Chinese policy towards the UNPKOs during the Cold War era

A study of Chinese voting behavior

I. Introduction

These two sets of data provide sound indicators for assessing China’s overall
participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime since both reflect a political decision made
in Beijing. When the vote on a resolution is finally cast after behind-the-door
negotiations, all members of the UNSC can not only express their views on the document
presented before them by the show of hands but also in their public explanation issued
before or after the vote is taken. The P-5—China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the
United States—can thus qualify their support or abstention with a dissociating or
sympathetic comment rather than vetoing the adoption of the draft resolution.9 In
combination with its explanation of vote, China’s voting behavior on UNPKO can
therefore indicate its support for the U.N. peacekeeping regime as a whole

Beijing is well aware of the different levels of support that can be conveyed in the
U.N. Security Council: “In the course of consultations, though the countries
concerned had accepted some of our principal views or had deleted certain contents
at our request, we were still dissatisfied with the draft. Only after taking account of
overall interests did we decide not to veto the draft resolution but to abstain from
voting on it. Sometimes, even after the countries concerned had accepted all our
views, we still found the draft resolution unacceptable to us as a whole. Given the
fact that the countries concerned had agreed to our views, we decided to abstain
from vote.” See Ambassador Shen Guofang quoted in Shi Jiangmin, “Ambassador
Shen Guofang Speaks of ‘United Nations in New Century’ Held by
www.people.com.cn on 6 January,” Beijing Renmin Ribao (Internet-Version) in
Chinese, January 6, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0108, January 6, 2001.

ere is also a clear correlation between the decreasing number of civil wars and the
increase in UNmissions.
e number of UN peacekeeping operations has increased bymore than 400% since the end
of the ColdWar.
As this upsurge of international activismgrew in scope and intensity through the 1990s
and 2000s, the number
of armed conflicts has begun to decline
James Dobbins et al., “The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq”,
RAND Corporation, 2005; Andrew
Mack, “Peace on Earth? Increasingly, Yes”, The Washington Post, 28 December 2005.

See UNPKO fact sheet for statistics on personnel, contributions as of 2007

II. The Korean War

Some History
Between the Second World War and the end of the Cold War (from 1945 to about 1990),
there were over 100 major conflicts that took the lives of more than 20 million people.
Most were conflicts between sovereign States or former colonies. Many conflicts during
this period were evidence of cold war tensions between the world’s major powers—
particularly the former Soviet Union and the United States—and their allies. In many
cases, the United Nations was powerless to deal with these crises because the Security
Council (where China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States had 'veto power') could not agree on a course of action.

On a number of crucial occasions, however, the countries of the world turned to the
United Nations as a means for preventing conflicts from spreading and leading to direct
confrontation between the world’s so-called 'superpowers'. For instance, during the 1973
Arab-Israeli war, tension between the two superpowers escalated to the level of nuclear
alert. The UN Security Council demanded a cease-fire and UN peacekeepers were sent to
separate the warring sides and calm down the situation. From the Congo to Lebanon, UN
peacekeepers played this role repeatedly during the cold war.

Although the cold war was a source of international tensions, it also tended to keep many
potential conflicts 'on ice'. Once the cold war ended, new hostilities emerged, often
between different ethnic, racial or religious groups. Such hostilities erupted in civil wars
and international conflicts like those in the former Yugoslavia, and in parts of the former
Soviet Union, as well as in Africa. Decades of political oppression and neglect during the
cold war years led to the collapse and disintegration of some States, like Somalia, from
within. Tension in and between countries has also grown as the gap between rich and
poor has grown; and as people have become frustrated with undemocratic institutions and
violations of human rights.

After the Cold War

In the post-cold war period, countries have turned to the UN with new aims for
peacekeeping.
Rather than simply keeping fighting groups apart, UN peacekeepers have been called
upon to help former enemies work peacefully together in order to:
a. rebuild the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war, as well as
international conflict;
b. address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political
oppression.
Two examples—in Haiti and in the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia—demonstrate
how UN peacekeeping has attempted to translate these goals into action:

III. 1971 and the regaining of its lawful seat

IV. Voting behavior and support

A change in situation and perception in the international system made the decision of
Beijing to instead of opposing to the PKOS, gradually accept its relevance in the quest for
maintaining power interests in foreign economies. The decision changed from opposing a
UN manipulated by the US to one of supporting the UN in order to create the proper
conditions for economic development. The initiative to oppose any armed approach to
conflicts, an experience learnt not easily, was no longer practical for Chinese interests.
The Cold War
 V. Becoming the enemy

VI. Conclusions

China’s image, anti-hegemonist, and security concerns are obviously interrelated

and merge increasingly into one single concept in the Chinese discourse as attested by the
White Paper on “China’s Development Road.” Since Beijing realizes that its national
security
interests increasingly overlap with those of the international community, multilateral
security cooperation becomes more attractive. China’s embrace of multilateralism
will then not only enhance its image and reputation among developing countries but may
also increase its legitimacy to condemn U.S. unilateralism
Congo (July 1960) was the first examples when the UNPKO decided to be impartial.
That may be a consequence of the Korean War, US not directly involved.
Rhodesia and South Africa were the only two cases were mandatory sanctions during the
Cold War ( no such measures were taken during Korea)
Page159 2nd paragraph, divisions in the security council
The main reason behind the councils in ability to adopt enforcement measures during the
cold war era, as mentioned by many scholars, was the confront between the great powers.
[why? Korea?]
 The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 was the first conflict situation which China faced
just after a couple of weeks of its gaining membership to the UN. China, which had
looked to growing Indo-Soviet relations with apprehension, was further alarmed when the
two countries signed in August 1972 the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. On its
part, China had already moved closer to Pakistan, particularly since early 1960’s, partly
following the principle that “an enemy of my enemy is a friend”. Further, India being a
strong contender pf leadership among the Third World and a great power in Asia, China
had additional reasons to form an axis against India.
The evermore troubling Indo-Pakistani crisis, beginning in 1972 encouraged
China to start condemning India, saying it was a lackey of the USSR. When the war
broke out, Beijing extended full support to Pakistan’s claims. Greater parts of Beijing’s
statements at the UN were directed against India and the Soviet Union, accusing of
interference in internal affairs of Pakistan. In this way, it projected itself as the champion
of the principles of national integrity of all small and medium sized countries.
China’s representative at the Security Council, in collaboration with the US,
countered Soviet support to India on the conflict-situation. When Bangladesh applied for
membership to the UN, China exercised its veto power to block it, position which
maintained for four consecutive years to increase Pakistan’s leverage in the negotiation
with India and Bangladesh on POW case and outstanding issues (Choedon, 1990). Later
Beijing decided to ease its stand and Bangladesh gained its membership and also moved
towards normalization of relationships with both Bangladesh and India in order to win
them over from the Soviet’s influence.
Similarly Beijing’s policy towards the Arabi-Israeli conflict has been motivated
not only by its interest in establishing relations with Arab countries but also to prevent
domination of the region by a power hostile to it. The latter concern has been prompted
by its perception that the region was not only a crucial link in any attempt to encircle
China by an ambitious power but also a bridgehead for control of the intermediate zone
and to establish hegemony in Asia.
By the end of the 70’s, China’s obsession of Soviet influence in this region had
prompted China to approve the US policy, initiated by Kissinger, which resulted in the
Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. It is obviuos that China was
motivated, not by any progress made towards paving a path for settlement, but primarily
because of the dent it made on the Soviet position in the Middle East.

Policy towards UNPKO

China abandoned its long standing “non-participating” diplomacy on the
questions of UNPKOs. For the first time in 1982, it voted for the extension of the UN
Interim Force in Lebanon –UNIFIL- and UN Disengagement Observer Force –UNDOF-.
Since then, it has not only continued to vote for the extension but paid its apportionment
towards the expenditure on the UNPKOs. Beijing has not given any explicit reason for
the change in regard to what it used to call “principled stand”. The plausible explanation
seems to be that China has come to appreciate the usefulness of PKOS as interim
measures for maintaining international peace and security.

The UN operations timeline points 3 major missions during the period of 1971-1987.

UNEF II

Oct 1973–July 1979

Second UN Emergency Force

Egyptian and Syrian forces attack Israeli positions. As fighting between Egypt and Israel
reaches critical stage, Security Council demands ceasefire, sets up Second Emergency
Force. UNEF II stabilizes situation in Canal sector and Sinai, supervises disengagement
of forces and forms buffer between them.

UNDOF

June 1974–Present
UN Disengagement Observer Force
Uneasy truce on the Golan Heights after 1973 war is replaced by agreed disengagement
of Israeli and Syrian forces. Security Council establishes UNDOF to supervise
implementation of agreement and maintain ceasefire.

UNIFIL

March 1978–Present
UN Interim Force in Lebanon

Israel invades southern Lebanon in retaliation for Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO) raid launched from Lebanese territory. Security Council creates UNIFIL to
confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and
help Lebanese Government restore its effective authority in area.