Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 13

Azcona v.

Jamandre
Facts
Guillermo Azcona leased 80 hectares out of his 150 hectare share in Hacienda Sta. Fe in
NegrosOccidental to Cirilo Jamandre. The agreed yearly rental was P7200 and the term was for
3agricultural years beginning 1960. On March 30, 1960, when the first annual rent was due,petitioner
was not able to deliver possession of the leased property thus he waived payment of that rental.
Respondent only entered the premises on October 26, 1960 after paying P7000, whichwas
acknowledged by the petitioner in the receipt. On April 6, 1961, the petitioner notifiedrespondent that
the contract of lease was deemed cancelled for violation of the conditions of thecontract. Earlier, in fact,
the respondent had been ousted from the possession of the 60 hectaresof the leased premises and let
with only 20 hectares of the original area.
Issues
Whether or not the lease contract is deemed cancelled upon failure of the respondent to:
1.
Attach the parcelary plan identifying the exact area subject of the contract
2.
Secure approval of PNB of said contract
3.
Pay the rentals
Ruling
Parcelary PlanThe correct view is that there was an agreed subject-matter, although it was not expressly
definedbecause the plan was not annexed and never approved. There was still an ascertainable
objectbecause the leased premises were sufficiently delineated and identified. Failure to attach the
planwas imputable to the petitioner himself because he was supposed to prepare the said
plan.Nevertheless, the identification of the lease area rendered the plan unnecessary and its absencedid
not nullify the agreement.PNB ApprovalPetitioners claim that such possession was not delivered
because the approval of bythe PNB hadnot materialized due to respondent's neglect. Respondent was
negotiating the loan with PNB butthe contract does not state upon whom fell the obligation to secure
the approval.Payment of RentPetitioner contends that the payment of P7000, which was short of P200,
was a violation of theagreement thus the contract should be deemed cancelled. But the petitioner
unqualifiedlyaccepted the amount. The absence of any mention of the discrepancy in the receipt nor
anyprotest or demand to collect the remaining balance, means that petitioner acknowledged
theamount as the full payment for the rent. The SC affirms the decision of the CA and petition
isdenied.Note: The CA held that the amount of P200 had been condoned but the SC viewed it as a
merereduction of the stipulated rental in consideration of the withdrawal from the leased
premiseswhere the petitioner intended to graze his cattle.
Relevant Articles/ Jurisprudence
Art 1235 When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness or irregularity,and
without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed fully complied with.

ARAAS VS. TUTAAN
127 SCRA 828

FACTS: On May 3, 1971 the lower court declared thatPetitioner Luisa Quijencio (and by her spouse Jose
Araas)was the owner of 400 shares including the stock dividendsthat accrued to said shares, of
respondent Universal Textile Mills, Inc. (UTEX) as defendant and Gene Manueland B. R. Castaeda as co-
defendants, and subsequently ordered UTEX to cancel said certificates and issue new ones in the name
of Plaintiff and to deliver all dividendsappertaining to the same, whether in cash or in stocks.UTEX filed a
motion for clarification whether thephrase to deliver to her all dividends appertaining to thesame,
whether in cash or in stocks meant dividends properly pertaining to plaintiffs after the
courtsdeclaration of plaintiff ownership of said 400 shares of stock. Defendant UTEX has always
maintained it would rightfully abide by whatever decision may be rendered since such would be the
logical consequence after the ruling in respect to the rightful ownership of said shares of stock. The
motion was granted which ruled against UTEX, ordering it to pay plaintiff the cash dividends, which
accrued to the stocks in question after rendition of its current decision excluding cash dividends already
paid to Gene Manuel and B. R. Castaeda which accrued before its decision. UTEX alleged that the cash
dividends had already been paid thereby absolving it from payment thereof.

ISSUE: Was the contention of UTEX, alleging that the cash dividends of stock had already been paid and
thereby absolving it from any further payment, valid?

RULING: No. The final and executory judgment against UTEX declared petitioners as the owners of the
questioned UTEX shares of stock against its co-defendants. It was further made clear in the motion for
clarification that all dividends accruing to the said shares after the rendition of the decision of Aug. 7,
1971 rightfully belonged to petitioners. If UTEX nevertheless chose to pay the wrong parties,
notwithstanding its full knowledge and understanding of the final judgment, it was still liable to pay the
petitioners as the lawful declared owners of the questions shares of stocks. The burden of recovering
the supposed payment of the cash dividends made by UTEX to the wrong parties Castaeda and Manuel
falls upon itself by its own action and cannot be passed by it to the petitioner as the innocent parties. It
is elementary that payment made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot extinguish the
judgment obligation of such debtor to its creditor.

Aranas v Tutaan
127 SCRA 828

Facts: The stocks of Universal Textile Mills (UTEX) were issued to co-defendants Manuel and Castaneda.
Subsequently, in 1971, the lower court declared that Luisa Aranas is the rightful owner of the 400 shares
of stocks at Universal Textile Mills (UTEX. Further, it ordered that dividends in cash or stocks pertaining
to the same be delivered to Aranas. UTEX then filed a motion to clarify the phrase in said decision which
states to deliver to her all dividends appertaining to the same, whether in cash or in stocks meant
dividends properly pertaining to the plaintiffs after the courts declaration of her ownership. The said
motion was granted, where the court ordered UTEX to pay the plaintiff the cash dividends which
accrued to the stocks in question after the current decision was rendered but the cash dividends already
paid to the co-defendants before the court decision may not be claimed by the plaintiffs.
The co-defendants filed for a new trial and the decision was the same as the the 1971 ruling. Upon
appeal to the CA, the said ruling was affirmed. The lower court issued a writ of execution in 1979
directed to UTEX to 1) cancel the certificate of stocks of the co-defendants and issue new ones in the
name of the petitioners, and 2) Pay the cash dividends accrued from 1972 to 1979 (period from the new
trial to the issuance of writ of execution). UTEX alleged that the cash dividends had already been paid.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid payment

RULING: No. It is elementary that payment made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot
extinguish the obligation of such debtor to its creditor. It was clear in the motion for clarification that all
dividends accruing to the said shares after the rendition of judgement belonged to the Aranas. When
UTEX paid the wrong parties, despite its knowledge and understanding of the final judgment, it is still
liable to pay Aranas as the lawful declared owners of the said shares. The burden to recover the wrong
payment is on UTEX and cannot be passed on to the Aranas as the innocent parties.

NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY CO. INC. VS. SENERIS
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY CO. INC. VS. SENERIS
10 SCRA 686

FACTS: Petitioner, New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. Inc. was the defendant in a complaint for collection
of money filed by private respondent, Ricardo A. Tong. In this complaint, respondent Judge rendered a
compromise judgment based on the amicable settlement entered by the parties wherein petitioner will
pay to private respondent P54,500.00 at 6% interest per annum and P6,000.00 as attorneys fee of
which P5,000.00 has been paid. Upon failure of the petitioner to pay the judgment obligation, a writ of
execution worth P63,130.00 was issued levied on the personal properties of the petitioner. Before the
date of the auction sale, petitioner deposited with the Clerk of Court in his capacity as the Ex-Officio
Sheriff P50,000.00 in Cashiers Check of the Equitable Banking Corporation and P13,130.00 in cash for a
total of
P63,130.00. Private respondent refused to accept the check and the cash and requested for the auction
sale to proceed. The properties were sold for P50,000.00 to the highest bidder with a deficiency of
P13,130.00. Petitioner subsequently filed an ex-parte motion for issuance of certificate of satisfaction of
judgment which was denied by the respondent Judge. Hence this present petition, alleging that the
respondent Judge capriciously and whimsically abused his discretion in not granting the requested
motion for the reason that the judgment obligation was fully satisfied before the auction sale with the
deposit made by the petitioner to the Ex-Officio Sheriff. In upholding the refusal of the private
respondent
to accept the check, the respondent Judge cited Article 1249 of the New Civil Code which provides that
payments of debts shall be made in the currency which is the legal tender of the Philippines and Section
63 of the Central Bank Act which provides that checks representing deposit money do not have legal
tender power. In sustaining the contention of the private respondent to refuse the acceptance of the
cash, the respondent Judge cited Article 1248 of the New Civil Code which provides that creditor cannot
be compelled to accept partial payment unless there is an express stipulation to the contrary.

ISSUE: Can the check be considered a valid payment of the judgment obligation?

RULING: Yes. It is to be emphasized that it is a well-known and accepted practice in the business sector
that a Cashiers Check is deemed cash. Moreover, since the check has been certified by the drawee
bank, this certification implies that the check is sufficiently funded in the drawee bank and the funds will
be applied whenever the check is presented for payment. The object of certifying a check is to enable
the holder to use it as money. When the holder procures the check to be certified, it operates as an
assignment of a part of the funds to the creditors. Hence, the exception provided in Section 63 of the
Central Bank Act which states that checks which have been cleared and credited to the account of the
creditor shall be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor in cash the amount equal to that which is
credited to his account. The Cashiers Check and the cash are valid payment of the obligation of the
petitioner. The private respondent has no valid reason to refuse the acceptance of the check and cash as
full payment of the obligation


ROMAN CATHOLIC OF MALOLOS V. IAC
191 SCRA 411

FACTS:

Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land. It then entered into a contract of lease agreement
with Robes-Fransisco Realty for the parcel of land. The agreement was that there would be
downpayment plus installments with interest. Robes-Fransisco was then in default. Knowing that it
was in its payment of the installments, it requested for the restructuring of the installment
payments but was denied. It then asked for grace period to pay the same and tendered a check
thereafter. Such was refused and the contract was cancelled.

HELD:

A check whether a managers check or ordinary check is not legal tender and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.
As this is the case, the subsequent consignation of the check didn't operate to discharge Robes-
Fransisco from its obligation to petitioner.

Negotiable Instruments Case Digest: Roman Catholic Bishop Of Malolos V. IAC (1990)


G.R. No. 72110 November 16, 1990
Lessons Applicable: Introduction to Negotiable Instruments (Negotiable Instruments Law)

FACTS:

July 7, 1971: A contract over the land was executed between the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos
(bishop) as vendor and the through its then president, Mr. Carlos F. Robes, as vendee, stipulating for a
downpayment of P23,930 and the balance of P100,000 plus 12% interest per annum to be paid within 4
years from execution of the contract.
The contract likewise provides for cancellation, forfeiture of previous payments, and reconveyance of
the land in case of failure to pay within the period
March 12, 1973: private respondent, through its new president, Atty. Adalia Francisco, addressed a
letter 6 to Father Vasquez, parish priest of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, requesting to be furnished with
a copy of the subject contract and the supporting documents
July 17, 1975: after the expiration of the stipulated period for payment, Atty. Francisco wrote the
formal request that her company be allowed to pay the principal amount of P100,000 in 3 equal
installments of 6 months each with the 1st installment and the accrued interest of P24,000 to be paid
immediately upon approval
July 29, 1975: Bishop through its counsel, Atty. Carmelo Fernandez, formally denied the request but
granted a grace period of 5 days from the receipt of the denial to pay the total balance of P124,000
August 4, 1975: private respondent, through its president, Atty. Francisco, wrote the counsel of the
petitioner requesting an extension of 30 days from to fully settle its account. - denied
RTC: favored Bishop declaring the down payment as forfeited
ISSUE: W/N there is tender of payment by issuance of a certified check

HELD: NO. RTC reinstated.
Tender of payment involves a positive and unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal tender
currency as payment to the obligee for the formers obligation and demanding that the latter accept the
same.
tender of payment cannot be presumed by a mere inference from surrounding circumstances
sheer proof of sufficient available funds to meet more than the total obligation within the grace period -
NOT sufficient
On the contrary, the respondent court finds itself remiss in overlooking or taking lightly the more
important findings of fact made by the trial court which are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should be accorded full consideration and respect and should not be disturbed unless for strong and
cogent reasons
certified personal check which is not legal tender nor the currency stipulated, and therefore, can not
constitute valid tender of payment
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an
instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment

Roman Catholic of Malolos v IAC
Facts:

The property subject matter of the contract consists of a parcel of land in the Province of Bulacan,
issued and registered in the name of the petitioner which it sold to the private respondent.
On July 7, 1971, the subject contract over the land in question was executed between the petitioner as
vendor and the private respondent through its then president, Mr. Carlos F. Robes, as vendee,
stipulating for a downpayment of P23,930.00 and the balance of P100,000.00 plus 12% interest per
annum to be paid within four (4) years from execution of the contract. The contract likewise provides for
cancellation, forfeiture of previous payments, and reconveyance of the land in question in case the
private respondent would fail to complete payment within the said period.

After the expiration of the stipulated period for payment, Atty. Adalia Francisco (president of the
company who bought land) wrote the petitioner a formal request that her company be allowed to pay
the principal amount of P100,000.00 in three (3) equal installments of six (6) months each with the first
installment and the accrued interest of P24,000.00 to be paid immediately upon approval of the said
request.

The petitioner formally denied the said request of the private respondent, but granted the latter a grace
period of five (5) days from the receipt of the denial to pay the total balance of P124,000.00. The private
respondent wrote the petitioner requesting an extension of 30 days from said date to fully settle its
account but this was still denied.
Consequently, Atty. Francisco wrote a letter directly addressed to the petitioner, protesting the alleged
refusal of the latter to accept tender of payment made by the former on the last day of the grace period.
But the private respondent demanded the execution of a deed of absolute sale over the land in question

Atty. Fernandez, wrote a reply to the private respondent stating the refusal of his client to execute the
deed of absolute sale so the petitioner cancelled the contract and considered all previous payments
forfeited and the land as ipso facto reconveyed.

From a perusal of the foregoing facts, we find that both the contending parties have conflicting versions
on the main question of tender of payment.
According to the trial court:
. . . What made Atty. Francisco suddenly decide to pay plaintiffs obligation on tender her payment,
when her request to extend the grace period has not yet been acted upon? Atty. Franciscos claim that
she made a tender of payment is not worthy of credence.
The trial court considered as fatal the failure of Atty. Francisco to present in court the certified personal
check allegedly tendered as payment or, at least, its xerox copy, or even bank records thereof.
Not satisfied with the said decision, the private respondent appealed to the IAC. The IAC reversed the
decision of the trial court. The IAC, in finding that the private respondent had sufficient available funds,
ipso facto concluded that the latter had tendered payment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the finding of the IAC that Atty. Francisco had sufficient available funds did tender
payment for the said obligation.
Whether or not an offer of a check is a valid tender of payment of an obligation under a contract which
stipulates that the consideration of the sale is in Philippine Currency.

HELD:
1. No. Tender of payment involves a positive and unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal
tender currency as payment to the obligee for the formers obligation and demanding that the latter
accept the same. Thus, tender of payment cannot be presumed by a mere inference from surrounding
circumstances. At most, sufficiency of available funds is only affirmative of the capacity or ability of the
obligor to fulfill his part of the bargain. The respondent court was therefore in error.

2. No. In the case of Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals:
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an
instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a managers check or ordinary
check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment
and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. The tender of payment by the private respondent
was not valid for failure to comply with the requisite payment in legal tender or currency stipulated
within the grace period


the DECISION of the IAC is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED and the DECISION of the trial court is
REINSTATED.


Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos (Consti1)
Commissioner of Public Highways, petitioner, vs. Hon. Francisco P. Burgos, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City, Branch II, and Victor Amigable, respondents.

March 31, 1980

De Castro, J:

Facts:
On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's land for road-right-of-way purpose.
On 1959, Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to recover the ownership and
possession of the land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the government
(entitled Victor Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways and
Republic of the Philippines).
Amigable's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the land was either donated or sold by its
owners to enhance its value, and that in any case, the right of the owner to recover the value of said
property was already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the non-suability of the
government was invoked.
In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property at the time of taking was P2.37 per
square meter. Amigable, on the other hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price was P6.775.
The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed the Republic of the Philippines to
pay Amigable the value of the property taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is applicable in determining the
amount of compensation to be paid to private respondent Amigable for the property taken.

Held:
Not applicable.

Ratio:
Article 1250 of the NCC provides that the value of currency at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis of payment which would be the value of peso at the time of taking of the
property when the obligation of the government to pay arises. It is only when there is an agreement
that the inflation will make the value of currency at the time of payment, not at the time of the
establishment, the basis for payment.
The correct amount of compensation would be P14,615.79 at P2.37 per square meter, not P49,459.34,
and the interest in the sum of P145,410.44 at the rate of 6% from 1924 up to the time respondent court
rendered its decision as was awarded by the said court should accordingly be reduced.



FILIPINO PIPE vs. NAWASA
G.R. No. L-43446 May 3, 1988

FACTS
NAWASA entered into a contract with the plaintiff FPFC for the latter to supply iron pressure pipes
worth P270,187.50 to be used in the construction of the Anonoy Waterworks in Masbate and the Barrio
San Andres-Villareal Waterworks in Samar.
NAWASA paid in installments on various dates, a total of P134,680.00 leaving a balance of P135,507.50
excluding interest.
FPFC demanded payment from NAWASA of the unpaid balance of the price with interest in accordance
with the terms of their contract
NAWASA failed to pay, plaintiff filed a collection suit
RTC rendered judgment orderedNAWASA to pay the unpaid balance in NAWASA negotiable bonds
NAWASA did not deliver the bonds to the judgment creditor
FPFC filed another complaint seeking an adjustment of the unpaid balance in accordance with the value
of the Philippine peso
FPFC presented voluminous records and statistics showing that a spiralling inflation has marked the
progress of the country from 1962 up to the present. There is no denying that the price index of
commodities, which is the usual evidence of the value of the currency has been rising.
ISSUE
W/N there exists an extraordinary inflation of the currency justifying an adjustment of NAWASA's
unpaid judgment obligation to FPFC.

RULING
Article 1250 of the Civil Code provides:
In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of
the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless
there is an agreement to the contrary..
Extraordinary inflation exists "when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the
Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value said currency, and
such decrease or increase could not have reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond contemplation
the the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation. (Tolentino Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code Vol. IV, p. 284.)
While appellant's voluminous records and statistics proved that there has been a decline in the
purchasing power of the Philippine peso, this downward fall of the currency cannot be considered
"extraordinary." It is simply a universal trend that has not spared our country.

Citizens Surety and Insurance Company vs. Court of Appeals Facts: On December 4, 1959, the petitioner
issued two surety bonds to the defendant to ensure the compliance of the latter while he entered a
transaction with Singer Sewing Machine Co. The respondent also put up collaterals such as his lumber
stock worthP400,000 and a second real estate mortgage to reimburse the cost paid by the petitioner in
case that the respondent will not comply to the agreement. The respondent failed to comply with his
obligations to Singer Sewing Machine Co. and the petitioner paid payments as a result of non-
compliance of the respondent. The respondent failed to reimburse the petitioner due to the losses he
encountered thereby the petitioner filed a claim of the sum of the money against the estate of the
respondent. Respondent opposed the money claim by stating that the surety bonds and the indemnity
agreements had been extinguished by the execution of the deed of assignment. Thus, after the trial, the
lower declared that the collateral is jointly and severally liable to the petitioner, hereby, requiring
respondent to pay the required amount with 10% interest per annum. The decision of the lower court
was reversed by the Court of Appeals when the respondent appealed. Issue:
Whether or not administrators obligation under the surety bonds agreements had been
extinguished through execution of the deed of assignment. Held: Obligation under the surety bonds had
not been extinguished by reason on the execution of
deed of assignment. The deed of assignment was intended as a collateral security for
the issuance of two (2) surety bonds by the petitioner towards respondent as evidenced by
the latters subsequent acts. These are partial payments made by respondent after the
e
xecution the deed of assignment to pay his indebtedness. Moreover, with the execution
of the second mortgage by respondent, it follows that there is no extinguishment of obligation since
indemnity bonds still existed by virtue of its execution. Thus, upon the failure of the respondent to
comply with its obligation under the contract if sale of goods towards Singer Sewing Machine Co., the
petitioner is still adequately protected by the lumber collateral which worth P400,000, more than
enough to guaranty the obligations. Here, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and money claim by
the petitioner.
\




SOLEDAD SOCO vs. HON. FRANCIS MILITANTE, Incumbent Presiding Judge of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XII,
Cebu City and REGINO FRANCISCO, JR.

FACTS: Soco and Francisco entered into a contract of lease on January 17, 1973, whereby Soco leased
her commercial building and lot situated at Manalili Street, Cebu City, to Francisco for a monthly rental
of P 800.00 for a period of 10 years renewable for another 10 years at the option of the lessee. It can
readily be discerned from Exhibit A (from SOCO) that paragraphs 10 and 11 appear to have been
cancelled while in Exhibit 2 (from FRANCISCO) only paragraph 10 has been cancelled. Claiming that
paragraph 11 of the Contract of Lease was in fact not part of the contract because it was cancelled, Soco
filed Civil Case No. R-16261 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the annulment and/or
reformation of the Contract of Lease.

Sometime before the filing of Civil Case No. R-16261 Francisco noticed that Soco did not anymore send
her collector for the payment of rentals and at times there were payments made but no receipts were
issued. This situation prompted Francisco to write Soco the letter dated February 7, 1975 which the
latter received. After writing this letter, Francisco sent his payment for rentals by checks issued by the
Commercial Bank and Trust Company.

The factual background setting of this case clearly indicates that soon after Soco learned that Francisco
sub-leased a portion of the building to NACIDA, at a monthly rental of more than P3,000.00 which is
definitely very much higher than what Francisco was paying to Soco under the Contract of Lease, the
latter felt that she was on the losing end of the lease agreement so she tried to look for ways and means
to terminate the contract.

In view of this alleged non-payment of rental of the leased premises beginning May, 1977, Soco through
her lawyer sent a letter dated November 23, 1978 to Francisco serving notice to the latter to vacate the
premises leased. In answer to this letter, Francisco through his lawyer informed Soco and her lawyer
that all payments of rental due her were in fact paid by Commercial Bank and Trust Company through
the Clerk of Court of the City Court of Cebu. Despite this explanation, Soco filed this instant case of
Illegal Detainer.

MTC and RTC have conflicting findings. The former found that the consignation was valid. RTC reversed
and ordered the eviction of the Francisco.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid consignation of payment of the rentals.

HELD: In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must first comply with certain
requirements prescribed by law. The debtor must show (1) that there was a debt due; (2) that the
consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was
made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons
claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due (Art. 1176, Civil Code); (3) that previous notice of the
consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation (Art. 1177,
Civil Code); (4) that the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court (Art. 1178, Civil Code); and
(5) that after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof (Art. 1178,
Civil Code). Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective.
(parang wala naman tong mga to sa 1176, 1177 and 1178?)

We hold that the respondent lessee has utterly failed to prove the following requisites of a valid
consignation: First, tender of payment of the monthly rentals to the lessor. Second, respondent lessee
also failed to prove the first notice to the lessor prior to consignation,

Evidently, from this arrangement, it was the lessees duty to send someone to get the cashiers check
from the bank and logically, the lessee has the obligation to make and tender the check to the lessor.
This the lessee failed to do, which is fatal to his defense.
Third, respondent lessee likewise failed to prove the second notice, that is after consignation has been
made, to the lessor. And the fourth requisite that respondent lessee failed to prove is the actual deposit
or consignation of the monthly rentals except the two cashiers checks referred to in Exhibit 12. As
indicated earlier, not a single copy of the official receipts issued by the Clerk of Court was presented at
the trial of the case to prove the actual deposit or consignation.

We, therefore, find and rule that the lessee has failed to prove tender of payment except that in Exh. 10;
he has failed to prove the first notice to the lessor prior to consignation except that given in Exh. 10; he
has failed to prove the second notice after consignation except the two made in Exh. 12; and he has
failed to pay the rentals for the months of July and August, 1977 as of the time the complaint was filed
for the eviction of the lessee. We hold that the evidence is clear, competent and convincing showing
that the lessee has violated the terms of the lease contract and he may, therefore, be judicially ejected.

Вам также может понравиться