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PEOPLE v LAGON

185 SCRA 442


FELICIANO.: May 18, 1990

FACTS
-On July 7 1976 a criminal action was filed with the City Court of Roxas charging Lagon with estafa for allegedly
issuing a P4,232 check as payment for goods knowing she had insufficient funds. However on Dec. 2, as the trial
commenced, the City Court dismissed the information on the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for estafa
was beyond the courts authority to impose. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE
WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the case

HELD
NO
- It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is determined by the law in effect at the
time of the commencement of the criminal action and not the law in effect at the time of the commission of the
offense charged.
-Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and
judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged with an offense within their
respective jurisdictions, in which penalties provided do not exceed prision correccional or fines no exceeding P6,000
or both.
-At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty under Art 315 of the RPC was arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional it is minimum period, falling well within the jurisdiction of the City
Court. But when the information was filed, PD 818 had increased the imposable penalty to prision mayor in its
medium period.
-The real question raised by petitioner is whether the said doctrine disregards the rule against retroactivity of penal
laws. It has been repeatedly held that in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction is not determined by what may be
meted out to the offender in after trial but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes. Once jurisdiction is
acquired by the Court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a
lesser offense which carries a penalty that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court.
-In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC, the court may not impose a more onerous
penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC retains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the refiled case under
PD 818, given the date of the commission of the crime (before effectivity of PD 818), the lower penalty provided in
Art 315 (otherwise within the jurisdiction of the City Court) should be imposed.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the petition


LEGADOS V. DE GUZMAN
US v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265 (1911) repealed by Legados case; Inferior courts have no jurisdiction to over crimes
that may require sentencing the accused to support the offspring from the crime, even if the period of
imprisonment is within the jurisdiction of the inferior court.
Legados v. de Guzman, 170 SCRA 357 (1989) MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses where the
penalty imposable does not exceed 4 years and 2 months (now 6 years) regardless of other imposable penalties
and civil liability arising from such offense. Hence, the inferior courts have jurisdiction for simple seduction, even if
the accused might be required to support the offspring from the crime.

FULL CASE:
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, effective August 14, 1981, grants to Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
1
"(e)xclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof.
2

The proviso altered and superseded the long standing doctrine first laid down in a 1911 case
3
that an inferior court
had no jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction although the penalty imposed is arresto mayor because
conviction thereof carried with it the liability imposed by Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code to acknowledge and
give Support to the offspring. The doctrine was made applicable whatever the peculiar circumstances of the
offender and offended party might be, it not being permitted, upon considerations of consistency and orderliness,
"to speculate on whether or not an offspring may still arise from the crime, whether or not the complainant or the
accused may be sterile or incapable of procreation, whether or not the complaint was already pregnant by another
man when the crime was committed and various other factual considerations before the jurisdiction may be fixed.
4

In the case at bar, long before the passage of B.P. Big. 129,
5
a complaint for simple seduction
6
was filed with the
then City Court of Dipolog (Branch 11)
7
against Vilmor Icao. The complaint was presented by the offended girl,
Cora Legados, represented by her mother, Rosa, and was subsequently made the basis of an information filed by
the First Assistant City Fiscal.
8
After entering a plea of not guilty on arraignment, Icao moved to quash the
information on the ground that the City Court had no jurisdiction to try the offense, and the fiscal who filed the
information bad no authority to do so. The Court denied the motion and scheduled the case for trial on the merits.
Icao thereupon instituted an action of prohibition
9
with the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
City
10
which, in due course, granted the petition and permanently enjoined the proceedings in the City Court. It is
this Order which is now assailed in this Court as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
The writ of prohibition was, of course, correctly issued by the respondent Judge, being consistent with the doctrine
obtaining at the time, i.e., that an inferior court had no jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction. But, as
already pointed out, the doctrine has since been changed. Now, the offense is explicitly declared by law to be
within the exclusive original jurisdiction, no longer of Courts of First Instance (since abolished and replaced by
Regional Trial Courts), but of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
WHEREFORE, the disputed Order of respondent Judge of October 9, 1972 is SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED
to the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City (which replaced the City Court) for further proceedings. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

PP. VS. MTC-QC
Whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the Metropolitan Trial Court or other first level court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal actions of libel, is the issue raised by the People of the Philippines, as
petitioner in the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus at bar. The fairly simple facts from
which the issue has arisen are hereunder briefly narrated.
On January 30, 1995 an information for libel was filed against Isah V. Red in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case thereby initiated was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-60134 and raffled to Branch 82.
Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction of the
offense. The Judge found merit in the motion and by an Order dated March 29, 1995, remanded the case to the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City for proper action/disposition in the premises. His Honor declared that
(u)nder Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof is vested in the Municipal Trial Court. **
. The case was accordingly transferred to the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court where it was docketed as Case
No. 43-00548 and raffled to Branch 43.
Thereafter, the private prosecutor, under the control and supervision of the Fiscal, filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Remand dated August 1, 1995 praying that the case be returned to the RTC. The movant invoked
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which pertinently provides that:
[1]

*** *** ***
The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense *** ,
and argued that
** . Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court (such as the Court of Tax Appeals) are
special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts
(such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law. (De Joya vs. Lantin, 19 SCRA
893). Moreover, a general law cannot repeal or amend by implication a specific provision or a special
law. Otherwise stated: a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and operation, is not
to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is
manifested. This is so, even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what
was set forth in the special act. (Philippine Railway Co. vs. CIR, 91 Phil. 35; Villegas vs. Subido, 41
SCRA 190; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 207 SCRA 487).
The MetroTC denied the motion by Order dated August 14, 1995. It opined that Rep. Act. No. 7691, which
took effect on April 15, 1994, would partake of the nature of a modern law which impliedly repeals an ancient
law (the Revised Penal Code) which is of 1932 vintage, which is inconsistent with the later law ** ; (and that) if
the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law shall be applied.
[2]
Later, the MetroTC also
denied the private prosecutors motion for reconsideration, by Order dated September 7, 1995. Still later, in an
Order dated October 18, 1995, it denied another motion by the same counsel reiterating the plea to remand the
case back to the RTC, and further directed the prosecution to present ** (its) next witness, trial having in the
meantime commenced.
Now, in this proceeding, the Stated prays for judgment: (1) declaring the questioned Orders dated August
14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 as null and void for having been issued by the respondent
court acting without jurisdiction; (2) enjoining the respondent court from further conducting trials in Criminal Case
No. 43-00548; and (3) commanding the respondent court to remand Criminal Case No. 43-00548 to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition. It cites Jalandoni v. Endaya (55 SCRA 261
[1974]), where this Court (a) drew attention to the categorical language of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code to
the effect that it is a court of first instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case, and (b) indicated
thirteen (13) cases, from People v. Topacio, 59 Phil. 356 (1934) to Time, Inc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303 (1971),
wherein this ** Court ruled that municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over libel cases.
[3]
It further argues that
in light of Jalandoni, and Berces v. Guingona (241 SCRA 539 [1995]) -- to the effect that a subsequent statute,
general in character as to its terms and application, is not to be construed as repealing special or specific
enactment unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exists between them -- Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code may not be deemed to have been superseded by
Republic Act No. 7691.
This Court has already had occasion to resolve the issue, substantially in line with the position taken by the
People, account having been taken of substantially the same arguments adduced by the opposing parties in this
case. In G.R. No. 122126 entitled Lydia Caro vs. Court of Appeals and Violeta Sarigumba, involving the same
jurisdictional issue as that specifically presented in the case at bar, this Court promulgated a Resolution on June
19, 1996 pertinently reading as follows:
Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public respondent Court
of Appeals in denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A.
No. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While
libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360,
Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction
under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law, however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72
SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid
down the rule that Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over the libel cases, hence, the
expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases.
Moreover, Administrative Order No. 104-96 -- treating of the subject: ** DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL
COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES;
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES -- issued on October 21,
1996 by the Chief Justice upon the advice and consent of the Court En Banc, inter alia provides, in categorical
acknowledgment of the validity of the doctrine just adverted to, that LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS.
The proposition is hereby reaffirmed, the Court perceiving no argument advanced by respondents justifying
its abrogation or modification.
Concerning respondents contention that the challenged orders are now immutable, having become final and
executory for failure of the prosecution to take an appeal therefrom, it suffices to advert to the familiar and
uniformly applied axiom that only final orders -- i.e., those that finally dispose of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the court respecting the merits of a case -- can become final and executory -- in the sense of becoming
unalterable through an appeal or review proceeding.
[4]
Interlocutory orders, on the other hand -- i.e., those which
resolve incidental motions or collateral matters but do not put an end to the case -- never become final in the
sense of becoming unchangeable and impervious to impugnation after expiration of the period prescribed for taking
an appeal from a final judgment.
[5]

Respecting respondents claim that venue is merely procedural, suffice it to point out that unlike in civil cases,
in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional.
[6]

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7,
1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court
is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is
commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition.
SARIGUMBA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(full case)
FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, SHERLITA R. GALLEGO, and EMMA C. DAGONDON, petitioners, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the March 20, 2002
Resolution
[1]
of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 24505-07 as well as the
June 13, 2002 Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Sometime in 1994, in a meeting held at the residence of Atty. Bernadette P. Encinareal, then Congressman
Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. promised to give P10,000.00 to each of the 33 barangay captains of the Municipality of
Tudela, Misamis Occidental. The Congressman assured the barangay captains that the amount was his personal
gift to each of them.
It turned out that the amount provided by Congressman Ramiro came from his Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) which was remitted to the Municipal Treasurer of Tudela per Allotment Advice No. F2-6781-94-315 in
the amount of P220,000.00 under Check No. 497664; and Allotment Advice No. F2-7784-94-415 in the amount
of P110,000.00 under Check No. 497679. Forthwith, petitioner Mayor Felix Sarigumba secured a cash advance
chargeable against the CDF of Congressman Ramiro and submitted to the Municipal Treasurer Voucher Nos. 9411-
422 and 9412-445 in the total amount of P330,000.00. The particulars contained in the said vouchers read: to
cash advance the CDF for payment of snacks during assembly meeting for peace and order meeting of 33
barangays of Tudela, Misamis Occidental.
Petitioner Sarigumba, thereafter, gave P9,500.00 to each of the barangay captains through two members of
his staff, Loreta Salinasal and Crosita Singidas. As per his agreement with the barangay captains, each of the
latter was to give P500.00 to the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) which would serve as contributions for
projects. The barangay captains thought that the amount given to each of them was a cash gift or pahalipay
from Congressman Ramiro.
[2]

Petitioner Sarigumba later liquidated his cash advance of P220,000.00 via Liquidation Voucher No. 9412-478,
stating therein that the said amount was used as follows:
(1) For the liquidation of cash advance amounting TWO HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS, to furnish
to various barangays of Tudela under check #497664 for meals and snacks during peace and order
meeting as per supporting papers hereto attached in the total amount of P220,000.
[3]

The petitioner-mayor also liquidated his cash advance of P110,000.00 via Voucher No. 9412-488, in which he
stated that he used the amount
(2) For the liquidation of cash advance under check #497679 on V #9412-445 to cover up expenses on
peace and order meeting to various barangays of Tudela, Misamis Occidental from CDF Fund under
AA #F2-6781-94-315 in the total amount P110,000.
[4]

He then supported his liquidation vouchers with attendance sheets bearing the signatures of those who
purportedly attended the assembly meetings. Petitioner Emma C. Dagondon approved Voucher No. 9412-478,
while petitioner Sherlita R. Gallego approved Voucher No. 9412-488.
Subsequently, Flaviano Zaide, William Gumisad, Edilberto Quinalagan, Maria Pacaro and Virginia Tampoog,
filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against the petitioners Sarigumba, Gallego and Dagondon, alleging, inter
alia
That we strongly deny that there had been an assembly or meeting where free meals and snacks during a peace
and order meeting were given to the barangay people in the year 1994 and 1995 except during the SOT at
Barangays Napurog, Duangican and Maribojoc but we knew for a fact that the said snacks were not given from the
above vouchers but the money out of the above disbursements were given as cash gifts to the Barangay Captains
of Tudela, Misamis Occidental. In support to the liquidation of the withdrawal of the aforesaid amount were the
signatures of the barangay people not for the purpose as alleged in those vouchers but obtained in different
manners like attendance during the monthly barangay assembly, or signatures for the retention of the Tudela,
Public High School at the Tudela Central School while other signatures were obtained to reimburse payment of a
hand-set radio (two-way) procured for the different barangays by the Mayor;
That signatures of the undersigned and numerous signatures of barangay folks including children were forged or
obtained under other pretense by the aforesaid mayor in support of the vouchers thereby cheating the people of
their money.
[5]

The Ombudsman requested the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an investigation of the Peace and
Order Campaign Funds for 1994. The Auditor directed each of the barangay captains who received the P9,500.00
from petitioner Sarigumba to remit the said amounts to their respective barangay treasurers and to submit the
receipts the latter would issue thereon.
When the barangay captains received the letter of the COA, they were surprised. They then secured receipts
from their respective barangay treasurers which indicated that they had returned the amount they received from
petitioner Sarigumba although no such amounts had yet been received by the former. The barangay captains were
thereafter accorded a chance to re-liquidate the amounts they received from the petitioner-mayor and they did so.
In their Memorandum Report to the Provincial Auditor dated December 3, 1995, the auditors declared that,
with the barangay captains submission of official receipts, there had been, in effect, no loss of government funds.
When the Sandiganbayan received a copy of the COA Report, its Committee on Legal Matters and Committee
on Finance, Budget and Appropriations, conducted an investigation, which yielded the following findings as per
Committee Report No. 96-13:
4. That the amount released to each Barangay Captain was only P9,500.00 and others P9,400.00 per
affidavit submitted by Loreta Salinasal, the Private Secretary to the Mayor.
5. That sometime in 1994 Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, [Jr.] assured the Barangay Captains of a
personal cash gift of P10,000.00 for each Barangay from his own pocket, but it was never meant
that the amount would come from Congressman Ramiros CDF for peace and order campaign in the
Municipality of Tudela. All Barangay Captains received the amount as promised by Congressman
Ramiro and disbursed it for their personal benefit. But later on re-submitted liquidation papers for
Peace and Order Campaigns in their respective barangays.
6. That the barangay captains changed their positions and denied, as shown in their uniform
testimonies, that the amount was indeed for Peace and Order Campaign and not a personal cash
gift from Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. The illegal act was already consummated.
7. That COA initiated the investigation of the release of said amounts only after the directive of the
Ombudsman arrived. Directing all Barangay Captains to return the amount of P10,000.00 and to
produce official receipts acknowledging that said amount had been received by the Barangay
Treasurers even if no actual cash was turned over. It appears also that the Municipal Treasurer
issued official receipts without actual cash involved to make it appear that said amounts were
returned by the barangay captains. The barangay then re-submitted liquidations to justify the
earlier liquidations where the forged signatures of barangay constituents were first presented to
COA as liquidation of said vouchers. The amounts released were already disbursed. The liquidation
papers for P220,000.00 and P110,000.00 were already submitted to COA as final liquidation. For all
intent and purposes the act was already consummated. The second liquidation would appear to
have been fabricated and had been compromised to legalize the unlawful act.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding probable cause for
malversation against petitioner Sarigumba; two counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code also against the petitioner-mayor; and one count of falsification of public
documents against petitioners Dagondon and Gallego.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman filed an Information for malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner Sarigumba with the Sandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information docketed
as Criminal Case No. 24505 reads:
That sometime in November and December 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of
Tudela, Province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused
FELIX L. SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, while in the
performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official
positions, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, embezzle and appropriate unto himself
and/or thru abandonment, or gross negligence allowed other parties to misappropriate, embezzle and/or use to
some other purpose the total sum of P330,000.00 he had earlier obtained as cash advance from the Municipality
intended for the Peace and Order Campaign of the different Barangays of the same municipality, thereby
constituting him a special disbursing officer and for which he is accountable, to the damaged (sic) and prejudice of
the government and of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[6]

Another Information for falsification of public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioners Sarigumba and Gallego was filed with the Sandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 24506 reads:
That sometime in December 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Tudela, Province
of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L.
SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, and SHERLITA R. GALLEGO, a
low-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Accountant, both accused, while in the performance of their
official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official positions, in
order to cover up the misuse of public funds advanced by respondent FELIX L. SARIGUMBA intended for the Peace
and Order Campaign of the 33 Barangays of the same Municipality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify Liquidation Voucher No. 9412-488 amounting to P110,000.00 by making it appear it was for
expenses during the peace and order meeting when, in truth and in fact, both accused knew well that there were
no such peace and order meetings being held; furthermore, fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures
were used as supporting documents causing it to appear that persons attended such peace and order meetings
when, [in] truth and in fact, they did not for there was no such meetings being held, to the damaged (sic) and
prejudice of the government and of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[7]

A third Information was filed with the graft court against petitioners Sarigumba and Dagondon for falsification
of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The inculpatory portion of the Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 24507, reads:
That sometime in December 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Tudela, Province
of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FELIX L.
SARIGUMBA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, and EMMA C. DAGONDON, a
low-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Accountant-Designate, both accused, while in the performance
of their official functions committing the offense in relation to their office, were taking advantage of their official
positions, in order to cover up the misuse of public funds advanced by respondent FELIX L. SARIGUMBA intended
for the Peace and Order Campaign of the 33 Barangays of the same Municipality, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify Liquidation Voucher No. 9412-478 amounting to P220,000.00 by making it appear
it was for meal and snacks during the peace and order meeting when, in truth and in fact, both accused knew well
there were no such peace and order meetings being held and much more on the serving of meals and snacks;
furthermore, fabricated attendance sheets and list of signatures were used as support documents causing it to
appear that persons attended such peace and order meetings when, [in] truth and in fact, they did not for there
was no such meetings being held, to the damaged (sic) and prejudice of the government and of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[8]

During the hearing of March 30, 1998, the Sandiganbayan expressed anxiety over the number of crimes
committed, and issued a Resolution worded as follows:
This morning, this court expressed its anxieties over the correctness of the accusation herein against the Mayor
and separately against the municipal accountant for the alleged malversation of sum of money and acts of
falsification involving the conversion of portions of the total amount by the accused. It would appear that,
considering that there are two amounts, two (2) offenses may have been committed; furthermore, the prosecution
can clarify whether or not the alleged falsification took place after the completion of the malversation or was part of
the total plan in order to effect the malversation without the same coming to the attention of the examining
authorities. Answers to these questions might result in the re-arrangement of the statement of accusation against
the accused charged for separate offenses.
[9]

This prompted the Special Prosecutor to ask for a period of fifteen (15) days within which to respond to the
misgivings of the graft court. In the meantime, the trial court deferred the issuance of any warrants of arrest
against the petitioners.
During the hearing of April 29, 1998, the trial court issued an Order, quoted infra:
This morning, the Court expressed its uncertainty over the propriety of proceeding with these cases as they stand
at this time considering that, on the basis of the very records of the prosecution at preliminary investigation, it
would appear that there is a need to determine whether or not the barangay captains did, in fact, receive the
amounts allegedly distributed by the accused mayor to them or whether or not any deficiency in the liquidation of
these cash advances were deficiencies in the submissions by the barangay captains alone or the barangay captains
in conspiracy with any other official.
Considering the concurrence of Prosecutor Victorio U. Tabanguil with the doubts expressed by this Court on this
matter, as prayed for by him, he is given sixty (60) days from today within which to determine whether or not
there exists probable cause against Mayor Felix L. Sarigumba as well as the subordinate officials of the Municipality
of Tudela, Misamis Occidental, or against any other persons not yet charged. Should he wish, he may summon
other witnesses herefor, including the initiation of another preliminary investigation to summon the barangay
captains or such other persons who may have been involved in the receipt and distribution of these funds. The
prosecution shall furnish this Court with all of its issuances and orders both in Manila and in Mindanao, should the
Deputy Ombudsman for that area deem it wise to take over the case one more time.
[10]

In the meantime, during the period of July 22 to 31, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer I Elmer Ben V. Pasion of
the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao conducted clarificatory hearings. In the course of the proceedings,
petitioner Sarigumba admitted that he and the barangay captains had agreed that each of the latter would
contribute P500.00 for the ABC projects, and that the amount actually received by each was only P9,500.00. The
said accused submitted deposit slips showing that the barangay captains had deposited the amounts they received
to the barangay treasurers. It appears that the barangay captains executed separate affidavits explaining the
circumstances under which they received the amounts from the petitioner Sarigumba through his employees, and
how the said amounts were spent.
In a Memorandum to the Ombudsman dated December 21, 1998, Graft Investigator Pasion summarized his
findings:
1. That the barangay captains did, in fact, receive the amount distributed by Mayor Sarigumba through his
representatives Loreta Salinasal and Crosita Singidas. That the amount actually received by the barangay captains
was only P9,500.00 as the barangay captains agree to contribute P500.00 each to the project of the Association of
Barangay Captains (ABC).
2. That some of the Barangay Captains in good faith had spent the money for their personal use having
thought all along that the amount distributed was a cash gift or pahalipay promised by Congressman Ramiro.
It was, however, refunded back to the barangay government by the barangay captains concerned as barangay
funds upon learning that the amount distributed was from the CDF of Congressman Ramiro and intended for the
Peace and Order Campaign.
3. The requirement of COA for the 33 barangay units to issue Official Receipts (Record, pp. 340-372) for the
receipts of the money corrected the recording in the Municipal Government of Tudela and properly recorded the
transfer of funds and accountability to the 33 different barangay governments.
4. That the 33 different barangay governments subsequently submitted their liquidations with the municipal
government of Tudela.
5. That based on the corresponding liquidation reports submitted by different barangay units, only some of
the barangays conducted the barangay assemblies where meals and snacks were served particularly during the
Service Orientation Training (SOT) with the 32nd Infantry battalion. That generally, the amount distributed was
not spent by the different barangay units for meals and snacks in the peace and order assembly but on some other
immediate needs for their peace and order programs as determined by the barangay captains.
[11]

Graft Investigator Pasion thus recommended the withdrawal of the Information for malversation and the
retention of the Informations for falsification, as follows:
1. Considering that during the clarificatory hearing, it was duly established by evidence and by admissions
that the barangay captains did, in fact, receive the amount distributed by respondent Mayor Sarigumba, the
Information for Malversation against the respondents is hereby recommended to be withdrawn in the absence of
evidence of shortage, taking, appropriation, conversion or loss of public funds.
For lack of criminal intent, probable cause could not be established against the barangay captains who, in an
honest mistake of fact, spent the money for their personal use, believing in good faith that the money distributed
was a cash gift or pahalipay promised by Congressman Ramiro.
2. Respondents, however, were unable to satisfactorily explain and justify the preparation of falsified
Liquidation Vouchers No. 9412-478 and 9412-488 by making it appear therein that the amount distributed [was]
expended for meals and snacks during the peace and order meetings when, in truth and in fact, peace and order
meetings were conducted only in some of the barangays. Moreover, fabricated attendance sheets and list of
signatures were used as supporting documents for the questioned Liquidation Vouchers causing it to appear that
persons named therein attended such peace and order meetings when, in truth and in fact, they did not so
attended (sic).
Premised, therefore, on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Domagas vs. Malana, 223 SCRA 359, that In
the crime of falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the
destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, it is hereby maintained that the Informations for Falsification
of Public Documents against the accused Municipal Mayor Felix L. Sarigumba and Municipal Accountants Emma C.
Dagondon and Sherlita R. Gallego be prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan.
[12]

The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., approved the said Memorandum, a copy of
which was filed with the Sandiganbayan by Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil on February 4,
1999.
[13]
On February 22, 1999, Special Prosecutor Tabanguil submitted a Review Memorandum to the
Ombudsman recommending that the three Informations be withdrawn. However, the Ombudsman denied the
recommendation with the following notation: Present the Documents containing the false entries for the scrutiny
of the Court.
In their comment on the Memorandum of the Graft Investigator Pasion, the petitioners reiterated that, as
found by the investigator, they had acted in good faith and that there was an absence of damage and prejudice to
the government. They, thus, prayed that the cases against them be dismissed. Appended thereto was the joint
affidavit of the barangay captains.
Despite the Ombudsmans denial of his Review Memorandum, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and
Motion for the withdrawal of the three Informations for falsification of public documents on March 29, 1999.
[14]

During the proceedings on October 17, 2000, the graft court addressed clarificatory questions to the Special
Prosecutor regarding the Memorandum of Graft Investigator Pasion which the Ombudsman concurred with.
Despite the responses of the Special Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause against the
petitioners and ordered the cases to remain in the court docket.
[15]
Warrants were issued for the arrest of the
petitioners. They forthwith posted cash bail bonds for their provisional release
[16]
which were later approved by the
graft court.
On December 26, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation
[17]
with the Sandiganbayan reiterating his
March 29, 1999 Manifestation and Motion.
The petitioners then filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Arraignment and to Motion to Quash the
Informations. However, on February 15, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order denying the motion.
[18]
The
graft court, likewise, denied the oral motion for reconsideration thereof made by the petitioners.
All of the petitioners were arraigned on February 19, 2001 and pleaded not guilty.
[19]

On May 28, 2001, the petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Cancel Pre-Trial and Trial, Motion to Dismiss
the cases, claiming that:
4. In the early part of May 2001, undersigned counsel, however, received from the accused a copy of the
Settlement and Balances dated April 16, 2001, from the Commission on Audit, Province of Misamis Occidental,
Oroquieta City, clearly showing that the amount of P330,000.00 subject of the controversy in the instant case and
which was disallowed in 1995 for lack of proper documentation, had been fully settled and allowed as of April 16,
2001.
[20]

The complaining witnesses, through counsel, opposed the motion; the Special Prosecutor, however, concurred
with the said motion. After due hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
[21]
denying the motion of the
petitioners on March 20, 2002. The graft court reiterated its finding of probable cause against them. The
petitioners then filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated June 13, 2002.
The Present Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners assert that the court committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it found probable cause against them, denied their motion to
dismiss the cases, as well as their motion for reconsideration thereof. The petitioners proffer the following
arguments:
First. Petitioner Sarigumba did not make use of the P330,000.00 subject of the Informations in Criminal Cases
No. 24506, considering that the said amount came from Congressman Ramiros CDF, and was distributed to and
received by the 33 barangay captains of Tudela, Misamis Occidental, who submitted the appropriate documents
liquidating said amounts. Moreover, as per the COA Report, the government did not suffer any loss of funds and
until clearance of the barangay captains.
Second. The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao and Special Prosecutor Tabanguil recommended the
withdrawal of the three Informations in said case.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for certiorari, it must first be demonstrated that the
lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of
jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or office, has jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or
acted without authority.
[22]

In a case where a lower court or quasi-judicial body commits an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction and
which is only one of judgment, such error is reviewable only by appeal. On the other hand, if the act complained of
was issued by such court or body with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
[23]

In the present cases, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the assailed
resolutions. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after
conducting a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party.
[24]
Probable cause is meant such set of
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.
[25]
Specifically, probable cause to warrant arrest
requires such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
[26]

Once the Informations are filed with the trial court, the determination of the presence or absence of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused, or for the withdrawal of the Informations, or for
the dismissal of the cases, is addressed to its sound discretion. As such, the trial court is not bound by the
recommendation of the Prosecutor. The trial courts exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule,
be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the
trial courts appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said
findings, as well as the conclusions of law. The general rule is that as long as the trial court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than mere
errors of judgment, correctible by appeal.
[27]

Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question
of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other
documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the petitioners for one count of malversation and two counts of falsification of public documents against petitioner
Sarigumba. The graft courts finding was based on the allegation in the Information, the Resolution of the
Ombudsman finding probable cause for the filing of the said Informations, the documentary evidence appended
thereto, as well as the facts and circumstances unearthed during the clarificatory hearing of October 17, 2000.
After the clarificatory hearings on the petitioners motion to dismiss the cases, the Sandiganbayan found probable
cause for the issuance of warrants for their arrest and for the court to proceed to trial, on the following
ratiocination:
It was not denied by the accused that the P330,000.00 came from the Countrywide Development Fund of
Congressman Hilarion J. Ramiro, Jr. The documentation for the cash advances taken out by the accused mayor
shows that the money was to be used for peace and order campaign.
Mayor Sarigumba is charged in the instant cases for malversation of the total amount of P330,000.00, as well as
for falsification of the attendance sheets attached to the first set of vouchers he had submitted to liquidate the cash
advances for P220,000.00 and for P110,000.00. It is claimed by the accused, however, that since the liquidation
was finally approved, no injury resulted from the cash advances he had made.
It will be noted that the cash advances were taken out by the accused mayor with the following particulars: To
cash advance the CDF for the payment of various expenses during the assembly meeting for peace and order of 33
barangays of Tudela, Misamis Occidental as shown by the Prosecutions findings.
From the clarificatory hearings conducted during the review hereof, it appeared that the barangay captains were
also under the impression that the amounts given to them were the cash gifts or pahalipay earlier promised by
then Congressman Ramiro. That was the reason why, as one of them explained, they spent the amounts on
personal matters although, later, they were required to refund the same.
The complainant made a list of her own findings after going over the receipts made by the barangay captains.
According to her, these documents were inappropriate for the liquidation of the cash advances. Her findings
ranged from inadequacy in the amounts accounted for to impropriety of the expenditures made vis--vis the
purpose for which the funds were intended per the terms of the voucher. Furthermore, there is also the finding by
the prosecutor at review that these were understood by the barangay captains to be cash gifts and not for the
purpose for which they were purportedly drawn by the mayor.
[28]

What militates against the petition at bench is the failure of the petitioners to append thereto certified copies
of the transcripts taken during the clarificatory hearings. Without such transcripts, the Court cannot review the
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan and determine whether or not it committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against the petitioners, and in denying their motion to
dismiss the cases.
Indeed, petitioner Sarigumba failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its
discretion in finding probable cause against him for malversation. Malversation is defined in Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, thus:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property - Presumption of malversation. Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation of
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than 200 pesos
but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount
involved is more than 6,000 pesos but is less than 12,000 pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000
pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall bereclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly- authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal uses. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1060, approved June 12, 1954.)
The elements of the crime are the following:
(a) The offender is a public officer;
(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.
[29]

The felony consists not only in misappropriation or converting public funds or property to ones personal use
but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate the same.
[30]
The felony may thus be
committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated and the appropriate penalty is imposed regardless of
whether the mode of commission is with intent or due to negligence.
[31]
An accountable officer may thus be
convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there
is a shortage in the officers account which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. All that is essential is
proof that the accountable officer has received public funds but that when demand therefor is made, he is unable
to satisfactorily account for the same.
[32]

The law declares that the failure of the public officer to account for such public funds or property upon
demand by any duly-authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that he has appropriated the same for his
personal use.
Based on the record, it is true that petitioner Sarigumba did not make use of the P330,000.00 which he
received from the Municipal Treasurer which was chargeable to the CDF of Congressman Ramiro; hence, there is
no probable cause for the charge of malversation by dolo against him. It must be stressed, however, that the
petitioner-mayor is also charged with malversation by culpa under the Information, allegedly committed by
distributing P9,500.00 to each of the barangay captains without bothering to inform them that the amount was
from the CDF of Congressman Ramiro and that the money should be used for the peace and order campaign in
their respective jurisdictions. All along, the barangay captains were of the belief that the amounts they received
were from the personal funds of the Congressman and that they had unfettered use of the money, for whatever
purpose they chose.
Indeed, Barangay Captain Cosme D. Sarabia admitted that he used the P9,500.00 he received from the
petitioner to pay his personal debts. The petitioner and the barangay captains agreed to remit P500.00 each from
the amounts they received from petitioner Sarigumba to the ABC for its projects. Indeed, the barangay captains
were astounded when they received the directives from the Auditor to remit the amounts they received from the
petitioner to the barangay treasurers, and to submit receipts as proof that they had followed the directive.
However, the barangay captains merely secured receipts from the barangay treasurers without actually refunding
the amounts, and were only later given a chance to liquidate the same.
The bare fact that the barangay captains were able to return the amounts they received from the petitioner or
liquidate the same after demand therefor does not preclude the finding of probable cause for malversation. As this
Court held in Kimpo v. Sandiganbayan:
In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the
commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect
the accuseds civil liability thereunder and be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary
surrender.
[33]

Indeed, the matter of whether the barangay captains were able to liquidate the said amounts and whether the
bases thereof are justified are matters of defense during trial, and not before trial, in a motion to dismiss the case.
Whether or not the barangay captains acted in good faith is a matter of defense on the part of the petitioner
Sarigumba. Even if the barangay captains had indeed acted in good faith, still, if petitioner Sarigumba had failed
to make it clear before or when he distributed the money to them that the money was for the peace and order
campaign in their respective barangays, he may be criminally liable for malversation by culpa.
Likewise barren of merit is the petitioners claim that there is colorable truth in the allegations of petitioner
Sarigumba in his liquidation vouchers, that the amounts given to the barangay captains were used mostly or
substantially for snacks or related expenses and that there was no probable cause against him for malversation,
and against all the petitioners for falsification. It must be stressed that the barangay captains themselves
disavowed such claim in their respective affidavits.
Demosthenes Singidas of Barangay Cahayag declared that there was a peace and order assembly which
coincided with their Barangay Assembly in 1994, where he gave P50.00 for meals to those who attended and that
he spent a total of only P4,000.00. Adelaida Paigan of Camating admitted that she spent the money for seminar
registration (no specific amount), a hand- held radio antennae (no amount also), P85.00 for the peace and order
campaign, food and snacks for the soldiers who guarded the election at around P1,000.00; Service Orientation
Training (SOT) meals and snacks in the amount of P1,184.00, and leveling and improving barangay roads in the
amount of P2,000.00. She also declared that papers were passed for signatures of the population of Camating, but
there had been no peace and order assembly held for the release of said amount. For his part, Francisco
Jerusalem of Barangay Casilak San Agustin alleged that he was given P10,000.00 by the mayor for no stated
purpose; that he did not want to receive it; and that it was given to him as cash gift. He did not even know that
the money was for the peace and order campaign. He stated further, however, that he spent the money for meals
and snacks during the peace and order assembly and for the SOT but did not state a specific amount. Gaudencio
Olarte of Barangay Upper Centro averred, among others, that he used the P10,000.00 for the jackets and
flashlights of three (3) barangay tanods; and for the construction of an outpost and a playhouse for the day-care
center. There was also a peace and order assembly in his Barangay in 1994 where the attendance was taken, and
he served meals and snacks with no statement as to where he got the funds. Edilberto Castro of Barangay Centro
Hulpa declared that he received the P10,000.00 which he thought came from Congressman Ramiro for the election
of the ABC President, Emeterio Valmoria and that he divided the P10,000.00 among his councilmen and the
members of the peace and order council. Edilberto Cobrado of Barangay Colambutan Bajo asserted that he did not
have his constituents sign for peace and order assembly. He maintained that he served snacks during the peace
and order assembly but out of his personal money. The P10,000.00 which he believed to be a cash gift from
Congressman Ramiro was spent for a barangay tanod outpost, posts for every purok and meals for visitors of the
barangay. Delio Cagas of Barangay Colambutan Settlement admitted that he received the P10,000.00 and thought
that the money was for his own use and that it was up for him to spend it or share it with his councilmen. Perlito
Yamaro of Barangay Duanguican alleged that in 1995 a Barkadahan which was a sort of peace and order
assembly was held, during which the attendees signed their attendance in the record book. He also admitted that
he received the P10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayor through Mrs. Salinasal, and it was up for him to spend it.
Equally damaging to the petitioners is the admission of Juan Gumilos of Barangay Gala that he received
the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal with no mention as to its purpose. Eduardo Rara of Barangay Gumbil was as
candid when he stated that he received the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal and learned that it was a cash gift
coming from Congressman Ramiro. Nido Madrazo of Barangay Maikay likewise stated that he received
the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal with no mention as to its purpose. It was somehow conveyed to him that the
money was for his own use, and that it was up to him how to spend it. Feliciano Sumader of Barangay Mitugas
also admitted that he received P10,000.00 which he shared with his councilmen. He also bought a battery charger
for a hand-held radio, aerial antennae, battery pack, and also spent some for the Lupong Tagapayapa. He had no
receipts to prove his claim.
Cosme Sarabia of Barangay Nailon alleged that he received the P10,000.00 from Mrs. Salinasal which he
believed was a cash gift promised to him by Congressman Ramiro. Luther Limbaga of Barangay Silongon declared
that he received the P10,000.00 from the petitioner-mayors secretary, and that he believed it was a cash gift to
encourage him to vote for Emeterio Valmoria who was then running as ABC president. He added that he
gave P150.00 each to seven (7) CVOs from December 1994 to July 1995, meals and snacks for the assembly and
the SOT. Sabino Dagondon of Barangay Taguima averred that he received the P10,000.00 in cash from Mrs.
Salinasal and it was said to be for his own use. Vicente Lagas of Barangay Tigdok even admitted that he did not
hold a peace and order assembly in 1994, only the monthly regular meeting, and that no meals and snacks were
served. He also stated that he used the P10,000.00 for wire and antennae in the amount of P500.00 (no receipt);
gave P200.00 each for councilmen including his secretary and treasurer; P3,800.00 for food items when barangay
officials conducted patrols around the barangay; and spent P100.00 during the seminar of hand held radio users.
Cipriano Sumondong of Barangay Yahong alleged that he received the P10,000.00 as cash gift from Congressman
Ramiro and that he presumed the money as the promised cash gift. Caridad Lagunay of Barangay Bongabong
alleged that she received the P10,000.00 as cash gift and was told that it was up to her how to spend it. She
alleged that there was no peace and order assembly but only the monthly barangay assembly where the names of
those present were checked against the logbook. When asked what she did with the P10,000.00, she answered: I
bought some things for the barangay office like curtains, plates, chairs and dividers and others. Bebiana Saligan
of Barangay Barra declared that she received the P10,000.00 as cash gift from Congressman Ramiro for voting
for Emeterio Valmoria as ABC president but after three weeks, she was required to submit an attendance sheet.
This confused her, and it was only then that she decided to return theP10,000.00 to the municipality. Rodolfo
Ontulan of Barangay Basirang averred that he received the P10,000.00 from Loreta Salinasal at the mayors office
for the incoming election of the ABC president. He, however, stated further that he used the P10,000.00 to buy a
hand-held radio antennae in the amount of P500.00 and that he gave P100.00 to each member of the barangay
council.
[34]

In fine, no less than the barangay captains belied petitioner Sarigumbas claims in his liquidation vouchers
that the cash advances the latter received from the CDF of Congressman Ramiro were used for meals and snacks
during the peace and order meetings.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.



ZALDIVIA V. REYES
ZALDIVIA V REYES, JR.
211 SCRA 277
CRUZ; July 3, 1992

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS
- The petitioner Lus Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal, allegedly
committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (OPP) of Rizal on May 30, 1990 and the information was filed with the MTC of Rodriguez, presided by
Judge Andres Reyes, Jr., on October 2, 1990.
- The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was
denied. On appeal, the RTC of Rizal affirmed the denial of the motion.
Petitioners claims In this petition, the petitioner argues that the charge against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure (RSP):
Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the procedure in the MetTC, the MTC, and the MCTC in the following
cases:
B. Criminal Cases:

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; .
- Petitioner also invokes Act No. 3326, "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
- Petitioner concludes that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date
of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground
prescription.
Prosecutions position The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of
the complaint against her with the OPP. The SolGen invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (RCP), providing as follows:
Section 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC, by filing the complaint directly with the said
courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
- Respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the OPP comes under the phrase "such institution"
and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the RSP.

ISSUE
WON the offense has prescribed

HELD
YES
- The filing of the complaint in the MTC, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Even if the court where the complaint
or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of
the proceedings against the offender.
- It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the
promulgation of the RSP on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been
incorporated therein with the revision of the RCP on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was
added on October 1, 1988.

- Sec. 1 of the RCP begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure.
The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that
is, those offenses not governed by the RSP.
- The charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by the
RSP and not the RCP.
- Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC,"
the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and
two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable
fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
- These offenses are not covered by the RSP. Under Section 9 of the RSP, "the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties
agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants
to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on any date before that.
- This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the SolGen that they
include administrative proceedings.
- At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the RSP and the RCP, the former should prevail as
the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and the RCP, the latter must again yield because
this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
- The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May
11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It
was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the OPP on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the
MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Case is DISMISSED on the ground of prescription.

ESCOBAL V. GARCHITORENA

ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon.
David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca,
respondents.

Facts: P is a graduate of PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence
Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the P was conducting surveillance operations on drug
trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He somehow got
involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended
Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21 charging Pand a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias
Jun Bombita with murder.
RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the P from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as
amended by P.D. No. 1847. The General Headquarters of the PNP issued Special Order No. 91, preventively
suspending the P from the service until the case was terminated. P was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991, the P pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23,
1991, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that as mandated by C.A. No. 408, in relation to Section
1, PD No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, P on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his
reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served
the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993, the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David
C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting the Ps suspension. The RTC did not reply.
Thus, on February 22, 1994, the P filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged
that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the
motion. Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The P commenced the presentation of his
evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et
al., he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
jurisdiction over the case.
RTC issued an Order declaring that the P committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his
official function. It added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic. The
amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the P
did not have a salary grade of 27. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information
pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the inclusion therein
of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the P in the performance of his duties/functions, nor
in relation to his office. P filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said order. He asserted that the trial court
failed to consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30,
1995, could not be applied retroactively.
RTC issued an Order reversing and setting aside its Order. It declared that based on the Ps evidence, he
was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting
evidence thereto. The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the
offense charged was committed by the P in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and,
conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic
notes, to the Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IVto
return the records of Criminal Case to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the P had a
salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the P had commenced presenting
his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the
case and render judgment therein after trial.

I ssue(s): whether the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.

Ruling: The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he
ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the
Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information. Such jurisdiction
of the court acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed
by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the
office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the I nformation. I t is not enough to
merely allege in the I nformation that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office
because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does
not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence,
the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the
Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial
court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975
amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a
position corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as
the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior
Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the
RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It
bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.





QUINDOZA V. BANZON
DANTE M. QUINDOZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE EMMANUEL G.
BANZON, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
On August 9, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received
the Letter-Complaint
[1]
dated August 1, 2002 filed by complainant Dante M.
Quindoza against Judge Emmanuel G. Banzon, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mariveles, Bataan. Complainant charges
respondent with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in
connection with respondents disposition of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-
7326, and 02-7332, all entitled People of the Philippines v. Dante Quindoza,
et al. for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Light Coercion.
The antecedents follow.
On May 8 and 22, 2002 respectively, complainant ordered the
disconnection of the water and electrical service of the housing unit illegally
occupied by Renato Caralipio (Caralipio),
[2]
and the electrical services of the
housing unit of Hermito de Asis (de Asis) for non-settlement of accounts with
the Philippine Economic Zone Authority and expiration of lease.
[3]
Because of
the incidents, criminal cases were filed against the complainant with the court
of respondent judge. Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 stemmed
from the incident involving Caralipios house,
[4]
while Criminal Case No. 02-
7332 related to the disconnection of electric service in the house occupied by
de Asis.
[5]

On June 4, 2002, the complainant filed an Urgent Motion to Quash in the
three criminal cases on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to allege
an offense. Complainant averred that he is the incumbent Zone Administrator
of the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ) and that his position has a salary grade
28 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.
[6]
He contended that it is not
respondents court but the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the
three criminal cases.
Complainant claims that in open court during the hearing of his motion to
quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 on June 20, 2002,
respondent ordered his incarceration, without right to file bail, until such time
that he shall have ordered the reconnection of the water and electrical
services of Caralipio and de Asis. According to the complainant, respondent
should not have ordered the reconnection of electricity in de Asiss housing
unit during the hearings in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326
because the disconnection incident relating to de Asis is the subject of the
third case, Criminal Case No. 02-7332, and the motion to quash therein was
to be conducted on June 27, 2002 yet.
[7]
He also points out that it was
erroneous for the respondent judge to include the reconnection of
the water services in de Asiss house because only the disconnection of
electricity was complained of in Criminal Case No. 02-7332.
[8]
Complainant
further avers that he made a formal written request
[9]
for a copy of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the June 20, 2002 hearing in Criminal
Cases Nos. 02-7325 and 02-7326 to avail of the proper judicial remedies but
respondent refused to release the transcript. He prays that his pending cases
be reassigned to another court and that respondent judge be ordered to inhibit
himself from handling any case involving BEZ or any of its officers and
employees.
[10]

The OCA indorsed the complaint and required respondent to file his
comment thereon.
[11]

Thereafter, respondent submitted his Comment dated September 20,
2002 and another Comment on November 29, 2002. Respondent has not
disputed complainants allegations in the latters September 20,
2002 Comment. He argues, however, that it is improper and premature for
complainant to insinuate bias and improper conduct on his part when the
issues which gave rise to the Letter-Complaint are still being ventilated in
court.
[12]
He asserts that complainant should have appealed the assailed order
instead of filing an administrative case against him because as the Court held
in Barroso v. Arche,
[13]
when a litigant disagrees with a ruling of the judge the
proper remedy is not to file an administrative complaint but an appeal which
points out the errors in the decision.
[14]
Respondent further claims that
complainant was arbitrary in effecting the disconnection of water and electrical
services of residents within the BEZ alleging that complainant disconnected
the electrical and water supplies of the occupants who could not afford to file a
case against him, without even bothering to explain the disconnections
although they were effected in violation of due process of law.
[15]
Respondent
prays that the complaint against him be dismissed and that complainant
instead be held administratively and criminally liable for his illegal acts.
[16]

Complainant submitted on October 25, 2002 his Reply, pointing out that
respondent judge failed to refute the charges against him but instead made
unsubstantiated allegations against the complainant.
On March 3, 2004, the OCA submitted its Memorandum, recommending
that respondent be fined Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for
oppression and abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.
On August 4, 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest whether
they would be willing to submit the case based on the pleadings filed within
ten (10) days from notice. Both parties complied and replied in the
affirmative,
[17]
with respondent adducing additional documents and arguments
in his defense.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Section 4(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No.
8249
[18]
clearly provides that employees of the executive branch classified as
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
not of the MTC. Clearly, any crime committed by complainant, a salary grade
28 employee, in relation to his office falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The record shows that the crimes allegedly committed by
complainant were in relation to his office as director of the BEZ.
When the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
[19]
Respondent judge undeniably
erred in denying complainants motion to quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-
7325, 02-7326 and 02-7332 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, as the OCA correctly observed, respondent judges act of
ordering the incarceration of complainant and threatening not to grant him bail
at the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326 and 02-7332 until he
shall have reconnected the water and electric supply connections of Caralipio
and de Asis indubitably constitutes oppression and abuse of authority
This is a clear case of oppression and abuse of authority. Respondent acted like a
petty tyrant requiring obedience from those around. He had no authority to order the
incarceration of complainant even if the latter refused to comply. In criminal cases, a
court can only do three things: (1) convict the accused and sentence him accordingly;
(2) acquit the accused and release him from detention if he is detained or cancel his
bail if he is bonded; or (3) he can dismiss the case for any of the grounds provided by
law.
[20]

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, gross ignorance
of the law or procedure and gross misconduct constituting violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct
[21]
are considered serious offenses which may be
penalized with either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits,
suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six
(6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but
not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), may be imposed.
However, as recommended by the OCA,
[22]
a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) is appropriate. This is the first offense of respondent.
In his Manifestation
[23]
dated September 24, 2004, respondent claims that
during the pendency of the instant case, complainant has been charged with
several criminal complaints for violation of Article 327 of the Revised Penal
Code involving the ex-parte demolition of several houses in Mariveles, as well
as complaints for qualified trespass to dwelling and light coercion, all of which
were assigned to his sala. Complainant has been charged, respondent adds,
with violations of human rights before the Commission on Human Rights.
Moreover, while asserting that complainant was high-handed and tyrannical in
the performance of his duties respondent stresses that complainant filed the
instant case to get even with and force him to be lenient with complainant in
the cases pending before his court.
The Court finds the cases adverted to irrelevant to the resolution of the
instant administrative complaint. If there is merit in the cases against the
complainant, then the same should be decided in the courts concerned, but
not in this forum at this time.
Complainant seeks to disqualify the respondent judge from handling his
pending cases and those that may be filed against the BEZ or any of its
employees and officers. The Court grants the inhibition sought with respect to
the pending cases, including the cases mentioned by respondent in
his Manifestation dated September 24, 2004.
Considering the animosity generated by this administrative complaint
between complainant and respondent judge, it would be in the best interest of
justice to remove any doubt that may be cast upon respondent judges ability
to resolve said cases with impartiality. However, there is no basis for
respondents inhibition from hearing any other case involving the BEZ or any
of its officers and employees.
However, with regard to cases still to be filed the recusal sought is
premature and therefore should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court orders respondent Judge Emmanuel G. Banzon,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Mariveles, Bataan, to pay a FINE
in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. He is also ordered to inhibit himself from hearing Criminal Cases
Nos. 02-7325, 02-7326, 02-7332, and 03-7760, 03-7761, 03-7762, 03-7763,
03-7764, 03-7765, 03-7766 and 03-7781 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Mariveles, Bataan involving complainant Dante M. Quindoza.
SO ORDERED.
INDING V. SANDIGANBAYAN

RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
the nullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution
[1]
of the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division), which denied the petitioners omnibus motion with supplemental motion, and
its Resolution dated April 25, 2000, denying the petitioners motion for the
reconsideration of the same.
The Antecedents
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City,
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
[2]
committed as follows:
That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public
officer, being a Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in the performance of
his official functions, particularly in the operation against drug abuse, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or users to enable him to
claim or collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount of P30,500.00,
as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust operations,
knowing fully well that he had no participation in the said police operations against
drugs but enabling him to collect from the coffers of the city government a total
amount of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to the government as well as the
public interest.
[3]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
[4]
for the dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, for the referral
of the case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for appropriate
proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein that under Administrative Order No. 270
which prescribes the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991, he is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary
Grade (SG) 25. He asserted that under Republic Act No. 7975, which amended
Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try
cases involving crimes committed by officials of local government units only if such
officials occupy positions with SG 27 or higher, based on Rep. Act No. 6758, otherwise
known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. He contended
that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction over the crime charged
against him. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial notice of Adm. Order No.
270.
In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
asserted that the petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, one of those
public officers who, by express provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7975,
[5]
is classified as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan,
not the RTC, has original jurisdiction over the case, regardless of his salary grade under
Adm. Order No. 270.
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the
petitioners omnibus motion. According to the court, the Information alleged that the petitioner
has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore, Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which amended Section
4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.
[6]

On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his omnibus
motion,
[7]
citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court in Organo v.
Sandiganbayan,
[8]
where it was declared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest amendment
to the law creating the Sandiganbayan, collated the provisions on the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and that the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty imposed by law
on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of
accused government officials and employees.
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28, 1999 and
entered a plea of not guilty.
[9]

On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayans September 23, 1999 Resolution.
[10]
The motion was, however, denied
by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.
[11]

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending as
follows:
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05 February 1997 made the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the penalty
imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and
salary grade of accused government officials and employees.
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in Lilia B. Organo versus The Sandiganbayan
and the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 133535, 09 September 1999, settles
the matter on the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court which is
over public officials and employees with rank and salary grade 27 and above.
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly
committed, he was already occupying the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member
I with SG 25. Hence, under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No.
7975, it is the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense
lodged against him. He asserts that under Adm. Order No. 270,
[12]
Dapitan City is only
a component city, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified
as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG 25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and retained by Section 4 of
Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
contend that Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act
No. 7975, expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over
violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, committed by the members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, without qualification and regardless of salary
grade. They argue that when Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No.
8249, it was aware that not all the positions specifically mentioned in Section 4,
subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically included
therein, viz:
It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod are specifically included as among those falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the qualification as to
Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to such officials of the executive branch other
than the regional director and higher and those specifically enumerated. To rule,
otherwise, is to give a different interpretation to what the law clearly is.
Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 and higher as the sole
factor to determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then the
lawmakers could have simply stated that the officials of the executive branch, to fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should have been
occupying the positions with a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. But the express
wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 specifically including the members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as those within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only means that the said sangguniang members
shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court regardless of their
Salary Grade.
In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are very well aware that
not all the positions specifically mentioned as those within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, the
legislature has explicitly made the officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and RA
No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because of the nature of these officials functions and responsibilities as well as the
power they can wield over their respective area of jurisdiction.
[13]

The threshold issue for the Courts resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has
original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No.
1606, took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the cases falling
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975
was amended by Rep. Act No. 8249, entitled An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes. The amendatory law
took effect on February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof enumerates the cases now
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act
No. 8249, applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of the
commission of the offense.
[14]
Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case
is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at
the time of the commission of the crime.
[15]
However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as
Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an exception thereto as it expressly states that to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of Rep. Act
No. 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the offense. This is
plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of these two
provisions which reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise [exclusive]
[16]
original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, [Book II]
[17]
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:

In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime
charged was committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The
applicable law, therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
[18]

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
[19]
where one or more of the principal accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
[20]

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
[21]

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
[22]

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.
[23]

A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining the
government officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
cases involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five categories, to wit:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. . .
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG 27 or
higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically included the following officials as falling
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the
general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. In other words, violation of
Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or higher,
and the officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, regardless of their salary
grades, likewise fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive
branch with SG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4 a.
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the phrase
officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. Or the category in paragraph (5) of the same provision
relating to [a]ll other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989 would have sufficed. Instead, under
paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act
No. 7975, Congress included specific officials, without any reference as to their salary
grades. Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials, regardless of their salary
grades, to be specifically included within the Sandiganbayans original jurisdiction, for
had it been otherwise, then there would have been no need for such enumeration. It is
axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that words in a statute should not be construed as
surplusage if a reasonable construction which will give them some force and meaning is
possible.
[24]

That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of their
salary grades, within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent from the
legislative history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of
Senate Bill No. 1353, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and
became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on
Justice and Human Rights, explained:
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that
only those occupying high positions in the government and the military fall under the
jurisdiction of the court.
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
over cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused
are officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Classification Act of
1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade
upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.
The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers such as the justices of
the Supreme Court and constitutional commissions are not subject to the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.
The bill provides for an extensive listing of other public officers who will be subject
to the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others, Members
of Congress, judges and justices of all courts.
[25]

More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate Bill
No. 844, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became
Rep. Act No. 8249. Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
Rep. Act No. 7975, thus:
SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO

By way of sponsorship, Mr. President we will issue the full sponsorship speech to
the members because it is fairly technical may we say the following things:
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that
Court to concentrate on the larger fish and leave the small fry to the lower
courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged
solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades
were at Grade 26 or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and
retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary
grades were at Grade 27 or higher and over other specific public officials holding
important positions in government regardless of salary grade;
[26]

Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
amended Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered them big fish
and their positions important, regardless of their salary grades.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated
in (a) to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and
Management in 1989, then in effect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was
approved. For example:
Category New Position Title Grade
16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE

Foreign Service

Foreign Service Officer, Class II
[27]
23
[28]

Foreign Service Officer, Class I
[29]
24
[30]


18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Local Executives

City Government Department Head I 24
[31]

City Government Department Head II 26
[32]


Provincial Government Department Head 25
[33]


City Vice Mayor I 26
City Vice Mayor II 28
City Mayor I 28
[34]

City Mayor II 30
19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE
Sangguniang Members

Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I 25
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II 27
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member 26
[35]

Office of the City and Provincial Prosecutors
[36]

Prosecutor IV 29
Prosecutor III 28
Prosecutor II 27
Prosecutor I 26
Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
prosecutors, without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included in Rep.
Act No. 7975 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover,
the consuls, city department heads, provincial department heads and members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,albeit classified as having salary grades 26 or lower,
were also specifically included within the Sandiganbayans original jurisdiction. As
correctly posited by the respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of,
and had taken into account, these officials respective salary grades when it deliberated
upon the amendments to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress
passed into law Rep. Act No. 7975, specifically including them within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it obviously intended cases mentioned
in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, when
committed by the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary
grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature
is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.
[37]
From the congressional
records and the text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the legislature undoubtedly
intended the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by the aforesaid subsequent laws, to be included within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
jurisdiction,
[38]
can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the
principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated otherwise,
except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of
their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public
officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts where
none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or
higher. By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule,
after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole.
[39]
And courts should adopt a construction that
will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam
pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute
its every word.
[40]

In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019. Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are specifically included as among
those within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
[41]
or even Section 4 of Rep.
Act No. 8249
[42]
for that matter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original jurisdiction
over the petitioners case docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

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