresponds
to
only one
kind
of
-
101
-
concrete
labour (see (a) in 2.1), Marx's definition
of
the
magnitude of
p
129)
valid only
for
value,
socially
necessary
labour-time
(Marx,
the
same
kind
of concrete
labour
applies only
in
producing
the
same
kind
of commodity.
In the
equal physical objectivity of
the
same use-values,
of
labour
are objectively offset making
the
socially average units of
labour. This
social average
is
not created
by
the labourers but by the
use-values
they
produce
in the
circumstance
that
each
individual
commodity counts only as an average sample of
its
kind. This implies that the
social average
is
not
directly
available
in
the
cases of
different kinds
of commodity or
in that
of
diachronic
labours
unless
the heterogeneous
and
diachronic labours
are
homogenised
and synchronised.
Such being the
case,
in
most
Marxian literature, the
phrase,
the
socially average unit of
labour, has been
widely abused as
if it
could
be directly
computable.
As for the
second question,
however, it is
only meaningful
for
different
concrete
labours
and
hence for different kinds
of commodity
given
the
between
use-values on one
hand
and
concrete
labours
on
the
other
hand. Originally,
we
derived the
heterogeneous labour
category
from the
residue after
the
abstraction of
abstract
labour in 2.2.4. The heterogeneous labours,
accordingly,
do
not apply
in the
cases of
different individual labours
nor
in the
cases
of within
the
seine sector of
labour. In the
case of
the
same concrete
labours
or
in the
same sector of production,
there
may as well
be the
heterogeneity
of
labour. But, in
such cases,
the
socially average unit
of
labour has
already
homogenised the heterogeneous labours. In the
issue, the
heterogeneous
labour
category
is
valid only
in the
case of
between distinct
concrete
labours. We have
seen
in the
previous chapter
that the
heterogeneity of
labour
can
be
characterised
in terms
of
the
-
102
-
skill
and
the
complexity
differentials
of
the
labours
since, when
they
are substantively identical, the heterogeneous
labours
can
transpire
into
the
external
diversities
of
the identical
substance, abstract
human
labour.
Thus, in this
question, we
have to
examine
in
what quantitative
proportions
the
skilled, complex
labours
are reducible
to the
unskilled,
simple
labours.
As for the third
question, on
the
other
hand,
we
have to
examine
the
synchronisation problem
in the three distinct
cases.
In
one case,
the labours
congealed
in
one commodity are all
diachronous
and yet are
synchronised
in the
value of
the
commodity.
In
another case,
the
labours
congealed
in the
same
kind
of
the
commodities are also
diachronous
and yet'are synchronised
in the identical
value of
the
same
use-values.
In the
other case,
the labours
congealed
in the distinct
kinds
of commodities are
diachronous
and yet are synchronised
in the
commodity values as
in the
case of
the homogenisation
problem.
For the
convenience of our
discussion, however,
we confine
the
synchronisation
problem only
to the
second case.
This is
not
harmful because the first
case may well
be
comprised
in the
second, and
the third is dissolvable
into the
other
homogenisation
problem
if the labour in
each sector of
production
is
synchronised with current
labour.
We
question
the
in
view of
the
pure
time
factor. The
congealed
labours, if they
are at
different
points of
time,
are seen as
distinct
even
if the intensity
and
the
productivity of
the
labours
are constant.
But, in Marx's
case
(1976a,
p
129), it
arises
from the idea that
an
incessant
variation
in the
productivity or
in the
intensity
of
labour
can continuously change value relations.
The two
positions,
however,
as
far
as
the
is
concerned,
are not contradictory
because the
synchronisation
itself is
only
to
-
103
-
equalise the intensities
and
the
productivities of
labour. But the
question
of
the
pure
time factor firstly
questioned
in Cohen
(1981)
is
contradictory to Marx's
case.
"Suppose
a commodity
has
a certain value at a
time t. Then that
value,
says
the labour theory, is determined by the
socially
necessary
labour-time
required
to
produce a commodity of
that kind.
Let
us now ask: required
to
produce
it
when?
The
answer
is:
at
t,
the time
when
it has the
value
to be
explained
[when
the
commodity
is
on
the
market.
...
LEB]. The
amount of
time
required
to
produce
it in the
past, and, a
fortiori, the
amount of
time
actually spent
in
producing
it
are magnitudes strictly
irrelevant to its
value,
if
the labour
theory is true.
...
The theory
entails
that
past
labour
is irrelevant to how
much value a commodity now
has. But
past
labour
would not
he irrelevant if it
created
the
value of
the
commodity.
It follows
that labour does
not create value,
if the
labour
theory
of value
is true. " (ibid,
pp
209-210)
Cohen
argues
in the-above that
past
labours
that have been
actually
spent
in
producing a commodity should not
be irrelevant to the
value of
the
commodity
if labour
creates value, and yet
they
are
irrelevant
to
the determination
of
the
value
if
what
determines
value
is
not
the
amount of
labour incorporated in the
past
but the
amount of
labour
currently necessary.
In this
argument,
the
past
labours
are seen as
essentially
distinct from the
current
labours
and
that
as not
being
synchronisable with each other,
in
which sense
Cohen's
position
is
distinct from
ours as well as
from Marx's
own.
In
our position,
they
are synchronisable on
the
grounds
that the
past and
the
current
labour
are
identical in
substance and so
the diachronicity
can
transpire into
the
external
diversity
of
the identical
substance.
The diachronous
labours
are
thus
capable of
being transpired into homogeneous
and
synchronous
labour. The
synchronisation of
the diachronic labours is,
however, beyond Cohen's
imagination because
what creates value,
for him,
is
not substantively
identical,
abstract
human labour but the human
labour
as such.
-
104
-
In
synchronising
the labours, however,
we
have to distinguish
between
direct
and
indirect labours. If
we
take
all commodities as a
whole,
there
cannot
be
any
distinction between the
direct
and
the
indirect labour:
a circuitous production
itself
cannot make such a
distinction.
Only
when we
take the individual
commodities separately
from the
whole context and see
the
exchange processes necessarily
involved between
them by the
(technical
and social)
division
of
labour
(production
materials are not produced
by immediate
producers
but
purchased),
then
we
distinguish the direct labour from the indirect
labour. The
reason we
distinguish the direct from the indirect labour
is in the different
principle of calculation of
the labour-amounts.
Indirect labour is
not
directly
related
to the
current production
condition of
the
commodity
in
question
but, instead, is directly
and
indirectly
related
to the
ad
infinitum
production conditions of all
the
other commodities.
Instead
of considering such
infinite
sequences,
however,
we can calculate
the
amount of
the indirect labour by
reference
to the
current market values of
the
production material.
This
calculation
is
not circular since
the
other part of
the
commodity value,
the
amount of
the direct labour, is to be
calculated
by
reference
to
production condition.
The two
parts of
the
commodity value,
indirect
and
direct labour,
are
therefore distinguished in terms
of an exchange
category and a production category.
As for the
direct labour,
on
the
other
hand, in
synchronising
the diachronic labours, the
reference
is
always made
to the
current
conditions of production.
In the
competition
between the
commodities of
the
same
kind, the
commodities currently produced are always predominant
in the
sense
that,
while
the
commodities previously produced are
quantitatively
limited, the
commodities currently produced are not
-
105
-
limited.
In
some cases,
however, the
commodities
previously produced
might
as well
be
predominant exceptionally.
Cohen's two
extreme cases
are
the
cases.
"Extreme
cases make
the
point clear.
(a)
Suppose there is
a use-
value a, which was produced
in the
past, when
things
such as a
could come
into being
only
through labour, but that labour is
no
longer
required
for things
such as a
to
appear
(perhaps
a
is
a
quantity
of manna, produced
by
men at a
time before God
started
what we
imagine is His
now usual practice of
dropping it). Then
according
to the labour theory
of value, a
is
valueless,
despite
the labour èmbodied' in it. (b)
Contrariwise,
suppose
there is
a
commodity
b
now on
the
market, and
that b
was not produced
by
labour, but that
a
great
deal
of
labour is
now required
for b-like
things to
appear.
(b
might
be
a quantity of clean air
bottled
before it became
necessary
to
manufacture clean air.
) Then b has
a
value, even
though
no
labour is
embodied
in it. These
statements
follow from the labour theory
of value"
(ibid,
p
209)
As for the first
case,
(a),
to begin
with, we see
the
commodity, a,
is
not currently produced either
for the
reason
that it is
no more socially
needed or
for the
reason
that its
production
itself is
no more
practicable.
If
not produced currently,
there
would
be
no
direct labour
to be
synchronised.
The labour
contained
in
a
is, in
principle, all
indirect labour. The
amount of
the indirect labour
represented
in the
market value of
the
production materials
is
already synchronised with
current
labour. It
would
be determined by the
play of supply and
demand. Even
so,
however, the
price of a
is
not
determined
entirely
arbitrarily no matter
how
strong
its
social
demand
may
be. It
must
follow
a certain social
limit
set up
by its
relation
to the totality
of
commodity world
(the
price of
land, for instance, is by
no means
arbitrarily
determinable
by the
play of supply and
demand).
On the
other
hand,
when we
take the
second case,
(b), the
commodity,
b,
has
a value even
though it has
no embodied
labour. It
was
not produced
by human labour. But
a
b-like thing is instead
produced
by
-
106
-
human
labour
since
the
social
demand for b
proved enormous.
But
a
great
deal
of social
labour is
currently required
for the
production of
the b-
like
thing.
In
conformity with
the b-like thing, b
also
has
a value
although
b has
no embodied
labour for the
reason
that it has
more or
less the
same use-value as
the b-like thing. This by
no means
contradict
Marx's labour theory
of value as
it is in
reference
to the
labour-amount
contained
in the b-like thing. Inasmuch
as, among
the
individual
categories, some may well
have
no substance,
'
the b itself
still
has
no substance even
if it has
a value.
Among the three
questions,
i.
e. social-average making,
homogenisation
and synchronisation, only
the first two
questions
have
been treated in the
previous
literature,
and
that, have
never
been
logically differentiated into two distinct
ones,
being
mixed up
together
as a single question.
In
consequence, a
lot
of
logical
and conceptual
confusions
have been
caused
in two directions.
In
one
direction, it is
misconceived
that
even an
individual
labourer
can produce a value and a use-value and so can count as
abstract
labour
as well as as concrete
labour. Thus, the
reduction of
skilled, complex
to
unskilled, simple
labour is
mixed up with
the
social-
average making question of
of
labour. These
fall in five
groups;
Hilferding
(1984), Okishio (1963), Morishima
(1973), Rowthorn
(1980), Roncaglia (1974), (in
the
ìndirect labour
a
method'
group),
Rosdolsky
(1977),
Bernstein
(cf Meek, 197V
,
(in the
4
money wage method'
group),
Himmelweit (1984) (uniquely in the
`circular
method'
group),
Morris
and
Lewin
(1973/4),
Itoh
(1987,1988) (in the
1
Among the
states,
some states
have
no sovereign power and are
nevertheless
called
the
state.
This by
no means prevent us
to
say
the
sovereign power
constitutes
the
substance of
the
state.
-
107
-
I
`social
norms' group), Bowles
and
Gintis
(1977) (uniquely in the
`heterogeneous
labour
theory
of value'
group).
In the
other
direction, the
reduction problem of skilled,
complex
to
unskilled, simple
labour has been
confused with another
problem of
the
wage
differentials. So-called
segmented
labour
markets
are misconceived
as
the
symptom of
the heterogeneous labours. We
said
in 2.2.1 that labour-power is
also a commodity even
if it is
a
`to-be-
hired'
good.
Different labour-powers
are simply
different kinds
of
commodity with
distinct
use-values
(with distinct
ability
to
contribute
profit-making).
So, the
wage-differentials are quite natural since
different
commodities should
have different
prices.
Segmented labour
markets
based
on non-economic prejudices appear quite natural.
The
non-
economic prejudices are quite common
in
any ordinary segmented commodity
markets.
A
car market,
for instance,
can
be
segmented
in
accordance
with many
different types
of car
based
on
the biasednesses,
various non-
economic prejudices, conventions,
illusions,
etc.
A
similar point
has
been
put
forward by Catephores
(1981), too:
"Labour
would
be both
segmented,
in the
value or price of
its
labour-power,
and
homogeneous, in its
value creating capacity.
However,
such reconciliation
is
not
intended for
and certainly
does
not come
to
grips
with,
genuine
labour heterogeneity,
which arises
only when we admit
different types
of
labour (say,
skilled and
unskilled) with
different
value creating power each.
It is for
this
case
that the
necessity of reducing all
labour to
one common
type becomes imperative, if
we
do
not wish
to
abandon altogether
the labour theory
of value.
" (Catephores, 1981,
p
276).
In the
above paragraph,
Catephores'
`homogeneous labour'
should
be
read
as our
àbstract labour'. Except for
such a minor
difference, his
message
is
entirely
the
same as ours.
He distinguishes between the two
distinct
cases of
heterogeneous
labour;
one
is
a segmented
labour
market
case,
the
other
is the
different types
of
labour
with
different
value
-
108
-
creating
powers.
The heterogeneous labours
which
in this
chapter we
question
are
the latter
case.
The heterogeneous
labours
are seen as
the
external
diversities
of
the identical
substance, abstract
human labour,
which must
be the
presupposition
for the law
of value
to
operate rather
than the
result of
it. But, by
contrast,
the
wage-differentials are not
the
presupposition
but the
result of
the law
of value.
And
so,
the two
cases are essentially
distinct. Catephores's
contribution
in the
above,
however, has fallen
on
deaf
ears
in Bowles
and
Gintis (198
,
Himmelweit
6
(1984), Krause (1982),
Itoh (1987,1988),
etc.
This
chapter consists of
three
sections.
In 3.1,
we shall
review all
the
previously presented
Marxian
solutions
to the
reduction
problem
to disentangle the
various conceptual confusions
involved in
them. We
examine
five distinct
approaches.
(1)
reduction
by
money
a, PP I fri-6
wages;
Bernstein (cf Meek, 19738, Rosdolsky (1977,
pp
506-520),
etc.
(2)
reduction
by indirect labours; Hilferding (1984,
pp
123-48), Okishio
(1963), Morishima
(1973),
Rowthorn (1980),
Roncaglia (1974),
etc.
(3)
reduction
by
exchange-values;
Rubin (1973),
Krause
(1982),
etc.
(4)
reduction
by
socio-historical and psychological processes;
Morris
and
Lewin (1973-4), Itoh (1987),
etc.
(5)
the
negation of
the
reduction
with
the heterogeneous labour theory
of value
in Bowles
and
Gintis
(1977). Himmelweit,
(1984) is the hybrid
of
(1)
and
(3)
and
thus falls
into
a complete circularity.
For the
sake of convenience, we
discuss
her
when examining
M. Our
own position will
be disclosed through the
critique of
the
above
five
approaches as
the
converging point of
them,
and will
be
summarised
in the
next section,
3.2. There,
our own
position
is
presented
for the two
questions,
i.
e.
the
synchronisation
and
the homogenisation question, and
for the two distinct
cases of
simple commodity
production
and capitalist commodity production.
In
-
109
-
doing
so, we show why
the
operation of
the law
of value
in the
commodity
production
requires
feudal
elements
(e.
g. castes,
guilds, etc.
) in the
simple commodity
production or,
in the
capitalist production, sexism,
racism, ageism, etc.
Lastly, in 3.3,
we
discuss the
magnitude of value
of
the "special"
commodity,
labour-power. But labour-power is
not a
special commodity
in
all respects.
But it
counts as a special category
for discussion
only
because
other people
have
often confused
it
as such.
The
alleged
inconsistency
of
Marx's two
versions of
the
value of
labour-
power
is to be
criticised.
By
applying our own position shown
in 3.2 to
this
`special'
case, we show
that the
`true' labour theory
of value
which refers
to the
socially necessary
direct
and
indirect labour
amount
as
determining the
commodity
value
is
not
incompatible
with
the incurred-
cost
theory
of value which refers
to the
monetary payment socially
necessitated
in
production as
determining the
value of
labour-power.
-
110
-
3.1.
Marxian
Approaches to the Reduction Problem
Marx's
solution
to this
problem was, originally, attributed
to
a social
process.
But
what constitutes
the
social process was not specified
by
Marx himself.
Boehm-Bawerk (1984,
pp
83-84) interpreted it to he
an
exchange process and accused
Marx
of arguing
in
a complete circle;
"values
are
determined by labour
content, while equivalent
labour
content
is
computed
from
observed exchange values"
(Brewer, 1984,
p
24).
In
replying
to this
accusation,
Marxian
economists,
instead
of
specifying what
the
social process
is, have
presented other alternative
approaches.
Chronologically, Marxian
solutions
have been
advanced
in
the
sequence of
(1)'reduction by
money wages
in Bernstein
(cf Meek,
1973,
pp
171-6), Rosdolsky (1977,
pp
506-520), Himmelweit
(1984),
etc.,
(2)
reduction
by the indirect labour
stored up
in the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour in Hilferding
(1984,
pp
123-48), Okishio
(1963),
Morishima
(1973), Rowthorn (1980), Roncaglia
(1974),
etc.,
(3)
reduction
by
exchange-values
in Rubin (1973,
pp
159-71), Krause (1982,
pp
116-40),
etc.
(4)
reduction
by
an
historically
and socially conditioned
psychological process
in Morris & Lewin
(1973-4), Itoh
(1987),
etc.,
(5)
no need of reduction with a
heterogeneous labour theory
of value
in
Bowles & Gintis
(1977). We
will examine
those in the
same order.
3.1.1 Reduction
by Money Wages
Unfortunately,
we
have
only a secondary source of
Bernstein's
argument
on
the
reduction
by
money
wages.
We
can simply
imagine its
outline
from
Meek (1973,
pp
171-6),
Hilferding
(1984,
pp
141-3),
etc.
According to
-
111
-
them, it is based
on
the
assumption
that heterogeneous labours
are
commensurable
in terms
of money wage, and
the
magnitude of value each of
them
produces
is in the
same proportion
to the
amount of money wage
it
receives.
Our first
objection against
this is in the fact that the
rate of
exploitation
is
not applicable
to individual labour-powers.
In
capitalist production, an
individual labourer
cannot produce any use-
value nor any value unless
it is in
cooperation with a collective
labourer (see (P2.3)).
Its
concrete useful character cannot
be
among
such concrete
labours
as are
to
correspond one-to-one
to
use-values.
And, by the
same
token, its
abstract character cannot count among such
abstract
labours
as are
to
correspond one-to-one
to
values.
The
second objection
is
against
its
confusion
between the
value
and
the
use-value of
labour-power. The
use-value of
labour-power
concerns
how
much
it
contributes
to the
production of value
(or
surplus-
value).
By
contrast,
the
value of
labour-power
relates
directly to the
amount of
labour-time directly
and
indirectly
necessary
for the
reproduction of
the labour-power. There
can
be
no
direct (quantitative)
relation
between the
use-value and
the
value of
labour-power. Yet
Bernstein
assumes a
direct (quantitative)
relationship
between the
value
and
the
use-value
in the
equal rates of exploitation.
The third
objection
is the
same as
the
usual criticism of
its
circular character.
It
calculates
the
magnitude of value
(= the
amount
of
labour) by
measuring
heterogeneous labours by
reference
to the
given
different
values of
the heterogeneous labour-powers
and
their
uniform
rates of exploitation.
The different
values of
the heterogeneous labour-
powers are,
however,
also commodity values.
You
must
be in
a circle
to
define the
magnitude
of value
by
employing
the
value of another
-
112
-
commodity,
labour-power.
Such
a circular character
has been
pointed out
in Hilferding (1984),
Meek (197
,
Eldred
and
Hanlon (1981),
etc.
But
a
the
criticisms
have ignored
what
difference there is between the
circular character of
Bernstein's
reduction seen
here
and another
Himmelweit's
reduction
to he
seen
here
shortly.
Unlike the latter
circularity,
Bernstein's
circularity requires an
external
factor, i.
e.
the
determined from
without.
One
agrees with
the
concept of
intrinsic
value while
the
other
does
not.
In
phenomenon, every
factor is linked (directly
or
indirectly)
with every other within a whole system.
A
circularity
is, therefore,
inevitable
and
has
a merit since
in the
circle we can
include
every
relevant
factor
without omission.
It is therefore
more scientific
than
a uni-directional causality
(
Hilferding-like indirect labour
method,
to be
seen shortly).
But
we regard
the
circularity still as
the
world
of phenomenon
because it
cannot explain
the
substance,
the
ultimate
cause, a necessity
(see 1.2). It
only explains
the
external relation of
reciprocal causations
between things, in
which sense,
it
permanently
remains as a phenomenal analysis.
Yet,
unlike other circularities,
Bernstein's
circularity
involves the
substance,
i.
e. an
intrinsic
value
concept
in the
assumed equal rates of exploitation.
In
view of
this,
the
Bernstein's
reduction
had
a certain scientific
foundation if its
other
defects
could
have been
rectified
(i.
e.
the
inanity
of applying
the
to individual
labourers, the
confusion
between the
use-value and
the
value of
labour-
power, etc.
). Therefore,
it
should
he
welcomed
that, despite the
circularity criticisms,
Bernstein's
solution
is
recently revived
in
Rosdolsky (1977,
pp.
506-520). Rosdolsky
presented
it
not
in
a circular
-
113
-
context.
"This
in
no way means
that Marx, in
contradiction
to his theory
of
value,
here derives the
value of commodities
from the
'value
of
labour', but
rather
that,
in the
social process of
the
equalization
of
different
labours, the
extra expenditure of
labour
which
capitalist
society must employ
for the training
of skilled workers
cannot
be
expressed other
than through
a
higher 'valuation'
of
the
products produced
by these
labour-powers. (If this
were not
the
case, no employer would
be
prepared
to
pay skilled workers
correspondingly
higher
wages.
---)"
[Rosdolsky, 1977,
p.
519]
Although he
presents
the
reduction
by
money wages
in the
above,
he does
not apply equal rates of exploitation
to individual labour-powers. He
simply argues
here higher
wages must
be
reflected
in the
value of
the
products, and
higher training
costs
in the
value of
labour-powers. But
he did
not
develop
this
position properly.
He
rather abandoned
the
whole section on
this
problem
in his later
editions of
The Making
of
Marx's Capital. Be that
as
it
may,
he
claimed
himself
grounded
upon
the
following two
statements of
Marx's
own;
"Ricardo
showed
that this fact does
not prevent
the
measurement of
commodities
by labour-time if the
relation
between
unskilled and
skilled
labour is
given.
He has indeed
not
described how this
relation
develops
and
is determined. This belongs to the
definition
of wages, and,
in the last
analysis, can
be
reduced
to
the different
values of
labour-power itself, that is, its
varying
production costs
(determined by labour-time). " (Marx, 1972,
p
165)
"All labour
of a
higher,
or more complicated, character
than
average
labour is
expenditure of
labour-power
of a more costly
kind, labour-power
whose production
has
cost more
time
and
labour
than
unskilled or simple
labour-power,
and which
therefore
has
a
higher
value.
This
power
being
of
higher
value,
it
expresses
itself in labour
of a
higher
sort, and
therefore
becomes
objectified,
during
an equal amount of
time, in
proportionally
higher
values.
" (Marx, 1976a,
p
305)
Marx
mentions
in the
first
paragraph
that the
relation
between
skilled
and unskilled
labour
belongs to the
question of wages, which resembles
Bernstein's
argument
but in
no case applies
the
equal rates of
-
114
-
exploitation to individual labour-powers. In the
second paragraph,
I
however,
he
mentions not only
that
a skilled
labour-power has
a
higher
value
but
also
that the
skilled
labour is
objectified
in
a
proportionally
higher
value.
In the latter
paragraph, an
impression is
noticed
that the
skilled and
the
unskilled
individual labours
can
produce value
independently in the
same proportion
to the
wages
they
receive.
But the impression is
not correct.
The
proportionality
between the higher
value
in
which a skilled
labour is
objectified and
the higher
value which
the
skilled
labour-
power receives cannot refer,
in
our opinion,
to the individualistic
production of value
but to the individualistic
assignment
(or
imputation)
of
the value
collectively produced.
Its handiest
evidence
can
be
offered
from the
non-additive character of
labour-values; for
instance,
when
10 individual labourers
of average quality work
together
for 10 hours, then the
collective
labourer
can produce more
than 10
times the
value an
individual labourer
of
the best
quality can produce
for 10 hours. We
call such a
discrepancy
a
"co-operation
effect" which
is
similar
to the
neo-classical category of
"economy
of scale"
(see
Marx, 1976,
pp
439-454). Such
a co-operation effect
is
not produced
by
individual labourers but by the
co-operation
itself. This is
why
labour-
values cannot
be
additive,
i.
e. why
the labour-values
are not
the
summation of
individualistically
produced values.
The
equal
proportionality
between the higher
value
in
which a skilled
labour is
objectified and
the
higher
value which
the
skilled
labour-power
receives
is
nothing
but the individualistic
assignment of value.
Noting that the
is
not applicable
to
individual labourers,
we may
incorporate into Rosdoisky's
solution
the
point of
the
individualistic, proportional
imputation
of
the
-
115
-
a
collectively
produced
value.
And thus
we can
develop Bernstein's
solution
into
a non-circular
form. By inverting the logical
sequence,
we can avoid
applying
the
to individual labourers
but
only
to
a collective
labourer. As
will
be
seen
in 3.2,
we start
from
the
value
produced
by
a collective
labourer
and
then
assign
(or
impute) different
portions of
the
value
to the individual labourers in
proportion
to their different
wages.
The
equal proportionality
in the
assignment
(or imputation) in
no way refers
to the
equal rates of
exploitation
but
refers
to the homogeneous
character of
the
quantified
individual labour-powers
as
they
compose one and
the
same quantum,
the
`value'
of variable capital.
In like
manner,
to he
short,
the
reduction problem of skilled,
complex
to
unskilled, simple
labour is
simply
dissolved in
capitalist
production
into
another problem, viz.
the
problem of wage
differentials
(or into the
problem of
labour
market segmentation).
Heterogeneous
labours
are commensurable via
differential
money wages multiplied
by the
uniform rates of assignment.
Its dissolution, however, has been
conditioned on capitalist commodity production.
Only to that
extent,
it
cannot
be
a proper solution
to the
reduction problem.
As Marx himself
insists, "at
this
stage of our presentation,
the
category of wages
does
not exist at all"
(1976a,
p
135, f 15), the
solution
has to be
sought
for in the
context of simple commodity production
in the first
place.
The
reduction problem
is
only
to
measure
the different
value-creating
capacity of
heterogeneous
labours. So, it
must precede
the
wage
phenomena
logically. We
will show
in the
next section
that the
wage
differentials (and/or the
segmentation of
labour
market) are enforced,
not contradicted,
by the law
of value.
In
conclusion,
we reject
the
reduction
by
money wages
for three
-
116
-
reasons; firstly,
because
the
solution must encompass even
the
case of
simple
commodity
production; secondly,
because the
is
not applicable to individual labour-powers; lastly, because
the
value
of
labour-power
can
have
no quantitative relation with
its
use-value.
The
value
of
labour-power
refers
to the
sale price of
labour-power,
while
the
use-value
of
labour-power
refers
to how
much
the labour-power
contributes
to the
production of value
(or
surplus-value).
Himmelweit (1984)
also presented a similar solution.
Her
solution can
be
characterised as a
hybrid between Uno (1980)
and
Rubin (1973).
It is true that Uno (1980)
has
not provided any solution
to the
reduction of skilled, complex
to
unskilled, simple
labour. But
he (1980,
pp
33-34)'explained
the
category of abstract
labour in terms
of
the flexibility
of capital.
She interpreted this
as
the
reduction of
individual labour-powers by
money wages, which was
different from
Rosdolsky (1977)
on account of
the
reduction of
ìndividual labourers'.
She introduced this into Rubin's
reduction.
In Rubin's
case,
the
reduction
is discussed in terms
of
the
abstraction
from
all
kinds
of
concrete
labour in
exchange.
This is
combined
by Himmelweit
with
the
reduction of
individual labour-powers by the
money wage.
She
regards
the
concrete
labour
as
indicating the
concrete
useful aspect of
individual `labour-power'
and conceives
that
even
the
individual labour
can produce value
independently
of
the
other members
of
the
collective
labourer to
which
it belongs. Thus, the
reduction
is
conceived not only as
the
abstraction
from
all
kinds
of concrete
labour
but from the
concrete
useful characters of
individual labour-powers.
The
reduction
is, therefore,
sought
for in the
labour-powers
as well as
in Rubin's
the
products of
labour,
which
necessarily
leads to
circularity.
-
117
-
Another
serious confusion
in her
argument
is in her
concepts of
use-value
and value.
Concrete labour
corresponds
to the
use-value of
its
product
but
the
concrete-useful character of
labour-power does
not
correspond
to the
use-value
but the
surplus-value which
it
contributes
to the
production
of.
Himmelweit
confuses
the two
categories and
relates
the
concrete useful character of
labour-power to
concrete
labour
and
to the
use-value of
its
product.
"The
only correspondence
between
concrete and abstract
labour is
that
workers who perform
identical
concrete
labour
must produce
equal amounts of value.
This is
equivalent
to
saying
that
commodities
identical in their
use-values must
have
equal value,
for
no purchaser would
be found to
pay
the higher
prices,
if
a
cheaper perfect substitute were availahle.
"((1*
P33)
In the
above, she argues,
the
same use-value must
have the
same value,
from
which she
derives that the
same concrete
labour
must produce
the
same value.
She ignores the individual differences
of
labour
which we
discussed in 3.0 by
establishing a symmetry
between the
value and
the
use-value of physical, ordinary commodities, on
the
one
hand,
and
the
abstract and
the
concrete character of
labour,
on
the
other
hand,
which
may
lead to the
peanut
theory
of value,
the
steel
theory
of value, etc.
(see 2.2.1).
3.1.2 Reduction by Indirect Labours
Reduction by indirect labours is
presented
in Hilferding
(1984).
Morishima
(1973), Roncaglia
(1974), Rowthorn
(1980), Okishio
(1963),
etc. as an alternative
to Marx's
so-called circular solution
being based
on a uni-directional
causality
(they
also misconceive
Marx's
social
-
118
-
process
as
indicating
an exchange process).
To
express
the
skilled,
complex
labours
as
the
sum of unskilled, simple
labour, it decomposes
the
skill
or
the
complexity of
labour indefinitely backwards into
a
stream of
the
unskilled, simple
labours
performed
for the
skill-building
at
different
points of
time. This
position was already criticised
in
anticipation
by Boehm-Bawerk (1984,
pp
84-5)
to be
practically
immeasurable.
Hilferding (i +.
p
146)
retorted, saying
that Boehm-
Bawerk
confused
theoretical
with practical measurability.
He believed
the indirect labour
method,
though
practically
immeasurable,
was
theoretically
measurable.
But, in
our view, even
theoretically, it is
not measurable.
We
will show
the
reasons
in this
sub-section.
In Hilferding's
position, any natural or
innate inequality
of
talent
and of ability among workers
is
entirely
ignored. All
inequalities, if they
exist, are assumed
to be
surmountable with
sufficient education and
trainings. Blaug (1982,
p
189)
criticised
this
assumption as unrealistic.
But,
as we
have
explained
in
section
2.3,
that
assumption
is
acceptable.
A `commodity'
production
is
not
like
an
artistic or scientific work
but is
an ordinary
imitative
work.
As far
as
it is imitable,
any
inequality
of
talent
and ability among workers
is
surmountable with sufficient
training
and education
(see 2.3). For this
very reason, we
have
changed
in 2.3 the
reduction problem of
heterogeneous to homogeneous labour into the
quantitative reduction of
skilled, complex
to
unskilled, simple
labour. On this, the indirect
labour
methods
have
got
it
right.
But, ignoring the
natural or
innate
inequalities
of
talent
and of ability among workers
does
not necessarily
require
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour to be
conceived as a
stream of past,
indirect labours.
When
we
take the
skill as
the
product of a certain amount of
-
119
-
indirect
labour,
the
amount of
indirect labour
should
determine the
value
of
the
skilled
labour-power (=
the
extra
higher
wage of skilled
labour-power)
rather
than the increased
value-creating capacity of
the
skilled
labour (the
use-value of
the
skilled
labour-power). The
indirect labour
methods confused
this. It is
supposed
in the indirect
labour
method
that the
amount of
indirect labour determines the
use-
value rather
than the
value of
the
skilled
labour-power. In
view of
this
conceptual confusion, we reject
the indirect labour
method as
theoretically inconsistent.
If
we compare
this
with a machine case as
fixed
capital,
its
theoretical inconsistency is
more apparent.
Skill
corresponds
to
a
machine,
expended
for the
skill-building correspond
to the labours
expended
for
producing
the
machine.
The
value of skilled
labour-power (we
call
A)
shall correspond
to the
value of
the
machine
(we
call
A'). The
unpaid
(the
surplus) part of
the indirect labour
stored up
in the
skill
(we
call
B)
would correspond
to the
unpaid
(surplus)
part of
the labour that
produced
the
machine
(we
call
B').
The
value produced
by the
skilled
labour (we
call
C)
will correspond
to
the
value produced
by the
machine
(we
call
C').
In the
case of
fixed
capital,
B'
is transferred into A',
and
again
into C'
as well
because A' is transferred to C'. But the
case
is
totally
confused
in the indirect labour
method.
To begin
with,
in the
classical
form
of
the indirect labour
method,
i.
e.
in Hilferding's
case
(1984),
B
is
not
transferred into A
nor
into C. The
skilled
labour is implicitly distinguished from the
fixed
capital case.
Thus, the
is higher for
unskilled
labour-power
than for
skilled
(ibid,
p
183); the
surplus value
which one unit of skilled
labour
can produce
is defined to he
equivalent
-
120
-
with
the
same unit of unskilled
labour
produces;
that is, it is defined
that
skilled
labour is
not a
labour-saving. Capitalists
should prefer
unskilled,
simple
labour
as
it
would provide more surplus value.
But in
the
modern
form
of
the indirect labour
method,
i.
e.
in Rowthorn (1980)
for
example,
B is
not
transferred into A but is transferred into C
(it
is
argued
that teacher's
surplus
labours
can also
be
exploited
by the
capitalists
indirectly by
employing educated
labour-powers). The
rate
of exploitation
for
skilled
labour-power is thus the
same as
for
unskilled
labour-power in this
case.
The
same approach
has been
seen
in
Roncaglia
(1974),
Brody
(1974),
Okishio
(1963),
etc..
In Morishima
(1973,
pp
192-3),
exceptionally,
the
is higher for
skilled
labour-power than for
unskilled
labour-power by
assuming a more
skilled
labourer
may
he
paid a relatively
lower
wage rate.
This kind
of anomaly originates
from the
confusions
between the
abstract and
the
concrete useful character of
the
skill-building
labours
and
between the
value and
the
use-value of skill-operating
labours.
Moreover, they
applied, wrongly,
the
rate of exploitation and
the
production of value
to the
case of
individual labourers despite in
a
capitalist production.
Another
crucial point
is in the theoretical locus
of skilled
labour. When the
skill
is defined
as
the
product of
indirect labours,
the
present skilled
labour, i.
e.
its direct labour
part
is
necessarily
defined to be
unskilled, simple
labour. For instance,
one unit of
skilled
labour,
s,
is defined in Rowthorn
(1980,
p
235) to he
equivalent
to
one unit of unskilled
labour,
representing
the
effort put
in by the
worker concerned,
plus
hS
units of unskilled
labour
embodied
in the
skills of
this
worker,
that is, is
=1+h* where one unit of skilled
labour,
s, counts
as
is
units of unskilled, simple
labour. Okishio
-
121
-
(1963,
p
289))
was
in the
same spirit.
But, Roncaglia
(1974,
p6) and
Morishima (1973,
p
192) ignore the
direct labour
part as operating
the
skill as
t
=h*.
SS
In the latter
case, skilled
labour
corresponds conceptually
to
a
completely automatized machine.
Like
a
fixed
capital which operates
automatically, skilled
labour
automatically emits
its
own stored-up
indirect labour bit by bit to its
products with no newly created value.
To that
extent,
Morishima's
and
Roncaglia's
skilled
labour is
not
the
abstract
labour that
produces value
but is
merely a use-value which only
transfers its
own stored-up past
labours to its
product
by dint
of
another separate unskilled, simple
labour. In Rowthorn's
case
(1980),
by
contrast,
however,
skilled
labour
not only produces new value
to the
amount of
its direct labour
part
that
counts as unskilled simple
labour
but
also
transfers its
own stored-up
indirect labours to its
product.
When the
skill suffers a moral
deterioration, the two
cases
result
in different
consequences.
In Morishima's
and
Roncaglia's
case,
the
skilled
labourer
can no
longer function
as a value-producing normal
labour but
simply
becomes
obsolete.
In Rowthorn's
case,
however, the
skilled
labour
can still
function
as value-producing even after a moral
deterioration
of
the
skill, only
because it
possesses an extra
productive
labour
of unskilled, simple
labour to
operate
the
skill.
The
significance of
this distinction
will
he
examined
in
more
detail in 3.3
in
another aspect.
Lastly, they ignored the time difference
of
performed
for the
skill-building.
Indirect labour
methods, whether
classical or modern, all
ignore the time difference
of
the indirect
labours
stored-up
in the
skill.
One
unit of simple
labour
performed
for
the
skill-building
a year ago
is
not
distinguished from the
same one
-
122
-
unit of simple
labour
performed
ten
years ago.
This ignorance is
not
justifiable
even
if
we assume
the diachronic labour
units
to he
homogeneous;
simply
imagine how
much
the
maintenance and
the
storage
would cost when
the labours have been
stored up.
They
are
inferior to
the bourgeois
economists who attribute significant weights
to the
pure
time-factor
as
in the
case of
discount
rates.
In
conclusion, after considering
the
above
three
points, we
could say
the indirect labour
method
is
rather applicable
to the
determination
of
the
values of
different labour-powers than to the
determination
of
the
value
the different labour-powers
produce.
Hilferding,
strangely, argues
in the
same way.
"Unskilled labour, if
applied
to the
production of a qualified or
skilled
labour-power,
creates on
the
one
hand the
value of
this
labour-power,
which reappears
in the
wage of
the
qualified
labour-
power;
but
on
the
other
hand by the
concrete method of
its
application
it
creates a new use-value, which consists
in this,
that there is
now available a
labour-power
which can create value
with all
those
potentialities possessed
by the
unskilled
labours
utilized
in its formation. " (Hilferding, 1984,
p.
145)
In the
above,
he
accurately attributes
the
use-value of
the
skilled
labourer (=
the increased
value-creating capacity)
to the
concrete,
useful characters of
indirect labour. But in his
explanation of
the
reduction proportions of skilled, complex
to
unskilled, simple
labour,
he
committed a confusion.
He
attributed
it to the
abstract character of
indirect labour. To that
extent,
he did
not
develop his
position
fully
in
a consistent way.
We have
already noticed
its trace before
when
Hilferding did
not
include the
unpaid part of
performed
for the
skill-building
in
calculating
the
amount of
indirect
labour;
a skilled
labourer did
not employ
the
skill-building
labours
capitalistically
and so
the
unpaid
labour
would not
he
appropriated
by
-
123
-
the
skilled
labourer.
His followers, Okishio
(1963), Morishima(1973),
Rowthorn (1980),
Roncaglia(1974)
etc.
have
never noticed such a critical
point
but
rather
developed his indirect labour
method
in
a more
devious
direction.
3.1.3 Reduction by Exchange-value
The Ruhinists,
e. g.
Rubin (1973),
Kay 117fr, 1979), Krause (1982),
etc.
characterise
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour in terms
of concrete
labour
and
thus deny the
quantitative comparability of skilled, complex
labour
with unskilltd, simple
labour.
According to their
represented
labour theory
of value, all
kinds
of concrete
labour
are abstracted
in
exchange as abstract
labour
and as
homogeneous labour. It is futile for
them to
question
how the
to
unskilled, simple
labour
are
determined because their
abstraction
from
all
kinds
of concrete
labour in
exchange explains every aspect of
it.
This
position
turns
us
back to the
original point which
Boehm-Bawerk
78
accused of
being
circular.
Rubin (}
may well
be
exempted
from
such
an accusation as
he insists
on
the intrinsic
value concept of commodity
exchanges.
But,
as will
he
seen
in the Appendix to this
chapter,
his
intrinsic
value concept
is
simply
tautological.
There
are some variants within
this
group,
however. (1) A
value-
form
analytic,
Eldred
and
Hanlon
(1981) denied Rubin's intrinsic
value
concept as
being
not verifiable.
To
avoid
its
circular character
thereby
caused,
Eldred
and
Hanlon denied
even
the
human labour. (2) A Rubinian Unoist, Himmelweit
(1984) developed
Rubin's
circular
character
in its
complete
form by
applying
Rubin's
-
124
-
position
not only
to the
exchange of
labour-products
but
even
to that
of
individual
labour-powers,
in
which
heterogeneous labour-powers
are
homogenised
in terms
of money wages while
the heterogeneous labours
contained
in
commodities
being homogenised in terms
of
their
exchange-
values.
As
a result, albeit
her intrinsic
value concept,
the
reduction
proportions are put
in
a complete circle.
Her
concept of
intrinsic
value and
the
given
rate of exploitation play no role
in her
sequential
determination. (3)
A
neo-Rubinist,
Krause (1982)
recently
has
introduced
a new category,
`standard
reduction' as
the determinant
of
the
reduction, only
to
camouflage
Rubin's tautological
character, which
we shall examine
here. We
examine
here Krause (1982),
not
because he is
the
most representative
but because he
exploits many sophisticated
ideas
borrowed from Sraffa
(1960)
at
the
expense of confusion.
Rubin
considered only a representative single
kind
of concrete
labour in
each
branch
of production
following
our
(P2.3). Krause
(1982,
pp.
116-40), however,
considered multiple
individual labourers
as
multiple concrete
labours to he homogenised in the
generalisation
of
his
solution
but followed
our
(P2.3)
when
he
explained
his
solution
in
a
simplified example.
We
will examine
the latter
case.
`Consider
an economy with
two
goods,
corn(C) and
iron(I). 4 hours
of
mining
labour (Im)
and
2/5 tonne
of
I
are used
to
produce one
tonne
of
C.
6 hours
of smelting
labour (IS)
and
1/2 tonne
of
C
are used
to
produce one
tonne
of
I. Let
x and y
be the
social expenditure of
concrete
labours to
produce one unit of
C
and
I
respectively,
then hold
x=
(51
M,
31
S),
y =(5/2.1m,
15/2.15). Likewise, let
x* and y*
be the
appropriate quantities
of abstract
labour
expressed
in terms
of a
certain single concrete
labour, 1, that is,
x* =5a+3,
y =(5/2)a+(15/2),
where a
is the
reduction coefficient of
Im to l
which equates
concrete
labours
as
homogeneous labour. '
-
125
-
( Fig.
1
and
Fig.
2)
3
7.5
Z
Figure
I
standard-curve
ige-
0.4
a*
FiRur R)
-
126
-
`But
if the
exchange-ratio, z
between C
and
I,
viz. z =x*/y*
is
given,
then
z =(5a+3)/[(5/2)a+(15/2)]
where
(3/(15/2)]<z<2, O<a<+infinite,
Solving
this
equation
for
a, we
have
a =[(15/2)z-3]/[5-(5/2)z}.
Graphically,
this
relation
is depicted in fig
1
and
is
called
èxchange
curve'
(ibid,
p.
91-5).
As
can
be
seen
from
this, the
reduction coefficient, a,
is determined by
a
given
exchange-ratio, z. z
determines
a, and a reduces
the
heterogeneous individual labours into homogeneous labour
with
given
conditions of production,
i.
e. x* and y*,
both
of which
in turn
determines
z.
Instead
of
being
circular,
it is
now seen as a
tautology
because
z and a are
both determined
as a single point
in
exchange.
Because
of
its
very
tautological
character, unlike
Rubin, Krause
by his
own
invention derived
another curve
to intersect the
exchange
curve of
fig. l
only
to
peg
the
exchange relation
to
a specific point.
Appropriating Sraffa's
standard commodity,
he derived
what
he
called
`standard
curve'
in the
way
that the
reduction coefficients vector of
als
is independent
of any particular commodity and concrete
labour.
"The
expression
Ci/11
[the
quantity of
ith
use-value produced
divided by the
quantity of
ith
concrete
labour
expended
in
producing
Cl
...
LEE]
could
he taken intuitively
as a measure of
labour
productivity,.
hut this
magnitude
depends
on which commodity
is
produced and which concrete
labours
are performed.
Now, the
expression
A.
/a
.
1. [a1 is the
reduction coefficient of
the ith
concrete
labour (Ii),
Al
is the
exchange value of
ith
use value
...
by LEE] is
a
dimensionless index
of
the
productivity of
labour
against
the background
of
labour
as abstract
labour,
and
indeed
indicates the
ratio
between the total
amount of
direct
and
indirect
labour
required
to
produce an additional unit of a commodity and
the
particular
labour
required
for that
commodity-both expressed
in terms
of quantities of abstract
labour. The
standard reduction
states
that this index
of
labour-productivity
ought
to he
independent
of any particular commodity and concrete
labour. It is
thus
a universal
expression
for the
productivity of
labour
as
abstract
labour.
" (ibid,
p.
123)
Thus, Krause(ibid, pp.
122-32) devised
a
`standard
reduction' such
that
a
-
127
-
vector,
a of
the
reduction-coefficients a.,..
>0
satisfies
the
condition
that (A1/afl1)
_
(Ai/ajij)
=k
for
i, j,
=1,..., n.
......
{I)
where Als
are
the labour-values
as
defined in
x* and y*.
Returning
to the
previous corn-iron economy,
the
equation
for the
standard curve
is
given
from (1),
namely, z =(2/3)a.
There is
exactly
one
intersection
point of
the two
curves at a =(3/45).
It
can
be
shown
easily
that there is
exactly one
(normed)
standard reduction
if
and only
if the technical
coefficient matrix,
A is
productive and
indecomposable
(ibid,
pp.
122-34).
The
existence and
the
uniqueness of standard reduction are proved as
follows in
a
general
context.
From (1),
A=kaL
follows
with
k
as a scalar
factor,
and
from the
definition
of
labour-values,
A
=aL(1-A)-l, we
have kaL
=aL(1-A)-1.
From
this, it
can
be
shown
that k is the
eigen value of
(1-A)-l,
and
that,
aL
is the left
eigen vector of
(1-A)-l.
At the
same
time, by
using
the
Leontief inverse, (1-A)
-1
=ZAk,
it
can
be
shown
that the
aL
is the left
eigen vector of
A, i.
e. aLA =r(A)aL where r(A)
is the
maximum eigen root
of
A,
and
the Sraffa's
standard commodity, z
is the
right eigen vector
of
A, i.
e.
Az
= r(A)z.
All this
satisfies
the
necessary and sufficient
condition
for the
existence and
the
uniqueness a.
There is
a
duality between Sraffa's
standard commodity
(z)
and a
particular proportioning of
direct
expenditures of
labour (aL). This
was
initially
advanced
by Pasinetti (1977,
pp.
79,100,119, fn) in the
special case of a uniform organic composition; as a
duality between
Sraffa's
standard commodity
(z)
and
the direct
expenditure of
homogeneous labour (1), i.
e.
IA
=rl as against
Az
=rz.
Krause
(1982)
developed
this idea by
replacing
Pasinetti's homogeneous labour, 1,
with
his
own abstract
labour,
aL,
thus
obtaining aLA=r(A)aL.
Concrete labour
(L)
thereby turns
into
abstract
labour (aL) by
multiplier alone.
"Abstract
labour has
no
time dimension: it
must always
be
expressed as a quantity
of some concrete, albeit arbitrary,
labour"
says
-
128
-
Krause (p6d
,
p.
83), "òne hour
of abstract
labour' therefore has
no
meaning,
while
òne
hour
of carpentry'
does. " Because he (p. 161, fl)
considers
the
reducibility
of exchange-values
to
a common substance
is
dubious,
he
conceives
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour
as
characterising
concrete
labours. As
a result,
the homogeneous labour
(aL) in Marx's terminology is termed
by him
abstract
labour.
Grounded
upon such a misconception,
he termed the
value-productivity of
labour
{i/a11i)
the `productivity
of abstract
labour',
and presumed
it to be
uniform
for
any particular commodity and any concrete
labour
even
in the
case of
different
organic compositions.
But, his `productivity
of abstract
labour'
cannot
be
uniform.
Only
a new value part,
i.
e.
the direct labour (A(1-A)),
could
be
equally
proportional
to the
amount of what
he termed
abstract
labour (aL).
In
different
organic compositions,
the
expression
A
/aiIi
cannot
be
uniform
and
has
nothing
to do
with abstract
labour itself. Legitimately,
we may
well use
the
value productivity expression,
Al/a11i,
when comparing
the
productivity of
different
concrete
labours. Even in that
case,
the
productivity, although expressed
in
value
terms,
still counts as
the
attribute of concrete
labour (the
term
`productivity'
is
an attribute of
concrete
labour,
see
Marx, 1976a,
p
137). Krause's
presentation
is,
accordingly,
based
on an entire confusion
between
concrete
labour
and
abstract
labour.
By
using
the
exchange curve explicitly,
Krause
patently
intended
to
camouflage
the tautological
character of
the
reduction
through
exchange.
To do
so,
Krause introduced
another
Sraffa-like
`standard
reduction'
from the
production side.
But, the
moment
he introduced it,
his
already empty
distinction
between
abstract and concrete
labour
was
further
evaporated;
abstract
labour
was conceived as
if
producing not
-
129
-
only
new value
(v+s) but
also old value
(c); he
assumed not
the
newly
created
value
(v+s) but the input
value plus
the
new value
(c+v+s)
was
proportional
to the
amount of abstract
labour.
3.1.4 Reduction by Social Norms
Morris
and
Lewin (1973/4) by
exploiting
Marx's historical
and moral
elements which originally
Marx
used
to
explain
the determination
of
the
value of
labour-power
explained
the
reduction process of skilled,
complex
to
unskilled, simple
labour
as
"an historically
and socially
conditioned psychological process"
(p 472), "whose
externalisation".
they interpret, "is
expressed
in
custom and
tradition"
(ibid,
p
468).
"Technological
relations
determine the
amounts of various concrete
labours
which are socially necessary
to
produce a unit of a
given
commodity, while
the
customary or
traditional
relationships
controlling relative
labour income differentials
produce,
in
effect, a valuation of skilled
labour in terms
of simple
labour. "
(ibid,
p
458-9)
"Within
the
scope of
the factory
or
firm,
a
Job Evaluation Plan
constitutes
the
occupational equalisation system which reduces
concrete
labours into 'human labour in
general.
' (ibid,
p
471).
As is
said
in 3.0, the
problem of
differential
wages should not
be
confused with
the
reduction problem of skilled
to
unskilled
labour, for
the differential
wages are
the
result rather
than the
condition of
the
enforcement of
the law
of value
inasmuch
as
labour-power is
also a
commodity.
Morris
and
Lewin
(1973/4) in the
above,
however,
confused
the two
problems
and
discussed them in
an equal context.
The
reduction
proportions are seen as
the
same as a
job
evaluation scheme.
Instead
of
directly
replying
to the
question of why
the
-
130
-
objective
and social phenomenon such as
the distinction between
skilled
and unskilled
labour is
related merely
to
a psychological process,
they
emphasise
the
objective and
the
scientific character of
the
psychological
elements.
"we
assert a
deeper
principle which
is that human beings have
always,
from
time immemorial, had
common sense and moral sense, a
feeling for
social
justice
and a psychological ability
to identify
with other
human beings
and
to
conceive of
them
as equal
to
themselves. This does
not
deny the
presence of
irrational
elements
in both
commonsense and moral
feeling. " (ibid, 468)
To justify
such a conviction,
they
argue, relying on
Darwin's theory
of
evolution and
its dialectic
process of variation
(or
mutation),
that the
psychological process
is biologically
rooted.
That is,
when
the direct
biological
process of
the
evolution
(or
mutation) of mankind was almost
over,
they
explain,
there
came out a
biologically
rooted psychological
process of evolution
"as
the basis for
adaptation,
through the labour
process,
to the imperatives
of species survival"
(ibid,
p
461). And
secondly, when
the
natural
(innate) inequalities
of
human labour became
surmountable
by dint
of commodity production,
they
continues
to
say,
the
`biologically
rooted psychological process' changed
into
a
`socially
and
historically
conditioned psychological process'
(externalised in
custom
and
tradition).
"Division
or
differentiation
of
labour takes the
place of
differentiation
of species
[where biological
evolution
has
slowed
down to
an
imperceptible
pace].
The
role of
genetic
variation or
mutation
in biological
evolution
is taken in human
social evolution
by the
creative
imagination
of
the human
psyche which produces,
by
the interaction
of
irrational
and rational psychic elements, a
range of possible solutions
to
problems of production,
i.
e.,
problems
of
the labour
process, which
have been
presented
by
changes
in the
natural and social environment.
We
could put
it
that the
vagaries
of an unstable genetic material are replaced
by
the
vagaries
of an unstable psyche and
that the
role of natural
selection
in biology is taken by
experimental practice
in the
social
labour
process.
" (ihid,
p
461)
-
131
-
It is true that
within a primitive community,
there
naturally springs up
a
division
of
labour
caused
by differences
of age and sex
based
on a
purely physiological
foundation. Yet, in
our opinion,
this
process
had
nothing
to do
with
the
`biological'
nor
the
`psychological'
process of
evolution.
The
processes of natural selection
based
on
the
species'
struggle
for
survival are not applicable
to the
community where no
privately
independent individuals live,
where no competition
for
physical survival
between the
community members exists.
Choice
and change of occupation are only possible
in the
civil
society which consists of privately
independent individuals
with
the
introduction
of
the
Yet, Morris
and
Lewin
(1973/4)
extended
it to
an antediluvian period;
"the historically
and
socially conditioned psychological process which
generates
the
equalisation of concrete
labours in terms
of
human labour in
general
is
as old as social
life
and social
labour itself" (ihid,
p
468) "going
down to the dawn
of
human history" (ibid,
p
472). But
such an over-
generalisation of
Darwin's theory
of evolution was
inevitably
required
for justifying their
psychological explanation of
the
reduction process.
It
was
true that Marx
was
greatly
impressed by Darwin's theory
of evolution.
But Marx
was
impressed
not
because Darwin's theory
was
true
and scientific,
but because Darwin's theory
well represented
the
bourgeois
vision of capitalist competition.
The
so-called
historically
and socially conditioned psychological process
is
another
fetish
of
capitalist competition
in
In the fetish,
what
they
understand as capitalist society
is
not
distinguished from
other
forms
of society
or
the
animal
kingdom. They
saw a capitalist society
as not essentially
different from
other societies
but in forms
of
-
132
-
appearance
only.
This is
seen
in their two
conceptions of
èssence
vs
phenomenon'
and
`general
human labour'.
"We begin
with a
brief
recapitulation of
Marx's
concept of value,
or commodity
value, as contrasted with exchange-value and as
related
to
general
labour. In developing this
concept
Marx
applied
Hegel's doctrine
of essence and appearance.
Value,
or commodity
value
is
related
to
exchange-value as essence
is
related
to form
of
phenomenal
appearance or manifestation....
On the
other
hand,
value
itself is
related
to
general
(or
abstract)
labour
as
form
of
appearance or manifestation
is
related
to
essence;
in this
case
value
is the form
of appearance or manifestation and
general
labour
is the
essence of
that
which appears.
Essence
and appearance are
obviously relative
terms;
what
is
appearance on one
level
may
be
essence on another
level. Thus
exchange-value
is
a
form
of
appearance which
is two levels
above general
labour, its deepest
essence....
It is
evidently our conviction
that
general
labour is
a
category which
has
some significance--sometimes not much--in a
variety of modes of production....
In the first
place, concrete
labours, i.
e.
-weaving,
shoe making, carpentering, are related
to
general
labour
as apples, pears, and oranges are related
to the
general
category
fruit, i.
e.,
they
are species of a
genus,
the
genus general
labour. " (ibid,
p
455)
They treat
essence and phenomenon as
if being the two layers
of an
onion's coat.
The
coat previously peeled off
is
called
the
phenomenon,
while
the
coat
later
peeled off
is
called essence.
The latest
coat
should
he the deepest
essence.
Since there
can
be
no core
left
when you
peel off one coat after another,
the two different
coats are not so
different from
each other
but in their
sizes.
The difference between
essence and phenomenon
is, likewise,
not so significant at all
for them.
The two forms
of society
in like
manner are not so
different in
essence
in their
explanation;
they
are
different
only
in the degree (or
the
extent, or
the
mode) of competition.
In that
context,
the direct
biological
process still works even
in
modern society
but in
a
different
form
of appearance
for them. And, by the
same
token,
`general human
labour' is
argued
as
the
genus
to be
significant
in
every society.
In
our position,
however, to
say
"what
is
appearance on one
-
133
-
level
may
he
essence on another
level" is
not
Marxian. In Hegel's
case,
what
is `form'
on one
level is `content'
on another
level; but
what
is
appearance
on one
level is
still appearance on any other
level. It is
a
mysticism
to theorise
on
the basis
of many
distinct levels
of essence
and phenomenon. As is
seen
in
section
1.2, àctuality'
is the
unity of
the
essence and
the
phenomenon; whence essence must show
itself in
phenomenon, which we call phenomenon
(or
appearance).
It
shows
itself,
however,
not as what
it is but in
a
distorted form; this is
why essence
is different from
appearance.
How
and
in
what way
it is different
can
be
explained only
in
science,
in the
unity of
the
essence and
the
phenomenon.
We
cannot
explain
why and
how the
amount of
fruitiness (the
genus)
which
the
given
quantities of apples, pears, and oranges possess
is
quantifiable.
The
same absurdity applied
to their
concept of
`general human labour'
as
the
genus;
it is
equally absurd
to
attempt
to
quantify
the
amount of
general
labour that
a given
quantity of weaving
or of carpentary possesses.
But they justified this
absurdity
by
merely
asserting
"it is
precisely
this
absurdity which characterises commodity
production"
in the
above.
They
committed
this fault because they did
not elucidate
in
concrete
terms how
such an absurdity was resolved
in
In
our case,
however, the
general
labour is
quantifiable
for the
reason
that, because human labours in
commodity
production
is identical
as abstract
labour, the
concrete
labours
change
into
skilled and unskilled
labour
as
the
external
diversity
of
the
abstract
labour, i.
e. as
the
merely quantitative
difference
of
homogeneous labour. This is
entirely
because the
general
human labour
is
not
treated
as
the
genus
but
as
the identical
substance valid
in the
society of commodity
production only.
-
134
-
3.1.5
No Reduction
with a
Heterogeneous
Labour Theory
of
Value
Bowles
and
Gintis (1977) divide the
labour
segments
into two
sorts.
One
(the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour differentials) is
economic and
the
other
(ageism,
racism, sexism, etc.
)
non-economic.
So, the
one
is
quantitatively comparable whilst
the
other
is
not quantitatively
comparable.
They
argued
that
only
the first kind
was reducible
to
homogeneous labours. The labours
which are
heterogeneous in terms
of
the
second
kind, they
argue, are not reducible
to homogeneous labour.
They thus define the labour heterogeneity
only
in terms
of non-economic
labour
segments such as ageism, racism, sexism, etc..
"Abstract labour
is heterogeneous", 'they
say
(1977,
pp.
175-6), "and does
not require
the
homogenisation
of
the labours. " Instead
of
the Marxian
concept of
the
substance of value
(= labour), they
proposed a
heterogeneous labour
theory
of value and
defined
value as a vector of
They
repealed
Marx's
value
theory for two
reasons;
first, it
was
based
on
the
reducibility of
different labours,
and second,
the
reducibility of
different labours
was
based
on purely economic
labour
segments.
But these two
reasons are
groundless.
They had
not
Marx's
value
theory but the Marxian indirect labour
method
in their
minds.
It is true that Marx's
value
theory is based
on
the
reducibility
of
different labours. Yet Marx's
reducibility of
different labours
was
not
because the labour
segments were purely economic
but because the
different labours
were all substantively
identical. Marx's
skill
differentials
were not only economic
but
also non-economic
labour
segments;
he
never
defined the
skill
differentials
on an economic
basis
alone.
He
apparantly
mentioned various social
illusions,
conventions,
prejudices, etc.
playing a
definite,
though
not an exclusive, role
in
-
135
-
a
formulating
the
skill
differentials (Marx, 1976A
p
305). When
we said
in 2.3
that the
external
differences
of abstract
labour
were all
characterisable
in terms
of
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour,
even
non-economic prejudices were all
transformed
into the
skill and
the
complexity
terms. Our
original reduction problem which we will consider
in the
next section,
3.2,
concerns why
the different labours
are
reducible even
if they
are
based
on non-economic
labour
segments, which
has
no relation
to the indirect labour
method.
There
are many serious conceptual confusions
in Bowles
and
Gintis's
(1977) basic
claim
that the heterogeneous labours
are not
reducible
to homogeneous labour for the
reason
that
non-economic
labour
segments are
involved in the heterogeneity
of
labour. We
mention
here
only
three
points; one
is (1)
the
confusion
between
abstract and
concrete
labour,
another confusion
is (2) between labour
and
labour-
power and
the last
one
is (3) between the
petty commodity mode of
production and
the
capitalist mode of production.
(1) First,
when abstract
labour is heterogeneous, the
value
concept
itself
must
he
groundless.
Abstract labour
was an ultimate
substratum
for identifying
various
heterogeneous labours in their
substances.
Only because they
are
identical in their
substances,
are
translated into the
external
diversities
(or
differences)
of
the identical
substance, which can
he
characterised
in
terms
of
the
skill and
the
complexity of
labour
as quantitatively
comparable.
But,
once
the
abstract
labour is heterogeneous,
can never
be
comparable
in
quantitative
terms.
Then, the
value concept will
he
groundless.
Originally,
value
is the
common element
of exchange-relations.
But,
when abstract
labour is
heterogeneous, there
can
be
no common element of
the
exchange-relations,
-
136
-
I
hence
no value category.
Bowles
and
Gintis
consider very easily
that,
because
abstract
labour is heterogeneous,
value can
be
expressed as a vector of
heterogeneous
labours.
They imagine Marx's
value
theory
started
from
a
definition just
as neo-classical utility
theory
of value
has
started
from
a
definition.
Thus, they
started
from the definition
of abstract
labour
as
heterogeneous labour to
arrive at another
definition
of value
as a vector of
the
previous chapter, section
2.2.1.
This
was what we criticised
in
Yet, Marx's
value
theory
was not
the
problem of
definitions. It
was not
in
a synthetic method
but
an
analytical method, which, starting
from
a concretum, arrives at
the
most
abstract
through
analytical
discoveries. But the
neo-classical utility
theory
of value was
from the
outset a synthetic method, which starting
from (stipulative) definitions
and
by
analysing
the definitions
arrives
at
theorems2.
(2) Second,
when
they divided the labour
segments
into two
sorts, non-economic
(irreducible)
and economic
(reducible) labour
segment,
Bowles & Gintis
(1977) disregarded from the
outset
the
economic
(reducible) labour
segments assuming
that they
were already reduced.
2
The Popper-like logico-positivism
argues
the
science must start
from
a
hypothesis (an
abstract
idea)
and,
to
get
less
abstract and more
concrete
hypotheses,
must
design
a set of empirical
tests
or experiments
grounded
upon
the initially
given
hypothesis. Insofar
as
its
empirical
tests
or experiments are concerned,
it
might
look like
an analytical
method.
But, if
we
look
at
the hypothesis
according
to
which
the
empirical
tests
and experiments are
designed, the
science
in the logico-
positivism must
be
a synthetic method.
By
experiments and empirical
tests, it
proceeds
from
a
given
hypothesis (the
abstract)
to
a
less
abstract
(more
concrete)
hypotheses
obtaining only so-far-so-good
conjectures
(in
such conjectures, we can never
get
a real concrete).
In
the
cases
of art, metaphysics, religions, etc.,
by
contrast,
it
proceeds
from
a concrete
and arrives at
the
abstract.
From
a painting,
Gogh's
sunflower,
for
example,
we perceive an abstract
imagination
which could
be
generalised
even upto
the
whole universe.
-
137
-
This
means,
as
they insist (1978,
p
313), the labour
segmentation
is
applied
to the
workers who perform
technically
identical labour. In
that
case,
the
segmented
labours,
although unequally rewarded, should
perform
identical
value productions
because they
are economically
already reduced
as
identical
ones.
This they have
explicitly pointed
out at many places
including their
rejoinders, e.
g.
(1977,
p.
182),
(1978,
pp.
312-3), (1981b,
p.
287).
The labour
segmentation
in Bowles
and
Gintis (1977),
therefore,
does
not refer
to the heterogeneity
of
labour
as substance of value
but
rather
to the
market-segmentation of
lahour-powers
as commodities.
That
is,
what
is
segmented
is
not
the labours that
produce value
but the
labour-powers that
'are
commodities.
Such
a segmentation cannot
he
a
subject
in
our value
theory. Even
ordinary commodity markets are
usually segmented.
A
car market, as
is
said
in 3.0, is
usually
segmented
into
many specific model markets,
depending
on various,
economic and non-economic elements such as social prejudice, convention,
etc..
The labour-power
segmentation
is
also
in the
same situation where
socio-historical, sexual, racial prejudices play
great
roles.
Nevertheless, Bowles
and
Gintis
(1977,
pp
173-4)
observe
"the
expanded reproduction of
the internal division
of
the
working class as
directly
conflicting with
Marx's
concept of abstract
labour in
which
the
only
theoretically important type
of
labour heterogeneity takes the form
of skill
differentials.
" This is
entirely
from
unsound conceptual
confusions.
The internal division
of
the
working class
is
merely a
commodity
differentiation
as a
labour
market segmentation.
It is true
that, in Marx's
value
theory, theoretically important type
of
labour
heterogeneity
must
always
take the form
of skill
differentials. But the
different labours
are not
differentiated in terms
of
their
own value
hut
-
138
-
in
terms
of value-creating
capacity.
They
confused
`differentiated
labour-powers'
as commodity with
`differentiated labours'
as value
substance.
They
are
differentiated in terms
of
the
skill and
the
complexity
of
labour
only
because they
are substantively
identical.
as
abstract
labour.
They fail to
realise
the fact that the labour
market
segmentation
must not
be discussed in the
same context with
the
problem
of
heterogeneous
labours,
as we
has
established
in 3.0.
(3)
Lastly,
with
their
own peculiar
`heterogeneous labour theory
of value',
Bowles
and
Gintis
(1977)
made a propaganda
for the
exploitation of one worker
by
another within
the
working class.
But,
as
is
seen
in
our
(P2.3),
an
individual labourer if taken
separately
from
the
collective
labourer to
which
it belongs
cannot produce any value.
Only
as an organ of a collective
labourer
can
count as abstract
labour
and produce value
(Marx, 1976a,
pp.
643-4) It
is, therefore, impossible to
calculate
the
exploitation of one
individual labour by
another
individual.
This
argument,
however, does
not mean
that
abstract
labour
can
hold
only
for
a collective
labourer. A
so-called
fundamentalist, Bell
(1977,
p.
172), for
example, attributed
the
labour
only
to
a collective
labourer. In
our position,
however,
even an
individual labourer
can
have the
abstract
labour
character
if it is
involved in
a commodity production.
Needless to
say,
the individual
labour
still cannot
directly
count as abstract
labour; it
can only
have
an abstract
labour
character.
Dr Marx
as an
individual human being
cannot
directly
count as
"human being in
general".
He
can only
have the
character of
human being in
general.
The
same
is true for individual
labours.
-139-
Appendix
to 3.1
Rubin's Labour Theory
of
Value
If the
social process which
Marx defined to determine the
reduction
proportions meant an exchange process,
Marx
would
have to
prove
the
value relations would not
deviate from
exchange-values.
But,
at many
places,
Marx has insisted
on
the deviation
of values
from the
exchange-
values
(i.
e.
from
prices of production).
Moreover,
some exchange-values
are argued
to have
no
intrinsic
value especially when non-labour
products are offered
for
exchange.
This is
why although exchange-values
reflect social relations,
the
social relations are not necessarily
reflected
in the
exchange-values.
There
are many social relations
that
are not of exchange relation
(non-producers,
e.
g,
land-owners,
are not
in the
relation of exchange
but
of a
tributary).
Boehm-Bawerk
criticised
Marx's
social process
to be
circular,
however, because he interpreted it
as meaning an exchange process.
It
should
be inevitably
circular
if the
reduction
is
carried out
by
exchange-values.
But,
although
he
was not
ignorant
of
Boehm-Bawerk's
criticism of
the
circularity,
Rubin
argued
for the
reduction
by the
exchange-values.
"the
reduction of qualified
to
simple
labour is
one of
the
results
of
the
objective social process of equalization of
different forms
of
labour
which,
in
capitalist society,
is
carried out
through the
equalization of commodities on
the
market.
" (Rubin, 1973,
p
167)
While
arguing
for the
reduction
by
exchange-values,
he
criticised all
the
attempts
to
determine the
to
unskilled,
simple
labour independently
of, and prior
to,
exchange-
process
for the
reason
that they
"missed
the
very
basis
of
Marx's theory
-
140
-
of value".
"The
assumption
that the
reduction
of qualified
to
simple
labour
must
take
place
in
advance and precede exchange
in
order
to
make
possible
the
act of equalization
of
the
products of
labour
misses
the
very
basis
of
Marx's theory
of value.
" (ibid,
p
168)
What he thinks is "the
very
basis
of
Marx's
value
theory"
must
he in his
intrinsic
value concept.
His
reduction
by
exchange-values can
be
exempted
from the
charge of circularity
by dint
of
his intrinsic
value
concept.
But his
explanation of
"the
very
basis
of
Marx's theory
of
value"
is
quite odd as
he
explains
the intrinsic
value concept simply
in
terms
of
the
proportional allocation of social
labour.
"As
we can see,
in
order
to
explain
the high
value of
the
products
of qualified
labour
we
do
not
have to
repudiate
the labour theory
of value: we must only understand clearly
the basic idea
of
this
theory
as a
theory
which analyses
the law
of equilibrium and
distribution
of social
labour in the
commodity-capitalist economy.
From this
point of view we can evaluate
the
arguments of
those
critics of
Marx
(See Boehm-Bawerk, Op. Cit. ) [sic]" (ihid,
p
168)
Rubin
explicitly explains
in the
above
that the
very
basic idea
of
Marx's
value
theory is in the law
of equilibrium and
distribution
of
social
labour. It is
rather
like
a supply and
demand theory
as
he
himself
mentions as
follows.
"But just
as
the deviation
of market prices
from
values
does
not
disprove but
makes possible
the
realisation of
the law
of value, so
the
"premium for
qualification", which signifies
the
absence of
equilibrium among
different forms
of
labour, in turn leads to the
increase
of qualified
labour
and
to the distribution
of productive
forces in the direction
of equilibrium of
the
social economy.
"
(ihid,
p
171)
Although Rubin's
explanation
in the
above
looks
similar
to the
supply
and
demand theory,
his theory
must
be distinguished from the
ordinary,
circular supply
and
demand theory in
admitting
the intrinsic
value
-
141
-
concept.
But his intrinsic
value concept
is in
no case properly
verified.
Rubin did
not verify
the
existence of abstract
labour,
which
he
argued
to be the
substance of value,
independently
of exchange-
values, as
being logically
prior
to
exchange-processes.
For the Rubinists,
any
labour that
produces a commodity
is
not
abstract
labour. To the
questions of
"What is the
abstract universal
labour distinguished from the
mere
human labour? ", "Why
and
how
can
the
abstract universal
labour
create value?
", Rubin (1978,
p
111)
replies,
"we define the
concept of abstract universal
labour in
such a way
that
the
concept of value also
follows from it". Especially in the following
quote;
"In
order
to
arrive at
the
concept of value
dialectically from the
concept of
labour,
we must also
include in the
concept of
labour
those features
which characterise
the
social organisation of
labour
in
commodity production and necessitate
the
appearance of value as
the
particular social
form
of
the
product of
labour. " (ibid,
pp
117-118)
Abstract labour is defined to the
effect
that it
can create value.
Why
is it to be defined to
such an effect as creating value?
Rubin
answers
in the
above; we
have to define
abstract
labour
as creating value
because
we want
to derive
a value concept
directly from the
concept of
abstract
labour,
not
because
abstract
labour
actually creates value.
Rubin
arbitrarily
defined
value and abstract
labour
as
he
wished, only
to the
effect
he desired. He defines his basic
concepts
to
contain
the
properties which
he desires finally to derive from it
as
`dialectical,
necessary products'.
His
argument
is
not academic, nor scientific,
but
only
for
propaganda.
It
must
be full
of repeated
tautologies; its
conclusion must
be
contained
in the
very
first definition from the
beginning
and
derives
many colourful
definitions from it
one after
-
142
-
another,
which are
in fact the
same repetitions.
By
such
definitions
so
deliberately
devised, however, he
was successful
in
setting up
his
own
peculiar
concept of abstract
labour.
Rubin (1978,
p
118) defined
abstract
labour
as
"labour
which was
made equal
through the
all round equation of all
the
products of
labour,
but the
equation of all
the
products of
labour is
not possible except
through the
assimilation of each one of
them
with a universal
equivalent".
To be
short,
he defined it
as what was created
by
money
in
exchange,
i.
e. as
the labour
represented
in
market values.
Thus,
we
call
Rubin's theory
"represented labour theory
of value".
Money
creates abstract
labour. The
abstract
labour then
creates
value.
The
value
determines
market value.
The
market value represents
the
amount of abstract
labour through
monetary mediation.
In this
circle, money
is the
only exogeneous
factor. Ultimately,
value
is
not
created
by
abstract
labour but by
money
in
exchange.
Yet
money
in
exchange
is
not created
by
value nor
by
anything else,
but it
must exist
from the
outset
(money is
seen
to
validate
the
social character of
private
labours in
exchange).
This
admittedly violates
Marx's
original
position: abstract
labour
creates value
in the direct
process of
production, prior
to
exchange, and
that the
money category must
be
comprised
in the
commodity category, which can only
be
separated after
the
value category
is
sufficiently
developed.
To
resolve such
difficulties, Rubin
(1978,
pp
121-125)
distinguishes between two
concepts of exchange; exchange as a separate
phase counterposed
to the
process of production, and exchange as a
social
form
of
the
reproduction process
itself. Exchange in the latter
sense contains
in itself
even
the direct
process of production
based
on
private exchange
when
he
says
"when
...
people produce specifically
for
-
143
-
exchange,
...
already
in the
phase of
direct
production,
the
character
of products
of
labour
can
be
regarded as values"
(ibid,
p
124). His
"exchange"
seen
in
such a context seems completely substitutable with
"commodity
production"
itself. If it is
substituted
by that, Marx
can
agree with
Rubin
when
Rubin
says
"Insofar
as exchange
in the latter
sense
is
concerned, without exchange
there is
neither abstract
labour
nor value, and
labour
only assumes
the
character of abstract
labour
with
the development
of exchange"
(ibid,
p
124). We
could read
it
as saying
"without
there is
neither abstract
labour
nor
value, and
labour
only assumes
the
character of abstract
labour
with
the
development
of commodity production".
Marx
would
have
no reason
to
disagree
with
this: Despite this, however,
we realise,
there is
still
something
that
prevents
the
substitution of exchange with commodity
production.
Rubin's
concept of abstract
labour
as
the
substance of value
requires something more
than
itself for its
practical reality.
When he
says
that in the
process of
direct
production,
though it is based
on private exchange,
labour is
not yet
abstract
labour in the full
sense
(ibid,
pp
124-125),
something more
than
is
additionally required
for `real'
abstract
labour. For Rubin,
abstract
labour becomes
real only
through the
mediation of money
in
exchange,
in the
sense
that the
equality of
different kinds
of
individual labour is
not possible except
through the
mediation of money.
Money is logically
a pre-requisite
for both
abstract
labour
and value.
This
admittedly violates
Marx's
position
in
which
both
value and abstract
labour
are
logically
prior
to
money; money
is to he developed
from the differentiation
of
the
commodity category;
from the
externalisation
of
its inherent
contradiction
between
value and
-
144
-
use-value.
In Ruhin's
position, value
is
created
ìdeally' in the
process of production
based
on private exchange
by "ideally
abstract
labour",
it
only
becomes
real
in the
process of exchange
by "really
abstract
labour"
obtained
by
monetary mediation
(abstract labour
=
the
labour
represented
in
market values
by
money).
Rubin's
reduction
by
exchange-values was exempted
from being
circular only
because
of
its
admission of an
intrinsic
value concept.
Once it fails in
verifying
the intrinsic
value concept,
however, its
circular character emerges.
Yet, it is
seen
in the
above
that Rubin's
substance of value, abstract
labour, is dependent
on
the
external
factors,
money and exchange-process.
Thus, his intrinsic
value concept
is
also
dependent
on
the
same
factors,
money and exchange-process.
Ruhin's
circularity,
therefore, is
not
deniable.
On the
other
hand, Rubin's intrinsic
value concept
is
often
asserted
to
exist
in the
social property of commodity producing
labours,
which reflect
the
social relation of commodity productions
independently
of exchange-values.
Instead
of abstract
labour,
social
labour is
argued
as
the
substance of value, since social
labour
exists
independently
of
exchange-values.
As
a result,
the intrinsic
value seemed verifiable
independently
of exchange.
Yet, to the
question of why a social
property
is
possessed
by the labours that
produce commodities,
Rubin
(1973,1978)
answers
that the
exchange relations
in
a society must
reflect
the
existing social relation of producers.
The
reflection of
the
social relation of producers
is directly identified
as
the
social
property of commodity
producing
labours.
Such
a
direct identification, however, is based
on
the following
two
unjustifiable
assumptions.
The first
assumption
is that the
whole
social relation
of producers can
be
reflected exhaustively
in the
-
145
-
exchange
relation
of commodities.
The
second assumption
is that
only
products
of
labour
are offered
for
exchange as commodities and non-
labour
products
are precluded
from
counting as commodities.
In the
society where
there
are non-producers
(e.
g.
land-owners)
who
live
on a
tributary (non-exchange)
relation,
the first
assumption
is
not
justifiable, however.
The
exchange relation of commodities cannot
reflect
the
whole social relation of producers
(e.
g.
land-owners
are
omitted).
Someone
may
include
even such a
tributary
relation among
ordinary exchange relations so as not
to
omit
land-owners
and
the like.
But,
when
it is included,
even non-labour products are
then
necessarily
required
to he
among
the
objects of exchange, which would violate
the
second assumption.
'
Yet, the
second assumption was vital
to find the
intrinsic
value concept
in the
social property of commodity producing
labours. Hence the two
assumptions are not compatible.
Eldred
and
Hanlon (1981),
thus,
revised
Ruhin's
position
into
their
own value-form analytic.
They
argue,
firstly,
concrete
labours
change
into
abstract
labour
not
in the form
of exchange-value
but in the
palpable
form
of money,
<money
= abstract
labour
= social
labour>
exists
independently
of exchange process.
Yet, in that
case, value
itself is
not an
intrinsic
existence
but
externally
dependent
on money.
Only
money counts as
having the intrinsic
value
if the intrinsic
value
is
deliberately to be
sought-for.
Secondly, they determine the
reduction
proportions
by
analysing
the
movement of money capital.
The
magnitude
of value, with
them,
are not
determined by the
amount of
labour
expended
but by the
amount of money
the
commodity attracts.
This
goes
closer and
closer
to the
supply
and
demand theory.
Elson
(1979h),
on
the
other
hand,
revised
Rubin's tautological
definition
of abstract
labour. She
argued
for
a value
theory
of
labour
-
146
-
in lieu
of
the labour
theory
of value.
Rubin defined
abstract
labour in
the
way
the
creation of value
is to be derived from it. Elson, however,
outspokenly
derives
the
abstract
labour
concept
from
value category.
So,
value creates abstract
labour,
not abstract
labour
creating value;
but the
creation should
be
a mental
(conceptual)
creation rather
than
a
practical one.
Value
comes
first by the
mediation money
in
exchange.
With the
value, she
tracks down
abstract
labour,
social
labour,
etc..
With Elson,
value
theory is thus inverted into
a
labour theory. What
was she
going
to do
with abstract
labour, by the
way?
She
suddenly
linked the
abstract
labour
category with
the
class movement.
It is
a
rule
that, in
synthesising a concrete
totality,
a new category
is
not
to
be introduced from'without but from the
externalisation of
intrinsic
contradictions.
But her linkage between
abstract
labour
and a class
concept was nothing
but
a
juxtaposition.
It is true that, despite Rubin's tautologies
(in
explaining
the
substance of value) and circularities
(in
explaining
the
magnitude of
value),
there have been
many
Rubin followers,
e.
g.
Weeks (1981), Clarke
(1980,1989), Gerstein
(1976), Himmelweit
and
Mohun
(1981), Krause
(1982),
etc.
Two
reasons are
likely for this.
Firstly, it is
not
deniable that the
existence of value and
the
determination
of
the
magnitude of value are
dependent
on exchange as
their
premises.
Since,
without exchange,
there is
no commodity, and
without
the
commodity,
there is
no value, neither commodity nor value
is
definable
without exchange.
At this juncture,
exchange
itself is
a
premise
for the
for the determination
of
the
magnitude of value.
This
premise,
however, is
a condition, and must
belong to
external
circumstance.
Exchange itself
cannot
be the
ultimate
substance of commodity
values.
Because
value reflects a relationship of
-
147
-
individual
categories
to the totality, the
the
determination
of
the
magnitude of value are substantively
independent
of
the
exchange
which reflects only
the
external relation
between
individual
categories,
but
are still
dependent
as
their
premises on
exchange.
The Rubinists, however,
misconceive
the
premises as ultimate
substrata.
Secondly, Rubin's theory
was
then the
only available alternative
to the
previous
Marxian
position,
i.
e.
the
embodied
labour theory
of
value which
had been
criticised
for being dogmatic,
metaphysical and
inconsistent. It
was
first introduced in 1973
not
because he
was right
but because he
provided a
temporary
asylum
for the Marxians. It
demonstrated that the
embodied
labour theory
of value was not
the
only
Marxian theory
any way.
As
against
the
abstract
labour in the
embodied
labour theory
of
value, which
had been
criticised
for being
metaphysical, not a real
existence,
Ruhin's
abstract
labour
category appeared as a real existence
since
the
exchange
itself
was a real process.
It is
argued
to
emerge as
the
abstraction
from
all
kinds
of concrete
labour in
exchange.
On the
other
hand,
as against
the transformation
problem
in the
embodied
labour
theory
of value, which
had been
criticied
for being inconsistent,
Rubin's
value
theory
simply
dismissed
such a
theoretical inconsistency
by insisting
on
its
qualitative aspect.
Lamentably, however, to take
an
asylumn
in Rubin's
represented
labour theory
of value was nothing
but
a
further intellectual.
crippling
(e.
g.
tautologies,
circularities).
Rubin's (1978)
exploitation
of
Hegelian logic
was
itself
questionable
since
he
confused
Hegel's
crucial categories, ground,
essence, content,
as one and
the
same.
He
assimilated all
those
as corresponding
to
Marx's `socially
necessary
labour',
which was still assimilated with
-148-
abstract
labour
as well as value.
Starting
from the
assumed capitalist
society,
he
established
the
relationship,
<essence
=
ground
= content>
as corresponding to <socially
necessary
labour
= value = abstract
labour>.
For this,
we call
Rubin
(1978)
a
`distorted dialectism'.
-
149
-
3.2.
The Determination
of
the Magnitude
of
Value
This
section
works with our own solution
to the
problem of
how to
determine
the
magnitude of value.
As indicated in 3.0,
there
are
three
distinct
questions
in determining the
magnitude of value,
i.
e.
the
normalisation of
of
labour, the
reduction of
heterogeneous
to homogeneous labour
and
the
synchronisation of
diachronic labours.
The three
questions were
logically distinct:
one
is
within
the
same sector of production, where
Marx's
socially average unit
of
labour-power
was originally
introduced for the
cases of unskilled,
lazy labours,
another
is between different
sectors of production, and
the
other
is between
past and current commodities.
The three
questions,
however,
concern only
the labours that
can
produce value and use-value as well.
An individual labour, for
example,
is
not concerned
here because it
cannot produce any value
(and
any use-
value) and cannot count as abstract and as concrete
labour. Distinct
kinds
of
labour-powers
also are not concerned
here because they
are
commodities, which should
he
subject
to the
operation of
the law
of
value.
It is to be born. in
mind
that
what we are concerned with must
have
no value
but
rather must
he
capable of creating value.
The
heterogeneous labour-powers, the
wage
differentials
associated with
them
are,
therefore,
not concerned
here.
But the two
points are not so significant
in the
case of simple
In
case of simple commodity production, even an
individual labourer
can produce value and use-value counting as abstract
and as concrete
labour. Let
us,
therefore,
examine
this
simple case
first. We
will show
here the
reproduction of
the
simple commodity mode
of production
itself
necessarily requires some sort of social
illusion,
-
150
-
convention,
prejudices, etc.
in determining the
reduction proportions
and yet
those
are
to be
undermined
by the
law
of value
itself.
3.2.1 Simple Commodity Production Case
We
shall start
from the definition
labour
as
it is
the
unit of measurement of
the
reduction.
Marx defined it
similarly
to
be "the labour-power
possessed
in his bodily
organism
by
every ordinary
man, on
the
average, without
being developed
in
any special way"
(Marx,
1976a,
p
135). This formed
a singular contrast
to Rowthorn's
(1980)
definition
labour. Because he
conceives
the
skill
as a stored-up
indirect labour, he
regards
"an
unskilled worker as
someone who possesses a negligible
learned
skill, a negligible quantity
of
indirect labour" (Rowthorn, 1980,
pp
235-6). This definition
of
unskilled, simple
labour directly
conflicts with
Marx's definition
of
the
simple, unskilled
labour. Marx
conceives
the
unskilled
(=
simple)
worker as a socially average unit of
labour-power
and as varying
in
different
countries and at
different
cultural epochs
(Marx, 1976a,
p
135).
Yet, Rowthorn's definition has been
popular
in the indirect
labour
methods of reduction, e.
g.
Hilferding
(1984), Okishio
(1963),
Morishima (1973), Roncaglia
(1974),
etc.
They distinguish the
unskilled, simple
labour from the
social average
labour. This is
because they
do
not actually understand why
the
reduction problem
has to
be
questioned.
As is
said
before, the
reduction problem
is in
question
here
only
to
define the
labour-power in the
case of
between
different
sectors of production,
between distinct kinds
-
151
-
of concrete
labour.
The
reduction of skilled
to
unskilled
labour is
itself
the
calculation of
the
labour. When the
social average
labour is distinguished
from the
unskilled, simple
labour
even after
the
reduction, we will still
have to
solve another problem
to
determine
the
magnitude of value;
how to
relate
the
unskilled, simple
labour
with
the
social average
labour.
If Rowthorn's
position
is
admitted,
i.
e.
the
unskilled, simple
labour
as a negligible quantity of stored-up
indirect labour,
there
would
be
no more unskilled, simple
labour in the
present world; any
worker
in
modern society,
however humble
and
however
unskilled,
has
a
considerable amount of stored-up
indirect labour in
view of
the
inherited
cultural assets of
the human
species, which might reach even
into
astronomical
figures. For instance,
even an ordinary schoolgirl
in
today's South Africa
would
have
mastered much more scientific
knowledge
than Isaac Newton
of
the 18th
century even
if
she could
be inferior to
him in terms
of creativity.
Brody (1974,
pp
84-88)
alone
in Marxian literature
regards
unskilled
labour
as
the
social average.
But Brody does
not enter
into
a
deep discussion
of
its
significance,
but
simply assumes
it. He
only
tried to justify the
circularity
thereby
caused.
We
will show
later in
this
section
that his
circularity originates
from the lack
of
the
concept of
the
substance of value
(viz.
the lack
of
the distinction
between
abstract and
homogeneous labour)
rather
than from the definition
labour
as a social average.
When Marx's
equivalence of
<simple,
unskilled
labour
= social
average
labour> is
admitted,
then it
will
be
only
the labours
whose
degree
of skill
is
above
the
social average
that
can count as skilled,
complex
labour.
The labours
whose
degree
of skill
is below the
social
-
152
-
average
will not
be
actually employed
in
production unless morally
protected
as
in the
case of
disabled
people.
Therefore, the
reduction
proportion
for
any actually employed
labour,
a,, will
be
not
less than
unity,
i.
e.
a.
>
1,
where
i is for
actually employed.
...........
(1).
If
we
take
all
individual labours
actually employed
in the
society,
however, the
social
labour
as a whole shall count as simple,
unskilled
labour. This is because the
social
labour in its
entirety
is
not
developed in
any special way, must
he the
same as a social average
labour. The
reduction proportion
for the
whole
labour, therefore,
will
he
unity,
i.
e.
E(a1)= 1,
..................
(2}
,
where
E(a1) is the
arithmetical average of als and
i
is for
actually
employed.
One
may
deny the
relationship,
(2), for
several reasons.
Perhaps the first
reason could
be that the
unemployed
labours
whose
degree
of skill
is below the
social avearge should
have been
calculated
in (2). We
may answer
to this
question
that
even
if they
are not
calculated,
the
reduction proportion of
the
social
labour
must
he
unity
as
far
as
the
social
labour itself is
not
developed in
any special way,
which,
by Marx's definition (1976a,
p
135),
should
be
simple
labour. Of
course, when we compare
different
several social
labours
at
the level
of
the international
economy, even a whole social
labour
can
be defined
as
the
one
developed in
a special way compared
to
another social
labour.
In this
case,
the
whole social
labours
cannot count as simple, unskilled
labour. But, here,
we pay attention only
to
a single society.
The
relationship
between (1)
and
(2) indicates
a contradiction
between the
whole and
the
parts,
between the totality
and
individual
parts, which can convert
into
an
inimical
contradiction among
individual
-
153
-
labours
within
the
society.
But, be it
noted, all
this is in the
case
of simple
commodity production; so, even an
individual labourer
counts
as producing
value.
The
for
each
individual labour,
according
to (1),
is
not
below
unity while
the
simple arithmetical average of
those
proportions
is
unity according
to
(2).
It follows from this that
the
for
every
individual labour
must
be
unity,
i.
e.
a1=
1
where
i
is for
actually employed
.....
(3).
This tells
us
that
every
individual labour in the
simple
commodity production must count as equal
human labour. Yet
when
this
principle applies and
thus
when a new
industry
or a new
invention is to
be introduced
counting as an above-average,
i.
e. whose reduction
proportion
is determined
over and above unity,
there
can
he
a
revolutionary effect
in the
structure of
the
society.
Let
us examine
this
more closely.
When
a certain
individual labour is to
count as a multiplied
simple
labour,
another part of social
labour is then
enforced
to
count
as a
below-average. This
part which counts as a
below-average
would
he
then
ceaselessly
threatened to be
weeded out as a superfluous, redundant
kind
and eventually as
the
proletariat unless
its
is
protected
from being lower than
unity
by the
society.
For instance,
when one unit of newly
introduced labour
counts as
skilled, complex
labour,
whose reduction proportion
being determined
at
8, i.
e. an=
8, then to keep the
social average at unity
in line
with
the
relation,
(2),
we need, say,
70
units of other previously employed
labour to
count as
the below-average
whose reduction coefficient
is to
he 0.9, for the
social average
for the 71
units of
individual labours
=1 =(1x8+70x0.9)/71.
But,
after awhile,
the labours
whose reduction
-154-
proportions
are enforced
to
count as
0.9
must recover all
their
original
normal states and
the
newly
introduced labour
with
its
reduction
proportion,
an=
8
must also
become the
simple, ordinary
labour. Why?
If the
newly
introduced labour,
whose reduction proportion
counted as
8
units of simple
labour,
an=
8,
persist
to have the
same
reduction proportion, which case
is
possible when
the labour is
especially
in
short supply and precious, no
doubt the labours
whose
reduction proportions were enforced
by it to
count as
0.9,
as
below-
averages, will struggle
to
recover
their
original normal states, or
shall change
into
another concrete useful
form to
resume
the
normal
state.
So, in the
meantime while others resume
the
normal state,
the
labours
which are-enforced
to
count as a
below-average
will
become
gradually
minority.
That is, 35
units of simple
labour instead
of
70
units,
for instance,
will now
be
enforced
to
count as
the below-average
but
with ai=
0.8
so as
to
recoup
the
gap
caused
by
an=
8, i.
e.
the
social average
for 36 individual labours= I
=(1x8+35x0.8)/36.
This
process will
go
on
further
until some part
is finally
weeded out
from
the
society and
then
repeating
the
same process
to
make another part
weeded out.
This
also expresses
the
contradiction
between the
whole and
its
parts,
between
social average and
individuals,
which
in the
end
leads to the
contradiction
between individual labours in the
society.
After
all, although,
in the
context of each
individual labour,
the
reduction proportion may well
have
a certain
degree
of
freedom to
count as an above-average
or as a
below-average depending
on
its
individual.
effort and struggle,
in the
context of
the
social
labour
as a
whole,
there
is
a
definite limit to
such an
individual freedom. This
contradiction
between the
whole and
its
parts
is
common
to
all sorts of
organism of a non-mechanical
character, which
implies
a
fierce
-
155
-
competition
for
survival
between individual
parts of
the
whole.
When
a part of social
labour is to
count as a skilled, complex
labour
either
because
of
its
precious quality or
because
of
its
traditional
convention,
then
some other part of social
labour
will
naturally
be
enforced
to
count as a
below-average
and
in
some cases will
finally be
weeded out.
If the labour that
counts as a
below-average is
still required not
to he
weeded out
for
a social. need
despite
still
being forced to
count as a
below-average, then
a certain social caste, a
social
tradition,
a convention, a prejudice, or a religious coercion
will
be
required
to
employ
it:
actually,
the
relationship
(3) is itself
impracticable. When there is
no
longer
social caste, social
tradition,
custom, prejudices, etc. required
to justify the
multiplication of
the
reduction proportions
for
certain
individual labours, then
we
have
either
to
obstruct or
to
reverse
the
multiplication effect
itself
of
the
skilled, complex
labours.
We have
a
good
historical
example
here, in 16th
century
England,
rising
industries in town did
cause
the
collapse of
the
most
traditional
industry
such as agriculture.
To
prevent
the
collapse of
the
traditional
sector, a
feudal
reaction
from the
agricultural
landlords
shifted
the burden
originally
imposed
onto
the
whole agricultural sector
onto
the
shoulder of
the
agricultural workers
(see Dobb, 1967, Chap. 2,
esp. pp
63-7). Another
example
in
a capitalist society,
"Where, for
instance, the
physique of
the
working class
has deteriorated
and
is,
relatively speaking, exhausted, which
is the
case
in
all countries where
is highly developed, the lower forms
of
labour,
which
demand
great expenditure of muscle, are
in
general considered as
higher forms,
compared
with much more
delicate forms
of
labour; the
latter
sink
down to the
level
of simple
labour. " (Marx, 1976a,
p.
305, f
-
156
-
19}.
In
short,
in
it is
a rule of
(3)
that the
reduction
coefficient
of each
labour
will eventually
become
almost
nearly equalised as unity, which means
the
social castes,
traditions,
prejudices, customs,
illusory
evaluation of prestigious
jobs,
etc. will
eventually
be
eroded
by the development
of commodity production
(either
by
an underground economy or
by
a social reformation).
This tendency
can work only
through the fierce
struggles
for
survival
between
independent
commodity producers
(this is because,
as
is
seen
in 2.3,
there is
no
job
an ordinary, normal
labour-power
cannot afford
to do
successfully when a sufficient education, experience,
training,
etc. are
provided).
3.2.2 Capitalist Commodity Production Case
A
is distinguished from
simple commodity
production
for two
reasons.
One is the
separation of
the
means of
production
from direct
producers, viz.
the
commoditization of
labour-
powers.
The
other
is the
substitution of an
independent individual
labourer
with a collective
labourer in
production, viz.
individual
labourers
can no more produce value on
their
own and cannot count as
abstract and as concrete
labour. Thus,
our reduction problem
in this
case
does
not concern
the heterogeneous individual labours but
only
concerns
different kinds
of collective
labourer in different
sectors of
productions.
However,
the
substitution of
the independent individual labourer
with a collective
labourer
results
in
a significant change
in the
-
157
-
implication
of
the
reduction proportions.
In
simple commodity
production,
a new
industry
or a new
invention
can
hardly
count as an
above-average
as
it
may
have
a revolutionary effect causing
the falling
out of
traditional
sector of production, e.
g.
agriculture.
In the
case
of capitalist production,
however, the differential
reduction
proportions of
different kinds
of concrete
labour
may
be
possible even
without causing any
distortion to
occur
in the traditional
sector of
production; newly arising
industries
can prosper at any
time
with no
harmful
effect on
the traditional
sector of production.
Why?
Because
each
kind
of concrete
labour
now consists of a
collective
labourer
containing many
individual
workers,
the burden
originally
imposed
onto an
individual labourer in the
case of simple
is
now
imposed
onto a whole collective
labourer.
It, therefore, becomes
possible
to
shift
the burden
originally
imposed
onto a collective
labourer
onto
the
shoulder of a certain stratum of
individual
worker within
the
collective
labourer,
onto
the different
races, sexes, ages of
the
collective
labourer. In
a word,
the hierarchy
of skilled and unskilled
labour between different branches
of production
can easily
transform into the hierarchy
of wage
differentials
within
the
collective
labourers. This,
of course, may
hold
even with a sort of
inter-sectoral discrimination
of reduction coefficients.
In
view of
this,
so-called uneven
development between different
sectors of production
is
now materially possible
in the
capitalist
production.
In the
case of simple commodity production,
the
uneven
development,
unless
it is
short-lived, may
have
caused a serious
distortion to the
economy, e.
g.
the
collapse of
the
most
traditional
industry
such as agriculture or
the feudal
reaction
from the
agricultural
sides
in the 16th
century
England. Only in this
very
-158-
context,
Marx linked
the
reduction problem of skilled
to
unskilled
labour
to the
problem of wage
differentials,
as
in the following:
"A
simple working-day,
for
example,
is
not a measure of value
if
there
are other working-days which, compared with
days
of simple
labour, have
the
effect of composite working-days.
Ricardo
showed
that this fact does
not prevent
the
measurement of commodities
by
labour-time
if the
relation
between
unskilled and skilled
labour is
given.
He has indeed
not
described how this
relation
develops
and
is determined.
This belongs to the definition
of wages, and,
in
the last
analysis, can
be
reduced
to the different
values of
labour-
power
itself, that is, its
varying production costs
(determined by
labour-time). " (1972,
p.
165)
In the
above,
Marx
accuses
Ricardo
of not
having described how the
relationship
between
unskilled and skilled
labour is determined,
and
then links the
reduction problem
to the
problem of wage
differentials.
But, today, Marx
also
is
accused of
having left the
problem of reduction
unresolved:
to link it to the
problem of wage
differentials
cannot
be
a
solution
to the
reduction problem,
because the
wage
differentials
are
rather
to be
considered as a result of
the determination
of
the
magnitudes of value whilst
the
reduction of skilled
to
unskilled
labour
is
a premise
of
the
magnitude of value.
As is
well
known,
when
Marx discussed the determination
of
the
magnitude of value,
he
simply assumed away every
form
of
labour directly
to
count as a simple
labour,
either
"for
the
sake of simplicity"
(1976a,
p.
135)
or
because "The laws
governing
this
reduction
do
not concern us
here" (1970,
P.
31). By
contrast,
however,
when
he discussed
a
capitalist production of
the
value,
Marx
again attributed
the
reduction
problem
to the
problem of
the
wage
differentials
as was
briefly
discussed in 3.1.1 before.
"We
stated
on a previous page
that in the
valorization process
it
does
not
in the
least
matter whether
the labour
appropriated
by the
capitalist
is
simple
labour
of average social quality, or more
-159-
complex
labour, labour
with a
higher
specific
gravity
as
it
were.
All labour
of a
higher,
than
average
labour
is
expenditure of
labour-power
of a more costly
kind, labour-
power whose production
has
cost more
time
and
labour than
unskilled
or simple
labour-power,
and which
therefore has
a
higher
value.
This
power
being
of
higher
value,
it
expresses
itself in labour
of
a
higher
sort, and
therefore becomes
objectified,
during
an equal
amount of
time, in
proportionally
higher
values.
" (1976a,
pp
304-5)
In the
above,
he
says
two things; the labour-power
of a
higher
character
(1) has
a
higher
value
(obtains
a
higher
wage-rate), and at
the
same
time
(2) becomes
objectified
in
proportionally
higher
values3.
This
remark might seem contradictory
to the
aforesaid proposition
that
an
individual labour-power,
so
far
as
it is
not an
independent
producer,
cannot produce any value at all
(it
produces value only as an organ of a
collective
labourer). But the two
remarks are apparently on
the
premise
that
each
labour-power
works as an organ of
the
collective
labourer,
3
The
passage quoted
in the
above
from Marx
(1976a) has been interpreted
one-sidedly and quoted partially
by two distinct
groups.
The
phrase
which reads,
"All labour
of a
higher,
than
average
labour is
expenditure of
labour-power
of a more costly
kind, labour-power
whose production
has
cost more
time
and
labour than
unskilled or simple
labour-power. " is the
one.
The
phrase which reads
"All labour
of a
higher,
or more complicated character
than
average
labour
...
which
therefore has
a
higher
value.
" is the
other.
The
one
is
exploited
in the indirect labour
method,
the
other
is
exploited
in
the
reduction
by
money wages.
As for the first
phrase,
to begin
with,
it in
no respect says
that
unskilled or simple
labour
costs nothing
in
training
and education, nor
that the
unskilled, simple
labour is below
the
social average.
But it
rather
implies that
average
labour is
not of
a
higher
character, whose production
has
not cost more
time than
unskilled
labour,
which
has
not a
higher
value, since
the
complicated
labour in the
above
is
compared not with unskilled
labour but
with
average
labour. As for the
second phrase,
the
word,
therefore
in the
phrase,
does
not
imply
`because
of
its higher
or more complicated
character'
but
rather
`because
whose production
has
cost more
time
and
labour than
unskilled
or simple
labour-power'. It does
not say
that
a
complicated
labour has
more value,
the
more value
it
produces.
We have
to
repeat again an
individual labourer
cannot produce value and so
cannot count as abstract
labour. But the last
phrase
in the
above
quote,
`This
power
being
of
higher
value,
it
expresses
itself in labour
of a
higher
sort, and
therefore
becomes
objectified,
during
an equal
amount of
time,
in
proportionally
higher
values.
' does
need attention as
in
our main
text
above.
-
160
-
i.
e. every
labour-power is
equally subsumed
under
the
same variable
capital.
Hence,
as a part of
the
same variable capital, every
labour-
power
is homogeneous
with every other as a certain part of
the
quantum,
variable capital, and
to that
extent
is-proportionally
objectified
in
the
value production.
This has
no relation
to the law
of equal rates of
surplus value, which cannot apply
between two distinct individual
labourers but
only
between two distinct
variable capitals
in the two
different
sectors of production.
It is true that individual labour-
power cannot produce value
independently,
and so cannot
have its
own
rate of surplus-value.
But
each
individual labour-power
can
be
objectified
(can be
contained)
in
a proportional amount of value
if
only
it is
posited as

part of
the
same variable capital and
thus
as an
organ of
the
same collective
labourer (some
wage
labour
cannot
be
posited as a part of variable capital
however,
e.
g.
machine repairer).
But the
problem still remains; why
the
reduction problem which
is
a premise pre-requisite
of
the
magnitude of
value
is to he dissolved into the
problem of
the
wage-differentials
which
is, however,
not a premise
but the
product of
the determination
of
the
value-magnitude.
3.2.3 Indirect Labour
and
Direct Labour
The
reason why
the
reduction problem
has
changed
its
character
from
a
premise
of
the
magnitude of value
into
a product
of
its determination
consists
in the
split-up of new value
into the two
separate parts
of v and s caused
by the
separation of
the
means of
production
from direct
producers.
-
161
-
Marx's formula
of a value account, c+v+s, expresses,
first
of
all,
an addition
of c
to the
new value, v+s.
"c"
expresses
the
value of
production
materials.
The
production material
is
consumed
in
production
process
but its
value
is
not consumed.
Why? Because its
consumption
is
not a consumption proper
but
a productive consumption.
Why is it
a
productive consumption?
Because its
consuming activity
is
a socially
useful
labour.
The
socially useful, concrete character of
its
consumption
has kept the
value of
the
production material alive, and
thus has
made
it transferred to the
value of
its
excretion
(to
the
value
of
its
product).
The
abstract character of
the
activity
has
created a
new value
to the
amount of v+s.
becomes
c+v+s.
Hence, the
value of
the
new product
But the formula
of
the
newly created value,
i.
e. v+s,
does
not
express an addition of v and s
but
a split-up of one single entity
into
the two
parts of v and s
because the initial
productive consumption
activity
is
a single activity.
To that
extent,
the
magnitude of each
element
in the formula,
c+v+s
is determined by different
principles.
To begin
with, we
have
made a clear
distinction between direct
and
indirect labour in 3.0. The
magnitude of c,
that is, the
amount of
indirect labour
cannot
be
calculated
directly from the
actually
historically
expended
labours in
producing
the
We distinguish between direct
and
indirect labour
only when
individual
commodities are
taken into
account separately,
i.
e. exchange
processes are necessarily
involved
and so
the
production materials are
not produced
by the immediate
producer
but
purchased.
The indirect
labour, therefore,
is
not
directly
related
to the
current production
condition of
the
commodity
but, instead, is linked
to the
ad
infinitum
production conditions
of all
the
other commodities
directly
or
-
162
-
indirectly.
Instead
of considering such
infinite
sequences, we can
calculate
the
amount of
the indirect labour by
reference
to the
current
market
value of
the
production material.
This
calculation
is
not
circular as
long
as
the
other part of
the
commodity value,
the
amount of
the direct labour, is
calculated
by
reference
to
production.
Since
market value may not coincide with
its
social value,
the
amount of
labour
represented
in
c will normally
differ from the
amount of
labour
actually expended
historically in
producing
the
producing materials.
As for the direct labour,
on
the
other
hand, the
newly created
value, v+s,
is to be
valued
in terms
of embodied
labour
as a production
category as
it is
calculated
by
reference
to the
current production
condition.
But they
are not measurable
in the
production sphere as
they
t
are
diachronic
and
heterogeneous, that is,
r
i(t)dt
is
a
black-box
where
Jo
i(t) is the intensity
of
labour
as a
function
of
time
and
its duration
is t. However, thanks to the
split-up of
the direct labour into the two
terms
of v and s,
the
newly created value
has
already
become
possible
to
be
measured since
the
magnitude of v
is directly
observable
in terms
of
represented
labour from the
market value of
labour-powers
and
that
of s
(=ev) is
also observable
in the
same
terms of the
represented
labour if
we
know
a certain rate of exploitation, e.
This is because
we
know
Ji
t
theoreticlly
(t)dt
=v+s =v(l+e).
If
only we measure
those
vis and
sIs simultaneously at
the
same market place
for different
sectors of
production,
those
are always reducible
to homogeneous
and synchronous
labour.
The
(e)
is
not
directly
observable at
the
market place and
hence the
newly created value, v+s,
too is
still
immeasurable. For this
very reason, we would rather
have to
say,
the
-
163
-
formula,
v+s=(l+e)v, expresses
the
magnitude of value not as
the
represented
but
as
the
embodied
labour
'amount.
Although it is
valued
by
reference
to the
market value of
labour-powers in terms
of represented
labour, its
valuation
terms
cannot change
its
character as embodied
labour.
We
will show
in 4.2 it is
a rule
that
an embodied
labour,
an
internal
magnitude must rely on
its
external magnitude
(the
represented
labour) for its
own expression
(see (P4.3)). In this
case,
it is
not
the
amount of v
but the
calibration of
the
scale of
direct labour (v+s)
that is
expressed
by
external magnitudes.
In
sum, even
though it
appears
to be
circular at
first
sight, our solution
is
valid as non-
circular as
far
as
the
(e) is
given
independently
of exchange and as
far
as
the individual labour-powers
cannot produce
any value unless as an organ of a collective
labourer.
To
conclude,
the fact that the
embodied
labour
as a
determinant
of
the
magnitude of
the
value newly created, v+s, appears
itself
as
if
being
a represented
labour
rather explains
that
we measure
the
amount of
direct labour
objectively
in terms
of socially average unit.
We
shall
show
in the
next chapter
that
even
the
(e),
too
can
he
calculated
indirectly from
market values without committing any
circularity.
Our
solution
to the
reduction problem
in the
above
has been
founded basically
on
the
embodied
labour theory
of value.
This
position
is, however, distinct from the
classical as well as
from the
modern
form
of
the
embodied
labour theories
of value4.
The
classical and
the
modern
4
The two
versions of
the
embodied
labour theory
of value we call
the
classical and
the
modern
form
of
it. Its
classical
form
as presented
in
e.
g.
Hilferding
(1984), Dobh
(1940,1973), Sweezy
(1942),
etc. can
he
characterised
as
being in
a uni-directional causality, while
the
modern
form
as presented
in
e.
g.
Morishima (1973), Brody
(1974),
etc. can
he
characterised
as a circularity.
Each
of
the
corresponding mathematical
equation of
the two
versions
is
as
follows;
-
164
-
form
of
the
embodied
labour
theory
of value,
first
of all,
do
not admit
that the
embodied
labour
must rely on
the
represented
labour for its
own
quantitative
expression, and secondly,
do
not
discriminate direct labour
from indirect labour in its
calculation principle.
Because
of
these two
facts,
they have failed in
presenting
the
value
theory in
an empirically
measurable way.
Even
worse,
the
modern
form
of
it has
committed a
circularity.
It
starts
from
a
definition
that <value
=
labour>
and yet
returns
to the
same
definition
<value
=
homogeneous labour>. Let
us
examine why
it is
circular.
The
corresponding mathematical equation of
the
modern
form
of
the
embodied
labour theory
of value
is
A=AA+1,
i.
e.
A(1-A)=1,
where
A
denotes
a value
vector, Aa technical
coefficient matrix and
I the
coefficient vector of
labour-inputs.
In
principle,
this formula is
not
solvable
by
A=1(1-A)-1
because
value
itself is
not reversible
into
a
certain amount of embodied
labour but
only
into
a represented
labour
amount
instead. Moreover,
even
the
original equation
form,
A=AA+1,
is
also
dubious because it is based
on a strict additivity of
labours. But
there
cannot
be
a strict additivity
for the
collective
labourer in
a
capitalist production; as we said earlier
in 3.0,
when
10 individual
labourers
of average quality work
together for 10 hours, they
can
produce more
than 10 times
of
the
value which one
individual labourer
of
the best
quality can produce
10 hours. This Marx
called a co-operation
effect
(cf. Marx, 1976a,
pp
439-454).
the
uni-directional
causality---*
A=AA+1
[or
A(1-A)=1J
but
AA1(l-A)
-1
the
circular
causality
--+
A=AA+1
[or
A(1-A)=1]
as well as
A=1(1-A)-1
where
A
is
a value vector,
A is
a
technical
coefficient vector and
1 the
vector of
labour-inputs.
The
meaning of
the
equations are
discussed in
the
main
text.
-
165
-
The
reason
for the irreversibility
of value
(A) into
embodied
labour (1(1-A)-1)
is in the distinctive
nature of
direct
and
indirect
labour.
Only direct labours,
and
thus
only newly created value part can
have the
reversibility of value
into
embodied
labour
and of
the
embodied
labour into
value.
In
case of
the indirect labour, however,
since value
deviates from
exchange-value,
the
amount of represented
labour
obtained
from the
exchange-value
is
not reversible
into the
amount of embodied
labour.
The formula becomes
solvable
in the
way of
A
=1(1-A)-1, only
when we presume
the
amount of
the
embodied
labour
of
input
materials
is
equal with
the
amount of
the
represented
labour in the
market values of
the input
materials.
In
view of
this,
we
have to
say,
the
modern
form
of
the
embodied
labour theory
of value
has been
grounded
on a violent
assumption on
the input
values.
In
our case,
however, the
embodied
labour is
referred
to
only
in
case of new value
(v+s),
and
hence it is
only a currently expended rather
than historically
expended
labour
which
determines the
magnitude of value.
We
said
in
a previous
footnote, 4, that the
violent assumption
for the input-values
made
the
embodied
labour theory
of value
become
circular.
You
may say,
however, that the
violent assumption
itself
can
make
the
embodied
labour theory
of value
be in
a uni-directional
causality as
it
starts
from direct labour
expenditure,
1,
and
from these
premises, using
the
operator
((1-A)-i), it deduces the
conclusion,
A
(that is, through the
operator
(1-A)-1,
we proceed
from 1 to
A).
Yet,
as
long
as
the
substance of value
(hinan labour) is
specifically
distinguished from the
value
itself, it
can
hardly deny its
circular
character.
It turns
out
to he
circular once
it is transformed into
an
-
166
-
eigen-equation
system
in
a von-Neuman-like
spirit
for
a closed model,
AAA*. The
self-contained
(closed)
system
does
reveal
its
circular
character;
it
starts
from
A
and
deduces its
own premises,
A.
again.
It
defines
values
by
values,
idem
per
idem-,
moving
in
a circle rather
than
reducing values
to
something
given previously.
Most Marxian
economists who use a simultaneous equation system
to
calculate value magnitudes e.
g.
Brody (1974),
Morishima (1973),
Roemer (1982),
Steedman (1975,1977),
etc. are
in this
circular
reasoning.
Among them,
only
Brody (1974)
made
this
point explicitly
clear;
"The
Marxian development
of
labour theory has been
severely
criticised
because
of
its "circularity".
The
proper answer
to this
does
not consist
in denying it but in
clarifying
the
role, scope,
appropriateness and consistency of certain
"circular" definitions
used
for defining
value or prices.
The
eigenvalue equation
Ax=x is
itself
a circular
definition in
x, and yet
its
analytical value
is
clear.
Our
mathematically
formulated definitions
of value prices,
production prices and
two-channel
prices are eigenvalue equations.
Each
of
these definitions is
unambiguous and analytically
straightforward.
" (Brody, 1974,
pp166-7)
This is the
position most
Marxian
economists who are neo-classically
oriented
have
so
far taken. They
use a simultaneous equation system
in
a von
Neuman-like
spirit, which
is based
on
the basic
assumption
that
the
amount of embodied
labour
of a commodity
is
equal
to the
amount of
represented
labour in the
commodity's value.
Actually,
as
long
as we
remain
in
such a circular reasoning, all
the discussion
on
the
substance
of value
definitely turns
out
to be
virtually nothing, as
Steedman
showed
in his
article
(1985)
and argued
there,
"The
concept of
'abstract labour, '
which
Marx links
so
tightly to
the
concept
of value and
to the
role of
gold
as
the
'universal
equivalent,
' is
a metaphor
for the fact
that
each specific
labour
is
one part of
the
social
division
of
labour. Apart from
any use
in
reminding
one of
this fact, the
metaphor and
the
concept can
he
-
167
-
discarded
at zero cost
to Marx's theory.
Marx's
search
for the
substance
of value produced only a. phrase--abstract
labour--which
has
no
genuine
explanatory content.
" (Steedman, 1985,
p
573)
What is
at
issue here is therefore
how to
deal
with
Brody (1974)'s
justification
of
the
circularity.
In
physics,
the forces
of
gravitation
is in
a complete circle, which
describes the
external relation of
individual bodies.
But
when we
take the
whole universe as a single
entity,
the forces
of
gravitation
are suppressed
into
nothing.
The
universe
becomes
nothing.
As Steedman (1985)
concluded, once we accept
the
circularity, we cannot
help but discard the
labour
as
the inward
nature of
the
phenomenon.
Actually,
as
is
seen
in the
above,
the
embodied
labour theory
of
value, classical-as well as von-Neuman-like modern
form, has
explained
nothing about
the
magnitude of value,
i.
e. neither
the
substance of
value nor
the
nature of value magnitude as
it
always remain
in
a
complete circle of
definitions.
But the
crucial point
in
countering
the
circularity
is here in
the irreversibility
of a value
into
a certain amount of embodied
labour
just like the irreversibility
of use-value
into the
useful concrete
form
of
labour. The irreversibility itself is incomprehensible
without
the
category of
the
substance of value, without
abstract and concrete
labour, between direct
and
indirect labour,
between
embodied and represented
labour, between
past and present
labour,
etc., etc.
In
conclusion,
the formula,
A=c+v+s,
is basically
on
the
separation of production
category
(v+s)
and exchange category
(c)
whereas
the formula,
(c+v)(l+r)=PrPr,
where r
is the
rate of profit and
PrPr is the
price
of production,
is
on
the
unity of
the
production and
the
exchange,
which shall
be discussed in detail in the
next chapter.
-
168
-
As
against
these two,
when we analyse
the
substance of value
in Chapter
2,
we must not
distinguish between direct
and
indirect labour but
rather
take
all
individual
aspects and elements
in the totality to trace hack
to the
substance of
them,
which
is
why
in the
previous chapter we
have
assumed
the immediate identity
of production and exchange
(just
as,
in
von-Neuman's case, production relation
is directly identical
with
exchange relation).
-
169
-
3.3.
The Value
of
Labour-Power
As is
said
in the
previous sections,
in 2.2,3.0,3.1
and
3.2, labour-
power
is
also a commodity.
As far
as
it is
a commodity,
its
value
is to
be determined
by the
amount of
labour
contained
in it. But
when
discussing
its
magnitude of value,
it has
often purplexed most writers
for the
reason
that the
amount of
labour
contained
in the labour-power
has been hard to define.
In the
case of ordinary commodities, as
is
seen
in the
previous
section,
the
amount of
labour
contained
in
a commodity
is
calculated
by
reference
to the.
market value of
its
(for indirect
labour)
and
the
value of
labour-power
plus
the
(for
direct labour). But in
case of
the labour-power, the
method
is
disarrayed. In Marx's
case, according
to Harvey
(1985),
there
are
two
distinct
versions
in
explaining
the
value of
labour-power. He
said;
"The first formulation
attributes
the
value of
labour-power to the
total
amount of socially necessary
labour
required
to
reproduce
the
worker's
labour-power. The
second attributes
the
value of
labour-
power
to
only
that
part of
this
socially necessary
labour for
which
the
worker must pay a monetary equivalent.
In
short,
the first
constitutes a
true labour theory
of
the
value of
labour-power,
while
the
second constitutes what could more properly
be termed
an
incurred-cost-of-production theory
of
the
value of
labour-power. "
(Harvey, 1985,
p
85, italics
are
by LEE)
Harvey in the
above
formulates two
`distinct' labour theories
of value
in the
case of
the
value of
labour-power. One is
a
true labour theory
of value,
the
other
is
an
incurred-cost theory
of value.
He
argues
the
two formulations
are not compatible with each other.
"Marx himself
claims
that the two formulations
are equivalent,
but
recent
discussions
of
the
role of
housework in the determination
of
-
170
-
the
value of
labour-power have
shown
that they
are not.
" (ihid,
p
85)
A difference
between
the two formulations,
according
to him,
rests on
whether
or not
the labour
of
the
workers'
housewives
can enter
into the
calculation
of
the labour
contained
in the labour-power. Harvey
argues
that it
enters
in the
case of
the true labour theory
of value
but it
does
not
in that
of
the incurred-cost theory
of value
for the
reason
that the labour
of
the
workers'
housewives is
not paid
by
money.
So,
Harvey
argues,
the two formulations
of
the labour theory
of value are
not equivalent
despite Marx's
claim of
the
equivalency.
Now in this
section, we shall show
are equivalent
that
even
in
the
`true labour theory
of value',
the housewives' labour does
not enter
into the
calculation of
the labour
contained
in the labour-power.
First
of all,
if
we examine
the direct labour
part contained
in
the
commodity, we can
take
notice of a
big difference between the two
cases of
labour-power
and ordinary commodity.
To
put
it in
plain
terms,
the labour-power,
unlike other ordinary commodities, contains no
direct
labour
part.
The
commodity
is
not offered
for
sale
in the form
of a
thing but in the form
of an activity.
Take
an example
in the
case of a
singer.
All his (or her)
activity
in
practising,
learning,
etc.
does
not enter
into the direct labour
part required
for the
production of
his
(or her)
public performance.
5
The
singing on
the
stage
(not
a rehearsal
but
a public performance) can only enter
category
required
for the
production of
the
singing.
But because the direct
5
If it
could
go
into
a
direct labour
part,
the
whole amount of
it
must
be
embodied
once and
for
all
in the
value of
the
commodity
(the
performance).
Because
it is indirect labour,
only a part of
it is
transfered
to the
value of
the
commodity.
The
whole
indirect labour, in
this
case, plays
a role as a sort of
fixed
capital.
-
171
-
labour (the
singing)
is itself
a commodity
inseparable from the
singing
activity
itself, it
cannot
be
contained
in the
commodity alongside
indirect
lahours.
6
So, the direct labour is
not embodied
in the
singing.
It is directly
consumed
the
moment
it is
produced.
Yet,
when
the
singing
is
recorded as a separate commodity
form in
a cassette,
the
song recorded
by him (or her)
can enter
category
required
for the
production of
the
cassette while
the
practice,
learning,
etc.
does
go
into the indirect labour
category.
The
same
applies
to the
case of
the labour-power.
In the labour-power,
no
direct
labour is
contained.
Its direct labour
part
is
only expended
in
producing other commodities rather
than the labour-power itself.
Then,
what about
the indirect labour
part required
for the
production of
the
commodity,
labour-power? We
can see no
difference
between the two
cases of
the labour-power
and other ordinary commodity.
In the
case of
the
ordinary commodity,
the
amount of
indirect labour is
determined by the labour
represented
in the
market value of
the
production materials rather
than the labour historically
expended.
Since it is
calculated
from the
market value,
the
so-called unpaid part
of
the historically
expended
labour
cannot
go
into this
category.
The
same applies
to the labour-power
case.
The
worker's own activity
for
his
own
life,
e.
g.
cooking, studying, exercise,
toiletting,
sleeping,
drinking,
etc. which are not paid
by
money cannot enter
into the
6
Singing
itself is
a commodity and, since
the `singing' labour is
not
congealed
in the
commodity
but, instead, is immediately
consumed
the
moment
it is
expended, cannot produce any value.
Remember
we said
in
2.2.4 that
abstract
labour
can produce a value only
because the human
labour is
congealed
and
thus
can
transpire into homogeneous labour. If
a
human labour is
not congealed,
it
can not
become
a
homogeneous labour.
If it
cannot
become
a
homogeneous labour, it
cannot
he
crystalised as a
commodity
value.
-
172
-
indirect
labour
category even
though those
activities are essential
in
producing
his labour-power. But if he (or
she)
buys
such activities
with money,
the
payment will make
the
cost
he
a part of
the indirect
labour.
By
contrast,
if
such services were offered
free by his
wife
(or
by her husband),
then the
service cannot enter
into the indirect labour
calculation.
As far
as
this indirect labour
category
is
concerned,
there
can
he
no
difference between the labour-power
and
the
other
ordinary commodity.
So,
as
far
as
this indirect labour
part
is
concerned,
there is
no
inconsistency in Marx's labour theory
of value.
Returning to the direct labour
case again,
the fact that the
labour-power,
unlike other ordinary commodities, contains no
direct
labour
part
implies that its
value
has
nothing
to do
with
the
category
of embodied
labour but
only with
that
of represented
labour. This,
however,
cannot constitute any reason
for the
alleged
inconsistency
of
of value.
of value simply
commands
that if there is
no
direct labour,
no additional value cannot
he
counted
in. So, in the
case of
labour-power,
we
did
not count
in
any
new value.
If this is
understood,
the
so-called
incompatibility between
of
Marx's
explanation of
the
value of
labour-power
can no
longer hold. The total
necessary
labour-time
required
for the
production of
the labour-power is itself
equivalent with
the
amount of
incurred-cost for its
production, which
in turn
rests on
the
general
standard of
living
of
the labourer
and,
in its final
analysis,
is
closely
bound
up with
historical
and moral elements,
the
class struggle,
etc.
Therefore, given
the
compatibility of
the two
versions,
the
labour
of
the
workers'
housewives does
not enter
into the
calculation of
the labour
contained
in the
commodity,
labour-power.
But the
surplus-
-
173
-
labour
of
the
workers'
teachers, if it be in
reality, will
have to
go
into
the incurred-cost
and
thus into the
calculation of
the labour
contained
in the labour-power because it
would
have
already
been
paid
for by
the
workers' money.
All this
explains why
historical
and moral
elements play a role
in determining the
amount of
indirect labour, the
incurred-cost in the
production of
the labour-power,
which relates
to
the living
standard of
the
workers.
-
174
-
4. TRANSFORMATION
PROBLEM
4.0
Overview
In this
chapter, we are
going
to discuss
another category, price of
production.
This
category
is based
on
the idea that
competing capitals
move
from
one
industry to
another
in
search of
higher
profits.
Where
profits are
high,
an
inflow
of capital
lowers the
profits
by increasing
supply and
depressing
price.
The
effect
is to form
prices of production
with a single
general
rate of profit.
If
commodities exchange at
their
values, and profits
(or
surplus-values) accrue
in
proportion
to the
amount of variable capital
only,
then
equal
investments
of capital would yield
different
rates of
profit
depending
on whether more or
less is
put
into
variable or
constant capital.
But this
contradicts
the
obvious
fact that,
under
capitalist competition, equal
investments,
regardless of
their
composition,
tend to
yield equal profits.
Marx
attempted
to
explain
that
such
deviations
of value
from
price of production were not
inconsistent
with
the labour theory
of value.
He
showed
how
prices of
production were related
to
values
in his Capital,
vol.
III, Chapters 1-
12.
In
volume
III
of
Capital, Marx
works out
the
relationship
between
value and price of production
by
starting
from
a value system
in
which
the
composition
of capitals varies, with a consequent multiplicity
of profit rates.
Then he takes the
average of
these
profit rates and
calculates prices of production
by the formula,
c+v+(c+v)r=price of
production
where
c and v represent quantities
in individual branches
of
-
175
-
production,
and r
the
average rate of profit.
As
a result,
Marx
maintains
that total
value equals
total
price of production and
total
surplus-value
equals
total
profit.
This, however,
was criticised
by Boehm-Bawerk (1984). He
(ihid,
pp
32-38) believes
that the
whole operation of
transforming
values
into
is futile,
as
far
as
individual
values
differ from
individual
prices of production, on
the
grounds
that the theory
of value
must explain,
first
of all,
the
exchange relation
between individual
commodities.
Hilferding (1984,
pp
159-162)
refutes
this
criticism
saying
that the two
equalities
between total
value and
total
price of
production and
total
surplus-value and
total
profit are enough
to define
the individual
exchange relations
in terms
of
both
value and price of
production.
In the
next round,
Bortkiewicz (1952,1984)
argued
that the two
equalities
by
which
Hilferding
refuted
Boehm-Bawerk's
criticism could
not obtain
if Marx's `flaw' in the transformation
procedure was
rectified.
In the formula,
c+v+(c+v)r= price of production,
the two
items
c and v are
taken
over
from the
value scheme and remain unchanged
in the
price of production scheme.
Input is
measured
in
values while
output
is
measured
in
Thus, to
`rectify' it,
Bortkiewicz transforms the input
values
into
price of production
terms
and shows,
instead, that
of
the two
equalities only one equality can
hold.
We
observe,
however,
even
the
one equality cannot
hold
when we
examine
the
whole process of
his
argument closely.
He
used a simple
reproduction scheme with
three branches
of production and posited
the
following two
equations,
(a)
and
(b),
as equilibrium conditions of
the
simple reproduction.
-
176
-
(a)
the
value of
luxury
goods =
total
surplus value
(b)
the
price of
luxury
goods =
total
profit
Because,
taking the feedback
effects
into
account,
he
was
going
to
remove every value
term from the initially
given
system,
the
resultant
price system was
going
to lose its
unit of account.
On
account of
this,
he
set as a numeraire
the
price-value ratio of
the luxury
goods
to
unity,
i.
e.
(c)
the
value of
luxury
goods
=
the
price of
luxury
goods
In the
combination of
the three
relationships,
(a), (b)
and
(c),
we
substitute
(a) for the left
side of
(c)
and
(h) for the
right side of
(c}.
We
get
the
numeraire,
"total
surplus value =
total
profit".
He,
however,
showed
in his
conclusion
that total
surplus value equalled
total
profit
but total
value no
longer
equalled
total
production price.
Starting from the three
assumptions of
(a), (b), (c),
which state
"total
surplus value =
total
profit",
he
concluded
the
relationship
between
value and price of production,
"total
surplus value =
total
profit",
which repeated
the
assumptions.
Of
course,
his
procedure
is
not
(i)
assume an aggregate equality
between
profit and surplus-value
(ii)
solve
the
equations of prices of production using
(i)
(iii)
show
that in the
solution
(i) holds
but
(i')
solve
the
equations
to
obtain relative prices of production.
(ii')
choose something
invariant to fix the
scale of prices.
(iii')
apply
(ii') to (i') to
get
absolute prices of production.
He
showed
in the latter
procedure
"total
value
does
not equal
total
price of production" even when
"total
surplus value =
total
profit"
is
taken for
granted as a numeraire.
This
means
Bortkiewicz
refuted
the
-
177
-
theory, `surplus-value
=
the
source of profit' with
this
rectification.
We
only said
in the
above
interpretation that if Bortkiewicz had
shown
anything
positive about
the
relationship
between
value and price of
production,
his
performance was simply a
tautology.
There
are
two
mutually conflicting
interpretations
of
his
conclusion.
Gerstein (1976,
p
254), Sweezy (1984,
p xxiv, p xxviii),
Desai (1988,
p
28),
etc.
interpret his
conclusion as not
disagreeing
with
of value.
But Samuelson (1982),
Steedman
Iq7
{ },
etc.
interpret it
as
directly
conflicting with
Marx's
value
theory. According to the former interpretation, Bortkiewicz
showed at
least
one relationship
between
(by
solving
the
price of production equations,
he
maintained one equality
instead
of
Marx's two
equalities and
the
one equality was enough
in identifying the
source of profit as surplus-value).
In the latter interpretation,
however, Bortkiewicz
with
his `rectification'
refuted
Marx's
value
theory
once and
for
all
because he
proved
Marx's two
equalities
did
not
simultaneously
hold. A
single equality alone was not enough
to identify
the
source of profit.
In
our position,
the latter interpretation is
absolutely
favoured
since what
he
proved about
the
relationship
between
value and price of production was already assumed
in the invariance
postulate,
in the
numeraire.
Winternitz (1948) drops the
simple reproduction assumption only
to have Bortkiewicz's
solution equally applicable
in
case of expanded
reproduction.
Instead
of
the
(c) in the
above
(the
unity price-value
ratio of
luxury
goods),
he
assumed
"total
value =
total
price of
production" and
then in
conclusion arrived at
the
relationship,
"total
value =
total
price of production"
denying "total
surplus value =
total
profit".
This tautological
approach was
later
generalised
by Seton
-
178
-
Ij
(1957).
Seton
enumerated many possible
invariance
postulates
that
were
equally
applicable
with
Winternitz's
and said
there
was no criterion
for
choosing any single one
to the
exclusion of
the
others.
It
effected,
however,
the
same
tautological
approach as
Winternitz's. This kind
of
approach
has been followed into the 1970s in Medio (1972)
Okishio (1974)
Mori
Shwx o,
14
C4epkores

l7
Morishima (1973,1979, (1978),
Shaikh ( ),
etc.
Medio (1972)
and
Morishi1sa
an. oi,
byes,
Morishima (1973,1974)A('1978)
employed somewhat
distinct
postulates.
IM
Shaikh ()
and
Okishio (1974)
all posited
"total
value =
total
price"
at each step of
the iteration,
and obtained
in its final
stage
the
same
"total
value =
total
price".
Medio imitating Sraffa's
standard
commodity
built p
a composite commodity and assumed
it to be
proportional
to the basket
of wage
goods
as well as
to the
whole
economy.
In that
very
definition
of
the
numeraire,
he
assumed not only
"total
value =
total
price of production"
but
also
"total
surplus value
=
total
profit"
from the
outset.
Morishima,
on
the
other
hand,
set a
certain
fixed
rate of profit as a pivot
in his
ergodic process.
But in
this, because
any arbitrarily chosen
initial
price vector can
lead to
the
same price vector
in its final
stage of
the Markov
process
(Hodgson,
1982,
p
97), there is
no relationship whatsoever especially presented
between
All this has destroyed Marxian
value
theory from its
very
foundations.
The
stream culminates
in Nguyen
(1982), Desai
(1988)
and
Szumski
(1989),
and observes
that,
although
the two
value and price of
production systems
have
nothing
to do
with each other,
they
are still
indirectly
related
to
each other via a common physical-technical system
of production.
This implied that both the
value and
the
price system
were
directly derivable from the
common physical-technical system.
But
-
179
-
if it is
really possible
to derive
a value system
directly from
only
physical-technical data, Samuelson
(1982), in
parallel with
Roemer
Raberfs
ow.
d
C J(ari
(1982),
Wolff
X(1984),
Bowles
and
Gintis
(1981),
etc. argues,
then
a
peanut
theory
of value or a steel
theory
of value can also assert
its
truthfulness
along with
the labour theory
of value; as against one
dogmatism,
there
would
be
an equal right of counter-dogmatism.
Or in
its final
analysis,
it
argues
that
a value system
is
only
introduced
as
an arbitrary
detour in deriving
a price system
(Samuelson,
1982,
p
17).
But
we showed
in 2.2.1 that, because
of
heterogeneous labours,
values
were not
derivable directly from the
physical-technical
data,
and,
accordingly,
the
so-called peanut
theory
of value or
the
steel
theory
of
value could not
be
maintained.
Marxian
responses
to the destructive
consequence of
the
above
`rectifications'
have been in two directions. In the first direction,
they
admit
Marx's failure for having
not
transformed input
values
into
PrPr terms
and
if he had done the
retransformation,
the two
equalities
between the sum
of values and
the
sum of prices of production, and
the
sum of surplus-values and
the
sum of profits could not obtain.
Thus,
they take
an epistemological
debate instead
of a
direct
reply
to the
quantitative
inconsistency. Gerstein (1976),
De Vroey (1981), Fine
and
Harris (1979)
are
the
representatives of
this
stream.
They deny
any
significance whatsoever
in the
quantitative comparison of values with
Gerstein (1976)
says
that
value refers
to
a
production category and yet price of production refers
to the
articulation of production and exchange.
De Vroey (1981),
on
the
other
hand,
says
that
value
is
an
instantaneous
existence created
in
exchange.
Fine
and
Harris
(1979) describe the
relationship
between
value and price
of production
as
that
of
'capital in
general'
versus
'many
capitals'.
-
180
-
We
shall
critically
examine
these
approaches
in 4.3.
In the
second
direction,
contributors regard a quantitative
comparison
of values with prices of production as an essential element
in the
value-price
problem.
Because
value
is
a quantum
in the first
place, a value
theory
must explain
the
quantitative aspects
first. In
view of
this, it
was welcomed
by
many when
Yaffe (1975) for the first
time
argued
that the input
values should not
he
retransformed
into
price
of production
terms. He
asserted
the "rectifications" initiated by
Bortkiewicz (1984),
Winternitz (1948)
etc. were all wrong, and argued
the two
equalities must obtain.
This is followed by Lipietz (1982),
Wolff, Roberts
and
Callari (1982),
Collier (1986),
Kliman
and
McGlone
(1988),
Carchedi-(1984),
etc.
in distinctive
ways.
They
all maintained
that
some
input
values
(especially
the
value of variable capital) could
not
have been transformed into
price of
production
terms. We
examine
their
arguments
in detail in 4.3.
This
chapter consists of
three
parts.
In the first
section,
in
4.1,
we will
describe
a cursory process of our retransforming
input
values
into PrPr terms
obtaining
the two
equalities.
We
concentrate our
discussion
on
the
main
difference between
our position and
the
position
of
the
`rectifications'.
In the
second section,
in 4.2,
we will verify
our position
in detail in
regard
to the transformation. Lastly, in the
third
section,
in 4.3,
we examine previous
Marxian
responses
to the
`rectifications'.
-
181
-
4.1
Problems
to be
raised
As
we saw
in the
previous section, when we
took
all
individual
capitals
as a single whole,
there
were no more
individual
capitals and so
there
would
be
no
longer the
variance of
the
composition of capitals.
With
no
variance of
the
composition of capitals,
however, there is
no reason
for
to deviate from
values.
Therefore, in the
totality, total
value naturally equals
total
total
surplus-value naturally equals
total
profit.
There
can
he
no
question about
this. Notwithstanding this, however, the
rectifications
which negate
the.
ahove
two
equalities are still convincing
to
many
Marxian
economists.
Only
a
few Marxists deny the
necessity
to
retransform
the input
values
(or
the
variable capital values)
into
price
of production
terms
accusing
the
`rectifications'
of
being Ricardian
(e.
g.
Yaffe, 1975, Lipietz, 1982, Foley, 1982, Collier, 1986, Wolff,
Roberts
and
Callari, 1982,
etc.
). But,
as will
be
seen
in Section, 4.3,
they
also commit more or
less the
same conceptual misconstructions
inherited from their
predecessors.
To dissipate
such misconstructions,
traditionally inherited,
we are
going
to
examine
in this
section what
conceptual misconstructions are underlying
in the traditional
`rectifications'.
The first
noticeable problem with
the
rectifications
is that
they
effectively sever
the link between
values and prices of production,
or at
least bury it in
algebra, and are
forced to
reject
Marx's
value
theory
as completely
redundant.
For instance, if
we
look
at one of
the
1977
`rectifications'
Shaikh
(
made
from Table 1,
which represents
exchange at values,
his finally `rectified'
in
-
182
-
Table 3 has
no
trace left
of
the
relationship
between the two tables
except
an arbitrary
ìnvariance
postulate'
which
keeps the
sum of prices
of production
invariant to the transformation
at
the
same
level
as
the
sum of values.
Table 1/ Exchange
at
Values
C V K S A
(S/K)% PrPr
profit
I 450 180 630 120 750 19.05 750 120
II 200 240 440 160 600 36.36 600 160
III 100 18 280 120 400 42.85 400 120
750 600 1350 400 1750 1750 400
Note: C
represents
the
value of production materials,
V the
value of
labour-powers,
K
cost price
(=
C+V), S
surplus-value,
A the
value of
the
commodity produced
in
each sector of production,
(S/K)% the
value rate
of profit,
PrPr the
I,
-II,
III
represent
the
three departments
specialised
in,
respectively, means of production,
means of consumption and
luxury
goods.
All the following tables
are
reproduced
from Shaikh ).
19'77
Table 2/ Marx's Transformation
C V K S A
PrPr Pofit
(Profit/PrPr)%
I 450 180 630 120 750 816.67 186.66 29.63(x)
II 200 240 440 160 600 570.38 130.38 29.63(%)
III 100 180 280 120 400 362.96 82.96 29.63(X)
750 600 1350 400 1750 1750.00 400.00
Table 3/ The
`rectified'
Prices
of
Production
e' V' K' S A
PrPr Profit
(Profit/PrPr)%
I 504 168 672 120 750 840 168 25.00(%)
II 224 224 448 160 600 560 112 25.00(%)
III 112 168 280 120 400 350 70 25.00(%)
840 560 1400 400 1750 1750 350
Note: C', V'
and
K'
correspond, respectively,
to C, V
and
K
calculated
in
price of production
terms
and all other notations are as usual.
-
183
-
As
we said
in the beginning
of
this
section,
if
values and
prices of production are
identical in
substance,
there
must
be
at
least
two
equalities
between
the
sum of prices of production and
the
sum of
values, and
the
sum of profits and
the
sum of surplus values.
The
single point of correspondence
between the totality
of value and
that
of
price
is inadequate in defining
a relationship
between individual
values, on
the
one
hand,
and
individual
prices, on
the
other
hand. To
that
extent, previous
`rectifications',
e.
g.
Bortkiewicz (1952,1984),
Winternitz
(1948),
Seton (1957),
etc.
intended
only
to
negate any
linkage
whatsoever
between
This
point,
however, has been
neglected
in
recent
rectifications.
Okishio (1974),
Morishima (1973,1974,1978),
Shaikh
(77
( ),
etc.
did
not regard
the
above result of
the
previous
`rectifications'
as conflicting with
Marx's
value
theory. The
equality
between total
value and
total
price of production appeared
to them to be
sufficient
for
affirming a
linkage between
value and price of
production'.
They
only
took
notice as a problem
that Marx's
own
transformation
procedure, as represented
in Table 2,
played no role
in
the
`rectified' Table 3. They thus tried to hare
a positive role played
by Table 2 in deriving Table 3. The intention
was
futile, however,
as
far
as
the linkages between
value
(Table 1)
and price of production
(Table 3)
were not established
in terms
of
the
aforesaid
two
equalities.
I
This
point
has been hardly
understandable
for
others.
Morishima's
"fundamental Marxian theorem" that the
rate of profit
is
positive
if
and
only
if the
is
also positive
is
asserted even with
a single equality.
But,
as
Samuelson (1982)'s "fundamental Napoleonic
theorem"
precisely
pinpointed
the
`fundamental
Marxian theorem'
was
simply
pulling
the
wool over
Marxian
economists.
Without the two
equalities
aforesaid,
we cannot say anything about
the
source of profit.
-
184
-
11
Anyhow, they
extended
Marx's Table 2 by
progressively
"feeding
back"
the
effects of
the initial
price-value
disproportionalities.
Table 4 illustrates
such an
iterative
procedure.
We
reproduce
Shaikh's
197
(M-12")
example
here
since
his
case
is the
most recent one.
Table 4/ The Transformation from Values to Prices
of
Production
Dept C V K S A PrPr
profit
%
r
1
Step 1A I 450 180 630 120 750 750 120 19.05
-
II 200 240 440 160 600 600 160 36.36
-
III 100 180 280 120 400 400 120 42.85
-
750 600 1350 400 1750 1750 400
Step 1B I 450 180 630 120 750 816.67 186.66 29.63 1.089
II 200 240 440 160 600 570.38 130.38 " 0.951
III 100 180 280 120 400 362.96 82.96 " 0.907
750 600 1350 400 1750 1750 400
Step 2A I 490.00 171.12 661.12 " " 816.67 155.54 it
II 217.78 228.14 445.92 " " 570.38 124.45
III 108.88 171.12 280.00 " " 362.96 82.96
816.66 570.38 1387.04 1750 362.96
Step 2B I 490.00 171.12 661.12 834.12 173.00 26.17 1.021
II 217.78 228.14 445.92 " 562.62 116.70 " 0.986
III 108.88 171.12 280.00 " 353.26 73.26 " 0.973
816.66 570.38 1387.04 1750 362.96
Final I 504 168 672 it 840 168 25 1
Step II 224 224 448 560 112 25 1.
III 112 168 280 350 70 25 1.
840 560 1400 1750 350
Note:
ri represents price rate of profit
for
each
department
of
production calculated
in
percent
terms
and -P
i
stands
for ith
price
multiplier
defined
as
"(ith
price
in
current step)+(ith price
in
previous step)".
The
numbers shown
in the
above are rounded off
to two
places.
-
185
-
Table 4 begins
with exchange at values.
Rates
of profit
in
each
sector
differ from the
social average.
Actual inflow
of capital or
outflow of capital,
they
say,
leads to the
equalisation of profit rates
(29.63%
in Step 1B). This
adjustment process
leaves the total
sum of
prices of production unchanged and makes
the transition from Step 1A to
Step 1B. Upto here,
we can
have
no substantial
disagreement. The
sum
of prices of production equals
the
sum of values and
the
sum of profits
equals
the
sum of surplus-values.
Yet, in the
next stage
(Step 1B
-.
Step 2A), they
calculate so-
called price-multipliers.
The
change
in
each price of production
is
expressed
in
proportion
to its
previous value:
i1=
816.67/750
=
1.089,
12=
570.38/600
='0.951, P, =
362.96/400
=
0.907. These deviations have
feedback
effects on
the
cost-prices
in
each capital and
thus derive
new
cost-prices
differing from those in Step lB. The
overall effect of
the
preceding
"feedbacks" is to
raise
the
aggregate cost-price
from 1350 to
1387.04. Keeping the
sum of prices unchanged,
they
compute a
decrease
of
total
profit
from 450 to 362.96. With this, however,
we cannot
agree.
If the
aggregate cost-price changes, we argue,
the
sum of prices
which originally
derived from its
previous cost prices cannot
help but
change.
This
we shall
discuss in this
whole chapter
in detail.
Anyhow,
with
the decreased
sum of profits,
they
adjust each
profit rate with
the
average rate
through the
adjustment of respective
In this
case,
the
sum of prices
has
no reason
to
vary.
The
adjustment
that
equalises
the
rates of profit with
the
average rate cannot alter
the
sum of prices.
This
we
do
not
disagree
with.
As
far
as
the Step 2B is
concerned,
there is
no problem.
They
repeat
the
whole procedure
from Step 1A to Step 2B
until
the
changes
from
one step
to
another are negligibly small.
The final
-
186
-
result
is
exactly
the
same as
Table 3. Originally, Table 3
was seen
to
have
replaced
Table 2
as an alternative
rectification.
Now, they
show
1977
(Shaikh,
I WO,
p
133), Table 3 has been
on
the basis
of
Table 2. From
this, it is
concluded
that Marx's transformation
as
depicted in Table
2
is
still valid even
in the
`rectifications'. But,
although
Table 2 has
been
used
in deriving Table 3, the
positive role
Table 2
plays
is itself
trivial
enough
insofar
as
there is
no
trace left in the Table 3
of
the
relationship
between Table I
and
Table 3. Moreover, it is
mistaken
in
Step 2A that the
aggregate price
is
unchanged even when
the
aggregate
cost-price
has
risen
from 1350 to 1387.04. But,
why
does the
aggregate
price change when
the
aggregate cost price changes?
In Step 2A, they left
SIs
intact
when changing
V1s
into PrPr
terms. It
was perhaps
because
what was changed
in the
previous step
lB
was not
the labour-times
expended
in
each production
but the
prices of
the
means of production,
the
the luxury
goods.
So, the
changes
had
no effect on
the Sis. SIs
are calculated
in terms
of
labour
amount while
Vjs
are
in
price of production
terms. We do
not
agree with
this.
We
saw
in 3.2
as well as
in 1.3 that the direct labour
as
corresponding
to
new value,
(V+S), is
a production category, whose
magnitude
is determined in the
process of production, whereas
the
indirect labour
as corresponding
to
old value,
(C), is
an exchange
category, whose magnitude
market place.
So V+S is
a single entity, which
Marx
called a
`resolution
principle'
in
distinction from Smith's
`composition
principle':
V+S is
not
the
addition of
V
and
S
but the division
of
direct labour into V
and
S.
When V
is
changed
into PrPr terms, then V+S is
also
to
change
into the
-
187
-
same
PrPr
terms,
2
i.
e.
V'+S'='2(V+S), when
V'=-p2V.
Someone
would ask
`How
can
the
value,
S,
be
calculated
in PrPr terms? It
will no
longer
be
a value
but
a price
if it is in PrPr terms'. But
we must note what
distinguishes
value
from
price of production
is
not
its
calculation
terms but its formation
principle.
Value is in
a resolution principle
with
the law
of equal rates of exploitation while
PrPr is in
a
composition principle with
the law
of equal rates of profit
(one is
produced
by labour, the
other
is
produced
by
capital) as will
be
seen
in
the
next section.
Both
value and
PrPr
are expressible
in
either
calculation
terms; labour terms
or money
terms. All this
will
be
discussed later in the
next section.
Instead
of
the
step
2A,
we
have
the following
step
2A' in Table 5.
Table 5/ The Revision
of
"Step 2A"
of
Table 4
Dept C' V' K' S' A'
PrPr
profit r
%
i
I 490.00 171.12 661.12 114.12 775.24 842.43 181.31 27.42
II 217.78 228.14 445.92 152.16 598.08 568.22 122.30 it
III 108.88 171.12 280.00 114.12 394.12 356.79 76.79 "
816.66 570.38 1387.04 380.40 1767.44 1767.44 380.40
Someone
might object
that Sis
are
to be in terms
of
labour
amount even when
Vis
are
in PrPr terms. To this
we
have to
reply,
repeatedly,
that S
and
V
are not
two distinct
parts
but
make a single
2
Let
us assume
Mr A's body
weight
is 72kgs
and
the
weight of one of
his
limbs is 18 kgs.
When the latter
changes
into
pound
terms, it
will
be
40
pounds.
Then,
we
have
v+s=72, v=18, s=54 and v'=40
(_
'P2 v, where
2P2=1/0.45).
If
we
take the
new standard of
the
weight, e.
g. v'=40,
then
his body
weight ought
to be
v'+s'=160
[_ (v+s)-PZ=72"(1/0.45)]
and
the
other part
(s)
will change
from 54 into 120 [=
s'= s'P2 =54"(1/0.45)].
In Shaikh's
case,
however,
v'+s'
is
still
the
same as v+s
(when
c=0
is
assumed)
and s' changes
from 54 into 32 (=
s'=v+s-v)).
-
188
-
entity whose magnitude
production process.
Its
amount
is immeasurable
as
illustrated
in terms
of
Jtl(t}dt
in 1.3. It
0
is
only measurable
in
case
the direct labour
splits up
into
v and s,
both
of which are either
directly
or
indirectly
observable
in the
market
place.
We
established a relationship, v+s=v(l+e)
in 3.2. So, Table 5
only expresses
that
when v changes
into
v-P2,
the
amount of
direct
labour,
v(l+e), must also change
into
vi2(l+e),
i.
e. vP2(l+e)=vi=+si2,
the
relationship changed
from
v(l+e) =v+s
into
v'P2(l+e)='P2(v+s)=v'+s'.
In
view of
the
above
discussions,
we propose
the traditional
value concept
inherited from Bortkiewicz
(1984),
etc. needs a
drastic
change.
In the
next section, we will propose a new value concept.
-
189
-
4.2
Propositions for
a
Proper Value Concept
In the
previous section, we
had the
question of why, when
V
changes
into
PrPr terms,
3
S
also changes
into the
same
PrPr terms. Our
position was
this:
what
distinguishes
value
from
price of production
is
not
its
calculation
terms but its formation
principle.
To
verify
this
position,
we
have to
work out
the following four
propositions.
(P4.1)
the holistic
context of
the transformation
problem:
there
are
three
phases
in the
problem of value
-
the
substance of value,
the
magnitude of value and
the transformation
of value.
In
examining
the
substance of value, we
identify
production and exchange.
But, in
examining
the
magnitude of value, we make a
hard
and
fast demarcation
between
In
examining
the transformation
of
value,
however,
we combine
the identification
and
the demarcation into
a unity
(this is to
say
that in the transformation
problem, not only
individual
values and prices
but the totality
of
the two
systems are
to be taken into
account).
(P4.2)
simple commodity production and capitalist commodity
production:
the distinctions between
production category and exchange
category, new value and old value,
direct labour
and
indirect labour,
embodied
labour
and represented
labour,
etc. alter
in
capitalist
production as against simple commodity production
(this is to
say
that
v+s
is
a single entity, not
the
addition of v and s).
(P4.3)
value as a quantum not as a quantity:
the
magnitude of value
is
not a quantity
but
a-quantum.
So,
on any account,
it
cannot
be
expressed
in
absolute
terms but
only as an
internal
and/or an external
magnitude of
labour (this is to
say
that
value can
be
expressed
in
either money or
labour
or
PrPr terms).
(P4.4) the
substantive
PrPr is distinct from
Yet in
substance,
both
is
only
in the form
of
a numeraire should not
of production).
identity
of value with price of production:
value not only
in
quantity
but
also
in
quality.
are
identical to
each other.
The distinction
their identical
substance
(this is to
say
that
he introduced
externally
in
calculating prices
3
Strictly
speaking,
however, V
does
not change
into PrPr terms
but is
simply multiplied
by the
multiplier,
P2,
defined
as
(dept. II's
current
price of production):
(dept. II's
previous price of production).
We
call
it PrPr terms
only
for the
sake of conventional readers' understanding.
-
190
-
As for (P4.1)[the
substance of value],
to begin
with.
In
seeking
for the
substance of value, as
is
seen
in 1.2,
we
take
a view of
the totality, in
which any
distinction between individual
parts, aspects and categories are all suppressed.
We do
not
distinguish
exchange
from
production simply
because there
are no
individual
parts,
aspects and categories
distinguished. We identify them
not
because they
are
identical but because they
only
form the
members of a
totality,
distinctions
within a unity,
different
aspects of an organic whole
(cf.
Marx, 1973,
p
99). As is
said
in 1.2,
value
designates the
relationship
of
the individual
categories
to the totality. When this
relationship
is
quantified,
it forms the
value quantum.
This
quantum
is
produced and
is
accumulated
in the
process of reproduction, mediated
by
exchange.
Unless the
relationship which
the
value
designates is
exchanged,
the
value
itself is
not
the thing to be
exchanged.
In the
process of
the
exchange, what
is
exchanged
is
not value
but
use-value.
Value does
not
change
hands,
only use-value change
hands;
after
the
exchange, value
stays
in the
same
hands in
a changed
form (from
a commodity
form into
a
money
form
and vice versa)4.
The
substance of value,
i.
e.
the
substance
of
the
relationship,
therefore, has little to do
with exchange although
its
production and
its
accumulation need
the
exchange as
its
external
4
Value
can change
hands in the
case of a value-transfer
through
usurpation, expropriation, etc., which
do
not
fall
under exchange
category.
Of
course, even
in the
exchange, value may also change
hands
in the
case of unequal exchanges.
In Marx's
case,
however,
unequal
exchanges
fall
within
the
relation
between individual
parts
(and/or
categories) and
thus
are classified
into
a sheerly accidental realm.
When the
exchanges
are put
in the totality
context,
the
whole value
cannot alter
its
magnitude at all; one man's
gain
is
offset
by
another
man's
loss. If, therefore, the
unequal exchanges are not contingent
but
regular,
then they
ought
to be
explained
in
other
terms
rather
than
exchange,
i.
e. certain social
inequalities fixed to
certain persons or
certain personalised
categories
based
on something social other
than
exchange
itself,
e.
g.
tribute, tax,
rent, etc.
-
191
-
moment;
exchange refers only
to the
external relation
between the
individual
categories
but
value refers
to the
relationship of
them to
the totality.
For
all
this, however,
value
is
closely
bound
up with
exchange
to the
extent
that
value must always
be in the
receptacle, use-
values.
When the
use-value
in
which
it is
reserved proved
in
exchange
less
socially useful,
the
value simply
breaks down because
value
itself
cannot stand good
without
the
use-value.
To that
extent,
the
substance
of value
is
nothing without
the identification
of production and
exchange.
The
supply and
demand
which
basically
relate
to
use-values
play a role
in
changing
the
value-form,
the
realisation of value.
As for (P4.1)[the
magnitude of value]
When individual
commodity values are made
issue
of, exchange
processes are necessarily
involved by
a
technical,
social condition of
production.
When
production materials are not produced
by immediate
producers
but
purchased,
the labour
contained
in the
commodities
is
not
all
direct labour but is the
combination of
the direct
and
the indirect
labour. It
was originally all
direct labour in the
case of
the
totality, but it is
now
the
combination of
the direct
and
the indirect
labour in the
case of
the individual
commodities not
because
of
the
circuitous production of
the
commodities
but because
of
the
exchange
relation
between them.
We
said
in 3.2 that direct labour is
computed
in
reference
to
production while
indirect labour is
computed
in
reference
to
exchange.
Someone
may argue
this
calculation
is inconsistent
since
the two
parts
are
in different
principles.
The
apparent
inconsistency
which
holds
5
In
money, we
find
out
the hypostatisation
of a pure value segregated
from the
use-value
in
which
the
value originally
hosted. Yet, in the
money,
there
is
still a use-value as such, a special use-value as
the
liquidity.
-
192
-
only
in the
case of
individual
commodities
can
disappear
when we
take
all
those individual
commodities
into
account as a single whole and
thus
see
of
the individual
commodities all
transpire
into direct labours. Then, how did
we calculate
the direct
and
the
indirect labour in
such an
individual
commodity value case?
The
amount of
indirect labour is
not
directly
related
to the
current production condition of
the
commodity
in
question
but, instead,
is linked directly
and
indirectly to the
ad
infinitum
production
conditions of all
the
other commodities.
Instead
of considering such an
infinite
sequence, we calculate
it by
reference
to the
current market
value of
the
production material of
the
commodity.
This
calculation
is
not circular
because
at
least the
other part of
the labour, the direct
labour, is
calculated
by
reference
to
production.
As for (P4.1)[the
transformation
of value]
We have
some method
by
which
to
calculate
the
amount of
direct
labour determined in the
process of production.
As
we saw
in 3.2,
when
the direct labour
splits up
into two
parts, v and s, and
thus
appears
indirectly in
exchange,
it becomes
measurable and observable.
This
requires, as
(P4.1)
states,
the
collapse of
the identity
and
the
distinction between
production and exchange
into
a unity.
This
cannot
be
explained properly until
(P4.2) is
made clear,
however.
As for (P4.1)[in
sum]
In
considering
the
substance of value, we
take
a view of
the
totality. In
considering
the
magnitude of value,
however,
we cannot
take the
view of
the totality
since we should
have to take
on
the
current conditions
of production of
the
commodities and
those
of
the
production
of
their
production materials as well as
those
of production
of
the
production
materials of
their
production materials ad
infinitum.
-
193
-
This infinite
sequence can
he
avoided when we
take
a view of
individual
commodities
and make a
hard
and
fast demarcation between direct labour
and
indirect labour in terms
of
the
production and
the
exchange category
and apply
this
principle
to
every
individual
case.
Then,
we can
get
a
succinct result as
described in the
above, and
the
method
to
measure
the
magnitude of value empirically.
Direct labour,
current
labour,
newly created value and embodied
labour belong to the
production category
(v+s).
Indirect labour,
past
labour,
old value
(or
transferred
value) and represented
labour belong
to the
exchange category
(c).
What is
produced
in
production process
is
not
the
whole value of
the
commodity
but
only a part of
it, the
production category.
The
exchange category
(c) is transferred
or added
to the
newly created value only
because
of
the
socially useful character
of
the direct labour
rather
than
of
its
own socially useful character.
[q.
e.
d.
of
(P4.1)]
As for (P4.2)
A
is
characterised
by three
facts. First,
an
individual labourer
cannot produce value and use-value
and so cannot count as abstract
labour
and as concrete
labour. Although
it has
an abstract
labour
character and a concrete
labour
character as
well,
it
cannot produce a value nor a use-value.
Only
a collective
labourer does
all
those. On this
account,
the labour hierarchy,
which
was
impracticable
unless
by
a non-economic coercion
in
simple commodity
production,
becomes
practicable even without
the
non-economic coercion
in
(see 3.2). Second, the
separation of
the
means
of production
from labour-power
split
the
newly produced value
-
194
-
(tantamount
to the
amount of
direct labour) into two
parts, necessary
labour (v)
and surplus
labour (s). Since the two
parts
became
either
directly
or
indirectly
observable
in the
market place,
the
amount of
direct labour
which was
immeasurable in the
became
measurable
by
references
to
exchange.
Third,
on account of
the
above
two facts, labour is
no
longer the
agent of production.
It is
replaced
by
capital.
What is
produced
in
production
is
now no
longer
determined by the
amount of
direct labour (v+s) but by that
of surplus-
labour (s).
Even
without
the increase
of
the former, the latter
may
well
be increased by the decrease
of necessary
labour (v). This
means
direct labour is
no
longer
a production category.
Only the
surplus
labour
part
becomes
a production category.
By the
same
token, instead
of
the indirect labour,
now
the indirect labour
plus necessary
labour
becomes
an exchange category.
We
can
have the following
comparison
in
Table 6.
Table 6/ The Summary
of
(P4.2)
simple commodity capitalist
production production
indirect labour
c c
direct labour
v+s v+s
production category v+s s
exchange category c c+v
embodied
labour
v+s v+s
6
represented
labour
c c+v+s
new value v+s s
old value c c+v
additivity of value? no yes
6
In
capitalist production, all
the labour is
calculated
in terms
of
represented
labour. This is because the
value of capital
(or
cost
price)
is in terms
of represented
labour determined in
exchange.
In the
equation
form, PrPr=(l+r)(c+v),
where r
is the
general
rate of profit
(socially
represented)
and
(c+v) is
advanced capital
(old
value), all
appear as represented
labour
even prior
to the
exchange of outputs.
7
The
additivity
of a commodity value
is
explicitly claimed
in Steedman
(1976a). He
argued c+v+s
is in
a strict additivity.
But
we argue v+s
-
195
-
Although the
new value
in
capitalist
production
is
still
denoted
as s as
it
could
be
so
in the
case of
the totality, the
new value
is to
he denoted differently in
case of
individual
capitals
(or
commodities)
to the
extent
that it
stands with a
different
principle of
formation.
In
simple commodity production, v+s
is
proportional
to the
amount of
the
agent of
its
production,
to the direct labour (or
to the
amount of
the
necessary
labour,
v, as
its
proxy).
By
contrast,
in
capitalist
however,
s
is to be
proportional
to the
amount of
the
agent of
its
production,
to the
advanced capital, c+v.
The
formation
principle changes
from the law
of equal rates of exploitation
to the law
of equal rates of profit, and
from the
resolution principle
of v and s
to the
composition principle of
the
v and
the
s.
Thus,
we
distinguish the two
cases not only
in terms
of simple commodity
production and capitalist commodity production
but in terms
of value
production and profit production, and
in terms
of value calculation and
price of production calculation.
What distinguishes
value
from
price of
production consists
in those distinct formation
principles rather
than
in their forms
of value.
The two
principles,
the law
of equal rates of profit and
the law
of equal rates of exploitation, may
be
seen
to be
external and
antithetic
to
each other.
In
view of
the determination
of new value,
the
one
is in
a circular causality
(in
a composition principle) while
the
other
in
a uni-directional causality
(in
a resolution principle)
if
they
are severed
from
each other.
As
we said
in 1.2, however,
neither
is
not
in the
addition of v and s
but the
resolution of v+s.
One is
called a composition
principle of commodity value, which
is Smithian.
The
other
is
called
a resolution principle of commodity value, which
is
Ricardian
as well as
Marxian.
-
196
-
the
circular nor
the
uni-directional
causality
is
scientific.
To
avoid
a circularity,
we reduce
the two
mutually antithetical
laws to the
relation of an
identity by
putting
the two laws in the
context of
the
wholeness.
In the
context of
the
whole, any
distinction
of
the two laws
is
simply meaningless; we
have
neither
the
"equal"
rates of profit nor
the
"equal"
rates of surplus value
because there
are no
longer the
parts
(no longer distinct
sectors, no
longer distinct
compositions of
capital).
Instead
of
the two laws,
we
have
only one
law, total
value
equals
total
price of production, and
total
surplus value equals
total
profit.
In the
context of
the
wholeness, productions are seen as
identical
with exchanges,
the
substance of price
is identical
with
the
the
producer of new value
is
one and
the
same.
However, in the
context of
the
parts,
by
contrast, productions are
distinct from
exchanges,
the
producer of
the
new value
is distinct in
each case, capital
in
one case and yet
labour in the
other case, and
to
that
extent,
the law
of
the
is distinct from
that
of
the
equal rates of profit.
In
view of all
this,
we
therefore
argue,
the transformation
problem combines
the identity
and
the
distinction between
production and exchange
into
a unity.
[q.
e.
d.
of
(P4.2)]
As for (P4.3)
value as a quantum not as a quantity.
We distinguish
quantum
from
quantity.
Quantum
refers
to the
question of
"how
much", quantity refers
to that
of
"how
many".
Value is
a quantum as a qualitative quantity referring
to the
question of
"how
much" rather
than that
of
"how
many".
One
of
the
prime
distinctions
between
quantum
and quantity consists
in how things
are
dealt
with when
calculating
quantum and/or quantity.
When
calculating quantity,
things
-
197
-
are
treated èxternally' by
reference
to
a selected
(or
presupposed)
qualitative
aspect common
to them
all.
The heterogeneous,
qualitative
aspects of
the things
are simply
dismissed. In this
case,
the
unit of
account
is
an
imaginary
existence
given
by the
externally chosen aspect
to define the
quantity.
Once the
unit of account
is defined
externally,
the
pure quantities are expressible
in
absolute
terms. We
call
this
àbstract
universal'
(see 2.2.1).
By
contrast, when we say of quantum,
however,
we conceive
things
as
holistically homogeneous
since
the heterogeneous
qualitative aspects
of
the things transpire
all
together into
a single
homogeneous
entity.
The transpiration itself, however, is
conditional on a certain external
cause
(a
certain
development
of commodity exchanges) as well as on a
certain
intrinsic
cause
(identical
substance as abstract
labour). We
call
the latter à
self-actualising universality' or
ìdentical
substance'
(see 2.2.3).
In the
case of pure quantity,
its
substance
is in
any case
imaginative
and abstract
because the heterogeneous
aspects of
the
real
things
are simply
dismissed in the
mind.
In the
case of quantum,
however, the imaginary
character of
its
substance
is
suppressed
by the
practical activity of
the
self-actualising universality
(or
of
the
ìdentical
substance').
Its
substance
becomes
a real since, unlike pure
quantities,
the heterogeneous
elements are
holistically taken into
account as
homogenised,
and so
its
unit of account can
be defined
intrinsically (as
a certain amount of congealed
labour). The labour
amount as an
intrinsic
magnitude
determines
a certain magnitude of value
and
is itself invariant to the
changes
in its form
of expression.
It
has two
sorts of
form
of expression.
It is
expressible
in two
modes,
either
in
an
internal
or
in
an external magnitude.
An internal
-198-
magnitude refers
to
a certain amount of
its
substance
(labour
amount),
whereas an external magnitude
to
a certain external comparison of
two
intrinsic
magnitudes
(e.
g.
money price).
The distinction between the
two forms
of value-magnitude,
the internal
and
the
external magnitude,
is
only
to identify the
source of a change
in the
magnitude, whether
the
change
is from
an
inherent
alteration or
from
an external alteration.
Marx
used
the two terms indifferently
and alternatively, and yet
preferred
the intrinsic
magnitude
(labour
amount) so as
to identify the
source of a change
in the
magnitude.
A
money price can change either
because the labour
amount of
the
commodity changes or
because the labour
amount of
the
monay changes.
Of
course,
this distinction between the
internal
and
the
external
magnitude
is
not valid
in the
case of
the
pure
quantity.
We distinguish the two forms
of value magnitude only
to identify
the
source of a change
in the
magnitude,
but
only conceptually.
The two
forms
are not
two
species, of which
the
one
involves
a character not
possessed
by the
other.
The two forms
equally
indicate
one and
the
same
thing. What is
an external magnitude
is just
as much an
intrinsic,
and
vice versa:
they
are
hardly distinguishable
unless conceptually.
This
is because
an
internal
magnitude
is
not expressible
in its
own
terms but
rests on an external magnitude
(e.
g.
12 hours
of
labour does
not stand
good
if
not
in
comparison with another
labour,
e.
g.
1 hour
of
labour).
Not
only
the
external magnitude
but
even
the internal
magnitude relies
on an external magnitude.
A
certain
degree
of
temperature, for instance, is, in its
nature, an
intrinsic
(or internal)
magnitude, which
has
a perfectly
simple sensation corresponding
to it
as such.
This intrinsic
magnitude
is
not expressible
in its
own
terms. If
we
look
at a
thermometer,
we
-
199
-
find
this degree
of
temperature has
a certain expansion of
the
column of
mercury corresponding
to it,
which extensive
(external)
magnitude
changes simultaneously with
the temperature
(the internal
magnitude).
The degree
of
temperature
relies
for its
expression on
the
expansion of
the
column of mercury.
The
external
disturbances
that influence the
expansion of
the
mercury cannot affect such a mode of expression.
The
case
is
similar
in the
world of commodity values.
The
amount of
labour thus defined intrinsically
as
determining
the
magnitude of value
is
not expressible
in
absolute
terms (12
units of
labour
means nothing unless
in
comparison with
I
unit of
labour}8.
Although
at
first
sight
the
value
(a
certain amount of
labour)
may
be
seen as an
immediate
quantum,
the immediate
quantum
is
also a mediation,
viz. a quantitative ratio,
the
reference of some one quantum
to
another,
forming the two
sides of
the
ratio.
The
exponent of
the
ratio
is itself
a magnitude, a quantum.
Still, the two
quanta
in the
ratio are not
reckoned at
their immediate
values;
their
value
is
only
in this
relation
as another ratio.
It is therefore
absurd
to
presume
that the
expression
8
You
may say
that in Marx's Capital, the
absolute measure of value
is
defined to be
socially necessary
labour-time
and
the
magnitude of value
is
expressed relatively
in the
units of money.
Marx's
absolute measure
is, in
our case,
the internal
magnitude, and
Marx's
relative measure
is,
in
our case,
the
external magnitude.
Marx's
exposition might seem not
agreeing with our exposition.
But I
must say
Marx's
exposition
in this
case, as
he
excuses
in his `Preface'
to the first
edition of
his
Capital, is
only
the
result of
his having
popularised
the
passages
concerning
the
the
magnitude of value as much as
possible;
"Beginnings
are always
difficult in
all sciences.
The
understanding of
the first
chapter, especially
the
section
that
contains
the
analysis of commodities, will
therefore
present
the
greatest
difficulty. I have
popularised
the
passages concerning
the
substance of
value and
the
magnitude of value as much as possible.
" (1976a,
p
89).
Even the
socially necessary
labour
amount
itself,
strictly speaking,
is
in
relative
terms
as a quantum.
12 hours
of
labour, for instance, is
relative
to
a certain clock's
time
and
is
not
itself intrinsically
defined
units of
labour. The
same
labour
amount can
be
expressed as
1
hour
of
labour-time if the
standard of
the
clock's
time
changes.
-
200
-
of
intrinsic
magnitude
to be invariant to the
changes of
the
external
magnitude with which
the former has
a counterpart.
The labour
amount,
say,
24 hours
of
labour,
of which
12 hours
of
labour is
necessary
labour
(v)
and
the
other
12 hours
of
labour is
surplus
labour (s)
and whose
indirect labour
part
is
negligible, must change
its
expression
from the
24 hours
of
labour into 24-P hours
of
labour
when
its
necessary
labour
part changes
its
expression
from the 12 hours
of
labour into 12-P hours
of
labour9. As
we saw
in 3.2,
we calculate
the intrinsic labour
amount,
t
i.
e.
the direct labour
as expressed
in terms
of
f
i(t)dt,
where
i(t)
is
Jc
the intensity
of
labour
variant with
the time
and
the
process of
production and
t is the duration
of
labour-time, by
exploiting
both the
external expression of v
in the
market place and
the
embodied-labour
Jt
relationship, v(l+e) =
i(t)dt. What is determined in
exchange
is
not
0
the
amount of v nor
that
of
(l+e)v but the
calibration of v
(and
thus
the
caliheration of
(l+e)v
as well.
Without the
value of
labour-power
separated
from the
new value, as an exchange category,
there is
no way
to
compute such an
intrinsic labour
amount.
To
sum,
A Intrinsic Magnitude: Value (labour
amount)
(Al) Intrinsic Magnitude
on
its
own
terms:
Indirect labour
+
Direct labour
(A2)
Intrinsic
magnitude relied on external magnitudes, c, v and s
c(represented
labour]
+
(l+e)v(embodied labour]
where
(1+e)v=v+s
B External Magnitude: Exchange
value
(money
price).
(In
simple commodity production,
A is
not observable only
B is
observable.
But, in
both
A
and
B
are
observable)
[q.
e.
d.
of
(P4.3)]
9
In Shaikh's
(1979)
calculation as
in table 4
of our section
4.1,
total
labour
amount
will still
be 24 hours
of
labour
and surplus-labour will
he (24-12'P) hours
of
labour
when necessary
labour
changes
its
expression
from 12 hours
of
labour into 12? hours
of
labour.
-
201
-
As for (P4.4)[the
substantive
identity
of value with
PrPr]
The
next proposition
to be
validated
is
about
the
substantive
identity
of price of production with value.
This is to
argue
(1) that
the introduction
of a numeraire
in the `rectifications'
was unnecessary,
(2)
that it is
not
the
multiplication of a value
by
a price multiplier
but the
application of a
different formation
principle
to it
which
transforms the
value
into
price of production
terms
and
(3)
that both
value and price of production are
the
same quantum,
the
same magnitude
of
identical
substance.
So-called
`rectifications' in Bortkiewicz
(1984), Winternitz
(1948), Seton
(1957),
Shaikh
(1977), Medio (1972),
etc.
introduced
an
invariance
postulate as a numeraire
for
calculating prices.
Presuming
that
values are expressed
in labour (socially
necessary
labour) terms
while prices of production are not expressed
in labour terms, they
imagine that if
all
input
and output value
terms
are changed
into PrPr
terms by
absorbing so-called
feedback
effects,
the
resultant price of
production system might well
lose its
unit of account unless a certain
quantitative relation
is
externally postulated
before the
value
terms
are changed
(see Samuelson's
erasure
theorem, 1971,
p
400).
Even if
price of production
is
not expressed
in labour terms but
is
a mere relative ratio
between two
mutually exchanging commodities,
it
is
still absurd
to
assume as a numeraire either
`total.
value =
total
price of production' or
`total
surplus value =
total
profit'.
One is in
labour terms
while
the
other
is
a mere relative ratio
(Itoh, 1988). How
could
the two be
assumed
to be identical? PrPr
can only
be
compared
with another
PrPr. And
value can only
be
compared with another value.
-
202
-
The
numeraire postulated as
invariant to the transformation is
merely
a
nonsense.
The
word,
transformation implies that the
change of a
form
of
an
identical
substance
into
another
form. The transformation
of value
cannot evaporate
the
substance of value
into
nothing
but
simply changes
a value
form into
another value
form,
a price of production
form. The
more
from the
resolution principle of value-price
theory into the
combination principle of cost-price
theory
was already seen
in (P4.2)
and
in table 6.
When
we say values and prices of production are
identical in
substance,
it
simply means
that the
unit of price of production
is
identical
with
that
of value account as socially necassary average
labour. Because,
".
only
in this
context, could
"total
value =
total
price
of production" and/or
"total
surplus value =
total
profit"
be
077
meaningful,
Shaikh
( ), Morishima
(1974),
Medio
(1972), Gerstein
(1976),
etc.
do
not preclude a view of
human labour
as
identical
substance underlying
the transformation. Despite
such a viewpoint,
they
calculate price-multipliers.
What
could
the
price-multipliers mean
given
the identical
substance of value and price of production?
In
97
table 4
prepared
by Shaikh
( ),
seen
in
our section
4.1,
'P1
meant a
price proportionality per unit of
labour
embodied
in the
means of
production.
-P2 meant
the
price proportionality per unit of
labour
embodied
in the
means of consumption.
This implied that the labour-
units
in different kinds
of commodity were valued
differently from
each
other
in the
price of production
terms. This difference, however, has
been
misconceived
as
if being
grounded upon
the
specific character of
the labours
embodied
in the
distinct
commodities.
Thus, they tried to
decompose the
labours
contained
in
each commodity
into
several
distinct
labours that
were
genuinely responsible
for
each
type
of commodity ad
-
203
-
infinitum.
In
such an
infinite
reduction,
value
and price of production which originally consisted
in the distinct
principles of valuation was misconceived as
if being in the distinct
proportionalities of
the
valuations.
And,
with
it, their initial
conception of
the
substantive
identity between the two terms is buried
in
oblivion.
We
can never repeat enough what
distinguishes
a value
form
from
form is
not
in the
valuation
terms but in the
principle of
the
quantitative
formation. As
our
foregoing discussions
show, not only
PrPr terms but
also value
terms
must rely on
the
price-
multipliers
for the
expression of
its
own
internal
magnitude.
The
price-
multiplier
for
each commodity must
be different from
others not
because
of
the
specific character of
the labour
embodied
in the
commodity
but
because
of
the
specific principle of
the two
valuation
terms.
It is
seen
in (P4.2)
that the form, the
structure and
the
principle of quantitative
formation
must
differ in PrPr
calculation
from
those in
value calculation.
Qualitatively, they
are
distinct in that
while values are
in
a resolution principle under
the law
of equal rates
of exploitation, prices of production are
in
a combination principle
under
the law
Quantitatively, however, the
difference
applies only
to individual
cases
in the
context of parts.
In
the
context of
the
whole,
total
value equals
total
price of production
and
total
surplus value equals
total
profit.
This
obtains
however
only
on
the
condition of
the
substantive
identity
of prices of production
with values.
10
10
Our discussion
on
the internal
and
the
external
form
of magnitude
corresponds
to Marx's
discussion
on
the
value-form
in Capital,
vol.
I,
Chapter 1, Section
3. In Marx's
case,
the
main
distinction between
value and
the
value-form
is in the
asymmetry
between the two
sides of
the
equation
in the
value-form as against
the
symmetry
between the two
sides of
the
equation
form
of exchange
discussed in the first two
sections of
Capital,
vol.
I, Chapter 1. Marx's
asymmetry
in the
value-
-
204
-
We
can summarise
the
value-price
relationship as
follows.
A Intrinsic Magnitude: Value / Price
of production
(Al)
Intrinsic Magnitude in its
own
terms
Indirect labour
+
Direct labour /
Advanced
capital
+ Profit
(A2)
Intrinsic
magnitude relying on extensive magnitudes
c[represented
labour]
+
(1+e)v[embodied labour] /
(c+v)(1
+the general
rate of profit)
B External Magnitude: Value / Price
of
Production
Exchange
value
/ Money
price of production
[q.
e.
d.
of
(P4.4)
In
conclusion, although values are
logically
prior
to
prices of
production,
the
expression of
the
values relies on
the
expression of
the
This
principle was explicitly used
in Flaschel
(1983)
to
calculate
labour-values in the
case of
joint-productions but
with no
justification. When this
principle
is
not
fully justified
form is
rendered
in the
relationship
between, in
our
terminology, the
external
form
of magnitude and
the internal form
of magnitude.
Marx's
symmetry
in the
equation
form
of exchange,
by
contrast,
is
rendered
in
the
relationship
between, in
our
terminology,
one external
form
of
magnitude and another external
form
of magnitude, or
between
one
internal form
of magnitude and another
internal form
of magnitude.
Our
main point
here is that both PrPr
and value are all
internal
magnitudes,
and so can
be
expressed
in
either
terms: in labour terms
(as internal
magnitude) and/or
in
money
terms
(as
external magnitude).
The
rate of
profit
is
also computable
in
either
terms. Being
expressed
in
money
terms is
not
harmful
at all
to the idea
of
the intrinsic
character of
the
magnitude,
PrPr. The
mode an
intrinsic
magnitude
transforms into
another
intrinsic
magnitude
by dint
of
the
separation of
the
means of
production
from the immediate labourers. It thus becomes
empirically
measurable magnitudes
(by the
externalisation of
direct labour into
v(l+e)).
By
contrast,
however, Marx's
main point
in his
value-form
discussion is that
money
is
also a commodity,
belongs to the
same
commodity category, rather
than in
showing
that
money alone
has the
privileged position as
the
value-form of commodities.
-
205
-
before being
applied
to the
calculation
of
labour-values, the labour-
value calculation would not
help but he
circular.
But
we
have
now
verified
this.
The internal
magnitude relies
for its
expression on external
magnitudes.
The direct labour
amount relies
for its
expression on
v(l+e) and
the indirect labour
amount relies
for its
expression on
the
market value of production materials.
We
saw
in 3.3 that labour-power
as a commodity
has
no
direct labour
part of
its
own, and so
its
value
is
determined by its incurred-cost
of production.
This implies that the
value of
labour-power,
and
thus
of v(l+e) as well, relies
for its
expression on
the PrPr
of
the
means of consumption.
The
market value of
production materials, on
the
other
hand, is
also closely related
to the
PrPr
of
the
So, the
whole commodity value relies
for its
expression on
the PrPr terms. The
same
is true
of
the
relationship
between
mass and weight
in
physics.
Although the
mass of a
thing is logically
prior
to the
weight of
the thing, the
expression of
the
mass cannot
help but
rely on
the
expression of
the
weight.
Another
significant
implication is
also available
in
our value
concept.
It has been
argued
in the
"rectifications" that the
rate of
profit and
the
in the departments, I
and
II (means
of production and means of consumption) are all
determined independently
of
department III (luxury
goods).
This
argument on
the
role of
department III is
no
longer
valid.
The
substantive
identity between
value and price of production and, as
its
consequence,
the
aforesaid
two
equalities show
that the
prices of production and
the
rate of profit are
in
no way
independent
of
department III
since
the department III is
also
to be included in the totality.
-
206
-
4.3
Critiques
of
the
`Rectifications'
This
section examines some
Marxian
critiques of
the
`rectifications'.
The
critiques are of
two kinds. One
maintains
Marx's two
equalities
between the
the
sum of values, and
the
sum of profits and
the
sum of surplus-values.
Under this
group
fall
Yaffe
(1975), Lipietz
(1982), Wolff, Roberts
and
Callari
(1982),
Carchedi
(1984),
Collier
(1986),
Kliman
and
McGlone (1988),
etc.
The
other admits
Marx's inconsistency in the
quantitative relationship
between
value and price, and so refuses
to
confront
the transformation
problem right
in the
quantitative
front but
only
discusses
some
epistemological principles of
it. Under this
group
fall Gerstein
(1976), De Vroey
(1981), Fine
and
Harris (1979),
etc.
We
will examine
the first
group
to begin
with.
As far
as
I know, Yaffe
(1975,
pp
45-6)
was
the first to have
defended Marx's transformation
procedure
from the
"rectifications"
of
it. He justified Marx's
method of
transformation by
showing
the
inadequacies
of
the
"rectifications". The inadequacies he
enumerated
were
in the following three
points.
(1) [Reproduction
scheme]
They
relate
the transformation directly
to the
reproduction schema of
Volume II
of
Capital. By
contrast,
Marx illustrated the
problem with
five different 'unrelated'
capitals.
(2) [Numeraire] They
require a new numeraire
in
calculating prices
of production.
To
compare
the two
systems,
however, 'price
of
production' system must
have the
same
dimension
as
'value'
system.
Both
systems must
be
expressed
in terms
of money price.
A
numeraire was already
in the
value system.
(3) [Retransformation] Capital is
not a value
in
static state
(not
an accumulated
labour time) but
a value
in
process
(in the
process
of self-expanding).
Constant
capital and variable capital
(as
a
value
in
process) are not
to he
confused with
the
value of
the
means of production and
that
of
the
means of subsistence
(as
a
-
207
-
value
in
static state), respectively.
Hence, it is
a
fundamental
mistake
to
retransform
the input
values
into
price of production
terms.
To justify
the
above
three
points,
he
explained
in detail Marxian
principles
in
comparison with
Ricardian
principles
(but,
as we saw
in
the
previous
two
sections,
the
`rectifications'
were not
in Ricardian
principles
but in Smithian
ones
in the
composition principle).
He
raised an objection
to
(1)
the
use of
the
reproduction scheme
by
pointing out
three facts. First, Marx's
reproduction scheme
is
and must
be discussed before the introduction
of
"many
capitals" since
it is
at a
different level
of abstraction
from the transformation
problem
(one is
mainly
in
relation
to the totality
while
the
other
is
mainly related
to
the
relationship
between the
parts).
Second, Marx's
reproduction scheme
concerns not only
the
reproduction of value
but
also of use-value,
but
Marx's transformation does
not concern
the latter
problem.
Third,
Marx's
reproduction scheme
does
also concern money movement and money
capital,
but the transformation
problem
does
not concern money problems.
To
show
(2)
why
the transformation
problem
does
not concern
money problems,
he
points out
two
crucial
facts. First, the
money
commodity as a measure of value
does
not
have
a price
(or
a price of
production).
Second,
competition
does
not affect
the
gold
(as
the
money)
industry in the
same way as
for luxury
products;
it has
a certain
independence
and a social monopoly.
Lastly, he
argued
for (3)
why
the input
values should not
he
retransformed
by
presenting
the transformation
process as
the
movement
of capital
in its
various
forms. He
argues
that the
price category can
apply only
to
output commodities.
Input
materials, once
they
are
functioning
as productive capitals, cannot
have
prices
but
values only
(capital itself
cannot
have
a price
form but
can only
have
a value
form
-
208
-
unless
it takes
a commodity
form in
certain phases of
its
circuit).
The
above
three
points,
(1), (2).
and
(3),
though they
are argued
in different
contexts,
do
not
disagree
with our own position expressed
in the
previous sections.
The
problem was
in his
method of argument not
in his
understanding of
Marx. He
simply urged us
to
admit
Marxian
principles as opposed
to the
others' without any explanation of
the
counterexample
that Marx himself
noted
that the transformation
of value
affected not only
S,
but
also
C
and
V
and so such
feedback
effects must
have been taken into
account
(1981,
pp
264-266). However, by
contast,
we
have
admitted
the
requirements of using reproduction scheme and of
retransforming
input
values.
As to
a new numeraire alone, we refused
to
use
it
simply
because it
was unnecessary
(see (P4.4)).
So,
although
the
content of our argument
is the
same as
his,
our argumentation
is
distinct. His insistence that individual
capitals, not related
by
a
reproduction scheme, must
be taken into
account
in the transformation
could
be
especially significant when
foreign trades, imports
and exports
are considered.
Lipietz
(1982) followed Yaffe's third
point
but
only
in
respect
to
variable capital.
He
refused
to transform the
value of variable
capital
for the
reason
that it
can obliterate a
distinction between
constant capital and variable capital
(ibid,
p
76). For him,
what
is
meant
by
saying
that
variable capital
is
purchased at
its
price of
production
is
not
that labour-power
can
have its
price of production
along with
its
value
but
rather
that the
element of variable capital
is
not
labour-power but the
means of subsistence which
the labourer buys
at
its
price of production.
On
account of
this, Lipietz (ibid,
p
74)
accused
the
`rectifications'
of
treating
variable capital exactly
like
constant capital.
He
refuses
to identify the
value of
labour-power
as
-
209
-
the
value of
the
the labourer
consumes,
but,
instead, he identified it
as a share,
1%(l+e),
of
the
value
the labourer
creates.
This
was
to
make
the
latter
not vary when
the
value of
the
means of subsistence was
transformed because the fraction (determined by
the
rate of exploitation) of
the
value added would remain constant
in
the transformation.
Letting
y
be the
net product and
Y the
corresponding vector of
gross outputs,
i.
e.
Y(1-A)=y
where
A is
a production coefficient matrix,
and
taking
a nuineraire, py=Ay, where p and
A
are a price and a value
vector,
he derives the
sum of profits as
follows.
the
sum of profits
=py-w1Y
(w is the
value of a unit of
labour-power
and
I is the
coefficient vector of
labour input).
=A
(I-A)
Y-wl Y because
py=A y=A
(1-A)
Y
=ew1Y
because
A(1-A)Y
is the total
value added
=
the
sum of surplus values.
In the
comparison of
his
own solution
(where the
element of variable
capital
is labour-power)
with
the
'old'
one
(where the
element of
variable capital
is the
means of subsistence),
Lipietz, however, does
not make an
issue
of which of
the two is better. He
simply addresses
that the
old solution
is
compatible and rather complementary
to his
own
on
the
grounds
that
what
he
gains
in his
own method
(i.
e.
being
closer
to the intuitions in Marx) by
expressing
the
rate of profit
directly
as
a
function
of e and y,
he loses through the
complete
indeterminacy
of
the
structure of y
(ibid,
p
83).
We do
not
think
so,
however. His
numeraire, py=Ay,
is, in
our
notation,
tantamount
to E(v+s)1_Z(v'+s')Z,
from
which naturally
follows
Zsj=Zs1'
because he
assumed
vi=v'1.
He defined the
value of
labour-
power as a
fraction
1/(1+e)
of
the
(v+s)
so as not
to transform the
value of variable
capital
into PrPr terms
when
the
values of
the
means
-
210
-
of consumption were
transformed.
In
our case,
the two definitions
of
the
value of
labour-power do
not conflict with each other,
however. It
is
expressible either as
the
value of
the
the
labourer
consumes or as
the
part, a share
1/(l+e)
of
the
value
the
labourer
creates.
Both
are essentially
identical
with each other
because
of
the
resolution principle of
the
value added.
Lipietz's
conception of
the
value category was not
grounded
on a resolution
principle
but
on a composition principle;
he (ibid,
p
78) took for
granted
Samuelson's
analogy of surplus-value with
the
case of a value
added
tax. He
only raised an objection
to Samuelson's
analogy of profit
to the
case of a
turnover tax for
a minor reason
that the
`turnover'
concept
is
not well
defined.
Wolff, Roberts
and
Callari
(1982)
assume
the
c1s are already
transformed
values.
They
express a commodity value as
the
sum of
the
prices of production of
its
(pA)
added
to the
living labour directly
required
(1), i.
e.
A=pA+1,
and
the
price of
production of
the
commodity as
the
sum of
the
advances
for its
(pA)
and
labour-power (pol)
marked up
by
a
general
rate of profit,
i.
e. p=[pA+pol](1+r) where
d is the
means of consumption
per unit of
labour-power. The
general rate of profit
is
expressed as
r=(IX-polX)/(pAX+pdIX), which
is
a ratio of a value
term to
a price of
production
term
and where
X
is the intensity
vector of
industries.
The
numerator of
the
above
fraction
expresses
the total living
labour (=1x)
minus
the
aggregate wage
hill
valued
in
price of production
terms
(=Pd1X). The
Pd1X
is
argued
to he in
value
terms
by
reference
to
Marx (1981,
p
1008). The denominator,
on
the
other
hand, is
valued
in
11
11
We
read,
"Moreover, the
average
price of
labour, i.
e.
the
value of
labour-power,
production price of
the
necessary
means of subsistence.
" (Marx, 1981,
p
1008). Even
without
this
reading,
-
211
-
PrPr terms
as
the total
value of
the
advances
for
as well as
labour-power.
Since the
equation claims
to he
expressing a profit rate,
it
explicitly admits
Marx's
contention
that total
profit equals
total
surplus value.
Marx's
other contention
that total
value equals
total
price
is
easily observed
by
adding
1 to
each side of
the
profit rate
equation yielding
(l+r)=(1X+pAX)/(pAX+pd1X),
which
implies, by
simple
multiplication,
(pAX+pd1X)(l+r)=1X+pAX.
Applying the
above
two
equations, p=[pA+pd!
](l+r)
and
A=pA+1,
we obtain pX=AX
(total
price
equals
total
value).
Wolfson (1984), however,
criticises
Wolff
et al. on
two
grounds.
First,
since,
in the
profit rate equation
form, the
numerator
is in
value
terms
while
the denominator is in PrPr terms, he
criticised
them
for
not
having justified the
rate of profit expressed as
the
ratio of a
value
term to
term. Second, he
criticised
them
for having
offended
the law
of
the
by
expressing surplus values as
IX-pdX
where
IX is
allowed not
to be
proportional
to
pad
(ihid,
p
429). These
criticisms,
however,
are not
replied
to
and are simply
ignored in their
rejoinder
(Wolff
et al.
1984). If they
could
have
replaced
IX
with
(l+e)pd1X following
our
proposition
(P4.3)
of
the
previous section, not only would
the
profit
rate equation
he justifiable but
also
the law
of equal rates of
exploitation would not
be
offended.
To
avoid such exponential criticisms,
in turn, Collier (1986)
we saw already
in 3.3 that the
value of
labour-power
was
determined by
the incurred-cost
of producing
the
labour-power
as a commodity
because
the
socially necessary
labour in its
production
does
not
include the
direct labour
category.
So, its
value ought
to be determined by the
prices
the
labourer
pays
for his
subsistence.
-
212
-
uses a
geometric
exposition, considering,
for the
sake of simplicity,
a
two-commodity Ricardo-Austrian
model of production
12.
The two
goods
of
the
model are
the intermediate
good,
coal
(X1)
and
the final
good,
corn
(X, ).
The technology for the two
goods
is
summarised
by the three
rays
(OA,
OB, OC) in Fig. l. OK
units of coal.
production requires
OL
units of
labour
and no other
inputs. OJ
units of
corn production requires
OM
units of
labour
and
OK
units of coal.
The
ray
OD
shows
the
employment structure of
the
economy
determined by
technology
(OL for
coal,
OM for
corn).
The
ray
OV
shows
the
amount of
labour directly
and
indirectly
embodied
in
corn
(%I
units of
direct
labour
+
NIN
units of
indirect labour for OJ
units of corn).
The
ray
OW
shows
the
subsistence wage
(JQ
units of corn equalled
to UN
units of
labour
explains
the
surplus value produced
in the OJ
units of corn).
By drawing MF
parallel
to 0V,
and
MG in
parallel
to OW in Fig. 2,
we express
the
coal production
in terms
of corn units.
MN (=OL)
units
of
labour is
embodied
in FN
units of corn
(= OK
units of coal)
by the
technology
of coal production.
FG
units of corn expresses
the
surplus
value produced
by MN (=4L)
units of
labour in the technology
of coal
production.
The
ray
OH
expresses
in
value
terms the
exchange ratio of
the two
goods,
"FN (=
KH)
units of corn =
OK
units of coal".
The
rate
of profit
in the
corn
industry is defined
as
the following.
r2 =
Sei(V2+C2)
=
YE
(FN+TM)
=
YE/(FN+YE).
By
contrast,
the
rate of profit
in the
coal
industry is defined
as
this;
rl =
S1
(V1+C1)
=
FG/GN
with
Cl being
zero.
Since the
coal profit rate =
S1/Vl
=
S2/V2 > S2/(V2+C2)
= corn profit,
12
It is Ricardian
in the
sense
that
constant
input
requirements are
assumed.
And it is Austrian
in the
sense
that
no circular
interdependencies
between the
sectors of
the
model exist.
-
213
-
< Fig. 1
and
Fig. 2?
8
X
L
1-c,
K
B
X
X
K
0
M
N
-
214
-
f,,
l Rl
2
L2
i.
e. rl>r2,
the
only way
for
output
levels to
remain
in their
current
proportions
is for the
price of coal
to fall below its
corn value.
OH
will shift
to OH'. Then, the
surplus-value of
FF' transfers from the
coal production
to the
corn production.
The two
equalities
between
total
value and
total
price of production, and
total
surplus value and
total
profit are
thus
observed.
This
geometric
method, which
is its
strong point,
implies that
both have the
same substance of
labour time
and are
in the
same
dimensionality,
which
we
developed in (P4.4) in
various ways.
Kliman
and
McGlone (1988)
revive an
iterative
method on
the
premises which are conceptually
different from those in the iterative
methods of
Shaikh '(1978), Morishima (1973,1974,1978)
and
Okishio
(1974).
In the latter
case,
the
stages of calculation
in
moving
from
one
price system
to
another
illustrate the
movements of prices and yet not
the
movements of values.
In the
case of
Kliman
and
McGlone
(1988),
however,
each stage of
the iteration is described
as a
discrete
separate
system, where
the
values and
the
prices
in
one stage
(period) has
nothing
to do
with
those. in
other stages
(periods). Each
stage
(period)
establishes a unique value-price system
independently
of
the
previous
value-price ones.
The
only
link between them is the
assumption of
simple reproduction.
The
simple reproduction,
however,
presupposes
two things.
First, the
magnitude of
the
value added
in
each sector of production
(v+s). is
presupposed not
to
change all periods.
And,
secondly,
the
magnitude of variable capital
(v} is
a
fixed
proportion of
the total
price of
the
likewise the
constant capital
(c)
-
215
-
is
a
fixed
proportion of
the total
price of
the
means of production.
As
a result,
two
anomalies are necessarily
incurred. One is
that the
amount of profit
is
obliged not
to be
equal
to the
amount of
the
capitalists' revenue
(since
a part of profit
is forced to he
incorporated into
capital
in the
subsequent periods
to keep the fixed
proportions of
the
prices of
the
means of production and of
the
means of
consumption
in the
circumstances
that the
prices of
the
means of
production and consumption are
incessantly
changing).
The
other
is that
the
is
allowed
to
vary
because the
variable capital
changes
in
accordance with
the
changing price of
the
means of
consumption whilst
the
magnitude of
the
value added
does
not change
in
any period.
At the
cost of
the two
anomalies,
however, they
managed
to
show
that total
price equalled
total
value and
total
profit equalled
total
surplus-value.
But the two
anomalies are
fatal. First, the
rate of
exploitation,
in
principle,
belongs to
a value calculation and
is
determined
specifically
in the instance
of production relations; a
transformation
procedure
itself has
no reason
to
change
it. Secondly,
while
the incorporation
of a part of profit
into
capital
is
required
by
assuming
the
amount of constant capital and
that
of variable capital
to
the fixed
proportions of
the
means of production and consumption,
the
capitalists are
thereby
compelled
to
consume
different
proportions of
the
means of consumption, which violates
the
simple reproduction
condition.
So far,
we
have
examined
the
recent solutions suggested
by
Lipietz (1982), Wolff, Roberts
and
Callari
(1982), Collier
(1986),
Kliman
and
McGlone
(1988). Though they
argue without exception
that the
two
equalities
between total
price and
total
value, and
total
profit and
-
216
-
total
surplus-value obtain simultaneously, we
have
shown
in the
above,
none of
those
solutions
is
satisfactory.
In
our
discussion, however, it
is
affirmed
that
at
least four
precepts are
to be
observed so as
to
produce
the two
equalities.
(1)
A
is to be
equalised across all sectors of production.
(2)
The
rate of
exploitation cannot change
in the transformation
procedure.
(3)
Value
and price of production are of
the
same substance.
(4)
The
value of
labour-power
can
be
expressed
in two terms indifferently, i.
e. as a
fraction
of
the
value added or as
the
production price of
the
means of
consumption which
the
money paid
to the labourer
would
buy.
Lastly, Carchedi (1984),
although
he
argues
Marx's
original
two
equalities
to be
valid,
takes
a
different
approach
from the
above, and
refuses,
in the
name of epistemological principles,
to
confront
the
quantitative calculations.
His terminologies
are unique,
distinct from
our common
language. When PrPr deviates from
value,
first
of all,
he
calls
the PrPr
`social
value' and
the
value
ìndividual
value'.
He
describes the deviation
of value
from
price of production as a sort of
unequal exchange, as
the deviation
of
individual
value
from
social
value.
Equal
exchange means
individual
values
do
not
deviate from
social values
for him. The transformation itself is for him
an unequal
exchange process.
In the
unequal exchange, one party's
gain
is
another
party's
loss. So
naturally
follows the
one equality
that total
price of
production equal
total
value.
Even
so,
however, the
other equality
that
total
profit equals
total
surplus-value
does
not necessarily
follow. To
get
the latter, he defines the
value of c
to be
an already
transformed
value on
the
grounds
that it
was
bought
at
PrPr
(at its
social value)
and yet
to be
modified
by the
change
in the
average conditions of
production of c
in the
present period
(see ihid,
pp
444-445),
and
the
-
217
-
value of v
is
also assumed
to he
an already
transformed
value on
the
same
grounds
(see ibid,
p
446). He (ihid,
p
446)
adopts
the Smithian
composition principle of v and s saying,
"The ind: i
vi.
dual
values are
the
values
given
by how
much surplus value
has been
added co
the
average,
socially necessary, quantity and quality of c and v".
Grounded
upon all
these
definitions, he
easily
derives "total
profit equals
total
surplus-
value"
(total.
price equals
total
value,
total input
value equals
total
input PrPr, from
which
follows total
profit equals
total
surplus-value).
Certainly, in his
argumentation, as we can see
in the
above,
the
whole
discussion in Marx's transformation is
simply
ignored in the different
context of
the
relationship
between
social value and
individual
value.
He
presupposes
two
mutually antithetical
tendencies:
one
is to
equal exchange
(to
the
equalisation of organic compositions of capital),
the
other
is to
unequal exchange
(towards
the hierarchy
of
the
organic
compositions of capita].
). In this
explanation,
he does
not
distinguish
(A)
competition
between
sectors of production
from the (B)
competition
within sectors of production.
Each
of
the two tendencies
must
belong
to,
respectively, each of
the two distinct
cases of competition.
Marx's
distinction between
social value and
individual
value
falls
within
the
case of
(B),
while
Marx's discussion
of
the
equal rates of profit. refers
to the
case of
(A)
3.
But Carchedi
(1984)
confuses
the two
cases and
13
The
general rate of profit
is the
result of competition
between
sectors of production whereas market value
is the
result of competition
within sectors of competition.
Different individual
conditions of
production make
for individual
values
based
upon
the
general
rate of
profit
(this individual
value
has
a social character
because its
calculation
is
grounded on
the
socially
determined 'general
rate of
profit').
The individual
values
transform themselves
into
a market
value
based
on
the
competition within
the
sector of production.
Contingent
elements
transform the
market value
into
a market price.
Social
average of
the individual
values may well
deviate from the
market
value
because the latter is determined by the
play of supply and
demand.
In
short,
Carchedi's
conception of social value and
individual
value
is,
frankly
speaking, extraordinarily
dislocated.
-
218
-
collapses
them into
a mixed single one.
This
stems
from
the
misguided
relationship
between
value and use-value.
When he talks
about social
value and
individual
value,
he forgets the
values are mediated
by the
same use-value.
Otherwise, how
could
the
value which ought
to be
of a
social character
be
calculated
in individual terms?
Such
a
dislocation is
not exceptional.
It has been
rather
inveterate in Marxian literature. Especially
when
the debates turn to
doubtful.
epistemological principles,
the dislocation
easily
turns
out
to
he
rampant.
The discussions
on
Marx's transformation
problem
is
also
the
case.
Some Marxists have
preferred
to
plunge
into
epistemological
debates to
avoid a
direct
reply
to the
quantitative
inconsistency
of
the
problem.
We
examine some of
them.
Gerstein (1976)
referred
to
value as
the
category of production
while
to
price of production as
that
of
the
articulation of production
and exchange.
De Vroey (1981),
on
the
other
hand,
ascribed value
to
an
instantaneous
existence created
by
exchange.
Fine
and
Harris
(1979)
attributed
the
value and
the
price of production
to the logics
of
"capital in
general"
and
"many
capitals".
To
give
the barest details,
we summarise
them
as
follows.
A;
"Production"
vs
"the Articulation
of production and circulation"
by Gerstein
(1976),
etc.
B; "An instantaneous
existence created
by
exchange"
by De Vroey
(1981),
etc.
C; "Capital in
general" vs
"Many
capitals"
by Rosdolsky
(1977),
Fine
and
Harris
(1979),
etc.
As for A, to begin
with,
Gerstein
(1976)
argues
this for the
reason
that
profits
do
not exist at
the
level
of
Capital
vol.
I
where
the
process of
production of capital
is
at
issue but
at
the
level
of
Capital
voi.
III
where
the total
process of capital
is
at
issue. He
paid no attention
to
-
219
-
the
first three
chapters
in Capital
vol.
I-where the
exchange process of
the
commodity was
discussed
with
the
categories of value, money,
capital, etc.
being derived from that
of
the
commodity.
While
observing
capital's production process,
he
neglected commodity's exchange.
Capital is
a value, and value
has little to do
with exchange.
It
can
only
have
some relation
to the
extent
that the
use-value
in
which
it is
existent
has
something
to do
with exchange.
As
we saw
in
(P4.1),
value
refers not only
to
a production category
but to the identification
as
well as
to the demarcation between
What
refers
to
a production category alone
is
only
its
new value part
(v+s).
In Capital, Marx's
concept of
the
production of capital stands
for two things;
a value production,
the
expanded reproduction of social
relations on one
hand,
and, on
the
other
hand, the
production of use-
values.
Marx's
concept of
the
exchange of capital,
however, does
not
stand
for the
exchange of values
but for the
exchange of use-values.
This is because
value
itself is
not
the thing to be
exchanged
but
only
to be
accumulated
by its
producer.
When
commodities are sold and
purchased,
the
value of
the
commodities
is
not
handed
over
to their
purchaser
but
stays
in the
same
hand in the form
of money
instead
of
in
the form
of a commodity.
Therefore, in
conclusion,
the
production of
value must comprise
both the
production and
the
exchange of use-values.
Another
problem
is in Gerstein's
concept of
the
articulation of
The term,
`the
articulation'
is distinct from
that
of
`the
unity' we used
in
(P4.1). The
one suggests
that,
of
the
two things,
some
parts are shared
in
common while some other parts are
not.
The
other supposes,
on
the
other
hand, that,
of
the two things,
a
thorough identification
as well as a
hard
and
fast demarcation
obtains.
Production
cannot share
a certain part
in
common with exchange;
there is
-
220
-
no articulation of
the two in the
same sense
that there
could
be
no
articulation of
time
and space.
In
opposition
to Gerstein,
as
for B, De Vroey (1981)
argued
that
value was an
instantaneous
existence created
by
exchange.
For the
reason
that there
should
he
no creation of value without exchange,
he
argued
it to be
an exchange category.
His definition
of value which
is
rather akin
to the
neo-classical concept of price, someone might argue,
does
not put
the
aspects of production entirely aside when
he
says
"the
magnitude of value
depends
on
the
average conditions of production
prevailing at
the
point of exchange"
(ibid,
p
177). Yet, he
says
that
the
magnitude of value
depends
on
(not is determined by) the
average
conditions of production.
Of
course,
his
value category may as well
depend
on
the
average condition of production only
to the
extent
that,
as an exchange category,
it
may well
depend
on
the
condition of supply
and
demand. So, the
allusion
does
not
link
value category
to
production.
According to him, the
value concept as an exchange category
is
useful
in
avoiding
the
vexed problems
that
arises
in
calculating
the
amount of
diachronic, historically
expended
labours. To
avoid
the
category of
historically
expended
labour
and,
instead, to take the
category of currently expended
labour, he
rejected
Gerstein's
value
concept as a production
category
in favour
of
his
own as an exchange
category.
With this
kind
of value concept,
however, the
concept of
capital will no
longer be decipherable
as a production category.
Lastly,
as
for C, this
position
has been
most widely accepted
in
common
by traditional
Marxists.
Negating
any significance
in the
quantitative comparison
of value with price of production,
Fine
and
Harris
(1979,
p
23),
etc.
insist
on
the
qualitative aspect of
the
-
221
-
trannsformation
problem and
thus
present
the
position,
C
as a reply
to
the
so-called quantitative
inconsistency.
They
say
(ibid,
p
23) that
a
quantitative comparison
between
value
and price of production
is itself
meaningless
because
the two
categories
are
in distinct dimensions;
one
is in the dimension
of
"capital
in
general", the
other
is in the
dimension
of
"many
capitals".
They imply in this
argument,
however,
that the dimension
of
"capital
in
general" is
one
thing, the dimension
of
"many
capitals"
is
another.
In
our position,
however,
the two dimensions
of
"capital in
general"
and
"many
capitals" cannot
be
apart.
If they
could
be
apart,
then the
equalisation effect and
the
capitalist competition as well
would not
be
comprised
in the dimension
of
"capital in
general"
but in
that
of
"many
capitals".
But
itself is
not
enough
to
get
the
equalisation effect unless
the dimension
of
"capital
in
general"
is
presupposed,
i.
e. unless
the dimension
of
"capital
in
general"
is introduced.
Usually,
imports
a
law
of
the jungle,
where
the
stronger preys upon
the
weaker.
Competition, therefore,
may
enlarge rather
than
reduce
inequalities. Just
as
free
competition
between
classmates, unless
the
classmates are completely
identical in
all aspects and conditions, cannot yield equalities
in their
academic
results, so
in
capitalist competition,
too,
equal rates of profit may
not
hold
unless
the
many capitals are all around
identical.
To
obtain equal rates of profit, accordingly, many capitals
in
free
competition must reflect
their homogeneity,
counting as
the
same
"capital
in
general".
The two dimensions
of
"capital in
general"
and
"many
capitals" are not
therefore to be
apart
in
yielding
the
equal
rates of profit; one counts as
the intrinsic, the
other counts as
the
-
222
-
external cause of
the
equal rates of profit.
The "capital
in
genera].
"
and
the
"many
capitals"
in Fine
and
Harris, therefore,
wouuld rather
have
to be
read as
"in the
context of
the
whole" and
"in
the
context of
the
parts".
So-called
quantitative
inconsistency between
value and price of
production
is
easily
dissolved in the
context of
'the
whole', not
in the
context of
"capital in
general".
-
223
-
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Marx's
abstraction process
in
analysing commodity values started
from
the three
premises,
(a)
the inherency
of use-value,
(b)
the inherency
of
exchange-value and
(c)
the identity
of
the inherent
exchange-values.
The first two
premises establish
the
in his
abstraction process
between the dual
character of
labour,
on
the
one
hand,
and
the two factors
of
the
commodity,
\on the
other
hand. Yet the
third
premise severs
the
contingent
factors
of commodity exchange
from
the
necessary ones of
it.
The identity
of
the inherent
exchange-values,
i.
e.
the
equation
form
of exchange, was
to take the
various
inherent
contents of
the
exchange-values as a single whole
like the
whole universe.
Yet,
since
the
contingent, roughly speaking,
depends
not upon
itself but
on
something else,
the
contingent
factors
are simply swept off when we
take
the inherent
contents as a single whole
in the
equation
form
of
exchange, as
there
would
be
no more external relations.
All
we
have
will only
be the
self-internal relation,
the intrinsic
causation,
the
substance,
the
necessity, etc.
In that
wholeness, any
distinction
between its individual
parts will simply
be dissolved into
a mediated
uniformity.
This
underlies
Marx's
seeking
for the identical
substance
of commodities
(see 2.1).
In the
Marx
seeks
for
a self-actualising
universality
(or identical
substance)
that
makes
the
equation
form hold
good.
It has to
satisfy
at
least three
requirements.
First, it has to
be intrinsic. Secondly,
it
must
commodities.
And, lastly,
while asserting
itself to the
exclusion of all
distinct
-
22
-
particulars,
it has to be
capable of reproducing
the distinct
particulars
from
within as
if they
were
its
own attributes
(as if they
were
its
own external
diversities)
so
that they
may
become homogenised
as qualitatively equal and quantitatively
different
ones.
In
view of
the
relationship
between the distinct
particulars
(being
created) and
the
sought-for
identical
substance
(creating),
Marx finds
out
it
should
not
be
anything other
than
abstract
human labour.
He
was well aware
that this
abstract
human labour
was not enough
to
count as
the
common element of
identical
magnitude which
he
originally sought
for. Unless the thus-far
excluded
distinct
particulars were counted
in in the
category,
the
abstract
labour
appeared
to be
a one-sided
`formal identity'. Looking
at
the
`residue'
of
the
products of
labour, he
notes
there\is
nothing
left
of
them in
each case
but the
same phantom-like objectivity,
the
congealed
quantities of
homogeneous human labour. The
reason why
the
contained
in the
commodities can change
into
homogeneous labours
consists only
in the fact that
abstract
human labour
is
congealed as
the identical
substance of
the
commodities
(see 2.2).
We
acknowledge
that
any
labour that
produces a commodity can count as
abstract
labour
satisfying
the two
requirements of
its
reality,
i.
e.
the
free
mobility of
labour
and
the
versatility of
labour (see 2.3).
The distinction between
abstract
labour
and
homogeneous labour
may seem novel
in this thesis. This distinction is
vital
for
explaining
productive and unproductive
labour. Traditionally, Marxian
explanations
of
the
productive and
the
unproductive
labour have been tautological.
To the
question of why a commercial
labour is
unproductive,
they
reply
that it is
unproductive
because it
cannot produce any value
(or
surplus-
-
225
-
value).
To the
question of why
it
cannot produce a value
(or
a surplus-
value),
they
reply
that it
(or
a surplus-value)
since
it is
unproductive
labour. This tautology is
now
to he
eliminated
by
our
distinction between homogeneous labour
and abstract
labour. We
can reply
that it
because it is
not congealed,
not objectified
in the
products and so cannot
become
a
homogeneous
labour;
since
it
cannot
he homogenised,
it
produces no value.
If it
produce a value,
it has to be
capable of
being
congealed
(or
objectified, embodied, externalised, etc.
).
The distinction between
productive and unproductive
labour is
vital
for
explaining
the
accumulation of capital, new middle class,
the
under-consumption
theory
of crisis,
the
over-accumulation
theory
of crisis,
the
emergence of
the
bank
notes and
the
state-intervention
in the
economy'.
After
closing
the discussion
on
the
substance of value,
Marx
moves
his
attention
to the
question of value-magnitude saying
that the
magnitude of value
amount of socially necessary
average
labour. In this thesis, however,
we asked
in
what quantitative
1
Unproductive labourer is distinct from
non-producer
(e.
g.
land-owner)
in
several points.
First,
unproductive
labourer does
produce a use-
value
but does
not produce a value while non-producer produces none of
them. Second, the
consumption
level
of
the
unproductive
labourer
may
be
enhanced without
the
encroachment of
total
surplus-value
in the
society
while
the
consumption
level
of
the latter is definitely to be
matched
with
the
encroachment of
the
surplus-value.
Thus, the
so-called
underconsumption crisis may
be
resolved
by
enhancing
the
consumption
level
of
the
unproductive
labourers. Third,
non-producers
have
a
certain
interest
relation
in the
society's capital-labour relationship
but
unproductive
labourers
are more or
less irrelevant to the
society's
relationship
between
capital and
labour (thus, they
make
the
new
category of a new middle class).
Every
unproductive
labourer,
of
course,
does
not
belong to the
new middle class.
But
every member of
the
new middle class without exception must constitute
the
unproductive
labourer.
-
226
-
proportions
the heterogeneous
and
diachronous labours
congealed
in the
commodities were reducible
to homogeneous
and synchronous
labours. With
the two
crucial points
in
mind,
i.
e.
(1) individual labourer
cannot
produce a value nor a use-value and so cannot count as abstract
labour,
(2) the
reduction problem of
the heterogeneous
to the homogeneous labour
is logically
prior
to the
operation of
the law
ofvalue whilst
the
problem of
the
wage-differentials
is the
result of
the law
of value, we
find
out
the
solution
to the
reduction problem
has
already
been
given
in
Marx's formular,
c+v+s=c+(l+e)v, of commodity value.
The direct labour
amount
is, in
principle,
immeasurable
and,
therefore,
must rely on
its
external magnitude
for its
expression,
that
t
is, (l+e)v=` i(t)dt
where
i{t}
is the intensity
of
labour, t is the
JC
duration
of
labour
and v
is the
externalised expression of a part of
the
direct labour (the
value of
labour-power). The
mode
in
which
the
intrinsic (immeasurable)
magnitude expresses
itself
as an external
magnitude
is
only available,
in the
capitalist commodity production as
is
seen
in the formular,
v+s=(1+e)v,
(see
Chapter 3).
The
mode
in
which an
intrinsic
magnitude
is transformed into
another only
to
express
itself in terms
of external magnitude
is
discussed in the transformation
of value
into
price of production.
The
agent of production
itself, first
of all,
is transformed from labour
into
capital.
In
accordance with
that, the law
of equal rates of
exploitation
is
replaced
by the law
And the
resolution principle of
the
newly created value as
the
amount of
direct
labour into two
parts, v and s,
is transformed
into the
composition
principle of
the two
parts,
v and s.
What
distinguishes
value
from
price of production
is
not
in
calculation
terms
but in the
principle of
-
227
-
formation. For this
very reason, we claim
the `rectifications'
initiated by Bortkiewicz
(1984),
etc.
has been
arithmetically wrong.
Marx's
original procedure and
his
original conclusion
that the
sum of
values equals
the
the
sum of surplus-
values equals
the
sum of profits, must
have been
right
(see Chapter 4).
Our interpretation
so
far
revealed claims no
inconsistency
with
Marx's
own views.
Nevertheless, it has broken
out of
the husk
of
the
traditional
Marxism. In 2.1
and
in the Appendix to 2.1,
we
have
shown
that,
in Marx's
category of
the
commodity, non-labour products are not
excluded at
the
outset and some
labour-products
are, rather, excluded as
inadequate
form
of exchange.
In 2.2,
we showed
that
even
if
non-labour
products were not
excluded, the identical
substance must
have been the
same abstract
human labour. In 2.3,
we show
that
any
labour in
reality
that
produces a commodity can count as abstract
labour. In 3.2
and
in
4.1
and
4.2,
we showed
that labour-values
were empirically measurable.
In
one of
her
critiques,
J. Robinson
(1977,
p
59)
said,
"Sraffa's
contribution
to Marxism is
mainly negative,
to dispose
of
the
rubbish of orthodox
theory. Now it is
up
to the Marxists to break
out
of
the husk
of
dogmatism
and set about
building the
political economy of
today in the
space
that he has
cleared.
". What
she meant
by the
`husk
of
dogmatism' for the Marxists
consisted
of
three
points.
Firstly,
non-
labour
products are not
taken into
account
in
analysing commodity
values.
Secondly, the
so-called
identical
substance of commodities,
abstract
human labour, is
not proved as a real existence and so
does
remain as metaphysical.
Thirdly, the
magnitude of value,
the
amount of
embodied
labour, is
not empirically
measurable.
These three
points are,
however, directly
dealt
with and are
broken
out of
in the
present
thesis. So,
we
hope this thesis
could
be the
very
foundation
on which
-
228
-
to build the
political economy of
today for
which many sincere
economists
like Robinson
have
a
thirst. It is
our conviction
that the
analytical
Marxism,
e.
g.
Roemer (1981,1982,1986a,
1986b), Cohen
(1981,
1982,1986), Elster
(1982,1985),
etc., although
it
makes out
èxploitation'
and analyses
`classes'
even without recourse
to the
value
theory,
can
in
no way
he the foundation itself for
which
Robinson has
a
thirst.
-
229
-
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