G.R. No.

L-48050 October 10, 1994

FELICIDAD JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Zambales and REINO ROSETE, respondents.
Cesar E. Palma for petitioner.
Saturnino V. Bactad for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us the order of a regional trial court citing the final
decision of the city court previously dismissing her complaint for forcible entry, and on the basis
thereof, dismissed her petition to quiet title on the ground of res judicata. We summon the time-
honored remedies accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria or accion de
reivindicacion to resolve the issues presented in the petition.
It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No.
1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, with the
District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, alleging that
she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she instituted a
complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 926,
stating in pars. 2 and 3 therein that
. . . plaintiff is the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical possession of a certain
parcel of land situated at Lower Kalaklan, City of Olongapo, said lot being designated
as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision since 1961 and up to
the present time, until the day and incidents hereinafter narrated. . . . Sometime on
December 12, 1970, the defendant, without express consent of plaintiff and without
lawful authority, through scheme, strategy and stealth, forcibly entered a portion on
the southwestern part of Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, with the assistance of hired helpers,
started construction of riprap along the Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of
land; said entry was further augmented by removing plaintiff's chain link, fence with
galvanized iron posts embedded in concrete, likewise destroying plants introduced
by plaintiff by removing existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments thereon, and by
these actions, defendant started exercising illegal possession of said portion of land
which contains an area of 200 square meters, more or less.
1

On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4,
2
dismissed Civil Case No. 926 on the
ground that "it appears to the Court that the Bureau of Lands has considered the area in question to be
outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff. . . ."
3
The Decision of the City Court of Olongapo City became final and
executory on 30 April 1973 when the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Br.
3,
4
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and conclusions of the City Court holding that
appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient evidence to prove that the area in question was within
the boundaries of Lot No. 1641.
5

Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548
and issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol
who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had sold the property he was
occupying, including the portion of about 200 square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete.
Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who
repeatedly refused to comply with the demand.
On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No.
926, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages
against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete before the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and
Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0, alleging in pars. 2 and 3 therein that
. . . plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land identified as Lot
No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo Townsite Subdivision . . . covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. P-3259, issued by the Register of Deeds for the province of Zambales. . .
. Sometime in December,
1970, and until present, defendants, relying on an application filed on December 23,
1969, with the Bureau of Lands, however have squatted, illegally occupied and
unlawfully possessed the southwestern portion of plaintiff's above-described property
of about 200 square meters, then by defendant BEN BABOL and now by defendant
REINO ROSETE, the former having sold the entirety of his property to the latter,
including the portion in question. . . .
6

Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent herein)
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol did not file any
pleading.
In its Order dated 27 January 1978,
7
the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. 1,
8
sustained the
argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied.
9
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity of
parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final
and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. She argues that private respondent
Reino Rosete, who invokes the defense or res judicata, was never impleaded in the forcible entry
case, which is an action in personam; neither was he a purchaser pendente lite who, perhaps, could
have validly invoked the defense of res judicata. With regard to the cause of action, she maintains
that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely
concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of
title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land.
Private respondent however submits that there is identity of parties in the two cases since he is a
successor in interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the commencement of the first
action. On the issue of identity of causes of action, he simply states that neither of the two cases,
i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the subsequent petition for quieting of title, alleges a cause
of action. Thus, private respondent continues, both cases have to be dismissed.
Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the
following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court
rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a
judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of
subject matter and of causes of action.
10
The presence of the first three requirements and the identity
of subject matter in the fourth requirement are not disputed. Hence, the only issues remaining are
whether as between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0 there is identity of parties and of
causes of action which would bar the institution of Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without merit. We
have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only
substantial identity of parties.
11
It is fundamental that the application of res judicata may not be evaded
by simply including additional parties in a subsequent litigation. In fact we have said that there is still
identity of parties although in the second action there is one party who was not joined in the first action, if
it appears that such party is not
a necessary party either in the first or second action,
12
or is a mere nominal party.
13
Thus, Sec. 49, par.
(b), Rule 39, Rules of Court, provides that ". . . the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity."
In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in interest of
Ben Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. Hence, there
is actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties between the two actions. But, there is merit in
petitioner's argument that there is no identity of causes of action between Civil Case
No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession,
regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property.
14
Thus, "[t]he only issue in an action
for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de
facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of
the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not
be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror."
15
And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery
of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in
any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.
16

On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for "Quieting of
Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of
land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434
17
of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished
from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that
respondent Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given
possession thereof. Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.
18

The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado,
19
, decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law and has
preserved the age-old remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of
real property, namely accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where
the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer
(desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration
of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court;
20
accion publiciana which is a plenary action for
recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de
reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes thejus utendi and the jus
fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.
21
It is different
from accion interdictal or accion publicianawhere plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to
possess without claim of title.
22

In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed
area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she
expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she be declared the rightful owner and given
possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely alleged that she
was "the true, lawful (possessor) and in actual, prior physical possession" of the subject parcel of
land, whereas in Civil Case
No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of the parcel of land
"covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-
0 definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants therein notice of plaintiff's
claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to possess which is an elemental
attribute of such ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry or
detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the
right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who
has the right or title of ownership.
23

And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria,
24
even if we treat Civil
Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action different
from that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No.
926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for
recovery, or petition to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January 1978 of the then Court of
First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0,
and its subsequent Order denying reconsideration of the dismissal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately to the court of a quo and the latter
to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 2203-0 with deliberate dispatch. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concu

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J .:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an
area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the
province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land
was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT
No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27,
1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner
German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a
residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit
No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that
part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner
advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner
proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and
cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have
occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D.
No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the
Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of
way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner
deprived private respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing
and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the
rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and
intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass,
remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos.
316, 583, 815, and 1028.
1

On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible
entry.
2
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by
the Municipal Trial Court.
3

Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986, said
court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and
the Regional Trial Court.
4

The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at
the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an
action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.
5
Petitioner moved to
reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986.
6

Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when
it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer
and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.
7

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to
exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues
presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having
heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration
negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the
subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry
case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.
8

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were
ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable
possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees
twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title
to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror.
9
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has
in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he
is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic
action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of
self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code.
11
Such justification is unavailing because the
doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession
which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort
to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which
states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the
thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970
FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO VILLADELREY, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Godofredo F. Trajano and Rafael A. Francisco for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J .:
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and Federico
Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the crime of Grave Coercion, with which they
are charged, and sentencing each to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to pay a
fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the
principal penalty, as well as one-third of the costs.
As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the present case is this:
The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated a
parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote,
barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted by
the deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia.
and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is Felix
Caisip, one of the accused herein. Even before the occurrence of the incident
presently involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings and litigations
involving the complainant and her husband, on one hand, and the men of Hacienda
Palico on the other.
It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed an action with the
Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia.
over lot No. 105-A of Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated February 22, 1958, the
Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch as
Guevarra is not a tenant on the said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by
Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a resolution dated
April 10, 1958.
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino Guevarra in the
justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible entry, praying therein
that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot No. 105-A. After due hearing, the
said Court in a decision dated May 2, 1959 ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot and to
pay damages and accrued rentals. A writ of execution was issued by Justice of the
Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo of Nasugbu, which was served on Guevarra on June 6,
1959, and the return of which was made by Deputy Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of
this Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites among other things that
the possession of the land was delivered to the Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip, the
overseer, and Guevarra was given twenty days from June 6, 1959 within which to
leave the premises.
The record before Us does not explain why said decision was executed. According to the
complainant, her husband's counsel had appealed from said decision. The justice of the peace who
rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an attempt to appeal, which was
not given due course because the reglementary period therefor had expired; that a motion to
reconsider his order to this effect was denied by him; and that a second motion for reconsideration
was "still pending consideration," and it was October 19, 1959 when such testimony was given.
Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial Judge, added:
On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant and Caisip
regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following day June 16, 1959,
the complainant allegedly again entered the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be
driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the aforementioned incidents, Gloria Cabalag was
charged in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, with grave coercion
for the incident of June 15, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No.
968 (Exhibit "3"); and with the crime of unjust vexation for the incident of June 16,
1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 970. Both cases, however,
were filed only on June 25, 1959.
In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against Gloria Cabalag, were filed eight (8)
days after the incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy that both cases were on
motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation thereof provisionally dismissed, on
November 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, upon the ground "that the evidence of
record ... are insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." The decision of
said court, in the case at bar, goes on to say:
It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to remain in the
premises, Caisip sought the help of the chief of police of Nasugbu who advised him
to see Deputy Sheriff Aquino about the matter. The latter, however, informed Caisip
that he could not act on the request to eject Gloria Cabalag and to stop her from
what she was doing without a proper court order. Caisip then consulted Antonio
Chuidian, the hacienda administrator, who, in turn, went to the chief of police and
requested for the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief of police, acting on
said request, assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico Villadelrey, police
sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of the Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio
Bote-bote.
1

On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-A
which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to do
so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to stay there and that the crops thereon belong
to them. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the police, Caisip went to
his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local police, who were some
distance away, and brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was then in a squatting position,
to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand
and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held
her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged her northward towards a forested area,
where there was a banana plantation as Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun.
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!"
2
her neighbors, Librada Dulutan, followed, soon
later, by Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen why they were dragging her. The policemen
having answered that they would take Gloria to town which was on the west Francisca Andino pleaded
that Gloria be released, saying that, if their purpose was as stated by them, she (Gloria) would willingly go
with them. By this time, Gloria had already been dragged about eight meters and her dress, as well as
her blouse
3
were torn. She then agreed to proceed westward to the municipal building, and asked to be
allowed to pass by her house, within Lot 105-A, in order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the request
was turned down. As they passed, soon later, near the house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant
organization to which she was affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him,
whereupon, he went down the house and accompanied them to the municipal building. Upon arrival
thereat, Rojales and Villadelrey turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed. After being
interrogated by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon representations made by Zoilo Rivera, released and
allowed to go home.
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to the effect that, upon being asked
by the policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria, not only refused to do so, but,
also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the defense, she was arrested because of the
crime of slander then committed by her. Appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, moreover, testified that,
as they were heading towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria proceeded to tear her clothes.
His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the prosecution and found that of the
defense unworthy of credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which fully concurred in
this view, are "final," and our authority to review on certiorari its appealed decision is limited to
questions purely of law.
4
Appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1) in not finding their
acts "justified under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in holding that the 20-day period of grace
given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid
and lawful; (3) in finding that the elements of the crime of grave coercion are present in the case at bar;
and (4) in finding appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is clearly untenable.
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may
be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having
been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A,
complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 or within said period invade or usurp
said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda
owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not "repel orprevent in
actual or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation." They expelled Gloria from a
property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for
forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the
Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up to June 26, 1959,
and had expressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959,
without a judicial order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a crime in
the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which, appellants
claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly untenable, because:
(1) said period was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's representative, appellant
Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed
by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact,
remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or
his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to
its owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it,
does not constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been
sentenced to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they,
as the parties who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in
or to the standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor,"
5
and the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the
nature of necessary expenses.
6

It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal authority
therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law," (weeding and
being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will (stopping the weeding and
leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of
Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
7

Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining witness, he should
be acquitted of the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge, correctly observed:
... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the complainant,
unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were the ones who used force
against Gloria, and while the Court is also inclined to discredit the claim of the
complainant that Felix Caisip drew a gun during the incident, it sufficiently appears
from the record that the motivation and inducement for the coercion perpetrated on
the complainant came from the accused Caisip. It was his undisguised and particular
purpose to prevent Gloria from entering the land and working on the same. He was
the one who first approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and tried to prevent
her from weeding the land. He had tried to stop Gloria from doing the same act even
the day previous to the present incident. It was Caisip who fetched the policemen in
order to accomplish his purpose of preventing Gloria from weeding the land and
making her leave the premises. The policemen obeyed his bidding, and even when
the said policemen were already over-asserting their authority as peace officers,
Caisip simply stood by without attempting to stop their abuses. He could be hardly
said to have disapproved an act which he himself induced and initiated.
8

In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that the
latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction.
9

In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength
10
and
disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her sex,
11
were present, insofar as the
three appellants herein are concerned. As regards appellants Rojales and Villadelrey, there was the
additional aggravating circumstance of having taken advantage of their positions as members of the local
police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted out to appellants herein, which is the minimum of
the maximum prescribed in said Art. 286,
12
and the fine imposed upon them, are in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendants-
appellants. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
1

On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by
Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and
Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22
thereof.
2

The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the
pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and
children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at
Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire
said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero
as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of
reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows:
That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos
and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and
then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property,
there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide
and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is
passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is
about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is
about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through
the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the remises
and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in
February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went
to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway
making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses
along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed
her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway
was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D"
and "1-E") And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.
Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was
an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the
tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other
inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the
tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were
even lost. . . .
3
(Emphasis in original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress
and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight
Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.
4

Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to
the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding
damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which
disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The
Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five
Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral
Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the
appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.
5

On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
6
Petitioners
then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of
way to herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right
of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the
judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has
already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain
any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the
court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed,
by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an
appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief
other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any
argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that
is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views
expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate
court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing
or modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.
7

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred
in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial
legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages
was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.
Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action,
since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong.
8

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of
a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
9

In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
10
The underlying
basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely
because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
11

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or
loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no
cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong.
12

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not
only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.
13
If, as may happen in many cases, a
person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining
any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is
regarded as damnum absque injuria.
14

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of
private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In
order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There
was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
15

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes
in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
16
It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract.
The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is
confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their
favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private
respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their
act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been
sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners
is damnum absque injuria.
17

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure,
for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is
no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper
manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such
damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.
18
When the owner of property makes use thereof in the
general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same
as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the incovenience arising from
said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.
19

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will
lie,
20
although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded.
21
One
may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may
cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's favor. An injury or damage
occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an
individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.
22

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial
court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J .:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation,
which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady
of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake,
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction
by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation,
this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on
the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to
dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No,
TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued
on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as
the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that
"criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action."
2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision
4
affirming the questioned order of the trial court.
5
A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986.
6

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action.
7
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it,
including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
8
The
nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the
pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities,
pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims.
9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement
culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the
tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal,
also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening
which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves
as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the
same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year
after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which
utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected
galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy
seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above
it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to
deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions,
washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ...
10

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to
wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (
c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
11

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of
damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio,
12
the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party
who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be
liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject
of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges
that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no
pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa
aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary.
13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain ...
14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals,
15
this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an
acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano,
16
the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay
City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to
reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs.
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 168732 June 29, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G.MARUHOM, BUCAY G. MARUHOM,
FAROUK G. MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. MARUHOM, ROCANIA G. MARUHOM, POTRISAM G.
MARUHOM, LUMBA G. MARUHOM, SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G. MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN
G. MARUHOM, MOHAMAD M. IBRAHIM, and CAIRONESA M. IBRAHIM, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
Decision
1
dated June 8, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 57792.
The facts are as follows:
On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his
co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk
G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba G.
Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M. Ibrahim
and Caironesa M. Ibrahim, instituted an action against petitioner National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lanao del Sur.
In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of land
described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three (3)
lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and 23,191 square meters each respectively.
Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents knowledge and
prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein
underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by
respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself through a
memorandum issued by the latters Acting Assistant Project Manager. The tunnels were apparently
being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCORs
Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del
Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City.
On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for
a permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but
his request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives
and property. On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and
vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less pay damages.
Respondents further averred that the construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their
lives and properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. Further,
these illegally constructed tunnels caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock thereby
entitling them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the public good, NAPOCOR
must be held liable for exemplary damages.
Disputing respondents claim, NAPOCOR filed an answer with counterclaim denying the material
allegations of the complaint and interposing affirmative and special defenses, namely that (1) there
is a failure to state a cause of action since respondents seek possession of the sub-terrain portion
when they were never in possession of the same, (2) respondents have no cause of action because
they failed to show proof that they were the owners of the property, and (3) the tunnels are a
government project for the benefit of all and all private lands are subject to such easement as may
be necessary for the same.
2

On August 7, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying plaintiffs [private respondents] prayer for defendant [petitioner] National Power
Corporation to dismantle the underground tunnels constructed between the lands of plaintiffs in Lots
1, 2, and 3 of Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278;
2. Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiffs the fair market value of said 70,000 square meters of land
covering Lots 1, 2, and 3 as described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 less the area of 21,995 square
meters at P1,000.00 per square meter or a total of P48,005,000.00 for the remaining unpaid portion
of 48,005 square meters; with 6% interest per annum from the filing of this case until paid;
3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs a reasonable monthly rental of P0.68 per square meter of the
total area of 48,005 square meters effective from its occupancy of the foregoing area in 1978 or a
total of P7,050,974.40.
4. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
5. Ordering defendant to pay the further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
3

On August 15, 1996, Ibrahim, joined by his co-heirs, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of
Judgment Pending Appeal. On the other hand, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal by registered
mail on August 19, 1996. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a vigorous opposition to the motion for
execution of judgment pending appeal with a motion for reconsideration of the Decision which it had
received on August 9, 1996.
On August 26, 1996, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion withdrawing its Notice of Appeal
purposely to give way to the hearing of its motion for reconsideration.
On August 28, 1996, the RTC issued an Order granting execution pending appeal and denying
NAPOCORs motion for reconsideration, which Order was received by NAPOCOR on September 6,
1996.
On September 9, 1996, NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal by registered mail which was denied by
the RTC on the ground of having been filed out of time. Meanwhile, the Decision of the RTC was
executed pending appeal and funds of NAPOCOR were garnished by respondents Ibrahim and his
co-heirs.
On October 4, 1996, a Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed by respondents Omar G.
Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom,
Hidjara G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom asserting as follows:
1) they did not file a motion to reconsider or appeal the decision within the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of judgment because they believed in good faith that the decision was
for damages and rentals and attorneys fees only as prayed for in the complaint:
2) it was only on August 26, 1996 that they learned that the amounts awarded to the plaintiffs
represented not only rentals, damages and attorneys fees but the greatest portion of which was
payment of just compensation which in effect would make the defendant NPC the owner of the
parcels of land involved in the case;
3) when they learned of the nature of the judgment, the period of appeal has already expired;
4) they were prevented by fraud, mistake, accident, or excusable negligence from taking legal steps
to protect and preserve their rights over their parcels of land in so far as the part of the decision
decreeing just compensation for petitioners properties;
5) they would never have agreed to the alienation of their property in favor of anybody, considering
the fact that the parcels of land involved in this case were among the valuable properties they
inherited from their dear father and they would rather see their land crumble to dust than sell it to
anybody.
4

The RTC granted the petition and rendered a modified judgment dated September 8, 1997, thus:
WHEREFORE, a modified judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Reducing the judgment award of plaintiffs for the fair market value of P48,005,000.00 by
9,526,000.00 or for a difference by P38,479,000.00 and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00
subject of the execution pending appeal leaving a difference of 4,878,500.00 which may be the
subject of execution upon the finality of this modified judgment with 6% interest per annum from the
filing of the case until paid.
2) Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein petitioners Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom,
Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Portrisam G.
Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible from the awarded sum
of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to plaintiffs.
3) Ordering defendant embodied in the August 7, 1996 decision to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.
5

Subsequently, both respondent Ibrahim and NAPOCOR appealed to the CA.
In the Decision dated June 8, 2005, the CA set aside the modified judgment and reinstated the
original Decision dated August 7, 1996, amending it further by deleting the award of moral damages
and reducing the amount of rentals and attorneys fees, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein Appeals are hereby partially GRANTED, the Modified
Judgment is ordered SET ASIDE and rendered of no force and effect and the original Decision of the
court a quo dated 7 August 1996 is hereby RESTORED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is DELETED and the amounts of rentals and attorneys fees are REDUCED
to P6,888,757.40 and P50,000.00, respectively.
In this connection, the Clerk of Court of RTC Lanao del Sur is hereby directed to reassess and
determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by Plaintiff-Appellant IBRAHIM taking into
consideration the total amount of damages sought in the complaint vis--vis the actual amount of
damages awarded by this Court. Such additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
SO ORDERED.
6

Hence, this petition ascribing the following errors to the CA:
(a) RESPONDENTS WERE NOT DENIED THE BENEFICIAL USE OF THEIR SUBJECT
PROPERTIES TO ENTITLE THEM TO JUST COMPENSATION BY WAY OF DAMAGES;
(b) ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION BY WAY OF
DAMAGES, NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED ANENT THE VALUATION OF RESPONDENTS
PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF ITS TAKING IN THE YEAR 1978 TO JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF
ONE THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (P1000.00/SQ. M.) EVEN AS PAYMENT OF BACK
RENTALS IS ITSELF IMPROPER.
This case revolves around the propriety of paying just compensation to respondents, and, by
extension, the basis for computing the same. The threshold issue of whether respondents are
entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied by petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the underground tunnels were constructed
does not belong to respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents owned the
property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not extend beyond what is necessary to enable
them to obtain all the utility and convenience that such property can normally give. In any case,
petitioner asserts that respondents were still able to use the subject property even with the existence
of the tunnels, citing as an example the fact that one of the respondents, Omar G. Maruhom, had
established his residence on a part of the property. Petitioner concludes that the underground
tunnels 115 meters below respondents property could not have caused damage or prejudice to
respondents and their claim to this effect was, therefore, purely conjectural and speculative.
7

The contention lacks merit.
Generally, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court does not pass
upon questions of fact. Absent any showing that the trial and appellate courts gravely abused their
discretion, the Court will not examine the evidence introduced by the parties below to determine if
they correctly assessed and evaluated the evidence on record.
8
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases
brought to it from the CA is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being as a rule conclusive and binding on the Court.
In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence demonstrating grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA or to any other circumstances which would call for the application of
the exceptions to the above rule. Consequently, the CAs findings which upheld those of the trial
court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that its substrata was possessed by
petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains
the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to
respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he
can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
9
this principle was applied to show that rights over
lands are indivisible and, consequently, require a definitive and categorical classification, thus:
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while
the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because
he may interfere with the mining operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he
destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner go without
encroaching on each others rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the
sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be
half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be
either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and possession of their properties in the
event the latter are reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are characteristically
indivisible. For the loss sustained by such owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
10

Moreover, petitioners argument that the landowners right extends to the sub-soil insofar as
necessary for their practical interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory would limit
the right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility which such area offers to the surface owners.
Presumably, the landowners right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to
obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no
more interest protected by law.
11

In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property motorized
deep wells but were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction
and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents, therefore, still
had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the
construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was appreciated by the RTC as proof that
the tunnels interfered with respondents enjoyment of their property and deprived them of its full use
and enjoyment, thus:
Has it deprived the plaintiffs of the use of their lands when from the evidence they have already
existing residential houses over said tunnels and it was not shown that the tunnels either destroyed
said houses or disturb[ed] the possession thereof by plaintiffs? From the evidence, an affirmative
answer seems to be in order. The plaintiffs and [their] co-heirs discovered [these] big underground
tunnels in 1992. This was confirmed by the defendant on November 13, 1992 by the Acting Assistant
Project Manager, Agus 1 Hydro Electric Project (Exh. K). On September 16, 1992, Atty. Omar
Maruhom (co-heir) requested the Marawi City Water District for permit to construct a motorized deep
well over Lot 3 for his residential house (Exh. Q). He was refused the permit "because the
construction of the deep well as (sic) the parcels of land will cause danger to lives and property." He
was informed that "beneath your lands are constructed the Napocor underground tunnel in
connection with Agua Hydroelectric plant" (Exh. Q-2). There in fact exists ample evidence that this
construction of the tunnel without the prior consent of plaintiffs beneath the latters property
endangered the lives and properties of said plaintiffs. It has been proved indubitably that Marawi City
lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. Lake Lanao has been formed by extensive earth
movements and is considered to be a drowned basin of volcano/tectonic origin. In Marawi City, there
are a number of former volcanoes and an extensive amount of faulting. Some of these faults are still
moving. (Feasibility Report on Marawi City Water District by Kampsa-Kruger, Consulting Engineers,
Architects and Economists, Exh. R). Moreover, it has been shown that the underground tunnels
[have] deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and considerably reduced its value. On
March 6, 1995, plaintiffs applied for a two-million peso loan with the Amanah Islamic Bank for the
expansion of the operation of the Ameer Construction and Integrated Services to be secured by said
land (Exh. N), but the application was disapproved by the bank in its letter of April 25, 1995 (Exh. O)
stating that:
"Apropos to this, we regret to inform you that we cannot consider your loan application due to the
following reasons, to wit:
That per my actual ocular inspection and verification, subject property offered as collateral has an
existing underground tunnel by the NPC for the Agus I Project, which tunnel is traversing underneath
your property, hence, an encumbrance. As a matter of bank policy, property with an existing
encumbrance cannot be considered neither accepted as collateral for a loan."
All the foregoing evidence and findings convince this Court that preponderantly plaintiffs have
established the condemnation of their land covering an area of 48,005 sq. meters located at Saduc,
Marawi City by the defendant National Power Corporation without even the benefit of expropriation
proceedings or the payment of any just compensation and/or reasonable monthly rental since
1978.
12

In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property without expropriation
and devotes the property to public use, after many years, the property owner may demand
payment of just compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither convenient
nor feasible.
13
This is in accordance with the principle that persons shall not be deprived of
their property except by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of
just compensation.
14

Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon
the property of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The
manner in which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process
rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through
proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the
power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents property as this power
encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the
expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the
owner of the condemned property.
15
Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of
their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court
must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just
compensation and that there is due process of law.
16

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of the sub-terrain
portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must
be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground
tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive
them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment
of just compensation.
17
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion,
it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so
because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal
beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just
compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.
18

The entitlement of respondents to just compensation having been settled, the issue now is on the
manner of computing the same. In this regard, petitioner claims that the basis for the computation of
the just compensation should be the value of the property at the time it was taken in 1978. Petitioner
also impugns the reliance made by the CA upon National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals
and Macapanton Mangondato
19
as the basis for computing the amount of just compensation in this
action. The CA found that "the award of damages is not excessive because the P1000 per square
meter as the fair market value was sustained in a case involving a lot adjoining the property in
question which case involved an expropriation by [petitioner] of portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision
plan (LRC) PSD 116159 which is adjacent to Lots 2 and 3 of the same subdivision plan which is the
subject of the instant controversy."
20

Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss
21
and is
ordinarily determined by referring to the value of the land and its character at the time it was taken
by the expropriating authority.
22
There is a "taking" in this sense when the owners are actually
deprived or dispossessed of their property, where there is a practical destruction or a
material impairment of the value of their property, or when they are deprived of the ordinary
use thereof. There is a "taking" in this context when the expropriator enters private property
not only for a momentary period but for more permanent duration, for the purpose of
devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
23
Moreover, "taking" of the property for purposes of
eminent domain entails that the entry into the property must be under warrant or color of
legal authority.
24

Under the factual backdrop of this case, the last element of taking mentioned, i.e., that the entry into
the property is under warrant or color of legal authority, is patently lacking. Petitioner justified its
nonpayment of the indemnity due respondents upon its mistaken belief that the property formed part
of the public dominion.
This situation is on all fours with that in the Mangondato case. NAPOCOR in that case took the
property of therein respondents in 1979, using it to build its Aqua I Hydroelectric Plant Project,
without paying any compensation, allegedly under the mistaken belief that it was public land. It was
only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial use, that NAPOCOR recognized therein
respondents ownership and negotiated for the voluntary purchase of the property.
In Mangondato, this Court held:
The First Issue: Date of Taking or Date of Suit?
The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent domain is the value of the property
as of the date of the filing of the complaint, as follows:
"Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend
as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint. x x x" (Italics supplied).
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence,
many ruling of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the
time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the
institution of the action precedes entry to the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as
of the time of filing of the complaint.
The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property
as of the date it was taken and not the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
In the old case of Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled that "x x x the
owners of the land have no right to recover damages for this unearned increment resulting from the
construction of the public improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to Pasay) from
which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow them to recover more than the
value of the land at the time it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public improvements."
In subsequent cases, the Court, following the above doctrine, invariably held that the time of taking
is the critical date in determining lawful or just compensation. Justifying this stance, Mr. Justice (later
Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for the Court in Municipality of La Carlota vs. The
Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, "x x x the owner as is the constitutional intent, is
paid what he is entitled to according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as of the
date of taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is
not, however, to be despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law guarantees just
compensation. It would be injustice to him certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the
value of what was lost. There could be on the other hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in
the collection, the increment in price would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has
been committed is intended precisely to avoid either contingency fraught with unfairness."
Simply stated, the exception finds the application where the owner would be given undue
incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property
expropriated -- as for instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare as was in the case in Caro de
Araullo. In the instant case, however, it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been an extra-
ordinary increase in the value of the owners land arising from the expropriation, as indeed the
records do not show any evidence that the valuation of P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to
increments directly caused by petitioners use of the land. Since the petitioner is claiming an
exception to Rule 67, Section 4, it has the burden in proving its claim that its occupancy and use --
not ordinary inflation and increase in land values -- was the direct cause of the increase in valuation
from 1978 to 1992.
Side Issue: When is there "Taking" of Property?
But there is yet another cogent reason why this petition should be denied and why the respondent
Court should be sustained. An examination of the undisputed factual environment would show that
the "taking" was not really made in 1978.
This Court has defined the elements of "taking" as the main ingredient in the exercise of power of
eminent domain, in the following words:
"A number of circumstances must be present in "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must
be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant
or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property."(Italics supplied)
In this case, the petitioners entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made
under warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by
Proclamation No. 1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of ownership sometime in
1979, the petitioner flatly refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted that the property was
public land and wrongly justified its possession by alleging it had already paid "financial assistance"
to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. Only in 1990, after more than a decade
of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize private respondents ownership and negotiate for the
voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to
negotiations for the correct price was then executed. Clearly, this is not the intent nor the
expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale.
Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent domain.
Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover possession and petitioner filed its
Complaint to expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent
domain. Thus the respondent Court correctly held:
"If We decree that the fair market value of the land be determined as of 1978, then We would be
sanctioning a deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason other than for eminent domain
would occupy anothers property and when later pressed for payment, first negotiate for a low price
and then conveniently expropriate the property when the land owner refuses to accept its offer
claiming that the taking of the property for the purpose of the eminent domain should be reckoned as
of the date when it started to occupy the property and that the value of the property should be
computed as of the date of the taking despite the increase in the meantime in the value of the
property."
In Noble vs. City of Manila, the City entered into a lease-purchase agreement of a building
constructed by the petitioners predecessor-in-interest in accordance with the specifications of the
former. The Court held that being bound by the said contract, the City could not expropriate the
building. Expropriation could be resorted to "only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the
owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price." Said the Court:
"The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the building, as we have interpreted
it, is in force, not having been revoked by the parties or by judicial decision. This being the case, the
city being bound to buy the building at an agreed price, under a valid and subsisting contract, and
the plaintiff being agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as sought by the defendant, is
baseless. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the
sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price. There being in the present case a valid and
subsisting contract, between the owner of the building and the city, for the purchase thereof at an
agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation." (Italics supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner effectively repudiated the deed of sale it entered into with the private
respondent when it passed Resolution No. 92-121 on May 25, 1992 authorizing its president to
negotiate, inter alia, that payment "shall be effective only after Agus I HE project has been placed in
operation." It was only then that petitioners intent to expropriate became manifest as private
respondent disagreed and, barely a month, filed suit.
25

In the present case, to allow petitioner to use the date it constructed the tunnels as the date of
valuation would be grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or color of legal
authority or with intent to expropriate the same. In fact, it did not bother to notify the owners and
wrongly assumed it had the right to dig those tunnels under their property. Secondly, the
"improvements" introduced by petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no way contributed to an increase in
the value of the land. The trial court, therefore, as affirmed by the CA, rightly computed the valuation
of the property as of 1992, when respondents discovered the construction of the huge underground
tunnels beneath their lands and petitioner confirmed the same and started negotiations for their
purchase but no agreement could be reached.
26

As to the amount of the valuation, the RTC and the CA both used as basis the value of the adjacent
property, Lot 1 (the property involved herein being Lots 2 and 3 of the same subdivision plan), which
was valued at P1,000 per sq. meter as of 1990, as sustained by this Court in Mangondato, thus:
The Second Issue: Valuation
We now come to the issue of valuation.
The fair market value as held by the respondent Court, is the amount of P1,000.00 per square
meter. In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation,
as is the case here, a trial before Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present
evidence on the issue of just compensation. Inasmuch as the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function and factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case falls within the recognized exceptions,
which is not the situation obtaining in this petition, we see no reason to disturb the factual findings as
to valuation of the subject property. As can be gleaned from the records, the court-and-the-parties-
appointed commissioners did not abuse their authority in evaluating the evidence submitted to them
nor misappreciate the clear preponderance of evidence. The amount fixed and agreed to by the
respondent appellate Court is not grossly exorbitant. To quote:
"Commissioner Ali comes from the Office of the Register of Deeds who may well be considered an
expert, with a general knowledge of the appraisal of real estate and the prevailing prices of land in
the vicinity of the land in question so that his opinion on the valuation of the property cannot be
lightly brushed aside.
"The prevailing market value of the land is only one of the determinants used by the commissioners
report the other being as herein shown:
x x x
x x x
"Commissioner Doromals report, recommending P300.00 per square meter, differs from the 2
commissioners only because his report was based on the valuation as of 1978 by the City Appraisal
Committee as clarified by the latters chairman in response to NAPOCORs general counsels
query."
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed to show why it should be
granted an exemption from the general rule in determining just compensation provided under
Section 4 of Rule 67. On the contrary, private respondent has convinced us that, indeed, such
general rule should in fact be observed in this case.
27

Petitioner has not shown any error on the part of the CA in reaching such a valuation. Furthermore,
these are factual matters that are not within the ambit of the present review.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
57792 dated June 8, 2005 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J .:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private.
1
In the cases at bar, which have been
consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin
and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and
covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa
and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under
claim of ownership.
4
Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who
declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado,
nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos,
67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father.
5
Balbalio
presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964,
6
Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964.
7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
8

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded
on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the
land sought to be registered.
11
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and
recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.
12
In other words,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not
alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims
of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug
mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly,
American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug
mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14,
1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June
Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the
required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings,
geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June
Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in
1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots
6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of
Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines
of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private
properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this
court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United
States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands
had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that
could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public
lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public
domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith,
249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator."
(St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650;
655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right
of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right
of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as
after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a
vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with
the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in
the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner
is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the
mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good
as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements
of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even
the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is
obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be
deprived thereof without due process of law.
13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any
of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative
Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of
their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain.
14
By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or
the obtention of a patent over it.
15
As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had
the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is
not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves
had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier
alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
16
The trial judge, who had the opportunity to
consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was
not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave
abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis.
17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact,
Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below"
18
but she did
not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of
the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
19
Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each
other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely
mineral once the mining claims were perfected.
20
As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly
so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from
all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit
of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be
found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise
of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously
by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of
the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.