CHAPTER VII

THE PREPARATIONS AND THE PLANS OF

OPERATIONS OF THE ADVERSARIES
The Strategic Importance of the Island of Crete
362. The island of Crete lies in the
centre of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, on the
cross-roads of the air and sea lines of communication,
from east to west and from north to south or vice versa.
Thus, it constitutes an excellent base for aeronautical
operations in every direction and the power that occupies
it secures the control of all communications in the
Mediterranean. These characteristics lend particular
strategic importance to the island.
A natural consequence of this strategic importance
was that, since the beginning of the econd !orld !ar,
Crete was of interest both to the "ritish and #itler.
363. The occupation of Crete by the "ritish, or at least
the assurance that it would remain under allied or friendly
forces, was of vital importance to them, because it o$ered
them the following advantages %
- Considerable protection to the "ritish bases in
&orthern Africa against the attac's of the (erman
Airforce, forcing the latter to launch its attac's from the
remote air)elds of mainland *urope.
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- /orward aeronautical base and as a base of
amphibious operations towards the shores and the islands
of the Aegean and the 1odecanese, while, at the same
time, it posed a serious threat for the +omanian oil wells.
- Contribution to the security of transportation from
the harbours of the -aci)c and the 2ndian 0cean, through
the ue6 Canal, towards the "ritish bases of the
Mediterranean and the Middle *ast. (iven that the
greatest part of the re-supply sources of the above "ritish
bases came from 2ndia, Australia and outh Africa, the
importance of the occupation or the control of Crete for
the "ritish can be easily understood.
/urthermore, Crete was the only free section of the
(ree' territory with both (ree' and "ritish forces and in
which the free (ree' tate still existed, by virtue of the
presence of the ,ing, the (overnment and the national
Armed /orces. Consequently, it was extremely important
for (reece and "ritain, both morally and politically, to hold
on to it.
364. 0n the other hand, if Crete were occupied by the
Axis, it would o$er to its forces the following strategic
advantages %
- Capacity for direct airforce threat against the sea
and air lines of communication of the Allies and
particularly against the "ritish /leet in the Mediterranean.
-*xcellent base of operation towards the Middle *ast
and the &orthern Africa area in general.
-afe Aegean sea lines, provided that Tur'ey would
remain neutral or pro-Axis and free naval communication
with the ports of the "lac' ea and the Adriatic sea.
365. The following communicee of the
(erman (eneral #eadquarters, dated 7une 83, 8948, sums
up the strategic importance of the island of Crete for the
adversary powers in the Mediterranean area, during the
econd !orld !ar %
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... As a powerful naval and airforce stronghold, in
close proximity with our sea lines of communication
through the Aegean, as a forward base to cover and
secure both an!s of the "orthern African #ront and the
$ritish sea lines of communication between Alexandria
and %alta, Crete was of e&ually great importance for the
war operations of the adversary in the 'astern
%editerranean, both from the o(ensive as well as from
the defensive aspect. The island had a similar importance,
in reverse, for the subse&uent operations of the )erman
%ilitary leadership in the 'astern %editerranean...*
The )ree! +lans for the ,efence of the Island
366. 2n Crete, before the war, the ; 1ivision had already
been established and was stationed at #ania. The units
under its command were the 84th, 4<rd and 44th 2nfantry
+egiments at #ania, +ethymno and 2ra'lio respectively, as
well as the ; Artillery +egiment at ouda and the Military
#ospital of #ania and other Military installation and
ervices. The transition of the 1ivision from peace to war
establishment had been prepared on the basis of the
Mobilisation -lan of 89<9.
=pon the occupation of Albania by 2taly, on April
89<9, the threat of war for (reece loomed as an
indisputable fact. As a result, the abovementioned -lan 2"
was drawn up, and among others, foresaw the *nglish-
/rench assistance as a de)nite development, in the case
of an 2talian attac'.
0n the basis of -lan 2" and the instructions of the
Army (eneral ta$, the 1ivision had drawn the following
three plans for the defence of the island%
- -lan &o. l , to cover the mobilisation in case of
threat to the island.
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- -lan &o. 3, to repulse any enemy landing after the
termination of the Mobilisation and before the 1ivision
was transferred from Crete.
--lan &o. <, to de)ne the mission of the Military
Command of #ania in case the island was attac'ed after
the departure of the 1ivision.
According to -lan &o < the following units would
remain on Crete under the Military Command of #ania%
The 44th 2nfantry +egiment, the 44th Artillery of *scort
-latoon, the "ase "attalions of #ania, +ethymno and
2ra'lio, three ri>e companies manned by transportation
troops from the 44th 2nfantry +egiment and a -ac'
Artillery battalion.
367. /urthermore, as part of the measures
that had been ta'en by the (arrisons of the islands, by
order of the Army (eneral ta$, the 1ivision had deployed
the coastal defence troops by the end of May, 894?, while
simultaneously activeted the sea and air surveillance
networ'.
The troops provided for the coastal defence
comprised, in total, three 2nfantry companies and one
Machine-gun platoon.
/or the operation of the surveillance networ', two
centres were established and became active% the
2nformation Centre of #ania @7oint Centre of the +oyal
&avy and /ield ArmyA, which had ten surveillance stations,
and the 2nformation Centre of 2ra'lio @also BointA, which
had three surveillance stations.
0n the naval side, no speci)c measures were ta'en
for the protection of Crete, due to the lac' in defence
organisation means @guns, mines, and other equipmentA
and, most important, because the (overnment believed
that the intervention of the "ritish /leet in the
Mediterranean was assured in conBunction with the overall
"ritish assistance.
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Crete under the $ritish -esponsibility
368. ince the morning of 0ctober 3:, the ; 1ivision
began to mobilise its units and to prepare to be
transferred to mainland (reece, so as to be employed in
the Albanian Theatre of 0perations. That same day, the
"ritish #eadquarters in the Middle *ast decided on and
ordered the reinforcement of Crete.
0n &ovember 4, the (ree' (overnment noti)ed the
"ritish (overnment that it wished to transfer the ;
1ivision from Crete, under the condition however, that the
islandDs defence would be underta'en by the "ritish. The
proposal was immediately accepted and the responsibility
for the defence of the island was assumed by the "ritish.
The transfer of the ; 1ivision was carried out from
&ovember 8: to 3C, using requisitioned (ree' ships,
under the protection of the (ree' and "ritish /leet. The
numbers transferred in total were, CEE oFcers, l:,EE3
enlisted men, E:5 pac' animals and :8 vehicles, without
any losses.
369. After the departure of the ;
1ivision, the command of the (ree' forces on the island
was assumed by the newly formed Military Command of
#ania, under .ieutenant (eneral 2oannis Alexa'is. 2t was
subordinate to the AG Military #igh Command of Athens.
The Military Command of #ania had under its command
the 1epots of #ania, +ethymno and 2ra'lio. *ach 1epot
had at its disposal an 2nfantry battalion @of two
companiesA and a aint *tienne Machine-gun platoon. 0n
7anuary 8948, in agreement with the "ritish #eadquarters
in the Middle *ast, these battalions were also transferred
to mainland (reece. Thus, there remained in Crete only
the nuclei of the 1epots, their strength comprising transit
soldiers, and its armament, one thousand (ra ri>es, l3
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aint *tienne machine-guns and approximately 4? light
machine-guns.
/ollowing the orders of (eneral #eadquarters, in
1ecember 894?, preparations were made for the
organi6ation militia units. These units were assigned to
protect the technical wor's and the vulnerable points, of
the island in general. The strength of the militia was
originally <,??? men, but reduced in /ebruary 8948 to
approximately 8,C?? men, organised in four battalions,
one in each -refecture @#ania, +ethymno, 2ra'lio and
.asithiA. The militia was supposed to be armed by the
"ritish, but this never happened. The militia units were
subordinate to the (endarmerie authorities who were also
responsible for their training. Tactically they were
subordinate to the Military Command of #ania.
1uring March 8948, the (endarmerie Academy was
transferred to Crete and disembar'ed at +ethymno, in
order to reinforce the units in Crete. 2ts total strength was
8C oFcers and about 9?? men. /urthermore, during the
second fortnight of April 8948, eight recruit battalions
were transferred to Crete from the Training Centres of the
-eloponnese, their total strength being :C oFcers and
4,:3C men. These battalions, after their arrival, were
designated as 2nfantry +egiments, temporarily retaining
their original title, i.e. the 8st, 3nd, <rd etc. Their men
were recruits from the classes of 894?, 8948 and had
received an extremely brief and barely suFcient training.
The armament of all the above (ree' units varied.
There were between )ve to twenty cartridges per ri>e,
while one third of the strength was unarmed.
0n April 39, 8948, the Military Academy arrived by
motorboats at ,olymbari in #ania, the initiative having
been ta'en by certain oFcers and Cadets of the Academy.
The Military Academy was directly under the command of
the Ministry of the Army in #ania and was deployed
defensively between the Moni HMonasteryI (onias and the
village of ,olymbari.
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2t is also noted that, at various times 8E,??? 2talian
prisoners @including C5E oFcersA had been transferred to
Crete and were placed in three -0! centres in the
-refectures of #ania, 2ra'lio and +ethymno.
370. The "ritish, upon assuming
responsibility for the defence, proceeded to organise a
fuel depot in the bay of uda and gradually transfered a
very small number of forces for the defence of the island.
Thus, by the end of March 8948, the following units had
been transfered on Crete % The #eadquarters of the 84th
2nfantry "rigade and the Commander of the "rigade 0.#.
Titbury, the 8CEth .ight Antiaircraft "attalion, the
command of the C3nd .ight Antiaircraft Artillery +egiment,
the 8C8st #eavy Antiaircraft "attalion, the 43nd *ngineer
Company, the 3nd "lac'watch "attalion, the C8st +aiding
/orce and the 8st !elsh "attalion.
After the (erman troops entered "ulgaria and the
"ulgarian air)elds were occupied by (erman airforce
units, the (erman attac' against (reece was regarded as
imminent.
This new threat led the "ritish #eadquarters to
decide that Crete should cease to constitute merely a
refuelling base and it should be organised into a naval and
airforce base.
0n March 39, the Commander of the M&"10 @Mobile
&aval 1efence 0rganisationA, MaBor (eneral !eston
arrived on the island, in order to examine thoroughly the
issue of the islandGs defence.
2n his report, submitted on April 8C, 8948, he
proposed the serious reinforcement of Crete, with forces
and equipment. The (eneral #eadquarters of the Middle
*ast agreed on these proposals, nevertheless the situation
prevailing in that area did not permit their
implementation. The )nal decision would be made after
the retreat of the "ritish forces from mainland (reece.
#owever, since April l5, when the evacuation of the
forces of mainland (reece had been considered,
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@operation J1emonDA, it was decided that a large section of
the retreating "ritish forces should land on Crete. Thus on
April 3C, the )rst substantial "ritish force of approximately
C,??? men arrived in Crete, mainly of the Cth &ew
Kealand "rigade.
1uring the following days and until April <?,
approximately 4C,??? men retreated from (reece, to
Crete and *gypt. Approximately 3C,??? of them remained
on Crete. #owever most of them were unarmed, without
any individual items, heavy armament or vehicles.
0n April 35, (eneral !ilson, Commander of the
"ritish *xpeditionary /orce in (reece, landed also on
Crete, assigned to examine, along with the enior oFcers
of the Cretan (arrison, the situation from the aspect of
the forces required for the defence of the island.
(eneral !ilson, after a brie)ng on the situation and
an examination of the entire matter, reported to the
Middle *ast #eadquarters that, the strength of the /ield
Army should be three brigades, with four battalions each,
a motorised battalion and furthermore the strength of the
M&"10 for the bay of uda. #e also mentioned the need
to provide one additional heavy and one light Antiaircraft
Artillery "attalions. The above forces would be suFcient
to secure, the vital areas of the island, that is, 2ra'lio with
its air)eld, #ania, the Maleme air)eld and the bay of
ouda.
The proposed forces were considered by (eneral
!ilson to be the minimum required for the islandDs
defence and he underlined that the use of less than those
would bring disaster, and that it was expedient to come to
a decision at once.
The Arrival of the .ing and the )overnment to Crete
371. !hen the ,ing and the (overnment were
convinced that there was no possibility of conducting the
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struggle in mainland (reece any more, they decided to
continue the )ght wherever it would be possible,
according to the general guide line of the honourable
national policy that (reece had adhered to towards its
friends and allies.
0n April 3<, 8948, the ,ing, -rince -etros, the -rime
Minister, certain members of (overnment and the "ritish
Ambassador to Athens arrived on Crete by a "ritish
hydroplane. The plane touched down in the bay of ouda,
which had been bombarded by the (erman Airforce
shortly before.
372. The e$ort of both the ,ing and the
(overnment, since the )rst hours of their arrival on Crete,
was to succeed in arming the (ree' Army and the
inhabitants of the island, as well as to reinforce the "ritish
forces there, particularly the airforce, since there was no
)ghter-plane unit stationed permanently on Crete.
The (ree' (overnment too' the initiative to hold a
meeting at #ania, which was attended by "ritish (enerals
!ilson and !eston, (eneral 'oulas, "ritish Airforce
Marshal 1D Albiac, ;ice Admiral Terl, Captain "emich, as
well as other (ree' and "ritish Army oFcers.
The (ree' -rime Minister, as #ead of the meeting, in
the course of the discussions requested that a "ritish
(eneral be assigned the command of the (ree' - "ritish
forces on the island, that "ritish armament be given to the
(ree' forces and that their feeding be provided by the
"ritish. #e also added that he considered the air support
as inadequate. 0n the following day, a note was delivered
to the "ritish Ambassador, in which the (ree' views on
the "ritish assistance were clearly laid out while, at the
same time, the ,ing and the (overnment, at every
opportunity and contact with the "ritish, did not fail to
stress the need to reinforce the islandGs defence.
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The $ritish +reparations
373. 0n April <?, 8948, the Commander-in-Chief in the
Middle *ast, (eneral !avell arrived on Crete. 1uring a
meeting on the same day, he assigned the command of
the (ree' - "ritish forces on the island to the Commander
of the 3nd &ew Kealand 1ivision, MaBor (eneral /reyberg,
who had arrived on Crete from mainland (reece on the
previous day. /urthermore, he added that the (erman
attac' upon the island was expected to begin in a few
days and that the island had to remain free at all costs.
After the meeting (eneral !avell departed for *gypt.
=ntil the end of April 8948, no )nal plans had been
drawn yet, nor had any preparations begun for the
defence of the island against a serious enemy threat,
although Crete had been under "ritish responsibility for
the last six months. The island, despite the views of the
"ritish -rime Minister, who aspired to see Crete organised
as a second capa /low @one of the most important bases
of the "ritish /leet in the Atlantic, on the 0r'ney islesA,
was far from being able to defend itself against a strong
enemy attac'.
MaBor (eneral /reyberg, upon assuming command of
the (ree' - "ritish forces on the island, examined the
situation immediately and discovered the enormous
shortages in armament, ammunition and all 'inds of other
supplies. 0n the same day, he also received the
intelligence report of April 39, from the "ritish Ministry of
Military A$airs, according to which the attac' against the
island should be regarded as imminent and would be
conducted by <,???-4,??? parachutists and airborne
troops, who would be supported by <8C bombers, E?
double-engine )ghters, 34? dive bombers and 35? single
engine )ghters. /urthermore, the enemy would be
provided with suFcient naval forces and means, in order
to conduct a landing from the sea.
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"ased on the above information, MaBor (eneral
/reyberg reported immediately to the Commander-in-Chief
in the Middle *ast that his forces were totally inadequate
to confront the expected attac' and that if the number of
)ghter aircraft was not increased and the island was not
protected from the sea, he was not able to hope to last
long with an army, lac'ing artillery and inadequately
provided with supplies and ammunition.
2n reply to (eneral /reybergDs report, the
Commander-in-Chief in the Middle *ast answered that he
considered the predictions of the Ministry to be
exaggerated, he admitted, however, that there was a
possibility of a large scale attac'. At the same time, he
informed him that, though it would be diFcult to o$er
greater air support, the /leet of the Mediterranean would
be ready to help, if the (ermans attac'ed Crete. 2n the
end, he made it 'nown to the (eneral that, the "ritish
Council had expressly ordered that Crete be retained, and
that, even if such a decision was revo'ed, it was doubtful
whether the island could be evacuated before the (erman
attac'.
374. At the same time, MaBor (eneral
/reyberg occupied himself actively in ma'ing the most of
the forces and the means available to him, awaiting the
supply reinforcements he had requested.
=nfortunately, less than half of the supplies that were
originally sent to the island, arrived there, owing to the
action of the enemy airforce. Thus, by mid-May, 8C,???
tons of army supplies and <,??? tons of ammunitions,
were unloaded, instead of the 35,??? tons of
ammunitions that had been sent. The above materiel
included E medium and 8? light tan's as well as 49 2talian
and /rench guns of 5C and 8??mm calibre. The latter were
spoils of war and most of them lac'ed the necessary
equipment and spare parts, while some had no sighting
instruments.
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Apart from the supplies, the following units and
troops landed on Crete%
- M&"10 units, that is, the ta$ of the 3nd
Antiaircraft Artillery +egiment of the +oyal Marines. The AG
and CG #eavy Antiaircraft "attalions, with eight three-inch
guns each. The LG and KG Coastal 1efence Artillery
"attalions with two four-inch guns each. The 3<rd .ight
Antiaircraft "attalion with light guns and a earchlight
"attalion along with the ta$ of the 22 earchlight
+egiment. A ignals company, a urveillance platoon and
a 1oc's and Transports company.
- The 8?th &ew Kealand "rigade.
- The 3nd .eicester "attalion.
- The 8st .ight "attery @four <.5 inch #owit6er gunsA.
Meanwhile, the wor's on the defence of the island
continued at a vigorous pace, while great care was being
ta'en to conceal and camou>age the supplies.
0n May lE, the Commander of the Crete /orces
reported to the #eadquarters of the Middle *ast that he
had completed the plan for the defence of Crete and that
he was very optimistic.
The )eneral ,isposition of the $ritish/)ree! forces and
%issions
@'etch-map no. 3:, 39, <?, <8A
375. The
general disposition of the "ritish-(ree' forces on the basis
of the importance and vulnerability of

the strategic points,
the width of the area, the con)guration of the terrain and
the existing strength was as follows %
- Cretan /orces #eadquarters @MaBor (eneral
/reybergA at the village of Agios Mattheos in #ania.
- Ma8eme-Agyia ector
The 3nd &ew Kealand 1ivision @"rigadier ir
*.-uttic'A with its #eadquarters near the road Bunction
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Ali'yanos-#ania and Maleme-#ania. 2t cousisted of the Cth
&ew Kealand "rigade @38, 33, 3<, 3: 2nfantry "attalion
and &ew Kealand *ngineer /ield 1etachmentA, the 8?th
&ew Kealand "rigade @Eth, :th (ree' 2nfantry +egiments,
a 7oint &ew Kealand "attalion comprising gunners and
soldiers from various services, the 3?th &ew Kealand
"attalion
8
and Cavalry 1ivisional /ield 1etachment
3
A and
the 8st (ree' 2nfantry +egiment
<
.
The artillery of the 1ivision comprised the 35th and
3:th Artillery "attalions, the 8st .ight "attery and
platoons from the 8CEth .ight Antiaircraft "attalion, one
battery from the 5th Australian Antiaircraft Artillery
"attalion and one from the #eavy Antiaircraft Artillery
"attalion, the #eavy Coastal 1efence "attalion and one
battery from the 3<rd Antiaircraft "attalion.
The 1ivision had been reinforced with 3 medium
tan's, that were placed at the disposal of the Cth "rigade
and 8? light tan's from the <rd #ussars +egiment, which
were 'ept in the 6one of the 4th "rigade.
The boundaries of the ector were to the west,
Tavronitis river, to the east, ,ladissos river, to the north,
the coast. The southern boundary was not a de)nite
ground line, but depended on the unit boundaries,
according to their missions.
8
"elonging to the 4th &ew Kealand "rigade
3
,nown as the 1etachment of MaBor +ussell
<
This +egiment was deployed in the ,asteli area of ,issamos and was
assigned to defend the area and repulse sea landing or air attac'
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- The #ania-ouda ector
The M&"10 (roup @MaBor (eneral C.*.!estoinA with
his #eadquarters in #ania. At its disposal there were% the
3nd (ree' 2nfantry +egiment, the 1epot "attalion of
#ania, the 8st +angers "attalion, infantry troops from the
8Eth and 85th Australian "rigades and )eld troops from
the 8?Eth #orse-drawn Artillery "attalion, the 3M3 and 3M<
Australian Artillery +egiments, the 88th earchlight
+egiment and the &orthumberland #ussars.
The artillery of the ector comprised the JMD Artillery
(roup @8C8st #eavy Antiaircraft Artillery "attalion, 839th
.ight Antiaircraft Artillery "attalion, one platoon from the
8CEth .ight Antiaircraft Artillery "attalion, one platoon
from the 5th .ight Antiaircraft Artillery battalion and one
battery from the 3<rd .ight Antiaircraft "attalionA and the
JD Artillery (roup @AG #eavy Antiaircraft Artillery "attalion
of the Marines, one platoon of the JCD #eavy Antiaircraft
Artillery "attalion, one platoon from the 8?Eth #eavy
Artillery "attalion, 8Cth Artillery regiment minus platoon
and the <?4th earchlight "attalionA.
The "oundaries of the ector were% to the west, the
rivers ,ladissos and -erivolianos, to the north, the coast
from ,ladissos river to cape 1rapanos. The eastern and
southern boundaries depended on the power of the
M&"10 troops, that were deployed as far as 1rapanos
and the troops of the 3nd (ree' 2nfantry +egiment, that
were deployed in the area Mournies--erivolia.
- The +ethymno-(eorgioupo8is ector
The 89th Australian "rigade @"rigadier (.A.;aseyA
with its #eadquarters directly to the west of
(eorgioupolis, which had the (roups of (eorgioupolis,
+ethymno and the Air)eld of -igi under his responsibility.
The (roup of (eorgioupolis included the
#eadquarters of the 89th Australian "rigade, the 3M5 and
3M: Australian "attalions and one Australian Machine-gun
-latoon. The artillery of the (roup comprised the 8?th
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#eavy Coastal Artillery "attalion and one 5C mm battery
from the 3M< Australian Artillery +egiment.
The (roup of +ethymno included the 1epot "attalion
of +ethymno and the (ree' (endarmerie "attalion under
the orders of the Commander of the 88th Army 1istrict,
Colonel tamatis -othoula'is.
The -igi Air)eld (roup included the 4th and Cth (ree'
2nfantry +egiments, the 3M8, 3M88 Australian "attalions
and two Australian Machine-gun platoons under the
Commander of the 3M8 Australian "attalion, .ieutenant
Colonel Campbell. The artillery of the (roup comprised 8?
guns @4 were 8??mm calibre and E were 5Cmm calibre A of
the 3M< Australian Artillery +egiment.
- The 2ra'lio ector
The l4th "ritish "rigade @"rigadier ".#.ChappelA with
its #eadquarters at &ew Ali'arnassos, which had the
(roups of 2ra'lio town and 2ra'lio air)eld @+oussesA under
his responsibility.
The (roup of 2ra'lio had the <rd and 5th (ree'
2nfantry +egiments and the "ase "attalion of 2ra'lio.
The 2ra'lio Air)eld (roup had the 3nd .eicester
"attalion, the 3nd "lac'watch "attalion, the 3nd Nor' and
.ancaster "attalion and the 3M4 Australian "attalion.
The artillery of the ector comprised the 3<4th
Artillery "attalion @8< guns of 5C and 8?? mm calibreA,
one platoon from the 8Cth +oyal Coastal 1efence Artillery
+egiment @two 4-inch gunsA, the 5th .ight Antiaircraft
"attalion minus three platoons @E "eaufort gunsA, one
battery from the 8CEth .ight Antiaircraft +oyal Artillery
"attalion @4 "eaufort gunsA, 3 platoons from the #eavy
Antiaircraft +oyal Marine "attalion @four <-inch gunsA and
one battery from the 3<rd .ight Antiaircraft +oyal Marine
"attalion.
2n addition to the above forces, on May l9, the 3nd
Argyle and utterland #ighlanders 2nfantry "attalion
@cottish unitA and < medium tan's landed Crete. The
ector had also been reinforced with 3 medium and E light
tan's.
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- +eserves at the disposal of the Commander of the
/orces on Crete.
The 4th &ew Kealand "rigade @8:th and 89th
"attalionsA, deployed in the ector Malame-Agyia and the
8st !elsh +egiment in the ector #ania-ouda.
The total number of men of the (ree' - "ritish forces
on Crete was% 8,C83 "ritish oFcers and 39,955 "ritish
soldiers, 454 (ree' oFcers and 8?,955 (ree' soldiers.
+egarding guns and tan's, there were 8C8 guns @of which
E3 were Antiaircraft and 4 Antitan'A and 3C tan's @9
medium and 8E lightA.
Apart from the military units, many other armed
civilian teams were organised during the (erman attac'.
ome were organised by the "ritish and the (ree'
(endarmerie authorities, while others were formed by
villagers who came forth spontaneously at the point of
con>ict or parachutists drop.
There was no Airforce on the island. The very few
aircraft that were left, departed, by order of the
Commander of Cretan of /orces, on May l9, to the air)elds
of *gypt.
2n conclusion what must be emphasised is that even
though the total number of men constituting the Cretan
strength sounded impressive, the weapons at their
disposal were signi)cantly below the acceptable
proportion for all types of armament.
376. The abovementioned "ritish-(ree' forces allocated
in the Maleme, #ania, +ethymno and 2ra'lio ectors, were
entrusted with the defence of the island, by forbidding the
enemy to use its air)elds and ports.
2n detail, their missions were the following%
- 3nd &ew Kealand 1ivision, @Maleme-Agyia ectorA %
To conduct defence within its area, forbidding the enemy
to occupy its coast, the Maleme air)eld and the valley of
Agyia from sea and air.
- M&"10 (roup @#ania-ouda ectorA % To conduct
defence within its area, forbidding the enemy to occupy
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the town of #ania and the harbour of ouda from sea and
air.
- The 89th Australian "rigade @+ethymno-
(eorgioupo8is ectorA % To conduct defence within its
area, forbidding the enemy to occupy +ethymno, the
Air)eld of -igi and (eorgioupolis from sea and air.
- The 84th "ritish "rigade @2ra'lio ectorA % To conduct
defence within its area, forbidding the enemy to occupy
the town, the air)eld and the port of 2ra'lio from sea and
air.
- +eserve @4th &ew Kealand "rigade minus battalion,
plus 8st !elsh "attalionA %
To conduct counter-attac's for the 3nd &ew Kealand
1ivision and the M&"10 (roup.
The )erman +lans and +reparations
@'etch-map no 3:A
377. 0n &ovember 83, 894?, #itler
expresses his intentions to occupy mainland (reece, so as
to be able to use the (erman forces against targets in the
*astern Mediterranean.
0n 1ecember 8<, 894?, the 1irective &o. 3? was
issued, by which the mission of the airforce in all phases
of the attac' against (reece is clearly de)ned. 0n April
8C, 8948, Air Marshal Alexander .ohr, Commander of the
2; (erman Airforce, to whom the air operations in *
*urope had been assigned, submitted a plan to Marshal
#ermann (oering, regarding the occupation of Crete,
which had been drawn by ;ice Marshal ,urt tudent,
Commander of the L2 Airforce Corps. 0n the same day,
the Army #igh Command submitted a plan for the
occupation of Malta.
As the available forces did not suFce for the
implementation of both the above plans, #itler decided in
a meeting on April 3?, attended by Air ;ice-Marshal
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tudent as well, that the operation for the occupation of
Crete should be carried out )rst.
378. "ased on the above plan and the decisions of
#itler, the 1irective &o. 3: was issued on April 3C, 8948,
under the code name O/all M*+,=+P @0peration
OM*+C=+NPA, concerning the operations for the occupation
of Crete and the use of the island as an air base against
"ritain in the *astern Mediterranean.
The high command of the operation was assigned to
the Marshal of the Airforce, (oering, while its tactical
preparation was entrusted to the Commander of the 2; Air
/orce, Air Marshal Alexander .ohr. The command of the
forces of the L2 Airforce Corps, that were to be used in
Crete, was assigned to Air ;ice Marshal tudent. The ;222
Airforce Corps, under the command of Air ;ice Marshal
;on +ichthofen would underta'e to wea'en the defence,
before the day of the attac', and would then support the
airborne operations and the operations of the land forces.
Air ;ice Marshal Conrad, Commander of the Transport
Airforce of the L2 Airforce Corps, was ordered to consider
and conduct the transportation of troops and supplies with
aircraft. The Commander of the * *urope &aval forces,
+ear Admiral chuster, was assigned to organise the sea
transportation pertaining to the operation, using all
means available.
The 2talian dictator requested that the 2talian Army
should ta'e part in the operation, with a strength of a
reinforced regiment, that would be operating from the
1ode'anese and would land on the eastern shores of the
island. This action was )nally carried out on May 3:, at a
time, that is, when the fate of the island had already been
decided.
379. /or the implementation of the operation
OM*+C=+NP, the Commander of the (erman forces of the
operation, Air Marshal Alexander .ohr, had the following
forces under his command %
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- The ta$ of the 2; Air /orce @,i)ssiaA.
- The forces of the L2 Airforce Corps, that comprised
the 5th Airborne -arachutist 1ivision @three -arachutist
regimentsA, the Cth Mountain 1ivision reinforced with
units from the Eth 1ivision, one -aratroopers Assault
+egiment and the Transport Airforce of the same Corps
with E?? transport aircraft and approximately 8?? gliders.
- The ;222 Airforce Corps, with E? reconnaissance
aircraft, 3:? bombers, lC? dive bombers and 8:? )ghter
of which 9? had a long range capability.
- The &aval /orces of outh-eastern *urope.
The total number of forces employed for the assault
on Crete amounted to 33,5C? men, 8,<5? aircraft and 5?
vessels for the transportation of landing forces and
supplies, supported by a small number of 2talian
destroyers and motor torpedo boats.
The island would be assaulted by 8?,???
paratroopers and 5C? men in gliders. /urthermore, C,???
men would be transported to the occupied air)elds and
coastal areas by transport planes and 5,??? by ships and
other vessels.
The ;222 Airforce Corps was allocated to the air)elds of
Central and outhern (reece, as well as to the air)elds of
the islands Milos and ,arpathos. The air)elds of Megara,
Topolia, 1adi and Tanagra were used for the transportation
of troops, the air)eld of /aliro @*llini'oA for the sta$s and
the one in ,orinthos, for the transportation of supplies.
The lac' of concrete or metal runways in most of the
air)elds in mainland (reece, resulted in a thic' cloud of
dust being raised at every landing or ta'e o$. This was
damaging to the aircraft engines and caused delays in
their departure, owing to the lac' of visibility in the ta'e-
o$ runway. 1uring the preparation of the attac', an e$ort
was made to deal with the problem and provisions were
made to concentrate )re pumps and other appropriate
means.
The estimate was that it would ta'e two wee's to
concentrate the personnel and supplies. The Transport
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units were not in (reece at that time. The 5th -arachutist
1ivision was at the training centres in (ermany, with the
exception of one of its regiments.
"etween May 8? and l3, the air)elds and areas of
concentration were appointed for each unit. The
concentration was terminated by May lE. 0n May 8:
transport aircraft formations landed at the air)eld. 0n the
following day, May l9, the distribution of fuel for the
operations, to the various air)elds, was completed,
amounting to approximately <,C<C tons.
380. The plan of operations, under the code name
OM*+C=+NP, provided for the following, in general %
- (aining and maintaining air superiority.
- 0ccupation of the air)elds of Crete using
paratroopers and gliders with the main e$ort at Maleme.
- After the occupation of the air)elds, landing of
airborne mountain troops in order to complete the
occupation of the island.
- The troops in Maleme would be reinforced by sea
with units that would be transferred from the nearest
shores.
- The land forces would be reinforced by sea with a
strong echelon of artillery, tan's, vehicles and pac'
animals.
The airborne troops would operate in three assault
groups % (roup !est, (roup Centre and (roup *ast.
The (roup !est @code name O,0M*TPA, its strength
comprising the Assault +egiment minus two companies,
under the command of MaBor (eneral *ugen Meindl would
occupy the Maleme air)eld.
The (roup Centre @code name OMA+PA under the
orders of .t. (eneral uessmann, Commander of the 5th
Airborne 1ivision, divided into two echelons and assigned
to occupy the ectors of #ania-ouda and +ethymno--igi
air)eld, as follows %
The AG *chelon @Commander Colonel #eindrichA, that
comprised the <rd -aratrooper +egiment, two companies
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from the Assault +egiment and various other divisional
units, would occupy #ania and ouda.
The "G *chelon @Commander Colonel turmA, that
comprised the 3nd -aratrooper +egiment @minus the 22
"attalionA, would occupy +ethymno and the -igi air)eld.
The (roup *ast @code name O0+20&PA, its strength
comprising the 8st -aratrooper +egiment from the 5th
Airborne 1ivision @plus the 22M3 -aratrooper "attalionA,
under the command of Colonel "rauer, would occupy
2ra'lio along with its air)eld @air)eld of +oussesA.
The above (roup would conduct an assault on the
island in two waves, in two time steps. The )rst wave
would launch the assault with the O,0M*TP (roup and the
)rst echelon of the OMA+P (roup, at ?:?? hrs, on May
3?, 8948, against the air)eld of Maleme and the area of
#ania respectively. The second wave would launch the
assault with the "G *chelon of the OMA+P (roup and the
O0+20&P at 8E?? hrs on the same day, against the towns
and air)eld of +ethymno and 2ra'lio respectively.
The "G *chelon of the OMA+P (roup, after the
occupation of +ethymnon and the -igi air)eld, would have
to move towards ouda so as to lin' up with the AG
*chelon of the same (roup.
The O0+20&P (roup, after the occupation of 2ra'lio
and the air)eld of +ousses @2ra'lioA, would have to see' to
lin' up with the "G *chelon of the OMA+P (roup
@+ethymnoA and send patrols eastwards and southwards.
The phasing of the operation in two time steps was
imposed by the necessity for a better air support.
0n the )rst day, according to the (erman plan, the
air)eld and ports of #ania, +ethymno and 2ra'lio would be
occupied. 0n the second day, ouda would be occupied.
1uring the same day, units from the Cth Mountain
1ivision, that would be transferred by sea would land on
the area of Maleme as well as on other suitable coastal
areas, so as to complete the occupation of Crete.
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