First Gulf of Sidra Incident (1981)

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The Gulf of Sidra incident was a naval engagement in which two Libyan Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter attack aircraft were shot down by two
American F-14 Tomcats from the USS Nimitz. The first Gulf of Sidra incident took place off the Libyan coast on August 19, 1981, during
the Cold War. At the time, Republican President Ronald Reagan was in Office, and Omar Kadafi was ruling Lybia.
Libya had claimed a 12 mile extension zone of its territorial waters in the Gulf of Sidra, declaring the territorial waters of the gulf as their
own. This prompted US naval forces to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations in the area, the so-called "line of death". These
operations intensified when Ronald Reagan came to office on January 20, 1981. In August 1981, he authorized the deployment of a large
naval force, led by USS Forrestal and Nimitz, off the Libyan coast.
The Libyan Air Force responded by deploying a high number of interceptors and fighter-bombers. Early on the morning of August 18,
when the US exercise began, at least three MiG-25 Foxbats approached the US carrier groups, but were escorted away by F-4 Phantom
IIs from Forrestal and F-14s of VF-41 and VF-84 from Nimitz. The Libyans tried to establish the exact location of the US naval force.
Thirty-five pairs of MiG-23 Floggers, MiG-25s, Sukhoi Su-20 Fitter-Cs, Su-22M Fitter-Js and Mirage F.1s flew into the area, and were
soon intercepted by seven pairs of F-14s and F-4s. The situation was tense, but neither side fired any weapons, even in at least two cases
when MiG-25s tried to breach through the American fighters by flying high and fast.
On August 19, 1981, two F-14 fighters were flying combat air patrol to cover aircraft engaged in a missile exercise. An E-2B Hawkeye from
Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron VAW-124 made radar contact with two Soviet-built Sukhoi Su-22 Fitters aircraft which had left
Okba Ben Nafi Air Base near Tripoli. The two F-14s were ordered to intercept. Only a few seconds before the crossing, one of the Libyan
fighters fired an AA-2 "Atoll" missile at one of the F-14s, but missed. Then the two Sukhois flew past the Americans and tried to escape.
According to the rules of engagement, the Tomcats were cleared to return, which mandated self defense on the ini tiation of hostile action.
The Americans pilots fired AIM-9L Sidewinders, shooting down the two Libyan aircraft. Less than an hour later, while the Libyans were
conducting a search and rescue operation of their downed pilots, two fully-armed MiG-25s entered the airspace over the Gulf and headed
towards the US carriers at Mach 1.5 and conducted a mock attack in the direction of USS Nimitz. Three F-14s headed towards the Libyans,
who then turned around and headed home.









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http://historywarsweapons.com/first-gulf-of-sidra-incident-1981/
Second Gulf of Sidra Incident (1986)
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The Reagan administration intensified its efforts to provoke a war with Libya, leading up to the Gulf of Sidra incident on March 24,
1986, which resulted in the killing of dozens of Libyan seamen at the hands of the US Navy.
Washington had been threatening Libya with war for several months in retaliation for the Gaddafi regimes financial support to militant
elements in the Palestinian independence movement. These provocations were taken to a new level when the US launched freedom of
navigation naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra. Libya claimed the entire Gulf to be territorial waters, as it is surrounded on three sides by
Libyan land. The US insisted that international waters ended 12 miles from the Libyan coast.
On March 23, the US brought an armada of vessels close enough to Libya to be visible from the shore. It included six frigates, five cruisers,
and three aircraft carriers that comprised a force of 250 jets and bombers and 27,000 sailors, soldiers and airmen. On the 24th, US ships
bombarded their ill-equipped Libyan counterparts, which were largely patrol boats. An unknown number of Libyans died in the
exchangeat least 35 according to one estimate. The US suffered not a single casualty.
Behind the Reagan administrations provocation was the drive of US imperialism to reassert its hegemony over the Middle East and North
Africa. US control had eroded in the face of growing European economic influence and a handful of nationalist regimes such as that of
Gaddafi in Libya, Hussein in Iraq, and Assad in Syria, which attempted to assert a degree of independence by positioning themselves
between the US and the Soviet Union.

Gulf of Sidra Incident

(Article I got from the lib under Sir Roques readings since they didnt have a copy of the original case)

The maritime area, the Gulf of Sidra (also Sirte, Surt) covers about 22,000 square miles. It protrudes southwards to a
distance of up to 140 miles and bordered on 3 sides (east, south, west) by Libya.
Under Art. 1 of its Law of 18 February 1959, Libya fixed the limit of its territorial waters at 12 nautical miles.
o This law superseded the one in force until this time which provided that the territorial sea of Libya extends 6
miles from the coast, as was the case before Libyas independence.
1 September 1969: King Idris I was overthrown out by a Revolutionary Command Council headed by Colonel
Muammar el-Qaddafi. It made an announcement in 1973 with the following points:

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https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/03/twih-m21.html
o The Gulf of Surt, within the territory of the Libyan Arab Republic and surrounded by land boundaries on its
East, South and West sides, and extending North offshore to latitude 32 degrees and 30 minutes, constitutes
an integral part of the Libyan Arab Republic and is under its complete sovereignty.
o It constitutes the internal waters of the Libyan Arab Republic.
o Throughout history, without dispute, the Libyan Arab Republic exercised sovereignty over the Gulf. The
same is crucial to insure the safety and security of the State because the Gulfs geographical location
commands a view of the Southern part of the country.
o The Gulf is within the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Libyan Arab Republic. Private and public foreign
ships are not allowed to enter the Gulf without prior permission from authorities of the State and in
accordance with regulations established in this regard.
Such claim was contained in a Note sent by the Libyan Embassy to the US Department of State on 11 October 1973,
prompting protest and rejection by the US for it was unacceptable as a violation of international law. US replied:
o The Libyan action purports to extend the boundary of Libyan waters in the Gulf of Sirte northward to a line
approximately 300 miles longand to require prior permission for foreign vessels to enter that area.
o Under IL, as codified in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the body of
water enclosed by the 300 mile line cannot be regarded as the juridical internal or territorial waters of the
Libyan Arab Republic.
o Nor does the Gulf meet the IL standard of past, open, notoriouseffective and continuous exercise of
authority and acquiescence of foreign nations necessary to be regarded historically as Libyan internal or
territorial waters.
o US therefore reserves its rights and the rights of its national in the Gulf of Sirte affected by the Libyan action.
Evident from the wording of the Libyan announcement that Libya considers the line claimed as the northern limit of
its internal waters (Libyan line) as the closing line of the Gulf of Sidra rather than as a straight baseline joining appropriate
points of the coast.
Under the general rules of customary IL, as affirmed by the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, codified in the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea:
o Straight baselines method of delimitation may be resorted to in localities where the coast line is deeply
indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.
Drawing of such baselines must not depart from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas
lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the
regime of internal waters.
The Libyan line does not conform to the said conditions. Rather, it departs to a very appreciable extent from the
general direction of the coast. Thus, the straight baselines method per se is inapplicable in the instant case.
The 1973 Libyan announcement seems to be based on the claim that the Gulf of Sidra constitutes a Libyan historic
bay.

[Article now goes on to determine validity of the Libyan claim under the historic bay doctrine.]

Both Art. 7(6), 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and Art. 10(6), 1982 Law of the Sea Convention stipulate that the
foregoing provisions [of those articles] do not apply to so-called historic bays.
o Thus, historic bay does not necessarily have to fit the semicircular area criterion laid down for a bay in
these Conventions.
Under existing law, a coastal state is entitled to enclose as internal waters a bay whose natural entrance does not
exceed 24 miles. Where such entrance exceeds that width, a straight baseline of 24 miles may be drawn within the bay
so as to enclose the maximum area of water possible within a line of that length.
o The Libyan line exceeds in its length the maximum permissible closing lines of bays by more than 12 times.
o The Libyan claim could be justified in international law if
Libya was able to demonstrate that the Gulf had been claimed as a historic bay over an extended
period of time.
The coastal state had effectively exercised its jurisdiction in the Gulf in the appropriate manner.
The coastal states claim and exercise of jurisdiction had been recognized by the international
community of maritime states, or at least acquiesced in.
Doctrine of historic bays: Claims to historic waters in general (and historic bays in particular) are relics of an older
and largely obsolete regime. It is understood that, while the international community may still be willing to consider
the validity of already existing claims of this kind (in exceptional circumstances), it has rejected attempts to establish
new maritime claims of an extravagant character since such claims clearly encroach on what otherwise would be
considered the common domain of the international community.
o Purpose: provide a smooth as possible transfer from some vague and obsolete notions of the Middle Ages to
the more stringent requirements of the modern IL of the sea.
o Principle that new claims should be allowed would be at variance of the UN Charter against the unilateral use
of force, which is inevitable.
Art. 2, 1958 Convention on the High Seas categorically states that the high seas being open to all nations, no State
may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty.
Besides its announcement, Libya has not offered any evidence to substantiate its claim.
o On the contrary, the 1955 Note of the Libyan Ministry for Foreign Affairs makes it clear that prior to 1973,
Libya claimed a territorial sea measured from the coast, as was the case before Libyas independence.
o The practice therefore, since its accession of independence in 1951, was that the territorial sea of Libya was
measured from its coast.
There is also the fact that no mention is made of the Gulf of Sidra in the survey of historic bays contained in the
Memorandum on Historic Bays prepared by the UN Secretariat for the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Under contemporary IL of the sea, any attempts by individual states to appropriate portions of the high seas are
deemed invalid. Thus, theres no need for other states to make a formal protest to prevent such rights from being
established. Those who have protested, are deemed to do so as being lodged ex abundante cautela (from an excess of
caution).
In the Security Council debate between 26 and 31 of March 1986, not even those who were friendly and supported
Libya (Malta, Kuwait, Iran, Yemen) supported its claim.

Paula P.